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CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

BY DR. ADOLF WUTTKE,

LATE PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY AT HALLE.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY DR. W. F. WARREN.

OF THE BOSTON UNIVERSITY.

TRANSLATED BY

JOHN P. LACROIX.

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NOTE OF TRANSLATOR.

THIS second volume contains the first of the three forms under which

Dr. Wuttke treats of the subject-matter of Christian Ethics. It

embraces and occupies the entire ethical field. Its aim is to treat

each phase and bearing of the moral life from a normal or ideal

stand-point; in other words, to present the moral life as God

originally willed, and yet wills, that it should be. It involves in its

scope, therefore, all the essential principles of the system of the

author, and constitutes a whole in and of itself.

As to the scientific character of the work, and as to whether it

answers wants which are but very imperfectly met by any of our present

English treatises; in a word, as to whether the work of Dr. Wuttke

finds before it, in the English-reading world, a comparatively

unoccupied and yet very important field, I beg leave to refer the

reader chiefly and ultimately to the work itself, but also,

preliminarily, to the special introduction to this volume, for which I

am thankfully indebted to Dr. W. F. Warren, of the Boston University.

Frank and earnest words like these from this distinguished scholar and

theologian will, I am sure, not fail to arrest the attention of whoever

thirsts after clear and truly Christian views on the great problems of

human life.

J. P. L.

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INTRODUCTION.

No literature is richer in native productions in the field of Ethics

than the English. It probably presents more original, representative

systems of moral philosophy than any other. This at least would seem to

be the verdict of a distinguished French philosopher, and French

philosophers are not often afflicted with "anglomania" in any amiable

sense. In the nineteenth Lecture of his Introduction to Ethics,

Jouffroy pays this high tribute to his neighbors across the channel:

"How has it happened, you may ask, that all these moral systems, which

we have been considering, were of English origin? The explanation of

the fact is this very simple one, that moral philosophy, properly so

called, has been infinitely more cultivated in England during the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than in any other part of Europe.

In France, for example, the Cartesian era produced only one eminent

moralist, Malebranche; and Malebranche belonged neither to the class of

selfish philosophers, nor to that of the sentimental philosophers.

Cartesianism was followed in France, in the middle of the eighteenth

century, by a new philosophy, but this was the system of materialism in

metaphysics and of selfishness in morals; and called to choose between

Helvetius and Hobbes, I could not but prefer Hobbes. Much the same

might be said of the philosophy of Germany, which has always been more

metaphysical than moral, and has never exhibited any forms of the

selfish or instinctive systems, which have obtained such a European

celebrity as those of Hobbes, of Smith, and of Hume." That this

fertility of Anglo-Saxon mind in the department of ethical speculation

was not limited to the centuries named, is clear from the bulk of our

more recent ethical literature. Its full stream has never subsided, and

is to-day pouring on past Bain and Barratt, in England, past Hickok and

Hopkins in America.

But while this department of our literature is almost immeasurable, and

certainly invaluable, it is sadly deficient in works written from a

distinctively Christian stand-point. One large portion of our treatises

are purely philosophical. Another, perhaps still larger, wretchedly

confuse and mix up the ethics of philosophy with the ethics of

revelation. Scarce one author has attempted to present in an

independent scientific form the whole ethical system of Christianity.

It is much as if we had innumerable treatises on what is called natural

theology, but as yet not one on the doctrines of the Christian

Revelation. Didactic theologians have occasionally included in their

Bodies of Divinity a brief account of the "Morals of Christianity," but

thus far no one has yet done for Christian Ethics in our literature,

what Danaeus and Calixtus did for it in the Reformed and Lutheran

Churches of continental Europe. The Science of Christian Ethics is with

us almost unknown. Too many of our least suspected manuals, written by

honored and able evangelical divines, presuppose and continually imply

a Socinian anthropology, and a worse than Romish soteriology. [1]

Whatever may be the true explanation of this grave deficiency, it

certainly is not due to an oversight of the essential difference

between philosophical and Christian Ethics. Not a few of our

evangelical writers have pointed out the incompleteness and

comparatively imperfect basis of the former; but, with the exception of

Wardlaw, scarce one has done any thing to supplant or to supplement it.

John Foster, in the Fourth of his "Essays," has some excellent thoughts

on the impossibility of ignoring such revealed facts as Human

Depravity, Redemption, the Mission of the Spirit, Immortality, and

Future Judgment, in any comprehensive and thorough presentation of the

system of Human Duty. Richard Watson enumerates five grave mischiefs,

which result from the attempt "to teach morals independently of

Christianity." The writer of the essay on the Science of Christian

Ethics in the work, "Science and the Gospel," (London, 1870,) a writer

who acknowledges his great obligation to the lucid and admirable

Wuttke," calling him "one of the most deservedly distinguished

ethicists of modern times," "a Christian ethicist of superlative

merit," expresses this sentiment: "The propriety of discussing moral

questions apart from their natural and immediate implication with

Christian Truth, admits of the gravest doubts." Wardlaw goes even.

further and asserts that, "The science of morals has no province at all

independently of theology, and it cannot be philosophically discussed

except upon theological principles." Watson's final definition of the

relation of the two systems or methods is less extreme than this, and

accords very nearly with that given by Wuttke in section fourth of his

Introduction. [2]

But whatever may be thought of philosophical ethics, or of the exact

relation of the two branches to each other, no believer in Christian

Revelation can for a moment call in question the legitimacy of

specifically Christian Ethics. No Christian believer can possibly speak

his whole mind respecting man, the ethical subject, or God, the author

of our ethical relations, or our destiny, the result of our ethical

action, without stating or implying all the fundamental doctrines of

Christianity. Indeed, no man can elaborate any ethical system of any

considerable completeness without definite and most important

theological implications. As a matter of fact, most of our accepted

text-books are thoroughly Deistic. They give us not the Morals of

Christianity, or of Judaism, or of heathenism, but simply the ethical

system of Lord Herbert, or Theodore Parker. We are glad to possess

them, glad to see just what ethical consequence Deism carries with it;

nevertheless we must repudiate their claims to an exclusive occupancy

of the field, and especially their claims to represent the ethics of

Revelation. Their use in Christian schools is at least of very doubtful

expediency. Let every theological system, even those of the heathen,

develop its supplementary ethical system, only let it not attempt to

palm off its own ethical implication for those of wholly different

systems.

The value of any elaborate system of ethics is largely in proportion to

its fidelity to the theological views and principles of its author. If

we study an atheistic system, we desire to ascertain precisely what the

logical results of atheism are in the field of morals. This is the only

special benefit we can hope to gain from the study. So a modern Jewish,

Mohammedan, or ethnic system is valuable in proportion as it gives us

the true ethical results of the particular religion from which it

springs. Thorough ethical treatises are, therefore, to be welcomed from

whatever theological stand-point they may be written. If thorough, they

will serve the cause of truth. In the way of reductio ad absurdum they

will often evince the untenableness of the theological principles upon

which they rest. So far as they spring from correct theological

conceptions, they will mutually complement and confirm each other.

The same thing may be said of systems of Christian ethics written from

different confessional stand-points. Their value, too, is usually in

proportion to their logical consistency. One of their most important

uses is to throw light upon the necessary ethical consequences of their

respective types of doctrine. In this respect the most strictly

confessional are the most useful. In the interest of universal

Christian theology, therefore, we greatly desiderate a thorough and

active confessional cultivation of this field. The more clearly and

constantly conscious of his distinctive doctrinal stand-point, the

better service the author will render. Nothing is gained, much lost, by

mixing up essentially Romish and essentially Protestant definitions. In

like manner Augustinian ethics are as eternally distinct from Pelagian

as are the theological systems so named. If Methodist theology be true,

no consistent Calvinist can ever write a system of ethics acceptable to

a Methodist, and vice versa. Romanism, Calvinism, Lutheranism and

Methodism as much need distinctive treatises upon ethics as upon

Christian doctrine. Each has the same right to the one as to the other.

Nor will they thus aggravate and prolong the dissensions and divisions

of the universal Church; they will rather accelerate the coining of the

day when each great branch of Christendom will have matured its

distinctive thought and perfected its distinctive life, preparatory to

a higher and grander synthesis. Even before that day comes, each type

of ethical inculcation will have its essential and characteristic

excellences, and so effectively supplement all other types.

Especially welcome to the English reader must be a thorough scientific

presentation of Christian ethics from the Lutheran stand-point.

Hitherto none has been accessible. The whole theological literature of

Lutheranism in the English language is deplorably meager. Considering

the historic interest and present relations of this great Church of the

Reformation, the deficiency is almost inexplicable. In this country the

actual numerical proportions of the communion, its rapid growth from

immigration, the close affinities of its best theology and best life

with the dominant theology and life of the country, conspire to render

its teachings and spirit a study of great interest to every intelligent

American believer. Nor can the unedifying controversies and schisms

which have hitherto so excessively characterized the body, or even the

high-churchly self-complacency of such representatives as the author of

"The Conservative Reformation and its Theology." effectually prevent

the Christians of neighboring folds from cherishing a growing interest

in their ecclesiastical life, and in that of their confessional and

ethnological kindred in the Fatherland.

An English translation of Wuttke's great work on "Christian Ethics"

ought, therefore, to be warmly welcomed on many accounts. First, for

all the excellent reasons suggested by Dr. Riehm, at the close of his

special preface to Volume I of this translation.

Second, because as a work on Christian Ethics it will contribute to the

supply of what is perhaps the gravest and most unaccountable lack in

the whole range of English theological literature.

Third, because it will have a tendency to stimulate American and

English moralists to a cultivation of their science from evangelical,

and possibly from strictly confessional, stand-points.

Fourth, because by means of it the English student will now, for the

first time, have an opportunity to see in full scientific form the

ethical implications and inculcations of modern evangelical

Lutheranism.

For all these reasons, it affords the writer unfeigned pleasure to bid

the new-clad work God-speed, and to commend it to the faithful study of

all lovers of Christian truth and holiness.

Wm. F. Warren.

Boston University, School of Theology, October, 1872.

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[1] Twenty years ago, when a mere college lad, the present writer

addressed a letter to Dr. Wayland, respectfully and earnestly inquiring

in what way certain statements in his "Moral Science" could be

harmonized with evangelical views of human depravity. His answer was a

curiosity. I would give not a little to be able to present it here.

[2] See "Institutes," Vol. II, bottom of p. 474.

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CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

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SECTION L.

THEOLOGICAL Christian ethics, as distinguished from philosophical

ethics, has an historical presupposition--the redemption accomplished

in Christ. But redemption presupposes sin, from the power of which it

delivers man; and sin presupposes the moral idea per se, of which it is

the actual negation. Hence the knowledge of Christian ethics, as

resting on the accomplished redemption, presupposes a knowledge of the

moral state of man while as yet unredeemed, as in turn this knowledge

presupposes a knowledge of that ideal state of being from which man

turned aside in sin. Christian ethics has therefore a threefold state

of things to present:

(1) The ethical or moral per se irrespectively of sin,--the moral in

its ideal form, the proto-ethical, that which God, as holy, wills.

(2) The fall from the truly moral, namely, sin, or the guilty

perversion of the moral idea in the actual world,--that which man, as

unholy, wills.

(3) The moral in its restoration by redemption, that is, the

regeneration of moral truth out of sinful corruption,--that which is

willed by God as gracious, and by man as repentant.

These three forms of the moral or ethical stand, in relation to

humanity, not beside but before and after each other,--constitute a

moral history of humanity: the first stage is pre-historical; the

second is the substance of the history of humanity up to Christ; the

third is the substance of that stream of history which proceeds from

Christ and is embodied in, and carried forward by, those who belong to

Christ.

As in Christianity all religious and moral life stands in relation to

the redemption accomplished in Christ, that is, to an historical fact,

hence Christian ethics must also, under one of its phases, bear an

historical character. Man is Christianly-moral only in so far as he is

conscious of being redeemed by Christ; hence in this Christianly-moral

consciousness the above-stated three thoughts are directly involved.

Only that one can know himself as redeemed who knows himself as sinful

without redemption; and only he can know himself as sinful who has a

consciousness of the moral ideal. The classification of ethics here

presented is based therefore in the essence of Christian morality

itself. The first division presents ideal morality as unaffected as yet

by the reality of sin,--morality in the state of innocence; the second

presents the actual morality of man as natural and

spiritually-fallen,--morality in the state of sin; the third presents

the Christian morality of man as rescued from sin by regeneration, and

reconciled to and united with God,--morality in the state of grace. The

first part is predominantly a steadily-progressive unfolding of the

moral idea per se; the second belongs predominantly to historical

experience; while the third, as a reconciling of reality with the

ideal, belongs at the same time to both fields. The historical person

of Christ is, for all three spheres of the moral, a revelation of the

truth that is to be embraced; in relation to ideal morality Christ is

the pure moral prototype per se--the historical realization of the

moral idea; in relation to the moral state in the second sphere, he

manifests the antagonism of sin to moral truth, in the hatred of which

he is the object; in relation to the third sphere, he is the

essentially founding and co-working power, and manifests the antagonism

of holiness to sin.

To present distinctively-Christian morality alone would be

scientifically defective, as, without the two antecedent forms of the

moral, it cannot be properly understood. To present ideal morality

alone is the task of purely philosophical ethics,--usually, however,

instead of the proposed pretendedly ideal ethics, the result is simply

an artfully disguised justification of the natural sinful nature of

unredeemed man. The ideal morality of our first division is in itself

fully sufficient only for such as do not admit an antagonism between

the actual state of humanity and the requirements of the moral idea, or

who explain it into a mere remaining-behind the subsequently

to-be-attained perfection, instead of conceiving of it as an

essentially perverted state. The fundamental thought of Christian

morality is this, namely, that the natural man is not simply normally

imperfect, but that he is, guiltily, in an essential antagonism to the

truly good, and that he is in need of a thorough spiritual renewing or

regeneration. That this is the case is not to be proved � priori, not

to be developed scientifically, but to be recognized as a fact. With

the reality of sin the moral life becomes essentially changed, and an

ethical treatise which should make reference to sin only as a mere

possibility, as is the case with purely philosophical ethics, would,

for this reason, be insufficient for the actual state of humanity. The

history of humanity has become in all respects other than it would have

been without sin, and hence a complete system of ethics cannot have

merely a purely philosophical, but must have also an historical

character,--must grapple with the entire and dread earnestness of real

sin. If it ended at this stage, however, it would present but a dismal

panorama of woe, utterly unrelieved by a gleam of comfort. But divine

love has interrupted the history of sin by an historical

redemption-act, and founded a history of salvation inside of

humanity,--has given to man the possibility and the power to overcome

sin in himself, and to rise up from his God-estrangement toward the

moral goal. This is the third sphere, that of distinctively Christian

morality, which, while it has indeed its prototype in the ideal

ante-sinful form of morality, is nevertheless not identical therewith,

inasmuch as its actual presuppositions and conditions are entirely

different,--namely, no longer a per se pure, and spiritually and

morally vigorous, subject, and no longer a per se good, and, for all

moral influences, open and receptive, objective world, but, on the

contrary, in both cases an obstinate resistance; it is in both respects

therefore a morality of incessant struggle, while that of our first

division is rather the morality of a simple development;--it is also

not a mere pressing forward out of an, as yet, incomplete and in so

far, imperfect state, but a real overcoming of actual immoral powers;

and the earnestness of the morality, as well as of the ethical system,

rises in proportion as we more deeply comprehend the inner and

essential difference between the above-given three divisions of the

subject-matter of ethics, as well as at the same time their inner and

historical connection.

This our distribution of the subject-matter of ethics, though

manifestly very accordant with the Christian consciousness, has been

assailed on many sides; and especially have some writers manifested

great concern as to whence in fact we could have any knowledge of this

ideal and strictly-speaking non-realized morality. Such an objection

ought at least not to be urged by those who think themselves able to

construct a system, even of Christian ethics, upon the mere facts of

the consciousness, or indeed upon a basis purely speculative. But

certainly all who conceive of sin as a something absolutely necessary,

will of course have to regard our first division as a pure product of a

dreamy imagination; we contest, however, to writers holding such an

opinion; the right to deny to a system of Christian ethics--which is

throughout inspired with the thought that sin is the ruin of men [Prov.

xiv, 34] and an abomination to the Lord [xv, 9]--the privilege of

treating upon and discussing that which God, as holy, requires of his

good-created children. As to whether for such discussion we have also a

source of knowledge, will appear as we proceed.

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PART FIRST.

THE MORAL PER SE IRRESPECTIVELY OF SIN.

Introductory Observations.

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I. NOTION AND ESSENCE OF THE MORAL.

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SECTION LI. The Good.

THE moral idea rests upon that of purpose or end. An end is an idea to

be realized by a life-movement. Whatever answers to an idea is good

relatively to that idea. Whatever answers to, and perfectly realizes, a

rational, and hence also a divine, idea, is good absolutely. All divine

life and activity has a divine purpose; whatever God brings to

realization is therefore absolutely good,--is in perfect harmony with

the divine will.--A nature-object is good per se and directly, in

virtue of the creative act itself; and whatever is implied in it, as an

end to be attained to by development, is actually realized in fact by

an inner divinely-willed necessity. The essence of a rational creature

is per se likewise good; but its full realization as that of a truly

rational being, that is, its rational end, is not directly forced upon

it by natural necessity, but is proposed to it as to be realized by its

own rational, and hence free, activity. The goodness of a merely

natural being lies in the necessarily self-fulfilling purpose of God in

the creature; that of a rational creature lies in the free,

self-fulfilling, through it, of the will of God to the creature. The

divine will is, in the latter case, not merely an end for God, it is

also a conscious end for the rational creature. The good in general, in

so far as it is a conscious end for a rational creature, is a

(concrete) good. In as far as this good is unitary and perfect, and

hence perfectly answering to the divine will as to the creature, it is

the highest good,--which consequently must also be absolutely one and,

for all rational creatures, essentially the same, namely, their fully

attained rational perfection. Hence all rational development of a

rational creature aims at the realization of the highest good.

As far back as in ancient Greece, philosophers have engaged in the

discussion of the notion of the good, and of the highest good, and have

proposed various definitions thereof,--those of Aristotle being in the

main correct. In and of itself the question is quite simple; it becomes

difficult only when we look upon the actual condition of man without

fully taking into account the antagonism of his reality with his ideal,

and are for that reason unable clearly to distinguish in human

aspirations the abnormal from the normal. As to the notion of the

relatively good, there is no dispute; it is always the. agreement of a

reality with an idea or with another reality, and hence is based on the

thought of a mutual congruity of the manifold.--The simple and true

notion of the good is indicated in Gen. i, 3, 4, 31; [comp. 1 Tim. iv,

4]. God speaks and it comes to pass; the reality is the perfect

expression of the divine thought and will, and hence, of its own ideal.

We have here the notion, not merely of the relatively good, but of the

absolutely good; relatively good is every harmonizing or congruence of

the different; absolutely good is a harmonizing with God. Hence, first

of all, God himself is good and the prototype of all good [Psa. xxv, 8;

lxxxvi, 5; Matt. xix, 17],--good relatively to himself, as being in

perfect harmony with himself,--good relatively to his creatures, in

that He sustains them in the form of life which He gave them, that is,

in their true peculiarities and autonomy, and constantly manifests

himself to them as their loving God and Father [Psa. xxxiv, 9]. A

creature is good in so far as it is an image of God,--namely, such a

revelation of the divine as is conditioned by the normal peculiarity of

the creature,--and, from another point of view, in so far as its actual

state is in harmony with its essence, its ideal, and hence also (since

all creatures are created for each other) with the totality of

creation. Every thing that God created was "very good" also in this

respect, namely, that the different creatures constituted among

themselves a perfectly concordant and harmonious whole; "it was not

good that the man should be alone," seeing that a finite creature is,

in its very essence, not a mere isolated individual, but should

constitute a member of a community. Hence the expression tvv has also

the signification of kalos, gratus, jucundus, suavis; we attribute this

quality to an object as bearing upon ourselves in so far as it

harmonizes with and reflects our own peculiarities,--in so far as we

feel an affinity for it and are enriched and furthered by it in our

life-sphere and activity. Hence, that is truly good for man which

contributes to the attainment of his true, divinely-intended

perfection, and hence, in the last instance, this perfection itself.

Now, a mere nature-object possesses the good within itself as a

necessary law, and cannot but realize it; but a rational creature has

it within itself as a rational consciousness, as a free law, as a

command, and it may decline to realize it. In a nature-object the end

fulfills itself; in a rational creature it is fulfilled only by the

free will of the same. Nature-objects are, in and of themselves, an

image of God; but man was created not only in accordance with the image

of God, but also unto it,--has this image before him as a goal to be

attained to by free action, as a rational task.

Whatever is good is good for some object, and is for the same, in so

far as actually appropriated by it, a good. That only can be a true

good which is good absolutely, that is, divine; all true goods are

front God [James i, 17], and lead to God. The idea of the highest good

we propose here to determine, preliminarily, not as to its contents,

but simply as to its form. It cannot belong exclusively to any one

phase of man's being, but must consist in the symmetrical completion of

his life as a whole; hence it cannot be simply the perfection of his

isolated individuality as such, but only as a living member of the

living whole. Nor is the highest good a merely relatively higher among

many other less high goods, otherwise the sum total of the former

together with these latter would amount to something higher still; on

the contrary all goods collectively, as far as they are really such,

must be single elements of the highest good; and the simple fact that a

particular object which I desire, and which hence seems to me as a

good, is adapted to be a manifestation or an element of the highest

good, is clear proof that it is a real, and not a merely seeming, good.

Whatever a man aims after appears to him as a good; whatever he shuns,

as an evil; and rationality consists in the fact that he aim not at the

seemingly, but at the really, good, and, in each single good, at the

highest good; and this aiming is itself good. The highest good is,

consequently, the highest perfection of the rational personality, or

the perfect development of God-likeness, or, in other words, the

perfect agreement of the actual state of man's entire being and life

with his ideal, that is, with the will of God,--which all are, in fact,

only so many different expressions for the same thing. Whatever

contributes to this highest end is good; whatever leads from it is

evil.

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SECTION LII. The Moral.

In so far as a rational creature realizes the good rationally, that is,

with a consciousness of the good end, and with a free will, it is

moral. The moral is the good in so far as it is realized by the free

will of a rational creature; and. in this manifestation of rational

life, both the will, and also the action and the end, are moral; and

true morality consists in the complete harmony of these three elements.

Morality is therefore the life of a rational being who accomplishes the

good with conscious freedom, and, hence, works the harmony of

existence,--as well the harmony of its own being with God as also (and

in fact thereby) the harmony of the being in and with itself and with

all other beings, in so far as they themselves are in harmony with God.

Morality, therefore, embraces within itself two phases of rational

life: on the one hand, it preserves and develops the normal autonomy

and peculiarity of the moral subject,--does not let it vanish into, or

be absorbed by, God or the All,--for there is harmony only where there

is a distinctness and individuality of the objects compared; on the

other hand, it does not permit this difference to become an antagonism

or contradiction, but preserves it in unity,--shapes it into rational

harmony. The moral is therefore the beautiful in the sphere of rational

freedom,--is rationally self-manifesting freedom itself. To be rational

and to be moral is, in the sphere of freedom, one and the same thing.

Moralness bears the same relation to the goodness of mere

nature-objects, as conscious freedom to unconscious necessity. The

goodness of creatures is not their mere being, but their life, for God

whose image they are, is life; God is not a God of the dead but of the

living. Hence the goodness of rational creatures is essentially life

also, and in this life morality realizes the good. With this view of

morality we may properly enough speak also of a morality of God; the

fact that human morality is really a progressive development of the

image of God, even presupposes this; moreover the Scriptures positively

express this thought, and there is no good ground for explaining it

away. God is good [tvv] and upright; [ysr; Deut. xxxii, 4; Psa. xxv,

8]; hence our German hymn: "O God, thou upright God!") is strictly

Biblical. God, as the absolutely holy will, is perfect morality itself,

inasmuch as his entire being and activity are in perfect accord with

his will and essence, and inasmuch as his infinite justice and love

establish and uphold the harmony of life in the created universe. God's

morality is his holiness. For this reason God is also the perfect

prototype and pattern of all morality; "ye shall therefore be holy, for

I am holy" [Lev. xi, 45]; also virtue, arete, in the strict sense of

the word, is attributed to God [1 Pet. ii, 9; 2 Pet. i, 3]. Hence, man

is moral not merely in general, in that he makes God's will the law of

his life, but more specifically, in that he makes God's morality his

pattern. In God all good is also moral or holy; in the creature; all

that is moral is also good, but all that is good is not also moral.

Rothe objects to the more common notion of the moral, because it

embraces only the idea of the morally-good, but not that of the moral

in its secondary sense; in his view a definition of the moral should

include also the morally-evil. It is evidently proper, however, to

confine a notion primarily to the normal manifestation of its contents,

and to treat the contrary manifestation as an abnormal perversion.

Surely, for example, it would be too much to ask that the notion of the

rational be so conceived as to embrace also the irrational,--that of

organism, so as to include also disease. In fact the objection of Rothe

has weight with him, chiefly for the reason that, in his system, evil

is viewed not as a merely morbid phenomenon, but on the contrary as a

necessary transition-state of development; in which case, of course, a

definition of the moral would have to include also evil.

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SECTION LIII. The Moral. (Cont'd)

Though morality, as the free realizing of the good, appears essentially

in the sphere of the will, yet as this will is a rational one,--the

expression of a consciousness and of a love to the object of that

consciousness,--hence, morality embraces the whole life and being of

the spirit in all its forms of manifestation, as knowing, feeling, and

willing. Moral knowledge is faith, not only religious, but also

rational faith in general; moral feeling is pleasure in the good, and

love of it, and, on the other hand, displeasure in the non-good; moral

willing is a striving after the realization of the good. Morality

itself, however, is not one of these three, but always and necessarily

the union of all three of these phases of the spirit-life.

These three phases of the spirit-life are severally and collectively an

expression of the union of the subject with objective being, with the

All in general,--in the final instance with God. The subject itself

becomes also to itself an object, and only thereby attains to its

truth. The mere isolatedness of a being is per se evil, is the opposite

of true existence and life, the ruin of life, that is, death,--is a

dissolution of the unitary collective life into indifferent ultimate

atoms. The individual exists in its truth only in so far as it comes

into union with the All; this union is not its annihilation but its

preservation, its recognition in the All as an organic member of the

same; it is a mutual, vital relation, a unity in diversity; and this is

in fact the essence of life, namely, that both the individual being and

the collective whole, in all its parts, stand in relation to each

other, and that, in this relation, the individual is, on the one hand,

as a member, quite as fully at one with the whole, as, on the other, it

is an integral being of itself.

In actively knowing, man brings the object into relation to

himself,--takes it up, in its idea, spiritually into himself; in

feeling, the subject brings himself in this spiritual appropriation

into relation to himself,--embraces the appropriated object as in

harmony or as in disharmony with his own being and character, that is,

as pleasing or displeasing; in willing, the subject assumes an active

determining relation toward the approvingly or disapprovingly received

object; hence, the will rests on feeling, as in turn, feeling on

knowledge, though the latter may be obscure and only half-conscious. In

each of these three respects the spirit may be more or less free or

unfree; in so far so it is free, it is also moral. It is true, knowing

and feeling are primarily unfree,--they press themselves directly upon

the essentially passive subject without his voluntary co-operation, and

in so far as this is the case they are as yet extra-moral; but the

moment they appear as freely willed they enter into the moral sphere,

and this is their higher, rational form. Knowing is moral when we will

to know rationally, that is, when we embrace isolated being, whether

that of objective nature or of ourselves, as not existing for itself in

its isolation, but on the contrary, when, passing beyond its

isolatedness, we conceive it as having ultimately a divine ground,--in

other words, when we associate all individual being with the infinite

being and life of God, and thus conceive all existence as unitary and

as established by God. Now, this passing beyond the individual object

is not an unfree process; the object does not force us to do so, much

rather it arrests us at its own immediate reality; but it is our

rational nature that induces us to will to pass beyond. Knowing becomes

moral when it becomes a pious consciousness,--assumes a religious

character; and this pious associating of the finite with the infinite

is faith, which is in its very essence religious. Faith can never be

compelled by a presentation of arguments; in all its forms it is a

voluntary matter; and from the simple fact that faith is a moral

knowing, and hence includes within itself willingness and love, it is

consequently not a mere knowing, not a mere holding-for-true; hence it

may be, and is, a moral requirement. Without this willingness to find

and acknowledge the divine in infinite objects, there is no knowledge

of God, and hence no real rationality of knowledge. Though faith is

essentially religious, nevertheless, springing forth from this source,

it overflows and fructifies with its moral potency the entire field of

rational knowledge. By virtue of this faith we have confidence in the

truthfulness of the universe,--confidence that truth is discoverable,

that the laws of our mind and the impressions made upon us by the

external world are not untrue and defective, that divine order and

conformity to law, and hence conformity to reason, pervade the

universe, so that, consequently, we may rely on this order and this

conformity to law. Without such a faith, without such a confidence

independently of all presentation of evidence, there could be no

knowledge--no possibility of a spiritual life in general. Without this

confidence we would be unable to avoid suspecting poison in every cup

of water, in every morsel of bread,--we would tremble lest, at every

step, the ground might give way beneath our feet. Fondness of doubting

presupposes depravity; skepticism proper, like the arts of sophistry,

is an immoral dissolution of rational knowledge; under the skeptic's

eye, both the spiritual world and the realm of nature fall apart into

lifeless ultimate atoms.

In so far as feeling is simply a direct consciousness of such an

impressed state of the subject, it is as yet extra-moral, because

unfree; it becomes rational and moral through freedom on the basis of

the religious consciousness,--namely, when I do not permit myself to be

determined by finite things in an absolutely passive manner, but, on

the contrary, when I subordinate all my states of feeling to the power

of faith or of the religious consciousness,--in a word, when I rise so

far into the sphere of freedom as to have pleasure only in that which

is God-pleasing, and displeasure only in the ungodly,--when my love to

finite things is only a phase of my love to God.

The will, the more immediate sphere of the moral, is in itself likewise

not as yet moral, but must first become so. Free will, as distinguished

from the unfree impulse of the brute, is primarily as yet devoid of

positive contents,--is only the possibility, but not the actuality, of

the moral. It becomes a really free and, hence, a moral will only by

coining into relation to faith, namely, in that it ceases to be a

merely individual will determined solely by the isolated personality of

the subject,--for, as such, it is as yet simply irrational and

animal,--and furthermore in that it imbues itself with a positive

faith,--determines itself by its God-consciousness and by its love to

God,--so that thus, passing beyond mere finite being, it bases its

outgoings on a rational faith in the infinite. This is so wide-reaching

a condition of the moral will, that even an evil will (which also lies

within the sphere of the moral) is determined by a certain

faith-consciousness, seeing that such a will is a rebelling against its

God-consciousness; "devils also believe" in God's existence "and

tremble" [James ii, 19]; the degree of guilt is strictly determined by

the degree in which God is known. Hence the will is morally good when

it rests on faith,--when it strives to realize the God-pleasing because

of its God-consciousness and of its love to God; and it is morally evil

when, despite its God-consciousness, it aims at the ungodly,--seeks to

divorce finite beings, and especially its own, from its union with God.

Hence in general terms, though morality has its essential sphere in the

will, yet it also embraces, as intimately involved therein, the spheres

of knowledge and of feeling.

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SECTION LIV. The Moral. (Concl'd)

As the life of a rational spirit is continuous, namely, a continuous

free activity, hence it bears continuously a moral character. Morality

is not simply a succession of single moral points, it is an

uninterrupted life, and every moment of the same is either in harmony

or in antagonism with the moral end,--is either good or evil. In the

entire life of man there is not a single morally indifferent moment or

state.

Man is God's image only in so far as he lives this God-likeness, for

God is life, and all life is continuous; a real interruption of the

same is its destruction,--is death. Sleep is only a change in the

manifestation of life, arising from the union of the spirit with

material nature, but not a real interruption of the same. Spirit sleeps

not; also the slumbering spirit is moral,--may be pure or impure; the

soul of the saint cannot have unholy dreams; dreams are often unwelcome

mirrorings forth of impure hearts; when Jacob rebuked his son Joseph

for his supposed ambitious dream [Gen. xxxvii, 10], his moral judgment

was quite correct,--simply his hypothesis was erroneous. Ally

assumption that there are morally indifferent moments in life is

anti-moral. And that there are;, in fact, in the natural life of man

middle states between life and death,--for example, swoons,--is of

itself a fruit of depravity, and in the same sense that death is such.

Morality is the health of the rational spirit; and every interruption

of health is disease. God's will is incessantly binding; there is

absolutely nothing conceivable which would not either harmonize with,

or antagonize, it.

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II. RELATION OF MORALITY TO RELIGION.

SECTION LV. Relation of Morality to Religion.

The religious consciousness,--which expresses the conditionment of our

being and life by God, and which, as a state of heart, is piety,--is

necessarily and intimately connected with morality, so that neither is

possible without the other; yet they are not identical. Religion and

morality, both, bring man into relation to God. In religion, however,

his relation is rather of a receptive character,--he permits the divine

to rule in him; in morality he is more self-active, he reflects forth

the God-pleasing from within himself. In religion he exalts himself to

communion with God; in morality he evidences this communion by

developing the divine image both in himself and in the external world.

In religion he turns himself away from finite individuality and

multiplicity, and toward the unitary central-point of all life; in

morality he turns himself from this divine life-center as a basis,

toward the periphery of created being,--from unity toward

multiplicity,--in order to manifest the former in the latter. The two

movements correspond to the double life-stream in every natural

organism, and hence they are simply two inseparably united phases of

one and the same spiritual life; and the very commencement of spiritual

life involves the union of them both. In religion and in morality God

glorifies himself no less than in creation,--in religion for and in

man, in morality through man; and the moral man, in that lie fulfills

God's will in and for the world, actually accomplishes the divine

purpose in creation,--the free moral activity of man being, in fact,

the divinely-willed continuation and completion of the work of

creation.

The consciousness that we, as separate individuals, have no absolutely

self-sufficient and independent existence and rights, as also that we

are not simply dependent on other finite powers, but, on the contrary,

on an infinite divine first cause, is of a religious character; and the

spiritual life that develops itself on the basis of this consciousness

is the religious life. In so far, however, as it is a disposition or

state of heart, that is, in so far as it expresses itself in the

feeling of love to God and in the thence-arising habit of will, it is

piety,--in which form it assumes directly also the character of

morality. A pious life is per se also a moral one; and morality is the

practical outgoing of piety. Religion and morality are therefore most

closely and inseparably associated; as morality rests on the

recognition that the good is either the actual state or the final

destination of all existence, and as this recognition, even in its

rudest forms, is of a religious character (since the "good" can have no

meaning save as the divine ultimate destination of creation), hence

morality without religion is impossible, and its character rises and

falls with the clearness and correctness of the religious

consciousness. He who despises religion is also immoral; and the

immoral man is also correspondingly irreligious; all immorality is a

despising of God, since it is a despising of the good as the God-like.

As now, on the other hand, religion is a believing, and hence a free,

loving recognition of the divine, and as it places man in a living

relation with God, hence all religion is per se also moral, and

religion without morality is inconceivable.

Thus, whatever is moral is religious, and whatever is religious is

moral; and yet these two are not identical; every religious life

includes in itself a moral will, and every moral action contains a

religious element,--implies religious faith; "without faith it is

impossible to please God" [Heb. xi, 6]. This looks like a contradiction

utterly irreconcilable save by making religion and morality absolutely

one and the same thing. Things, however, that are indissolubly

associated, as, for example, heat and light in the rays of the sun,

need not for that reason be identical. In the religiously-moral life

two things are always united: our individual personality as a

relatively self-dependent legitimate entity, and the recognition of God

as the unconditioned ground of our entire being and life,--that is to

say, an affirming and also a relative negating of our separate

individuality, an active and a passive element. Both are equally true

and important; the one calls for the other, and either, taken

separately for itself, would be untrue; the two must exist in harmony

and unity. The passive phase--the emphasizing of the being of God in

the presence of which individual being retires into the background and

appears only as conditioned and dependent--is the religious phase of

the spiritual life; the active phase--that is, the emphasizing of the

personal element by virtue of which man appears, as an initiative actor

with the mission, as a free personality, of carrying farther forward in

the spiritual sphere the creative work of God--is the moral phase. The

religious life is, so to speak, centripetal; moral life, as radiating

out from the middle-point, is centrifugal; the former corresponds, in

the spiritual life, to the functions of the veins of the body; the

latter is more like the arteries, which, receiving from the lungs,

through the heart, the vitalized out-gushing blood, distribute it

nourishingly and productively through the body, and ramify themselves

out toward the periphery, whereas the veins conduct it back from the

outermost ramifications toward the center. In correspondence to this

figure, the separate outgoings of the moral life are more manifold than

are the center-seeking manifestations of the religious life. Hence

piety, by its very nature, tends to a communion of pious

life-expression, to the social worship of God; but in morality the

person comes into prominence more in his self-dependent individuality:

in the sphere of morality, moral communion rests more on the moral

individuals; in that of piety, the pious personality rests more upon

pious communion and upon the spirit which inspires this communion. In

the moral sphere, Christ says to the individual: "Go thou and do

likewise;" in that of religion he says: "Where two or three are

gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." Secret

prayer does not conflict with this, for it is only one phase of piety;

the piety of the recluse is simply morbid.

Religious life is only then genuine when it is at the same time also

moral,--when it does not in Pantheistico-mystical wise dissolve and

merge the individual into God; the one-sidedly religious life which

lightly esteems outward morality entangles itself inevitably in this

quietistic renunciation of personality. Moral life is healthy only when

it is at the same time also religious,--when the person does not assume

to live and act as an isolated being from an unconditioned autonomy of

its own independently of God; it is, however, as distinguished from the

religious life, essentially a virtualizing of liberty. The one-sidedly

moral life, that is, the attempt to virtualize personal freedom without

religion, leads to the reverse of the morally-religious life--to

haughtiness of personality as of an absolutely independent power, to an

atheistic idolizing of the creature, and, in practice, to a throwing

off of all obligation that conflicts with personal enjoyment. The moral

life is therefore true and good only when the virtualization of the

freedom and independence of the person is rational, that is,

essentially religious; and it becomes morally evil so soon as it

asserts its freedom as unconditioned and apart from God.

Piety and morality consequently mutually condition each other,--develop

themselves in no other way than in union with each other. It is true,

the first beginning of the religiously-moral life is, in so far; the

religious phase, as all religion rests upon a revelation of God to man,

that is, upon a receiving, and not upon a personal doing; but this

revelation is only then our- own, the contents of our religious spirit,

when we embrace it in faith, and this embracing is a free, a moral

activity. Hence even the first incipiency of the rational, the

morally-religious life includes in immediate and necessary union both

phases of the same, so that, though in logic we may speak of the one as

being; antecedent to the other, yet in point of reality we cannot so

speak. Should this seem enigmatical to the understanding, still it is

no more enigmatical than is the nature of all and every life-beginning;

and just as little as we can deny the reality of the beginning of man's

natural life, for the reason that it is absolutely hidden and

mysterious--so that we can neither say that the material being of the

same is antecedent to its spiritual power nor the converse,--even so

little can we hope to solve the mystery of the beginning of the

religiously-moral life, by assuming the one or the other of its phases

as the first and fundamental one. The plant, in developing itself out

of its embryo, grows upward and downward almost simultaneously; if it

is insufficiently rooted it fades; if it cannot grow upward it decays;

the sending out of roots corresponds to religion; the development into

foliage and fruit, to morality. Also in the further development of the

rational life these two phases are constantly associated, and in their

associated unity and harmony consists the spiritual health of man. We

are religious in so far as we recognize that God is the unconditioned

ground of our being and moral life; moral, in so far as by our free

life we confess in acts that God is for us the absolute rule of

action,--that we are free accomplishers of the divine will. In

religion, God is for us; in morality, we are for God; in the former God

is manifested to us; in the latter God is manifested in and through us.

"I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me" [Gal. ii, 20]; this is the

essence of Christian morality. "As many as are led by the Spirit of

God, they are the sons of God" [Rom. viii, 14]; that is, religion is

the vitality of morality, and morality the factive life-manifestation

of religion, and consequently of divine sonship. "Fear God and keep his

commandments, for this is the whole duty of man" [Eccl. xii, 13; comp.

Deut. x, 12]; hence the fear of God is the ground and beginning of

moral wisdom; "this is the fear of God, that we keep his commandments"

[1 John v, 3]. According to the uniform tenor of Scripture, religion

and morality go always hand in hand; this is aptly expressed by Luther

in his Catechism: "We should fear and love God, in order that," etc.;

the fear of God necessarily involves the keeping of the commandments,

and this fear is itself of moral character, as is implied by the very

word "should"; "if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door" [Gen.

iv, 7]. Hence the usual Scripture expression for morality is: "to walk

before God" [Gen. xvii, 1; xxiv, 40], that is, to act out of a full

consciousness of the holy and almighty One, in full trust and love to

Him; or: "to walk with God" [Gen. v, 22, 24; vi, 9], to "keep the way

of the Lord" and "do justice and judgment" [Gen. xviii, 19], "to walk

in God's ways," "to serve the Lord" and "to keep his commandments and

statutes" [Deut. x, 12]; and God's exhortation to the progenitor of the

Israelites is: "I am the Almighty God, [therefore] walk before me and

be thou perfect" [Gen. xvii, 1].

The glorifying of God in religion and morality is the completing of his

glorification in nature. In religion, God permits the man who comes

into living communion with Him, to behold his glory; in morality God

permits men to show forth his glory--to let their light shine before

others that they also may praise the Father in heaven. The will of God

in creation was not as yet fulfilled at the conclusion of the creative

act. "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness," --but this

image is God-like, not in its mere being, but only in its rational,

moral life. God created the world for rational creatures, in order that

for them and through them his image might be manifested in

creation,--that is to say, in the interest of moral development. Hence

sin is treachery against God, an infringement on his honor. Morality

looks to the honor, not of man, but of God; it is per se a serving of

God, and all divine service or worship is a moral act.

The relation of religion to morality is often stated quite differently

from the view here presented. The more important of these views are the

following four:

(1) Religion and morality are totally identical. In developing this

view, the one is necessarily reduced to the other. (a) Morality is

entirely merged into religion--the view of all consistent mysticism;

man has nothing to do but to give himself entirely over to God; and

wisdom consists not in acting, but, on the contrary, in renouncing all

practical activity (Eckart, Tauler, Molinos). (b) Religion is entirely

merged into morality. Morality is directly in and of itself true

religion; to be moral is identical with being pious; outside of virtue.

there is no piety which is not only not simply associated with virtue,

but which is not, in fact, itself virtue;--the view of the

worldly-minded in general, and, particularly, of the "illuminism" of

the eighteenth century.

(2) Religion and morality are in their entire nature radically

different, and hence entirely independent of each other; the one may

exist without the other. This is the view of all the naturalistic

systems of recent date. It is at once refuted by the simple fact that

the different religions have given rise to correspondingly different

systems of morality.--In approximation to this view, Rothe affirms

(Ethik, I, Seite, 191, sqq.) at least a predominant non-dependence of

the two spheres on each other.

His position is as follows:--Morality and piety, while not entirely

different, are yet relatively independent and self-based. Each has

indeed a certain relation to the other, and there is no morality which

is not, in some degree, also piety; both have the same root, namely,

the personality; but the two form, nevertheless, independent branches

strictly coetaneous. The consciousness of this relative independence of

morality belongs among the inalienable conquests of recent

culture,--namely, the consciousness that an individual human life may

be relatively determined by the idea of the moral, nay, even by the

idea of the morally good, or, more definitely, by the idea of human

dignity and of humanity, without at the same time being determined by

the idea of God,--and indeed in such a manner that it shall possess

this idea of the moral as not derived to it from the idea of God. The

Christian moralist cannot refuse to recognize this consciousness. The

misconception, that morality can rest on no other basis than the

religious relation, would at once vanish, could moralists determine to

keep distinct the moral sensu medio, from the morally-good. For, that

there can be moral evil on a basis other than a religious one, will of

course be questioned by none. It is true, when strictly understood or

comprehended, the idea of the moral cannot arise apart from the idea of

God.--These last two statements of Rothe undermine his entire position;

for the question here is not at all as to evil, but exclusively as to

the morally-good; and it is hardly possible that any one would argue

thus: Because evil can exist without religion, therefore also the good

can exist without religion. Moreover, in admitting that without

religion man can be morally-good only relatively, but not truly, Rothe

implicitly admits also that morality is in fact not a something

existing alongside of religion and in real independency of it;

consequently the above-assumed morality that is independent of

religion, is but mere appearance.

(3) Religion is the first, the basis, also in point of time; while

morality is the second, the sequence. This is the most usual, also

ecclesiastical, view; and as applied to Christian morality it is also

undoubtedly correct, since here the question is as to being redeemed

from a presupposed immoral state; in which case, of course, the

religious back-ground forms the basis of the renewal, from which, as a

starting-point, the moral will, in general, must rise to freedom.

Where, however, the moral life does not presuppose a spiritual

regeneration, there no moment of the religious life is conceivable in

which it does not also contain in itself the moral element,--thus

absolutely precluding the idea of a precedency of one to the other;

moreover, even in the spiritual regeneration of the sinner, the process

of being morally laid hold upon by the sanctifying Spirit of God,

issues directly into a willing, and hence moral, laying hold upon the

offered grace of God.

(4) Morality is the first, the basis, while religion is the second, the

sequence, also in point of time; the moral consciousness of the

practical reason is the ground upon which the God-consciousness springs

up;--so taught the school of Kant, and in part, also, Rationalism. This

view, in its practical application, coincides largely with that one

which merges the religious into the moral. It is true, appeal is made

to the passage in John vii, 7: "If any one will do his will," etc.;

here, however, the question is not as to the religious consciousness in

general, but as to the recognition of Christ as the Messenger of God.

But whoever purposes to do the will of God, must have a consciousness

of God already.

From the intimate unity of religion and morality, which we have

insisted upon, results readily the solution of the question, as to how

and whence we can have a knowledge of the moral condition of humanity

as pure and unfallen. The sources of a knowledge of religion are at the

same time, also, the sources of an acquaintance with morality; and

religion throws light not only upon what has transpired and now is,

since the fall, but also upon what preceded all sin. Thus we have for

morality in general, as well as for the consideration of morality

irrespectively of sin, the following sources of information:--l. The

rational, morally-religious human consciousness, both as it is yet

extant even in the natural man, and also, as it is enlightened by

divine grace in the redeemed.--2. The historical revelation of God in

the Old and New Testaments. Although as bearing upon the moral sphere

Revelation relates predominantly to the actual sinful condition of

humanity, yet it contains also, at the same time, the holy will of God

to man per se. The moral law of Christ, "Thou shalt love thy God,"

etc., is in fact absolutely valid, not only for such as are as yet

implicated in sin, but also for man per se, and irrespectively of sin;

moreover, it is not difficult for the Christian who has become

acquainted with the divine economy of grace to distinguish, in the

divine precepts, that which is intended for the chastening and

discipline of the sinner, from that which is morally binding per

se.--3. From the personal example of Him who knew no sin, from the holy

humanity of the Redeemer.--So much here merely preliminarily.

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III. SCIENTIFIC CLASSIFICATION OF ETHICS.

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SECTION LVI. Scientific Classification of Ethics.

The usual distribution of the subject-matter of ethics into the

doctrine of goods, of virtues, and of duties, does not answer the

nature of this science, as these are not different parts of the whole,

but only different modes of contemplating one and the same

thing,--modes which are so intimately involved in each other, that such

a classification inevitably involves, on the one hand, an unnatural

severing of the subject-matter, and, on the other, manifold repetitions

of the same thought. All the various articulations of this science into

the mere discussion of virtues, duties, and goods, according to the

different classes and subdivisions of particular virtues, duties, and

goods, come short of exhausting the subject-matter, and must therefore

involve the throwing of other important ethical considerations into an

introduction or some other subordinate position.

Among the various classifications of the matter of ethics, the

above-mentioned is in recent times the more usual; it is adopted by

Schleiermacher, though only in his Philosophical Ethics, and it is

applied by Rothe to Theological Ethics also. In both of these writers,

the importance of such a classification lies in the thought of the

working of reason upon nature, in which morality is by them made to

consist. The goal of this working, namely, the positive harmony of

nature and reason, is the good; the power of reason which works this

good, is virtue; the mode of procedure for working the good, the

directing of the activity toward it, is duty. [3] This view,

irrespectively of the so-strongly emphasized thought of Rothe, of the

good as a harmony of (material) nature and reason,--which is utterly

inapplicable to Christian morality,--is in fact valid also for

Christian ethics (Schwarz). In Christ's words: "Seek ye first the

kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things [temporal

goods] shall be added unto you" [Matt. vi, 33], are comprehended both

the highest good and the single goods, duty and virtue,--the latter

being embraced in "righteousness," though righteousness is indeed more

than virtue. There is a difference between the goal to be reached, the

way or movement toward it, and the power of the subject which

conditions this movement; still it does not follow from this that the

entire subject-matter of ethics can be organically and exclusively

distributed on this basis. The antithesis of duties and goods could be

most easily carried out, since the producing activity and the produced

result are clearly distinguishable. But even here the difficulty

arises, that true good, and hence, of course, also happiness (as

Aristotle very justly remarks), is not an inert result but an activity;

but every activity, if it is rational, must be the expression of a

moral idea, the realizing of a duty; so that we are brought to the at

first strange-seeming conclusion, that dutiful acting is itself a part

of the being and essence of the good,--is in one respect itself a good.

The family, the church, the state, etc., are goods; but these all are

conditioned not merely on dutiful acting,--they themselves are a purely

moral life,--consist, strictly speaking, in a collectivity of moral

actions, although not solely therein. If we once abstract these

actions, there remains neither family nor state nor church; these are

not mere empty spaces in which moral acting takes place, but they are

themselves incessantly generated by this acting, and without it would

not exist,--just as the fiery ring of a revolved torch is not an entity

per se, but exists alone by virtue of the motion. Hence the visible

embarrassment of the ethical writers in question as to where they shall

treat, for example, of family and political duties, whether under the

head of duties proper or of goods.--Still more embarrassing is it in

the discussion of the virtues. That virtue is per se a good, being an

end to be acquired by moral effort, is perfectly evident, and is so

admitted by Schleiermacher (Werke, III, 2, 459); also in the

above-cited utterance of Christ, righteousness appears as a goal of

effort, as an element of the essence of the kingdom of God [comp. Phil.

iv, 8]; we aim at virtue, and we possess virtues; but every possession

is a good. Now as goods are of course not merely objective,--as indeed

the highest good of Christians, the possession of the kingdom of God,

comes not with outward observation but is of a strictly inward

character [Luke xvii, 20, 21],--hence it is plain that virtue is also a

good; as indeed the kingdom of God consists "in power" [1 Cor. iv, 20],

and hence by its very nature includes in itself virtue. Hence the

doctrine of goods cannot be discussed without treating also of virtue.

On the other hand, a merely dormant power is in reality nothing at all;

the reality of a power is its outgoing,--the reality of virtue is moral

action, that is, the fulfilling of duty. It is not possible, therefore,

to discuss the virtues without at the same time treating of all the

duties, and vice versa. Hence the distribution of ethics

above-mentioned can be adhered to only so long as the discussion

lingers in generalities and avoids the particular.

Schleiermacher and Rothe, in fact, admit that the three divisions,

goods, virtues, and duties, are not, in reality, different parts of,

but only a three-fold manner of viewing, the same object,--yet in such

a manner that in each of the three the other two are included, if not

expressly, at least substantially. The doctrine of goods, of virtues or

of duties, embraces, either of them, according to Schleiermacher, when

fully developed, the whole of ethics (Syst., p. 76 sqq.). The

classification in question can therefore be carried out only by

arbitrarily leaving some of the divisions imperfectly discussed.

Particular goods, says Rothe, do not spring from the working of a

particular virtue and through the fulfilling of a particular duty, but

on the contrary no single one is realized otherwise than through the

co-working of all the virtues and through the fulfilling of all the

duties, and each single virtue contributes to the realization of all

the goods, and is conditioned on the fulfilling of all the duties, and

each particular virtue contributes in turn to every dutiful manner of

action (i, 202). Irrespectively of the fact that the latter

declarations are too sweeping,--seeing that, for example, the family

may often exist as a good without the virtue of courage, of industry,

etc., and that courage may exist apart from the fulfillment of the

family duties, etc.,--still it is quite evident that if either of the

three divisions in question were really and completely, and not merely

in general, carried out, there would remain nothing for the other

divisions save a few general observations. The family, for example, is

a good only in so far as it has domestic love for its basis, and, in

point of fact, Rothe treats of domestic love among the goods; but what

remains then to be said of it in treating of the virtues and duties?

The remarkable scantiness of Schleiermacher's discussion of duties is

itself evidence of an erroneous classification. And Rothe obtains for

his discussion of duties (in fact confessedly finds any occasion

whatever therefor) simply because, as he says, reference is there to be

had to sin, so that the discussion of duties becomes essentially the

portrayal of struggle. But this admission destroys the very basis of

the classification;--were it not for sin, a discussion of duties would

not be possible, whereas the basis of this classification has not the

least reference to sin. If Schleiermacher, after speaking, in his first

part, of chastity and unchastity, had then in his second part spoken of

chastity as among the virtues,--which his plan required of him, but

which he does not do--and in his third part fully discussed the duties

of chastity, then in order to carry out his classification he would

have had to reiterate the same matter three times.--Rothe speaks in

very strong expressions against those who do not adopt this

classification, affirming that all previous ethical teaching and

phraseology have been erroneous, and have ignored the fact that even

every-day parlance makes a difference between being virtuous and acting

dutifully;--as if common usage does not, just as frequently and just as

correctly, speak also of acting virtuously and being true to duty!

Oddly enough it seems, in the face of this so-deemed "imperishable

desert" of Schleiermacher in regard to this classification, that

Schleiermacher himself--clearer-sighted here than Rothe--does not apply

it to his own Christian Ethics; and not only that, but he even declares

it inadmissable here,--seeing that a description of virtue and a

description of the kingdom of God as the highest good, cannot possibly

be kept separate, inasmuch as virtue is simply a "habitus" generated by

the Holy Spirit as indwelling in the kingdom of God; nor can Christian

ethics, in his opinion, be treated under the-head of duties, seeing

that no one duty can be discussed save in and with the totality of all

the duties, and hence in connection with the idea of the kingdom of God

(Chr. Sitte., p. 77 sqq.). And the same might also be said against the

application of this classification to Philosophical Ethics.

If this classification of general ethics into the doctrines of goods,

of virtues and of duties, is practically untenable, much more is it

inapplicable to Christian Ethics, since it lacks one essential

Christian thought, that of the divine law. Schleiermacher presented no

discussion of the law, as he wrote wholly irrespectively of the idea of

God; and for this reason alone his classification would be inapplicable

to Christian Ethics. For duty is not identical with the law. The law is

objective, duty subjective; the law is the moral idea per se in its

definite form, as thought, as universally valid--the will of God in

general; duty is the subjective realization of the law for a particular

individual under particular circumstances,--relates per se always to

the strictly particular, the actual. The law is valid always, and under

all circumstances; duty varies largely according to time and

circumstances; the very same mode of action which is to-day my duty,

may be to-morrow, contrary to my duty;--to-day my duty is silence,

to-morrow I must speak. The law is categorical, duty is usually

hypothetical; the former is the expression of divine morality, the

latter of human. So also is the relation of goods to virtue; the former

are more the general, objective phase; the latter is more the

particular, personal, subjective phase; virtue is the subjective

possession of a moral power the product of which is objective good. In

the Old Testament the moral life-movement went over from the divine

objective will, namely, the law, to the human subject in order to bring

the latter into possession of the highest good; in the Christian world

the moral life-movement goes out from the subject as being already in

union with God, and already in possession of the everlasting good, and

directs itself to the objective realization of God-like being,--from

the inward possession of the kingdom of God to the objective

manifestation and realization of the same.

Of other scientific classifications, we will say but little. The older

popular division of the subject-matter of ethics according to the Ten

Commandments, was a form very well adapted for popular Christian

instruction, and, indeed, by giving a large construction to the more

immediate scope of these commandments, it admits of the treatment of

all evangelically-ethical thoughts: it does not, however, suffice for a

scientific development of Christian ethics, seeing that this series of

commands was constructed primarily for merely practical purposes; very

essential points, such as the moral essence of man and of the good, and

(as parts of the latter) of the state and the church, would have to be

thrown into introductory or collateral remarks.--The classification

according to our duties to God, to our neighbor, and to ourselves,

while in fact embracing the whole circle of duties, yet requires

likewise too much of the essential matter to be thrown into an

introduction.--Harless makes the divisions, the good itself, the

possession of the good, and the preservation of the good; but by "good"

he understands rather the antecedent condition than the goal of the

moral life; by "possession," more the obtaining and preserving of the

possession; and by "preservation," rather its actual manifestation.

This, as well as Schleiermacher's theological classification, relates

only to distinctively Christian ethics.--A very common classification

is, into general and special ethics,--the latter treating of the

special circumstances and relations of the moral life; but such a

system can be carried out without violence only when the first division

is reduced to a mere general introduction.

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[3] Schleirm. Syst., p. 71 sqq.; Grundlinien, 1803, p. 175 sqq; �b. d.

Begriff des h�chsten Gutes, Werke III, 2, 447 sqq. Comp. �. 48.

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SECTION LVII. Scientific Classification of Ethics. (Concl'd)

Morality is life, and hence, activity or movement, and more definitely,

rationally-free movement. Herein lie three things: the subject that

moves, the end toward which the movement goes out, and the

movement-activity itself. The subject goes out from its immediate

condition of being per se, through movement, over into another

condition which lies before it as an end. But the moral subject is not

a mere isolated individual; on the contrary, it is the freely

self-developing image of God as the primitive ground and prototype of

all morality, and it lives only in virtue of constant inner-communion

with God. The holily-ruling God becomes, as distinguished from man, the

eternal, holy proto-subject of the moral life; and there is no moment

of the moral life in which the human subject, strictly per se and

without God's cooperation, works the good.--The goal toward which the

moral movement directs itself is also of a twofold character. Man finds

himself already in the presence of an objective world different from

himself; and even where he makes himself his own object, this, his

reality, is, primarily, a gift conferred upon him without any moral

action on his own part; this conferred existence (world and self) is

the working-sphere of his moral activity--the most immediate object and

end of the same. But man is not, in his activity, to throw himself away

upon this objective world-to merge himself into it--but he is to shape

it by his own power, and in harmony with the moral idea,--to male the

possibility of the good into real good, to realize a spiritual end in

and through the objective world. Hence the goal of the moral activity

is to be considered under two phases: (a) As a pure object untouched as

yet by the moral activity,--as a mere platform, as material given for

the moral activity in order to be spiritually dominated by this

activity so as to become a spiritually and morally formed real good.

(b) This object itself as morally fashioned, as having become a

good,--existing primarily only as an idea, a rational purpose, but

afterward as a result of moral activity, as a fruit realized,--that is

the ideal goal proper, or the end of the moral activity. In the first

case, the object is, for the moral activity, a directly-given reality,

but it is not to remain as such; in the second case it is primarily not

real, but exists only in thought, but it is ultimately to become a

reality expressive of the thought.--The third phase of the moral

movement, namely, the moral activity itself, is, as spiritually free,

likewise of a twofold character; on the one hand, it is to be

considered from its subjective side, that is, in respect to how it is

rooted in the subject himself, and from him issues forth,--the

subjective motive of the moral activity, the source of the stream; on

the other hand, it is to be considered as a life-stream, sent forth

from the subject and directed upon the object,--that is, the activity

proper itself as having become real and objective in its progressive

development toward the attained goal in which it ends.

The subject-matter of ethics falls, therefore, into the following

subdivisions:

1. The moral subject, purely in and of itself considered.

2. God as the objective ground of the moral life and of the moral law,

and also as the prototype of the moral idea, and as co-working in the

moral life.

3. The given objective existence upon which, as material to be

fashioned, the moral activity exerts itself.

4. The subjective ground of the moral activity, the personal motive to

morality.

5. The moral working or acting itself, the moral life-movement toward

the moral goal.

6. The conceived object of the moral activity, its goal or end,--the

good as an object to be realized.

While Dogmatics sets out most naturally from the thought of God, Ethics

takes its start from man, the moral subject, inasmuch as morality in

its totality is simply the rational life-development of man,--God

coming into consideration here not so much in his character as Creator

as rather in that of a Lawgiver and righteously-ruling Governor. Should

we, however, divorce Ethics entirely from Dogmatics, we would, of

course, have to preface the moral discussion of man by a presentation

of the doctrine of God.

The idea of the moral subject, of the rational personality, is the

foundation-thought of ethics,--the root out of which all the other

branches spring. But man is a morally rational person only in so far as

he conceives of himself, not as an isolated individual, but as

conditioned by the divine reason and the divine holiness. Hence the

idea of the moral personality leads out beyond itself to the thought of

God, as the eternal fountain and the measure of morality, as the holy

and just Lawgiver; the prototypal relation of God to the moral has its

personally-historical manifestation in Christ, the Son of God; the

moral idea becomes in Christ an actually-realized ideal. The doctrine

of the moral law belongs not in the sphere of the human subject, but in

that of the divine, for the law is not man's but God's will.

In the notion of the moral subject considered as an individual being,

there lies implicitly also the notion of an objective world different

from the same. Morality, as active life, has this world before it as

its theater of effort; the activity in its outgoing comes into contact

with a reality independent of itself, which, though because of the

unity of creation it is not antagonistic to the subject, is

nevertheless primarily foreign to the same, and not in any wise imbued

with or dominated by it. But to be a spirit, implies in itself the

dominating of the unspiritual, the entering into harmony with all that

is spiritual. It is the task of the moral subject to bring about this

domination and this harmony. Moreover, in so far as man finds himself

in a simply given, and not as yet spiritually-dominated and cultivated

condition, he becomes to himself his own object, his moral activity

being directed upon himself.

The modifying activity as exerted upon this given existence is not,

however, of a purposeless character, but it has before it, in the

rational end, an ideal object the realizing of which is to be effected

by the activity as moral. In an ethical discussion which follows the

actual order of the moral life, this moral activity will have to be

considered first, although with constant reference to the moral end.

This activity, as a spiritual outgoing from the subject, has, on the

one hand, its fountain in the moral subject, on the other, it has also

a development-course as a stream. Each is to be considered separately,

so that we have here again two subdivisions. The consideration of the

subjective origin or ground of the moral activity--its motive,--has to

do with the why. The existence of the law and the encountering of an

external world by the subject, do not suffice to explain why man should

enter upon a course of moral activity; there must be found, as

distinguished from these, a motive in the subject himself that prompts

directly to moral activity,--that sets the subject into movement. The

mere "should" is not enough to move us; we may remain indifferent and

emotionless in the presence of every "categorical imperative" and of

every, however well-grounded, command; if there is not some impulse to

activity within us, all and every command will fall back powerless from

us; and this impulse must be of a rationally-free, a moral character.

The moral activity itself, which is occasioned by this inner motive, is

to be considered primarily only in its essence and in its general forms

of manifestation, and it involves only the general, but not the

special, discussion of the doctrine of duties. By far the largest scope

of special activity comes under the last division of our

classification; for the true essence and real worth of moral good lies

in the fact that it is not a dormant possession, but that, on the

contrary, it unfolds continuously new and richer life,--just as a

natural fruit is not simply a product in which the life of the plant

ends, but is also the germ of a new life;--with this difference,

however, that the fruit of the moral activity is not merely the germ of

a new life that simply repeats its former self, but rather of an

enriched, spiritually-heightened life. In the attained moral good the

moral life-movement rises to a new, higher circulation; the person in

possession of this good has become richer,--is a spiritually

higher-developed personality; the previously existing moral-subject has

become more exalted and spiritualized,--is, in fact, the already

attained moral good itself; and the moral activity gains thereby ampler

and more ennobled contents; with the acquired good springs up new duty.

In elucidation of the classification we have given, compare the

passages Deut. x, 12 sqq.; xi, 1 sqq.; xii, 1 sqq. Here we may consider

as the moral subject the people of Israel,--the moral mission and

activity of whom cannot possibly be understood save in the light of

their historically-moral peculiarity. Jehovah is the sovereign,

requiring moral obedience to his will; the people's sinful hearts [x,

16], the heathen country and inhabitants [x, 19; xi, 10 sqq.; xii, 2

sqq.], and the national life of the Israelites, form the sphere. the

theater, of the moral activity; thankful love to the merciful,

longsuffering God is the moral motive [x, 15, 21 sqq.]; willing

obedience, the walking in the ways of God, is the moral activity; and

the approbation of God and his blessings are the moral end [x, 13-15;

xi, 8 sqq.; xii, 7 sqq.].

In consideration of the thought that there lies at the basis of all

moral activity an end to which the activity directs itself, it might

seem more correct to consider this end, namely, the good, before

discussing the moral activity itself; however, on the other hand, as

the realization of the good presupposes the moral activity, and as we

are to consider the good not as simply conceived, but as realized, and,

inasmuch as out of the realization of one good a new field of moral

activity arises in turn before us, hence it is clearly more natural, in

fact, to place the discussion of the end or the good (as being actually

the last in the order of the moral development) in the last place; for,

it is in fact quite evident, that we cannot speak of the family, the

church, and the state, without having first examined the moral activity

per se. To begin with the discussion of the good would be the so-called

"analytical method," whereas ours, on the contrary, is the

"synthetic;"--the course of the former is, so to speak, retrogressive;

while the latter proceeds forward, more in the actual course of the

moral development, and hence is the more natural.

The first three subdivisions of our classification embrace, it is true,

only the antecedent conditions of the moral activity itself; but it

does not follow from this that their subject-matter is to be thrown

into an introduction. Free rational life, as an object of ethics,

cannot be treated as a mere activity without taking into consideration

also the active subject, as well as the law by which the subject is

governed, and the field upon which it acts; he who describes vegetable

life, must surely speak also of the organs of plants. In any case, a

controversy as to whether this consideration forms only an introduction

to the subject-matter, or is a part of the subject-matter itself, would

be very unprofitable.

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CHAPTER I.

THE MORAL SUBJECT.

SECTION LVIII. The Moral Subject.

THE moral subject is the personal spirit, in a stricter sense, the

created spirit. Between the different grades of spiritual beings, there

is, in respect to the moral life-task, no essential difference; and,

hence, for the individual spirit, the life-task never comes to a

definitive close. The basis of the moral life is the individual moral

person; but in so far as a plurality of persons constitute themselves

into a spiritual life-whole, such a collective totality becomes also

itself a moral subject with a peculiar moral task.

In the widest sense of the moral thought, even God himself, as the holy

One, is a moral subject. But in so far as ethics has regard not to an

absolutely infinite, eternal Being and life, but to a task

accomplishing itself in time, it considers only the created spirit as a

subject of morality. But all created personal spirits without exception

are moral subjects, and that too with an individual task that never

comes to a close; the blessed spirits, angels included, have not only,

like earthly men, constantly to accomplish morality, but so soon as we

leave sin out of view as an abnormal reality, their moral task is

essentially the same as that of man; and Schleiermacher is wrong in

limiting moral acting, and hence also ethics, to the, as yet, militant

life, and in excluding them from the perfected life of the blessed

(Syst., p. 51, 61). Unless we are to conceive the blessed as

spiritually dead, then they must have a life-activity answering to the

divine will,--that is, a moral one. Were this not the case, then

Christ's holy life would be moral only so long as he had to do with an

opposing world; and only the earthly, but not the glorified, Christ, as

also not the saints in heaven, could be looked upon as moral examples

for us. It is true, the manifestation-form of the morality of a blessed

spirit will be different from that of the yet militant; nevertheless

the essence remains the same.

The distinguishing of the moral collective subject from the individual

subject is a point of essential importance; for, the moral activity of

the two is by no means the same. For the member of a moral community,

there arise special moral duties that fall to him, not as a moral

individual but as an organic member of a whole, and which he is to

fulfill not in his own name but in that of the totality. The action of

the individual is, of course, the first, the presupposition of the

other; the moral community is always the fruit of a precedent moral

activity of the individuals,--is itself a realized-good, which,

however, at once becomes in turn itself a morally-active subject,

unless indeed it is to cease to be.

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I. THE INDIVIDUAL MORAL SUBJECT, MAN.

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SECTION LIX. Man as a Spirit.

Man as created after God's image is, as spiritualized nature, both

spirit and nature, and also the real unity of the two.

A. As a spirit he is a rationally-free, self-determining being,

attaining to his full, peculiar reality through free activity. The

basis and essence of this spirituality is personal self-consciousness.

Only in so far as man is self-conscious can he be moral, and by virtue

of this self-consciousness he is answerable for his life,--his life

becomes to him a moral one, and is counted to him. But he is conscious

of himself as a personal individual, that is, he distinguishes himself

from others not merely by his being, but by a to him

exclusively-peculiar, determined being,--by his peculiar personality,

which in this peculiarity does not belong to him directly from nature,

but is acquired only by personal, moral activity, and hence constitutes

character-peculiarity. The individual being of man is distinguished

from that of nature-objects by the fact that it has inherent in itself,

as an inner rational power, the destination not to remain a mere

individual unit, but to become a personality,--in a word, man is from

the very beginning not a mere specimen of his species, but is called to

become a peculiarly-determined being.

The Christian idea of man is summed up in the thought of the image of

God, and hence presupposes dogmatically the development of the idea of

God. The great emphasis which is laid in Scripture on this idea of

God-likeness [Gen. i, 26, 27; ix, 6; 1 Cor. xi, 7; James iii, 9; Col.

iii, 10; Acts xvii, 28, 29] shows of itself that we have not to do here

with a mere poetic figure. All that is created is good,--is an

expression of the divine will, and hence is an image of the divine

thought; but the rational creature, as the crown of creation, is the

most complete expression of this goodness,--is the image of God, bears

upon itself the most perfect impress of the Creator. Now as God is

essentially a spirit, hence, man is God's image more immediately only

as a rational spirit, whereas the body merely bears on itself, like

other nature-objects, the trace of the Creator, but not his perfect

impress, and it becomes an image of God only, mediately,--namely, in so

far as it is progressively transfigured by the spirit into its own

perfect expression. In the Scriptures Christ is called by pre-eminence,

the true image of God; but man is called to become like this image

[Rom. viii, 29]. Christ is this image not merely as the eternal Son of

God, but also and especially as the true Son of Man, who historically

and visibly reveals the divine [Col. i, 15]; and as such he is the

"first-born among many brethren."

The rational spirit stands in contrast to mere nature-existence. A

nature-entity determines not itself, but is determined by a

nature-force not lying within its own consciousness,--is even in its

activity predominantly unfree, whereas that which constitutes the

essence of spirit is, to be free, to determine itself in its

peculiarity, to be active toward conscious ends. The brute has not

purposes, but only impulses. There is indeed reason in the brute; the

brute does not, however, have the reason, but the reason has the brute.

The reason that is in nature is only objective rationality; whereas

spirit is a subject possessing reason as a consciousness. This

consciousness is rational, however, only as self-consciousness, wherein

man becomes to himself a real object,--comes into spiritual

self-possession, and in this self-possession distinguishes himself from

all other objective beings. By virtue of self-consciousness man remains

ever in the presence of himself, and at one with himself; and only in

virtue of this continuous sameness of the personal spirit, is it

morally responsible.

But a spirit is more than a mere numerical individual; nature-creatures

differ from others of their species, not by essential peculiarities but

by their mere separate being and by outward fortuitous

determinations,--are mere essentially-similar specimens of the same

kind, mere repetitions of the same existence. But each individual

personal spirit has, as distinguished from other personal spirits, a

determined peculiarity of its own, which raises it from a mere

numerical existence into a determined personality. In

self-consciousness man knows himself not merely as a man, but as this

particularly-determined man. He bears, therefore, a personal name, the

significance of which is, that it is his destination to be something

different from others,--to possess in his being something which others

neither have nor can have in the same manner. The name is, with man as

well as with God, an expression of personal peculiarity--of that which

inwardly distinguishes one determined personality from others [Exod.

xxxiii, 12, 17; Isa. xliii, 1; xlv, 3, 4; lvi, 5; John x, 3; Rev. iii,

5]; this personal peculiarity the spirit does not have from nature, nor

yet is it generated by merely natural development; but the child has

from the very beginning the capacity for, and hence the destination

unto, such a personality-constituting peculiarity; nor is this capacity

a merely conceived possibility, on the contrary it is a real germ; but

this germ can come to development only by moral activity. This germ of

personality which lies in the very essence of the rational spirit does

not contain within itself the determined peculiarity; it simply

requires development, but as to how, and unto what peculiarity it

becomes developed, that depends on the free moral activity of the

person himself. That this personal peculiarity does not come from

nature, but belongs to the life of the free spirit, is clearly implied

in the custom, prevalent among almost all nations and tribes, of

name-giving. Nature gives to man at birth his individual existence; the

spiritually and historically formed society, or family, gives to him

his personal name,--designating thereby either the goal of this

personality or its already acquired peculiarity [Gen. iii, 20; iv, 25;

v, 29; xxi, 3; xli, 51, 52; Matt. i, 25; Luke i, 60, etc.].

This thought of the moral quality of the personality is not so

uncontested as might be supposed. Schleiermacher, in his Philosophical

Ethics, [4] holds that moral individualities differ primitively, before

all moral activity, and hence do not merely become different. While

preceding moral systems, and especially that of Kant, either overlooked

the special peculiarity of the person, or even ignored it as something

illegitimate, Schleiermacher emphasizes justly enough the moral

significancy of this peculiarity, but lie also rushes to the opposite

one-sidedness, and magnifies the difference into a primitive,

determined, ante-moral one,--a sort of moral atomistics, which, in

order to escape the difficulty of the notion of free

self-determination, assumes a much greater incomprehensibility. In a

system, sprung up from essentially Pantheistic soil, this view is not

inconsequential, inasmuch as here the notion of a really free

self-determination is out of the question; but at the same time also

the notion of moral personality is precluded, and ethics is reduced to

a presentation, not of how man as a free individual should conform

himself to a moral idea, but of how he must develop himself in his

strictly naturally-determined idiosyncrasy. But a spirit that is

absolutely determined by the All (conceived here as strictly

impersonal) could not essentially differ from a mere nature-creature;

even brutes have unfree spirituality. We admit that men, even had they

not sinned, would not have manifested perfect similarity, but would

have been in some respects differently attuned from nature itself,--as,

for example, in the peculiarities of sex, of temperament and of

nationality, (see � 67,) but these natural differences affect not the

personal essence itself,--do not make of the individual a being

strictly personally-different from all others, but are only different

traits of entire clans or groups,--are not so much differences of

individuals as of races. The fact that in the present condition of

mankind, each individual has inborn within him the germ of determined

moral peculiarities, of particular vices and the like, is simply a

result of his illegitimate abnormal state, and is very far from

justifying us in merely cultivating and developing our inborn

peculiarities. But Schleiermacher is very erroneous when he regards

this original difference, even in spiritual and moral respects, as

something necessary and contributive to the aesthetic beauty of the

All,--as, for example, when he says: "Some [of the phases of humanity]

are the most sublime and striking expression of the beautiful and the

divine; others are grotesque products of the most original and fleeting

whim of a master-hand; . . . why should we despise that which throws

into relief the chief groups, and gives life and fullness to the whole?

Is it not befitting that the single heavenly forms should be glorified

by the fact that thousands of others bow themselves before them?

Undying humanity is unweariedly busy in reproducing itself and in

manifesting itself under the greatest variety of manner in the

transitory phenomena of finite life. Such is the harmony of the

universe, such the great and wonderful simplicity in its eternal

art-work. What indeed were the monotonous reiteration of a beau ideal

in which, after all, the individuals would be (time and circumstances

substracted) strictly like each other-the same formula with the

coefficients varied?--what were such a monotony in comparison with this

infinite variety of human peculiarities? . . . This individual appears

as the rude animal part of humanity, affected only by the first

infantile instincts of the race; that other one, as the finest

sublimated spirit, free from all that is common and unworthy, and with

light wing rising above the earth;--but all are there in order to show,

by their existence, how the various forces of human nature operate

separately and in detail." (Reden, 2 ed., p. 130 sqq.). Such language

outdoes even the Greek distinction of man into barbarous and free-men,

and is, as a consistent expression of a purely naturalistic view of the

world, in most direct antagonism to the Christian thought of a moral

world-order upheld by a holy God.--Rothe (Ethik i, � 120 sqq.) adopts

the view of Schleiermacher in a somewhat different, though less

consistent form.

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[4] System, p. 93 sqq., 157, 172; comp. Christl. Sitte, p. 58 sqq., and

Grundlin. einer Kritik, etc., p. 79 sqq. (2 ed., p. 57); Monologen, 4

Ausg., p. 24 sqq.; Reden, 2. ed., 129.

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SECTION LX. The Cognizing Spirit.

The self-conscious personality unfolds its life under a variety of

forms.--(1) Man is a knowing, a cognoscitive, spirit,--he takes objects

spiritually, that is, according to their idea, into himself, and thus

makes them his enduring possession. The object of knowledge is truth,

and the knowing spirit is capable of attaining thereto. Knowledge is in

itself true and does not deceive, for God's created universe is good,

and hence true and in perfect harmony with itself. As a rational

spirit, man knows not only the created world but also its divine

source,--in fact the essence of rationality consists in the knowledge

of God in his existence, his nature, his government, and his will. This

God-consciousness, resting upon a self-revelation of God to man, is

indeed, as finite knowledge, not capable of thoroughly comprehending

the infinite essence of God, yet, with a full consciousness of its own

limits, it is nevertheless a true, real, and well-grounded knowledge of

the divine, and as such it is the presupposition of morality.

The human spirit is an image of the eternal divine life, though in the

form of a temporal life. God, in his eternal life, is eternally

self-begetting, self-knowing, and self-loving,--absolutely his own

object; and the finite spirit, reflectively manifesting the

life-development of God, has a threefold object upon which its

life-movement is directed, namely, itself, the external world and God.

Man is God's image in this threefold relation,--in willing, in knowing,

and in feeling; but as, primarily, his reality is given to him, as

already existing without his co-operation, hence these three activities

appear in another and chronologically different order of succession, as

knowing, feeling, and willing. Thus the finite spirit knows (takes

cognizance of), feels (loves) and wills both itself, the objective

world and God; and, as the life of a created being is a progressive

development whose spiritual significance lies before it as a goal or

purpose,--as something not as yet fully real, but rather as to be won

by effort,--hence the threefold life of the spirit has also a threefold

end, namely, truth, happiness, and the good; and it is only in the

perfect attaining of this threefold end that the image of God in man

perfects itself,--that the highest good is realized. But as the

perfection of created things consists in the fact that they perfectly

correspond to the divine creative idea, so the perfection of knowledge,

feeling, and willing, and consequently of truth, of happiness, and of

the good, consists in their so relating to God that all finite objects

are known, willed, and loved only in God and as relating to him. God

himself is the truth, the good and love, and whatever falls under this

threefold notion, does so only in so far as it is rooted in and in

harmony with God.

Man, as created good by God, must have the capacity perfectly to attain

to this good state which is divinely proposed to him as his life-goal.

Hence his knowledge cannot be deceptive, but must have the truth as its

contents. The world would not be good, would not be in harmony, if the

intellectual images of objects in the knowing spirit were not true to

the originals,--if the thought as objectively real were essentially

other than the subjective one. What Christ promises to his followers:

"Ye shall know the truth" [John viii, 32], must also be fully

applicable to man per se; redemption is in fact essentially a

restoration of the lost perfection; God wills that all men should "come

unto the knowledge of the truth" [1 Tim. ii, 4]. The destination of man

to know the truth is expressed in Gen. ii, 19, 20. God brought the

beasts to Adam in order "to see what he would call them," that is, how

he would distinguish them from himself and from other objects,--form of

them a definite, generically-characterizing notion; the name is an

expression of the obtained notion;--and whatsoever he severally called

them, "that was the name thereof;"--this is not a mere experiment on

the part of God, but, on the contrary, a divine guaranty for the

truthfulness of human knowledge, and at the same time for the freedom

of the same. God himself brings before man the outer world; thereby he

guarantees to him that his knowledge is legitimate, true, and reliable;

and it is not God who gives names to the objects; man himself does it,

and freely; the knowing (taking cognizance) of the truth is a free, and

hence a moral activity; and this calling by name, this definite,

distinguishing knowing, is sealed by God as truthful,--"that was the

name thereof;" man's free knowing is not to be mere empty play, but to

have a reality as its contents; and the spiritual significance of

things is to find its goal only in its being spiritually appropriated

by man. Our knowledge of the objective world is not to remain a mere

sensuous beholding, as with the brute, but is to rise beyond that stage

into the sphere of ideas; this is for us a moral duty, and one which

has a divine promise. Thus the first man takes cognizance of, and

names, also the woman, his created helpmeet [Gen. ii, 23]; and Eve, as

well as Adam, recognizes the divine will and distinguishes it from her

own as owing obedience to the former [Gen. iii, 2, 3]; in the one case

as well as in the other, there is manifested at the same time a

definite self-consciousness as different from the objective

consciousness.

The relation of our knowledge to God is of course quite different from

its relation to the world. While all worldly being may, as created, be

also ultimately fully known and comprehended by man, on the contrary

the infinite and eternal being and essence of God is, for the

essentially limited human spirit, a thought never fully to be grasped;

and the incomprehensibility of God [Psa. cxlvii, 5; Isa. xl, 28; lv, 8,

9; Job xi, 8; Rom. xi, 33] is a Christian doctrine by no means to be

rejected. But this incomprehensibility does not preclude a very

essential and true knowledge, otherwise were all Godlikeness in man a

mere empty rhetorical phrase. Even as the eye is unable to take in the

entire ocean, and nevertheless has a very definite intuition of its

existence and peculiarities, so likewise is the finite spirit unable to

take in the infinite, to fathom it in its bottomless depths, and yet it

is able with constantly increasing clearness to attain to a true

knowledge not only of the existence but also of the nature of

God,--not, however, by means of the understanding, which relates to and

is exclusively occupied with the finite, but by means of the reason,

which relates essentially to the infinite. As all created being is a

reflection of God, and as man is his image, hence the type leads

directly to an (imperfect it may be, but yet) true knowledge of the

prototype [Rom. i, 19, 20; Col. iii, 10]. The assumption that man can

know of God only that he is, and what he is not, but not what he is, is

self-contradictory and unbiblical; a merely negative knowledge is no

knowledge at all, and of that of whose nature I know nothing I cannot

affirm even, that it is. The Evangelical Church very strongly

emphasizes primitive man's capability of attaining to a knowledge of

the truth, even in relation to the divine nature; the Apologia (i, �

17, 18) ascribes to him sapientia et notitia dei certior, "a correct

and clear knowledge of God." Skepticism may readily find excuse for

itself outside of Christianity, but what holds good of man as estranged

from God, does not hold equally of him who is in communion with that

God who is himself the truth; and hence within the Christian world,

skepticism has no longer any reason of existence. Also the assertion of

Kant, that the object per se remains hidden from human knowledge, and

that all knowledge of reality has, in the sphere of pure reason, only a

formal and subjective validity, is in direct contradiction to the

Christian world-view, which expresses a much greater confidence in the

harmony of the universe. The perfect man and the Christian can do more

than "conjecture and presume;" for, "the spirit of man is the candle of

the Lord" [Prov. xx, 27].--That man's first God-consciousness should

rest on an objective self-revelation of God, was a necessary condition

to his spiritual education toward finding the truth for himself.

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SECTION LXI. The Volitionating Spirit, Freedom of Will.

(2) Man is a willing, a volitionating, spirit; the goal of his

life-movement is for him a conscious end. He is not impelled

unconsciously and by extraneous force toward that to which he is to

attain, but he knows the end, and himself directs himself toward

it,--he chooses the known goal by virtue of a personal

will-determination,--that is, in his willing he is free. The end of

rational willing is the good, and, in so far as this is to be realized

by freedom, the morally-good. That which in nature-objects takes place

by necessity, becomes, in the sphere of the moral will, a "should;"

that which in the former case is natural law, becomes here a moral

precept; that which is there natural development, becomes here moral

life. But the will of the created spirit differs from the prototypal

will of God by the fact that its development in time is not

unconditioned, but is always conditioned on free self-determination, so

that consequently there exists the possibility of another

self-determination than that toward the true end,--that is, in a word,

by the fact that man's freedom of will, as distinguished from the

divine (which is, at the same time, eternal necessity), is freedom of

choice--liberum arbitrium. The finite spirit can, and should, attain to

the good as the purpose of its life, but it can also--what it should

not do--turn away from this good; and it attains to the good only when

it freely wills to attain to it. Man, as created good, has this freedom

in the highest degree, so that it is not limited or trammeled by any

tendency to evil inherent in his natural non-perfection, as, for

example, by his sensuousness. It is incumbent upon ethics to describe

and explain the development of the natural freedom of the, as yet,

undetermined will, into the moral freedom of the holy will.

The moral freedom of the will is distinctly presupposed in the Biblical

account of primitive man. "And the Lord God commanded the man, saying,

Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of

the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it" [Gen. ii, 16,

17]. God's injunction addresses itself to the free will of man, and

requires of him moral obedience. When, now, man nevertheless actually

did that which was forbidden, he simply did the opposite of what God's

holy will was; and he thereby demonstrated in fact, though to his ruin,

the reality of human freedom of choice. Scripture knows absolutely

nothing of any other view of the true nature of man than that he was

capable of freely choosing good or evil. For this idea of freedom of

choice, however, Scripture has no specific expression; for eleutheros,

eleutheria, originally used in a legal sense, designate the condition

of mall as emancipated by Christ; the idea of man's freedom of choice

is expressed rather as a "choosing between good and evil;" for example,

in Isa. vii, 15, 16, where the time of the spiritual maturity of a man

is called the time when he "shall know to refuse the evil and choose

the good" [comp. Deut. xi, 26 sqq.], or when he can do "according to

his pleasure" [Esth. i, 8], or that which is "good in his own eyes"

[Gen. xvi, 6; xix, 8]. The view of freedom of choice as presented in

the book of Sirach xv, 14, holds good in its full sense evidently only

of man as free from the bondage of sin. In the New Testament, man's

freedom of choice is implied by thelein (for example, in Matt. xxiii,

37; whereas the "power over one's own will" mentioned in 1 Cor. vii, 37

refers more to our moral discretion).

In the Christian church the full moral freedom of choice of man before

the fall, has been uniformly admitted; and the notion that human

actions are necessarily determined, just as uniformly rejected [comp.

Apol. i, p. 52, 53; Form. Conc. ii, p. 580, 677]. The "supralapsarian"

predestinarianism of Calvin has never been ecclesiastically sanctioned,

nor in fact does even it deny freedom of choice as a principle, and

expressly, but only actually. Entirely different from this teaching of

Calvin is the fundamental denial of freedom of will in all Pantheistic

systems since Spinoza. In Pantheism there is no place for freedom, and

what appears there under this name is something entirely different from

that which the consciousness of all nations understands thereby. Where

conscious spirit is not the ground, but simply a product of the

collective development of the All, there the individual spirit is in

its entire existence, essence, and life, absolutely determined; and its

single life-manifestations are quite as absolutely determined as is its

being itself;--in which case the rational spirit can never have a

consciousness of freedom, but only a "sense of absolute dependence,"

and hence there can be no room for any moral responsibility. The

seemingly moral life is as immediate and necessary a manifestation of

the "all-life" as is the growth of plants, and it differs from the

nature-life only in the fact, that man has a consciousness of that

which he does necessarily, in fact, but which he fancies he does

freely. The will differs from unconscious nature-impulse only by the

consciousness which attends it, but it is, in fact, quite as absolutely

determined and unfree as is the latter. This view is expressed most

clearly, simply, and consequentially, by Spinoza; and it is neither in

the interest of clearness nor of scientific honesty, when more recent

systems, based on him, make free use of fair-sounding words about human

freedom. In essential agreement with Spinoza, Schleiermacher, in his

"Discourses on Religion," rejects the freedom of the will. The essence

of religion is a sense of the absolute unity of the universe and the

individual existence,--a consciousness that our whole being and

activity are the being and activity of the universe itself, and are

determined thereby.--Schelling, who subsequently attributed to the idea

of the personal will a very high significancy, held as yet in his

"Lectures on Academic Study" (1803) to the unconditional necessity of

all apparently free phenomena. History is quite as fully an immediate

and necessary manifestation of the absolute, as is nature; men are but

instruments for carrying out that which is per se necessary, and they

are, in their reality and peculiarities, quite as fatally-determined as

the actions themselves. Actions appear as free or arbitrary only in so

far as man makes a necessarily-determined action specifically his own,

but this action itself, as well as its result in good or evil, and

hence also man in all his life-manifestations, is but the passive

instrument of absolute necessity; all that which is apparently free is

but a necessary expression of the eternal order of things. Subsequently

(1809), Schelling sought to rise above Pantheism, and, in some manner,

to comprehend the freedom of the will, but he did not rise beyond

wide-reaching contradictions. The assumption of an ante-mundane fall

into sin was intended to reconcile freedom with necessity (Phil. Schr.,

1809, i, 438 sqq., 463 sqq.). On this we remark here simply, that from

an ethical stand-point it makes no moral difference whether free

self-determination is precluded, for our whole mundane life, by an

absolute natural necessity, or by a pretended ante-mundane free

determination of man himself, but of which he has not the least

consciousness. Where there is no continuity of the consciousness, there

is also no unity of the person; and a pretended free act which I am

supposed to have done, but of which I know absolutely nothing, is not

my act but is absolutely foreign to me; and a fettering of my freedom,

by a, to me entirely unknown, timeless act cannot be regarded from a

moral point of view as other than a simple being-determined by

unconditional necessity.--Hegel has left the idea of freedom, in many

respects, in great uncertainty; he is very fond of talking of freedom;

but his system itself is compatible only with a universal

all-determining necessity; freedom is nothing more than "the not being

dependent on another, the sustaining relations to one's self;" in its

full sense, however, this is true only of the spirit as absolute;

individual spirits are only transient manifestations of the collective

life, and are determined by the same.--More recent philosophy, wherever

it deviates from strict Pantheism, uniformly attempts to bring personal

freedom of will more clearly before the consciousness. There is here no

possibility of a middle-ground, and ambiguous rhetoric can no longer

deceive. Where God is not the infinite eternal Spirit, but comes to

self-consciousness only in man, there the thought of a real freedom of

will is impossible. The infinite domination of the All leaves no place

for the free movement of the individual spirit; the misused freedom of

a single creature would throw the collective universe into disorder,

for the unfree All affords no possibility of preserving moral order as

against the free actions of individuals. On this ground there remains a

freedom only for thoughtless contemplation; and this would then, of

necessity, lead to the ethics of an unlimited self-love which can seek

and find in the bedlam of individual wills nothing higher than itself.

Freedom is possible only where a free Spirit rules in and over the All.

The personal God is able, in almighty love, to create free spirits, and

to guarantee them in their freedom, namely, in that he lovingly

withdraws his direct activity from the sphere of will-freedom, and thus

preserves the created spirit in its spiritual essence which is freedom

itself; and such a God is able in the midst of the diversity and

multiplicity of free actions, and even of ungodly ones, to preserve the

moral order of the universe.

(The question of freedom of will has of late been much discussed,

mostly from the stand-point of recent philosophy and in relation

thereto. Daub: Statement and Criticism of Hypotheses Relating to

Free-Will, 1834; Romang: On Free-Will and Determinism, 1835 [starting

out from Schleiermacher's stand-point, he attains only to a semblance

of freedom]; Matthias: The Idea of Freedom, 1834; [since Hegel]

Herbart: On the Doctrine of the Freedom of the Human Will, 1836

[critical, rather than furnishing new matter]; Vatke; Passavant: On the

Freedom of the Will, 1835; K. Ph. Fischer, in Fichte's Zeitschrift,

iii, 101; ix, 79; Zeller, in the Theologische Jahrb�cher, 1846; and

others).

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SECTION LXII. The Feeling Spirit.

(3) Man is a feeling, a sensitive, spirit,--becomes conscious of

himself as standing in harmony with, or in antagonist to, other being;

and, inasmuch as in the primitive unperverted creation, goodness, and

hence harmony, is an essential quality, and a real disharmony therein

inconceivable, hence while man--as self-developing, that is, as seeking

after an, as yet, unrealized goal--has a consciousness of something yet

lacking to his ultimate perfection, still he knows nothing of any real

antagonism of existence, and hence he has no feeling of pain, but only

of joy in existence, arising from his consciousness of an undisturbed

harmony of universal existence with his own. personality,--that is, in

a word, the feeling of happiness. In so far as this feeling expresses

at the same time the recognition of this existence in its peculiar

reality, it is love. Bliss and love to God and to his works are not two

different things, but only two different phases of the same spiritual

life-manifestation,--the former being rather the subjective, the latter

the objective phase,--inasmuch as in bliss and love man is, in fact,

perfectly at one with the objective universe.

Feeling is not peculiar to the rational spirit; it becomes rational

only in so far as it is an expression of self-consciousness; and as

self-consciousness is rational only in being a consciousness not of

mere individual being but also of a Godlikeness in the peculiarity of

the person, so also is rational feeling not of a merely individual

nature, but it is excited by the traces of God which shine forth from

all created existence, and hence it is, at bottom, always a love of

God. The goodness of created existence is embraced by rational feeling

not as being good merely for the feeling individual, but as a

being-good per se; the rational spirit feels not merely that this or

that entity stands in harmony with itself, but it feels itself as

standing in harmony with the totality of existence,--feels the harmony

of God's world as such. In the same degree that spirituality rises,

rises also the vividness and compass of feeling. The unconscious

nature-object is affected only by the very few things that come into

immediate contact with it; the brute shows so much the more extended

and more lively a sympathy with external existence the higher and

nobler its rank. Emotionlessness, blunt indifference toward external

objects, is always, save where it is artificially superinduced by false

teachings, a sign of deep moral degradation. The Biblical account of

the primitive condition of man uniformly represents the destination of

nature to be, to procure to the rational spirit the feeling of joy, of

happiness. Man is placed in the garden of Eden, and thereby brought

into the immediate presence of the full harmony of the created. world;

in it God causes to grow "every tree that is pleasant to the sight and

good for food;" and the full feeling of happiness, as springing from

his love to that which harmonizes with him, is procured to man (to whom

it is not "good" to be alone) by the creation of woman,--in whom he at

once recognizes that she is bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh,--a

being other than, and yet of, himself.

Feeling is the presupposition of all activity, and hence also of the

moral; and the most real feeling of all--that which relates to the

moral-is not an un-pleasure feeling,--as is often assumed in antagonism

to the Biblical world-view, but in fact a happiness-feeling. It would

not imply a "good" creation, nor indeed any God-likeness in man, were

it a fact that man were incited to activity only by un-pleasure, that

is, by pain, while yet happiness were the end of the active life. Even

as God is not prompted to activity by any feeling of want, but rather

in virtue of his eternal and absolutely perfect bliss, so also can the

true moral feeling of man, who is God's image, be no other than the

feeling of happiness and love; but the consciousness of a yet to be won

good is per se by no means a feeling of unhappiness, on the contrary it

in fact awakens a direct pleasure in seeking.

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SECTION LXIII. The Immortal Spirit.

(4) Man, as a rationally self-conscious spirit, is personally immortal;

only as such is he a truly moral being,--has a moral life-task

transcending his own immediate individuality. Faith in immortality is

the presupposition of true morality; for the moral life-task is one

that is incessantly progressive, ever self-renewing, and at no moment

perfectly brought to a close; and, as the perfect realization of

Godlikeness, it can only be accomplished through an

uninterruptedly-continuing personal life.

We have to do here, not with the scientific demonstration of the

doctrine of personal immortality, but only with its moral significance.

In recent times, especially since Kant, the notion has frequently been

maintained, that morality is entirely independent of a belief in

immortality, nay, that it evinces its purity and genuineness by the

very fact of entirely leaving out of view this belief, and that a man

is not truly moral so long as he allows himself to be determined in his

moral activity by this belief. It is true, Kant deduces from the idea

of the moral, the idea of personal immortality as a rational postulate;

the moral idea itself, however, is with him independent of this

postulate,--calls for its fulfillment absolutely and unconditionally.

There is in this some degree of self-contradiction; if the "categorical

imperative" demands morality unconditionally, and utterly

irrespectively of immortality, then this immortality cannot be embraced

in it as a postulate, but must be merely associated thereto from

without. In the endlessness of the life-task, however, as it is

presented by Kant, there actually lies, in fact, the thought of

immortality as included in the moral idea itself,--so that his express

dissociating of the two ideas is illegitimate and unnatural.

Schleiermacher goes further; and, even in his Dogmatics, he is unable

entirely to rise above his previous express denial of immortality. In

his Discourses on Religion he places the religiously-moral life-task

proper in an actual disregarding of the idea of this immortality.

"Strive even in this life to annihilate your personality, and to live

in the One and All; strive to be more than yourselves, in order that

you may lose but little when you lose yourselves;" the immortality to

be aimed at is not that of the personality, not above and beyond the

earthly existence, but it is an ideal immortality in each and every

moment; men should not desire to hold fast to their personality, rather

"should they embrace the single opportunity presented to them by death

for escaping beyond it." [5] Even in his Dogmatics Schleiermacher

holds, that the purest morality perfectly consists with a "renunciation

of the perpetuity of the personality,--that, in fact, an interestedness

in a recompense is impious. In the Hegelian philosophy morality is

absolutely independent of immortality; this idea in fact can nowhere

find footing in the system; the religion of the "this-side" which

sprang from this philosophy, affects to give point to its rhetorical

flourishes on morality by its seemingly magnanimous renunciation of all

expectation of eternal life.

The pretended disinterestedness of moral actions performed without

reference. to immortality, is mere appearance. All moral activity looks

to an end, and this end is a good; and personal perfection is for each

individual an essential part of the highest good, or, in fact, this

good itself; hence not to wish to obtain any thing for one's self by

one's moral activity is simply absurd; the first and most necessary of

all goods, and the one which is the presupposition of all morality, is

in fact existence; to desire to renounce personal existence, or to

regard it as indifferent, is equivalent to renouncing moral life, and

is consequently not unselfish, but it is immoral. It is true we cannot

claim for the so-called teleological proof of the immortality of the

soul, full demonstrative power; this much, however, it does prove,

namely, that the highest moral perfection would be impossible without

immortality; for, as man can never arrive at such a perfection of the

moral life as that he can advance no further, so that consequently his

farther existence would be purposeless, but in fact, on the contrary,

every fulfillment of one moral duty gives in turn birth to new ones,

and there is absolutely no point to be found where the moral spirit

might say, "thus far and no farther, there remains nothing more for me

to do," --hence also moral perfection cannot be realized save in an

unbroken perpetuity of personal life. To say now, that the moral

life-task does not consist in obtaining entire moral perfection, but

only a limited degree thereof, would be per se immoral. And in fact

should we for a moment concede some such limited degree of the moral,

then there would be no conceivable rule for fixing this degree, and

each would be at liberty to narrow the limits of his morality at

pleasure, without that any one would be justified in blaming, or less

esteeming him therefor.

In all moral systems, even those of heathen nations, morality is more

precious than temporal life, and that person is regarded as ignoble and

contemptible, even by pagans, who clings to his life at any price, for

example, at that of failing in his duty to his country, to his family,

or to his own honor. This moral sentiment of honor we have no wish to

weaken. It is conceivable, on the assumption of the prevalence of sin,

that one's moral duty, as, for example, that of speaking or confessing

the truth, or of fidelity in love or obedience, cannot in some

conjunctures be fulfilled save at the sacrifice of temporal life. Now,

to one's existence in general one has an unlimited right; it is his

first and most natural right. In the absence of immortality, however,

the sacrifice of one's life for a moral duty would not only not be a

moral requirement, but it would be downright folly and sin; for

morality can never require the giving up of the first condition of all

moral activity, namely, personal existence. The first, the most

immediate and absolutely unconditional duty, is self-preservation, and

other duties are binding only in so far as they do not radically

interfere with this one. As it would not be a moral action, but on the

contrary a proof of insanity if one man should really choose [6]

eternal damnation for the sake of another, just as little is any being

whatever at liberty to purchase for others any temporal good, however

great, at the cost of personal existence; and in the absence of

immortality there can be none other than temporal goods. Man may

sacrifice any one good only for the sake of a higher good; but in

renouncing existence he obtains no good whatever. The sound and

unsophisticated judgment will find, on the denial of immortality, no

other rule of life-wisdom than simply to take advantage of the short

span of life here allotted to us for enjoying the greatest possible

happiness. Happiness is in fact an absolutely necessary phase of human

perfection, and an essential expression of the highest good; to strive

after it is not only not selfishness, on the contrary, it is a

requirement of reason and of moral duty; and it is not possible that in

a world of rational order morality should work any thing else than

happiness. Were it otherwise it would be a plain proof of the

non-existence of a rational, moral world-order, and in that case it

would be totally absurd to speak further of moral duty at all, for duty

is itself a part of a moral world-order. If there is, now, no eternal

blessedness as a highest good, then it can be only after temporal,

earthly happiness, that man has to seek, and by which consequently he

is to measure the morality of his acts. If it is true that all morality

necessarily renders happy, then on the above hypothesis only that can

be moral which procures for us earthly comfort, temporal enjoyment; the

teachings of the Epicureans would then be the only rational theory, and

no valid objection could be made to the moral rule: "Let us eat and

drink, for to-morrow we die" [1 Cor. xv, 32]. Foolish then would he be

who did not recklessly seek as much enjoyment in his earthly life as in

any way he possibly could. It is, of course, not necessary that this

system should lead simply to groveling sensual enjoyment; the ancient

Epicureans knew well enough that riotous intemperate indulgence works

much suffering, and the modern ones also know equally well, that by

unrestrained wantonness they bring themselves into shame and contempt

in the eyes of the morally-taught masses; this, however, does not in

any degree ameliorate the essence of this morality of the "this side."

The outwardly-respectable life of many a denier of immortality rests in

reality on the power of public opinion, and on custom as grown up from

Christian ground. But the case is quite otherwise where unbelief

becomes fashionable in wider circles of society. Let vouch for this,

the utter immorality and depravity that prevailed in the circles of the

French and of the Gallicized German free-thinkers of the last century.

In the lower walks of society where a simpler logic prevails, and where

respect for position and for public opinion has a less controlling

power, the practical inferences from a naturalistic philosophy are more

speedily and consistently drawn; and the ringleaders in depravity among

the lower classes of the present day are, for the most part, deeply

imbued with the conquests of "free thought," and are able thereby

admirably to justify their wantonness; and there is scarcely

conceivable a more absurd r�le than that assumed by the "respectable"

among the free-thinkers, who presume to preach morality to their more

free-thinking and more logically reasoning brethren.

He who is without belief in immortality cannot act from an

unconditional moral idea, but only from empirical external fitness,

from circumstantial need; he cannot make moral duty his life-task, and

his moral life sinks to a merely higher-cultured animal life. The

question as to whether Christian morality is possible without a belief

in immortality would have to be rejected as trivial,--seeing that a

belief in Christ's and God's express word is certainly included in

Christian morality,--had it not been expressly affirmed by some. The

word of Christ, however, is a sufficient answer. "He that loseth his

life for my sake shall find it," and "He that loveth his life shall

lose it, and he that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto

life eternal" [Matt. x, 39; Luke ix, 24; xvii, 33; John xii, 25; x, 17;

comp. 1 Cor. ix, 25; Phil. i, 21]. We emphasize in these passages, not

the expressly pronounced affirmation of a life after death, but simply

the express requirement to sacrifice one's life in the interest of a

moral duty. But a world-government in which the realization of the good

is possible only by the destruction of him who has for his life-task to

realize the good, would be per se in a state of utter anarchy, and

would have no right to impose moral duties. The simple undeniable fact

is this, that the Christian heroes who literally fulfilled the above

word of Christ, had joy in so doing only because of that living faith

that enabled them to pray amid the tortures of death: "Lord Jesus,

receive my spirit" [Acts vii, 59]. But between the Christian martyr's

joy in death and an unbeliever's defiant contempt of death, there is a

world-wide difference. Cases are not unfrequently seen of hardened

criminals and atheists meeting death with undaunted courage and great

coolness; this is, however, but another form of the cold defiance with

which other persons blow out their own brains; and whoever has the

assurance to compare such blind hardness, even in the remotest degree,

with the joyousness and peace of soul of the Christian, surely shows

himself utterly incapable of appreciating the true nature of morality.

When Schleiermacher and others, after him, declare it as unpious to be

interested in a recompense,--understanding by this assertion that there

is wanting a pure and immediate seeking for piety and morality

themselves, and that both are desired merely as means for attaining to

perfect happiness in a future life,--there is indeed some ground for

their position, but only in so far as the subject should regard

morality merely as a means to happiness, and that too as a meritorious

means even in our present state of sinfulness, while the happiness

should be considered as a justly claimable reward. But so soon as the

objectors presume to reprehend the seeking after happiness as an

essential and necessary phase of the highest good, and to brand as

unpious the striving after the same as an actual life-purpose in

general, we must reject their position as one-sided and untrue. Every

good and hence every moral end produces happiness; and it would be a

strange requirement, to permit the seeking after the good but not the

seeking after the happiness therein contained. When Christ and the

Apostles hesitated not to base all moral sacrifice on the promise and

confident hope of eternal life, it does not seem very becoming in a

Christian to stigmatize this as immoral self-seeking. When appeal is

made to the Reformed divine Danaeus, who (in his Ethica Christ. i, c.

17) represents the honor of God as the sole motive, and that for the

sake of which we should be in duty bound to take upon ourselves eternal

death, were it required of us, and who stigmatizes it as mercenary to

act morally for the sake of eternal happiness,--we may reply, on the

one hand, that it could never occur to one who is a Christian and

conscious of redemption by grace to regard eternal blessedness, as a

reward due for his virtue-merit,--which, in fact, is the sole view that

Danaeus rejects [fol. 78, ed. 3],--and, on the other hand, that this

somewhat rash and readily misunderstood declaration has quite a

different sense in the mouth of Danaeus, who held fast to personal

immortality, and in the mouth of those who see in the thought of

immortality only a "dogma" without significance for the religious life,

and which it is well to vail as much as possible in ambiguous

phraseology. And in fact it doubtless forms a part of the moral

honoring of God, that we believe in his promises, and love and thank

him for them, and also act piously from this loving thankfulness. For

the moral life is genuine only when it is a full and true expression of

the filial relation of man to God; and it is not only illegitimate, but

also a sinful disregarding of God, to require that we should keep only

one phase of this relation in view, and violently throw aside and

forget the other,--that we should see in God only the Sovereign and not

also the lovingly promising Father. If God has gifted man with

immortality, if he has promised to the Christian eternal life, then

neither can nor should man, as moral, have any other moral goal than

that which answers to this promise; if man, in his moral life, ignores

that this life is the way to eternal life,--that God has placed before

him an everlasting goal,--such conduct is an immoral rejecting of God's

love. Whoever does not act from love acts immorally; now, for the

promise of eternal life we owe God thankful love; hence there is no

true morality which has not this loving thankfulness for its motive.

Against this view,--which is surely in perfect harmony with the general

Christian consciousness,--indignant warning has been made, [7] as if it

were an ignoring of the inalienable "conquests of recent science," and

even appeal has been made to the Old Testament, in which, as an actual

fact, it is asserted, the doctrine of immortality is not presented as a

moral motive. Now, if the conquests of modern science are to consist in

going back to the Old Testament stand-point, for which, on other

occasions, the objectors are not in the habit of showing any very high

esteem, we may well allow ourselves to deem it a progress beyond said

conquests, to come back to the stand-point of Christ and the Apostles.

What the wise educative purpose of the said Old Testament peculiarity

was, we have elsewhere inquired, and we do not hesitate in the least to

claim that Christian morality stands higher than that of the Old

Testament, and that also in moral respects "he that is least in the

kingdom of heaven is greater" than the greatest of the Old Testament

saints [Matt. xi, 11], though indeed the latter also had, in their

faith in the divine promise, in their hope of a future glorious goal

for all the children of God, a powerful moral motive that was in no

wise opposed to a belief in immortality, but on the contrary implicitly

contained it. Whether those who in recent times decline, with such

professed disinterestedness, the application of faith in immortality as

a moral motive, seek their moral glory in quite as unconditional a

submission to God's revealed Word and guidance as did the saints of the

Old Testament, seems to us, after all, quite questionable. We do not

doubt but that there may be some sort of morality without said faith;

but the question is as to true morality--that which embraces the whole

man, appropriates to itself all truth, and is of the truth. The pains

which some persons give themselves to prove that there may be a moral

life without faith in immortality, reminds us very much of the recently

made experiment of a naturalist:--he scooped out with a spoon the brain

of a living dove, and the poor bird actually continued to live for six

several weeks, and even partook of food in the mean time! Very

interesting experiments may be had by performing similar amputations on

the living body of the Christian faith,--and some of our theologians

are quite busy at the work,--but whether the patient prospers very well

under the operation is another question.

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[5] Reden �b die Rel., p. 174 sqq., 2 Auf.

[6] It is only seemingly so that Paul expresses such a willingness in

Rom. ix, 3.

[7] So especially Alex. Schweitzer in the Protest. Kirchenz., 1862, Nr.

1; Fr. Nitzsch in the Stud. u. Krit., 1863, II, 375.

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B.--MAN AS TO HIS SENSUOUSLY-CORPOREAL LIFE.

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SECTION LXIV.

The natural body, as the physical basis on which the spirit develops

itself to its full reality, has not a purpose in and of itself; but

only for the spirit, namely, to be the perfectly-answering and

absolutely-subserving organ of the spirit's relations to nature. This

embraces three points:--1. The sensuous corporeality is, despite its

seemingly trammeling power over the freedom of the spirit, per se

absolutely good, and there is neither any thing evil in it nor is it

the cause of any evil whatsoever; and as the body must, in so far as it

is normal, be in harmony with the spirit and with nature, hence there

is in it no sort of ground for any trammeling of the spiritual

life--for any pain.

The moral significance of the sensuous nature, the corporeality, of man

is a very important point in the Christian world-theory, and can in no

wise be regarded as non-essential. It is, in fact, one among the living

questions of the day,--questions which are being warmly agitated even

outside of the church, and in relation to which the bearing of the

Christian consciousness is, in many respects, entirely misunderstood.

As early as the fourth century there infected the Christian church

(partly under the prompting, or at least the countenance of

non-Christian influences) a spiritualistic view of the

naturally-sensuous,--a practical disesteeming of the same in comparison

with the spiritual; and the Middle Ages followed in general the same

tendency; the Reformation returned to the primitive Christian and

biblical view. The recent rationalistic philosophy of the understanding

developed, in contrast to the Middle Ages, the theoretical rather than

the practical phase of spiritualism, and conceived the

sensuously-corporeal life, not merely as the cause of sin, but as per

se and originally a trammeling of the spiritual life,--as the real

source and seat of sin, and hence as a mere transitory and soon

entirely-to-be-thrown-off evil,--and interpreted, utterly erroneously,

the New Testament term, sarx, referring it to the natural corporeality.

Death, which had previously been viewed as the wages of sin, was now

regarded as the emancipator from the seductive and spirit-burdening

corporeal life,--as the divinely appointed normal beginning of the

untrammeled life of the spirit. Sensuousness is here the not inherited,

but innate, and not guilty, but guilt-generating malum originis--an

evil, the origin of which was not free responsibly-sinning man, but the

divine creative will itself; in getting rid of corporeality therefore

man gets rid at the same time also of his (so-regarded)

scarcely-imputable sinfulness. Sin consists essentially in the

predominating of the sense-life over the spirit; the spirit per se

would have little or no occasion for sin. The doctrine of a

resurrection of a glorified body is rejected as belonging to a crude,

unspiritual world-view; it is only the pure disembodied spirit that is

free and perfect. In opposition to this view, the more recent and now

spreading irreligious Materialism has exalted the sensuously-corporeal

nature above the spirit, and conceived of the spirit as merely a

transient force-manifestation of organized matter.

The evangelically-Christian view is neither the above spiritualistic

nor this materialistic one. Christianity, though so often charged by

worldlings with a one-sided spiritualism, places in fact a much higher

moral worth on the corporeal nature than was ever done by heathenism.

The body is destined, it is true, to absolute subserviency to the

spirit; but it has precisely in this, its perfect service, also a share

in the high moral significancy of the spirit,--it is not only not to be

discarded as a trammeling of the spirit, but is a very essential part

of the moral person. As the eye cannot say to the hand: "I have no need

of thee" [1 Cor. xii, 21], neither also may the spirit thus speak to

the body. As the nature-side of man, corporeality mediates the action

of the spirit upon nature, so that nature becomes thrown open to the

spirit as an object both of knowledge and of action. The spirit stands

in living relation not only to spirit, but essentially also to nature,

and virtualizes also therein its Godlikeness.

The normal relation of the body to the spirit cannot be directly

inferred from the present actual state of humanity; for if we assume,

even preliminarily, the possibility that the moral spirit of the race

has fallen away from its harmony with God, we yet thereby render it

unsafe to infer that relation from the present state of things, since

from the disturbed harmony of man with God follows also the disturbance

of his harmony with himself, and especially of that between spirit and

body. The true original relation can be educed only, on the one hand,

from Scriptural declarations and from the living example of Christ,

and, on the other, from the Christian idea of creation. The simple fact

that all that God creates is good, is itself proof that the

corporeality created for the spirit can neither be a trammeling nor a

natural source of suffering for the same. Suffering and pain are indeed

means of educative chastening for man as sinful, but for the unsinful

their presence would be the reversing of all moral order. In God's

good-created world, men, were they unfallen, would receive their moral

training through manifestations of love, without the intervention of

suffering and pain; to deny this would be to deny either God's love or

his power.

The sensuous corporeality in its uncorrupted primitiveness can disturb

neither the moral life by really immoral appetites, nor the feeling of

happiness by pains and sickness,--the aequale temperamentum qualitatum

corporis (equipoise of the qualities of the body) of the Apologia (i,

17);--in that which was created good there can be no antagonism between

the life of the spirit and that of the body, nor between the body and

nature; but every suffering, every pain, is evidence of an antagonism,

of an evil in its subject. In the Scriptures all bodily sufferings are

expressly traced back to sin [Gen. iii, 16, 19; Rom. v, 12-21]; this is

the only possible "theodicy" in regard to human suffering. The body of

the rational spirit is under the dominion of that spirit, and not under

that of unspiritual nature; and the spirit is under the power of

itself, and not under that of a nature-bound body; and it is only such

a spirit as is free in every respect,--one that is not rendered unfree

by a hampering corporeality,--that is in a condition to fulfill the

whole of moral duty. In proportion as the now actually spirit-hampering

sensuous corporeality is held to be the normal condition, and to answer

to the divine creative idea, in the same proportion must the moral

life-task also be lowered. And when Rationalism finds the true freedom

and moral emancipation of the spirit only in the freeing of the same

from the body, there is at least this much of truth in the position,

namely, that it is an admission that the present bondage of the spirit

under the manifoldly-hampering power of the body is not in harmony with

the true life of the moral spirit. But whereas the

evangelically-Christian consciousness refers this antagonism in God's

world to the guilt of man, Rationalism casts the responsibility for

this condition (which itself admits to be in contradiction to the moral

idea) upon God, and thereby, in fact, undermines the Christian idea of

God, and hence also the unconditional obligatoriness of moral duty.

Ultra posse nemo obligatur (Obligation does not transcend ability);

this is an ancient truth valid not only in the sphere of jurisprudence

but also in that of morality.

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SECTION LXV.

2. The body mediates the relation of the objective world to the

personal spirit, through the senses; and this mediation, as being

established by the divine creative will, is a truthful one. On the

other hand, the body mediates the active relation of the spirit to the

objective world, and, in subserving the spirit, it thereby mediates the

morally-essential dominion of the spirit over nature, and is, hence,

the necessary and adequate organ of the moral spirit in its relation to

the external world,--and not that of nature for its dominion over the

spirit.

If the created spirit has surety of ability for knowing the truth, this

of itself implies that the knowledge mediated by the senses must be

real and true,--that sense-impressions per se do not deceive us. "The

hearing ear and the seeing eye, the Lord hath made even both of them"

[Prov. xx, 12]; but God is a God of truth; and the solemn exhortation:

"Lift up your eyes on high, and behold who hath created these things!"

[Isa. xl, 26], is at the same time a guarantee of the reliableness of

the senses. If the senses deceive us, then God deceives us. Just as

without faith in God there is no morality, so also, without confidence

in the truthfulness of the divinely established world-order--which of

course includes the vital relations of creatures to each other--a

complete morality is impossible. Man cannot be under obligation to be

truthful, if creation is not so. The matter is therefore not so morally

indifferent as at first glance it might seem. If God is to be seen in

his works [Rom. i, 20] then must these works speak truthfully to us. If

sense-impressions have only subjective truth, then they have none at

all, and hence no worth whatever,--then we sustain no moral relation to

the objective world, inasmuch as under such circumstances it would have

for us no existence. There could then be no further question save of a

moral duty of man to himself or to God. Skepticism on this point is

therefore no less anti-moral than impious. Deceptions growing out of

false judgments as to per se true sense-impressions, must of course not

be confounded with the deception of sense-impressions themselves; it is

not the eye that sees the sky touch the earth at the horizon, it is

only a premature judgment that leads to this deception. Real

sense-deceptions spring of disease, but disease does not exist in a

state of moral purity.

The spirit is to dominate over nature, not directly, however, by a mere

magic-working will, but by the instrumentality of its own dominated

body. The destination to this domination is expressed even in the build

of the human body: erect, with upturned look, with hands planned for

the most manifold activity, the human body bears upon it the impress as

well as the reality of dominating power. While Materialism subordinates

spirit to nature, the Christian worldview subordinates nature to

spirit; and as the spirit is entirely master over its body, so is it

likewise master over nature by means of the body. A childish,

morally-unripe spirit cannot, it is true, dominate nature at the will

of its irrational whims,--but we speak here only of the rational

spirit, and in this sphere the words, "the spirit is willing, but the

flesh is weak," have no application; in normal man the flesh is also

willing and strong. Even as through the senses nature is open and

unlocked for the cognizing spirit, so is it also through the bodily

organs for the volitionating spirit. If the facts seem otherwise in the

present reality of things, if the body is no longer an absolutely

obedient medium for the dominion of the spirit over nature, but on the

contrary is much oftener a mere instrument of nature for her dominating

over the spirit, this is simply because the right and primitive

relation has been disturbed, and has given place to the enfeebling

influence of sin.

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SECTION LXVI.

3. The incipient limitation of the freedom of the normally

self-developing spirit by the body in consequence of the dependent

condition of the latter on external nature, is only the corresponding

normal expression of the still existing unfreedom of the, as yet,

unmatured spirit, and is therefore also the protection of the same

against its own immaturity,--a divinely-intended means of discipline

for the same. But this primarily limiting relation of the body to the

spirit is only transient, and is not a real trammeling. The body, while

following in its own development the growth of the spirit in

rationality and freedom, passes gradually over from its at first

predominantly determining and conditioning character to that of being

predominantly determined and conditioned by the spirit; and in its

ultimate perfection,--as corresponding to the fall moral maturity of

the spirit,--it becomes perfectly spirit-imbued and

spirit-appropriated,--the absolutely subservient organ of the

emancipated spirit,--becomes a perfectly spiritualized and transfigured

body, which latter, as being developed by a regular growth out of the

original unfree nature-body, is conditioned neither on a violent death

of the nature-body nor is subject itself to death, seeing that it is

simply the necessary and normal organ of the immortal spirit.

It would be an injustice in the Creator, and a God-repugnant defect in

creation, were the essentially free and morally matured spirit bound in

unfreedom by a per se irrational nature; and the anti-scriptural

notion, that the rational spirit has been banished into a body, as into

a prison, in punishment for the sins of a previous life, would then be

the sole possible justification of the Creator. But the conditional

unfreedom of the spirit such as we must admit also for the unfallen

state, namely, that it is limited by the natural alternation of

sleeping and waking [comp. Gen. ii, 21] by the natural wants of food,

etc., [comp. Gen. i, 29, 30], is not against but for the spirit. It

reminds the personal spirit of its belonging to the per se unitary and

law-governed All, its regulated connection with nature; it protects

the, as yet, inexperienced spirit from unwise presumption, from

arbitrary irrational meddling with the divinely-established order of

the world,--teaches it to submit itself to the divinely-willed and

ordered laws of existence, teaches it humility, and brings to its

consciousness its dependence on God's power, thereby impressing upon it

the lesson that it can attain to true freedom only by a free and

cheerful self-denial in relation to the will of God. Hunger, e. g., is

the most powerful stimulus to activity, and hence to the development of

the spirit, and ever since the entrance of sin into the race there has

been no other so sure and effectual a means of stirring up the spirit

out of its slothful indolence [Prov. xvi, 26, in the original]. In the

present state of man hunger is not only of significance for the

individual, it is a world-historical power, the first and most

persistent stimulus to civilization. Unfallen humanity, it is true,

knows nothing of any hunger-stress, but it knows it as a want requiring

satisfaction; and it is not a feature of the suffering but of the true

humanity of Christ, that he also felt hunger.

That which was a disciplining beginning, however, is not to be

permanent; but it is not the body, but only the limiting power of the

same that is to pass away. The view that the body is not a permanent

condition of the spirit, but only a prison-house destined to

destruction,--a merely useless burdening incident of the spirit,--is a

very favorite one, it is true, but it is a very un-Christian one. What

God does is done well, and he has given the body to the spirit for

perfect service, and not for a burden and a clog. Of the notion that

the original body is only a worthless case or husk, to be cast off like

the chrysalis of the butterfly, the Scriptures know nothing;--the

dissolving of the earthly house [2 Cor. v, 1] applies only to the body

of sin and death [Gen. iii, 19];--the body is originally, on the

contrary, the divinely-established permanent condition of true life,

though indeed not an absolutely necessary condition of the life of the

spirit in general. Christ, the perfect man, shows in his own person

what the human body signifies and is; Christ's resurrection is a stone

of stumbling for all one-sided spiritualism. Christ lives on, not as a

mere bodiless spirit, but in his now glorified body, and he will

transfigure our sin-ruined body that it may be like unto his glorious

body [Phil. iii, 21]. This transfiguration, though without death--not a

being unclothed, but a being clothed upon [2 Cor. v, 4]--is the

original purpose of the body given to the immortal spirit as its

subservient organ. The spirit's body is in fact, as such, no longer a

mere nature-object, but, as the exclusive possession of an immortal

subject, it is also itself raised above the perishableness incident to

all mere nature-objects.--Death is in the Scriptures uniformly referred

back to sin; and the great emphasis which the New Testament lays upon

the resurrection of the body indicates what the original body was to

have been. If it is the moral destination of the spirit to be free, to

dominate by reason over the merely natural, then death, as a violent

interruption of life, comes into direct antagonism with this

destination; it indicates a complete ascendency of unconscious nature

over spirit, the impotency of the spirit in the face of nature--a

condition of the real bondage of spirit to nature. Were this

wide-reaching antagonism between the actual state and the moral nature

of the spirit the original condition, and were it included in the

nature of things or in the creative will itself, then the nerve of all

morality would be paralyzed, and all moral courage broken. To struggle

against too great odds is folly; if irrational nature is more powerful

than the moral spirit, then the latter can rationally take no better

course than to yield to superior force, and to place its own sensuous

nature higher than its spiritual.

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C.--THE UNITY OF THE SPIRIT AND THE BODY.

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SECTION LXVII.

In virtue of the union of spirit and body into one personality, the

spirit is manifoldly determined also in its moral life, and it appears

in consequence under different phases of existence, which occasion also

correspondingly different manifestations of morality.

1. The stages of life. The spirit is dependent in its development on

that of the body, not absolutely, however, but only relatively; the

development-stages of the moral spirit--which do not entirely coincide

with those of the body, but only in general and partially run parallel

therewith--are the following:--(a) The stage of moral minority,

childhood. Here the body is as yet master over the spirit; the spirit

is as yet in most things essentially unfree--dependent on outer,

sensuous, and spiritual influences,--is more guided than

self-guiding.--(b) The stage of transition to majority,--still wavering

between freedom and unfreedom; morality appears essentially under the

form of free obedience toward educators.--(c) The stage of moral

majority. The person has come into possession of himself,--is actually

master over himself as regards moral self-determination, is able by his

moral consciousness to guide himself independently; hence he is fully

morally responsible, and is in process of developing an independent

character.--A relapsing of the morally matured into a state of moral

irresponsibility, a becoming childish, is not conceivable in a normal

condition of humanity, though here there would doubtless, indeed, be a

greater turning away from merely earthly things, and a growing

preoccupation with the supernatural,--in the stage of moral old age.

The development of a spirit as united with a body, consists in one of

its phases in the fact that it more and more throws off its primarily

normal greater dependence on the corporeal life,--that it becomes

freer, ripens toward maturity. Although we cannot conceive of the first

created human beings as beginning life in a state of unconscious

childhood, still the above-mentioned stages of life, seeing that they

are implied in the very nature of self-development, must hold good, at

least, of all succeeding generations; and even the first man could not

appear at once as a perfectly mature, morally-ripened spirit, but had

to pass through similar stages of development. According to the

naturalistic view, the spiritual development is exclusively and

absolutely conditioned on that of the body--is only the bloom and vigor

of the same. This assertion, as well as the theory on which it is

based, is refuted by the simple matter of fact that spiritual

development often far outruns that of the body, and in fact in a normal

development must do so, and also that in persons of precisely equal

bodily development, the spiritual ripeness may be very widely

different. In an as yet unmatured body there may be a mature spirit, in

a weak and ailing body, a strong spirit; this would be inconceivable on

the naturalistic hypothesis. But especially the moral development may

come to ripeness of character much earlier than the corporeal life;

growth in knowledge is much more dependent on the development of the

body; the understanding does not outrun the years, and children that

are early ripe intellectually, are usually morbid phenomena; but a very

youthful soul may acquire a real and firm moral character. The proverb,

"Youth is without virtue," in so far as it is meant to be an excuse, is

absolutely immoral and perverse.

In consequence of the normal super-ordination of the spirit to the

body, the spiritual development-stages do not coincide, in point of

time, with the corresponding bodily stages, but precede them somewhat.

The first stage is that of childlike innocence, where the child as yet

knows not how to distinguish between good and evil [Isa. vii, 16],

where, as yet, the moral consciousness slumbers, and the life-activity

does not spring from a will conscious of a moral purpose, but, on the

contrary, from unconscious feelings which are directly excited by

external or sensuous influences; hence an accountability proper cannot

as yet be presumed. The child has indeed propensions and aversions,

love and anger, and other states of feeling, but it does not have them

intelligently,--is not as yet in spiritual self-possession. Obedience

is, as yet, a mere scarcely-conscious following, taking its rise simply

from natural feelings and from the instinct of imitation, and which is

indeed a germ of morality, though not, as yet, actual morality, but is,

in-fact, also found to some extent among domesticated animals. The

typical character of children as presented by Christ [Matt. xviii, 3]

does not relate to any moral perfection in them, but only to their

receptiveness for moral impressions, to their innocence, to their

consciousness of need, and their readiness to believe.

The stage of transition, or youth, is the time when the person can

distinguish between good and evil, and where, consequently, there

exists a real moral consciousness, though not one that is thoroughly

formed and in every case self-determining, but only primarily a

consciousness of good and evil in general, and the particular

application of which in single cases is, for the most part, not left to

personal free self-determination, but to the guidance of educators. The

boy has the definite law, as yet, only in an objective manner, in the

will of his parents; his moral consciousness sketches only general

outlines,--for the more definite traits and shades it is as yet

dependent on some other, to him objective, consciousness. Hence the

most characteristic form of the morality of this period is obedience;

and the greatest danger to morality, so long as this partial

uncertainty yet remains, is the tendency, readily resulting from the

incipient consciousness of moral self-determination, to wish to

determine one's conduct in particular cases directly and immediately

from the, as yet, only general and indefinite moral

consciousness,--that is, the tendency to premature freedom, the

pleasure in an unregulated enjoyment of freedom, in arbitrary

self-determination. This in fact was the danger to which our first

parents fell a prey.

The stage of moral maturity, in a normal development, far more than

overtakes that of bodily ripeness. While civil law fixes the civil

majority, that is, the time of ripe understanding, at the period of

full bodily maturity, the moral community, the Church, declares man as

morally mature much earlier (confirmation); also the state fixes full

moral responsibility much earlier than the civil majority. These

distinctions rest on well-grounded experience. The young man knows not

merely moral duty in general, but he is also capable of conforming his

life thereto in particular. Obedience to parents or guardians assumes

now the form of obedience to the moral law, which latter indeed

includes the former, but no longer as an essentially unconditional

obedience, but simply as one that is to be subordinated to the moral

law. But a morally mature person can come into an actual conjuncture

where it is necessary to refuse obedience to parents, only on the

presupposition of a morally disordered state of humanity; and also

civil law finds in such obedience, after years of moral majority, no

excuse for criminal acts.

The becoming-childish of the aged would be a very weighty reason for

doubting of personal immortality, were it a normal phenomenon of old

age. When, however, we consider that even in the present sin-disordered

condition of the race, this becoming-childish is by no means a

necessary and universal phenomenon, but that, on the contrary, the

fruit of a morally-pious life--even in far advanced age, and despite

the otherwise slumber-like obscuration of the intellectual

faculties--is a heightening of the religious and moral consciousness,

and that even the better forms of heathenism consider reverence for the

moral wisdom of the aged as a high virtue,--we can readily, then, infer

from this, how little room there would be for a real becoming-childish

in any respect whatever in an unfallen state of humanity. Precisely

what would have been the characteristics of normal old age in a sinless

state, we know not; this much, however, we do know, that the life of an

immortal spirit, as being destined to a higher ennoblement or

transfiguration, and as not subject to a positive violent death, could

not be liable to a return to a state of moral minority,--at the

farthest it would only have prepared itself for this freely

self-accomplishing ennobling, by a greater turning away from earthly

things. All senility of age we can regard only as an absolutely

abnormal sin-born phenomenon, seeing that it stands in manifest

antagonism to the nature and destination of the personal spirit.

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SECTION LXVIII.

2. Differences of temperament--the different tempers of the spirit in

its bearing toward the outer world, as determined by differences of

bodily peculiarity. These differences are--as an expression of that

manifoldness of being which is necessary to the perfection of the

whole--per se good, and give rise to a vital reciprocalness of relation

among the members of society. As mere natural determinations of the

spirit they have primarily no moral significance; they receive such,

however, as conditions of the moral life. They do not constitute moral

character; on the contrary, they are, in their disproportionateness, to

be controlled by the character, and trained into virtue.--Related to

the temperaments are the normal differences in the natural

peculiarities of nations.

From a naturalistic stand-point great importance is attributed to

temperaments, as if they were original moral determinations. But that

which is original and merely natural is not as yet moral; it is only

the antecedent condition of the moral. Moral character is not

determined by nature, but only by the free action of man himself; in

proportion as we consider the moral as determined by nature, we destroy

its very essence. While the ancients considered the temperaments rather

in their purely corporeal significance, in recent times emphasis is

often given rather to their spiritually-moral significance, to the

detriment of morality. On this point there has been much fallacious

speculation, and the inclination is in many respects manifest, to

attempt to comprehend man in his moral peculiarity from mere

nature-circumstances, rather than honestly to look into his moral

nature--to search his heart; and men are very ready to excuse their

moral foibles and vices on the score of temperament; this course is

naturalistic, and, in fact, materialistic. Temperament is, essentially,

simply the normal basis on which morality is to develop itself; it does

not, however, itself determine the moral life-task, but only has

influence in throwing it into its peculiar form; he whose character is

shaped only by his temperament has no character. The moral character

stands above all temperament; and where there are different and opposed

temperaments like moral characters may be formed, and the converse.

Temperaments are not per se a peculiarity of the spirit, but are based

in that of the corporeal life, and pass over upon the spirit only by

virtue of a kind of communicatio idiomatum. It is usual to distinguish

four temperaments,--according to the susceptibility for external

influences, and to the active bearing toward the outer world: (1) that

which is very open for outward impressions, and is at the same time

more acted upon from without than self-active--the light, sanguine

temperament;--(2) that which is very open for outward impressions, but

is at the same time rather self-active, initiatively working, and

influencing the outer world--the warm, choleric temperament;--(3) that

which is less receptive for outward impressions, and at the same time

rather inactive, indifferent--the cool, phlegmatic temperament;--(4)

that which, while equally feebly-receptive for outward impressions, is

yet more active, storing up in itself what it receives--the heavy

melancholic temperament.--The types of temperament, however, do not

usually appear under these pure forms; generally they are commingled

and toned down. Nor does a temperament always remain the same, but it

changes with the outward relations and age of the person.

As the moral person is not to permit himself to be determined by the

irrational, but should himself freely determine himself on the basis of

the moral consciousness, hence he is all the more moral the more he

subordinates his temperament to his moral will,--not cultivating simply

those virtues which are more congenial to his temperament, as, for

example, friendliness in the sanguine, patience in the phlegmatic,

courage in the choleric, etc. Morality consists rather, on the

contrary, in the inner harmony of all the different moral phases, and

must consequently counteract the one-sidedness of any particular

temperament. The light temperament tends to frivolity, the warm to

passionateness and revenge, the cool to indifference and indolence, the

heavy to selfishness and narrowness. He who leaves his temperament

unbridled, cultivates not its virtue but its defect; for virtue is

never a mere nature-proclivity. As a peculiar endowment, temperament,

like every other endowment, must be morally shaped, and hence brought

into proper harmony with the moral whole of the life. No sin finds a

moral justification in temperament; and, on the other hand, only that

course of action is morally good which springs not merely from

temperament, but from the moral consciousness.

The differences of natural national peculiarities are related to the

difference of temperament. Also in a sinless state, a diversity among

nations, a difference of taste, etc., arising primarily from

differences of country, would be perfectly normal and necessary [Acts

xvii, 26]. As the mountaineer is different in his entire bodily and

spiritual temper from the dweller in the plain, the inhabitant of the

North from him of the Tropics, etc., so there arises therefrom a

diversity of forms of the moral life-work,--which, however, cannot come

into hostile antagonism with each other, but in fact constitute a

stimulating diversity, from which arises an all the greater and more

vital harmony of the whole. Labor and enjoyment, the family-life and

the life of society, will necessarily assume different forms; and the

proper development and preservation of the normal peculiarities of

nations form an essential feature of general moral perfection. It is

not as a progress of spiritual and moral culture, but to some extent as

a perversion thereof, that we must regard the tendency manifested in

recent times to sweep away, to a large extent, the peculiarities of

nations, and to bring about the greatest possible uniformity.

Manifoldness of language and spirit is not confusion, and it has, as

opposed to a bald, lifeless monotony, its legitimate moral right. The

sons of Jacob, as differing in character, imparted also a normal

difference to the tribes in Israel; nevertheless one spirit could and

should have pervaded them all.

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SECTION LXIX.

3. The difference of sex conditions a correspondingly different

peculiarity of the moral life-work. Man represents the outward-working,

productive phase of humanity, woman the receptive and formative,--he

more the spirit-phase, she more the nature-phase; in him preponderate

thought and will; in her rather the feelings, the heart; to man it is

more peculiar to act initiatively,--to woman rather, morally to

associate herself. The moral life-work of each is different in the

details, but in both it is of like dignity; it is simply two different

mutually-complementing phases of the same morality. The morality of

both sexes consists, in fact, in especially developing that phase of

the moral life that is peculiar to each,--not as strictly the same as,

but as in harmony with, the peculiarity of the other.

The antithesis of the two sexes is the highest spiritualized

manifestation of that primitive antithesis of the operative and the

reposing, the active and the passive, that conditions all earthly

life,--that assumes an endless variety of forms, and appears in each

single phenomenon of the world under some of its many forms of

combination. Nowhere do we find mere force, nowhere mere matter, but

every-where in nature both are united, and yet they are not the same.

What this primitive antithesis is in nature,--what the greater

antitheses of the light and the heavy, repulsion and attraction, motion

and rest, sun and planet, animal and plant, arteries and veins, etc.,

are,--this is, in highest refinement and perfection, the antithesis of

man and woman in humanity. That the nature-phase is somewhat more

prominent in woman than in man is evidenced also by the earlier

physical development and maturity of the female sex, and by the greater

dependence on nature and on the changes of the seasons in the entire

female sex-life. The higher intellectual power is undoubtedly with man,

and the moral subordination of woman to man in wedlock and in society

is an unmistakable law of universal order. The difference of the two

sexes is not to be t6ned down, but to be developed into moral harmony.

As an effeminate man or masculine woman is offensive to the esthetic

sense, and a hermaphrodite repugnant to uncorrupted feelings, and a

sexless form expressionless and unnatural, so also, in moral respects,

it is the duty of man to cultivate his manliness, and of woman to

cultivate her womanliness; and any assumption by one party of the

peculiarities of the opposite sex, is not only unnatural but also

immoral.

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II. THE COMMUNITY-LIFE AS A MORAL SUBJECT.

SECTION LXX.

Man is not simply an individual being, but, by virtue of his moral

rationality, which seeks everywhere to reduce the manifold to unity, he

effects also a moral community-life, a community of persons, to which

the individual is related as a serving member, and which has in turn

itself a definite moral life-purpose, to the fulfilling of which the

individual members are indeed called, though this moral life-purpose,

that is to be carried out by the individual, is not identical with the

life-work which he, as a personal individual, has to fulfill for

himself. A plurality of persons constitutes a moral community-life only

when, in virtue of a real common-consciousness, and a common moral

life-purpose, they are molded into a life-unity, so that the individual

members bring not only the whole into active relation to themselves,

but also and essentially themselves into active relation to the whole;

and the moral life of the individual is the more perfect the more it

develops itself into a life of the whole; and the ultimate goal of

moral development is, that all humanity become a unitary moral

community. The true morality of the individual assumes therefore always

a twofold form: one that is personally-individual, and one that is an

expression of the moral life-purpose of the community-life, and in the

name of which it fulfills that purpose; neither is subordinate to the

other, but they stand in vital reciprocity of relation.

The notion of the community-life as a moral subject is of very great

significance for ethics. Heathenism attained to it but very

imperfectly, inasmuch as the thought of the unity of mankind was

entirely wanting, and as where the community-life was most

prominent--in China--there only a naturalistic, mechanical world-theory

prevailed, and as, on the contrary, where the personal spirit came into

prominence--in the Occident--there it did so only in the form of the

strong individual will,--that is, the will did not appear as general

but as individual and arbitrary, so that the community-life itself bore

the impress of the individual will. In the Israelitic theocracy we

find, in virtue of the divine disciplinary purpose, only the embryonic

beginnings of the community-life; as yet, the morality of the

individual prevails over the collective morality. But to the idea of

the latter itself there is very clear allusion. The words, "I will make

of thee a great nation;... in thee shall all families of the earth be

blessed" [Gen. xii, 2, 3], are not a mere blessing, but they imply also

for Abraham a moral duty, namely, that he live not for himself, but

also for his people, and through them for the whole race,--that he work

and act not merely as Abram but as Abraham, as the father of nations

[Gen. xvii, 5]. Christianity brought the great idea to realization; the

truth that makes man truly free rendered again possible the founding of

a true moral community,--primarily as the Church, but then also as the

Christian state. The idea of moral communion becomes here at once a

fundamental one. Personal communion with the personal Son of God and of

Man as chief, creates the true, vital moral community-life; the

individual lives for the community and the community for the

individual, and both through Christ and for Christ. This circumstance

is very suggestive as to the moral destination of humanity as sinless.

The moral activity of the individual person as such is clearly to be

distinguished from the moral activity of the same as an embodiment of

the public morality. The mere circumstance, that in a state of

sinfulness these two forms of morality may appear in antithesis and

contradiction--that a man may perform his duty as a citizen to a

certain degree of serviceableness, while his personal morality stands

very low--shows that in the thing itself there is a real difference.

What I do as a vital member of the moral community--as it were out of

the spirit of the same, and to some extent, in the name of and as

representing the same, that is, what I do, not because I am a moral

individual, but because I belong, as a part, to a moral

community,--that must of course, under circumstances of moral maturity,

be in entire harmony with my personal moral disposition; but harmony is

not identity. As representing the moral community-life and the common

consciousness, my personal individual will retires essentially into the

back-ground, and the public spirit possesses me and guides me,--rules

sovereignly in me, and thrusts aside even my otherwise legitimate

individual weal. The warrior, in fighting for his country, acts not

from his personal individual will; he seeks, in case he enters into it

morally, nothing for himself, but every thing solely for his country;

he sacrifices his personal right to domestic happiness, to quiet labor,

to legitimate enjoyments, and even his life itself, for the

community,--not as a personal individual, but as a vital member of the

nation. The morality of the individual bears more a masculine, that of

the community more a feminine character, inasmuch as in the latter case

there is a predominancy of yielding to influence, of self-associating,

of devotion even to sacrifice. The moral honor of a community is other

than that of the individual; when the soldier defends the flag of his

regiment, it is not, or should not be, his own honor, but that of the

entire body, that prompts him; and where there is honor, there is also

morality.

The distinction of this twofold morality presents itself, under one of

the special forms of the second phase, namely, official morality, as

recognizable also outwardly. What the clergyman, the soldier, the judge

does officially, is also morality, but it is not by any means identical

with his personal morality, as is shown even by the fact of the

different degrees of censure incurred for violations of duty in the two

spheres. An untruth, a deception, perpetrated in official activity, is

much more severely punished, and deserves also severer moral rebuke,

than a like act done in non-official life. He who is acting in a public

capacity is not at liberty to overlook an offered indignity, while his

very first duty when insulted in a private capacity, is, to manifest a

readiness for reconciliation. The moral community often expresses this

difference in the fact that those who act principally and

professionally in its name, wear a special official garb, so that the

entire external appearance and bearing of such public persons are not

governed merely by their personally free self-determination. but bear

the impress of that which transcends the individual will, namely, the

community-life; personal character, while realizing public morality,

falls back behind the character of the community-life. Nevertheless it

is true that the whole moral activity and life of the individual

contributes essentially to the honor or shame of the family and of the

community to which he belongs [Lev. xxi, 9], so that consequently this

distinction of a twofold moral sphere of activity does not amount to a

real separation.

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CHAPTER II.

GOD AS THE GROUND AND PROTOTYPE OF THE MORAL LIFE AND AS THE AUTHOR OF THE LAW.

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SECTION LXXI.

As morality is connected with religion in an indissolubly vital unity,

hence the God-consciousness is the necessary presupposition and

condition of morality, and the character and degree of the morality is

consequently also conditioned on the character and degree of the

God-consciousness, although a higher degree of the latter does not

necessarily work also a higher degree of morality. Hence true morality

is only there possible where there is a true God-consciousness, that

is, where God is not conceived of as in some manner limited, but as the

infinite Spirit in the fullest sense of the word. Only where the moral

idea has its absolutely perfect reality, in the personal holy God, has

morality a firm basis, true contents, and an unconditional goal.

If morality is in any manner conditioned by religion, then is also the

quality of this morality different in different religions. We have

already shown that morality is not conditioned by the mere

God-consciousness, but only by it as having grown into religion, for a

God-consciousness which does not become a religious one, but remains

mere knowledge, cannot become a moral power; and this is the simple

explanation of the fact, that while a feebler God-consciousness cannot

produce a higher degree of morality, yet a higher God-consciousness

does not necessarily create also a higher degree of morality,--namely,

when it does not develop itself into a religious life-power. When it

does so develop itself, however, then it is unconditionally true that

the degree of morality perfectly corresponds to the degree of

God-consciousness;--otherwise we would be forced to modify our

previously assumed position, that religion and morality are two

indissolubly united and mutually absolutely conditioning phases of one

and the same spiritual life. Where God is conceived of as merely an

unspiritual nature-force, as in China and India, there morality cannot

rest on the free moral personality of man, but, on the contrary, it

must throw the personality into the back-ground as illegitimate; where

the divine is conceived of only in the form of an antagonism of

mutually hostile divinities, as with the Persians, there the moral idea

lacks its unconditional obligatoriness, and in fact the contra-moral

has its relative justification; and where the divine is conceived of as

a plurality of limited individual personalities, there the sphere of

morality is invaded by the pretensions of the arbitrarily

self-determining subject, and moral action lacks a solid basis. It is

only where there is a consciousness of the infinite personal Spirit

that both the moral personality is free, and the moral idea absolutely

unconditional and sure. The heathen do not really have the divine law;

they have only, lying in the very nature of the rational spirit, an

unconscious presentiment of the same [Rom. ii, 14, 15].--Though

Polytheism is with us no longer in fashion, still we are all the more

infested with Pantheism, or such a form of Deism as differs therefrom

only by an unscientific arbitrary inconsequence,--not, however, by any

means with that vigorous and comparatively respectable Pantheism of

India which drew, with moral earnestness, the full practical

consequence of its world-theory, and presented in an

actually-carried-out renunciation of the world the very contrary of our

natural and legitimate claim to happiness,--but, on the contrary, with

a Pantheism that is in every respect morbid and characterless, and

which, greedy of enjoyment, delights itself in a world robbed of God.

Pantheism lacks the antecedent condition of all morality, namely,

personal freedom; with the universal prevalence of unconditional

necessity there is no place for choice and self-determination; it also

lacks a moral purpose, seeing that it knows no ideal,

reality-transcending goal of morality, but, on the contrary, must

acknowledge the real as per se the fulfillment of the ideal, that is,

as good,--and for the reason that that which appears as a goal of

life-development, is, in fact, realized from necessity; it lacks also a

moral motive, for the sole causative ground of the absolutely necessary

life-development is, as unfree and as unfreely-acting, non-moral,--is

only a conscious nature-impulse. On the assumption that the entire

being and activity of the individual is simply a necessary expression

of the existence and life which God generates for himself in the world,

it follows that each and every being is fully and perfectly justified

in whatever nature and activity he may chance to appear, and no one can

reproach another because of any seeming moral depravity. The moral

tendencies of Pantheism, and of the therewith essentially identical

Naturalism, must not be judged of from individual instances of men who

are still unconsciously imbued with the moral spirit of the community,

but rather from the effects that result where this world-theory has

taken hold on the masses,--as at the time of the Reign of Terror in

France, and in the bearing and aspirations of our more recent

demagogues of reform, nearly all of whom are imbued with Pantheistic

views.

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SECTION LXXII.

The personal God is the basis of the moral, (1) in that He, as holy

will, is the eternal fountain and embodiment of the moral idea. The

good is not a mere object of a possible willing, not merely ought to be

willed, but is eternally willed by an eternal will, and is nothing

other than the contents of this will itself; God is the absolutely

moral spirit, the holy spirit--perfectly at one with himself in his

free personality, and eternally self-consistent,--and who as such

guarantees to the moral life-task of his free creatures, full truth,

unconditional and permanent validity as God's requirement, and unshaken

certainty, and perfect, constant unity and consistency.

Outside of the Christian God-consciousness the moral idea lacks all

certainty and strength. It is easy to say, that we should do the good

for its own sake, that the moral law presents itself as a "categorical

imperative," but in the reality of life such generalities will not

avail. For a mere idea without any sort of reality, no human heart can

grow actively warm; here there is at best only an intellectual

interest, but not a morally-practical one. The validity of the moral

idea must have a deeper basis than a mere intellectual process. Before

I can do the good for its own sake, I must love it; before I love it, I

must with full certainty know it. So long as I am in doubt as to what

is good, or as to whether there is any good, I have no object of love.

The essence of the good, however, implies that the same is not my

merely subjective opinion, but that it is universally valid--good per

se. Now, should I leave the God-consciousness out of sight, then there

would remain for me, in order to determine the unconditional validity

of a supposed moral precept, and to avoid the possibility of a mere

arbitrary judgment, no other resort than the impracticable test of

Kant. [8] ." Suppose, however, that, apart from religious faith, there

were in fact a scientific source for a certain knowledge of the moral

law, still this would not yet answer the purpose;--not every one can be

a philosopher, but all are required to be moral. Hence the moral

consciousness cannot be based on mere scientific demonstrations, but

must have a basis available for all rational men; now just such a

resource is the God-consciousness. So soon as I know that a mode of

action is God's will, then am I perfectly certain that it is good, that

it has universal and unconditional validity;--I have not to infer that

because it is universally valid, therefore it is God's will, but the

converse. Without certainty of moral consciousness there can be no

moral confidence; in this connection all doubt works ruin. The question

is as to certainty of moral consciousness, and hence essentially as to

God's will's becoming known to me.

So soon as there exists a consciousness of God, all good must be

referred absolutely to God's will; whatever God wills is good, and

whatever is good is God's will. The divine order of the world assumes,

in the sphere of the free will of creatures, the form of a moral

command; the "must" becomes a "should;" this is not a lowering, but an

exalting of the law, for freely realized good is higher than the

unfreely realized, seeing that God himself is freedom. If a moral duty

is God's will, then I am also further certain that it cannot be in real

conflict with other moral duties. This is the high moral significancy

of faith in the living God, namely, that it alone can give a full unity

and certainty to the moral consciousness; with every limitation of the

idea of God the moral consciousness also becomes uncertain and

doubtful. Hence the Scriptures, even in the Old Testament, attribute

such high significancy to the unity and unchangeableness of the holy

and almighty God as moral law-giver, and base thereon, in contrast to

heathenism, all morality,--as, for example, in Gen. xvii, 1; Deut. vi,

4 sqq.; x, 14, 17. In the first passage God's omnipotence is emphasized

in order to awaken in man a consciousness of his dependence; inasmuch

as all existence is absolutely in God's hand, therefore should also

man's free activity subordinate itself to Him,--therefore also is the

sinful effort to be independent of God, that is, to be equal to God,

unmitigated folly. Hence also he, who walks before the Almighty, has

the assurance that he will attain to his goal; thou canst, for the

reason that thou shouldst, for it is God who places upon thee the

"should."

But the certainty of the moral idea is only one of its phases, the

other is its actuating power. It is true, the idea itself of the good

should move the will; but its power is immeasurably greater When it is

itself the expression of a holy will than when it merely speaks to the

human will. It is the sacred awe of the Holy One that lends it this

power. In a mere idea I can have pleasure, but it cannot inspire me

with awe. The command that emanates from the Living One, gives life; a

mere idea pre-supposes life as a condition of its efficacy. The moral

idea becomes truly influential on the personal spirit only by its being

the actual will of a personal God. "The statutes of the Lord are right,

rejoicing the heart; the commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening

the eyes" [Psa. xix, 8].

The question: is a thing good because God wills it, or does God will it

because it is good? contains for us no contradiction. It would do so,

however, if the first clause meant, that it is accidental and arbitrary

that God declares this or that to be good, and that He might also just

as well have declared good the very opposite (Duns Scotus, Occam,

Descartes, Pufendorf). God cannot will anything else than what is

God-like--corresponding to his nature; this "cannot" is a limitation

only in the form of expression, in reality it is the highest

perfection. A being that can come into contradiction and antagonism

with itself, is not perfect. If the good is that which corresponds to

the divine nature, and if God's will is necessarily an expression of

his nature, then, whatever is good is good because God wills it, and

God wills it because it is good. God's declaration: "I am that I am"

[Exod. iii, 14] is valid also for his holy volitions. The idea of the

good is not something existing without and apart from God, it is a

direct beam from his inner nature.

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[8] Namely: "Act so that the maxim of thy conduct shall be adapted to

become a universal law for all men

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SECTION LXXIII.

God is the basis of the moral, (2), in that He reveals himself in his

universe as the Holy One,--discovers himself to man as the prototype of

the moral, as the personally holy pattern after which man should form

himself. In this consciousness of God as prototype of the moral, man

conceives morality as Godlikeness, and himself,; in his true moral

dignity, as God's image and as a child of God.

The idea of a moral self-revelation of God is of wide-reaching moral

significancy. Heathenism knows nothing of such a self-revelation; it is

true, in the higher heathen religions, moral laws are referred to a

divine origin, but this signifies simply either a revelation of the

general laws of world-order, or, at best, a revelation of the divine

will in regard to men, but not of the real moral nature of God.

According to the Christian world-view, the good is not merely to be

realized, but it exists already in full reality from eternity; morality

is not to create something absolutely new, but only to shape the

created after the model of its divine Creator; the free creature is to

become like the holy God,--to come into free harmony, not simply with a

naked idea but with an eternal reality. As a consequence of this,

morality has an incomparably higher certainty and vitality than if the

moral law appeared merely under the form of an idea. There can be no

more convincing logic than the word: "Ye shall be holy, for I the Lord

your God am holy" [Lev. xix, 2; xi, 44, 45; xx, 7; comp. Deut. x, 17

sqq.; 1 Pet. i, 15, 16; Eph. v, 1]; and Christ himself repeatedly

presents the moral essence of God as the true pattern for man, both in

general and in particular [Matt. v, 48; Luke vi, 36]. Even as in

education there is no better moral instruction than that by personal

example, so is there also in the moral education of humanity no more

deeply influential moral revelation than that of the holy personality

of God; and as the child naturally seeks not so much to realize a

lifeless law as to become like a beloved and revered personal example,

so is it likewise the case in the moral development of humanity in

general; and this is not childlike immaturity, but rational truth; and

herein also is the child a proper example. In realizing morality man

does not present himself in the All as a solitarily-shining star, but

as a God-loved and God-loving image of the invisible God,--as a human

resplendence of His holiness.

A much deeper impression than that made by the revelation of the holy

personality of God through speech, is made by the revelation of the

same by actual reality in the person of Christ. We cannot answer here

the oft proposed question as to whether the Son of God would have

become man even had not sin entered into the world; the Scriptures give

us on this point no decision; and even those who affirm it do not place

the advent of the perfect man at the beginning of the race. Hence, even

in this view, the coming of Christ is not held as a necessary condition

of the moral life. But as Christ is in fact not merely the Redeemer

suffering for and through sin, but also the true personal manifestation

of the perfect image of God--the absolutely perfect prototype of human

morality,--hence, for us, who are no longer in the condition of

original sinlessness, the knowledge of pure morality is essentially

conditioned on a knowledge of Christ. The first sin-free human beings

needed not this historically-personal example in order to have a

truthful moral consciousness, and to be able to realize morality; but

we need it--we who have had to be redeemed from the curse and power of

sin; we need, also as a help to a knowledge of the morality of unfallen

man, this example that did not rise out of sin but stood above it. In a

much higher degree, in fact, than Christ is the example for the

redeemed, Is he the true criterion for a knowledge of unfallen human

nature; for there is much in the moral life of the Christian for which

Christ's own life cannot be a direct example; for instance, the

continuous struggle against the still-remaining sin in the human

heart,--in Christ there was no such struggle; to him every thing that

was sinful was foreign and external, but never inward and personal. On

the. contrary, there could be nothing in the moral life, of unfallen

man which could not be directly connected with the person of Christ,

though indeed, not all the special phases of human morality could have

their particular expression in the life of Christ. Thus we have

occasion here to make at least allusion to Christ.

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SECTION LXXIV.

God is the basis of the moral, (3), in that, omnipresently ruling and

judging in his universe, He wisely, lovingly, and justly guides and

furthers toward its eternal goal the moral life of his creatures,

without, however; interfering with their moral freedom. This

consciousness gives to the moral life full confidence and joy in the

fulfillment of the divine will, and the proper fear of all that is

ungodly.

The thought of a merely impersonal moral world-order may seem in itself

simple and attractive; for real life, however, it is of no efficiency.

Even the proud equanimity of the Stoic is unable definitively to find

any better remedy for the antagonism of the reality of existence with

his self-conceived ideals, than suicide; and those who, in recent

times, assuming that the Christian World-view is gloomy and

unhumanitarian, prefer to it the domination of eternal impersonal

necessity, and explain away all evil and anarchy as mere appearance,

gain after all from this pretended self-explaining and all-reconciling

view, little other profit than a complacent satisfaction with

themselves and with their own system.. So long as man cannot rid

himself of his consciousness of freedom and of the possibility of its

misuse, as well as of his consciousness of the reality of evil in the

world, just so long will the notion of a world-order unembodied in a

personal God prove to be powerless. The Greek had a much higher

world-theory than that of ordinary Pantheism, and yet he could not

explain away the antagonism that exists between the moral life and

non-moral fate, or the excess of real evil; and he gave utterance, in

his noblest intellectual productions, either to a melancholy lament

over the mysterious tragedy of life, or to a blank hopelessness as to

the triumph of the good. Greek tragedy is, by far, more moral than the

anti-Christian Pantheism of recent date. To feel and bewail the

antagonism of existence even with out-spoken hopelessness, approximates

more nearly the truth than to explain it away with delusive sophistry.

In a world where the misuse of moral freedom may create evil and

disturb the harmony of existence, there can be hopefulness and

confidence in moral effort only in virtue of a firm faith in the

personally-ruling almighty and holy God; without this there is for the

rational spirit no possibility of an unshaken conviction that a truly

moral conduct will, in fact, bring real fruit, and not prove to be a

useless vain undertaking, an empty play of a restless

activity-instinct.--We are here as yet not dealing with a world

actually disordered by sin; but also for the unfallen state all moral

effort becomes impossible, becomes even idle folly, so soon as we

assume even the possibility of a disturbance of the harmony of the

world,--unless there exists at the same time the consciousness of a

holy God freely ruling above all creature-life, and conducting the

moral order of the universe. But the possibility of such a disturbance

through the misuse of freedom, is directly implied in the idea of

freedom. Hence the notion of a merely general world-order without a

personally-ruling God does not suffice, even for the unfallen state, to

give to moral effort the necessary confidence. The question is here as

to a certainty not merely that the moral efforts of the individual will

bear the expected fruit for himself,--though we must consider this also

as a perfectly legitimate claim,--but also, in general, that his moral

efforts will not be in vain for the furtherance of the perfection of

the whole,--will not be counteracted by the possibly interfering power

of evil. Without the confidence that by virtue of the all-potent wisdom

of the personal God, all truly moral effort will bear legitimate fruit,

and that evil can never prevent him who continues faithful, from

reaching the last and highest goal of the moral, and that consequently

the anarchy that evil Brings into the world will fall only on the heads

of the evil-doers, while even the "prince of this world" can effect

nothing against the just [John xiv, 30],--without this confidence, the

courage and vitality of all morality are paralyzed. Also in the

unfallen state human knowledge must still be limited,--must be unable

to see into the ultimate depths and ends of existence, and least of all

into the future. Hence, without confidence there is no means of rising

above doubt as to the success of moral effort, and consequently also of

a degree of discouragement in the same. The true moral courage is not a

blind defiance of fate, but a rejoicing in the consciousness that all

things work to the good of those who love God [Rom. vii, 28], and that

"in Him we live and move and have our being" [Acts xvii, 28],--that

God, the ground and source of all morality, is not far from any one of

us, but works in and with us for the accomplishment of his holy

will.--And as effort for the good can be potent only through confidence

in God, so also is the moral dread of evil effectual only through the

fear of God. Not as if a mere fear of punishment were to restrain man

from evil, but rather a holy awe of the holy and all-knowing God. This

is also fear,--not, however, slavish, selfish fear, but moral

reverence, befitting shame in the presence of the pure and holy One. To

say that man should shun evil even irrespectively of God, is empty

talk; if he believes in God, then he cannot leave Him out of thought at

the sight of evil; and if he believes not in God, then he believes also

not in the holiness of the moral command, and he will in fact not shun

the evil,--he will simply deny it, as modern observation proves. The

fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, and also of morality [Psa.

cxi, 10]; "fear the Lord and keep his commandments," says the Preacher

[Eccles. xii, 13]; this is the fundamental idea of morality in the Old

Testament [comp. Deut. x, 12, 13]. There is one Lawgiver and Judge who

is able to save and destroy [James iv, 12]; in the unity of the

lawgiver and judge lies the guarantee and holy potency of morality.

Whoever believes, not merely in an All, but in the living God, and

knows that all that is hidden from human eyes is known to the

all-knowing One, and that all secret sins rest under the curse of Him

who can kill and make alive, who can wound and heal, and out of whose

hand there is none that can deliver [Deut. xxvii, 15 sqq.; xxxii,

39],--such a one will evidently have a very different dread of evil

from that of him who regards it as a mere world-inherent necessary

transition-stage to perfection.

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SECTION LXXV.

God is the basis of the moral, (4), in that as holy Lawgiver he reveals

his eternal, holy will in time. The totality of created being is, in

the design of the creative will, to be in harmony with God and with

itself. The idea of this harmony, as active in God under the form of

will, is God's law. Unfree creatures have it as an inner necessity, and

must fulfill it; free creatures have it as a moral command, and should

fulfill it; for the former it exists as an unconscious instinct or

impulse, for the latter it is revealed; as God's law, it is made known

to rational creatures by revelation. The moral law is therefore the

revealed will of God as to the rational creature,--namely, that the

same should bring its entire life, consciously and with free will, into

harmony with God's purpose.

A law which cannot be derived from God's will is not a moral law, but

at best a civil one. That the moral law is based in the inner essence

of the human reason is not controverted by the proposition, that it is

God's will, but it is in fact confirmed. Human reason is conditioned by

the same divine will which wills the good; and as, among the goods

which God himself created, the highest is reason, hence the inner

essence of the reason must involve also the moral,--not, however, as

something conditioned independently of God, but in fact as God's will

revealed to the reason, in so far as the latter has kept itself

unclouded. However, this moral law, as immanent in the reason, is not

to be conceived as implying that the rational will gives law unto

itself; it is the part of the will to submit itself to the law, but not

to give it; the moral law is above the will, above human reason in

general; and the latter, in its consciousness of the same, recognizes

it in fact as divine, and consequently as absolutely valid and beyond

the scope of human determination. As little as man can give to himself

reason and its dialectical laws, so little can he give to himself moral

law. Freedom of will has to do only with the fulfilling, but not with

the conditioning of the law. The morally cognizing reason simply finds

revealed within itself the divine law, but does not make it. The

Scriptures uniformly present the moral law as being essentially the

will of God, without, however, thereby interfering with the idea that

the same is the expression of the inner purpose of being itself. "Be ye

transformed," says Paul, [Rom. xii, 2], "by the renewing of your mind,

that ye may prove what is that good and acceptable and perfect will of

God;" the "will" of God is here the fundamental; any thing is "good"

only because it expresses the will of God which is itself good per se;

the "acceptable" is that which is good relatively to the spirit that is

contemplating it,--that excites approbation in the rational spirit, and

is in harmony therewith,--in a word, that is in harmony with God and

his thoughts, and with God-related spirit in general; and the

"perfect," the goal-attaining, is whatever is the realization of the

divine and good end. Thus the apostle expresses the essence of the good

under all its phases; the good is good both as to its origin, as to the

cognizing spirit, and as to its end.

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SECTION LXXVI.

In treating of the moral law as the expression of the divine will, we

have two points to consider, first, the communication of this law by

God to man, and then its inner essence.

I. THE REVELATION OF THE DIVINE WILL TO MAN.

This revelation reveals to us not only the contents of the divine law,

but must also reveal it as the divine will. This manifestation of the

holy will of God is of a twofold character. In reason, which is the

more especial embodiment of the divine image, and which is consequently

the God-ward phase of man, man has the power of recognizing the divine

will in regard to reason,--the rational life-purpose of the rational

spirit. Hence, by virtue of his rationality, man has the divine law in

himself as a personal knowledge attained to through free

self-development. The divine will-revelation is therefore primarily an

inner revelation within the rational spirit conditioned by the creative

will itself. As, however, this knowledge cannot be a directly-given

one, but must be first attained to by morally-spiritual activity, hence

it cannot be for morality the sufficient antecedent condition. There is

a necessity therefore, in order to the commencement of the

morally-rational life of humanity, of a special training of the same by

God unto moral knowledge,--of a direct extraordinary objective

revelation by means of which man may have from the very beginning a

definite consciousness as to the divine will, and a firm guarantee of

the truth.

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(a) The extraordinary, positive and supernatural revelation of the

divine will, in the educative guidance of man by God, precedes indeed

his own reason-knowledge as arising from the inner, general, natural

revelation, but in a normal development of man it then gradually

retires into the back-ground in proportion as his spiritual ripening

advances. Its purpose is to awaken rational knowledge, and to conduct

the awakened spirit to its spiritual majority; and hence it involves

the virtualizing of the moral freedom and of the independent

personality of the rational spirit.

The seeming contradiction that lies in the facts, that rational

knowledge cannot be given in an immediate and ready form, but must be

first attained to through moral effort, and that, on the other hand,

all moral activity presupposes already the consciousness of the moral,

is reconciled solely and simply by the fact that the creating God is

also an educating one,--that He reveals to man Himself and his

will,--even as also the child does not ripen to reason and maturity by

being abandoned to itself, but by being educated by reason and to

reason,--by having the moral consciousness which as yet slumbers in it

awakened by instruction, and, when once awakened, then strengthened by

actual moral example. Without instruction and training the child never

becomes a truly rational person; and when, in harmony with the

Christian system, we affirm the same thing of the first man, we do not

thereby state anything inconsistent with the nature of man, but in fact

simply that which is implied in the very nature of rational

spirit-development. If for a moment we should, with Rousseau, conceive

of the first generations of man as in a condition of animal unculture,

creeping on all fours, and without speech, then we are utterly unable

to learn from any of the champions of this theory in what manner these

human-like animals could ever attain to reason and to a moral

consciousness. We have in fact, in the case of the uncivilized tribes

of the race--who, low as they are, are yet not so low as the

above-supposed semi-men,--positive proof that man when once sunk into

the condition of a savage never again rises to a higher culture, of his

own strength.

Without a consciousness of God and of his will, man is as yet, on the

whole, not rational; but man was created by God after his own image,

and hence unto reason and unto morality. This implies of itself that

this consciousness was necessarily shared in even by the first man. Now

as man knows nothing of nature save as nature communicates herself to

him through sensuous impressions, so also can man know nothing of God

unless God reveals himself to him; and in fact a God who should not

reveal himself is utterly unconceivable. If now a consciousness of the

moral, that is of God's will, is the necessary antecedent condition of

all moral activity, and if, at the same time, all real rational

knowledge springs from a moral using of such knowledge, then is it

perfectly self-evident that the beginning of this knowledge must have

been directly prompted by God himself. The fact that this first

revelation is termed, in distinction from the self-wrought-out

knowledge, an extraordinary and supernatural one, does not imply that

it stands in contradiction or antagonism to the inner revelation in the

self-developing spirit. On the contrary it is for the development of

humanity in general both very natural and in harmony with general

order; for, all life of individual objects, both in the spiritual and

in the natural world, requires a first stimulation, an awakening

influence from other already developed objects and beings; and this

stimulating rises toward educative training in proportion as the

perfection of the species rises; man has therefore, by virtue of his

rational nature, a claim upon an educative influence from the rational

spirit; and this is in fact the historical revelation. Man is not by

his birth or creation already really a morally-rational spirit, he

becomes so only by an educative influence from the rational spirit, and

hence, in the case of the first man, from a primarily objective

revelation from God. This revelation, however, does not remain in this

objective character, but, in stimulating man to a moral consciousness

and to moral activity, it brings him to the inner revelation in the

rational nature of man himself--to a consciousness of his own

God-likeness, and hence also to a consciousness of the divine

prototype. The first man sustained to God an absolutely child-like

relation, as to an educating father; and such is precisely the Biblical

account of the primitive state. If we do not presuppose such an

educative primitive revelation of the moral, then, either the moral law

would have to exist, (as in irrational nature-creatures, so also in

man) as a direct instinctive impulse,--in which case man would not be a

moral being, but only a peculiar species of animal; or, a rational

knowledge of the moral would have to be already created in him,--which

would be contrary to all our notions of man's spiritual development,

and surely a much greater miracle than the one which it was designed to

dispense with. That which has no need of training is either not a

rational being, or it is God himself. The educative revelation

presupposes indeed a corresponding moral endowment in man; but this

moral endowment, the unconscious germ of the moral, has need, in order

to its developing itself into reality, of a spiritual training. This

training does not create the moral consciousness, but only awakens

it--gives to it primarily definite contents, which the thus stimulated

morally rational consciousness then perceives as not in antagonism but

as in harmony with itself, and for that very reason appropriates to

itself.

In order to man's being really moral he must be conscious that in his

free acting he freely subordinates himself to the will of God; but he

can do this only when he recognizes the moral, not merely as such, but

also as being of divine origin, and this he can do only when he

distinguishes the divine will from his own; this distinguishing,

however, is possible, for the first man, only when the divine will

presents itself to him as other than his own, as objective to

him,--when God expressly reveals himself to him. On this definite

distinguishing of one's own personal, from the divine will, depends all

morality; a merely unconscious following of propension is not moral,

but immoral. Man must become conscious that he does this or that act

not simply because it pleases him, but that it pleases him because it

pleases God. In this conscious, discriminating, free choosing of the

divine will as distinguished from the merely natural individual will,

man is expected to discover his essential difference from nature, his

belonging to the kingdom of God; he is to learn to distinguish between

"can" and "should," between his ability and his obligation, and thus to

become conscious of his moral destination to freedom. Were the moral

consciousness or the moral impulse inborn in man, then he could not

come to a consciousness of his freedom--of his ability morally to rise

above his merely individual being, and freely to choose the divine.

Herein lies the high moral significancy of the notion of an historical

divine revelation. In the interest of freedom, in the interest of the

training of man into a moral personality, we would have been forced

philosophically, to presuppose such a revelation, did we not already

know of it from Biblical teaching.

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SECTION LXXVII.

(b) The inner revelation of the holy will of God in the rational

consciousness of man is not a mere instinctive impulse, as this is the

characteristic of irrational nature-creatures, nor is it a mere

feeling, inasmuch as this, so far as relating to spiritual things,

always presupposes a knowledge, a consciousness, but it is a real

consciousness, which, however, is at first only obscure and indefinite,

and receives more definite contents only through educative revelation,

whereby it is developed into full clearness. The inner and the

objective revelations, though differing from each other as to the order

of their taking-place and as to their form, do not differ in their

essential contents, nor indeed as to their certainty; and the objective

revelation is no more rendered superfluous by the inner one, than is

the latter by the former; each mutually calls for the other.

Just as the educative influencing of the child does not render

superfluous its own active moral self-development, but in fact calls

for the same as its end, and as the latter without the former is not

possible, so is it also with the twofold revelation. If the historical

revelation did not lead to a knowledge of the moral law as immanent in

the reason itself, man would remain in perpetual nonage,--would not

come to a consciousness of his rationality; in fact this revelation has

its own withdrawal into the back-ground as its ultimate end,--as indeed

since the accomplishment of redemption it has actually, in a large

degree, so withdrawn.--By inner revelation, here, is not to be

understood a real inspiration as in the case of the prophets, for this

would in fact be supernatural and extraordinary; it is simply the

gradual coming forward of the divine image in man,--the rational

spirit's becoming-conscious of itself as such image. This

becoming-conscious on the part of one's own rational nature is properly

called a revelation, for the reason that this God-likeness is not

conditioned by man himself but is created by God in the state of a

germ, and is by the free activity of man, simply developed. The

positive revelation is the light whereby this divine image, hidden in

man's inner nature, becomes visible to his understanding, or more

properly, it is the warming sunlight under whose influence the germ of

rationality unfolds itself out of secrecy into day. The inner

revelation is neither in antagonism to, nor is it identical with, the

objective; it is no more in antagonism therewith than is man's own

active self-development to moral maturity in antagonism with his

training received from others; nor is it so nearly identical therewith

as to amount to a repetition of the same thing. Their respective

difference of origin continues to hold good also for the morally

mature; even for the regenerated Christian, though he possesses the law

of the Spirit as a living power within him, the historical revelation

continues to serve as a permanent unvarying basis for the development

of his moral consciousness, and as a sure criterion for testing the

truth of the light within him; Christ came not to destroy the law.--As

in their origin, so also in their form, they are different; the

positive revelation bears a thoroughly historical character; the inner,

a psychological. The former assumes the form of positive laws given at

particular times, and through particular personal instrumentalities;

the latter is continuous in every individual throughout his life.

On this inner revelation through the God-likeness of the rational

spirit the Scriptures lay some stress, notwithstanding that they speak

of it simply in connection with man as perverted by sin, in whom the

natural consciousness of God and of his will is seriously obscured and

in need of special illumination,--for which reason the natural inner,

and the supernatural inner, revelations are not strictly and formally

distinguished. In allusion to moral wisdom, it is said: "It is the

spirit in man, the breath of the Most High, that gives him

understanding" [Job xxxii, 8; comp. Prov. xx, 27]; and it is prophesied

of the new Covenant: "I will put my law in their inward parts, and

write it in their hearts" [Jer. xxxi, 33],--as in contrast to the Old

Covenant under which the law was predominantly objective and in sharp

antagonism to the sin-blinded heart. But what is true of the New

Covenant is likewise true of the unfallen state. This prophecy refers,

it is true, to the working of the Holy Spirit, but unfallen man was per

se already filled with this Spirit. Paul speaks of a natural

consciousness of God and of the moral, even in the heathen [Rom. i, 19

sqq.]; by how much more must this be true of man as unfallen. This

natural God-consciousness is the general manifestation of that "life"

which was the light of men [John i, 4].

It is a favorite manner with some to speak of a moral "feeling," and

even of a moral instinctive "impulse," as the primitive germ which

subsequently develops itself into a moral consciousness. If by such

feeling or impulse so much is meant as a knowledge as yet indistinct--a

presentiment rather than a comprehension,--we can readily admit it,

though in any case the expressions are very inappropriate, and serve

only to confusion. Understood in their proper sense, we must

emphatically reject them; for feeling is simply an immediate

becoming-conscious of a state occasioned in the subject by an

impression, and is hence always of a merely subjective and strictly

individual nature, whereas the moral law is per se necessarily

objective and universal--an idea; an idea cannot be felt, but must be

known, though indeed this knowledge may be primarily as yet indistinct.

A direct feeling can be occasioned only by a sensuous impression; of

spiritual things I can have a feeling properly so-called, only after

they have become an object of my cognizing consciousness; every feeling

presupposes either a sensuous impression or an idea, a conception. To

consider feeling, in the sphere of the religiously-moral, as the

fundamental antecedent condition before all knowledge, is simply to

confound an, as yet indistinct, anticipatory consciousness with feeling

proper, and poorly serves to the attainment of scientific clearness.

Still less can we speak of a moral impulse; in the strict sense of the

word, as the primitive antecedent; an impulse that does not rest on a

moral consciousness belongs not to the sphere of the moral but to that

of the merely natural, and in the exact proportion that we attribute

power to some such pretended impulse, we violate the freedom of the

will. If an unconscious impulse toward the good is the primitive

antecedent in man, then is a choice of the evil utterly impossible. If,

however, we should assume, as the primitive condition, that there were

in man contradictory impulses, the one toward the good, the other

toward the evil, still we would not, by this anarchical duality,

safeguard the freedom of the will, if we did not assume as above these

mutually conflicting impulses, also a higher moral

consciousness,--whereby in fact the hypothesis itself would be

destroyed.

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SECTION LXXVIII.

The revelation of the divine will to the moral subject, as given in the

rational self-consciousness, is the conscience. This is not an

originally ready power, but, as given at first only in germ, it must be

developed,--stands in need of culture, primarily by God himself, and,

in all after the first generation. by the already morally-matured

spirit of men; and with its further moral development it constantly

becomes more definite, more clear and more rich in contents. Now, as

sin separates man from God and from the knowledge of Him, and also

damagingly affects the moral training received from others, it is clear

that the conscience has its full purity and power only in a sinless

state.--As relating to the moral life-manifestations, the conscience

appears as a morally-judging power, and as such it is either in harmony

with the particular manner of action--in which case it awakens a joyous

feeling of approval,--or it is in antagonism therewith, and in this

case it awakens a painful feeling of disapproval; and either feeling

prompts to a corresponding course of action. As the conscience is a

revelation of the moral law as the divine will, hence it never exists

without a God-consciousness,--it is itself, in fact, one of the phases

of this consciousness, and is per se of a religious character, and is

inexplicable from the mere world-consciousness. In its germ it is a

primitive and not a derived power, and in this sense it is already

presupposed on the entrance of the positive divine revelation. The

actual acceptance of this revelation is of itself already a moral act

which presupposes the conscience; but the latter is excited to activity

and to full development only by the positive revelation. Conscience is

essentially an integral part of man's God-likeness,--is, like

rationality in general, a divine life-power imparted to the creature.

The conscience is in its essence, not different from the

God-consciousness, but is only the bearing of the God-consciousness

upon the moral; as relating to the good, it relates also to God, for

none is good but God alone [Matt. xix, 17]; and God is the criterion of

all good, for the good is the God-answering; a conscience which is not

a God-consciousness is a perverted, an unanchored one. As the

conscience is an inner revelation of God to man, we place its

discussion in this section, although it is an essential element of the

moral subject.--The manners of conceiving of the conscience differ very

widely; it is, in turn, regarded either as a cognizing consciousness,

or as a feeling, or as an instinctive impulse; and consequently it is

sought for in all the different spheres of the soul-life; it is indeed

true that the conscience cannot be real without embracing in itself all

three of these spheres; and hence the word may be used in all three

significations. In the expression: "Conscience says to me," or "it

approves this and rejects that," it is conceived of as a cognizing,

judging consciousness; but we also speak of a joyous, or a chastising

conscience; and again we say: "conscience compels me to this act or

deters me from it." The question, however, is: which of the three

phases is the primitive, the fundamental one? which constitutes the

essence of the conscience? According to what we have previously said as

to the relation of feeling and willing to the cognizing consciousness,

it follows very plainly that the essence of the conscience is to be

found in that which its name directly expresses in various languages,

namely, a being-certain, hence a certain knowing, a cognizing

consciousness; in the New Testament the term suneidesis--(from sunoida,

conscious sum, strictly: "I am a fellow-knower," and in a higher sense:

"I know with God," in whom all knowledge centers),--an associate

knowing with God, in virtue of his indwelling in rational creatures, is

used of the conscience, both in so far as it leads to the good (agathe

suneidesis, or kale or kathara), and in so far as, by reproving, it

punishes evil [John viii, 9]; and the same word is used also directly

in the sense of religious consciousness, presenting the conscience as a

consciousness of the divine will [1 Peter ii, 19; Rom. xiii, 5; Heb.

ix, 9]. The conscience, as differing from the enlightening influence of

the Holy Spirit [Rom. ix, 1], is a power inherent in the essence of man

per se, see Rom. ii, 14, 15; in this passage the logismoi are not the

conscience, but the reflections that spring from the conscience, which

itself is the "work of the law written in the hearts," that is, the

consciousness of the contents, of the requirements of the moral law;

Paul is not speaking here of the true and perfect conscience, but of

the natural conscience of sinful man; the essential features of the

true conscience, however, still lurk in the disordered one; and this

essential character appears here evidently as a consciousness of the

moral. In the Old Testament the conscience is designated by the word

heart, lvv [Job xxvii, 6].

The conscience is not a mere simple knowing, it is an utterance of the

practical reason, a direct judging of moral thoughts and actions, an

approving or condemning witness as to the moral conduct of man [2 Cor.

i, 12; v, 11; Rom. xiv, 22; Acts xxiii, 1; xxiv, 16; 2 Tim. i, 3; 1

Peter iii, 16; Heb. xiii, 18]. Such a judging presupposes the

consciousness of a moral law, according to which the decisions are

made; and this consciousness is the inner essence of conscience itself.

The conscience is a judging power, for the reason that it is per se a

consciousness of the law as the divine will; it utters itself

discriminating and deciding (krinon) because it is mindful of the

eternal ground of the holy,--because it is the inner essence of the

divine image as coming to self-consciousness; this latter is the

essence of the conscience, the judging is its active

manifestation.--The conscience can be awakened, cultivated, and refined

by human instruction, but not generated; it is a perpetual witnessing

of God as to himself and his holy will in the rational spirit of man,

and for this simple reason it is not within the control of man, but is

a power above him; it may be silenced temporarily, and led astray in

its particular utterance as a discriminating power, but it can never be

eradicated nor definitively perverted. It is not the person, strictly

speaking, who has the conscience, but it is the conscience that has the

person; it dwells indeed in the individual personality, but it is not

itself of subjective character, since it is of divine quality; it does

not express my personal peculiarity, but the holy will of God in regard

to me. Conscience is the fact of the divine morality in man antecedent

to all human morality; it is the germ proper of man's

God-likeness,--the God-likeness itself as bearing relation to free

conduct, in so far as this consciousness constitutes a part of the

essence of rationality. Without this divine germ of the moral in man,

morality would be impossible--as impossible as is seeing without

eyesight, no matter how much light there might be, or instruction

without previously existing rationality as a basis. A convicting by

argumentation is possible only when there is antecedently existing in

the subject some certain knowledge wherewith the new truth shall agree.

What axioms are in mathematics, that is the conscience in the moral

sphere. He who does not recognize the axioms, and hence has, as it

were, no mathematical conscience, is beyond the reach of instruction.

He alone can become rational and moral, and live so, who is so already

in the original structure of his being; and this deepest ground of

moral rationality is in fact the conscience. He in whom the witness of

the holy God does not witness for the holy, cannot be moral; but such

an abandoned one there cannot be in the entire creation of God, for to

none has he "left himself without witness." A man may become ungodly,

may be unconscientious, and yet not be free from the power of

conscience; he may deprive himself of his eyes, but not of his reason,

and consequently not of his conscience. For this simple reason, every

sin is a fall of man from his own proper nature, an unfaithfulness

toward himself. Conscience rests on the. discrimination of the personal

creature and its will from the personal God and his will; it finds its

universal expression in the words of the Lord: "Not my will but thine

be done." Whoever supposes himself to act from necessity, or merely

according to his own individual will, for him the idea of the

conscience is obscured; the irreligious are necessarily

unconscientious. It is for the simple reason that it is not the

individual ego, but the divine, that speaks in the conscience, that

there can be a reproving, an evil, conscience, in which the difference

of this twofold ego appears in an irreducible antithesis. But this

voice of the divine ego does not first come to the consciousness of the

individual ego, from without; rather does every external revelation

presuppose already this inner one; there must echo out from within man

something kindred to the outer revelation, in order to its being

recognized and accepted as divine. Even as Adam at the first sight of,

the woman recognized at once that she was flesh of his flesh, so

recognizes man immediately on the utterance of the divine will by

special revelation that this is spirit of that spirit which dwells and

speaks within him,--not, however, as his individual ego, but as

distinct from it, and as having uncontested right to rule over it.

The first manifestation of conscience in the Scriptures appears in the

words wherein Eve opposes the temptation: "We may eat of the fruit of

the trees of the garden; but of the fruit of the tree which is in the

midst of the garden, God hath said: ye shall not eat of it." Here Eve

distinguishes the command, as the divine will, from her own will; which

latter, however, she afterward carries out; but this adversely judging

conscience presupposes a previous first activity of the same, namely,

the recognition of the divine command as obligating. The command itself

spoke in fact, primarily, only to the understanding; the recognition of

it as divine, as a legitimate determining authority for the individual

will, the receiving of it into the heart, and the willingness to

conform the individual volitions to it,--all this is not a matter of

the cognizing understanding, nor in general of the individual spirit as

such, but of that divine element in man which responds to the divine

command--the conscience; and in the very first utterance of this power,

it shows itself primarily, indeed as a consciousness, but then

straightway also as a feeling of love as toward the congenial, the

right, and as a willingness arising from this consciousness and this

love.

The cognizing activity of the conscience relates primarily and directly

only to the God-pleasing, and not also to the God-repugnant; for the

former is real, but not the latter, and all true and real cognition

relates to something real. Hence the second phase of conscience, that

where men's "eyes are opened" and they "know the good and the evil,"

does not belong to the primative and pure conscience, but is a

manifestation of the conscience as already in antagonism to the moral

actuality of man. As primarily relating to the Godlike, and hence as

attended by a feeling of approbation, the conscience has originally

nothing to do with fear of punishment, but is on the contrary an

expression of peace with God; fear presupposes already a disturbed

harmony and a knowledge of good and evil; hence in the Scriptures we

find conscience expressly distinguished from fear. [Rom. xiii, 5.]

According to Rothe, conscience is the divine activity in its passive

form, that is, it is the soul's self-activity as being determined by

the body, or, in general, by material nature, and, in the final

instance, by the divine self-activity, or, in general, by God

himself,--that is, it is instinctive impulse as religious. In his

opinion conscience lies not on the side of the self-consciousness, but

on that of the self-activity, and relates not to conceptions and to the

understanding, but to volitions and to actions. Conscience has

essentially an individual character,--is of subjective, not of

objective, nature; hence it is not correct to speak of a tribunal of

conscience. "The conscience of another has not the least binding force

for me, but only my own; when an appeal is made to conscience, there

all further discussion is cut off, there all objective arguments become

powerless; whatever is a matter of conscience to me is to me a sanctum

sanctorum which none dare violate"--not even for objective reasons; nor

does my conscience bind any one else. Conscience is essentially a

religious instinct-impulse; and as being an activity of God in man

under the form of an instinctive impulse, and hence also a sensuously

perceptible one, it is attended by sensuously-somatic phases of

feeling. Now every instinct-impulse is either positive or negative,

hence conscience is either approbative or disapprobative; as

disapprobative it is religious aversion,--an instinctive impulse toward

the counterworking of the sin (hence stings of conscience); as

approbative it is the religious appetite. Rothe takes occasion here to

complain seriously of the hitherto prevalent confusion of phraseology

on this subject,--namely, in view of the fact that conscience is

treated of, sometimes as a propension, sometimes as a moral feeling,

sometimes as a religious feeling, sometimes as such and such an

instinct-impulse, or as such and such a sense; in this, however, he is

manifestly unjustifiable; it is to no good purpose to quarrel with

language which is, in fact, often profounder and truer than the boldest

theoretical systems: No one has a right arbitrarily to define ideas

contrarily to the general consciousness, and then to find fault with

language because it does not harmonize with the definitions. In the

present case we find language perfectly justifiable in making so wide a

use of the term conscience, inasmuch as all the above phases are in

fact embraced in it, though indeed not in equal degrees. The strange

notion that conscience rests on a determination of the personal soul by

the material body, so that by implication a rational spirit without a

material body would not have any conscience, we pass over in silence,

and make only the following observations. Should we admit that

conscience relates to volition and action, it does not follow from this

that it is not per se, and primarily, a consciousness; thought in fact

may influence volition; and the necessary presupposition of every

volition is a thought; but an unconscious instinct-impulse is neither

religious nor moral, but irrational. The fact is, conscience lies most

strictly on the side of the self-consciousness; otherwise an evil

conscience could not contain a self-accusation. That the conscience is

of subjective nature is only in so far correct as it constitutes an

integral element of rational personality; but it is entirely incorrect

in Rothe to reduce it to a mere individually-subjective phenomenon, and

entirely to deprive it of objective character. If conscience is to be

at all of a rational character, it must have a general, and hence also

an objective significancy. That which is merely subjective has not the

least moral significancy, rather is it the opposite of the moral; what

is holy for me must be also holy per se and before God, and what is

holy before God must be holy for all moral creatures. My conscience is

true only in so far as it is an expression of the moral idea; but the

moral idea is not of a merely subjective nature. For every Christian,

it is a matter of conscience to follow Christ; this holds good in

general as well as in particular, and not simply for me as such and

such a particular person. The more the conscience bears a merely

subjective character, the more defective it is; in a normal condition

of humanity all moral consciences would necessarily be essentially

concordant, inasmuch as there is only one God and only one divine will,

and inasmuch as conscience is the expression of this will. Rothe comes

himself into violent contradiction with his assertions, in that he

makes conscience to be determined by a divine activity; for this divine

activity must be objective to the subject; and, as of a holy character,

it certainly does not determine each individual to a different

decision: and a little farther on Rothe himself takes this position:

that the conscience as an activity of God in man, has a direct and

unconditional authority, and from which man cannot in any manner

escape; that arguments avail nothing as against conscience,--that

perfectly convincing arguments may be urged and yet the conscience

remain unmoved; that consequently conscience is also infallible, that

it never deceives and is incapable of being bribed; and that though we

may blind ourselves as to its decision, yet it is itself not to be

deceived. These positions, so utterly extreme and so contrary to all

experience, are manifestly irreconcilable with his previous position,

namely, that conscience, being entirely devoid of objective character,

is a mere subjective phenomenon; for in the notion of an authority in

conscience, and especially of an unconditional one, it is manifestly

implied that the subject is subordinate thereto. [9] --According to

Schenkel (Dogmatik, 1858, I, 135 sqq.) the conscience is a special

faculty of the human soul, or rather that one of its organs which has

to do with religious functions, whereas the reason and the will do not

relate directly to God but to the world; this conscience, in which the

God-consciousness is primarily and immediately given, is at the same

time also the ethical central-organ. What is to be gained by this freak

of fancy it is difficult to determine. When men thus arbitrarily, and

contrary to prevalent usage, limit the notion of the reason and the

will, it is of course an easy matter to discover new faculties of the

soul and new organs of the same; but whether anything important is

gained thereby, and whether the supposed epoch-making new discovery

will meet with much favor, we may seriously doubt.--Trendelenburg shows

much more circumspection and acumen in considering conscience as the

reaction and pro-action of the total God-centered man against the man

as partial, especially against the self-seeking part of himself

(Naturrecht, 1860, � 39).

II.--THE ESSENCE OF THE MORAL LAW AS THE DIVINE WILL.

SECTION LXXIX.

The essence of the moral law as the divine will cannot be deduced from

the nature of man alone, but essentially only from the idea of God as

ruling righteously in his creation.--(a) As morality rests on freedom,

and as freedom consists in the fact that a man chooses, by a personal

independent volition, a particular mode of action among several

possible ones, hence every moral action is at the same time the leaving

undone of a possible contrary action. The moral law is therefore per se

always twofold; it is command and prohibition at the same time, and

consequently there is in fact no essential difference whether the law

appears in the one or in the other form; and as the moral life of man

is a continuous one, hence he must at every moment of time be

fulfilling a divine law; a mere non-doing would be a negation of the

moral. It is in consequence of the freedom of choice, and not in

consequence of sinfulness, that the divine law bears the form of a

"should."

Every presentation of the moral law from the stand-point of man alone,

that is, purely from the nature of man, without deriving it from God,

is anti-religious, and can never include the whole truth of the moral

idea. And in precise proportion as we conceive more highly of the moral

nature of man from that stand-point, we render unavoidable his

Pantheistic exaltation into the highest realization of God himself--the

putting of man in the place of the personal God. We cannot possibly

understand the moral law save as the divine purpose in regard to free

creatures, and we can base it on the nature of man only in so far as we

recognize in and through this nature the divine creative will, the

fulfillment of which lies in the realized moral perfection of man.

The fact that any particular action is morally good, necessarily

implies as possible a contrary, or non-good one; and the commanding of

the former is per se a prohibiting of the latter; every command

directly implies the prohibition of the contrary form of action. Now it

might seem as if the converse did not hold good, namely, that a

prohibition does not imply at the same time also a command; the laws:

thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, seems to require

simply a non-doing. This, however, would be possible only on condition

that a mere non-doing were in general a moral possibility. But as life

is strictly continuous in all of its stages, and as even a momentary

real cessation of life is death, hence least of all can the highest

form of life, the moral life, be a non-living, a simple non-doing,

without thereby turning into the contrary, namely, into spiritual and

moral death. As the human spirit, even in the deepest sleep as

conditioned by the weariness of the body, is never idle, but keeps up

an activity in remembered or unremembered dreaming, so also the highest

form of spirit life, the moral life, is never interrupted by a pure

inactivity. Hence a prohibition that should include in itself no

contents of a positive character, no command, could not be of a moral

nature. The moral non-doing of a morally prohibited action is in and of

itself necessarily the doing of the contrary. Hence, Luther, in his

elucidation of the Commandments, is strictly right in never leaving

them in the form of a simple "thou shalt not;" but in uniformly

deducing from them a very positive "thou shalt." The law: "thou shalt

not kill," though in form a simple prohibition, nevertheless directly

implies the enjoining of all that man, in his intercourse with others,

ought to do as contrasting with the disposition that leads to murder;

we should not only not kill our neighbor, but we should help and succor

him in all his bodily perils;--a mere non-doing in the face of such

perils would be a direct violation of the law. If man is not to commit

adultery, then must he, in the conjugal relation, not only not do any

thing that stimulates and nurtures an adulterous disposition, but he

must do the contrary thereof; that is, he must live purely and chastely

in words and acts, and love and honor his own consort.

Nevertheless it is not indifferent as to which of the two forms the

moral law assumes; the difference, however, lies not in the essence,

but in the practical educative adaptation. As the essence, the end, of

the moral life is not negative but has positive contents, the true and

perfect form of the law is in fact that of the express command; "thou

shalt" is higher than "thou shalt not." But for man while as yet

undeveloped to moral maturity, the form of prohibition is the more

obvious and simple, since, on the one hand, it brings his moral liberty

of choice more clearly to his consciousness, and, with the exclusion of

the immoral, opens to him the whole field of the discretionary, and

since, on the other, it establishes protecting limits for the field

within which he is to train himself up to moral maturity, to a

consciousness of the good. With the child, education always begins in

the prohibiting of what conflicts with its well-being; God's first law

to man was a free throwing-open of the field of the discretionary in

connection with a limiting prohibition [Gen. ii, 16, 17], whereas the

real command appears primarily only in the general form of a blessing,

as expressive of the goal of moral effort, the good [Gen. i, 28]. While

the Mosaic Commandments bear predominately the character of

prohibition, Christ sums up the moral contents of the divine law in the

form of a positive command: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all

thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself;" and at the same time Christ

declares that this command embraces the whole ancient law. Hence, while

the essence of the divine law continues ever the same, the revelation

of it gradually advances from the predominantly prohibitory form to

that of the positive command.

As both forms of the divine law present a duty to the free will of man,

they both bear the expression of a command, a "should." This is the

form assumed by nearly all laws, from the first one given to Adam to

the perfect laws of Christ. Since the time of Schleiermacher, however,

many take offense at this "should," and strive to banish it, at least,

from the pure moral law. In Schleiermacher's Philosophical Ethics, this

rejection of the "should" is entirely consequential; for here the moral

is quite as necessarily-determined a phenomenon of the universe as is

the natural, and for freedom of will there is no place whatever;

consequently ethics has no other task than simply to describe that

which takes place from necessity, but not to present laws under the

form of requirements, of duty. Rothe follows this view only up to a

certain point; he rejects the form of the "should" only for sinless

man, as indeed also one cannot apply the idea of "should" to God; only

for sinful man can the moral appear as a duty (Eth. I, Auf., � 817). As

relating to God this is doubtless correct, inasmuch as God's freedom is

not human liberty of choice, and as it absolutely excludes the

possibility of sinning, and since God is absolutely his own law. But as

relating to free creatures, even though they be as yet perfectly

sinless, it is erroneous,--at least unless we are to regard the moral

perfection of the same as a cessation of all freedom of choice and

likewise of all moral duty. As long as man does not cease to propose to

himself moral ends, and freely to aim to reach them, so long will duty

as yet continue. This form of the law would be unsuitable for perfect

man only when it should be conceived of as something uncongenial to

man, as some sort of oppressive yoke, which, however, is by no means

the case. The as yet unrealized state of a freely-to-be-attained goal

always implies a "should." It is only from some such misconception as

if the "should" implied something foreign and burdensome to man, that

we can explain why even Harless limits the application of this word to

the fallen state (Christl. Ethik, 6 Auf., p. 80 sqq.). There is,

however, no shadow of censure in the form "thou shouldst;" in fact,

there is for the free will no other form of law conceivable than that

of the "should." Without a distinguishing of the divine will from that

of the subject, no real conscious morality is possible; and simply this

distinguishing and nothing more--not an antagonism of estrangement--is

contained in the idea of the "should." It is in this idea in fact that

morality and piety find their unity, the moral being conceived as the

divine will [Deut. x, 12; Micah vi, 8]. The child that does the good

for the reason that it knows that it is the will of its parents that it

should do so, stands morally higher than the one that does it without a

consciousness of its duty; the former, but not the latter, is able to

offer resistance to temptation; for temptation is overcome only by the

thought of the divine will, or of duty. A command does not presuppose a

contrary inclination, but only the possibility of sin, that is, it

presupposes freedom of will. In denying to man while as yet in a

sinless state all consciousness of the divine law, and supposing him to

act simply from a direct impulse of love, we not only contradict the

express declaration of the Scriptures as to a revelation of the divine

will to primitive man, but we also render the fall into sin an

impossibility.

SECTION LXXX.

(b) Whatever is morally good is God's will, and is hence also moral

law; and this law has, as God's will, an unconditional claim,--presents

itself always as a requirement from which there is no escape, and

cannot possibly be construed into a mere counsel the non-fulfillment of

which would not be a sin, and the voluntary fulfillment of which would

constitute a supererogatory merit. The moral goal of every human being

is moral perfection, and all that conducts thereto is for every such

being an absolute duty, that is, it is God's will and law concerning

him. No one can do more good than is required of him; for the human

will cannot be better than the divine, and God's law is not less good

than God's will. That which in the Scriptures has the appearance of

real moral counsel is simply a conditional law, the fulfillment of

which becomes a duty to the individual only under certain, not

universally-existing, circumstances; but wherever it does become a

duty, there it is so absolutely, and hence its non-fulfillment is a

violation of duty; and wherever it does not become a duty there its

fulfillment has no merit.

Here, for the first time, we meet an antagonism of moral views between

the different Christian churches; and it is a far-reaching one; and

from this point on, in our attempt to construct a system of Christian

ethics, and not simply of the ethical views of this or that church, we

must seek for the essence of Christianity, not merely in those

generalities which are common to all particular churches, but, wherever

two views are in irreconcilable antagonism, we must necessarily decide

for that one which is of a really Christian character, and cannot

regard both as equally legitimate. And although. the question in this

connection is nearly always, as to counsels to redeemed Christians,

still it properly belongs in this place, since in fact unfallen man

would be, even much more than the redeemed, in a condition to obtain a

higher merit than is strictly required.

On a superficial examination it might seem that by the dogma as to the

evangelical counsels (consilia as distinguished from praecepta) the

moral requirements were advanced higher than the generally-sufficient

degrees of morality; the fact is, however, the very opposite. The

notion that there is some good which is not also a duty, can only be

obtained by lowering the moral requirement from that of the highest

possible moral perfection to an inferior requirement; and a

supererogatory merit becomes possible only where the idea of the good

embraces more than the moral requirement. The Protestant church,

however, holds fast the view that all real good is absolutely a duty,

and hence that man is obligated to do all the good within his

power,--that he should unconditionally strive for the highest possible

perfection. The Protestant view as to the moral requirement stands

therefore higher than the opposing view. The Protestant church rejects

the notion of moral counsels, and of the meritoriousness of their

fulfillment, for the reason that it regards their contents as not

absolutely good, as not per se moral, but as only good under certain

not universally-existing circumstances, but as absolutely commanded

when those circumstances do exist. That which is good in a particular

conjuncture is, when that case arises, an absolute duty, and not a mere

discretionary and non-obligating counsel. The saying of Christ [Luke

xvii, 10]: "When ye shall have done all those things which are

commanded you, say: we are unprofitable servants,"--which is not

designed to disparage the worth of true morality, but simply to lead

man to humility by reminding him of his sinful state, and of his

redemption by grace alone,--is, however, applied by the theologians of

the Romish church to the doctrine of the evangelical counsels, in that

they say that man should in fact not remain a mere unprofitable

servant, but should be a child of God, as indeed also Christ was not an

unprofitable servant; and even some Protestant exegetes try to escape

this inference simply by referring the works here in question not to

Christian morality, but merely to the Mosaic law. We regard both the

inference, and this mode of escaping it as inadmissible. It is indeed

true, man should not be simply an unprofitable servant but a child of

God; but from this very fact it follows that that which morally

conditions this filial relation to God, must also be a positive moral

requirement and duty, and not a mere counsel, which we may leave

unfulfilled and yet not fail in doing all that is actually required of

us; man is in fact absolutely bound to become a child of God. Now as a

limitation of these words of Christ to the Mosaic law is not justified

by the context, seeing that just previously (verses 5, 6) the question

had been as to the power of faith, hence their true scope is, we think,

as follows: man, even though redeemed but not yet free from sin, is

unable by his dutiful works to acquire merit before God in such a sense

as that he could claim of God the blessedness of the children of God as

a reward due, and which God would be required by his justice to grant,

but on the contrary he can regard this blessedness only as a gracious

gift conferred upon him in virtue of his faith in the compassionate

love of God in Christ. To the works owed, it is not other non-owed and

hence supererogatory works that are compared, but faith, which, though

indeed also a moral requirement, yet differs essentially from works

properly so called (comp. verse 19; "thy faith hath made the whole").

Christ's utterance, therefore, teaches clearly the very opposite of

sanctification by works as prevailing in the Romish church.

The Romish church finds further support for its supererogatory good

works,--which consist essentially in intensified self-denial, that is,

in voluntary celibacy, poverty, obedience to man-devised rules,

solitary life, etc.,--in those texts of the New Testament which seem to

present celibacy and voluntary poverty as a higher morality not to be

expected of all Christians. To the rich young man, who, as he himself

affirmed, had kept all the commandments, Christ says [Matt. xix, 21]:

"If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast,--and give to the

poor, and then thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come and follow

me." Now, it is argued, the moral law does not in fact require of all

men the giving up of their possessions, and yet this young man had

fulfilled all the commands which Christ mentions to him; hence this

giving-up was over and above these commands. This is a very unfortunate

inference, for surely a morality which does not lead to the perfection

of man, can hardly be pure and required by God; and in the case of this

young man the giving-up of his riches was the condition of his

perfection, and hence, as we hold, an unconditional requirement, in

case he really desired to attain to the highest good. The young man in

declining the requirement failed, as Christ says, to have part in the

kingdom of heaven; all his presumed fulfillment of the law was

insufficient. Now this is in plain antagonism to the Romish doctrine,

according to which the fulfillment of the law, even without obedience

to the counsels, is amply sufficient to a participation in the kingdom

of heaven, whereas the supererogatory works simply serve to a more

speedy attainment thereof, or to a higher degree of blessedness. Hence

those who refuse to admit that certain particular actions become a duty

only under particular and not universally-existing relations, but that

when these do exist, then they become in fact a positive requirement,

would have no other alternative left, than to regard the requirement

made of the rich young man as a general duty for all Christians. We can

distinguish universally-valid commands from conditional ones, not,

however, moral commands from mere counsels. Also the conditional

commands are, when the particular conjuncture arrives, of absolute

obligation, and not to fulfill them is disobedience to God's command;

whereas, in the Romish view, the non-fulfillment of the counsels does

not incur the least moral blame.--When Paul says of himself [1 Cor. ix,

12-18] that he has denied himself many things to which he had a right,

that he has labored without charge, etc., the Romanists here find a

supererogatory work to which the Apostle was not obligated. Paul,

however, declares expressly that he so acted in order "not to abuse his

power [liberty] in the Gospel." Now if the taking advantage of his

discretionary power, under these particular circumstances, would have

been a misuse of his liberty, then the course of action adopted by the

apostle was evidently simply his duty, and by no means a supererogatory

work.--But the greatest emphasis is placed on the utterances of Christ

and of St. Paul as to abstaining from marriage: "All cannot receive

this saying, but they to whom it is given" [Matt. xix, 11]. Now, that

those who do not receive the saying can be believing Christians who

attain to the kingdom of God, although not to that higher stage of

salvation which is conditioned on supererogatory works as Romanists

understand it, is not only not said, but, to the contrary, it is said

that the self-chastening in question is done "for the kingdom of

heaven's sake," and hence plainly in the sense that the same is a

condition of attaining to the kingdom of heaven. But the opera

supererogationis of which one is found here, are not regarded as a

condition to participation in the kingdom of heaven. When Paul [1 Cor.

vii] commends to Christians to abstain from marriage, this is certainly

not offered as a universally-applying command, but manifestly as a mere

counsel (comp. verse 12), not, however, in such a sense as that

individuals may disregard it at perfect pleasure and without moral

detriment. On the contrary, the apostle expressly gives the ground of

his advice: "I suppose that this is good (kalon) for the present

distress;" "such (as marry) shall have trouble in the flesh; but I

spare you." From this it follows that where such a "present distress"

does not exist, or where there is full moral power and readiness to

endure the worldly trials, there the advisableness of celibacy no

longer applies. In general the principle is valid: "If thou marry thou

hast not sinned" (verse 28); but in every definite case the duty

becomes definite also. Where there is such a pressure of "distress,"

and where higher duties are to be fulfilled, and there is not

sufficient power to bear the worldly trials without danger to

faithfulness, there to marry is not only not a mere non-sinning, and

abstaining from marriage a good counsel, but the former is a positive

sin, and the latter a duty. And wherever any one, in view of these

particular circumstances does remain unmarried, he does not thereby

acquire a higher, a supererogatory desert, but he simply fulfills his

duty. Such a supererogatory desert is moreover directly excluded by the

fact that the apostle proposed by freedom from marriage to preserve the

Christians, in that time of distress, from temporal "trouble;" now he

who renounces an otherwise legitimate privilege in order to be spared

from worldly trouble, cannot possible lay claim to a special higher

desert and to a special recompense for the same. In fact, we can

readily conceive of cases to the contrary, where the greater desert

would consist precisely in the assumption of these trials by marrying,

and where therefore to marry would be a duty.

According to the Romish doctrine there is a difference between God's

holy will and his moral law; the former has not an unconditional

validity, but is, in relation to man in the sphere of higher moral

perfection, simply a wish the fulfillment of which would indeed be

pleasing to God, but with the non-fulfillment of which He will

nevertheless be satisfied. Bellarmin says, apropos to Matt. xxii, 36:

"He who loves God with his whole heart, is not bound to do all that God

counsels, but only what He commands,"--an assertion that must appear to

an evangelical conscience as a reversal of the moral consciousness.

Hirscher, in his earlier writings, defended this doctrine thus: "Love

is a command given to all without exception, whereas a specific degree

of love is not commanded; rather is love, when once really existing,

left to its own nature; it in fact presses forward of its own

prompting, and it is inconsistent with its inner nature that the rude

hand of a command should impose upon it that which it will always

freely bring forth from its own heart; hence love is in general an

absolute duty, not, however, a specific higher degree of love; the

absence of the higher degree does not involve also an absence of

righteousness in general, but only a certain higher range of the moral

affections; so was it with the rich young man in the Gospel." Now, all

this is manifest sophistry. It is true the degree of love cannot, for

every particular case, be stated in a particular legal formula, still,

however, this degree is an absolute duty; it simply depends on the

spiritual and moral culture of the individual, but is in no case left

to individual caprice. Whoever loves God or Christ, or father, mother,

or consort less than his moral culture enables him to do, simply

commits sin; and he who loves with all the capacity of his soul does

not do any thing supererogatory, but simply his bounden duty; and it is

nearer the truth to say that all will have to accuse themselves of

loving too little, than that any single soul may boast of loving God

more than with the "whole heart and soul and strength." (In the fifth

edition of his Moral, II, p. 328 sqq., Hirscher so tones down the above

teaching that only a mere shadow of it remains.) The Romish doctrine,

in making perfection dependent on the fulfillment of the counsels,

implies thereby that God's will, as expressed in the moral law, is not

that man should be perfect, but it is on the contrary rather an

individual courage transcending the mere will of God, that leads him

out beyond the moral goal set for him by God himself. [10]

SECTION LXXXI.

(c) While, on the one hand, there is no form of action which could be

to the subject, in any given moment, morally indifferent, that is,

neither in harmony nor in disharmony with the divine will, neither good

nor evil, still, on the other hand, no definitely-framed form of law

embraces within itself the total contents of the moral life-sphere; for

as every law has only contents of a general character, while the moral

activity itself is always of an individual character, so that the moral

actions of different men that fall under the same moral law offer a

great diversity, hence the moral law does not sustain to the actions

that answer to it precisely the same relation as an idea to its direct

realization and manifestation; the particular moral action is not the

simple, pure expression and copy of the moral law itself, but it always

contains something which does not arise from the law, but from the

individual peculiarity. The law as appropriated by the person is

fulfilled only in such a manner as expresses also the peculiarity of

the person. Every moral action contains therefore two elements: a

general ideal one, the moral law, and a particular and inure real one,

the personal element,--which latter, as the expression of the

personally peculiar character, has also its perfect legitimacy. God's

moral will is not that men should be mere impersonal, absolutely

similar expressions of the moral law, but that the latter should come

to its realization only as appropriated by the particular personality.

This personally peculiar element that inheres in every actual moral

action cannot be embraced in any general legal formula, inasmuch as in

its nature it is in fact not general, but a pure expression of

individual personality. Every real moral activity is therefore the

product of a twofold freedom: of that which subordinates the individual

personality to the law, and of that which does not merge the

personality into a mere abstract idea, but preserves it in its

legitimate peculiarity, and which is to a certain extent a law unto

itself.

By this notion of the right of personality Christian Ethics differs

from all non-Christian systems, not excepting those of the Greeks,

notwithstanding that the latter lay such great stress on the freedom of

the person; and this feature is of wide-reaching significance. The

decided rejection of the notion that there may be morally-indifferent

actions and conditions, and the emphasizing the rights of personal

individuality, are very essential to a true understanding of the moral.

By insisting disproportionately on the former, we leave too little room

for the peculiarity of the moral personality, and make it necessary

that for every particular action there should be also a special law;

this leads inevitably to a legal bondage hostile alike to all vital

individuality, and to the essence of personal freedom. This is the

stand-point of Chinese and of Talmudic ethics, and to a certain extent,

of the casuistics of some Romish moralists. On the other hand, if we

insist too exclusively on the peculiarity of the person, we incur the

danger of trespassing on the unconditional validity of the law, to the

profit of the fortuitous caprice of the subject,--somewhat as recently

in the period of the so-called "geniuses" and of the genius-less

freethinkers who followed them, all morality was made to consist in the

uncurbed development of the fortuitous peculiarity of the individual,

to which peculiarity every thing was freely allowed provided only that

it was "genial." The only true course is, in harmony with the general

Christian consciousness, to hold fast to both of these elements.

At each and every particular point of time, the moral activity and the

moral state are either good or evil, either in harmony with the moral

idea or not so. Although in the same action there may be different

phases which have morally different characters, and which place good

and evil in close proximity, still these contrary elements never

coalesce into a moral neutrum, into a morally-indefinite fluctuating

between good and evil--a moral indifference. An individual may indeed

be morally undecided, neither cold nor warm; this indecision, however,

is not of a morally-indifferent character, but is itself evil. There

may be different degrees of good or evil, but not an action that is

neither good nor evil. This will become self-evident if we fix our mind

on the fundamental idea of good and evil as that which answers to, or

does not answer to, the divine will; between these two a third is

absolutely inconceivable, just as in mathematics there is no medium

between a correct and a false result, or in a clearly presented legal

case no medium between yes and no. The bride who cannot answer "yes" to

the question as to her willingness to the marriage, says thereby, in

fact, "no;" and whoever does not at any given moment say "yes" to God's

never neutral will, simply rejects it. The essentially

self-contradictory assumption of a morally-indifferent middle-sphere

between good and evil, is in itself anti-moral; and every immoral

person is only too ready to transfer all his immorality, in so far as

he cannot explain it into good, into this pretended sphere of the

morally indifferent.

And yet this so widely prevalent tendency to assume that there is a

morally-indifferent sphere of action, is based on an actual, though

falsely interpreted, presentiment of the true relations in the case.

The fact is, every feature in correct moral action is not directly and

specifically determined by the moral law, but a very essential phase of

such action, has another source than the general law; nor is the truly

moral man simply a mere expression of the moral law, but, as differing

from other equally moral men, he is entitled as a person to have and

retain his special peculiarity. This phase of the moral life appears at

once, and very clearly, in that which lies at the basis of all moral

society--wedlock-love. Love, and, more specifically, conjugal love, is

a moral command; but the fact that this love fixes itself exclusively

and continuously upon precisely this particular person, is a

personally-peculiar shaping of the moral law; no law can prescribe what

particular person shall be the object of my conjugal love; and the

personal element is here so manifestly legitimate that the eliminating

of it--the indulging in love, not to a particular personally-chosen

person, but to the other sex in general--results in "free" love, the

very quintessence of immorality and vulgarity. Wherever moral theories

ignore the rights of personality, there the tendency is very strong to

base marriage, not on personal choice, but on the choice of the State,

as in ancient Peru. Now, what is true of conjugal love is true also,

though not always in such striking consequences, of all moral activity.

When two equally moral persons do the same thing, fulfill the same law,

it is, after all, not the same action; nor indeed should it be; what is

right and good in one person may, in that particular form, be even

wrong in another, notwithstanding that the moral law is the same for

all. Paul employs his moral activity in a different manner from that of

Peter and James; in fact, in the living communion of Christians there

is presented not only a great diversity of spiritual "gifts," but also

of personally-moral idiosyncrasies; even in the purely spiritual sphere

there are manifold gifts, but only one Lord. The normal difference of

moral life-tendency as seen in the sons of Adam, and which must have

occasioned as great a difference in the fulfilling of the moral

commands as it did in the manner of offering worship, presents a type

of the manifold moral diversities into which the moral law is shaped by

peculiarities of personality.

The virtualization of the personal element is not to be understood as a

something conflicting with the divine law; on the contrary, it is in

fact the divine will that the peculiarity of the personality be

preserved. If, at first thought. it should seem questionable to place

along-side of the universally-valid law another essentially variable

element, lest thereby the unconditional validity of the law be

infringed upon and negatived, let it be observed, in the first place,

that the personal peculiarity finds in the moral law both its limits

and its moral criterion, so that consequently it can never come into

antagonism with the same, but that, nevertheless, there is, within the

scope of the personal spiritual life, a field into which the law,

because of its general character, does not dictatingly enter. So long

as the moral consciousness is not yet truly mature, there is, indeed,

in the personal element of the moral, a peril for the moral life,

inasmuch as the law cannot give specific directions for every special

case. Hence in the Old Testament God complemented his earlier

legislation by special revelations of his will through priestly and

prophetic inspiration; now, however, since the Spirit of God is poured

out upon all men, there is no longer any need of this extraordinary

revelation of the divine will in individual cases, for now the human

personality, having come into possession of the truth, has also become

"free indeed,"--is so imbued with the divine law that, in loving and

acting as prompted by its divinely purified heart, it fulfills the

divine law in the very fact of developing its personality; and, in

fulfilling the law, it preserves also at the same time its personal

peculiarity,--as, for example, in a happy marriage there is no longer

any antagonism between the fulfilling of the will of the one party by

the other, and the acting-out by each of his own personal peculiarity,

but, on the contrary, in each of the two elements the other is already

implied. And the moral unripeness of individual persons, that

necessarily still exists even in a normal condition of humanity, is

complemented to full moral safety by the spirit of the moral

community,--as in fact this thought is vitally embodied in every true

Christian church-communion.

SECTION LXXXII.

The sphere of the personally-peculiar element is that of the

discretionary or the allowed. That particular action which is neither

commanded nor forbidden in general by any moral law is an allowed

action; this circumstance does not, however, by any means make it of a

morally-indifferent character; on the contrary, the morally-allowed

belongs per se to the morally-good in so far as the development of

personal individuality is per se legitimate and good. The idea of the

allowed relates therefore less to the moral activity per se and in

general, than rather to the peculiar manner in which an end that is per

se good, that is, correspondent to the moral law, is realized in

particular, by virtue of the personal peculiarity of the actor; and the

same moral law may be fulfilled in many ways, the moral quality of

which, however, is conditioned in each particular case by the said

peculiarity. There is nothing that is allowed under all circumstances;

and all that is allowed, and all so-called indifferents (adiaphora) are

in each particular case either good or evil, but never morally neutral,

notwithstanding that such actions may be per se, that is, generally

considered, morally undetermined, and neither commanded nor forbidden.

The moral quality lies not so much in the action objectively

considered, as in the disposition from which it springs and by which it

is attended.--The sphere of the allowed is different for every stage of

the moral development and for each particular circle of life. The

farther the moral development of the person has progressed, that is,

the more the moral law has become identified with his personality, so

much. the higher will also be the rights of his personal individuality,

so much the higher the morally-personal freedom, and consequently so

much the wider also the sphere of the allowed; to the pure all things

are pure. Free movement within the sphere of the allowed is therefore

essential to a truly moral life, and conditions the all-sided

development thereof; this movement is per se good, and it is in itself

a good, the significance and compass of which increase with the moral

development of the subject. Herein lies the contrast of the Christian

freedom of the Gospel to the bondage of the law.

This is one of the most important and, at the same time, most difficult

points in ethical science, and both for the same reason, namely, from

the necessity of giving play to personal freedom, and of doing this

without infringing on the unconditionally-valid moral law; and in exact

proportion as a system of ethics embraces the idea of personal freedom,

will it also be able to embrace the idea of the allowed. As in express

laws--commands and prohibitions--God manifests himself as holy, so in

the concession of the allowed he shows himself as loving. As in the

fulfilling of the command and in the observing of the prohibition, man

becomes conscious of his moral freedom, so, within the sphere of the

allowed, this freedom becomes to him an enjoyment. Now, as freedom of

will is not a mere antecedent condition of all morality, but also

itself a moral good, and as every good is per se an enjoyment, hence

free-created beings have also a moral claim upon the legitimate

enjoyment of freedom,--not simply of freedom as subject to definite

commands, but also of freedom as entitled to free choice in various

directions,--that is, they have discretionary power to free activity;

this constitutes in fact the divinely conceded sphere of the allowed,

wherein mainly the personally-peculiar element of the moral comes to

virtualization.

The very first moral direction, or rather blessing, that was given to

man, contains implicitly the notion of the allowed or discretionary:

"Replenish the earth and subdue it and have dominion over the fish of

the sea," etc. This is really not so much a command as a blessing,--it

proposes a moral goal, a good. But in this good that is to be sought

after, namely, dominion over nature, there is at the same time implied

a command to realize this supremacy of the rational spirit through

moral activity. But within this command there lies also a discretionary

field. The particular manner how man is to realize this dominion, is

not expressed in the command, but is left to his free personal

self-determination--in so far as he does not thereby come into

collision with other moral commands. Thus, man may use animals for his

own purposes, may domesticate them, train them, force them to help him.

and use them for his nourishment; but as to what choice of them he

shall make, and as to what kind of service he shall exact of them, this

is left to his discretion,--here he may act freely, here he has the

full enjoyment of his freedom. For unfallen man there was no need of

narrower limits; but when depravity gained the upper hand these limits

were drawn closer, and the Mosaic law gives very specific and narrower

bounds within which man, as no longer morally stable, was to exercise

his freedom upon nature.--The first definite command of God presents at

once, along-side of the expressed command, also the allowed: "Of every

tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of the

knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat;" whatever he may choose

of the other trees is per se good; the choice he shall make is not

prescribed; simply a boundary is set, beyond which begins evil. Now, we

cannot say that this choosing within the given limits is of a

morally-indifferent character; rather is such choice, as the

realization of a good, itself morally good; and this goodness, consists

in the simple fact that every choice is good, and that the choice of

the one is not better and not worse than the choice of the other. To

infer from this that the single objects of the choice are morally

indifferent, would be to overlook the fact that the moral element does

not lie in the object, but in the choosing person, and that the latter

exercises his morality precisely in the fact of freely choosing in

accordance with the peculiarity of his personality; not to choose at

all would be to despise the divine gift, and hence immoral.

In the state of innocence the sphere of the allowed was,

notwithstanding the indispensable educative limitation, wider than it

was subsequently in the state of sin, not, however, because men were

then morally more contracted, but because they were morally purer. In

consequence of redemption from the power of sin, the now sanctified

personality becomes also freer, and the sphere of the allowed is

enlarged; herein lies one of the most essential differences between Old

Testament and New Testament ethics. The moral itself receives, in

contrast to the specifically and particularizingly prescribing ancient

law, a more general form, and the whole law and the prophets are summed

up in one short command: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy

heart, and thy neighbor as thyself." The sanctified personality acts

within the limits of the law with more freedom; the boundaries of the

allowed, as established for the state of sin, are thrown more into the

back-ground; the laws as to the Sabbath and as to meats and other

similar prescriptions, are thrown into a freer form by the personality

as made free in Christ. Instead of the limiting laws regulating the use

of "meats," and other material objects in general, and which were

framed with reference to the sinful impurity of man, Christ gives the

broad principle: "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man,

but that which cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man" [Matt. xv,

11]; and Paul expresses this in a still more general form: "Every

creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused, if it be received

with thanksgiving" [1 Tim. iv, 4]; and elsewhere [Titus i, 15] he

states the thought in its highest exaltation: "Unto the pure all things

are pure;" that is, the higher the morality rises, so much the wider

becomes also the sphere of the allowed, and hence of freedom; and upon

him who is morally perfect, who is inwardly fully identified with the

divine will, there is no longer imposed any degree whatever of

outwardly-legal limitation to the employment of his freedom; for

whatever he can love, that God loves also, and his sanctified

personality cannot choose any thing that would be offensive to

God,--and such a person is again invested with his original full right

of dominion over nature, with his full right of free choice; and

whatever he does of free choice, that he does to the glory of God [1

Cor. x, 31].

The words of Paul [1 Cor. vii, 28] may serve as a further illustration

of the notion of the allowed: "If thou marry, thou hast not sinned;"

whereas on this very occasion the apostle dissuaded from marriage. The

Christian has a right to marriage; whether, however, under

circumstances that would otherwise morally admit of it, he put into

execution this right, does not depend on any particular legal

prescription, but on his own untrammeled personal choice. Paul had

discretionary "power to lead about a sister, a wife, as well as other

apostles" [1 Cor. ix, 5]; but he did not do so; all have the "power to

eat and to drink" [verse 4], but our choice is, within particular

limits, left free. Ananias was at liberty to keep his field or not

[Acts v, 4]; what he did was of his own election; it was not a moral

law, but solely his personal choice that determined his conduct. [Comp.

1 Cor. vi, 12; x, 23; Rom. xiv, 1 sqq.; xv, 1 sqq.; Matt. xii, 3, 4.]

The sphere of the allowed is the more special theater of personal

freedom, as distinguished from mere moral freedom. In obedience to the

commanding law I am indeed free, but this freedom is nevertheless a

controlled one; it is true, I can will and act otherwise than the law

wills, but I dare not; and if I in fact do so, then I violate the law,

then I am an enemy of God; I have the liberty but not the right so to

act. Commanded duty has consequently, notwithstanding the liberty on

which it rests, always still a certain constraint in it; and though in

the mere literal fulfillment of the law, man becomes conscious of his

freedom, yet he does not come to a proper and full enjoyment thereof.

If God's law actually entered, prescribing and prohibiting, into all

the details of individual action, without, by some concessions,

allowing play-ground for discretionary action, then, though man would

indeed have the privilege of freely obeying or disobeying at each

particular moment, nevertheless he would feel the law as a burden upon

him; and Paul was very apt in expression when he spoke of the

preparatory law of the Old Covenant as a chastening-master. For the

simple reason that the essence of man is freedom or self-determination,

it is natural for him to aspire to become also fully conscious of this

freedom,--to put it into exercise in so far as consistent with his

moral obedience,--and hence he needs a free field wherein he may act

with real freedom, without having his actions in every respect

prescribed to him, without being strictly bound by the law,--where, in

a word, he may say: I may choose this, but I do not need to choose it;

and whether I choose this or that depends entirely on my personal

self-determination, and that too without detriment to my moral duty.

The sphere of the allowed stands in the same relation to that of the

express law as play to earnest activity. Play also is an element

essential to the full development of youthful moral life. With the

child, play is of high moral significancy, as it is thereby that it

learns to comprehend, to exercise, and to enjoy its full personal

freedom. In learning and working the child is also free; but however

good and zealous of work it may be, it is nevertheless conscious at the

same time of being controlled by an objective law to which it must

adapt itself; the other and equally legitimate phase of its life, that

of personal freedom and self-determination, is revealed to it in its

purest form only in play; and the child, even the morally-good one,

finds so great a delight in play, for the simple reason that it thereby

comes to the enjoyment of its personal freedom; and the essence of its

enjoyment lies in the simple fact that in its playful activity and

feats it is free lord of its own volitions and movements; and those

children become spiritually dull whose plays are strictly watched over

by tutorial intermeddling. Playing is freedom, however, only in form,

and is without definite contents; hence it is essentially only a

transition-occupation appropriate to the age of childhood. The sphere

of the allowed in general, is the wider and positive-grown extension of

that play. Here belongs recreation after labor, as in contrast to the

positive fulfilling of the law; recreation is per se morally good and

its essence consists in freedom; that I select precisely this path for

a promenade, or busy myself thus or thus, is neither prescribed to me

by any law, nor is that which I do not select forbidden. It is entirely

erroneous to say that man must be totally swallowed up in his calling,

that he has a definite duty to fulfill at every moment; this would be a

moral slavery. The sphere of personal liberty has also its own good

right, and for the plain reason that man is not merely an obligated

member of the whole, but also a free individuality. Recreation per se

is therefore by no means of a morally indifferent character, but the

particular mode of its realization is discretionary, and the moral law

is not, at this point, of a detailed particularizing character, but it

simply hovers protectingly on the outskirts, and wards against

abuses,--even as a prudent educator simply exercises a protecting

oversight over the child's play, but does not prescribe the details.

Man is indeed moral at every moment of his existence, and should at

each moment be and act morally right. but every thing that he does is

nevertheless not a direct expression of some moral formula, on the

contrary there is a share therein that belongs, and rightly too, to

personal free choice,--just as, in regard to his clothing, a sensible

man, though in the main following the prevalent mode, will nevertheless

reserve the privilege of deviating therefrom whenever it better suits

his personal individuality.--Even as a fish in the water, though indeed

swimming according to the natural laws of gravitation and motion, yet,

within the scope of these laws, disports itself at pleasure, and

exhibits precisely in this free motion the traits which distinguish it

from the unfree plant, so also does man, within the limits and

conditions of the moral law, comport himself freely on the field of the

allowed, and in so doing manifests the characteristics of the free

child of God as in contrast to servitude under a chastening law.

Schleiermacher (Werke III, 2, 418 sqq.) denies the admissibility of the

notion of actions that are merely allowed. We have, in his opinion, no

time for that which claims to be, not duty, but simply allowed, not

morally necessary, but only morally possible; every performance of such

an action implies a definite willingness to act otherwise than from

moral motives,--which is immoral; the idea of the allowed belongs not

to ethics but to civil law. This we concede in so far as Schleiermacher

speaks of such actions as are held to be neither in conformity nor in

disconformity to duty, that is morally indifferent, but this is by no

means the true idea of the allowed. However, we do not admit the

existence of such a class of actions; but in morally-good actions there

is a phase which is not determined by the law itself, and which

constitutes the allowed.--Rothe (Ethik, 1 Auf. � 819) finds the idea of

the allowed in the fact that particular forms of action cannot be

referred with certainty to a particular legal formula, so that

consequently their moral worth cannot be estimated thereby beyond a

doubt. The reason of this may lie in the incompleteness of the law;

hence the allowed has a larger scope in the minority-period and with

children; but as the law becomes more definite and perfect, the sphere

of the allowed grows narrower; the more fully man is as vet without

positive law, so much the more numerous are the actions that are

allowed to him; but there arrives a turning-point in the development

where the relation again changes, and for the reason that, then. the

law begins to retire into the background and to become progressively

simpler, so that the sphere of the allowed becomes again more

extensive. With this view of Rothe we cannot coincide. According to it

the sphere of the allowed rests only on a lack of the law, and it

would. be more properly termed the sphere of the morally doubtful.

Adam, however, to whom the allowed was at once presented in connection

with the commanded and the prohibited, could not possibly be in doubt

as to what would be moral for him; and the divine word placed before

him with perfect definiteness the sphere within which he was allowed

entire freedom of action. And it is utterly erroneous to say that in

childhood the sphere of the allowed is wider than in maturer years. The

fact that many a thing is allowed to the child which does not become it

in later years, is not a proof that it has a wider liberty, but only

that at this period the allowed lies in a different circle, and one

that answers to the childish understanding; on the contrary, the fact

undoubtedly is, that to the child more things by far are not allowed

which are allowed to the man, than conversely; and every wider stage of

development brings to the youth a consciousness of an increased freedom

of self-determination, although, on the other hand, it is true that the

more earnest demands that are made by the growing positiveness of the

life-work, exclude much of the earlier childish liberty. But that there

comes again afterward a turning-point when a contrary relation begins,

cannot be substantiated, and moreover it conflicts directly with the

idea of a constantly progressive development toward moral

maturity.--With a similar tendency, Stahl (Rechts-philos. II, 1, 112)

transfers the allowed beyond the sphere of the ethical proper, as being

in its fulfillment morally indifferent, and into the sphere of

satisfaction, that is, of earthly enjoyment; hence he infers

consistently enough, that the sphere of the merely allowed must

constantly decrease as morality advances, and that satisfaction is

ultimately to be sought only in that which is at the same time a

fulfilling of the moral law,--as, for example, in the exercise of

benevolence, etc. Christian Friedrich Schmid arrives at the same

conclusion (Sittenl., p. 450 sqq.). According to this view the sphere

of the allowed would amount in fact but to a sphere of the non-allowed,

and would be simply a temporary concession to moral immaturity and

weakness. This seems to us incorrect. For a truly rational man, there

can be no other satisfaction than a moral one; whatever he does and

receives, he does and receives in faith and love and with thanksgiving,

and in virtue of this thankfulness every truly allowable enjoyment

becomes invested with a moral character. Stahl appeals to the fact

that, with the progress of moral development, many a thing that is

otherwise allowed must be renounced; but this is only in appearance a

greater limitation; for though it is true that mature man no longer

allows himself many of the pleasures of his unripe youth, yet he has in

their stead other and wider fields of the allowed which are denied to

youth. The greater freedom of the Christian as compared with the

law-observer of the Old Testament, is perfectly evident. It is true,

many things were allowed to the Jew, which, because of the higher

morality introduced, are no longer allowed to the Christian, such as

the putting away of wives, and retaliation [Matt. v, 31 sqq.], so that

it might seem as if the sphere of the allowed, and hence of personal

freedom, were really more narrowly limited in Christianity than in

Judaism. However, when we reflect upon the above-cited declarations of

Paul as to the contrast of Christian freedom to the yoke of the law,

the matter will doubtless appear in reality very differently. Many

things were not indeed morally allowed to the Jews, but only tolerated

in them, because of their hardness of heart; the whole significancy of

the moral law was not yet exacted of them, just as in children many a

thing is tolerated and overlooked because of their more limited moral

knowledge, which in riper persons would be regarded as improper and

blameworthy, without implying, however, that that which is tolerated is

actually admitted as allowable. The fact is, that as the moral

consciousness grows in clearness, the compass of duties grows wider

also, so that many a thing that was not previously a moral requirement

now becomes really such. This does not, however, render the sphere of

the allowed narrower, but in fact wider, inasmuch as every duty admits

also of a variety of ways of fulfillment, and consequently also a

diversity of ways of virtualizing our personal peculiarities. Thus, the

fact that consorts may no longer discard each other, though at first

sight a seeming limitation of the sphere of the allowed, yet really

greatly exalts the moral personality of both parties; they have by far

a higher right in each other,--may require more of each other, may more

strongly emphasize the right of their moral personality, may each allow

to the other, and to himself toward the other, more than would be

proper were marriage merely an easily-dissolved contract,--even as the

son of the house is freer and may allow himself more liberty than the

servant, and for the simple reason that the former is more indissolubly

united with the house than the latter;--the closer and firmer the bond,

so much the greater mutual trust and confidence, so much wider also the

sphere of the allowed.

Writers often admit two different species of the allowed: the one is

allowed because of the meagerness of the moral knowledge, as with the

child; the other, conversely, because of the advanced state of the

moral maturity. This difference, however, is by no means a real one;

and, when expressed in this form, the idea of the allowed has no longer

any unity, but involves a direct antagonism. Rather do both of these

forms of the allowed fall under the one notion of the rights of the

personal peculiarity. Many things are, for the peculiar nature of the

child, morally good, which are not so for a riper person, and for the

simple reason that the unsuspecting child, in doing that which would be

improper in those of riper years, "thinketh no evil," and because the

sentiment holds good also of unconscious innocence, that "to the pure

all things are pure." And the case is essentially the same with him who

is morally matured; simply the form is different. When man has come,

through moral growth, into a state of conscious innocence, then also to

him, as being pure, many a thing is pure which would be impure to the

sinful.

SECTION LXXXIII.

In so far as the moral law is made into a moral possession of the

person, that is, a constituent element of his personally-moral nature,

it becomes to him a moral principle, a life-rule or maxim; without

moral principles there is no real morality. As in this union with the

personal peculiarity the moral law itself enters into this peculiarity,

hence though it is in fact the same always and for all men, still the

life-rules that grow out of this law, among different persons and

nations and under different conditions in life, must evidently also be

relatively different. The correct shaping of the moral law into

life-rules correspondent to the peculiarity of persons and

circumstances, constitutes the principal work of practical wisdom.--A

disregarding of the rights of the personal peculiarity in the moral

life, and the exclusive application of general and definitely-expressed

laws as direct rules of life, result in a servitude to a legal yoke

(rigorism) which is incapable of producing any truly personal morality,

and has no justification save as a temporary disciplinary process in a

state of depravity.

The law is not of man, but solely of God; life-rules each person makes

for himself, not, however, independently of the law, but as based on

it, though peculiarly modified by his moral personality. The life-rule

or maxim is the law as incarnated, as having become subjective; in it

man has appropriated the law as a personal possession,--has merged it

into his flesh and blood. My life-rule, even in so far as it is

perfectly correct, is valid in this definite form only for me, and it

may legitimately enough be widely different at different life-stages

and under different circumstances. The manifoldness of life-rules

contributes to the esthetic richness of the collective life of the

race; in them the moral idea, though essentially one, yet shapes itself

into a variegated diversity, just as the light of day, though in itself

essentially colorless, is reflected back from flowers in a thousand

varying tints. It is true, the giving scope here for freedom of will

involves also a possibility of immoral self-determination; and it is

also true that sin, in consequence of its essential deceptiveness,

seeks almost always to hide itself under the cloak of pretendedly

legitimate life-rules, and thereby attains to its seductive power, and

that the free personal shaping of the moral law into life-rules is

possible without danger, only as proceeding from pure and sanctified

human nature, so that consequently the severe discipline of the

tutorial law appears as peculiarly appropriate for the divine training

of mankind before the full realization of redemption; but wherever

morality is to become perfect, that is, free, there the law itself must

become an inner freely-appropriated one,--must be received into the

personality as its essential possession, and not as a foreign element,

but as one that has coalesced with its essence; and this essence is a

personally-peculiar one. Even as natural nutriment does not nourish in

its natural crudeness, but only in so far as it is received and really

appropriated into the natural organism and into its peculiarity, so is

it also with the moral law. From the possible danger of subordinating

the unconditional validity of the divine law to individual caprice,

there does not follow a condemnation of the personally-peculiar molding

of the law, but only the requirement that morality be based not on

merely unconscious or obscure feelings or impulses, but upon a positive

clear consciousness of God's will and of one's own moral condition. The

non-governing of one's self, the yielding of one's self to immediate

natural impulses, the giving rein to the spiritual and sensuous

proclivities that already exist irrespective of a knowledge of the

divine will, is per se, even where sin does not yet exist as a power of

evil, immoral. Moral life-wisdom is not an acquisition attained to in

unserious play; and slavish submission to an all-specifying, rigorous

law is easier than the free, moral developing of life-rules on the

basis of the more general moral law. The less ripe the moral

personality, so much the more dictating must be the objective character

of the law, so much the more severe must be its discipline [Gal. iii,

24]; and the riper the moral nature of the person becomes, so much the

more freely and independently may and should he shape the law into

life-rules for himself.

It creates confusion to confound the moral law with personal

life-rules; it inevitably leads either to legal bondage or to moral

laxity. The Scriptures contain not only moral laws, but also life-rules

for particular, not generally existing life-relations, and the

regarding these latter as general moral commands or counsels has

sometimes led Christian ethics into error. When the apostle recommends

celibacy because of the "present distress" [1 Cor. vii,] he gives

simply a life-rule for particular, expressly-stated circumstances; and,

in order to prevent all misunderstanding, he says, in relation to the

unmarried: "I have no commandment of the Lord" [verse 25]. By this,

Paul does not mean that he establishes on his own authority a new

command without reference to any divine law, but only that this

specific life-rule is not itself a divine law, but rather simply a rule

of conduct applying the divine law to particular circumstances. The law

on which it is based, however, is not: "Thou shalt not marry," but:

Care for the things that belong to the Lord, and not for the things

that belong to the world [see verses 32, 34]. Monasticism made of this

life-rule an objective law or counsel. The instructions of Christ to

the apostles, when sent out to prepare the way for himself [Matt. x, 9

sqq.]: "Provide neither gold nor silver nor brass in your purses,"

etc., are not given as a moral rule to the moral man in general, but to

the apostles for this specific mission. But the mendicant orders made

of this also an objective law. When Christ required of the rich young

man to sell all that he had and give it to the poor, it is perfectly

evident that this was simply a specific injunction for this particular

person, seeing that neither Christ nor the apostles required in all

cases, or in any manner, the giving up of possessions, notwithstanding

their strong emphasizing of the duty of charity [Acts v, 4; 1 Tim. vi,

17 sqq.; 2 Cor. viii, 1 sqq.]. The monastic vow of poverty is a

perverted application of this injunction. To the same category belong

the rules of propriety for women, as given in 1 Cor. xi, 5, 10 sqq.,

and in part evidently also the resolution of the Apostolic Council

[Acts xv, 20, 29]. In all such rules either the assigned or the

directly implied reference to particular, but not generally existing

and permanent relations and circumstances, distinguishes them very

readily from general moral laws, the characteristic of which is to be

valid absolutely and always.

SECTION LXXXIV.

The moral law as (by virtue of the particular form into which it is

thrown by the peculiarity of the moral person) requiring its

realization in a particular case, is moral duty; duty is, therefore,

the law as coming to actual application in moral action through the

moral life-rules into which it has been shaped by appropriation into

the moral person,--that is, it is the law as realizing itself under the

form of life-rules, in other words, it is the law as shaping itself in

and for a particular person under particular circumstances, and as

becoming in him a determining and actuating power. I fulfill the law in

that I do my duty. The duties that spring from the same law are

different for different men and for different circumstances.--As,

therefore, duty is the product of two elements, the moral law and the

peculiarity of the person, and as the moral laws collectively, though

existing under the form of a plurality, must yet of necessity

constitute a concordant whole, hence, if we leave out of view the

actuality of sin, a conflict of different duties with each other

(collision of duties) is utterly impossible. The distinction of

conditional and unconditional duties is not correct, and rests on a

confounding of the notions of law and duty.

The moral person does not directly and strictly fulfill the law, but

simply his duty. Even ordinary speech indicates the difference; we do

not say, "my law," but always, "my duty." The law per se is general and

above man; duty is always special and personal. No one person can do

the duty of another; and what is duty for me, may be a violation of

duty for another. The law alone is directly prescribed; to what

particular form of action this law, as appropriated into my

personality, determines or obligates me, is not directly expressed in

the law, but is the result of a moral judgment in view of my special

moral peculiarity and circumstances. We cannot, therefore, with

propriety institute a contrast between conditional and unconditional

duties. The condition is already implied in the relation of the

fulfillment of the law to the fulfillment of duty; what I may not or

cannot now do, is simply not my duty; at another time, however, this

same form of action may become my duty. Any and every duty may, with as

much propriety, be called conditional as unconditional; in its becoming

a duty it is always conditional; whenever, however, it actually

presents itself, there can no longer be any question of conditionality.

Whoever is in a condition to rescue a person from imminent life-peril,

has the unconditional duty of doing so; whoever cannot do so, has no

duty whatever in the matter; between these two positions there is no

third one possible. With like propriety we may say also that the law is

at the same time conditional and unconditional, but in a converse

relation; in its essence it is unconditional, in the manner of its

fulfillment it is always conditional. The law, "Thou shalt love thy

neighbor as thyself," is in its moral contents unconditional; every

human being is an object of this love, but how this love is to be

exercised, in what manner it is actually to manifest itself in actions,

that is, to what definite duties it shall lead, this depends on

manifold conditions not contained in the law itself; to one's husband

or wife, or to parents, one owes a very different love from that due to

friends, and the very same sacrificing love will manifest itself very

differently toward the moral and toward the immoral.

When the law is presented in the general form of command or

prohibition, the manners in which the manifold relations of life make

it the duty of different persons to fulfill it are so different, that

there may even arise an appearance of contradiction. The fact is,

however, that for a real conflict (collision) of duties (a subject

which has from of old been a favorite and much discussed one among

moralists) there is in a normal state of humanity no possible place.

Moral laws cannot come into conflict with each other, otherwise the

idea of the moral, and the moral order of the universe itself, would be

undermined; and there is just as little ground for a conflict between

duties, seeing that their conditionment is in fact based in part on the

personal peculiarity and special circumstances of the subjects. The

personal peculiarity of a sinful man may indeed come into conflict with

the moral law; but in so far as this is the case it forms no legitimate

element in the construction of the notion of duty; rather will it

become our duty in many respects to counteract this element. But all

legitimate personal peculiarity is itself formed in harmony with the

moral idea, and hence cannot come into conflict therewith. For an

irreconcilable collision of duties there is, therefore, nowhere any

manner of possibility.

The idea of duty is often otherwise understood than as here presented.

Duty is frequently declared to be the divine law itself. Now if by this

is meant, that which God requires of us in each particular case, and

that too of each individual in particular, then it would be

correct,--this, however, is not expressed by the term "law;" but if it

means, that duty and the divine law are identical, then it is

incorrect. More definite is the statement, that duty is the manner of

action which conforms to or harmonizes with the law. The Kantian school

explains duty as that which, according to the law, should take place,

or which, by virtue of a law, is practically necessary, or which

answers to an obligation,--obligation being understood as the necessity

of an action in consequence of a moral law. All these statements are

inadequate, inasmuch as the personal peculiarity is left out of the

account, so that consequently no difference whatever is made between

duty and law; and as to how obligation differs from duty we are utterly

unable to see. Schleiermacher in his System (� 112 sqq.) defines duty

as "the form of conduct in which the activity of the reason is at the

same time special, as directed upon the particular, and also general,

as directed upon the totality," or, the law of the free

self-determination of the individual in relation to the common moral

life-task of the race, or, the formula for the guidance of rationality

in single actions in the realizing of the highest good. That these, in

the main, correct statements, are still too indefinite, is shown even

by their numerousness. Similarly, but more definitely, Rothe explains

duty as that definite form of action which is required by the moral law

as under the form impressed upon it by the individual instance.

SECTION LXXXV.

To duty on the part of the moral subject, corresponds right on the part

of the law. My duty is to fulfill the right of the moral law, that is,

the right of God to, or his claim upon, me. The substance of dutiful

action is therefore justice or right, and the product of this action is

the right, i. e., the realized claim. Hence dutiful action is per se

right-doing. Duty and right call for each other,--are but two phases of

the same thing; to every right there corresponds a duty, and

conversely,--simply the subjects are different; every duty is the

expression of a right; another's right in regard to me is for me a

duty, and to the fulfillment of another's duty in regard to me I have a

right; the two ideas are absolutely correlative and co-extensive. In

virtue of duty I accomplish the moral, for the law has a right, a

claim, upon me; in virtue of right the moral is accomplished upon me;

in the fulfilling of duty I keep the law; in my accomplishing of the

right the law keeps me. The fulfilling of my duty obtains for me a

right to, or claim upon, the moral law in so far as this law is an

element of universal order, namely, the right to be a real, living, and

hence free, member of the moral whole,--in other words, a. moral claim

on the just recompense of God. There is, morally, no other right of an

individual than such as is conditioned by a corresponding fulfillment

of duty on his part; rights without duties would be a reversing of

moral world-order. God has an absolutely unlimited right because he is

absolutely holy, and man, as related to God, is under absolute

obligations. All right has therefore its basis in God's right and in

God's love. Hence in the Scriptures the notion of duty is nearly always

presented as an indebtedness,--as the right of God to man, as what man

owes to God. God's righteousness has a right to righteousness in man,

and hence righteousness is man's duty; those who fulfill their duty are

therefore the righteous.

As duty is not merely of a subjective character, a mere utterance of

the individual consciousness, but the law as appropriated by the

person, so also, and equally emphatically, is right also not a mere

subjective something with no better basis than a merely fortuitous

power of the individual. Every right of the individual is a special

expression of the right of the whole, and is valid only in so far as

this individual is in moral harmony with the whole. Whoever by

undutiful conduct dissolves his union with the moral whole, loses

thereby, in like measure, his right to or claim upon the whole. Duty

and right are both an expression of the moral; the former is the moral

as subjective obligation, the latter is the moral as objective

requirement; both manifest the essence of the moral as an essential law

of collective being. The individual has duties and rights only as in

vital union with the whole. I have duties and rights, not in virtue of

being a mere individual, but in virtue of the fact that the totality of

being bears a moral character. From this it follows at once, that there

can be true duties and rights only where the morality of the whole is

based, not merely on the morality of the individual persons,--which

would be a mere arguing in a circle,--but where it is based on the

holiness of the personality of God. I can keep and fulfill the law only

when the law keeps and fulfills me; I can do my duty only when I

therein recognize a right or claim of the moral whole, and hence of the

holy God, upon me. An impersonal whole has no right to, nor claim upon,

the personal spirit; from such a servitude Christianity has

definitively emancipated human thought; nor has one man, as upon his

fellow, any other right or claim than such as he derives from God; that

is, he has it only by the grace of God; that man has per se a right

upon his fellow, irrespective of God, is an un-Christian view; "Be not

ye the servants of men" [1 Cor. vii, 23]; this is Christian right and

Christian freedom.

In such a moral world-order where duty and right are absolutely

correlative, where right extends as far as duty, and duty as far as

right, every one receives strictly his own right--his due. The dutiful

man has a right upon the moral whole,--a right to have his personality

respected,--and it is thus that the moral law, the moral world-order,

realizes itself on man; it upholds in a just and honorable position him

who has upheld it. He who gives honor to God, to him God gives also his

honor. Also he who violates duty receives his right; every punishment

is the fulfilling of the right of God and of the collective universe

upon the individual; the criminal has a right to the punishment; when

the criminal comes to his right mind he demands himself his own

punishment, and a child that is not totally perverted finds a moral

tranquillization in suffering the punishment it deserves,--it even

calls for it.

The notion that the fulfillment of moral duty acquires for man a claim

upon the moral order of the world, and hence upon God, is emphatically

rejected by Schwarz (Eth. I, p. 199), who even declares such a view as

blasphemous; God alone, he holds, is the absolutely-entitled One; man

has, as toward God, simply duties, but no rights; God only can have

claims upon us, not we upon God. And he appeals for support to Rom. ix,

20; xi, 35 sqq.; Job ix, 12; Luke xvii, 10. The first two passages,

however, relate to the impossibility of fathoming the eternal divine

counsel, and declare any doubt as to God's holiness and righteousness

as unjustifiable; moreover all of them relate exclusively to the

condition of sinfulness, in which we of course concede, in harmony with

Scripture, that all salvation rests exclusively on the undeserved and

compassionate mercy of God. We are now speaking, however, of man as not

yet under sin, of the moral life in its unclouded purity, and here the

matter stands very differently. If God's righteousness is not a mere

empty figure of speech, it must form the basis of a moral right; we

cannot doubt that God rewards each according to his moral conduct; and

when a truly moral creature receives from God a just reward [Rom. ii,

6, 7, 13], this is not a mere compassionating gift, but it is justice,

and the creature has, in virtue of his righteousness, a claim upon such

a reward. It is indeed a gracious gift of the Creator, that he has made

the creature thus noble, that it is permitted to bear in itself God's

own image; but that God regards and treats the creature that has become

positively holy, in view of and in reference to that fact, is simply

justice. As the sinner receives but his right when the divine

punishment falls upon him, so also the sinless creature receives but

his right when he is an object of the divine pleasure. To think

otherwise on this point would be to overthrow our notion of a holy and

just God. The Scriptures express very distinctly this thought of the

right of the moral person upon God, even in circumstances where,

because of sin, there can no longer be any question of a right strictly

speaking,--so that, then, it is in fact a pure grace that God,

notwithstanding this, yet concedes to man such rights. Of the

justifying faith of Abraham, Paul says, "To him that worketh is the

reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt" [Rom. iv, 4]; if therefore

man should really and truly fulfill the law of God, then his reward

would fall to him in due course of justice. The inference of the

apostle, as to the worth of faith for sinful man, would not have the

least basis should we presume to regard this declaration of his as per

se meaningless and impossible; and this holds good in the fullest sense

of man as untouched by sin, as also it is true of the Son of man. The

true and real fulfilling of the law has in fact eternal life as its

just reward [Matt. xix, 17]; the only question is, as to whether in

fact any person perfectly fulfills the law as Christ did. The doctrine

of grace for the redeemed is not interfered with by that of a claim of

the moral man upon God, but receives in fact thereby its proper

foundation. In the idea of the Covenant which God made with the

Patriarchs, and as to which he himself says: "I have made a covenant

with my chosen, I have sworn to David my servant: Thy seed will I

establish forever," etc., there is contained also the idea of a right

upon God as graciously conceded even to sinful man, provided he should

obey the voice of God and keep his commandments [Psa. lxxxix, 4; Exod.

ii, 24; xix, 5; Deut. vii, 8, 9, 12; ix, 5]. That God should make such

a covenant, is pure grace; but now that He, the truthful One, has made

it, it follows that those who keep it acquire thereby a right to its

fulfillment on the part of God; and hence the pious of the Old Covenant

make appeal in their petitions to the promises of God [Gen. xxxii, 12;

Exod. xxxii, 13; Deut. ix, 26 sqq.]. The great emphasis which the

Scriptures place upon the thought of the covenant of God with man,

which is, in fact, more than a promise, implies very clearly that here

the moral character of God, as well as that of man, is essentially

involved. We need only separate from the idea of a right all that the

sinful heart has associated therewith, all that is presumptuous and

self-seeking, and it will no longer have the least feature that could

give offense to the most reverential mind. The Scriptures present the

thought of duty as intimately connected with the idea of right; and

this involves, in fact, the profoundest conception of the moral. Here,

all dutiful living, on the part of man, is a right of God upon him

(mspt), a paying of his debt to God,--it is hopheile,--and man is

debtor to God and to the brethren [Rom. i, 14; viii, 12; Luke xvii, 10;

comp. 1 Cor. vii, 22]; and God's laws are an expression of the rights

of God [Lev. xviii, 4, 5; xix, 37; xxv, 18; Deut. vii, 12; xxxiii, 10;

Psa. xix, 10; 1, 16; cv, 45; cxix, 5 sqq.; Isa. xxvi, 9; and others].

By virtue of his moral nature, of the likeness of God that was

impressed upon him, man becomes in turn a debtor,--is under obligation

to bring this nature into realization, to fulfill the claim or right of

God upon him; and he who fulfills this right is consequently just or

righteous; "He hath showed thee, O man, what is good (the moral law);

and what doth the Lord require of thee (as duty) but to do justly (the

right) and to love mercy?" [Micah vi, 8; comp. Deut. x, 12, 13]. Thus,

as it appears, the Scriptures present rather the objective phase of the

moral, the right of God and of the divine law upon man; whereas the

moralists of recent times, especially since Kant, devote their

attention rather to its subjective phase, as duty.

In the manner of viewing the relations between right and duty there

often prevails some confusion; right is often confounded with

discretionary power, whereas, in fact, the former is more than the

latter, and contains an actual requirement; or, right is regarded as

the mere possibility or liberty to act. Furthermore a great difference

is frequently made between right and the right, the two being taken as

capable of excluding each other, so that I may have a right and yet its

execution be not right. This, in so far as the question is as to moral

right, is manifestly absurd. It is true, according to civil law, I may

have a so-called right in the exercising of which I shall do wrong; but

of such civil right we are not here speaking; in the sphere of morality

I can never have a right to what is wrong, and I can never exercise a

right without doing the right. I have a right only in so far as the

moral law takes me under the protection of the moral order of the

universe; I have a right upon another in so far as he has a moral duty

to fulfill toward me; I have right conduct in so far as I myself

realize the moral law; and this I do in fact when I do not throw away

my own moral right, but maintain it intact. Whenever I have a moral

right, then is it also right to realize it.

CHAPTER III.

THE OBJECT OF THE MORAL ACTIVITY.

SECTION LXXXVI.

As the moral is the free realizing of the good, and as the good itself

is the inner law and nature of the divinely-created All, hence, in

every moral activity, man comes into relation to this All, and this

All--as well as also God himself--becomes in its entire existence, so

far as within the scope of man, an object of the moral activity,

namely, either in that as a good it is brought into unity with the

moral person, or appropriated by the same,--or in that, as material

capable of being modified, it is formed by the moral activity.

I. The moral life relates primarily always to God. God can be an object

of the morally-pious activity only in so far as he is conceived of as a

personal spirit; to an impersonal God there can be no moral relation.

This moral activity is not a mere receiving, but it is a real acting,

namely, in that man not only turns himself toward God, but in that he

also turns God toward himself; the good that is realized by this

activity becomes actual, however, not in God, but in us, in that it

brings us into communion with God, so that consequently all pious

activity is at the same time a moral producing for ourselves.--As God

upholds, and rules in, all creatures, hence all moral activity without

exception stands in relation to God, and all realizing of the good

works communion with God. All that is moral is also pious, and all that

is pious is also moral. Hence all duties are also duties to God, and

religious duties do not stand along-side of other duties, but they

include them in themselves.

Every view is defective which excludes from the moral life any thing

whatever that comes into the life-sphere of man. This is precisely that

which distinguishes rational creatures from the irrational, namely,

that the latter have always simply a quite definite and restricted

scope for their life-manifestation, while every thing else is

indifferent to them, and as good as not existing, whereas rational

creatures have an interest in all that exists, and bring it into some

manner of relation to themselves. Perfect indifference to the world is

Indian, but not Christian, wisdom; God is indifferent to nothing, and

for this reason moral man, the image of God, is so also. The collective

All and God himself constitute the life-sphere of the moral. Because of

the inner unity of all things, every moral act not only reverberates in

the whole universe, and there is joy among the angels in heaven over

one sinner that repents, but this act itself acts upon the All, for all

that is good and all that is capable of good belong together in one

great unity. The declaration: "Whether life, or death, or things

present or things to come--all are yours" [1 Cor. iii, 22], holds good

in its fullest sense of the moral life, although indeed our moral

bearing toward the different forms of existence is correspondingly

different; to nature the moral spirit is related as dominating, to God

as obeying.

The conceiving of God himself as an object of the moral activity is a

fundamental point in Christian ethics. It is true the heathen also

required reverence toward the gods, but this exercise of piety did not

rise to a dominating power over the entire moral life. In recent times

it has become a favorite view to regard the moral as not relating to

God at all, but only to man, or indeed also to nature; it is even said

that God cannot be an object of the moral activity, seeing that because

of his unapproachable sublimity he must be inaccessible to all human

influence. Evidently, with this view of the matter, prayer is narrowed

down to a mere pious exercise without any other possible efficacy than

to benefit the person so exercising; it would be more consequential,

however, for those who think thus to follow Kant, and discard prayer

altogether as empty and meaningless. It does not come within our scope

to answer here the question, how the answering of prayer is

reconcilable with the eternally-immutable nature of God, but we simply

accept from dogmatics the unquestionably Scriptural principle, that God

actually does hear and answer prayer, that prayer and its answering are

not a delusion, but that proper prayer really and truly conditions the

answering of the petitions, and that consequently it has a positive

influence on the bearing of God toward man. True prayer is impossible

so soon as I entertain the opinion that it has no effect, that the

gracious turning of God toward me is not in some way conditioned

thereby. This does not imply that God comes into any manner of

dependence on man; whatever he does is eternally self-determined, but

it is determined in view of the moral bearing of man as divinely gifted

with rational freedom. In this sense, prayer is really a moral activity

in relation to God, and God is a real object of the same. Prayer is the

beginning and the end of all moral activity. The sentiment: "Pray and

work," holds good of all and every moral life; the two do not stand

beside each other, but consist only in and with each other.

God, as living and personal, cannot sustain a relation of indifference

to human conduct. If we can speak in any proper sense of a displeasure

of God at sin, of a wrath of God against sin, then must also,

conversely, the pleasure of God in the moral conduct of man be of a

real character, and hence, in some manner, conditioned by said conduct.

The moral activity as relating to God is per se necessarily pious; but

to presume, for this reason, to exclude it from the sphere of the

moral, would be very inconsistent; for in fact it takes place with

freedom, and with moral consciousness and with moral purpose, and it is

frequently, in the Scriptures, expressly required as a duty; and all

duties are moral. But, on the other hand, all duties are also pious,

inasmuch as morality is always in very close association with piety (�

55), and no duty can in fact be truly fulfilled without being regarded

as an expression of the divine will, and hence without pious submission

to that will. We therefore must reject the view that there are no moral

duties toward God, and no moral influencing of God; if there are sins

against God, as, for example, blasphemy, then there must also be duties

toward Him,--and we must, further, reject the view that the duties

toward God constitute a special group entirely distinct from the

others, so that in fact the duties toward man might be fulfilled

without at the same time also fulfilling those toward God.

The distribution of the subject-matter of ethics into duties toward

God, duties toward one's self and duties toward other men, was formerly

very usual; it was, however, only partially correct. God fills, in

fact, heaven and earth, and the statement of Christ that whatever "ye

have done unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it

unto me" [Matt. xxv, 40], is of course true also in relation to God. It

might, however, be said that, while it is true that all other duties

imply in themselves also a fulfillment of duty toward God, yet that the

converse is not true, so that consequently the duties of piety might be

considered by themselves, seeing that in fact in the duty of worshiping

God no other duty is directly implied. This is, however, only seemingly

so; for in every duty toward God, I fulfill also directly at the same

time a duty toward myself: I cannot possibly love and honor God without

exalting myself into communion with Him; whatever man does to the honor

of God is at the same time a self-transfiguration; he cannot praise God

as his Father without confirming himself as the child of God. Moreover

he can do this only in so far as he, at the same time, divests himself

of illegitimate self-love; and only that one can be in communion with

God, who likewise enters into communion with the God-fearing. The

fulfilling of our moral duties toward God implies consequently in

itself, really and directly at the same time also, the fulfilling of

our duties toward those who are beloved of God. Hence, the moral

relation to God is the central spring of all other moral life, and our

duties toward God do not stand co-ordinate with and apart from our

other duties.

SECTION LXXXVII.

II. The moral activity as strengthened by its moral relation to God,

that is, by communion with Him, comes now, and only in consequence of

this strengthening, into a truly moral relation to the

created,--comprehending both the moral person himself and also the, to

him, objective world.

(1) The moral person is his own object. Man is morally to form, to

cultivate himself--to make his personal peculiar reality a product of

his moral activity. Man is what he is as a person solely in virtue of

moral activity; without this activity he remains in spiritual

unculture, and is essentially impersonal. Hence man is, in so far, an

object of his own moral activity, as he has not yet attained to his

ultimate perfection,--in so far as he is a cultivable and, as yet,

relatively incompleted being, that is, in so far as there is yet a

difference between his ideal and his reality. Man is to form himself

into a good entity, that is, into a personal reality that is in full

harmony with God, with itself and with the All, in so far as this is

good.

The possibility of man's bearing a moral relation to himself rests on

the nature of rational self-consciousness, wherein man becomes in fact

an object to himself. If man were from the very start absolutely

perfect and complete, he would still be, even then, an object of his

own moral activity, only however under its conserving, but not under

its formative, phase. Progressive development is implied in the very

nature of the created spirit, and there is no stage of temporal life

conceivable where man would not have a still higher perfection to

attain to, and further moral culture to work out.--All self-forming,

unless kept in harmony with God, becomes necessarily anti-moral. Man

can, it is true, develop himself in harmony with himself without being

in harmony with God, --this is, however, a culture of self into the

diabolical; and if he forms himself merely in harmony with the world,

he becomes an immoral worldling, and if in this worldliness he leaves

self-harmony out of the question, then he becomes simply characterless.

(a) The spirit is an object of the moral activity in virtue of its

being per se merely the possibility of its real development into a

rational spirit,--the germ of itself,--and because it does not develop

itself into its full reality by inner nature-necessity, but by freedom.

Man has, in virtue of his very constitution, the task of forming

himself into the full reality and truth of spiritual being, namely, in

respect both to his knowing, to his feeling, and to his willing,--that

is, into the perfect image of God. The soul-life of brutes shapes

itself by inner nature-necessity; brutes have no need of education;

man, however, without education and without moral self-culture would

sink below the brute, and for the evident reason that he would thus

fall into complete self-antagonism; his freedom would become unbridled

barbarity. Spirit lives only by continuous development; where it is not

morally trained, it pines away and degenerates. What Christ says of the

received talents [Matt. xxv, 14 sqq.] is especially true also of the

moral culture of the spirit.

(b) The body is an object of the moral activity in so far as it is the

necessary organ of the spirit in its relation to the world. It is not

from the very start an absolutely subserving and perfectly

spirit-imbued organ (� 65, 66), nor does it become such by purely

natural development, but it is trained into such only by the rightful

dominating of the rational spirit over it. The merely natural

development of the spirit forms not as yet a spirit's-body, but only an

unspiritual animal body. Even as in the features of the countenance,

spiritual unculture and spiritual refinement are almost always visibly

expressed, so is also the body in its entire being subject to the

refining influence of the moral spirit; and this influence ought not to

be of a merely mediate and unintended character, as resulting from the

unconsciously-ruling potency of the spiritual life in the body, but in

fact also of an immediate character. The good that inheres in the body

is to be faithfully preserved,--the germs of higher perfection to be

developed. Whatever is originally given in the body, whether as

actuality or as capacity, is a legitimate possession of the spirit and

should not be lightly esteemed. To despise the body is to dishonor the

Creator. It should not be honored, however, as merely corporeal, but as

subserving the spirit in its rational life-work,--not as an end in

itself, but as an end for the spirit. "Glorify God in your body;" this

moral precept, the apostle bases on the fact that this body is "a

temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God, and ye

are not your own" [1 Cor. vi, 19, 20]. The body is not a mere

nature-object, but a holy temple of a sanctified spirit,--bears the

consecration of a sacred destination; man has not discretionary power

over it, as over a mere nature-object,--not merely as over an

unconditional possession, but as over a good intrusted to him by God,

and belonging to God, and for which he must give account to God.

SECTION LXXXVIII.

(2) The external world as an object of the moral activity,--the widest

and almost endlessly diversified field of this activity,--is--(a) the

world of rational beings,--primarily and chiefly the world of humanity.

To the moral person other persons stand, on the one hand, in the

relation of similarity, in virtue of the common possession of a

rational nature, and, on the other, in the relation of difference, in

so far as each individual is an independent moral person with a special

peculiarity; and it is the part of the moral activity at once to

respect, to acknowledge, to preserve, and to promote both these

features, and to bring them into reciprocal harmony. A human being

never becomes, for the person acting upon it, a merely dependent

rightless object, but in all cases continues to be a personality that

is to be respected in its legitimate peculiarity, and hence it should

never become an unfree and as it were impersonal creation of another,

but it is an object for the moral activity only so far as it is itself

at the same time recognized and treated as a moral subject. The moral

bearing of man to his fellows rests essentially on the thought of the

inner, and not merely conceived, but also real, unity of the human

race, which finds its whole truth only in the thought of the common

origin of all men from a first-created primitive individual.

Here also Christian morality comes into striking antagonism to all

non-Christian morality. The thought of mankind as a homogeneous whole

of which each individual is a legitimate rightful member, is peculiar

to Christianity; the heathen know only nations and compatriots but not

humanity and man; even the free Greek and the Roman make the

distinction both in fact and in law between persons and slaves; the

slave is only a thing, not a moral personality. All acting upon others

which aims simply to exert an influence upon them without also

receiving an influence from them, is immoral. Even the immature child

necessarily exerts some influence upon its educator; and when Christ

presented a child to his disciples as a moral pattern [Matt. xviii, 3,

4], this is not to be regarded as holding good simply in a loose sense

and for the morally immature, on the contrary it is the moral essence

of the child, its God-likeness, that is, in fact, a true mirror of the

moral even for the relatively mature educator, and that has a right to

his respect. That person is a pernicious educator who has never

experienced a real moral influence upon himself from the child,--who

has never recognized in the soul of the child the features of the image

of God, nor been impressed with respect for child-na�vet�; and it is

the acme of meanness not to respect and sacredly to protect

child-innocence.

The moral conceiving of man as an object of the moral activity,

presupposes that we have in fact to do with real true men, men who are

not only similar to us, but who are bound to us as members of one body.

To creatures which, while belonging to the zoological order bimana, and

while differing from the ape by the formation of the skull and of the

feet and by an erect walk, yet should have been from of old

distinguished, both in their origin and also in their

spiritually-inferior nature, from the so-called "nobler" race of the

whites, we could not come into the same moral relation as to those who

are our brethren. The question as to the origin of the different races

of men has a deep moral significancy, and is of fundamental importance

for ethics. The natural science of the present day, which has become

largely infected with a spirit-denying materialism, is well known to

have until quite recently declared it as a fully-established fact that

the various physically-differing races of men are of different origin,

and cannot have descended from a single primitive race; and there are

not a few persons, in other respects favorable to the Christian faith,

who recognize these pretended "results of modern science" as really

such, and regard them as beyond question. It is not here the place to

examine the scientific worth of these so-esteemed results; we have to

do with the question here only in its moral significancy. We merely

remark in passing, that we must absolutely deny to an experimental

science--and this is the pretended source of said results--the right to

decide upon matters that lie beyond all experience. Such science can

simply affirm what is, or is not, but it cannot decide what cannot

possibly be. "Empirical" natural science may be justifiable in saying,

that so far as experience goes, a white person is never born of a

negro, nor a negro of a white person, though even this is not

uncontested, but it has no scientific ground for inferring, that,

consequently, it can also never have been otherwise. Inferences of this

kind, illegitimate even according to the simplest rules of logic, are

overturned almost daily by the mere progress of science. Moreover, it

is not unworthy of remark that the position: "as it is in the life of

nature now, so must it always have been" is applied to the question

before us by the very same persons who cannot admit that the human race

could have otherwise originated than through some extraordinarily

potent nature-process--through human germs, forsooth, that were cast

from the sea upon the shore,--and who in reply to the question: why

then this interesting nature-process has not repeated itself also in

our own day, or at least during the historical period in general?

immediately exclaim, that nature has declined in her generative power.

On the whole, therefore, and in view of the fact that the latest

"progress" of this particular wing of natural science takes ground in

direct antagonism to the above pretended unassailable "results,"

namely, in regarding man as an advanced development of the ape

(Darwin), we may without the least anxiety spare ourselves the trouble

of refuting the above-mentioned earlier view, and abandon this "modern"

science to its own further self-dissolution.

Christianity has from the beginning had a clear consciousness of the

moral significancy of the original unity of the human race. Though God

had undoubtedly the power to create thousands of men in the different

parts of the earth, instead of one, as he did in fact do in the case of

plants and animals, nevertheless it must be for good reasons that in

the Scriptures the whole human race is assumed to have sprung from a

single stock [Gen. i, 27, 28; ii, 18; iii, 20]. There is involved here

an antagonism of the natural and the spiritual stand-points, and that

too in a moral respect. According to naturalism the unity of the world

is a merely conceived something,--in reality it is a product of a

presupposed multiplicity of single existences; and also the good, which

in its nature is a manifestation-form of unity, is not an element

fundamental and presupposed in every single existence, but it is simply

a consequence--a product of the active individual; the good is ever to

be without ever and truly being. According to the Christian system,

however, the real unity and the real good are every-where the first,

the fundamental, while multiplicity is only of a derived character.

Here the moral is simply and solely the following of God as the

absolutely good One, a free manifestation of a unity with God which in

fact, however, originally existed,--which had not first to be realized,

but only revealed, witnessed, and freely virtualized. Man is able to be

moral only because, in his nature, he is already at one with God. So is

it also in his moral relation to mankind; the unity of the total sum of

individual men is not first to be created out of an original

multiplicity, and to be constituted as an entirely new something, but

it is simply (and this is the origin and the reason of this plurality)

to be freely and morally witnessed and confirmed. Humanity is to become

morally one, for the reason that in their origin they are already one;

love to mankind is simply fidelity to the nature of man as existing

from the beginning. This view is in diametrical antagonism to

naturalistic ethics; and hence Paul presented it very prominently, at

Athens, as the peculiarly-Christian view in contrast to heathenism

[Acts xvii, 26; comp. Rom. v, 12, sqq.]; the latter estranges humanity

into an original diversity; the former attributes all hostile

antagonisms to the workings of sin.

The very natural and in fact morally legitimate feeling, that

blood-relatives stand to us in a closer relation of duty than entire

strangers, contains a profound truth. It calls forth really a very

different and morally more potent feeling, when we know that even the

degenerated negro is of our own blood, our brother, sprang from one

father, than if we should assume that he is originally, and by nature,

of a spiritually and corporeally inferior species [August., De Civ.

Dei., xii, 21]. That which forms no unessential part of the

world-historical honor of Christianity, namely, that it has made

slavery morally impossible, has been again absolutely put into question

by the teachings of naturalism; and it is scientifically as well as

morally a signal indication of inconsideration, and especially so on

the part of theologians, to declare the decision of the question as to

the original unity of the human race as a mere non-essential matter. By

the assumption that there were originally different races, the

slavery-system is not only excused, but it is directly justified. In

fact man has not only not the duty, but he has not the right to break

down the original and naturally-constituted differences of spiritual

existence. But the moral influencing of the degenerate races consists

essentially in raising the actually lower-standing individuals of the

colored races to the height of the whites,--in placing them both, in

spiritually-moral respects, on an equal footing, in making of the

colored races our true and proper brothers, in doing away, in fact,

with whatever places them actually below the whites. But the effort to

do this would be, in the eyes of the above-mentioned teaching, a simple

presumption, a transgression of the limits prescribed to us by nature

herself; according to it, the negro is destined by his primitive and

manifestly inferior peculiarity, to service under the higher race, and

it would be a criminal interference with the ordinances of nature to

wish to change this. That which has hitherto passed for the greatest

stain upon a perverted Christian civilization, the re-establishment of

slavery, can find no more desirable an apology than these results of a

perverted science; and it is a standing and entirely consequential

opinion among even the most liberal-thinking champions of this

tendency, that negroes are in fact but half-men and should remain such.

SECTION LXXXIX.

(b) External nature as an object of the moral activity is such not

merely in its single manifestations, but also in its totality. On the

one hand, nature exists not for itself but for the rational spirit for

man; on the other, it is, as a work of divine creation, a good thing,

and hence has rights in and of itself:--(1) Nature is by origin and

essence destined to be dominated by the rational spirit as God's

image,--to be formed by the spirit into its organ and for its service.

As nature is not per se moral, hence man's moral relation to it does

not consist in his receiving from it a direct moral influence, though

indeed he does receive from it a mediate moral influence through the

contemplation of the image of God as manifesting itself therein, but in

his acting morally upon it. For the single individual, this action is

always limited to a narrow theater, but for humanity it extends to all

terrestrial nature. As the body is related to the individual spirit, so

is nature related to humanity in general; nature's destination is to be

perfectly subservient to man and to be exalted in the service of his

rational destination.--(2) But this dominating of nature is essentially

conditioned on the truly moral and hence rational self-culture of man,

in virtue of which nature is not to be subjected to the whims of

irrational caprice; for, as God's work, nature has claims upon man; it

is legitimately an object for human activity only in so far as main

subordinates himself to the divine will, whose peculiarity it is not to

destroy but to preserve.

The relation of nature to the rational spirit is neither that of an

object absolutely different from and foreign to it, seeing that both

are the work of one creative spirit, nor that of a power entitled to

dominate over the same; this would be a reversing of the moral order of

the world; for that which is per se higher and rational should not be

enslaved under that which is inferior and irrational. If, therefore,

nature and spirit exist for each other, and if they are to constitute

an intimate unity, then the only relation possible is, that the spirit

shall be the dominating power over nature,--the power that forms and

molds it. And if in reality the relation is in many respects now

actually otherwise, still this should not lead us astray in conceiving

of the true relation between them in a sinless state. The rational

consciousness of all nations has at least some presentiment of the

proper relation. Even as in all forms of superstition a more or less

clear expression is given to a presentiment, though indeed misapplied,

of a corresponding deeper truth that lies beyond the grasp of the

superficial understanding, so also has the notion of magic, so widely

prevalent throughout heathendom, its roots in a presentiment of the

true relation of reason to nature. [11] It is but the childishly

perverted thought, that the spirit should not be enslaved under

unspiritual nature,--that its true destination is to cause nature to

subserve it in its own purposes. When Christ, in his character of Son

of man, exerts his mastery over nature, and by his miraculous deeds

counterworks the sufferings that have sprung from the enslavement of

sinful humanity under nature, and when he promises like power also to

his disciples on condition of faith [Matt. xvii, 20; Mark xvi, 17, 18;

Luke x, 19; xvii, 6; John xiv, 12], he simply indicates, though

primarily only in a typical manner, the true goal of human development

in its relation to nature. The miracle does not play feats with nature,

it simply dominates it,--subjects it not to the irrational caprice of

the individual will, but to the rational will of man as in union with

God; and it is a rational demand of the rational will, to be free from

all fetters that lie outside of the rational will,--to be. untrammeled

in its activities by sufferings that spring from bondage to

spirit-hostile nature.

Nevertheless nature is not to be considered as mere material for the

active spirit, and absolutely without rights of its own; it has a right

to be respected, because of the rationality that is impressed upon it.

From the face of nature the Spirit of the Creator beams forth upon us

with striking evidence; here also there is holy ground which man should

not tread with unwashed feet. That is not a moral bearing toward nature

which forgets the image of God that is stamped upon it, and which, in

the zeal of shaping and enjoying it, perceives not that also natural

objects, even while as yet untouched by the plastic hand of man,

proclaim the glory of God. The Hindoo's dread-reverencing of natural

objects, though indeed oblivious of the Creator, has yet a positive

presentiment of the divine in the works of the, to him, unknown God.

CHAPTER IV.

THE MORAL MOTIVE.

SECTION XC.

EVERY motive to action is primarily a feeling; but feeling springs from

a consciousness. And feeling is such motive under both of its forms of

manifestation, as feeling of satisfaction or of dissatisfaction, and

hence of pleasure or of displeasure. The feeling of displeasure is to

be assumed as existing to a certain degree also in a state of strictly

normal life-development, namely, in so far as man, before reaching his

last stage of perfection, has always a consciousness, that as yet

something is lacking to him to which he is yet to attain. This is not

pain, but yet it is a feeling of want.

Any view is contrary to the nature of the soul-life which assumes any

other soul activity, as, for example, cognition, as the most immediate

motive of the moral. Thought per se contains nothing that moves the

will; but thought is in fact never absolutely alone, is never a merely

inert possession, but it excites at once and necessarily a feeling, and

then, through this feeling, the will. I feel myself in some way

affected by the perceived or conceived, more or less agreeably or

disagreeably, according as it is in harmony with, or in contradiction

to, my present state. An entire indifference is here impossible, though

indeed the shades of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure may be very

different,--impossible for the reason that that which I receive into

myself sensuously or spiritually, must necessarily come into some sort

of relation to my present corporeal or spiritual reality, and for the

reason that this relation must always be either one of harmony or

disharmony. It is true indeed that the different phases of a received

impression may have different bearings, and hence the feeling that

arises from them may be of a complex character; nevertheless in this

complexity the elements of the pleasant and the unpleasant remain

always distinct,--do not coalesce together into a feeling of total

indifference, just as every object that is taken for nutriment is

either strengthening or weakening to the body, but cannot be absolutely

indifferent. Now, every feeling stirs up also straightway the will, and

hence activity in general; in case it is a pleasant feeling we desire

to possess its object, either by preserving it or by appropriating it;

in case the feeling is unpleasant we seek to get rid of it. In this

double-movement all action is embraced, and hence also all that is

moral; and this movement itself rests absolutely on an antecedent

feeling. Thought, it is true, is the foundation of the moral, but it is

only the feeling excited thereby that is the motive proper of action.

Only he can will the good who has pleasure in the law of the Lord [Rom.

vii, 22; Psa. i, 2; cxii, 1].--When the thought of something not yet

existing, but which may be realized by my action, awakens in me a

feeling of pleasure, this is in fact the thought of a good, which, by

virtue of this feeling, becomes an intention, which differs from a

resolution in the fact that the latter relates not to the good itself

but to the means of realizing it. While, however, an intention refers

to a good, a purpose refers to the good. I purpose to become a perfect

man; I have an intention of mastering a science; I form a resolution or

determination to study. But a thought becomes to me a purpose only by

the accession thereto of the feeling of love; in a resolution the will

stands forth a little more actively.

It might, now, seem that while in the condition of the primitive

sinless goodness of human nature, there would be place for feelings of

pleasure, that is, of happiness, yet there would not be occasion for

the feeling of displeasure. This would be only then correct when man's

original perfection should be conceived of, contrary to the very idea

of life in general, as a state of completion. But all capability of

development implies a certain lack, though not a fault, nor a non-good;

and every consciousness of a lack awakens the feeling of a want, which,

though it is not a pain, and does not destroy inward happiness, is yet

also not the pleasurable feeling of complete satisfaction. That even he

who is perfectly constituted, and who remains in this perfection,

should still have bodily and spiritual wants, which are per se

necessarily attended with a certain, though indeed only momentary,

feeling of displeasure, is implied in the very nature of the creature

and of its development.

SECTION XCI.

Feeling as relating to the object that excites it, is, as a feeling of

pleasure, love, and, as a feeling of displeasure, hatred. Between these

two there is no third, although both may exist in different degrees and

even in association with each other. Hence love is the feeling of

pleasure which springs from the consciousness of the harmony of a real

or conceived object with the actual state of the subject, together with

a desire to preserve and to perfect this harmony, and hence also to

preserve the being and essence of this object. Hatred is the feeling of

displeasure which springs from the consciousness of an irreconcilable

antagonism between the object and the subject, together with a desire

to destroy this antagonism in the object, even should this involve the

destruction itself of that object. In a normal moral condition of

things where all that exists is good, love alone has a real object,

while hatred has only a possible one.--Love is essentially of a

preserving character, hatred is essentially of a negating, destroying

character; as, however, all moral action aims to create a reality by

continuous development, hence preserving love is necessarily at the

same time also promotive of the being and nature of the beloved object,

and negating hatred is at the same time a confirming of the opposite of

the bated object. Hence love works in order to be able to love always;

hatred works ill order to destroy itself; love lives in order to be

eternal; hatred lives in order to come to an end; only that hatred can

be endless whose object is eternal--namely, Satanic hatred. As moral

hatred is necessarily an effort to destroy the antagonism of existence,

that is, to re-establish its harmony, hence it is in essence the same

thing as love. Hatred is per se as moral as love,--is but its necessary

reverse phase. There is no moral love without hatred, and no moral

hatred without love; pure hatred without love would be simply Satanic

hatred. As moral hatred is in its essence love, hence the actual motive

of all moral activity is love.

"Love is the fulfilling of the law" [pleroma, Rom. xiii, 10]; in this

formula the Christian idea of the moral motive is very definitely

expressed; love leads to the fulfillment of the law; it is the rich

fullness in which all law is included. Without love there is no

morality; and where love is, there morality is truly free, for love

develops itself into all forms of the moral. Hence Christ, after the

example of the Old Testament [Deut. vi, 5; x, 12; xi, 13], sums up the

whole law in the one precept of love to God and to our neighbor [Matt.

xxii, 37; Luke x, 27]; "This is the love of God, that we keep his

commandments" [1 John v, 3]; love is not and cannot be a mere inert

feeling, but it is by its very nature active, it produces that which

its subject loves,--brings about the full and free harmony of the

person and his life with God. Whoever assigns any other motive for

morality than love, knows nothing of the moral. But love tends by its

essential nature to a unity of the diverse,--seeks not its own mere

isolated being. Mere self-love to the exclusion of love to others is

not love at all, but only immoral self-seeking; it is indeed a motive

to action, but to anti-moral action; Even that which appears in the

animal world as an unconscious symbol of moral virtue, is based on

love, and is an expression thereof. There is no form of moral activity

conceivable which would not be an expression of love [1 Cor. xvi,

14].--The moral love of the divine is, per se and necessarily, also

hatred against that which is ungodly. But as the ungodly is primarily

not real but only conceivable, and as this thought itself becomes

really vital only through the reality of sin, it does not come here

properly within our scope.

Love is taken here primarily as not yet a virtue or a disposition, but

as a simple feeling occasioned by a consciousness of harmony or of

disharmony. The love that is required as the fulfilling of the law is

more than mere feeling, though indeed it has feeling as its basis and

essence. And yet the love here in question is not a mere feeling of

pleasure, not a mere impressed state of the heart, but it contains in

itself at the same time a power prompting to an active relation to the

beloved object. All love has for its object a something that is good,

and hence, as relating to the subject, a good (� 51), and it evidences

the existence of this good by the outgoing and recognizing

life-movement of the subject toward it,--by the effort of the subject

toward the object in order to preserve or intensify its unity, its

harmony therewith. Now as all existences are created for each other and

destined to a self-harmonious life, hence love is the primitive feeling

of all rational creatures,--the direct witness of the goodness of

existence, an echo of that first witness of the Creator as to his

created work, and hence also the innermost vitality of the moral life,

the purpose and essence of which is in fact, harmony, or the good.

Directed toward the good, and hence the divine, love has for itself the

pledge of eternity; whereas moral hatred, as directed against all

non-good, that is, anti-divine, has, in virtue of its negating nature,

for its purpose, the destroying of its object and of itself with it.

Peace is the goal of love and also of hatred,--is an essential phase of

the highest good itself.

SECTION XCII.

If love is the motive to all moral action, and consequently also the

necessary presupposition thereof; hence there must also be an

ante-moral love, one that is per se not yet moral but which simply

leads to the moral. In man's originally-possessed, though not as yet

developed, God-likeness, there is in fact implied an original love

antecedent to all moral volition,--an immediate love of the created

spirit for the Creator as revealing himself to it, and for the

surrounding universe as proclaiming the Creator's love. This direct and

not morally-acquired love is, however, not an unfreely-operating,

compelling instinctive impulse, but receives the character of moral

freedom through the simultaneously awakening consciousness of personal

independence and of the therein-contained love of the person to

himself, so that in virtue of this twofold primitive love, which offers

the possibility of an antagonism as well as of a harmony, man is

invited to a free self-determination.

If the feeling of love is a directly excited one, and, as such, the

presupposition of the moral activity to which it leads, it would seem

as if moral freedom were actually precluded. For this feeling is as yet

involuntary and unfree; and love and hatred produce, directly, a desire

or a rejection. On the other hand, we cannot possibly exclude love from

the sphere of the moral, and make of it a mere antecedent condition of

the same; for according to the Christian consciousness at least, man is

morally responsible for his love and his hatred; love is an object of

duty, and is required by Christ as the essence of all fulfillment of

the law. This seems like an irreconcilable contradiction.

In the first place, it is unavoidably necessary to admit that there is

an ante-moral love. Brutes even have love, and are thereby impelled to

activity; also the child at its mother's breast feels and manifests

love. This is not a love springing from free conscious volition,--not a

moral love,--but a purely natural love, which forms, however, the

necessary antecedent condition of all development to morality.

Primitive man must also have had such a love, inasmuch as without this

a life of God's image is not conceivable. Created in harmony with God

and with the All, he must have had also a direct feeling of this

harmony, must have felt happy in his existence and in his

Paradise-world; and in this feeling of happiness he must also have

loved that whereby it was produced in him; there met him on every hand

the image of divine love, of the harmony of the universe, and he must

have felt and loved it; and when God revealed himself to him as the

loving Father, then must man have experienced also toward Him a feeling

of harmony and love. But all this love is as yet simply a

directly-excited one,--is not freely produced by moral activity, and is

consequently not yet a moral love, though it indeed conducts to moral

activity and thereby to a transformation of itself into moral love. If

now this first ante-moral love of man for God and his work were the

sole love really existing in man, then evidently the action answering

to it, and hence also to the will of God, would flow out of it so

immediately and necessarily that the possibility of a contrary

self-determination would be scarcely conceivable, so that though indeed

moral freedom in general would not be thereby destroyed, yet liberty of

choice would actually and essentially be precluded. Man would not stand

in free self-determination between the choice of the good and the evil,

but he would be overpoweringly driven by an inner potent impulse to a

choice of the good. Now, though this would in fact render conceivable

an absolutely sinless development, still it would render all the more

inconceivable the possibility of a determination to the sinful.

But the matter assumes a very different aspect when we take into

account the equally natural and immediate ante-moral impulse of

self-love. This must, in fact, also be regarded as ante-moral, for the

reason that it is the involuntary natural expression of soul-life in

general, and hence exists also unconsciously among brutes. The fact

that with man it is conscious, and constitutes a phase of rational

self-consciousness, does not make it per se moral, but simply renders

it capable of being formed into a moral quality. While now in the case

of the brute the unconscious self-love can never become really evil,

the self-love of man is, by virtue of the higher independence of the

free spirit, only in a possible harmony with the love to God and the

universe, but should come into real harmony therewith. Self-love is per

se good,--is by no means the same as self-seeking or selfishness;

Christ himself represents self-love as morally right, and as the

measure for our love to our neighbor [Matt. xxii, 39; Luke x, 27; comp.

Rom. xiii, 9; Gal. v, 14; James ii, 8; Eph. v, 28, 29, 33; 1 Sam.

xviii, 1, 3]; but the goodness of this love consists not in an

antecedently-established harmony with the love to God and the world,

but simply in its liberty to confirm this harmony spontaneously. The

love of God and the love of self are both equally primitive, and are

per se not in antagonism with each other in the least, but yet they are

different from each other and relatively independent of each other. In

this mutual independence of these two forms of love there is afforded

opportunity for the freedom of human choice. Man is called freely to

confirm the harmony of his self-love and his divine love, and that too

not by suppressing the one or the other, nor by making his love of God

dependent on his self-love, but in fact by making his self-love

dependent on his love of God,--by freely subordinating it thereto. As

soon as the divine command was given to him, man was at once conscious

that there was a difference between his self-love and his love to God,

but also, at the same time, that it was his duty to develop this

difference, not into antagonism but into harmony. The one (logically)

possible mis-choice, of suppressing the per se legitimate self-love by

disproportionate exaltation of the love to God, was impossible in fact,

inasmuch as the love to God necessarily involves in itself all possible

good, and hence also the proper love of self, for God preserves that

which He himself has willed; so that consequently there remained

possible only the other mis-choice (which was therefore morally

forbidden), namely, of subordinating the love of God to self-love,

instead of preserving the latter in its true character through its

proper subordination to the former. If simply the love of God had been

primitive in man, then a choice of the ungodly would have been

impossible; if simply self-love had been primitive in him, then a

choice of the good, of submission to the divine will, would have been

equally impossible, and man would have been in the one case

irresponsible for the good, and in the other for the evil--without

desert and without guilt. But by virtue of the fact that the love to

God and the love of self are alike primitive, as the ante-moral germ of

the moral, it follows that man is fully responsible for the

confirmation or the disturbance of the harmony of this twofold love;

for this determination was not already involved in the constitution of

man, but was proposed as a moral task to his free will. The mere love

to God would have made man good but not free, the mere self-love would

have made him seemingly free but not good; the twofold love made him

free for choosing the good, but also free for the possible choice of

the evil,--which, under these circumstances, assumed, in consequence of

the equally real original love to God, the form of infidelity to God,

of a punishable sin. The case is quite similar with the moral culture

of the child. The child, as soon as self-conscious, has love for its

mother, and also a per se strictly legitimate love for play; when the

will of the mother calls the child from its play, it becomes conscious

of the difference of the two forms of love; it knows also that it can

prefer its love for play, and leave the will of the mother unheeded. It

must by a morally-free choice, make a decision,--must subordinate the

one love to the other; if it chooses obedience, then in thus choosing,

and thus only, it feels itself truly free. If there had been no

difference of a twofold love, the child would have had no choice; it

would have just as unfreely, and without a consciousness of the good or

a right to praise, followed its mother, as, on the other supposition,

it would have unfreely and without a consciousness of the evil or a

desert of blame, preferred its play. It is only such cases of choice,

of moral self-determination, that bring the child's morality to

development and to maturity.--It would be very erroneous to consider

self-love as per se evil, and as a natural germ of the evil; the fact

is, it simply offers-not per se, however, but in its normal difference

from the love to God--the possibility of evil, but equally so also the

possibility of moral good in general. It is only in the

consciously-wrought free subordination of self-love to the divine love,

that the latter as well as the former becomes moral. There can be no

question of a "must" in the determination, whether in the one direction

or in the other, but only of a "should" and a "should not."

SECTION XCIII.

The primitive love of man to God and his works becomes moral only,

when, with consciousness and free recognition, it is confirmed by the

self-loving spirit, and when the love to God is made to control the

love of self, that is, when this twofold love becomes a striving of the

self-love to put itself into harmony with all love, through free

self-subordination to the love for God. Love as moral, and as

consciously striving toward its object, becomes disposition. Hence for

all further development of the moral life, a moral disposition is the

necessary antecedent condition; and it is such in its twofold form, as

the affirming disposition of love, and, with reference to evil, as the

negating disposition of hatred. It is only as disposition, but not as

ante-moral natural lobe, that love is an object of the divine law, a

moral requirement, whereas the ante-moral love is simply an element of

the good that is conferred in creation itself. Hence, as moral motive,

love is also the basis of the moral in the fullest sense of the word,

the life-inspiring germ of all other moral activity.

By the fact that love becomes a moral duty, it does not cease to be a

moral motive. Man, as, awakened to moral consciousness, is to have no

other motive of his moral activity than one which he has himself

morally constituted,--not a merely natural ante-moral love, but love as

a disposition. Many are led to deny that love is at all an object of

the divine law, from the simple fact that they reduce it to a mere

involuntary feeling. Also Rothe affirms that we cannot command to love,

but only to learn to love. This is very nearly a distinction without a

difference; for if we can command to learn, and this learning has a

necessary result, then evidently in commanding the learning we also

command the result. The notion that man is per se, and irrespective of

his moral depravity, not master of his own heart,--that he cannot

dominate his proclivities. his love or his repugnance,--simply destroys

his moral responsibility. If man cannot control his love and his

hatred, and bring about in himself moral love, but must allow himself

to be ruled by blind inclinations, then is he no longer a moral

creature, but simply a dangerous sort of animal. If marriages are

contracted only from "irresistible inclination" and dissolved because

of "irresistible aversion," then they lie outside of the sphere of

morality. Christian morality does not indeed require that marriages

shall continue to exist despite the pretended "irresistible aversion;"

on the contrary, it denies fundamentally that the notion of such an

ungovernable aversion is to be admitted, inasmuch as it makes man

morally responsible for his love and his hatred. It would not only be a

monstrous but also an absurd theory of morals which should admit, on

the one hand, that we are not at all master of our love and our

aversion,--that love cannot be commanded as a duty,--and yet, on the

other hand, should require that man should not act according to his

love or aversion, but according to requirements of the moral law that

have no connection therewith; he who has not love cannot practice love

without hypocrisy; but that he has it not is his own fault. Christian

ethics requires not to proclaim love in our deeds where there is no

love, for it cannot require falseness; but it requires us to have love

for all, and, for that reason also to practice it. The Scriptures

declare unequivocally that love, the motive of all moral action, is

also a duty commanded by the moral law; the law "Thou shalt love thy

neighbor as thyself" [Lev. xix, 18; Matt, xxii, 39; Mark xii, 31] is

called a "royal law," that is, a law that dominates all others [James

ii, 8; comp. Gal. v, 14; Col, iii, 14; 1 Tim. i, 5; 1 John iii, 11

sqq.; iv, 7 sqq.].

SECTION XCIV.

As morality is the free fulfilling of the divine will, hence moral love

is primarily always love to God, and the love to created things is

moral only in so far as it springs from the love to God,--considers

created things as the work of God, and loves them in him. The

God-consciousness, as developed into a moral love of God, is piety

(eusebeia); hence all morality rests on piety. All non-pious love is

immoral, and hence also all love to the creature as such, taken in

itself without connection and interpenetration with the divine love.

But all love to God rests on our consciousness of God's love to us;

love is produced only by love; all moral love is, in its essence,

reciprocal love; a non-loving creature can be loved only in so far as

God's love is reflected to us from it; and for this very reason moral

love to persons seeks indeed their love in return, but does not need

it.

As rational thought finds the unity of its thought-world only in the

thought of God, so also moral love finds its rest and its unity only in

love to God; it is not content with the semblance thereof but only with

the truth; and all things have their truth only in their relation to

God. As that love is higher, truer, and mightier which loves, in a

person, not merely the earthly but also the soul, so is that love

higher, truer, and mightier which loves in man, not merely the creature

but also the image of God, and, through it, God himself. Love is the

more genuine the higher its object; he who sees in creatures the trace

of God, and loves God in them, he alone loves with the whole might of

love. The proper love to the creature rests on the consciousness that

"the earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof" [1 Cor. x, 26]; this

does not lower the creature in the eyes of the love, but elevates both

its worth and the love for it. Thus also Christ presents the precept of

love to God as "the first and great commandment;" and "the second is

like unto it," that is, it is already implied in it, though it does not

absolutely coincide with it,--it is in fact the reflection of our love

to God back upon our neighbor; our love for our neighbor is erroneous,

when it does not rest upon love to God. Hence Christ says: "He that

loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me" [Matt. x,

37]. To the natural man this sounds hard and severe; but from a

Christian stand-point, nay, even from a religious stand-point in

general, no other view is possible than in fact, that a love for the

creature without the higher divine love, or with one that prevails over

the latter, is sinful. By this relation of all love to the love of God,

this love is preserved also from one-sided narrowness,--clings not, in

irrational caprice, to isolated objects,--but extends itself to all

that is created, though indeed different degrees of such love are

possible, from the fact of the differing peculiarity of the object and

of the loving person.

This true mutual relation of our love to the creature and our love to

God, appears still more striking when we attentively consider the

relation of human love to the divine love. As human thinking is only a

reflection of the divine thought, so also is human love only a

reflection of the divine love. All that is true and good in the copy is

enkindled by the true and the good of the prototype; "He that loveth

not knoweth not God, for God is love" [1 John iv, 8]. Man could not

love God, and hence could not love morally at all, were he not loved of

God. God's love is a love of grace; man's love is a love of

gratitude,--the answering love of a child. Love cannot love any thing

else but love [Psa. ciii, 1 sqq.; Col. iii, 17; 1 Thess. v, 18; 1 John

iv, 11, 19]. For this reason there is no pain so great as where love

remains unrequited. But to the pious heart it is not unrequited; such a

heart finds the love which it seeks; Christ says: whatsoever "ye have

done unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto

me;" and where, against the loving one, the heart of man coldly closes

itself, there the love of God comes in its place.

SECTION XCV.

While our love to created things is either simply a love to the

inferior, or to the equal, or to the merely relatively higher, and

hence always meets its object with a consciousness of its own

independent power and of an individual personal right, our love to God

is, as directed to One that is absolutely superior to all that is

human, always associated with a consciousness of our own impotency as

in contrast to the infinite holy power of the Beloved, and hence is a

love of fear. Love to God is essentially God-fearing; there is,

however, no moral fear of God without also love to God. Mere fear alone

is not a moral motive, for only love is this.

In all love to a created object our moral action is complementive and

promotive of the being and life of the same; we render to it in our

love a real service, and obtain for ourselves a claim upon its

grateful, answering love. But God's being and life cannot be

complemented and heightened by our love; we cannot render to him a real

service for which he would be under obligation to us [Job xli, 2; Rom.

xi, 35]. Our love to God consists only with the consciousness that we

receive every thing from God, and God nothing from us,--that our entire

being and life stand absolutely in his power. Such a consciousness

includes necessarily the feeling of fear--not fear of a mere power

operating without reference to moral action, but of a righteous God who

opposes all that is unholy; and in this sense Christ himself makes a

regard for the penal judgments of God a motive for moral action [Matt.

v, 22, 25 sqq.; xxv, 45, 46]. Fear of God in the absence of love is, in

fact, by no means irrational; rather is it, wherever such love is

lacking, the natural expression of the antagonism between the unholy

nature of the person and the holy God, but such fear is not a moral

motive. It presupposes the antagonism which the moral denies; and it

cannot do away with it, for it is love alone that harmonizes. That

nevertheless this slavish fear is of moral significancy for the state

of sinfulness, we shall subsequently see. For the unfallen state, mere

fear has neither reason nor possibility, for mere fear is, in its

essence, hatred,--hatred against the more powerful being with whom we

are not united by love.

Mere love, however, without fear, as toward God, is not truthful, for

that would be only a love of familiarity as with our equal. He who is

conscious of his moral freedom, must also be conscious, as often as he

makes use of this moral freedom, that God opposes his holy power to its

misuse. The feeling which springs out of such a consciousness is not

contrary to love, nor is it yet love itself, but it is genuine moral

fear. Hence this moral awe of God, the true reverence for God, is the

beginning of all wisdom and the condition of all morality [Deut. v, 29;

vi, 2; x, 20; Prov. i, 7; viii, 13; ix, 10; xv, 33; xvi, 6; Psa. cxi,

10; cxii, 7; Job xxviii, 28; 2 Cor. vii, 1]. Only those who fear the

Lord trust in the Lord [Psa. cxv, 11]; for only the holy God gives

surety for his love and truthfulness; not to fear God involves being

godless [Prov. i, 29; Rom. iii, 18], and piety is synonymous with the

fear of God (phobos Theou) [Acts ix, 13; Eph. v, 21; 2 Cor. vii, 1].

The reference is not to this pious dread of the holy God, but to that

mere servile fear which is at bottom hatred, when St. John says: "There

is no fear in love, but perfect love casteth out fear; because fear

hath torment (kolasin echei, is a feeling of estrangement from God, of

unblessedness); he that feareth is not made perfect in love" [1 John

iv, 18]. The true fear of God is closely allied to the love of God

[Deut. x, 12].

SECTION XCVI.

Where the love to God is true God-fearing, there it is also a firm

trusting in God. Trusting is the reverse side of this fearing.

Man-fearing is devoid of trust; God-fearing is per se also

God-trusting. In relation to all that is evil, I fear God, who will

bring it to naught and me with it; in relation to all that is good, I

trust God, who will not permit me to come to naught, but will

gloriously accomplish that which I begin in his name. God-fearing love

is full of confidence in the results of its moral strivings; because it

fears God, it has no reason to fear any power that is hostile to God.

Certain of its victory, and certain that it works in God and for God,

and hence that it accomplishes divine and imperishable work, it becomes

enthusiasm, which is the highest and truest moral motive, and the only

sufficient power where there is involved a moral working for general

interests that transcend all temporal individual interests,--where the

temporal happiness of the person must be sacrificed to a moral

principle,--which, however, is conceivable only where sin is dominant.

Trusting in God is faith, love, and hope at the same time; primarily,

however, it is not a result of moral self-culture. but it is simply the

germ of that threefold life that is antecedent to all actual moral

life. As the awakening consciousness of the child expresses itself in

an, as yet, obscure trust to its mother, so is it with man's first

life-relation to God. Man attains a trust not simply through faith and

through love, but faith and love are per se, and of necessity, trust

already; and hence trust is a necessary antecedent condition of all

moral life. Trust relates to the idea of an end; the mere desire of an

end is not a sufficient motive to inspire moral effort toward it; it

may be a hopeless, and hence an inactive, desire; doubting Peter sinks

in the waves; it is only an unshaken trust that confirms courage and

awakens strength [Psa. xviii, 31 sqq.; xxvii, 14; xxxiv, 9; xxxvii, 3

sqq.; lxii, 6 sqq.; lxxxiv, 13; Prov. xvi, 20, and elsewhere].--There

is no enthusiasm for evil,--at furthest only a Satanic pleasure in

evil, but this pleasure is attended with fear and malice, but not

enthusiasm. Man as sinful may err as to what is good or evil, and he

may therefore have enthusiasm for a folly, but only from the fact that

he takes it for something good and noble. Nor can the merely individual

and temporal awaken enthusiasm; nothing but the ideal can do

this,--that which is, or is conceived of as, absolutely valid, as

eternal truth, and hence of divine significancy, in a word that in the

victory and permanent endurance of which the person has entire

confidence. For that which is merely individual or useful I may indeed

have energy or passion, but not enthusiasm. Only the absolutely good,

the divine, is free from all doubt. Doubt is death to enthusiasm;

without faith it is not possible morally to battle for the divine.

Without enthusiasm there can be but a cold, calculating working for

temporal ends, but no effort for the divine and eternal; hence whatever

is not of faith is sin, for it is non-moral, whereas man ought

constantly to be moral. The apostles had indeed, during Christ's

earthly life, a warm love for their Master, so that they were ready

even to die with him [John xi, 16], but they had enthusiasm only after

the pouring out of the Holy Ghost.

SECTION XCVII.

As love springs from the consciousness of the harmony of the person

with his object, and as the feeling of such a harmony is the feeling of

happiness, hence all love is per se also happiness, and its striving is

necessarily a striving for happiness. As, however, love does not seek

its own, but finds its bliss alone in that of the beloved, it is clear

that this striving for happiness, as based on moral love, is in nowise

self-seeking and narrow-hearted, but, on the contrary, a proper motive

of moral activity,--only, however, in so far as it is in unison with

the right love, and does not appear as something different from

it,--not as the first and fundamental element, but only as a derived

one; but it becomes an immoral motive in so far as it is an expression

of mere self love (Eudemonism).--The tendency to the good, which is

produced by moral activity, becomes in turn itself a higher motive to

the moral.

The question as to the morality of happiness-seeking as a moral motive,

cannot be answered without a more definite characterization. The

"eudemonistic" view proper, that of the Epicureans, is evidently

immoral, as it rests on mere self-love. Heathen ethics could oppose to

this self-seeking happiness-principle nothing other than the notion

that virtue should be sought after for its own sake. If there was here

a seeming subordinating of the person to a general moral idea, still,

because of the inner untruthfulness of the position, it could not

possibly be otherwise than that in fact, even in the strictest

Stoicism, the mere proud self-consciousness of the individual should

be, after all, the influencing motive proper. The thought of love as

the true moral motive was entirely wanting to heathen ethics,--is

peculiar to Christianity. The Christian idea of love harmonizes the

legitimate self-love with submission to the moral law. In loving God,

man loves also himself as a child of God, and in fulfilling his duty he

at the same time realizes his happiness. The love to God and to His

creatures is, on the one hand, a feeling of happiness, and, on the

other, a motive to moral activity. The old controversy about the

happiness-principle, which has in recent times been revived, especially

by the school of Kant, receives its proper solution only in the

Christian view, namely, in that, while Christianity recognizes in the

proper seeking for happiness a strictly moral motive, it also exalts

the character of this seeking by the love in which alone it bases it.

It is therefore a very one-sided illiberality in Rationalists to

reproach Old Testament ethics with "Eudemonism." It is true, the Old

Testament recognizes the seeking after happiness as a proper motive in

the fulfilling of the law: "That it may go well with thee and with thy

children after thee, and that thou mayest prolong thy days upon the

earth" [Deut. iv, 40; Exod. xx, 12; Deut. v, 16; xxix, 33; Psa. xxxvii,

37; cxxii, 6, etc.]; the formula "Blessed is he that," etc., [Psa. i,

1; ii, 12; xxxiv, 8; xl, 4, etc.] and other similar ones, are very

frequently given as an encouragement to moral obedience; but also

Christ himself and the apostles expressly present such a motive: "Do

this and thou shalt live" [Luke x, 28; comp. Matt. xix, 16, 17, 28, 29;

vi, 19, 20; Mark x, 21; Luke xii, 33; John iii, 36; Eph. vi, 3; Rom.

ii, 7; 1 Tim. iv, 88; vi, 19]; the "crown" of life is promised as a

reward to fidelity [1 Cor. ix, 25; 2 Tim. iv, 8; 1 Peter v, 4; James i,

12; Rev. ii, 10]; but neither the Old nor the New Testament separate

this striving for happiness from the love to God and our neighbor in

which, in fact, both Covenants find the true motive to moral action.

There is, in reality, no essential antagonism between love and the

striving after happiness; but the latter is directly implied in the

former, and is, in the nature of the case, inseparable from it.

Christianity knows no other happiness than love to God in the

consciousness of being loved by him.

All moral activity has necessarily a permanent result in the person

himself; it makes the moral his possession and property,--forms more

and more his moral character, and hence creates a tendency to, and a

readiness in, moral acting. I his moral possession, as a result of

moral activity--virtue--becomes in turn itself, as an active power, a

motive force to moral life, so that by his moral activity man

constantly increases the actuating power of the same. Of this readiness

or skill in moral acting we will have occasion to speak hereafter; we

merely remark here, that by virtue of acting morally the originally as

yet undetermined freedom of choice receives a determined

character,--takes up into itself the morally good as such. The moral

develops itself into a constantly increasing power,--renews itself on a

progressively larger scale in the organic circulation of life. The good

becomes to the moral man, as it were, a second nature, which, in turn,

works out of itself by virtue of its own power; it is no longer simply

something objective to him, nor merely a natural quality conferred upon

him, but it is a vital possession, and hence an actuating power within

him.

CHAPTER V.

THE MORAL ACTIVITY.

SECTION XCVIII.

LOVE works the accomplishment of the lovingly-willed end; the moral

motive and the accomplishing of the end belong, therefore, morally,

inseparably together. The moral element lies neither exclusively in the

motive, nor exclusively in the action; neither exclusively in the

intention or end, nor exclusively in the means to the end, but in the

unity of both. A good end does not sanctify the means, nor do good

means sanctify the end, but a good end is accomplished morally only by

good means; all end which actually can be realized by immoral means, is

itself immoral.

As the moral is a free realizing of a rational end, the question

naturally rises, wherein the moral element properly lies, namely,

whether in the end and in the motive? or in the means to the end, that

is, in the acts that lead to the realization of the end? or whether in

both at the same time,--that is, whether we are to judge of an act

exclusively from the intention, or exclusively from the action itself,

or in fact from both together? The first of these queries has been

answered affirmatively by the Jesuits--though this is not peculiar to

them, but is involved more or less in all perverted moralizing,

especially in that of worldly society at large; outside of the sphere

of Christian earnestness there prevails every-where in fact a tendency

to distinguish between the morality of the end and that of the means.

From the very idea of the moral it follows necessarily that the

conscious end, and hence the intention, occupies with good right the

chief place in determining the moral judgment, and that consequently

only that action can be good which aims at a good end--one in harmony

with the moral order of the world. Whatever accomplishes such an end

must consequently be in harmony with the moral order of the world, and

hence be itself good; when therefore the axiom: "The end sanctifies the

means" is understood to mean "that the means which answer to a really

good end are necessarily also good," then it is entirely

unobjectionable; it becomes false only when either the end is only

seemingly good, or the means only seemingly appropriate, or where it is

assumed that the means, that is, the actions, are per se morally

indifferent, and receive a moral character only from the intention. As,

however, all free action falls within the sphere of the moral order of

the world, and as the reality that is produced by this action is either

in harmony or in disharmony with this order, hence also the action, per

se and irrespectively of its end, is either good or bad,--though

indeed, in order to its full moral appreciation, its end also must be

taken into the account. He who sets a house on fire from negligence may

have had no evil intention, but he is punished nevertheless, and justly

so, for his action was per se evil, and might have been avoided by him.

If we suppose instead of an absolutely good end, that is, such a one as

is a part of the highest good, simply particular ends, the goodness of

which consists only in their subordination to the order of the whole,

then the axiom: "The end sanctifies the means," is false, in so far as

the end or means do not consist with the order of the whole. He who

burns down a house in order to drive the rats out of it attains indeed

his end, but at the same time he destroys the super-ordinate end of the

house. The question becomes difficult only when bearing upon moral

action in a sinful world, in which evil, and hence the infliction of

evils for punishment, for discipline and defense, has a legitimate

place. But of this we can only speak further on.

Moral action, as flowing from love, may be considered from two points

of view: first, in itself, according to its inner differences, that is,

moral action as such; secondly, in relation to the different moral

objects in virtue of the differences of which the moral action itself

assumes a different form.

SUBDIVISION FIRST.

THE MORAL ACTIVITY PER SE IN ITS INNER DIFFERENCES.

SECTION XCIX.

As moral action always seeks to effect a harmony between the acting

person and the moral object, hence it stands in relation, on the one

hand, to the former as its starting-point, and, on the other, to the

latter as the goal aimed at by the life-movement. This harmony can

consequently be effected in a twofold manner,--either in that the

object becomes for the subject, or the subject for the object, that is,

either by appropriation or by formation. As, however, every entity, in

so far as it is good, has a right in and of itself, hence it has such a

right also as bearing upon the morally active person, so that neither

the appropriating nor the forming is without some degree of limitation,

but both must respect this right of the object. The two forms of moral

action have therefore, as a necessary limit, a third form of moral

bearing, namely, a bearing by which the moral object is preserved in

its rights,--moral sparing.

This third form of the moral bearing, which, as an activity of the

will, has of course a moral character, has been very largely ignored in

ethics, or at least left in the back-ground, and it is even severely

criticised in its defenders, and yet it is a sphere of very essential

duties, duties which can be classed into other spheres only by manifest

violence, and which yet consist, in fact, neither in appropriation nor

in formation. When I check my foot in order not wantonly to crush an

ant that is crossing my path, this is in fact a moral self-limitation,

but it cannot be properly classed as moral forming, seeing that the end

of this action is very evidently the to-be-spared animal, and not the

acting person. But every moral action without exception is also a moral

self-forming, a self-cultivating, without, however, that this

self-culture should always appear as the end proper. Without the proper

respecting of the duty of sparing, appropriation and formation would

become violence. But the moral motive of all right action, namely,

love, implies in its very nature also the exercising of preservative

sparing; man cannot love an object, and yet not seek to preserve it in

the beloved peculiarity of its being. Sparing is not of a mere negative

character, a mere limiting of another action, but it is essentially

different from all other action; it is of a negative character only in

form but not in contents. When I do not severely reproach a person who

is inwardly and deeply ashamed and humiliated because of his sin, but

tenderly spare him, this is not a mere non-doing of that which I might

do, not a mere limiting of my punitive activity, but it is the very

opposite of this. There results here from the moral motive, that is,

love, not a positive acting upon the other, but a restraining of such

action; and if I thereby heap coals of fire upon the head of an enemy,

and thus profit him morally, still this is not a real influential

forming on my part, but a giving place for the moral self-forming of

the other; my sparing procedure here is indeed mediately a forming, as,

on the other hand, it is also a self-mastering; per se however, it is

an action different from both. When, in the sphere of the freedom of

rational creatures, God restrains his immediate action in order to

preserve them in their freedom,--when God spared Cain, and, after the

flood, promised henceforth to spare living creatures as a whole [Gen.

iv, 15; viii, 21; ix, 11 sqq.],--this is simply a divine example of

moral sparing. To spare is often more difficult morally than to

appropriate or to influence, for in the latter cases the person has a

lively consciousness of self, and stands forth prominently with his own

rights and his enjoyment of activity; but, in sparing, it is the right

of the object that stands in the foreground, and the actor must

recognize and respect this right, and must morally overcome his

personal will and his pleasure in self-assertion. Sparing is the

preservative, the "conservative," phase of the moral life, and its

carrying-out presupposes greater moral maturity than the exercise of

the appropriating or forming activities; for the youthful zeal of the

morally immature spirit, its practice is exceedingly difficult; not to

crush the bruised reed, nor to quench the smoking wick [Matt. xii, 20],

is more difficult, and involves a higher moral wisdom, than to destroy

or to create anew.--As the sparing procedure is logically the most

immediate course of conduct, and rather a withholding than an express

acting, hence it is more appropriate to treat of it first.

I. MORAL SPARING.

SECTION C.

Moral sparing is a self-limiting of personal action in the interest of

the rights of the object; the latter is neither appropriated nor formed

by the person, but simply let alone in its peculiar being and nature.

The duty of sparing rests upon the right of every natural or spiritual

and historical entity to its existence and its peculiarity, in so far

as these are good, and hence upon love to the object as being

good,--consequently, in the final instance, upon a pious world theory,

upon love to God. The entity is spared because it bears in itself the

impress of the Eternal,--is an expression of the will of God; hence

sparing is moral only in so far as it relates to the good and the

divine ill existence, and not to that which by virtue of its ungodly

nature should be an object of moral hatred.--The higher the perfection

of an object, so much the higher is also its right to moral sparing;

the less the perfection, the more the object falls within the sphere of

appropriation and formation. The highest object of moral sparing among

created things is man, and whatever exists through and for him; but,

above all, his moral personality itself, and hence also his honor. God

himself cannot indeed be an object of moral sparing in the strict sense

of the word, but lie is such, however, in the forms of his revelation

in time, and in all that symbolically represents him.

An indiscriminate sparing would be simply spiritual and moral sloth or

indifference, and hence immoral. The sparing of the anti-godly is a

sinning against God, is the withholding of moral love. An evil

existence has indeed also, in so far as any good still inheres in it, a

right to be spared,--only, however, in that which it has of good. The

right to be spared is not, of course, in the case of finite existences,

of an unlimited and unconditional character, and in the case of

nature-objects it is much more limited than with personal beings,

though indeed it never sinks entirely to zero. It is true, nature is

destined to service under the dominion of the rational spirit, and, in

so far as it reaches this destination, man has in fact a right to pass

beyond the limits of mere sparing restraint, and actively to lay hold

on the very existence of nature, transforming and appropriating it.

Where the right of the personal spirit is not recognized, where God is

conceived of as a mere nature-entity, there pious morality manifests

itself in a wide-reaching sparing of natural objects, far beyond the

measure of what is required of us; so is it with the Brahmins and the

Buddhists; and, especially in the case of the former, this

over-delicate sparing of natural objects is associated with a cruel

un-sparingness toward themselves.

As the duty of sparing rests on the right of each particular being to

its own peculiarity, hence this duty as well as this right rise in

scope in proportion to the degree of the individual perfection. That

which is absolutely perfect bears the character of eternity and

unchangeableness, and though it may indeed be spiritually appropriated,

yet it cannot in any respect be formed or changed. In the process of

education, the dictating influence upon the child falls into the

background in proportion as the child grows toward moral maturity.

Lifeless matter has no claim to sparing. When the Brahmin does not

allow himself causelessly to crush the least earth-clod, this is simply

because he regards it as the sacred body of Brahma. Plants have a

better claim to be spared than inorganic objects, and the more so the

higher their organization, and especially as they stand in a closer

relation to man; to injure fruit-trees and other edible vegetation,

without cause, is regarded as sinful even by uncultured tribes. The

more an object enters into the sphere of man's spiritual life, the more

it bears the impress of the spirit, constituting, as it were, a sort of

larger corporeality for man, so much the higher is its claim upon

sparing. This is especially the case with the human body itself, as the

organ of the spirit, as a "temple of the Holy Ghost;" in the next rank

stand all such natural objects as hold a relation to the spiritual

life, and which are mementos of important events and of spiritual

effort in general,--every thing, in fine, that has been actually

produced by the human spirit, and the more so in proportion as it is of

a spiritualized character,--and hence, especially, all products of

industry and art. But the highest right to sparing is possessed by the

personal spirit itself in its personal peculiarity; to assail the honor

of another is to wound his moral being; the higher the moral culture

and maturity of a person, the higher is also his right to moral

sparing; by sin this right is necessarily largely forfeited.

While the heathen idol falls, of course, within the sphere of human

sparing, the eternal and almighty God stands beyond the scope of this

activity. Nevertheless there are sacred duties which express, in a

certain sense, a sparing of the divine; the name of God and his honor

are to be held sacred; and whatever is a symbol of the divine, or is a

reminder of God's presence, has an especial claim to moral sparing;

even uncultured tribes practice a reverential sparing in regard to all

that is sacred or stands in relation to the divine in contradistinction

to the worldly and the profane. From the simple fact of the sparing of

whatever stands in real, or even in symbolical, relation to God, it is

very evident, of how great significancy is piety for morality. The

pious mind finds God's being and providence in all things and in all

life, and whatever is not hostile to God is, for it, sacred and an

object of pious sparing. The higher the piety of the person, so much

the higher becomes the worth, and hence also the right, of all

existence, in so far as this existence is good. He who is impious has

no reverence for created things,--no tenderness toward them. Not to

spare that which has a right to sparing, is moral rudeness. The immoral

and the impious are uniformly rude and coarse; they have indeed fear

but no awe.

Sparing is, as a non-doing, only then moral when it is a conscious and

freely-willed withholding of a real out-going action, that is, when it

is an inner activity, a moral self-controlling out of respect for

another's right, and when it is in real harmony with moral forming and

appropriating, so as not in any manner to interfere therewith,--that

is, when it is the virtualizing of the real rights of the moral object.

The formable or cultivable object has, however, just as good a right to

be formed as it has to be spared. In so far as sparing is a mere

non-influencing of the objective entity, it is not yet moral, and may

even also be evil. The spiritually indolent declines even this form of

activity, not, however, from love to the object, but from mere

selfishness. Only that sparing is morally good which rests on love to

the object, and which therefore implies a conscious self-limitation and

self-controlling, and which is, consequently, only in outer form, but

not in inner essence, a mere non-doing; mere non-doing would be per se

sinful, inasmuch as the moral life must always be active, and it is

only the seeming non-doing which, however, is an inner-doing, that can

be moral. True moral sparing is, in relation to beings that are.

formable and in need of formation, uniformly also a formative

influence, namely, in that it gives proper play for legitimate

self-forming on the part of the object. A tyrannical education that

extends its tutorial dictation into all the minute details, produces

not a moral character but only servile-mindedness. All right education

must also practice, in the interest of the training of moral freedom, a

wise sparing,--must allow the child the possibility of determining

itself independently, and of thereby maturing itself toward moral

freedom. As the sparing of a growing plant is at the same time also a

furthering of it, so also, and even in a higher degree, is this true of

sparing as exercised toward rational beings; the pardoning of an

offense exercises frequently a very fruitful influence on the moral

development of him who is pardoned.

II. MORAL APPROPRIATING.

SECTION CI.

In the appropriating activity man effects his unity with the objective

entity, by taking it up into himself,--by uniting it with himself, by

making it an element of his own nature. This moral activity differs

both in regard to what element of the object is appropriated by the

actor, and in regard to how this takes place.

(a) According to what element of the object is appropriated, the

appropriating is either natural or spiritual; the latter is the more

comprehensive, and extends itself to all objective existence,--also to

God.--Natural appropriation relates as well to the existence and

preservation of the individual person as to the existence and

preservation of the species, and is the necessary condition of both. In

both respects, therefore, man is bound to nature and stimulated by

natural instinct, and although in this respect he is freer than the

brute, and all the freer the higher his personality is developed,

nevertheless in respect to the preservation of the existence of the

subject, this freedom is still always of a limited character, and the

law of nature is, in many respects, stronger than the will, though,

however, not so potent as to force the will to the immoral.

All natural existence is at the same time also of spiritual

significance,--is a realized thought, the expression of an idea. But

as, on the other hand, not every spiritual entity is connected with a

natural one, hence spiritual appropriating is of greater compass and

higher significancy than the merely natural. The higher moral worth of

the former appears also from this, that it preserves the objective

existence in its reality, whereas natural appropriation more or less

destroys it. With the increase of moral and spiritual growth, natural

appropriation constantly gives place more and more to the spiritual;

with the child the former predominates; but what is normal in the child

becomes immoral in mature age.

In natural appropriation there is manifested a real and normal

limitation of free self-determination. When hunger predominates, the

spiritual forces subside, and at last it becomes even mightier than the

free determinations of the will. Nevertheless this power of nature over

the will is neither unlimited nor absolutely definitive, but the moral

will is capable of asserting its autonomy against it. It may indeed

enfeeble the bodily force and therewith also the spiritual, but it

cannot absolutely determine the will. Christ cried out indeed on the

cross: "I thirst;" but when hungering in the desert he resisted the

temptation. The fact that from grief or despair persons have starved

themselves to death, proves at least that the will is capable of being

stronger than nature, even under its most overpowering phases. He who

in the last desperation of famine lays hold on human life to satiate

his hunger [Lev. xxvi, 29] commits a crime even in the eyes of human

law, and the violence of hunger forms no excuse. That also in this

respect a great difference is to be made between man as unfallen and

man as enslaved to sin, we have already observed.

SECTION CII.

Natural appropriating per se is not yet a moral activity, but it is

extra-moral, and therefore when it appears in and of itself as the

substance and chief-end of life, it is immoral. It becomes morally good

only when it is the expression of an under-lying spiritual

appropriating, that is, when it does not rest on mere sensuous impulse,

but on conscious love, not so much to the sensuous object per se as

rather to God who lovingly gives it to us. This implies further that,

with a moral person, the natural appropriating should never predominate

over the spiritual,--that not the attendant sensuous enjoyment per se

should be regarded as the essential and proper object of effort, but

rather the rational God-willed end of the sensuous, so that

consequently the sensuous enjoyment should be aimed at only in so far

as the moral purpose admits of it.

There is per se forbidden to man, irrespective of his sinfulness, no

natural temperate sensuous appropriating; this is plainly seen in the

account of Paradise and in the example and deed of Christ at the

wedding of Cana. Thankfulness to God sanctifies even the sensuous

appropriation of his gifts [1 Tim. iv, 3-5]. The Christian custom of

saying grace at meals, after the example of Christ [Matt. xiv, 19; xv,

36], which prevailed also generally in the ancient church [Acts xxvii,

35; Tert. Apol., 39], has a high moral significancy; it rescues the

natural enjoyment from the stage of mere sensuousness,--elevates it

into the sphere of the moral. As even in the opinion of worldly society

the significancy of social repasts consists not in the sensuous

enjoyment, but in the intellectual entertainment and interchange of

sentiment, so according to Christian morals the significancy of all

sensuous appropriation consists in its relation to God,--in the

appropriating of the divine in and through the bread and wine of daily

food. "Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all

to the glory of God" [1 Cor. x, 30, 31]. But man does not give God the

glory when he forgets Him and finds pleasure merely in the sensuous.

God neither forbids nor begrudges to man the enjoyment of the sensuous,

but he forbids a beastly merging of one's self into it. He who forgets

the Giver in the gift sinks below the sphere of the moral and even of

the human. The world at large is not fond of grace-saying, and yet even

the heathen made his libations to the gods at his repasts. Even

Schleiermacher (Christl. Sitte, Beil., p. 33) found in the just-cited

words of Paul simply an assumption of the animal

element--food-taking--"into the sphere of social pleasure," "in order

to chasten mere sensuous desire," and he is unable to discover any

significancy in the saying of grace.

The observing of moderation in natural appropriation, the regarding it

as a mere means to the rational end of preserving the individual as

well as the species, is not merely a moral preserving of the person but

also of the object,--is a doing of justice toward the object. He who is

temperate simply, e. g., in order not to injure his health, is not yet

moral, but only self-seeking. Appropriation finds its measure in the

moral duty of sparing. All natural appropriating is more or less a

destroying of the objective entity; and, as the latter has per se a

right to sparing, it follows that the limit of appropriation is not a

merely subjective one. The nightingale-tongue pies of the Roman

epicures are not mentioned with detestation simply because they are a

mere immoderation, but because they involved an injustice against the

right of nature to be spared. And many modern table-luxuries are not of

a much more innocent character.

In sexual appropriation the moral is conditioned not merely, as in the

use of natural objects, on thankful love to God as the giver,

but--inasmuch as the object appropriated is itself a moral

personality--also on personal love to the same. Without this love the

person of the object would be treated as a mere impersonality, as a

mere nature-object, and its validity as a personal moral spirit

ignored. Upon this moral recognition of the personality Scripture lays

great emphasis. "Adam knew Eve, his wife;" the same expression (yd) is

very frequently used of wedlock communion, also on the part of the

woman [Gen. xix, 8; Num. xxxi, 17]. This is usually explained as a mere

euphemism, but it is in fact the appropriate expression to the essence

of the matter. The persons mutually recognize each other as

personalities bound to each other in full reciprocal

possession,--recognize, each, himself in the other and the other in

himself--recognize the complete belonging of each to the other in

virtue of a mutual love which precludes every thing that is strange or

disuniting, so that consequently the two constitute truly one soul and

one flesh. The expression to "know," to recognize, refers therefore

primarily solely to legitimate wedlock cohabitation, and was applied

only subsequently and improperly also to sinful.

Sexual appropriation also is in part a destruction, a despoiling of the

person, which finds a compensation only in the fact that the one person

belongs to the other as an inalienable possession--that both persons

are united to an indissoluble life in common. Hence the commerce of the

sexes without marriage is self-profanation; and virginity is esteemed

among all, not absolutely barbarous nations as an inviolable treasure

to which only that one has a right who is united in his whole

personality to the person of the virgin. And even within the limits of

marriage each party has a right to sparing, and should not be degraded

into a mere object of sensuous pleasure; also here there is a measure

that is conditioned on the end, and the transgressing of which is a

dishonoring, a degrading. of the consort.

SECTION CIII.

2.--Spiritual appropriation relates to all objective existence, nature

included, and takes up the spiritual contents thereof into the being of

the self-conscious subject,--makes it its personal possession. The

moral subject enlarges thus its own spiritual being,--receives the

universe as well as God into itself,--forms for itself an inner world

which, as a copy of the real world, realizes under its subjective phase

the moral end, namely, the effecting of the harmony of existence.

In spiritual appropriation, as the far richer field of this activity,

the appropriated object is in no wise destroyed, but on the contrary

preserved, nay, brought to its higher truth, namely, in that its

spiritual contents not only exist per se, but also exist for the

spirit, and have now in the spirit a continued existence even after the

object itself outwardly perishes. That which has become a part of

history and science has thereby attained to imperishableness. That

which externally perishes, the natural existence, is the inferior, the

less essential; that which is capable of becoming a possession of the

immortal spirit is, in fact, the higher,--the essence, the idea, the

spiritual contents of existence. In virtue of their spiritual contents

even natural objects receive a sort of immortality by being

appropriated by the rational spirit; in a still higher degree is this

true of the facts of history. Spiritual appropriation is related to

natural appropriation as the spirit to the body; the latter must

therefore always be subordinate to the former,--must absolutely serve

it.--As all nature is created not only by spirit but also for spirit,

and as whatever is spiritually created is likewise for the spirit,

hence it is but justice to both natural and historical existence,--but

a simple right of the same upon the rational spirit,--that it be

appropriated by the latter, and it is a perfectly moral requirement

that spiritual appropriating be made an essential part of the moral

activity. Only savages know nothing of history, of the permanent

preservation of the transitory. The preservation of that which belongs

to the spirit, that which has been appropriated by it, is the earliest

evidence of the spiritual, the historical character of a people,--of

human culture. The most ancient historical nations of heathendom, the

Chinese and the Egyptians, place their chief interest in the preserving

of transpired events; the Egyptians sought to rescue from perishing

even the bodies of men, as the tabernacles of the spirit,--sought to

appropriate them to history. The art of writing has as its original

purpose, not mutual personal intercourse, but history,--was committed

not to perishable leaves but to the rock; and also the most ancient

products of architectural skill were consecrated, not to purposes of

dwellings, but to purposes of history.

SECTION CIV.

(b) The difference of spiritual appropriation in respect to how it

takes place, appears, on the one hand, in this, that the appropriating

person is active as a rational spirit in general,--as at one with all

other rational spirits, and hence in such a manner as that the

appropriation might be made in like manner by any other

spirit,--general appropriation; and, on the other, in this, that the

person is active as a single personality for himself,--appropriates the

object to himself as an individual, makes it his exclusive

possession,--particular appropriation.--(1) General (universal)

appropriation is cognizing or learning. The object is indeed received

by the individual spirit and into it, not, however, as its exclusive

possession; on the contrary, in this receiving, the person divests

himself at the same time of his isolated character,--has the

appropriated not as a mere particular possession for himself, but as a

possession of the rational spirit in general,--as universally-valid.

The so appropriated spiritual possession is truth; now truth has the

destination and tendency to become a common possession. Learning or

cognizing is therefore moral: (a) in that it seeks to appropriate to

itself the real spiritual contents of existence, that is, seeks after

truth; (b) in that it makes of truth, not a personal isolated

enjoyment, but strives to communicate it to others.

All learning is spiritual appropriating, but not all spiritual

appropriating is general; we here consider spiritual appropriation

under another phase than in the preceding section. Where the love of

sensuous enjoyment prevails to a sinful extent, there the love of truth

declines. The desire of knowledge is a characteristic of the moral

spirit. Man, as called to dominion over nature, is also called to the

spiritual appropriating of the same, and of all existence. The striving

after truth is a seal of man's God-likeness. Even as to God every thing

is open, and all truth is known, so also is man only then truly a

spirit when he strives after truth and seeks cognoscitively to

appropriate to himself all things. This is a legitimate striving after

possession,--after the possession of an inner world, a true copy of the

real one; and it is among the most essential sources of the bliss of

the perfected, that they know the truth and constantly appropriate to

themselves cognoscitively more of it. The acquiring of the truth is a

becoming free from the limits of a merely individual existence,--a

divesting ourselves of the mere state of nature, an assuming of a more

general character, an entering into the life and essence of the

self-concordant All, an appropriating of the objective outgoings of

spirit in general. "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make

you free," says Christ to such as shall continue in his word [John

viii, 32]. Even as light breaks down the isolation of individual being,

and throws up a bridge to that which is outwardly separated from it,

thus causing all separate objects to exist in some sort for each other,

so the knowledge of truth frees man from the bonds of a merely isolated

being, opens for him the totality of existence as his

life-sphere,--throws a unifying bond around deity and the totality of

his creatures. As no life of the earth is without light, so also is

there no life of the spirit without the knowledge of truth; and it is

not this or that truth that makes man free, rational, and blessed, but

the truth; and the Spirit of the Lord strives to lead his disciples

into all truth. Whoever seeks to set limits to the moral thirst for

truth, whoever declares any truth as indifferent or unworthy of effort,

he resists the outgoings of the spirit of truth. Moreover, there is no

particular truth which stands isolated and for itself, and does not

first receive its validity from the truth which springs from the

eternal Spirit of God; and he who thinks to satisfy the thirst of the

soul for truth with certain separate morsels of truths from the sphere

of the finite and transitory, knows not the truth but only falsehood.

All true knowing is of such a nature that every other rational spirit

can and must know in precisely the same manner, and hence has a

significance beyond the possession of the individual,--is general

appropriation. Hence, as moral, it is also directly connected with a

tendency to make that which is appropriated by the individual person a

general possession of all rational beings. The moral man cannot wish to

retain the truth for himself alone, but the truth which has become his

possession impels him, by virtue of its general character, freely to

communicate it to others [Luke ii, 17; 1 John i, 1 sqq.]. The duty of

secret-keeping has a validity and significancy only on the supposition

of predominant sinfulness,--is inconceivable save on the presupposition

of sin; and the weakness of being unable to keep a secret springs, in

some sort at least, from a correct feeling of that which ought to be.

Goodhearted persons are usually poor secret-keepers; and for innocence

there is no secret. The truth, like light, cannot hide itself; it is

only with designing effort that either can be concealed. Truth, morally

considered, belongs not to the mere understanding but to the heart; and

with that of which the heart is full, the mouth overflows [Luke vi,

45]. He to whom the truth belongs, belongs also himself to the

truth,--must also bear witness of the truth. "We cannot but speak the

things which we have seen and heard," said Peter and John in the

presence of the chief council [Acts iv, 20], and they only express the

inner moral necessity of such a witnessing of obtained truth. Whoever

feels nothing of such an inner impulsion to witnessing either possesses

not the truth, or the truth possesses not him. With the witnessing of

the truth it is in some sense as it is with the first ante-moral love;

the person may indeed resist the inner impulse, but if he does not do

so then his immediate love of the truth will spontaneously induce him

to witness for it without any need of a special effort of the will. "Ye

also will bear witness (as well as the Holy Ghost), because ye have

been with me from the beginning," says the Lord to his disciples [John

xv, 27]; this is not an injunction but a promise; they will not be able

to do otherwise; the truth is stronger than the command. Hence he who

is of the truth needs no longer the law; for the truth impels him to

bear witness of itself through his life.

SECTION CV.

(2). Particular (individual) appropriating is enjoying. Here the object

exists solely for me in so far as I am an individual being,--becomes my

special possession. In enjoyment I do not, as in cognizing, have the

object purely as such, but I have it as it stands in accord with my

peculiarity, as it has become an element of my own being. In enjoyment

I have, therefore, always also myself as in some way affected by the

object; hence the sphere of enjoyment is essentially feeling, namely,

the feeling of pleasure. Enjoyment is either sensuous or spiritual; the

former is never moral per se, but only with and in the latter.--As the

personal spirit has an independent right, in and of itself, and as true

enjoyment rests on love to the object, and consequently is a

virtualization of this love, hence enjoyment is also a moral right, and

therefore also relatively a duty. The morality of enjoyment consists

primarily in a conscious and complete subordinating of merely sensuous

enjoyment to spiritual; and furthermore in the fact that it be always a

pure expression of moral love, and hence also of thankfulness, and that

it rest on joy in God,--that it stand in proper harmony with the

formative activity; and also in the fact that, by virtue of the

agreeable feeling manifested in it, it awake also communicative love,

namely, the tendency to extend the enjoyment to others.--The highest

enjoyment consists in the consciousness of the filial relation to God,

that is, in the perfect appropriation of life-communion with God; and

in fact to the child of God, only that is a real enjoyment, in which

also God has pleasure. In association with this enjoyment of the filial

relation to God, every other enjoyment is sanctified.

In learning, or cognizing, I throw into the back-ground my isolated

individuality,--let the truth, as general, rule over me; my mere

isolated being has no validity; in enjoying, on the contrary, I come

with my separate individuality into the fore-ground; the object per se

has no validity; in learning I have myself only as a member of the

whole, but in enjoying I have myself as an individuality distinct from

the whole. Hence enjoyment, as of such and such a form, is not

communicable; de gustibus non est disputandum. Whatever one rational

person cognizes as true, that must be cognized by all as true; but that

which is an enjoyment for one is not necessarily such for another. All

enjoyment is love, and the highest earthly love is conjugal and

maternal love; but this love which is at the same time the highest

earthly enjoyment, belongs to this or that particular person,--is by no

means personally-communicable; a child can be loved by no one else as

it is by its mother. As knowledge naturally impels to communication, so

enjoyment, on the contrary, impels rather to isolation; the

pleasure-seeker would fain have every thing for himself; if he seeks

society, it is only in so far as society becomes to him an object of

enjoyment. Enjoyment readily gives rise to jealousy, whereas knowledge

tends to a liberal imparting of the acquired truth; even maternal love

knows jealousy.

Christian morality begrudges not enjoyment to man, not even the

sensuous, for "the earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof" [1

Cor. x, 6; Psa. xxiv, 1; comp. Gen. ii, 9]. The pious reference of all

enjoyment to God as the Giver of all good, and thankful love to him,

render even sensuous enjoyment moral, in so far as it is sought in the

divinely-ordained manner,--spiritualize it, in fact, by the

heart-disposition of the subject, and place the joy proper in the

spiritual associations of the sensuous. So soon as sensuous enjoyment

is sought purely for itself, apart from the spiritual and from love to

God, it becomes at once immoral, seeing that it then interrupts (� 102)

the spiritual life, which by its very nature is continuous; of the

relation of enjoyment to forming, we will speak hereafter.

The communication of enjoyment,--a constituent element of its

morality,--springs not from the essence of the same, but from love to

man in general. It can only take place in so far as thereby the essence

of the enjoyment is not affected; the enjoyment that lies in the

family-life can never be made a common possession; and the fact that in

the case of a few rude tribes, hospitality is extended to a

communicating even of marital rights, [12] is evidence simply of a

perversion of the moral. Manifestly, however, wedlock-happiness and

that of the family in general require, in order to their being moral,

that they be communicated to others, not, however, as a direct

enjoyment, but through hospitality,--through the throwing open of the

family to friendly intercourse, through the permitting of others to

share in the inner peace of the domestic life. Hence there is not

lacking a moral back-ground for the custom of reserving the higher

sensuous enjoyment of repasts for hospitable occasions, in which the

spiritual intercourse, and hence spiritual enjoyment, occupies the

fore-ground, while the sensuous enjoyment appears only as an attendant

in the back-ground. The idea of Paradise is the epitome of the entire

circle of true enjoyments,--it is not a mere crude or childish

fancy-creation, but the very truth itself. Christian morality is not

averse to enjoyment; it favors man's taking delight in this world of

reality. But Paradise exists only where man is in filial communion with

the divine Father,--where love to God sanctifies all earthly enjoyment.

"The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness, and

peace, and joy, in the Holy Ghost" [Rom. xiv, 17]. Christianity knows

no other joy than joy in the Lord; "Rejoice in the Lord always, and

again I say, Rejoice" [Phil. iv, 4]. He who rejoices in the Lord, takes

true delight in all that comes from the Lord [Deut. xxvi, 11]. To man

as sinful many enjoyments are forbidden, because he is able to enjoy

them only sinfully; to the pure the sphere of morally-pure enjoyment is

much wider and richer [Titus i, 15]. The child of God has enjoyment in

every thing, and every thing is to him a moral enjoyment, save alone

the violation of God's law; to him the world is a paradise, for it is

God's, as is also himself; and he loves not the world without God, but

only in God and with God. The blessedness of the children of God, the

unspeakable enjoyment of true heart-devotion in fervent prayer, in

which man knows himself at one with his God, and rests in the peace of

God, is not a subject for scientific synthesis and analytical

description; it belongs to the sphere of the inner life, and needs to

be experienced rather than described; the world knows nothing thereof.

III. MORAL FORMING.

SECTION CVI.

Moral forming works the harmony of existence, in that thereby man

impresses upon objective existence the peculiarity of his own

spirit,--makes it an expression thereof, that is, spiritually shapes

it. The object is destroyed not in its existence, but only in its

isolation and peculiarity,--receives the peculiarity of the acting

spirit, is imbued with, and thus bound to, it. Forming is morally good

not when it is an impressing of the merely individual and as yet not

morally-rational spirit upon the object (for this would be injustice to

the object, a non-sparing of its legitimate being), but when it is an

impressing of the spirit as moral, as rational and as in harmony with

God, that is, when the object itself is formed toward a complete

harmony with the morally-rational collective spirit. Moral forming must

therefore always be associated with moral sparing, and all the more so

the higher the spiritual significance and worth of the object that is

to be formed. As related to the moral spirit, therefore, all moral

forming is an educating, which latter is never an absolutely

all-determining forming, but a forming that respects the rights of the

personality that is to be formed.

The outward-going formative activity can neither be arbitrary and

purposeless, nor a mere destroying of that which exists, but must have

a rational end and a right of its own. In view of the wants of the

moral activity, therefore, created existence cannot be, primarily, at

once and definitively completed and perfected, though indeed it is

good, but it stands in the presence of the activity of the rational

spirit as formable material to which man, as active, has a right, and

the final completion of which is an end for human activity. It is only

through forming that man makes the objective world his own, namely, in

that he impresses upon it his stamp, and makes it by moral activity

into a likeness of himself, and therefore into his own possession. "Do

your own business (prassein ta idia) and work with your own hands" [1

Thess. iv, 11]; man really possesses nothing as his own but that which

he has produced by working and forming; and it is not a curse but an

original moral law of the universe, that the true existence of man,

bodily as well as spiritually-moral, is conditioned on formative

working, on labor. Even the first man was not placed in Paradise simply

to enjoy its delights, simply to appropriate to himself, naturally and

spiritually, that which already existed, but he was to cultivate the

garden [Gen. ii, 15]. Man is called to dominion over nature, to be a

creator of a spiritual World; this is both a wide and also a

privileging and obligating field for the moral. The play of the child

is a forming; that of the brute has no objective significancy; and

wherever by virtue of an instinct, the brute exercises a formative

activity, there we are simply presented with a natural symbol of the

moral, as in the case of the bee, the ant, etc.

Forming, as compared to sparing and appropriating, appears at once as

the higher, and generally more difficult, form of activity; sparing is

a mere checking of the outward-going activity; appropriating, according

to its kind, either annihilates the objective existence, or leaves its

substance untouched; but forming interferes positively with the

existence and peculiarity of the object. There is need here, on the one

hand, of a considerate respecting of the right of the object to its own

peculiarity, so that the forming may not become an unjust perverting

and destroying, and, on the other hand, of a proper and clear

consciousness of the rational purpose of the transforming.

Appropriating begins earlier in the spiritual development of man than

forming; the latter always presupposes some degree of moral maturity;

forming as exercised by an immature spirit is a destroying. The

formative activity of the child appears as a rending-asunder of

whatever falls into its hand; the historical activity of savage or

half-civilized tribes, bears also this childish character. Unripe youth

have also, as relating to society and the state and to historical

reality in general, great pleasure in destruction; and the

revolutionary spirit of boisterous young men is only a higher degree of

the destructive proclivity of the child; but on the supposition of the

attainment of higher spiritual maturity, that which is innocent in the

child becomes a culpable lack of judgment. Moral forming must

necessarily always have also a preserving phase, inasmuch as in all

that which is to be formed there is also something that has a right to

existence, and hence a claim upon sparing; and an education which

ignores this right in the pupil, is violent and therefore immoral.

SECTION CVII.

Moral forming differs likewise in two respects. (a) According to that

which is formed in the object, it is either a sensuously-natural or a

spiritual forming.--1. Natural forming is a shaping of nature-material

for the human spirit by virtue of the mastery of the spirit over

nature, to the end either of practical utility or of a manifesting of

spirit in art-work. Nature, as created, is indeed per se good and

perfect, but it becomes a true home for, a true organ of, the spirit

and of history, only by becoming imbued with spirit. Natural forming is

moral and rational only in so far as it is the sensuous expressing of a

spiritual forming.

All dominating is necessarily a forming, inasmuch as the dominated is

more or less an expression of the will of the dominating power. A

natural entity can bear this expression only in virtue of being shaped

by man and at the same time for man. In natural forming the difference

between man, as a moral creature, and the brute, becomes at once

plainly visible. The activity of the brute is predominantly a sensuous

appropriating; that of man is predominantly a forming, and indeed

primarily a sensuously-natural forming. The appropriating of nature is

primarily permitted by God to man, and is limited by a prohibition only

in one respect; the forming of nature is enjoined upon him [Gen. i, 28;

ii, 15]. The mere letting alone of even a Paradisaical nature in its

given condition, is for man per se immoral; he is called to form it

into a home for himself by his personal activity.--But man cannot

morally accomplish a natural forming save on the condition that there

exists already in him an antecedent moral forming. The artist cannot

create a work of art unless it has already been spiritually formed in

his soul; and each and every object that is shaped, is to be, in its

entire purpose, not a mere solitary something existing for itself, but

rather one of the stones of a greater and essentially-spiritual

structure,--the structure of history. Man shapes nature not for its own

sake but for humanity, namely, into a home for man's spiritual life,

into an expression of historical reality,--which is essentially the

product of spiritual forming. Hence natural forming has always the

purpose simply of serving the spiritual, even as the nourishment and

development of the body take place not in the interest of the body, but

of the spirit.

SECTION CVIII.

Spiritual forming relates to the spiritual essence of the object, and

hence predominantly to the conscious spirit; it is a communicating of

the spiritual possession of the subject to the object, a shaping of the

object according to the rational idea of the subject, a putting of the

former into harmony with the moral person of the latter. Each man has

the duty of helping spiritually to form every other one who comes into

spiritual relation with him, that is, of communicating to him his own

moral nature, of revealing himself to him; this holds good even of the

as yet morally immature in relation to the morally mature. All

morally-spiritual communicating is a forming, and all spiritual forming

is a communicating. Communicating is, however, only then a moral

forming, when the communicating spirit itself stands in harmony with

God, is itself morally good, and when its motive is love.

Also spiritual forming extends in a certain sense to nature-objects, in

so far as these are not a mere sensuous existence, but have also

spiritual contents. The training and ennobling of domestic animals is

not a sensuous but a relatively-spiritual forming, inasmuch as their

inner nature is raised to a higher plane. The chief sphere of spiritual

forming is, however, the personal spirit. Man has neither the right nor

the liberty to develop himself as a mere isolated individual,--he

cannot develop himself morally save when in spiritual life-relation

with the moral community; and each stands with every other in such a

moral relation. And this relation is a mutual forming and

appropriating, at the same time. Man is formed only by appropriating to

himself spiritual elements, that is, in that another spirit reveals

itself to him. Forming cannot take place morally by the imbuing of

thoughts and sentiments that are foreign to the subject himself into

the spirit that is to be educated, for this would be deception, and

would not establish a spiritual communion; it can be done only by a

self-revelation of the moral spirit. Only the morally-formed spirit can

itself form; the immoral spirit can only pervert, and can do this

successfully only when it affects morality. However, it is not

necessary that the formative spirit should be already mature; also the

child exerts a formative influence upon its elders.--In the condition

of sinlessness the formative activity has no need of art or of a

calculated plan; mere self-manifestation exercises a formative

influence directly and of itself. All artfully-planned manners of

influencing are evidence of lost purity, and cannot, however cunningly

contrived, exert the power of the moral reality. The moral spirit lets

its light shine before men that they may see its good works, and this

light directly illumines and enlightens the spirit of others. This

self-revelation, however, would be immoral, that is, hollow and empty,

were it to spring from self-complacency instead of from love to others.

It is love alone that divests this letting one's light shine of an

appearance of parade. Loving souls hide themselves not from each other;

true love impels to a full and genuine self-communication; and moral

love has nothing that it would gladly or necessarily conceal.

SECTION CIX.

(b) According to the manner in which the objective entity is

formatively influenced, we have to distinguish between particular and

general forming.

1. Particular forming forms single objects for the service of the

earthly wants of single or several persons, that is, for use for

temporal ends. It is therefore labor, in the proper and narrower sense

of the word. Labor relates not merely to natural matter, but also to

the individual spirit, in so far as the latter is to be formed for the

temporal earthly life, and hence is spiritual as well as natural

forming.

All utility relates to the particular; that which is for the common

utility is simply that which is useful for many particular persons.

When the Rationalistic school spoke of the "common utility" of

religion, it manifested simply very bad taste; religion is thus placed

on a par, e. g., with a public fountain or an advertising sheet. Labor

concerns the individual; works for the common utility, such as roads or

canals, look not to the good of humanity as a whole, as a unity, but to

the many individual persons whom they are to benefit; for him who does

not use them, they have no significancy and are perhaps even offensive.

Their utility and enjoyment fall to the individual as such, but not in

virtue of his being a man, a rational spirit. In a work of art,

however, one has pleasure precisely in his character of rational

spirituality; although from another stand-point this work is of no

"use" to him whatever. That which is to exalt the heart must be more

than labor. Products of labor may indeed excite a general and rational

interest, as, for example, a machine or other superior fruits of skill;

here, however, it is not the work itself that is admired, but the art

to which the handicraft has been exalted,--the spiritual power of

invention, that is, the power of spirit,--not the utility, but the

beauty or ingenuity,--not the merely individual element, but the

spiritual, which, as such, bears upon itself the stamp of general

significancy and validity. The actual work on a machine is performed

not by the ingenious inventor, the master, but by the manual laborer;

and in that which this laborer executes there is little else to admire

than the industry, but nothing of a general interest. The end of a work

of art is not, to be used by the individual, but to be enjoyed and

admired universally; and it is properly regarded as a sign of spiritual

unculture when a particular age takes delight only in the merely

useful, in mere labor, and not also in that which transcends labor,

namely, in art,--when the age does not also exalt labor into art. In

the time of Rationalistic illuminism many "useless" art-structures of

the Middle Ages, magnificent castles and churches, were converted into

magazines and factories,--art was turned into a hand-maid of labor;

this was certainly very "useful," but it was at the same time also an

evidence of shameful unculture. The spirit of mere utility is but

little removed from barbarism.

Labor is not mere manual toil. Common usage is perfectly right when it

speaks also, and not merely in the stricter sense of the word, of

spiritual, intellectual, labor, and of intellectual laborers, in

distinction from a higher spiritual and intellectual activity. The

highest results to which the spirit can attain are not effected by

labor; the delicate, etherial image which delights our astonished gaze

was not painfully wrought out by the sweat of the multitude, but sprang

forth at once from the brain of genius; but, as distinguished from this

ideal activity of the spirit, there is another which is entitled to be

called work in the strict sense of the word, and which consists in a

strictly-particular forming. All spiritual activity which looks to the

mere benefit of individuals is labor; thus, we speak of the labor of

pupils, of official labors, etc. The pupil labors in order, by the

appropriation of particular scientific material, to form himself as an

individual for a calling in life; the teacher labors upon the pupil for

the same end. All spiritual forming which looks to success in the

world, to obtaining a position in it, is labor; hence also we may speak

of a scientific industry; there is an immense difference between

science as manual labor, and science as an art. When the learner,

however, elevates himself to a more ideal activity,--when, inspired

with enthusiasm for the true and the good, he soars above the merely

particular, or when the teacher seeks to awaken an enthusiasm of this

character in him, then the activity ceases to be labor and becomes a

higher kind of forming. It is true, we sometimes speak, though in a

less strict sense, of a laboring in the sphere of purely spiritual

things, as, for example, in that of religion and of active love [Rom.

xvi, 6, 12; 1 Thess. i, 3; Heb. vi, 10; 1 Cor. xv, 58; 2 Cor. vi, 5;

xi, 27; Rev. ii, 2, 3; xiv, 13]; Paul says, "I labored more abundantly

than they all" [1 Cor. xv, 10], and the pastor and the messenger of the

Word may speak of their labor on souls [1 Cor. xvi, 16; 2 Cor. x, 15;

xi, 23; 1 Thess. iii, 5; v, 12; 1 Tim. v, 17]; however, in this

essentially figuratively-used expression [see John iv, 38; 1 Cor. iii,

8] reference is had not to the activity per se, but to the trouble in

overcoming obstacles (hence the words kopos and kopia) which lie not in

the matter itself, but in other circumstances, such as the enmity of

sinful men, the feebleness of the actor himself, etc.

SECTION CX.

2. General forming forms the object for a general, that is, a rational

end,--not merely for a particular need, for temporal utility. but for

the rational and moral spirit in general,--forms it for rational

enjoyment, for moral approbation, i. e. into a beautiful and good

product,--is artistic forming, in the largest sense of the word. It may

be a sensuous as well as a spiritual forming. The natural entity

receives a spiritual form,--becomes an expression, an image, of the

rational spirit, an expression of harmony in general,--a work of art.

The spiritual entity is formed into an essentially God-answering, truly

rational character, into a beautiful soul, into a child of God.

Religious and ideal culture in general differs essentially from

education for a worldly calling,--aims not to make man into a "useful"

and serviceable being, but into one in whom both God and men have

pleasure, and who has himself pleasure in God and in all that is divine

and beautiful,--seeks not to mold him into a merely isolated being, a

mere citizen, a mere professional man, but seeks to bring to

development that which is purely and truly human in him,--seeks to make

the merely natural person into an image of the moral spirit, into a

true image of God, into an expression of the truth. All that which is

created by general forming is art-work; and when this forming, as

distinguished from professional working, creates a science, then this

science becomes itself a work of art. Hence, no general forming is

possible without moral enthusiasm, that is, without being imbued with

and prompted by a universal spirit which divests itself of all

individual narrowness, and of all selfishness, and aspires to a

universal divine ideal (� 96).--A special phase of general forming

constitutes the typical or symbolical activity, under which falls also

the morally becoming.

The fruit which is aimed at in mere work is only for the benefit of the

individual; works of art, and the beautiful and good in general, are

for the spiritual enjoyment of rational man as such. Also the angels

must rejoice in heaven, not only over a sinner who repents, but also

over all that is truly beautiful. Man forms himself into a useful, a

skillful, a learned member of society by labor and pains-taking, but

into a beautiful soul only by enthusiasm; this is indeed not the

beautiful soul as improvised by sentimental novelists, but the soul

that is beautiful in the eyes of God and of all of God's children,--the

child-soul of a child of God, full of love and enthusiasm,--the soul of

him who is pure of heart, and which inwardly beholds God, because God

looks upon it with pleasure. Hence the Scriptures look upon the higher

artistic endowment as a special gift from God [Exod. xxxi, 3, 6; xxxvi,

1, 2].

Art in its deepest ground and essence is religious, as in fact

historically it is a birth of religion; this holds good. without

exception of all nations. No religion is without art, without an ideal

embodying of the highest ideas. Architecture, plastic art and song,

among all nations, have sprung from religion, and are the subservient

attendants of religion [Exod. xxxi, 2 sqq.; xxxv, 1 sqq.]; and it

required all the ungenial one-sidedness and bald reflective tendency of

Zwingli to banish art from the Church,--a wrong against Christian

humanity which has, at least in some degree, been disavowed in most of

the branches of the Reformed Church. Even worldly art, in so far as it

has not, untrue to its essential nature, entered into the service of

sin, is closely related to religion. It also elevates man above the

merely individual and sensuously-natural; and, itself a birth of

enthusiasm, it awakens also in man enthusiasm for the beautiful and the

noble,--for that which raises him out of his isolation and

self-seeking, and up to that which finds response in all moral souls.

Love to art banishes rudeness,--makes the heart receptive also for the

morally beautiful and divine. Hence the culture of art is so important

an element in education and in the life of nations. But for this reason

also art becomes such a demon-power, when, forgetting its nobility, it

stoops to the role of pandering to corrupt pleasure, and when, instead

of inspiring enthusiasm for the truly beautiful, it only aims to

intoxicate and seduce by lustful appeals to the senses. Wherever there

is a healthful religious life, there art and religion stand in intimate

and mutual relations. Where faith is alive in the heart, there it

utters itself in "psalms and spiritual songs," there it celebrates the

glory of its God in a becoming ornamentation of his altars and courts

[Exod. xxxv, 21 sqq.], and wherever true art prevails there it

consecrates the most beautiful of its products to the honor of God.

Religion created for the Greeks poets and artists, and the poets and

artists created for the Greeks their gods; and however much there may

have been of heathen error in these creations, still this much at least

is here exemplified, namely, that the divine makes its nearest

approaches to man in the words, the songs and the works of artistic

inspiration. The prophets of the Ancient Covenant were also unable to

bring down to the plane of mere simple prose, the visions which they

had spiritually beholden; and also the Prophet of the New Covenant

publishes his visions under the drapery of boldly-constructed symbols.

He who finds fault with this knows neither art nor religion.

General moral forming does not necessarily take place directly and

immediately; as relating to the free spirit, it consists essentially in

the fact that, by the moral activity of the subject, the object is so

incited and inspired as to bring about self-development through his own

spontaneity and strength. In this consists the true art of education

and governing, namely, in that the guiding power hides itself in some

respect from the spirit that is to be molded,--does not permit its

influence upon it to appear as a limiting, overpowering force, but

rather simply gives scope for free and independent self-development.

This does not take place, however, by a simple "letting alone" of the

one who is to be guided, but by the fact that the moral and rational

consciousness is quickened and strengthened in him,--that he is brought

to feel and know himself, not as a mere non-obligated individual, but

as a personality inspired by a holy and moral spirit,--that a moral

disposition and an ideal enthusiasm become in him an actuating power,

which in turn itself forms him to a higher development and perfection.

There is an important sphere of moral activity, namely, symbolical

forming--to which belongs also the practicing of the becoming,--which

can be understood only from the stand-point of general artistic

forming;--a sphere of stumbling and offense to all champions of the

merely prosaically useful. The morally-good, is not simply to become

real, but the real is also to be an expression, a manifestation of the

morally-good,--is to bear witness in its entire outward appearance to

an inner ideal quality, and every single good is to show itself not

merely as per se good, but is also to point to a higher good beyond

itself. Even as in nature, the good, as a regulated means to an end, is

associated with a beauty more significant than the mere fitness for an

end,--even as the flower not merely possesses the fructifying organs

and the delicate tissues that protect them, but also, in its graceful

form, its hues and its fragrance, delights man, and, as a symbol of the

eternally beautiful, reminds him of divine love and of the glory of

God,--even as the birds of song not only nourish themselves and

propagate their race, but also praise the goodness of the Creator in

strains that touch the heart,--even as God not only causes the sun to

shine and to awaken life, and the clouds to drop rain, but also paints

on the skies the color-resplendent bow as a pledge of his faithfulness

and grace,--in a word, as God himself decks his creation with such

grandeur that the heavens proclaim his glory, and with such beauty that

the understanding is incapable adequately to comprehend it, but only

the adoring heart to feel and love it,--so also man, as God-like, not

only forms that which is useful for the temporal life, but also that

which, as a significant sign, points to a higher good,--forms reality

into a type of the true and good,--creates the poetry of reality. Every

artistic product is such a sign or symbol, but all symbolical forming

is not properly artistic in the stricter sense, though it is indeed

poetical. The clothing of man is not simply for a protection against

the weather, but also largely a suggestive expression of the inner

life; all adornment as well as cleanliness has a spiritual

suggestiveness. For him who knows not this symbolical, poetical phase

of the moral, a very important and essential part of morality remains

incomprehensible. A large portion of the moral precepts of the

Scriptures look not to a direct and simple realization of a good, but

to the expressive suggesting of a moral element not directly contained

in the matter itself,--have a symbolical character; and lightly to

esteem this phase of things is an indication of moral obtuseness.

Doubtless it was not very "useful" when Mary, the sister of Lazarus,

took a pound of pure and costly ointment and anointed the Lord's feet;

and the harsh reproof of Judas was perfectly well-grounded from the

stand-point of mere utilitarianism, but the Lord judged very

differently from Judas [John xii, 3 sqq.; comp. Mark xiv, 3 sqq.]. To

this category belong almost all the precepts of the Old Testament in

regard to the clean and the unclean, to food and clothing,--in which

case the object of the forming is man himself,--and also in regard to

the form of worship and whatever is therewith connected, such as

circumcision, etc., as well as in regard to agriculture [Lev. xix, 19;

Deut. xxii, 9, 10] and to the treatment of animals [Exod. xxi, 28, 29,

32; xxiii, 19; Lev. xx, 15, 16].

The becoming is the outward, beautiful or symbolical form of the

moral,--in a certain sense its esthetic phase. To celebrate the Lord's

day in the spiritual-exalting of the heart to God, is a moral duty; to

give expression to the celebration by sacred art and by a worthy

outward appearance, is becoming. The ungodly world is prone to

substitute in the place of the moral substance an outwardly and

externally gracious form--the becoming; the suggestion: "That is not

becoming," is with the irreligious world of much more weight than: "It

is sinful." The outward form may indeed be hypocritically assumed in

the absence of the substance, but he who holds fast to the moral

substance, must observe also the form; he only is morally-cultured who

not only observes the substance of the general precepts, but also aims

at the morally-becoming; and this is in fact a general and artistic

forming on the part of the moral activity. The becoming stands not

along-side of the moral precept, but is essentially contained in it,

as, in fact, without it man remains coarse and rude. Almost all of the

above-mentioned precepts of the Old Testament are precepts of the

becoming, and the New Testament also lays great stress on the becoming

[1 Cor. xi, 4 sqq.; 1 Tim. ii, 9, and others].

SECTION CXI.

Appropriating and forming are, in a right moral development, ever in

association with each other, and that too all the closer the higher

their character. No spiritual appropriating is without spiritual

self-forming, and no forming of an objective entity is without a

spiritual appropriating of the thing formed; and in fact the forming of

one's own spirit is per se necessarily an appropriating. The measure of

appropriating and especially of enjoying stands in all right

development, always in strict relation to the measure of the forming;

and the two modes of forming are associated not only with each other,

but also with the two modes of appropriating, as are in turn the latter

with each other.

The fruit of labor and still more the work of art, are the property of

the laborer and the artist; they call it their own; they have

appropriated it to themselves in the very process of producing it. The

outward-directed activity turns thus about and flows back into the

acting person. In forming an objective entity, man forms his own self;

he has the work not merely as his own, as a copy of his thought, but he

is also himself spiritually and morally promoted both by the working

and by the work. All forming is self-forming; and inasmuch as man

stands to his fellows in a spiritual relation,--reveals himself to them

through his culture,--hence all self-forming is directly also in turn a

forming of others.--All particular forming, all work, should as moral

include in itself also at the same time an element of general forming;

without this the laborer falls into spiritual and moral deterioration.

When the laborer unites the useful with the beautiful,--gives to his

work a graceful form,--when song accompanies the work, when the heart

mounts up from the work that serves a temporal end, toward the Eternal

One, and thus puts into earnest practice the precept: "Pray and labor,"

then the particular forming is exalted and transfigured by the general.

The more isolated, the more limited, the work is, so much the more

preponderates the merely useful phase of it; hence no work is so

dangerous, nay, so detrimental, to the harmoniously-moral culture of

man as the spiritless mechanism of factory-work; and white slavery

works here often much more ruinously than the black. The uninterrupted

monotony of the narrow routine of the work paralyzes the spirit and

subverts morality.

Furthermore, all forming is not only a general appropriating, formative

of the subject himself, in that he recognizes the product of his

influence, but also a particular appropriating, in that he enjoys it.

The divine prototype of this is seen in the account of creation, where

we read that God looked upon all that he had made, and found that it

was very good. All moral work, and still more, all general forming,

are, in and of themselves, also enjoyment, and that too the highest and

purest enjoyment, even as in the above utterance of the Creator his own

bliss was implicitly expressed also. But also the sensuous enjoyment

that is not directly included in the formative activity itself, is

nevertheless, in virtue of the moral order of the world, associated

with it. Adam was first to dress and care for the garden, and

thereafter to eat of its fruits [Gen. ii, 15, 16]. "If any one will not

work, neither should he eat" [2 Thess. iii, 10]; this is a morally

unassailable principle; and where the practice is otherwise, there the

social relations are corrupt; and the grudge of the suffering laborer

against the luxurious idler has a very just foundation. In proportion

to the degree of productive activity, rises or falls the moral right to

enjoyment in general, and to personal position in society. Hence the

admonition: Let each labor to produce with his own hands something good

[Eph. iv, 28; comp. Acts xx, 34, 35; 1 Thess. iv, 11; ii, 9].

SECTION CXII.

Inasmuch as man becomes perfect only through the perfect all-sided

development of all his life-phases, and as ally exclusive realization

and culture of one, or simply some, of them works a disturbance of the

inner harmony, hence every person should, in so far as his

circumstances admit of it, realize every form of moral appropriation

and moral culture. He who allows his life to be devoted exclusively to

particular forming and appropriating,--to toil and enjoyment, has

fallen out of moral harmony, and is consequently immoral. General, and

hence, essentially, religious, forming must attend the work hand in

hand; and the ordination of the Sabbath along-side of the days of labor

has not simply a religious, but essentially also a moral significancy.

Moral resting from labor is a rising to ideal self-culture, an exalting

of the temporally-particular into the eternal, the holy, the general,

the divine; the celebrating of the Sabbath is the higher and moral

transfiguring of the temporal prosaic individual life by the poesy of

the ideal and the infinite.

In particular forming man merges himself into objective existence;

primarily he has not the object in his own possession, but the object

possesses him; hence the danger, especially in a state of sinfulness,

that the person lose himself in his labor,--that, as in sensuous

enjoyment, he passively surrender himself to the creature [Eccles. vi,

7, in the Hebrew text]. Man should, however, hold fast to himself and

to his Creator,--should withdraw himself from his absorption in finite

things, collect himself in spiritual repose,--should obtain fresh moral

strength for the particular forming of industry, in the general forming

which springs of enthusiasm. Even as God, though merging himself into

the world while creating it, yet did not lose and forget himself in it,

but returned to himself and to his infinite self-sufficiency, and ever

retains himself in eternal unchangeable majesty above all that is

created, so also is it a moral requirement that man, in his creating of

the finite and particular, should not forget himself as a personality

gifted with eternal destinies; it is for man's sake that the Sabbath

was made [Mark ii, 27]. It is very suggestive that in the Scriptures

the repose of God after creation is made the prototype and basis for

the celebration of the Sabbath [Gen. ii, 3; Exod. xx, 8 sqq. ]. It is

thereby implied that it is our innermost God-likeness that calls for

the rest of the Sabbath,--the truly rational, religiously-moral essence

of man, and not the mere natural need of repose and enjoyment. That

which is with God only two phases of his eternal life itself, and not

an alternation in time, namely, creative action and self-possession,

this falls, in the case of the finite spirit, at least partially, into

such an alternation,--into labor and Sabbath-rest. God blessed the

Sabbath day; there rests upon its observance an especial, an

extraordinary benediction, an impartation of heavenly goods, even as

the blessing upon labor is primarily only an importation of temporal

goods. The Sabbath has not merely a negative significancy, is not a

mere interruption of labor, but it has a very rich positive

significancy,--it is the giving free scope to the higher,

time-transcending nature of the rational God-like spirit, the

re-attaching of the spirit that had been immersed by labor into the

temporal, to the imperishable and to the divine. Where God is conceived

of as swallowed up in nature, as with the Chinese and in the unbelief

of our own day, there exists no Sabbath; there is to be found only a

discretionary alternation of labor and sensuous enjoyment. The

celebration of the Sabbath belongs to morality per se, and does not

depend on the fact of the state of redemption from sinfulness; but

where sin is as yet a dominant power there its observance is

necessarily less free, legally more strict, than where the freedom of

the children of God prevails.

From the fact that all moral working is attended also with a general

forming, it follows manifestly that, for him who is truly morally free,

the antithesis of Sabbath-rest and labor is not of an absolute

character,--that every day and all labor have also their Sabbath

consecration, and that, on the other hand, also the Sabbath does not

absolutely exclude all work. It is perfectly clear, however, that, in

general, only such works consist with the observance of the Sabbath as

express a general formative activity,--as bear an artistic character in

the noblest sense of the word. In this category belong those healings

of the sick by which the Lord incurred the reproach of

Sabbath-breaking. Such works are not labor, but, as a restoring of the

disturbed order of the universe, ate of general and spiritual

significancy.

SUBDIVISION SECOND.

THE MORAL ACTIVITY IN ITS DIFFERENCES AS RELATING TO ITS DIFFERENT OBJECTS.--I.

IN RELATION TO GOD.

SECTION CXIII.

As God sustains to man an essentially active and creative, but not a

receptive, relation, hence in the strict sense of the word he is an

object only of moral appropriating.

(a) The moral appropriating of God is directly at the same time also

the highest moral self-forming of the moral person, and contains two

necessarily associated elements: first, that God becomes for us, and

secondly, that we become for God; that is, that, on the one hand, we

take up into our moral consciousness the ever present divine, and that,

on the other, we elevate our moral consciousness to God,--form it into

the divine life; the former is faith, the latter is worship; neither

can exist without the other. Believing is the lovingly-willed and

lovingly-willing, that is, the pious recognizing of God as lovingly

revealing himself to us as our Lord and our Father, and to whom we are

obligated to unconditional obedience and submissive love,--it is the

self-consciousness of man as having come to its rational truth, namely,

in that man regards himself no more as a mere isolated individual, but

thinks of himself constantly and strictly in his relations to God.

As believing is essentially the particular appropriating of God, so the

knowing, the cognizing of Him is the general appropriating; and hence

the striving for this knowledge is a high moral duty; this duty is

fulfilled not without believing, but only through and in virtue of the

same,--is a spiritual receiving and a true appropriating of the divine

revelation imparted to us through the channel of faith, in regard to

the nature, power, and will of God. The correct knowledge of God is not

the antecedent condition, but the goal of the moral striving, and hence

without it there can be no perfection of morality.

God is indeed per se already present in every creature; but in order

that he shall be truly present for man, that is, in a manner called for

by his rational nature, it is necessary that man shall freely

appropriate to himself this presence of God. I possess rationally only

that which I rationally and morally appropriate. All appropriating, and

hence all faith, pre-supposes a difference, and at the same time a

mutual life-relation between its subject and its object; what I already

am, in and of myself, that I cannot appropriate to myself. That the

appropriating of God is a moral act, arises from the fact that man may

fully admit his difference from, and yet not heartily recognize his

life-relation to, God,--may cling to himself as independent of God, may

sinfully aspire even to become like God. It is a moral activity when

man raises his self-consciousness, which is primarily merely

individual, into a truly rational one, and conceives of himself not

merely as an isolated being, but as conditioned by God, that is, as

created by and obligated to God; it is only this religious

self-consciousness that is moral, and this is in fact faith. Faith is

not a mere regarding as true, not a mere religious knowledge, or a mere

objective consciousness, but it is a morally-conditioned believing, a

willing, and hence a loving, recognition; in faith we will to have God

and a consciousness of him in us, and we desire this consciousness as

divine, that is, as a full and true life-force, and hence as operative,

as realizing the divine. The notion of faith combines, therefore,

loving and willing with knowing,--is not identical with one of the

three, but is the unity of them,--is not an affair of the mere

understanding but of the heart (� 53). Faith is the thankful reflection

of the divine love; he who is loved by God, turns himself lovingly

toward the loving One. Without the love of God to man there would be no

love of man to God; man believes because he becomes conscious of the

divine love; he who would only recognize received love, but not

reciprocated it with his heart, is immoral; a mere recognition of God

without heart-faith is sinful.

"Faith is the substance (the sure confidence) of things hoped for, the

evidence of things not seen" [Heb. xi, 1]; it is not a confidence of

that which falls within the immediate scope of experience, but of that

which lies beyond it, not of that which already exists in realization

but of that which is yet, in virtue of faith, to be realized into fact,

though indeed it already exists in germ. The really complete

life-communion with God, the full appropriating of the divine, is at

first only an object of hope,--can be really brought about only through

faith; and faith lays hold, in full confidence of success, upon the

divine as lovingly revealing itself to it. Faith stands, therefore, not

by the side of knowledge, as if not including this within itself, nor

yet below it, as if it were but a lower degree thereof, and would cease

with the increase of knowledge, but in fact above it, inasmuch as it is

a loving knowing, a lovingly-willed and lovingly-willing knowing of

God, so that consequently it includes within itself both feeling and

willing as essential constituent elements. Believing leads to knowing,

but also precedes actual knowing, and hence is not conditioned thereon.

As particular appropriating, believing or faith is, so to speak, an

enjoying of the divine,--belongs essentially to the personality itself,

and is therefore not communicable, whereas knowing may, on the

presupposition of faith, be communicated by instruction. In the entire

sphere of the religious life, believing precedes knowing, for without

faith God would no more exist for us than would sensuous objects

without our senses; believing includes, it is true, some degree of

knowing, but is not per se complete knowing. And for the simple reason

that believing includes knowing as an essential element, it is a moral

requirement to bring our knowing to its highest possible perfection,

and thereby also to heighten and strengthen faith. The divine

revelation as received by faith becomes real knowledge by a proper

spiritual merging of ourselves into it, by a full appropriating of its

contents into our entire spiritually-transformed being, so that the

knowing becomes thus a powerful moral motive to the loving of God and

to obedience to his will [Psa. lxiii, 7 sqq.; Jer. xxix, 13, 14; John

viii, 32; Acts xvii, 27; Col. i, 11; Eph. i, 17, 18]. The knowledge of

God consists not merely in the, as yet, only imperfectly attainable [1

Cor. xiii, 9, 10; 2 Cor. v, 7; Isa. lv, 8, 9] knowledge of God's being

[Rom. i, 19, 20], but also of the divine will as to us [Col. i, 9, 10;

Eph. v, 15-17] and of the divine providential activity in nature and in

human life, and of the holy purpose of his world-government. Though

indeed a proper and ripe knowledge of God leads to a higher perfection

of the moral life, still knowledge is not, as faith, the antecedent

condition of the moral in general; for only he can know the truth of

God who is pure of heart [Matt. v, 8].

SECTION CXIV.

The second phase of the moral appropriating of God is, that man becomes

for God,--that he exalts himself toward God by a moral act in order to

unite God actually, and not simply in inner recognition, with

himself,--in order to permit the divine activity to be influential upon

him; this is in fact the worshiping of God, which is at once a

religious and a moral, and hence a holy, activity. The worship of God

is either purely spiritual and at the same time affirmative, namely, in

that man puts himself spiritually into direct relation with God,--rises

to God in pious devotion, which is prayer,--or it is of a rather

virtual and at the same time more negative character, namely, a free

moral turning away from the ungodly and the unholy,--sacrifice. These

two phases of the worshiping of God belong inseparably together; there

is no prayer without sacrifice, and no sacrifice without prayer.

Faith is the purely inward phase of the moral appropriating of the

divine,--the woman-like self-opening of the soul for the in-shining of

the divine light; in this receiving, the person remains strictly in and

with himself. Worshiping is more objective; the person goes forth out

of himself,--lets his own light beam forth toward the divine original

light, even as the flame of the sacrifice, when once kindled by the

heavenly fire, mounts up toward heaven again. All worshiping of God

presupposes faith, though it is itself more than faith. When man has by

faith received the divine into himself, and imbued himself therewith,

he still yet distinguishes himself as a creature from God,--puts

himself into moral relation to God, raises himself by a moral action to

God as to one different from himself; and this is the worshiping of

God. To the pure mystic all worship falls away, for he loses sight of

the distinction between the Infinite and the finite.

Worship is the immediate actual outgoing of faith; it is a religious

activity which aims at making the already naturally-existing communion

of God with us into a consciously-willed communion of ourselves with

God; it is a sacred activity as distinguished from the worldly or

profane,--from that which deals only with temporal things. In a normal

moral condition of humanity, all activity whatever would bear a sacred

character, and the distinction between the sacred and the "profane"

could only assume the form of a conditional outward difference of a

temporally-alternating occupation with earthly things, on the one hand,

and with eternal interests on the other; with labor and with the

Sabbath-rest of the soul during the continuance of the earthly life,

and that, too, only in so far as consistent with the fact that all

earthly occupation is constantly exalted and sanctified by a positive

and conscious relation to the eternal. Our sacred activity relates

either immediately to God,--is a purely affirmative uniting of the

human to the divine; or it relates only mediately to God, but

immediately to the ungodly, namely, in that by refusing the ungodly, it

sets up a barrier against it,--turns the heart away from the evil, and

toward God. These two features can never be separated; prayer without

sacrifice, without a rejecting of the ungodly both within and without

us, is morally impossible; in exalting ourselves to God in prayer we at

the same time distinguish the divine from the anti-divine, and withdraw

ourselves from the latter; we cannot truly pray without at the same

time renouncing the worldly,--without giving up, without sacrificing,

the pretentious emptiness of finite things.

SECTION CXV.

1. Prayer, as resting on faith in the personal God, is the free moral

uniting of the believing heart with God, in such a manner that the

moral personality is in fact not lost, but, on the contrary, exalted in

and by God; it is the free and conscious recognizing that God knows all

our thoughts, and the joyful wish that such be the case; it exalts our

natural communion with God into a spiritual and moral one, the being of

God in man into a being of man in God. As it is alone in this being at

one with God that the true life of the rational spirit consists, hence

in the moral man, at least a prayerful disposition, if not express

praying in words, must be strictly unceasing. Prayer has only then

moral worth when it really springs of a praying heart, and hence, when

it is offered with devotion; and as it unites the person with the

Father of all men, hence it leads to a communion of prayer, and the

higher form of prayer is therefore social prayer.

In prayer man enters into personal communion with God, and in loving

confidence expressly communicates to him as the All-knowing One, his

pious thinking, feeling, and willing; only that which is pious can be

communicated to God; a consciously unpious prayer is blasphemy. Prayer

is absolutely conditioned on a believing recognition of the divine

omniscience; it is not, therefore, so much a means of making our

thoughts known to God,--for God knows our thoughts from afar, and of

what we have need before we ask therefor,--as rather an expression of

our belief that God knows, and our joyful willingness that he should

know thereof. A prayer that should spring from the thought that God

himself needed it in order to know our inward state, would be per se

impious and in self-contradiction; but every thought and every act that

we are not willing that God should know, and that we would hide from

him, is impious, and the degree of our piety is measured by the degree

in which we have the desire that all our acts and thoughts should be

known of God. The intermission of prayer does not shut out our inner

life from the divine knowledge, it simply shuts out the divine blessing

from us. Prayer reveals not our being to the divine knowledge, but it

reveals the divine all-knowing presence to us,--brings not God down to

us, but elevates us to God; it is for us the means of uniting ourselves

truly with God, inasmuch as thereby not only is God, as the Omnipresent

One, with us, but also we, by a religiously-moral act of will, are with

God; and only when God is himself with us, not merely naturally and

without our desire, but upon our express prayer and seeking therefor,

are we in real saving life-communion with him. Without prayer there can

be only a natural, but not a moral and spiritual communion with God;

and this merely natural communion is, on the supposition that it rises

no higher, in antagonism to the essence of a moral creature, and hence

leads to the casting off of man by God. For him who cannot pray, God's

presence is judicial and condemnatory. As in prayer man exalts himself

to the highest object of the moral activity, so is prayer also the

highest moral act; and all other moral action receives its moral worth

solely from its relation to this,--solely as morally consecrated by

prayer.

In prayer, man gives utterance to his highest moral privileges and to

his free personality, inasmuch as thereby, with full and joyful

freedom, he wills, recognizes and heightens that which already existed

without prayer, though indeed only in an immediate, natural ante-moral

manner, but which could not so remain without turning into antagonism

and unblessedness, namely, the divine omnipresent domination. Only to

those who desire it is God's presence a blessing, and only by those who

love is the loving communion of God experienced; "draw nigh to God, and

he will draw nigh to you" [James iv, 8; comp. Psa. cxlv, 18, 19]. It is

the sublime significancy of prayer that it brings into prominence man's

great and high destination, that it brings to expression his free

personal relation to God, that it heightens man's consciousness of his

true moral nature in relation to God; and as all morality depends on

our relation to God, prayer is, in fact, the very life-blood of

morality. The true freedom, and hence also the true morality of man,

manifests itself not in his arbitrarily choosing that which is fleeting

or baseless, but in the fact that with conscious free-will and glad

assent he recognizes and confirms that which lies in the holy

constitution of the world itself. To the limited natural understanding,

prayer seems useless and therefore irrational; for this understanding

is not capable of comprehending the spiritual. It is true, God causes

his sun to rise upon the good and the evil, gives rain to the just and

the unjust, furnishes food to man and beast,--in a word, He "gives to

all men their daily bread" even without prayer; but the significancy of

such prayer is the fact of our recognizing Him as the Giver of all, of

our receiving his gifts with thankfulness. That God's presence and

gifts be not only about us but also for us, that they become a blessing

to us, a bond of love between God and us, a living fountain of

godly-mindedness,--that they be not foreign to us, not in antagonism to

us, but in fact our own and in harmony with us,--that God's being in us

be also our being in God,--all this is the fruit of prayer.

Prayer is so intimately connected with the morally-religious life that

it appears, under some form, even among those nations where, because of

the relative ignoring of the personality of God, it has almost lost all

shadow of meaning, as, for example, in India. Greek and Roman

philosophers often introduce their disquisitions with prayers

(Socrates, Plato); the Romans prayed on occasion of all important

state-events, on the election of magistrates, the enactment of laws,

etc. Of course in heathen prayer there could never exist the proper

earnestness, inasmuch as the idea of God was always imperfect; no

heathen could ever pray as could a pious Israelite. The first real

opposing of prayer, if we except the frivolous Epicureans, was on the

part of Maximus of Tyre, a Platonist of the second century after

Christ; it was also opposed by Rousseau, though for very superficial

reasons (because the order of the universe could not be changed by

individual wishes), and, with astonishing lack of insight by Kant, who

even finds in the Lord's Prayer, as given by Christ, a very clear

suggestion to substitute in the place of all prayer simply a

determination to lead a good life (Relig. innerh., etc., 1794, p. 302).

In Pantheism the rejection of prayer as absurd, is a matter of

course.--The Scriptures present prayer as one of the most essential

moral requirements [Psa. cxlv, 18, 19; Matt. vii, 7; Mark xi, 24; James

i, 5 sqq.; 1 Tim. ii, 1-3; Eph vi, 18]. The injunction to pray without

ceasing [Luke xviii, 1-7; 1 Thess. v, 17; Rom. xii, 12; Col. iv, 2; 1

Tim. ii, 8; comp. Psa. lxiii, 7] implies the constant aspiring of our

heart to God as to Him whose will alone is our law, and who gives his

blessing to whatever is done in his name.--Where sin is not yet

dominant, any other than a devotional prayer is inconceivable. Devotion

in prayer is not merely the absence of distraction, but it is the

praying out of a true, earnest and upright heart-disposition. Devotion

cannot be required as a special duty, for it is necessarily included in

the very idea of prayer; the Scriptures simply allude to the

earnestness of prayer, and to the liability of self-deception in

well-meant prayer [Isa. xxix, 13; Psa. cxlv, 18; Matt. xv, 8; vi, 5-7;

James v, 16].

It is not as a merely moral, but as a religious, activity that prayer

leads to communion, for religion is essentially socializing, not

directly, however, but in virtue of the communion which it establishes

with God. Mere individual prayer has its proper justification as

bearing on the personal relation to God; it is in fact the primary and

most obvious form [Matt. vi, 6]; but prayer attains to its highest,

though never exclusive, character as the single-hearted prayer of the

believing communion or church-society. And this not simply because such

prayer hightens the feeling of the unitedness of the faithful, but

because, in virtue of the throwing off of personal isolation and of its

flowing out of the holy spirit which pervades the society, it has a

guarantee of greater purity, and consequently the promise of special

blessing [Matt. xviii, 20; Acts ii, 42; Eph. v, 19; Col. iii,

16].--Christ himself gives the moral pattern of prayer; he prayed out

of the full consciousness of life-communion with God, and consequently

with full confidence of being answered [Heb. v, 7]; he prayed often in

solitude [Matt. xiv, 23; xxvi, 36, 42; Mark vi, 32; Luke vi, 12; ix,

28], and often in the presence of others [Matt. xxvi, 39; John xi, 41

sqq.], and in communion with his disciples [John xvii, 1 sqq.].

SECTION CXVI.

All prayer is primarily, either expressly or in virtue of its necessary

presuppositions, a confession, a recognition of God as the

unconditional Lord, and as the all-knowing, all powerful and all-loving

Father. In as far as in it we are always conscious of ourselves as

loved by God, prayer is at the same time also thanksgiving. In so far

as in prayer we have respect not only to the past and present, but also

to the goal of moral effort, the realization of which we regard as not

in our own power independently of God, nor yet in an unfree

nature-necessity, but in the will of God as co-operating with us,

prayer becomes petition--the climax of the inner religiously-moral

life, wherein the true filial relation of man to God finds its

expression; and as the moral end is of a rational, and hence not merely

individual, character, consequently the petition is essentially also

intercession--the highest religious expression of our love to man. As

only the all-embracing wisdom of God is capable of fully seeing the

appropriateness of earthly things and relations to the attainment of

the highest good, hence the petition for earthly goods, though per se

entirely legitimate, can never be more than of a humbly conditional

character; and there is no petition other than that for the per se

unquestionably eternal good, that has no other condition than the

willing, believing obedience of the subject. The promise of answering

is based on the condition of believing and of humble confidence.

Prayer is per se a recognition of God,--it is adoration and confession

both to God as the all-ruling One, and also before God as the

all-knowing and holy One. In this recognizing confession itself, there

is involved a thanksgiving, which consequently is included, though it

may be but implicitly, in every prayer; in the Lord's Prayer it lies in

the very address. All thanksgiving [1 Sam. ii; Psa. cvi, 1; Rom. xv, 6;

1 Tim. iv, 4, 5; Phil. iv, 6; Col. iii, 17; iv, 2] is at the same time

a petition for the bestowal of the good for which it is offered; and

the petition is, in virtue of the soul-uniting filial relation to God,

necessarily also intercession for others and for the whole kingdom of

God [Matt. vi, 10; John xvii, 9 sqq.; Eph i, 16; vi, 18; 1 Tim. ii,

1-3; Col. i, 9; iv, 3; Phil. i, 4; James v, 16; Heb. xiii, 18]. So long

as prayer remains of a merely individual character, it comes short of

true prayer,--rests not yet on a consciousness of the filial relation

to God, for this consciousness is inconsistent with self-seeking

exclusiveness; the children of God have their home only in the kingdom

of God.

Prayer as petition is the profoundest enigma for the merely wordly

finitely-occupied understanding; for the religious heart, however, it

is the beginning and the center of the spiritual life. He who cannot

offer petitions to God is not of God. All intellectual doubts as to the

nature and efficacy of petitioning prayer, have as their back-ground a

doubt of the personality of God, although they may assume to be a

vindication of the eternal order of the world. A God who cannot answer

petitions is not a personal spirit, but only an unconscious

nature-force. In the believing petition the Scriptures promise answers

[Psa. 1, 15; x, 17; xxii, 4, 5; xxxiv, 15; lxii, 1 sqq.; lxv, 2; xciv,

9; cii, 17; cxlv, 18, 19; Prov. xv, 8; Isa. lxv, 24; Matt. vii, 7;

xviii, 19; xxi, 22; John ix, 31; xvi, 23, 24; 1 John iii, 22; v, 14;

James i, 5; iv, 8; v, 13-18; 1 Pet. iii, 12]; to the impious and

foolish petition they refuse it [Job xxvii, 9; xxxv, 13; Psa. lxvi, 18;

Prov. xv, 8, 29; xxviii, 9; Isa. i, 15; John ix, 31; James iv, 3, and

others]; and confident faith in an answer is itself the condition of

the answer [Mark xi, 24; James i, 6, 7]. As the fuller development of

the subject belongs to dogmatics, we here subjoin but a few general

observations. The answering of prayer is not unconditional; it is

conditioned, on the one hand, on the loving wisdom of God, which is

higher than that of man [Eph. iii, 20], and, on the other, on the

prayer-spirit of him who prays. And the answer is not a merely seeming

one, so that prayer would be superfluous, but the answer is given on

the basis and in virtue of the prayer [Luke xi, 5-13; xviii, 1

sqq.,--the lesson of which is, that if earnest prayer is effectual even

with unloving men, how much more is it so with the all-loving One who

gladly hears such petitions; Gen. xviii, 23 sqq.; Exod. xxxii, 9 sqq.;

Num. xiv, 13 sqq., 20; xvi, 20 sqq.; Isa. xxxviii]. Prayer does not

change the eternal counsel of God; this counsel is itself not

unconditional, but it is determined by the all-knowing One in view of

the free conduct of his creatures; and, consequently, one element of it

is, that prayer is eternally destined to be answered. Every pious

prayer is answered, although only in the manner most wholesome to him

who offers it, and hence not always in the special manner in which the

answer is expected [2 Cor. xii, 8, 9.] If man deceives himself as to

the sought good, still he receives the good,--not, however, the false

one which he had in mind, but the true one which he had in heart. Hence

no believing prayer, in so far as it relates to earthly goods, can be

or should be more than a conditional petition, and the manner of the

fulfillment must be submitted to the wisdom of God. If even Christ

prays in this conditional manner to the Father [Matt. xxvi, 39, 42;

Luke xxii, 42], by how much more should man so pray, whose knowledge is

so limited; true faith is in fact a confidence that God knows best what

serves for our peace, and brings it about; childlikeness and humble

confidence give power and truth to prayer [Rom. viii, 15; Gal. iv, 6].

Under this condition, prayer for particular earthly goods is not only

allowed to man, but is also willed by God and with promise of answering

[Matt. vi, 11; vii, 7 sqq.; Phil. iv, 5, 6; Eph. vi, 18; James v, 14

sqq.]; and the confidence of obtaining the object sought, even in such

special petitions rises to confident assurance wherever the prayer goes

forth from a complete life-communion with God, and in the, power of the

Holy Ghost,--wherever it is prayer "in spirit and in truth" [John iv,

24; Rom. viii, 26, 27; Gal. iv, 6; Eph. vi, 18; comp. John xiv, 13;

xvi, 23]; for, the more complete the union of the pious heart with God,

so much the more does it partake of the illuminating power of God, and

God's knowledge of the future begets in him who partakes of God's

Spirit a presentiment of the divine counsel in regard to him; and the

presentiment rises to a prayerful longing, an unshaken faith; and the

true petition to a prophecy. The fulfillment of the petition is felt by

anticipation in the prayer itself; he who truly prays is a prophet; and

God is the fulfiller of the prophecy, because he is the author of the

counsel. Here also Christ himself furnishes the pattern: "Father, I

thank thee that thou hast heard me," etc. [John xi, 41]; his prayer

related to what he had already prophetically beholden and predicted

[verses 11, 23]. The primary and most essential element of true prayer

is, of course, the petition for the filial relation to God and for the

coming of the kingdom of God [Matt. vi, 10, 12; John xvii, 15; Luke xi,

13]. Man should beware, however, of sinning in prayer itself; but by

self-seeking narrowness he does this; to pray in the spirit of God, is

to pray for the kingdom of God. Model prayers are the Lord's Prayer and

the high-priestly prayer of Christ.

As God's eternal decree to answer prayer is conditioned on the

actuality of the prayer, hence prayer is not simply moral

appropriation, but also, though not in a direct and strict sense, moral

forming, seeing that, though indeed not God himself, yet in fact the

particular temporal manifestation of his world-government, is

conditioned on prayer. God's essence is indeed not subject to change;

his doing and acting in the world, however, are, in virtue of his

righteous love, conditioned on the free conduct of his rational

creatures, and hence also on prayer. The real forming, however, which

is directly connected with prayer relates to the personal

religiously-moral being of the subject. The blessing efficacy of prayer

beams back from God upon the offerer, namely, in that in virtue of the

prayer not only his being in God comes more vividly to his

consciousness, and has a more efficacious influence, but also God's

being in him comes to a higher reality. Faith in prayer and in the

answering of prayer, heighten the divine life of the children of God.

SECTION CXVII.

2. The negating and rather virtual phase of the service of God, is the

actual or symbolical manifesting of the real or conditional vanity of

earthly things and relations, as contrasted with God or with the

God-loving, pious state of the heart, namely, in sacrifice, the essence

of which is self-denial or renunciation. In the unfallen state of man

sacrifice consists essentially simply in a free giving-up of that which

is naturally pleasurable, out of regard to the divine will and far the

sake of the higher good, the moral end; hence it consists in the

subordinating and giving up of earthly desire. The appropriating of the

divine requires the rejection of all that is ungodly, and therein the

person accomplishes, at the same time, a high moral culture of himself.

As contrasted with the highest good and with God, every thing finite

appears as relatively empty and void; the actual manifesting of this

nullity, out of love to the divine, is sacrifice,--a notion that is

fundamental to all religions, and that constitutes the focal point of

all religious life, and which is still recognizable even in the most

utter perversions of the truth. [13] There is no love without

sacrifice; the higher the love, so much the higher the readiness to

sacrifice for the sake of the beloved; sacrifice is the test of love;

maternal love sacrifices repose and enjoyment for the sake of the

child; this is not figurative language,--the sacrifice is real and

true. As God's highest love expresses itself in the giving up of his

Son, so man's love to God is manifested in the sacrificing of that to

the enjoyment of which man has in general a right. As, however, in the

sinless state of humanity, there would exist no really untrue and vain

object from which man would have actually to turn away in moral

abhorrence, but only a merely relatively such, namely, the merely

natural and transitory as in contradistinction to the spiritual, hence

in this case sacrifice would not consist in the destruction of an

entity, but in the renunciation of an enjoyment, an abstaining from the

merely worldly. In the interest of his spiritual freedom, of his moral

growth, man is not to give himself over to nature, but must by

obedience renounce some degree of the enjoyment of nature and of his

personal discretion. He is to sacrifice whatever tempts him from God,

whatever binds him to the merely natural or to the non-divine; also of

unfallen man it was required that he should realize his spiritual

freedom by the free renunciation of a merely natural enjoyment.

Christ's fasting in the wilderness was not a part of his atoning

self-sacrifice, and yet it was a sacrifice on the part of the Son of

man, even as was also required of unfallen man. In yielding himself to

enjoyment without moral discrimination, man loses hold on the

spiritual; lie must renounce in order to be free. In the unfallen state

sacrifice has essentially an educative end and a symbolical form. God

certainly did not forbid man to eat of the designated tree because it

was a bad tree, for to sinless beings there could be nothing evil in

the entire circle of God-made nature; but in his educative wisdom, God

required of man a sacrifice, for the simple reason that no moral life

is possible without self-restraint, no religious life without

sacrifice. Man stands in the presence of nature and God, both are good;

but nature is a created object and may not be placed on an equal

footing with God. When man enjoys nature for its own sake and without

reference to God, he sins; for he ought to belong, not to nature, but

to God. Hence he should recognize, and manifest in moral acts, the

truth that nature per se is not the true being and the true goal of

moral aspiration, namely, the highest good, but only a means to this

end. Hence his moral relation to nature and to the sensuous, is, as in

contrast to his relation to God, of a negative character. This "no" in

regard to nature, man pronounces morally when he subordinates his

relation to nature to his higher relation to God, when he says to

sensuous desire: "Thou mayest not, shalt not absorb and dominate my

thinking and willing;" he must freely hold in check the merely

sensuous, for the sake of the spiritual,--must restrain himself from

the former in order that he may possess and perfect himself as a moral

spirit, and that he may rise to spiritual-mindedness.

It is the antagonism of the spirit to the flesh that lies at the basis

of sacrifice; in the interest of the spiritual, the spirit sacrifices

the fleshly. Also man as normal and not yet sinful, had to crucify his

flesh with the affections and lusts thereof [Gal. v, 24], although this

flesh and its desires were not yet immoral; but to have sought the

flesh as an end, as a good, would have been sinful; and God put upon

him a requirement of abnegation in order that he might recognize and

actually learn this fact,--that he might break away from the merely

sensuous, and develop in himself the image of God. Simple obedience to

this requirement, without a why or wherefore, was the purest and best

of sacrifices. This Paradisaical germ of all sacrifice is, therefore,

self-denial in obedience to God, a renouncing not a destroying, a

giving up, out of love to the spirit, of that which is dear to the

flesh; and this idea pervades all forms of sacrifice, even the emphatic

sin-offering; only that which is dear to man can be to him a sacrifice;

and because of the simple fact that the first man would not bring the

light sacrifice required of him, it became necessary for him afterward

to make severer ones; and from the hour of the fall and thenceforth the

morally-religious consciousness of humanity finds satisfaction only in

a series of progressively more violent and more terrible sacrifices,

culminating in the offering of human victims, and that too not merely

among the rude, but even among the most civilized of gentile nations.

In the idea of sacrifice it is always implied that that which the

person gives up is per se good and right, that primarily lie has a

right to its enjoyment, but that he gives it up for the sake of a

higher end; to give up that which is per se bad, is not to sacrifice;

the offering that was presented to Jehovah had to be pure and spotless;

and the worth of the sacrifice rises with the worth of the object

offered. Thus, sensuous enjoyment is per se good, but it must be

restrained and limited, and often refused, in order that not it but the

rational spirit may be the master. But man has also to bring, in the

interest of the moral, purely spiritual sacrifices. It was not the

sensuous per se that was the temptation to Eve, but the representation

made to her that the tree would render her "wise;" it was her duty, as

it is the duty of man in general, to renounce the desire of obtaining

from the creature that wisdom which only God can impart--which can be

learned only in believing obedience to God.

The sacrifice that was required of unfallen man implied in its

renunciation at the same time, a confession, namely, to God as the

highest good and the highest love, and this again implied thankfulness

for the love received in communion with God. Inasmuch as every good

gift is from God hence the thank-offering of the believer can only be

symbolical, expressive of his readiness to give up in the interest of

the eternal even that which is dearest of all to him, in the

consciousness that in the communion with God for whom it is given up,

the real and true life is in fact preserved; in the presence of God

none is to appear empty [Exod. xxiii, 15; xxxiv, 20].

Sacrifice appears in the Old Testament in its more definite form as

early as in the case of Cain and Abel; we find no indication of its

express institution by God; and we might therefore regard it as an

immediate and natural expression of the religious consciousness;

however, a positive divine prescription is the more probable. It is

certainly not probable that sacrifice was first made from a

consciousness of guilt; the offerings of Cain and Abel, consisting of

the products of the field and of the flock, seem rather to be

thank-offerings than sin-offerings; Abel's bloody offering is expressly

designated [Gen. iv, 4] by the word minchah (present, gift) by which

are subsequently designated the bloodless thank-offerings in

contradistinction to the bloody, and, for the most part, atoning

offerings, namely, the sebachim; the offering of Noah appears expressly

as a thank-offering [viii, 20] The burning up of the material of the

sacrifice signifies the renunciation and the eradication of the earthly

desires of him who sacrifices; the pure heavenward-mounting sacrificial

flame symbolizes the exaltation of the heart from the earthly to the

heavenly,--the union with God. Thus sacrifice becomes a symbol of the

alliance of man with God; and in the case of Noah and the patriarchs, a

sign of the Covenant, and hence also a sign of the union of the

Israelites who escaped from Egypt, into one people [Exod. iii, 12].

And, therefore, subsequently in the fully-developed sacrificial service

of a sinful people, the essence of the sacrifice was in fact not placed

in the outward rite, but in the submission of the heart, in the

renunciation of an earthly self-seeking mind, in the complete giving up

of all earthly love for God's sake [Gen. xxii, 16]; obedience is better

than [outward] sacrifice; God-pleasing sacrifices are a broken spirit

and a contrite heart, and "to do justice and judgment is more

acceptable to the Lord than sacrifice" [1 Sam. xv, 22; Psa. xl, 6; 1,

8-15; li, 16, 17, 18; Hos. vi, 6; Eccl. iv, 17; Prov. xxi, 3, 27; Isa.

i, 11; Jer. vi, 20; comp. Matt. ix, 13; xii, 7; Mark xii, 33]. In the

case of the very first sacrifices God warns man against the error of

supposing that the essence of the sacrifice lies in the outward act;

Abel's offering He graciously accepts, that of Cain He disregards.

Sacrifice is an appropriating of the divine, inasmuch as in the turning

away from the non-divine there is necessarily implied a turning to the

divine.

SECTION CXVIII.

The moral sparing of the divine, has direct reference not to God

himself; but to the forms under which He is revealed. Every thing

whereby God becomes for us is sacred as distinguished from merely

created objects per se. In the unfallen state of humanity all created

objects are at the same time also sacred, namely, in so far as they are

considered an expression of the divine will; and whatever is sacred is

in the highest degree an object of moral sparing,--should be treated as

sacred. This sparing springs from moral humility,--is an express

respecting of the sacred in virtue of a holy awe, springing from a

lively consciousness, on the one hand, of the divine glory even in the

humbler forms of its manifestation, and, on the other, of our own

existence as a limited one and as resting solely on divine grace. The

objects of this sacred awe, and hence of moral sparing, are both the

immediate, full and actual self-revelations of God, and also all

mediating instrumentalities of His revelation and communication, as

well as also every thing that relates to the reverencing of God on the

part of man.

The distinction between the sacred and the non-sacred is, for the

unfallen state, of a merely conditional character; it is in fact,

simply the same thing considered under two phases; in all things we can

behold both the created and the Creator. He who is truly pious sees

himself every-where surrounded by the sacred,--he prays to God not

merely in the temple of Jerusalem, or on Mount Gerizim, but every-where

in spirit and in truth. Now, in so far as objects that are imbued with

the divine are temporal and finite, they are capable of being abused

and desecrated,--hence the moral duty of sparing. The direction of God

to Moses on occasion of the revelation in the burning bush [Exod. iii,

5], suggests the proper moral bearing of man; he must put away from

himself all that bears upon itself the character of the common, the

unholy, the dross of earth. The duty of sparing, as relating to the

sacred, is not. a mere non-doing, but, like every other form of this

duty, it is a self-restraining out of regard to the higher right of the

sacred object; a sparing from mere indifference would be sinful.

The objects of this sparing are: (1) The immediate personal revelations

of God himself. Here there is no room for a mere passive bearing; here

the mere non-doing, the mere not respecting the divine presence, is an

offending of God himself; and moral sparing passes over at once into

adoring reverence; here the declaration of Christ holds good: "He that

is not for me is against me;" the not-concerning ourselves about God is

a dishonoring of God.--(2) God's revelation and self-communication

through his Word should be recognized as absolutely sacred, and

distinguished in every respect from whatever is merely human and

natural; it is disesteemed and dishonored by doubt, unbelief, and

disobedience, and by trifling or irreverent use, by ridicule or

neglect; the divine Word as sacred is to be treated entirely

differently from the merely human; it calls for unconditional faith and

reverent submission.--(3) The name of God [Exod. iii, 14] and other

symbolical designations of God must be treated with sacred awe and

sparing,--may not be associated with the common and thus subjected to

irreverent use, may not be misused in sport, or frivolity, or for

deception [Exod. xx, 7; Lev. xix, 12; xxii, 32; Matt. vi, 9]. A name is

not a mere empty sound; it is the body of a thought; and as the human

body is not an object of indifference for the spirit, and as to

dishonor it is to insult the spirit, so also is a misusing of the

divine name a dishonoring of God himself. In the awe of the Jews as to

the pronouncing of the name of Jehovah, there lay a deep moral

significancy, though indeed this peculiarity rendered also possible an

outward evasion of the command itself. That the precept to revere God's

name appears as one of the chief commandments of the Mosaic law,

evinces its high moral importance. Where there exists reverential love,

there the name of the beloved will not be desecrated by triflingness

and frivolous sport. And what is true of the name is also true of all

symbols of God, as, for example, in the Ancient Covenant, of the

covering of the ark of the Covenant (the mercy-seat), of the pillar of

fire, etc. In a more general sense every form of sin is a dishonoring

of the name and image of God, inasmuch as man himself bears God's name

and image in himself, and should therefore spare and respect these in

his own person [comp. Rom. ii, 24]; and all morality may be summed up

in the keeping sacred of the divine image in ourselves,--as expressed

by Jehovah: "Ye shall sanctify yourselves and be holy, for I am holy"

[Lev. xi, 44], or in the words of Peter: "Sanctify the Lord God in your

hearts" [1 Pet. iii, 15].--(4) The human organs of divine revelation,

the prophets and the called heralds of the divine Word in general, have

a moral right to reverential sparing, though this sparing refers

essentially not to them as men, but to God in whose name they speak.

[Psa. cv, 15; Matt. x, 40, 41; comp. xi, 49-51; 1 Thes. v, 12, 13; Heb.

xiii, 17]; the persecuting and killing of the prophets is frequently

spoken of in Scripture as among the most heinous of offenses. Also in a

sinless development of humanity all those would be regarded in the

light of prophets of God, who, having attained to higher spiritual

knowledge, should bear witness of divine truth; they would stand not

strictly on an equal footing with those whom they should teach and

train; and their recognition as divine messengers would beget a greater

willingness to give heed to them. Wherever there is a really moral

communion, there the ministers of God are honored; not to respect them

is a sign of deep moral declension; but the deepest degradation of all

is where they themselves do not respect their calling. No prophet of

God was ever without moral self-denial and constant humiliation before

God,--without the deeply felt consciousness of Moses: "Who am I that I

should go unto Pharaoh, and bring forth the children of Israel out of

Egypt?"--but also no prophet of God was ever without the sacred right

to be recognized and respected as God's messenger, provided only that

he be found faithful.--(5) All that relates to the worshiping of

God,--the holy seasons, places, and things, are, as sacred, to be

distinguished from the non-sacred, and to be honored accordingly, and

not to be placed on an equal footing with that which serves only

temporal, individual ends. The Sabbath is to be treated quite otherwise

than the day of labor; it has a right to be respected, for it is God's

day, set apart to his special service. Its celebration by actual divine

worship is only one of its phases, the other is its being sacredly

spared. Every thing is to be avoided on the Sabbath which disturbs the

devout frame of the soul,--attracts it back to the merely earthly and

sensuous, impresses upon it a mere every-day character. lie who does

not honor the day of the Lord, honors also not the Lord of the day.

Holy places and things, being consecrated to heavenly purposes, should

not be profaned to worldly entertainment and to merely temporal uses.

Though we do not recognize any mystic power in a special consecration,

yet we hold fast to the principle that holy places and things belong

exclusively to the service of the Lord. God himself ordained, in the

Old Testament, particular sacred things and a special consecration of

them [Exod. xxv, sqq.; xxx, 22 sqq.]. Even as the "burning bush" [Exod.

iii, 5] and the mount of legislation and the holy of holies in the

temple were separated from all that was not sacred, so also is it with

every place that is dedicated to the holy One [Lev. xix, 30]. The

significancy of this setting apart, and the importance of this

respecting of the sacred, increase with the actuality of sin.

Note. God cannot of course be an object of moral forming in the strict

sense of the word. Though prayer is in fact a moral influencing of God,

inasmuch as it finds hearing, still no change is thereby wrought in

God, and that which is realized by the efficacy of prayer is not so

much in God as in us and in the world. But in a remote sense we may

speak of a forming of the divine, namely, in so far as God is expressed

in sacred symbols and in sacred art, and in so far as, by our

witnessings for God, the knowledge and love of God are implanted in the

souls of men; all this, however, is in reality simply a forming of the

finite and the human into an image of God, and not a forming of God

himself.

II. THE MORAL ACTIVITY, IN RELATION TO THE MORAL PERSON HIMSELF.

SECTION CXIX.

(a) The duty of moral sparing is here the preserving of one's own

existence and of its normal peculiarity and development, as prompted by

a consciousness of the divine will, and hence also the warding off of

all therewith-conflicting and disturbing or destroying influences on

the part of nature or of the spiritual world. To this end it is

necessary that in all things the true relation of the body, as a

serving power, to the rational spirit, as the dominating power, be

preserved, and that the image of God, which though originally inherent

in man. is yet in need of fuller development, be preserved pure even in

its corporeally-symbolical manifestation.

The moral sparing of one's self is the higher moral application of a

law that pervades the entire totality of being. That which is cohesion

in a nature-body, and the law of gravitation in the natural world in

general, and the instinct of self-defense and of self-preservation in

the animal world, becomes with man a moral duty. When man seeks to

preserve himself, to ward off injury and death, out of mere natural

instinct, his action is not yet moral; it becomes moral only when it

springs from a consciousness that it is God's will,--that God has

pleasure in our existence as his own creative work, that He has a

purpose in us which we are morally to fulfill. Of a duty of

self-destruction there can never be any possibility; and for a duty of

entire self-sacrifice, of the giving up of life for the sake of a

higher end, there is, in a state of sinlessness, also no possibility;

otherwise the divine government would be in anarchy. God who gave

existence to man wills also its preservation,--has willed it as a moral

end, and not simply as a means to an end. Death is simply the wages of

sin, and not a condition of virtue, save alone where on account of sin

there is need of a sacrifice.

In a sinless state the duty of self-sparing is of easy fulfillment,

partly for the reason that it corresponds to a natural law immanent in

all living creatures, and partly because disturbing influences are

conceivable only where they are occasioned by the fault of man

himself,--for example, when he presumptuously exposes himself to such

natural influences as he is not yet able to resist,--which is in fact

possible seeing that, also for the unfallen state, the complete mastery

over nature is presented as a condition yet to be attained to by moral

effort. Also from the influence of spiritual beings an injuring of the

moral person is possible, so long as the rational creature has not as

yet attained to its ultimate perfection, so that here also there is

place for the duty of watchfulness, in order that the diverse

personalities that are as yet in process of development may not act

hinderingly upon each other. And this duty of sparing watchfulness is

still more increased when the moral person stands no longer in the

presence of simply sin-free beings, but is assaulted by spiritual

temptation, as in the case of Adam and Eve; here the duty of

self-preserving sparing assumes at once the form of a positive warding

off.--In the Scriptures the duty of sparing one's self, even in

relation to the corporeal life, is presented as per se strictly valid;

"no man ever yet hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it,

even as the Lord the church" [Eph. v, 29]. Man is also to exercise this

duty of sparing in view of his own possible sinning; in protecting his

moral innocence, man protects also the image of God as created in him.

SECTION CXX.

(b) Moral appropriating is, as regards the moral person himself,

directly at the same time also a moral forming of the person into a

progressively more perfect expression of the moral idea,--into a

personally-peculiar realization of the moral end; and in proportion as

the moral person appropriates to itself its own self, puts itself into

possession of itself, it accomplishes upon itself also a moral forming.

(1) Not the body is to appropriate to itself the spirit, but the spirit

is progressively more and more to appropriate to itself the body, and

to form it, and thereby also to form itself; hence the spirit alone is

the appropriating factor, and the body is simply to be appropriated and

formed. Even as nature stands to God in a twofold relation, namely, in

that, on the one hand, God accomplishes his will in it, makes it good,

and, on the other, reveals himself through it, makes it into his image,

into an object of beauty, so also has the body in relation to the

spirit the twofold destination of being its organ and its image; the

former it becomes essentially by particular forming, the latter by

general forming (�� 109, 110).

(a) The body is formed and appropriated to itself by the spirit as its

true absolutely subservient organ, in that (1) it is strengthened and

rendered apt in accomplishing every service for the rational will,

through the mediating and carrying out of all appropriating and forming

action of the rational spirit as bearing upon the external world; (2)

in that, in its sensuous impulses, it is held under the discipline of

the spirit, and is never allowed to have an independent right for

itself; in both these respects realizes itself the complete domination

of the spirit over the body.

It is characteristic of the true moral nature of man, that he is

capable, not merely, as is the case with the brute, of appropriating

and forming external objects, but also himself. The brute is formed by

nature, not by itself, and it appropriates to itself only nature, but

not itself; but man in his first-given condition does not as yet really

have himself, but must first learn to possess himself,--must attain to

moral ownership of himself.

Man virtualizes his god-likeness primarily in this, that he glorifies

God even in his body as the temple of the Holy Ghost [1 Cor. vi, 19,

20], and that he presents this body to God as a living, holy, and

well-pleasing sacrifice [Rom. xii, 1.] The preliminary manifold

dependence of the spirit on the body, and through the body also on

external nature, is to be overcome and changed into spiritual freedom;

the spirit is itself to make the body truly its own body, to

appropriate it to itself as a moral possession, to form it into the

perfect organ of the spirit,--in a certain sense, to create it

spiritually. The original foreignness of the body to the spirit is to

be overcome; its as yet partially-actual independence is to be broken;

the body is to be thoroughly permeated by the spirit, and all that is

merely objective and unfree in it, to be done away with. The dominion

of the spirit over nature, which is set before it as a moral goal, is

to realize itself first on its own nature, that is, on the body. That

this is a moral task is plainly indicated by nature itself. The brute

is much earlier self-supporting and mature than man, and needs no

training in order to attain to its greatest skill; all the skill that

man attains to he has to get by learning, to acquire by moral effort;

and all learning is an appropriating through consciousness; man must in

some manner first comprehend his body, before he can really form it and

take it under his control; he who is spiritually dull usually remains

also physically clumsy; man as coming from the hands of nature is the

most helpless and most unskillful of creatures; all that he ever

becomes is by the spirit,--by free moral activity; that his nascent

life is much more helpless than that of any of the animals, is simply

an incident of his high moral dignity. That which he has from nature is

indeed good, but if it remains as mere unspiritualized, undominated

nature, then it becomes for him evil,--becomes something of which he is

to be ashamed. This rendering the body skillful is a

personally-particular forming--a working of the spirit upon the body;

thereby the spirit forms the body into its own true possession; it

aspires to have it for itself, to have it entirely in its control.

Herein consists also the true particular appropriating, the enjoying,

of the body; man enjoys it when he has it fully in his power. This is

the secret of the rich enjoyment of young persons, when, in free

corporeal movement, in skillful playing, in skating, in rhythmical

muscular action, etc., they feel themselves masters over their bodies;

it is the consciousness of freedom, of acquired mastery; for, all

consciousness of mastery is a feeling of happiness, and that, too, a

per se legitimate one.

Man is to form and appropriate to himself his body in two respects; for

as a spirit lie stands to the outer world in the double relation of

receiving and of influencing,--through the senses and through the

organs of motion. The cultivation of the senses is more an

appropriating than a real forming; the senses must first be brought

under the control of the spirit; the seaman and the huntsman have not

always a really sharper natural eye than others, but their seeing is

more skilled,--they see many objects from which others may indeed

receive exactly the same light-impressions, but yet not actually

perceive them, for the reason that they overlook them; seeing is an

art, and many, though with open eyes, see comparatively little. An

uncultured person hears, in a beautiful piece of music, little more

than confused sounds, for the reason that he does not know how to hear.

It is a moral duty of man to develop his senses to perfection, fully to

appropriate them to himself, for they were given to him by God as

channels through which to appropriate to himself the outer world; and

it is unthankfulness to God for man to be willing to see and hear

little or nothing in God's nature,--for him to have no open eyes for

the glory of God as resplendent in creation, and no ear for the

beautiful harmonies of nature and art. Rudeness and unculture are

sinful in every respect, and hence also in respect to the senses.

The appropriating training of the organs of motion to vigorous

skillfulness, not merely as a pleasure but also as a duty, is brought

about under normal circumstances not so much by calculating art as by

spontaneous natural activity; and it takes place chiefly during youth.

While it was an error of many former educators entirely to neglect the

training of the body to skillfulness and grace, still, on the other

hand, there is danger of overestimating the worth of regulated

gymnastics. The unnatural physical life of our city populations may

render necessary a systematic process of corporeal exercise,

notwithstanding its manifold unesthetic and even repulsive

joint-wrenchings; but where the young people can have scope for

indulging in more natural and frolicksome muscular recreation, regular

gymnastics are doubtless quite superfluous; the learned cramming of

overcrowded schools needs them indeed as a sanitary complement, but it

is dangerous to substitute mere medicine for daily bread. It is a

morbid condition of society, when that to which nature itself prompts

us has to be made a school-requirement.

The complete subordinating of the sensuous impulses to the discipline

of the spirit, that is, the training of the body by the spirit to

temperateness in respect to all sensuous enjoyments, and to such

activity as is necessary to its being a proper organ for the spirit, is

also, at the same time, an appropriating and a forming; the members are

to be formed into "instruments of righteousness unto God" [Rom. vi, 12,

13]. Paul represents the complete dependence of the body on the moral

spirit as a dependence, not on the merely individual spirit, but on the

spirit as morally subordinating itself to God. Man, as consecrated to

God, is not to permit the per se legitimate caring for his body to

become a fostering of the sensuous desires [Rom. xiii, 13, 14], but is

strictly to subordinate the nurturing of the body and the indulgence in

sensuous enjoyments to the rational purposes of the moral spirit, so

that they shall simply be means for the spirit and never ends, in

themselves [Luke xxi, 34; Rom. xiv, 17; Eph. v, 18; 1 Thess. v, 6; 1

Tim. iii, 2; Tit. ii, 1 sqq.; 1 Pet. iv, 7, 8]. Temperateness, however,

does not imply the taking of the least possible quantity of food and

drink, nor indeed indifference to the sensuous pleasures of the table;

this would in fact be unthankfulness toward the goodness of God who has

prepared for us also this pleasure; it does, however, require the

observance of that measure which is conditioned on the needs and health

of the body, and on the properly understood social relations of the

person. Excessive indulgence is not only a degradation of the person

himself, but also uncharitableness toward the destitute.

SECTION CXXI.

(b) The body is to be formed into an image or symbol of the rational

spirit,--to become a revelation of the spirit in the external world;

that is, it is to be shaped into an object of beauty, into a

spiritualized expression of the moral personality. This takes place:

(1) immediately,--in that the body, without the express and conscious

activity of the person, is formed into a true expression of the

morally-cultured spirit; (2) mediately,--in that the body, which though

per se possessing the highest nature-beauty, is yet not to remain in

simply that state, is formed by means of a spiritually-expressive

characterizing adornment into an expression of artistic beauty,--into a

symbolical expression not merely of the spiritual in general, but also

of the personally-moral character in particular,--and in that, with

moral carefulness, it is kept free from whatever would present it in

the light of an object that is disesteemed or given over to natural

unfreedom, and cast off by the spirit,--the virtue of cleanliness.

Adornment, both under its positive and its negative phase, is a moral

duty, not merely out of regard to others, as the true moral

presentation and revelation of self to others, but also out of regard

to the moral person himself.

The natural perfection of the body is not yet the true,--is to be

exalted from natural beauty to spiritual. As the spirit (exists

primarily only in a germinal form, hence the body cannot, from the very

beginning, bear the full impress of the same; the spiritual expression

of the body is at first not that of the personally-formed, but only of

the as yet impersonal, spirit in general. The expression of the

countenance becomes really spiritual, truly beautiful, only by and

through a personal character-development, which is, in turn, reflected

back from this personal peculiarity. The spirit must already have

behind it a moral history, before it comes to expression in the

features. A general beauty without character, is meaningless; a

personally-spiritual beauty is winning and magnetic. The body becomes

truly beautiful only through the complete appropriating of the same by,

and for, the spirit; and the true secret of beauty consists in a

genuine spiritual and moral culture. Where falseness has not yet gained

firm foothold, there the countenance is the mirror of the soul; and,

for the skilled look, even disguising falseness is transparent. There

lies at the basis of "physiognomics" a deep truth; but this truth is

not expressible in definite words and lines. It is not by mere chance

that for certain historic personalities, such as those of Christ and

the more prominent of the apostles, certain very definite forms and

casts of countenance have found their place in Christian art, and by

which every one recognizes them at first glance. The true

character-expression of the cultured body is, in some sense,

spirit-imbued,--is sensuous and supersensuous at the same time; neither

words, nor outlines, nor even the photographic pencil of nature, is

capable of reproducing it, but only the spirit-guided hand of the

artist; spirit is recognized and grasped only by spirit; no photograph

of a spiritual, character-imbued face attains to the fidelity of an

artistic portrait. In a sinless state, the beauty of the spirit would

necessarily reveal itself in beauty of body. So also must it have been

in the case of Christ,--and the erroneous notion that for a time

prevailed in the early church, to the effect that in Christ there had

been no physical comeliness, was soon dissipated by the correct

consciousness of Christian art. The heavenly soul of Christ must have

depicted itself in his countenance [comp. Psa. xlv, 3]; and the reason

why the children approached Him with glad confidence and shouted:

"Hosanna!" is doubtless because of a direct impression which Christ's

person made upon them; children have a wonderful capacity for reading

character in the external appearance. Female vanity, in laying such

great stress on corporeal beauty, is guilty simply of applying to

sinfully-perverted reality, the thought, that is correct for the

unfallen state of humanity, namely, that beauty of body is evidence of

a beautiful soul. The moral task in relation to this culture of bodily

expression, is, happily, not an immediate intentional forming of the

body, but rather the moral forming of the soul, which then, in turn, of

itself impresses itself on the body.

The ornamentation of the body, including the exclusion of all

uncleanliness, is a very important moral duty, and one that is very

definitely emphasized in the Scriptures. On the subject of nudity and

clothing, there has been, both from the moral and from the artistic

stand-point, much disputing. Greek art, in its golden age, represented

some of the gods nude; at a later period, when it had stooped to the

service of worldliness rather than of religion, it expressed itself

predominantly in the nude. Still, however, only such gods appear nude

as represent a certain degree of moral and spiritual unripeness or

sensuousness; Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, appear almost always draped; for

spiritually-developed and historical characters, also among human

beings, nudity was an artistic impossibility. This suggests the true

law in the case. Nudity represents merely the naturally-beautiful, not

the spiritually-beautiful, merely the human in general, not the

personal in particular,--is that which is alike in all persons, not

that in which they spiritually differ. That portion of the body which

does not express the merely general, that is, the countenance, is, in

fact, uniformly left free of clothing. The very sense for the

morally-spiritual gives even a stronger expression to the personal

through the medium itself of clothing. Who could bear the thought of a

nude Caesar or Homer! Christian art rejected the nude, for the good

reason that it had spiritual characters to represent. Moreover, mere

nudity is artistically beautiful only in the form of lust-repellent,

colorless sculpture; in painting it becomes licentious and, therefore,

un-beautiful. It is a very false opinion, that clothing really conceals

beauty; clothing, as an expression of the spiritual, as a free artistic

creation, is in fact the higher beauty. This appears very clearly when

man is represented not as an individual, but in groups; a

bathing-place, swarming with nude figures, presents assuredly no

beautiful spectacle, even if they were so many Apollos; precisely where

man appears in his higher truth, namely, in society, there a beautiful

scene is presented only by the help of diversified,

character-expressive clothing. It is true, clothing is beautiful only

where it is really expressive of a character, whether of the nation or

of the person. The slavish copying after journals of fashion, is

evidence of a want of sense and of character, and of a lack of esthetic

perception.

Clothing did not first become necessary because of sin. The Biblical

account implies only, that it became necessary prematurely, and for

another than its normal reason,--namely, before the development of

personal character had led to its invention as an adornment. The sin of

the first pair effected only that the hitherto-innocent consorts felt,

now, shame in each other's presence, and that clothing, the proper

object of which is ornamentation, was turned into a garb of penance.

Clothing was not the very first want of persons living as yet in the

most primitive simplicity; nor was yet its lack the characteristic

trait of the Paradisaical state; clothing would have become a moral

requirement also in the unfallen state so soon as man had grown into

families, and the riper character of parents appeared in the presence

of children [comp. Gen. ix, 21 sqq.] The nudity of savages is not

innocence, but shameless rudeness.

Animals do not decorate themselves, they are decorated already; man

exalts himself above the animal by ingenious decoration. The tawdry

ornamentation of savages exemplifies this, under a rude form; with

them, the mere changing of the natural form is regarded as a

beautifying; the notion of ornamentation is conceived under an

essentially negative form; the unnatural itself is regarded as

beautiful. There is a higher significance in the hunter's hanging about

himself the skins of the bear or lion;--this is to him essentially a

decoration of honor, a sign of his courage. Thus also, in the simpler

forms of civilized life, it is an honor for a woman personally to weave

and to prepare her own clothing and that of the family; it is natural

for man to display his work, the fruit of his skill; but he also loves

to manifest his spiritual idiosyncrasy under an esthetic form in the

ornamentation of the body. Clothing and ornamentation in general, when

of a normal character, manifest, in part, the general element, the

natural peculiarity, and, in part, the personal peculiarity; hence in

the style of the clothing we can to a certain extent recognize the

personal character; the distinction between male and female clothing

among all civilized nations has a deep moral ground [comp. Deut. xxii,

5]; and just as, on the one hand, it is usually foolish and vain for an

individual to break entirely with a general national custom, so, on the

other, it is evidence of spiritual imbecility to make one's entire

outward appearance a piece of mere imitation, without personal

peculiarity.

The Scriptures attach some importance to a befitting adornment,

especially in its moral significancy. Jehovah himself prescribes a

worthy garb for those who officiate in his worship [Exod. xxviii and

xxxix; Num. xv, 38 sqq.]; a holy adornment becomes those who offer

worship to the Lord [Psa. xxix, 2; comp. Exod. xix, 10; Ezek. xxiv,

17]. When Christ in his parable [Matt. xxii, 2 sqq.] characterizes the

not putting on of the wedding-garment as a serious fault, he manifestly

does more than allude to a mere worthless custom [comp. Gen. xli, 14];

and the apostle does not consider it unimportant to commend to the

societies a becoming adornment [1 Tim. ii, 9, 10].

That cleanliness of body and of clothing is regarded not only in the

Old Testament [Exod. xix, 10; xxix, 4; Lev. viii, 66; Num. viii, 6

sqq.; xxxi, 21 sqq.; comp. Prov. xxxi, 25], but also in all the higher

heathen religions and in Islamism, as an important moral and religious

duty, so that in fact a large part of the worship consists in washings,

with direct symbolical reference to moral purification,--is a plain

indication of the deep moral significancy of bodily purity. The

sanitary interest is here merely incidental; the essential point is the

outward expressing of the spiritual. Man is to bear, in his entire

inner nature, as well as in his outward manifestation, a

spiritually-moral impress,--is to be, in all respects, an expression of

free self-determination, is to have upon himself nothing which has

attached itself to him merely outwardly or fortuitously, as something

belonging not to him, but to an extraneous nature-body,--is to be a

purely spiritual creation. Uncleanliness is the expression of unfree

nature,--of a dependent, passive belonging to mere outward nature, an

evidence of self-abandonment, self-disesteem and dishonor, and is

regarded among all cultivated nations as a symbol and actual indication

of sin; it has never been any thing other than isolated spiritual

perversions of humanity who have found an especial wisdom and greatness

of soul in an open display of uncleanliness. Sensual pleasure-seeking,

riotousness and moral degradation usually lead to corporeal filthiness;

and it is a very wise principle of education in the case of the morally

abandoned, and in missions among rude tribes, to place a very high

value on bodily cleanliness. The precepts as to cleansing, in the Old

Testament, are based on this ground; Christianity expressly declares

carefulness about outward cleanliness as a virtue intimately connected

with religion [Matt. vi, 17; comp. John xiii, 4 sqq.].

To the gracefulness and beauty of the physique, belongs also that

manner of movement or bearing which answers to the spiritual character,

to beauty of soul; the cultivation of skillfulness of movement leads

directly to the culture of esthetical motion. The beauty of movement

consists in the fact that it expresses the perfect mastery of the soul

over the body, and thus presents, in the body, not merely the organ of

the will, but also, through the element of the beautiful, an image of

the self-harmonious spirit,--in youth an expression of heart-gladness,

in age that of earnest dignity. The dance is esthetic only in youth, in

the mature it is repulsive.

SECTION CXXII.

(2) Moral appropriating and forming, as bearing upon the spirit itself,

that is, the moral striving of the spirit to have and to possess itself

as its own moral product, takes place through conscious, free activity,

although indeed in the unconscious nature of the personal spirit there

exists an impulse ill that direction. In so far as man is a rational

spirit he has before him his own self as a moral task,--is to form

himself into a moral personality, into a character; all non-advancement

is here retrogression. This appropriating and forming relates to the

spirit both as cognizing, as feeling, and as willing, and looks to the

harmony of these three phases of the spirit-life.

It is only when the spirit makes itself into its own possession,--forms

itself into a truly rational spirit, that it is a moral spirit. He who

is only a product of other spirits, who allows himself passively to be

molded merely by the spirit that for the time being prevails in

society, is, even when this spirit is a good one, not yet morally

mature, but is in moral nonage; he is not yet a person, not yet a

character. What Christ says [Matt. xxv, 14 sqq.] of putting to use the

talents received, holds good also of the moral endowments of man; he

dare not leave them idle, but must put them to moral usury,--must mold

himself by spiritual appropriation into richer self-possession. He who

"has not,"--who leaves idle his received talent, who makes it not into

a vital possession,--does not retain it even as an unproductive power,

but loses what he already has, and for the simple reason that it is a

general law that a life-power, if unawakened into activity, dies away

and perishes; it is only in virtue of a vital progressive development

that the spiritual can be preserved,--even as water is saved from

stagnation only by motion. The state of innocence cannot be preserved

by mere non-doing; moral indolence would let even the trees of life in

Paradise wither away. By the leaving idle of that which is destined to

development, man sinks to moral dullness and insensibility; the

spiritual condition of savages is a manifestation of the consequences

of burying the received talent.

The culture of self by the appropriation of truth, that is, the forming

of self to knowledge and wisdom, is presented in the Scriptures as one

of the highest moral duties, and it is inadmissible to limit this

appropriation to merely religious and moral truth, though of course

this is the principal thing (� 104). God actually directed the first

man to the acquirement of knowledge by the fact of his referring him to

the objective world about him (� 60), and in the fact that He made

known himself and his will to him. But the knowledge of good and evil

was forbidden to man, for the reason that a real knowledge of the

latter was possible only by its realization; he was indeed to know what

he should not do, but not to know of a real evil, and only a real

entity can be truly known; but the woman sought after a wisdom [Gen.

iii, 6] apart from true wisdom, and consequently fell.

Feeling is primarily of an immediate, involuntary character; but man is

not to be under the power of unfree feelings; he is rational only when

he develops his feelings into moral ones,--brings them under the

control of his rational knowledge and of his moral volitions. There is

absolutely no place in the human mind or heart for any thing that is

not morally willed or conditioned. Hence it is a moral duty to

cultivate our feelings into moral integrity, so that they may never

incur the liability of being reproached by the moral

consciousness,--never, even involuntarily, entertain envy, and the

like. In the ante-sinful state such feelings of course do not yet

exist; but non-moral feelings become very soon sinful ones unless they

become developed. And even the, as yet, uncorrupted feelings are

primarily still in a crude state and in need of culture. The feeling of

delight, and hence of happiness, rises with the increase of culture;

the first human beings could not be so happy in their first days as

they could have been after further moral development. They too were

liable to have morally false feelings. It is true there was as yet

nothing immoral before their eyes which could have become an object of

immoral delight; but they had, before them, themselves as in need of

further development; hence if they had felt perfectly contented in this

state of need, instead of thirsting after a higher perfection, this

feeling would have been immoral. On the other hand, they were capable

of feeling displeasure at the divine,--as in fact actually occurred in

view of the divine prohibition. And the pleasure which Eve felt in the

words of the tempter was already decidedly immoral, seeing that it

implied a will not to follow the will of God, and was essentially the

fall itself.

But feeling must be formed not merely as to its quality, but also as to

its degree of liveliness. If only the more prominent phases of good and

evil make an impression upon us, while the less prominent ones pass

before us unnoticed, then our moral feeling is obscure and obtuse. The

fact that feeling, like the bodily senses, is affected at first only by

the stronger impressions, implies of itself the duty of making it

sensitive--sensitive even for the most delicate features of the godly

or the ungodly. And this can be brought about only by a constantly

increasing growth in knowledge,--by an attending to whatever takes

place within and without us; we must prove all things and hold fast to

the best, the good, and that too not merely as knowledge but also as

the possession of our heart, as our delight and joy.--Our feelings, as

moral, stand not outside of, but also under our will. The notion that

the heart cannot be commanded, is absolutely immoral,--is an assertion

of man's irresponsibility. Natural feeling does indeed precede the

will, but moral feeling is, under one phase, determined by the moral

will [� 93]. It is not left to the hearts of children whether they will

or can love their parents, they are bound to love them; and the same is

true of wedlock-love, of our love to our calling, to our rulers, to our

country. The first promptings of feeling are as yet extra-moral, but in

that by this first excitation the will becomes free and is set into

activity, it then in turn directs its activity also upon the feelings

and the affections.

That willing is in harmony with knowing and feeling, is primarily

strictly natural; in man, however, as distinguished from the much

earlier self-possessing animal, this agreement is primarily only

approximative; the will must be exercised in order to be sure of

itself; man must first learn how to use it. There is need of a moral

will in order that the will nay become moral. This has all the

appearance of a vicious circle, but it is not; the fact is, I must in

general, and as a principle, have a will always to follow the truth, in

order that, in particular, I may actually form my individual will

morally, and make it subject to recognized truth. The spirit is willing

but the flesh is weak; this is relatively true also in a normal

development of mankind; this flesh is, however, not merely

sensuousness, but also the spirit itself, the will, in so far as it has

not as yet become veritably free. The will of the spirit must become

something which it is not, as yet, from the very start,--truly free;

and it is free only when that feebleness, which is primarily merely a

sort of clumsiness, is overcome,--when the spirit is not only in

general willing to do God's will, but also shows in each particular

case the same unwavering willingness. That which, in a state of

sinfulness, becomes a self-conflicting double will [Rom. vii, 15 sqq.],

exists also in the ante-sinful state, at least in so far as to

constitute a difference between the will as purely individual and the

will as truly rational, God-consecrated, and self-denying. The former

is not to be done away with, but to be harmoniously subordinated to the

latter; the will must be so formed as that we can say at every moment:

I will, and yet not I, but God who dwells in me. The will should not be

a willful will, but must be molded into an obedient one,--into

obedience to the divine will, which, in virtue of our love to God,

becomes at one with our own will. In obeying, man distinguishes indeed

his own will from God's will, but he subordinates his will, not

lothfully but in loving willingness, to the lovingly-appropriated

divine will,--transfigures the former, more and more, by his love of

the latter, so that finally there are no longer two wills, but only

one,--and that, not in virtue of any destruction, but simply in virtue

of love, not by violence but through freedom,--by following the example

of Christ in the constant practice of the principle: "Not my will, but

thine be done" [Luke xxii, 42; Matt. vi, 10; John v, 30; Psa. xl, 8;

Jer. vii, 23; Matt. vii, 21; xii, 50; 1 John ii, 17; Heb. xiii, 21].

Every moral will must say with Christ: "My meat is to do the will of

him that sent me" [John iv, 34]; obedience is the food of the

soul,--forms and strengthens the will to an increasingly freer and

holier manner of willing. Only those are the children of God who are

led by the spirit of God,--who permit themselves freely to be guided by

Him, who will only in and through Him [Rom. viii, 14].

Hence also in the forming of the will we have to distinguish between

the quality and the degree. A will may in fact be good in quality, may

aim at the good and detest the evil, and yet be lacking in strength and

in steadfastness,--may shrink before difficulties; it may begin well

and yet not bring to perfection; good resolutions do not necessarily

imply a truly good will; in fact, the road to hell is said to be paved

with good resolutions. He who has a good will only at first, but does

not really carry out any thing, is as yet unfree in his will,--has it

not under his control, and is yet a moral minor; he does not actually

will at every particular conjuncture that which he wills in general.

Hence it is man's duty to place his will entirely under the dominion of

moral reason, to mold it to freedom, in order that in particular cases

it may not offer resistance to good resolutions in general,--in a word,

that a will of the flesh may not oppose itself to the will of the

spirit.

III. THE MORAL ACTIVITY AS RELATING TO OTHER PERSONS.

SECTION CXXIII.

(a) The moral sparing of others consists in a real recognition of their

moral personality, and hence of their personal independence, freedom,

and honor.

(a) Man's personal independence and freedom, which are the expression

of his morally rational essence, may be limited by others only in the

interest of higher moral ends, namely, either in order to train the as

yet morally and spiritually immature toward real freedom, or in the

moral interests of the moral whole or society.--(b) The personal honor

of our fellow-man is preserved when we recognize and treat him as a

morally-rational being called to God-likeness and God-sonship, and

hence as capable of, and entitled to, moral communion with us,--when we

do nothing toward him which is inconsistent therewith,--which would

stigmatize him as non-moral, or, undeservedly, as immoral and

irrational; this is the duty of respecting our neighbor, and as implied

therein of respecting the personal dignity of man in general,--the duty

of sparing and protecting the good name of our neighbor.--(g) From

these two duties follows the duty of a sparing respect for whatever

appertains to our neighbor,--belongs to him as a possession, is his

property in the broadest sense of the word, that is, whatever he has a

right to call his own,--and hence a positive avoidance of all action

whereby it would be damaged or alienated from our neighbor.

Even as our personal morality does not consist in undisciplined

arbitrary discretion, but in the controlling our own will by the will

of God, so also there is no moral influencing of our fellow-man without

a limiting of his individual will, of his individual liberty, and that

too in the very interest of his higher personal freedom. The child

cannot be educated without that in many respects limits be set to its,

as yet, unripe, unintelligent will; in the person of the educator it is

confronted with the principles of moral order under which it is to bow

its individual will; it is in fact an essential part of the duty of

sparing the personality of the child, that it be not allowed to grow up

in rudeness. As the child is related to its parents, so is the

individual person to the moral whole. He whose calling it is to govern,

must confine the liberty of the individual within the order of the

whole,--must in some measure limit it in order that all may become

truly free; in an organized moral community it is each member's duty to

co-operate in the realization of moral order, and hence to hold within

bounds both his own will and the will of others. Hence the moral

sparing of others is never of an unconditional character, but finds a

limit in the duty of moral culture; but within this limit the duty of

sparing becomes all the more imperative. The limiting may never be such

as to reduce the object to a mere will-less creature of arbitrary

discretion; the right of the object of education or guidance to be an

independent moral personality with a moral purpose of its own, may

never be ignored. He who is as yet morally a minor may never be treated

as if he were always to remain such,--never as a mere means to an

end,--but he must be treated as having an end in himself. A slavish

education is sinful; despotic government is immoral, whether exercised

by a single individual or by a minority-crushing majority. Whatever

apology may be made for slavery in a sinful world, in the sphere of

pure morality it is absolutely anti-moral.

The sparing and respecting of the personal honor of others, appears

among the chief commands in the Old Testament [Exod. xx, 16; Lev. xix,

16], and is presented also in the Gospel as one of the most essential

of duties [Matt. v, 21, 22]. My neighbor has upon me a claim to respect

for his honor, for his good name. Man is not a mere isolated unit, but

a vital member of a moral whole; the personal honor, the good name, of

each is the moral bond which holds together the community; he who has

lost respect in society stands outside of the scope of its

common-life,--is a broken-off leaf soon to wither away.--The sparing of

the possessions of others [Exod. xx, 15, 17; Lev. xix, 35, 36; Deut.

xxv, 13 sqq.; xxvii, 17; 1 Thess. iv, 6] is only a special phase of the

sparing of the person of others. In his property man creates for and

about himself a little world which as the product of his labor, belongs

to him, which he calls his earnings, and for which he has consequently

a moral right to recognition and respect on the part of others.

SECTION CXXIV.

(b) The moral appropriating and the forming of others are, in virtue of

the mutual moral relation of men to each other, always associated

together in a normal state of things,--each being and involving at the

same time also the other; and both take place at the same time in the

moral act of love. In active love toward his neighbor, man brings about

also love toward himself, for the beloved person becomes united to, and

appropriated by, him who loves; the active love of one's neighbor is

therefore an appropriating and a forming at the same time, both in

respect to the neighbor and in respect to the loving person himself.

The exercise of love breaks down the antithesis of individual persons,

but at the same time respects their moral rights and moral

independence.

It is noteworthy that in the Scriptures we never read of the love of

mankind, but always of the love of neighbor; [Matt. vi, 14, 15 is only

a seeming exception to this, as here "men" stand in contrast to God].

Christ's love to us is indeed called love to man or to the brethren,

but never love to neighbor; but our love to man in general, and not

merely to our Christian brethren, is always called love to neighbor. In

this very circumstance the moral relation of men to each other is

directly indicated. My fellow-man does not stand before me as a mere

isolated individual, but as one who, by God's will, is near to me,--who

belongs to me for my full love, belongs to me so intimately that there

ought to be nothing strange or uncongenial between him and me. In love,

my neighbor becomes mine, and I his; hence love is a mutual

appropriating; and by the fact that I thereby enlarge both my

life-sphere and his own, it is at the same time a mutual forming. Love

seeks not merely the welfare of the other, but also his love. In the

act of love I form the other, in that I impart myself to him as loving,

and that too in my moral character; I rejoice him and exalt his moral

life, in that I stimulate him to reciprocal love. At the same time also

I exercise a formative influence on myself, in that by this communion I

am myself exalted and promoted in my spiritually-moral existence,--in

that I spiritually appropriate to myself an other spiritual being.

The law of love is presented by Christ as the highest of all commands,

and love of neighbor as the substance of all moral duties toward our

fellow-man [Matt. xxii, 39, 40; John xiii, 34, 35; xv, 12, 17; comp.

Rom. xii, 10; xiii, 8-10; Gal. v, 14; Eph. v, 2; 1 Thess. iv, 9; 1 Cor.

xiii, 1 sqq.; 1 Pet. i, 22; iv, 8; 1 John iii, 11; James ii, 8; Heb.

xiii, 1]. All fulfilling of duty toward our neighbor is an exercise of

love; when not so it is but deception; that which springs not of love,

is not only morally worthless, but also immoral, because counterfeit.

Love is the test of true God-sonship [1 John iv, 12, 13], "for love is

of God, and every one that loveth is born of God and knoweth God" [1

John iv, 7]; human love is thankful reciprocation for that love which

first loved us,--is true religion [James i, 27]; and love to God must

necessarily manifest itself also in love to the beloved of God [1 John

iv, 20, 21; v, 1, 2]. The precept of love to neighbor is presented even

in the Old Testament as a chief duty [Lev. xix, 18], and is expressly

extended to non-Israelites [verse 34; Deut. x, 19; Micah vi, 8; Zech.

vii, 9]; what a contrast this forms to the boasted "humanitarianism" of

the Greeks to whom every non-Greek was a right-less barbarian! Thou

shalt love thy neighbor "as thyself;" this is not a mere comparison of

two parallel forms of love,--both are at bottom but one love; a truly

moral love of one's self as a moral personality, necessarily manifests

itself also as love to other moral persons through whom in fact one's

own rational being is heightened; true love of neighbor is also at the

same time true self-love. This holds good even of the false love of

neighbor; every one seeks, in some form, friendship and love, and feels

himself unhappy in isolation; hence our Lord says: "If ye love [only]

them which love you, what reward have ye? do not even the Publicans the

same?" [Matt. v, 46, 47; comp. Luke vi, 32]. If now even a false love

of neighbor is at the same time a love of self, how much more so is the

true love of neighbor!--not however, of course, in such a sense as that

I love my neighbor only for my own sake, for that would be

self-seeking, but in the sense that I love my neighbor for God's sake,

and in this love of God exalt at the same time my own moral life, and

find in the love of neighbor true moral enjoyment.

The symbolical expression of mutual union in love is bodily touching,

especially the giving of the hand [2 Kings x, 15; Gal. ii, 9], and in a

higher form the kiss, which evinces a more intimate equality of love

the more it is reciprocal; the kiss on the forehead or cheek is rather

the sign of a condescending and more distant love, the kissing of the

hand that of a reverential love, the kissing of the feet that of a

humbly submissive love [Luke vii, 38; Isa. xlix, 23], the kiss on the

lips that of a mutual, confidential, intimate love, and hence

especially expressive also of sexual love. In the Scriptures the kiss

appears as the sign of love between parents and children [Gen. xxvii,

26, 27; xxxi, 28, 55; xlviii, 10; l, 1; Exod. xviii, 7; Ruth i, 9; 1

Kings xix, 20; Luke xv, 20], between brothers and sisters and relatives

[Gen. xxix, 11, 13; xxxiii, 4; xlv, 15; Exod. vi, 27; Ruth i, 14],

between friends [1 Sam. xx, 41], as an expression of homage [1 Sam. x,

1; Psa. ii, 12; Luke vii, 38], and as an expression of love in other

respects [2 Sam. xx, 9; Matt. xxvi, 48 sqq.; Luke vii, 45; Acts xx,

37]; hence it is also a symbol of reconciliation [Gen. xxxiii, 4; 2

Sam. xiv, 33: Luke xv, 20]; and the fraternal kiss was, in the early

church, a general custom [Rom. xvi, 16; 1 Cor. xvi, 20; 2 Cor. xiii,

12; 1 Thess. v, 26; 1 Pet. v, 14.]

SECTION CXXV.

Active love is a self-impartation of the subject to the object,--an

imparting of what is one's own to another in order to exalt his life.

Hence it manifests itself in service-rendering, in benefiting; all

moral community-life is a reciprocal service of love; every act of love

is a sacrifice. Sympathizing love imparts every thing which is dear to

it:--(a) It imparts its own spiritual possessions in order thereby to

promote the spiritual life and the spiritual possessions of the other,

and this, in virtue of an honest and truthful self-communication. To

this communication corresponds, on the part of the object, the

answering and accepting love of confidence, that is, a willingness to

let himself be formed by the appropriation of the

spiritually-communicating love of his fellow,--a being receptive for

self-revealing truthfulness. (b) Love imparts also its material

possessions, and is hence a devoting of our personal productive forces

to the aid of the needy, in the fulfillment of the duties of charity

and personal assistance. In imparting and devoting itself, love

acquires a right to the reciprocating love of the other,--to

thankfulness in heart and act.

Love imparts lovingly to the beloved that which itself loves; only that

in which I myself have pleasure, can I lovingly impart; for this reason

every true act of love is a sacrifice, and a sacrifice that is not

hesitatingly and stumblingly brought; love makes it easy; but every

sacrifice must be made to God; only he who practices love for God's

sake brings a proper offering. To do good and to communicate is

expressly declared in the Scriptures as a God-pleasing sacrifice [Heb.

xiii, 16]. The mite of the poor, when offered in love, avails more than

the rich gift of the thoughtless spendthrift; in fact he who does not

morally love his legitimately-obtained possessions, cannot in the

nature of things make therefrom a sacrifice.

Christ gives as the determining rule for our conduct toward our

neighbor the general formula: "All things whatsoever ye would that men

should do to you, do ye even so to them, for this is the law and the

prophets" [Matt. vii, 12]. Hence true self-love is the pattern and

measure of love to neighbor; our own rational striving shows us what is

the striving of others, and ought to put itself into harmony with the

latter; that which I would acquire for myself as a right upon others,

ought first to be a duty toward them. By this rule Christ implies, at

the same time, that love begets answering love, and hence reverts back

upon him who exercises it. This is a practical life-rule in answer to

the question: flow shall I exercise love in each and every particular

case? and it gives as the answer: Just as I should wish that it should

be done to myself,--a very safe rule, provided always that my own moral

consciousness in general is not beclouded, so that I should no longer

know what would really serve to my peace. The precious is purchased

only by the precious,--love only by love. All love seeks to serve; love

of neighbor is ministering love. "Whosoever will be great among you,

let him be your minister, and whosoever will be chief among you, let

him be your servant, even as the Son of man came not to be ministered

unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many" [Matt.

xx, 26 sqq.]. Christ's love, the highest pattern, is itself the highest

love-service, and has brought the greatest sacrifice; all love to God

is a service of God; all neighbor-love is a God-serving in the service

of the neighbor. "Let no man seek what is his own, but every man what

is another's" [1 Cor. x, 24]; love to self must not become a separating

of ourselves from others, nor a self-seeking using of them;

self-seeking must be sacrificed in order to attain to true self-love in

the love of neighbor. "Remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he

said, It is more blessed to give than to receive" [Acts xx, 35]; giving

makes happier in the very love-act itself, and, though a sacrificing,

is yet at the same time a receiving, an enkindling of reciprocal love,

an imitating of God and of Christ who out of love gave all; it is more

blessed than receiving,--not that we are simply to give acts of love,

and not also thankfully to receive them,--for he who cannot, out of

love, receive, is unable also to give out of love, and he who, because

of pride, will not receive, gives in fact only out of pride; but that

kind of receiving is not blessed and does not render blessed, which is

not willing also to give, but only to have, and in which the person

regards only the bestowment as such, and not the love which makes

it,--inclines only to possess the gift, but not to recognize the love

and to reciprocate it in love. The moral person receives also gladly,

out of love, from love, not however for the sake of the gift but for

the sake of the giver,--desires indeed to receive love, but only for

the reason that he himself loves. The giving of presents is a

universally recognized sign of love, even where the moral consciousness

appears under its rudest forms [Gen. xii, 16; xlv, 17 sqq.]; there is

no love which does not seek to impart itself,--which would not gladly

offer liberally, for the delight and enjoyment of the other, that in

which the loving one himself has delight and enjoyment, and thus prove

itself genuine by sacrifice [Gen. xxiv, 22, 53; xxxii, 13 sqq.; xlii,

25; xliii, 11; xlv, 22 sqq.; 1 Sam. ix, 7 sqq.; xviii, 4; Prov. xviii,

16]. Among certain rude tribes it is customary for friends to

interchange names, as is, in fact, the case with one of the parties,

even now, in Christian marriage; this is also a love-offering.

Communicating love imparts indeed all that it has, but it does not give

away all; the spiritual possession grows in imparting itself. The

communicating of one's own spiritual possessions is the exercise of

truthfulness. The rational spirit has, in virtue of its own duty of

spiritual appropriating, an absolute right to truthfulness in the

self-communications of. others, though indeed not an unconditional

right to the communication of all that is known by others. Love admits

of no falseness; and though there may be things in the life, even of

the righteous, especially inner states, which may not and should not be

communicated indiscriminately to every one,--for example, to the as yet

morally immature,--still, this silence is essentially different from

falsifying. In the Scriptures truthfulness is based on love; "speak

every man truth with his neighbor, for we are members one of another"

[Eph. iv, 25], that is, because we are united as vital organs to a

single moral body,--belong to each other, should he transparent to each

other. "To this end," says Christ, "was I born, and for this cause came

I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth" [John

xviii, 37]; this is true of Christ also in his character of Son of man,

and hence also of all men; now Christ came into the world out of love,

and out of love he bore witness to the truth. Truth is the good, the

divine, as relating to spiritual communicating. Whatever exists is for

the personal spirit, and each personal spirit exists for all other

personal spirits,--must be perfectly transparent to them, in so far as

sin throws into it no shadow, in order that spirit in general, the

essential nature of which is to unite the separated, may attain to the

truth [Matt. v, 37; comp. Job xxvii, 4; Zech. viii, 16; Psa. xv, 2;

xxxiv, 14; Rev. xiv, 5]. Where sin is not yet predominant, but love

prevails, there truthfulness is easy and natural; it becomes difficult

only where sin predominates.

The formative influencing of others through the living-out of a moral

character is to be regarded simply as a phase of the truthfulness of

loving self-communication, and not as constituting a special duty of

giving a good example [Matt. v, 14-16; Rom. xiv, 19; xv, 2; Phil. ii,

15; iii, 17; Titus ii, 7; 1 Pet. ii, 9, 12, 15; comp. 1 Cor. iv, 16;

xi, 1; Phil. iv, 9; 2 Thess. iii, 7]. No one may wish to be moral in

order to appear moral; that would be downright hypocrisy; but also no

one should desire to conceal that which in his character is truly

moral; this would likewise be untruth. But in order to the formative

influencing of others through moral self-manifestation, it is of course

not enough simply to be inactive, simply as it were to let one's self

be contemplated, but there is requisite, in view of the diverse

characters that are to be influenced, a selection of special manners of

self-communication; as bearing upon children the manner must be other

than with the morally mature; from this, however, it does not follow

that this self-impartation is to sink to a mere self-complacent display

of self,--an intentional presentation of self as a moral pattern, in

any respect whatever. This would be, even in a saint, a violation of

becoming humility,--a tempting of hearts from Him who alone is the

perfect type of holiness.

Spiritual self-communicating, even when perfectly truthful, is not per

se of a moral character, for, in view of the limitedness of men as

individual persons, it is in fact a direct necessity; for this reason,

perfect solitude is so great a torment; the recluse endures his

freely-chosen solitude solely because he is engaged in a continuous

spiritual self-communicating, namely, to God in prayer; a non-praying,

unpious solitary would either be suffering the severest punishment or

would be spiritually deranged. Self-impartation may even be sinful, as

in purposeless, thoughtless gossip; it becomes moral only when it is a

practicing of love. Loving self-communication seeks not its own but

that which is another's. Falsehood is hatred, is lovelessness; where

true love is there falsehood is impossible; hence the deep pain

occasioned by falseness on the part of the beloved one.

From the fact that truthfulness is an expression of love, it is

entitled to answering love from the other party, to a ready welcoming,

to confidence. It is true, confidence in men is generally presented in

the Scriptures as deceiving [Psa. cxviii, 8; Jer. xvii, 5, 6, etc.];

here, however, the question is only as to an unpious confidence which

builds not upon God but upon man, and of the state of sinfulness in

general. But where sin is not yet in the mastery, there mutual

confidence is the necessary antecedent condition of all moral

communion, and a necessary out-going of love. Distrust paralyzes love.

The truthful have a moral right to confidence in their word; confidence

is the reverse side of truthfulness. Even as Christ uniformly required

faith and confidence in himself, because he was the Truth, so may every

one who is of the Truth lay claim to confidence; hence confidence is

not a discretionary state of the mind, but a moral act. The little

child that was proposed to the disciples as a moral type, is such also

in respect to trust and confidence.

The more outward form of self-imparting through service-rendering [Gen.

xxiv, 18 sqq.; xxxiii, 12, 15; Exod. ii, 17; Deut. xxii, 1 sqq.; Matt.

xxi, 3; John xii, 2; xiii, 4 sqq.; Acts xxviii, 2; Gal. v, 13; 1 Pet.

iv, 10; Heb. vi, 10; xiii, 16, etc.] which, on the supposition of a

state of sinfulness, includes in itself also beneficence, is not as yet

in the unfallen state a showing of pity, for misery does not exist save

in a state of sin; but there is always need of mutual assistance so

long as the last degree of perfection is not yet reached, and hence

there is always also the duty of helping, through the imparting of our

own forces and means,--of mutually complementing our possessions which

largely vary according to the personal peculiarity of the possessors.

Love is in its very nature communion-forming,--calls for the love of

the other. And unreciprocated love presupposes sin. Love gives itself

over, but it does not give itself away; it desires to find itself again

in the beloved, even as light never shines without being reflected. The

loving reflection of love, namely, love as the fruit of love, is

thankfulness. He to whom thankfulness or unthankfulness is indifferent,

has no love; even the Lord himself wept over Jerusalem when it spurned

his love. The warmer the love, so much the more sensitively is felt the

chill of thanklessness; only a taking refuge in the love of God can

assuage this pang. But only he is entitled to thankfulness whose love

is itself humble thanks to the loving God; without this the pretended

right is simply presumptuous self-seeking. The moral worth of

thankfulness and the despicableness of thanklessness are recognized

even among the rudest tribes, as in fact even in brutes thankfulness is

manifested by brightened looks; and hence Christ represents this duty

as valid even among the heathen,--as instinctively commending itself to

the natural consciousness, and as also practiced by man in his natural

state [Matt. v, 46; Luke vi, 32, 33; comp. Exod. ii, 20; Josh. vi, 22

sqq.; 1 Sam. xv, 6; 2 Kings v, 16, 23; Ruth ii, 10 sqq.; Luke xvii, 16;

Acts xxiv, 3]. But only love has a right to thankfulness; a benefit

which does not flow from love, which merely seeks thankfulness, does

not deserve thankfulness, for it is inwardly false.

SECTION CXXVI.

At an equal stage of spiritually-moral maturity, men are related to

each other as mutually-forming and appropriating each other to a like

degree; but the more there is a difference in this maturity, so much

the more predominates on the part of the morally higher-developed the

formative influencing, and on the part of others the appropriating.

However, the right and duty of formative influencing on the part of the

morally less-developed never sinks to zero;--even the as yet morally

immature inevitably exert a measure of moral influence upon the morally

higher-developed and upon the totality of society.

A complete moral equalization of all men as to their moral influencing

of others would be an irrational reversing of all moral order, a

dissolving of all historical life into unorganized individual units.

Children never sustain to their parents a relation of perfect equality;

their relation to them is always rather appropriating than formative;

the resistance of children to the higher moral validity of the parents

is regarded among almost all nations as a flagrant outrage, and

reverence for age as a high virtue. But society at large is a moral

whole, and here also the higher-advanced have and exercise naturally a

guiding and an educative influencing-activity over and upon the others,

and the totality has a higher validity than the individual. The

higher-developed moral individual sustains to the morally-immature the

right and duty of educative influencing; a perfectly holy man would

enjoy per se a right to spiritually-moral dominion; and for this good

reason, and not simply in virtue of his being the Son of God, is Christ

our legitimate Lord. Nevertheless the right and duty of moral forming

never sinks, even in case of the most immature, to absolute nothing;

childish innocence has disarmed many an evil intent; the direct

impression of guileless confidence, of unsuspicion, strikes the

malicious purpose with shame. The pious simplicity of the faith-word of

a child has often proved a heart-stirring awakening for vain

wisdom-boasting unbelief.--Also toward the moral community, the

individual sustains the right and the duty of moral influencing, though

in a normal development of the community-life this influencing would

give place very largely to appropriating; moreover it varies according

to the varying social stations of the individual.

IV. THE MORAL ACTIVITY AS RELATING TO OBJECTIVE NATURE.

SECTION CXXVII.

(a) The moral sparing to which nature, in virtue of its essence as

God's perfectly created work, and as an expression of the divine love

and wisdom, has a right, requires that man, in the exercise of the

moral dominion over nature to which he is called, regard this, its

divine phase, with due respect,--that he avoid all purposeless and

wanton changing or destroying of natural objects, and that, on the

contrary, he exercise toward nature a considerate love, especially in

its higher manifestations, by preserving them in their peculiarity. The

duty of considerate sparing rises in proportion as the nature-creature

comes into actual relation to human life, and enters into the sphere of

his moral activity as a helping factor.

Moral love to nature is thankfulness to God who gave it to us for moral

enjoyment and for moral dominion; to man, as pure, God gave not an

uncongenial and fear-awakening nature, but a Paradisaical nature. God

loves nature as he made it, and from its bosom God's creative love

beams out toward us, and he has even impressed manifold natural

suggestions of the moral upon it; Christ himself requires respect for

nature, for the heavens are God's throne and the earth is his footstool

[Matt. v, 34, 35], and it is in virtue of this religious conceiving of

nature that there can be moral duties also toward nature (as against

Rothe, Ethik, 1. ed., iii, � 866). With the exception of the Indians,

who adore nature as the revealed divine essence itself, no people has

manifested so high a respect for nature as the Israelites; the

legislation of the Old Testament surpasses all other systems in a

considerate sparing of nature. Domestic animals especially are placed

under the sparing protection and care of the law [Prov. xii, 10]; the

mouth of the threshing ox is not to be muzzled [Deut. xxv, 4]; on the

Sabbath cattle, also are given rest Exod. xx, 10]; and in the

Sabbatical year both cattle and beasts are to pasture on the fallow

lands [Exod. xxiii, 11; Lev. xxv, 6, 7, in the original text]; the

beast of another that falls under its burden, or loses its way, is to

be helped [Exod. xxiii, 5; Deut. xxii, 1 sqq.; comp. Matt. xii, 11];

animals may not be castrated or otherwise maimed [Lev. xxii, 24; even

the crossing of animals of different kinds is, in high moral

recognition of the rights of nature-creatures, forbidden [Lev. xix,

19]. With the greatest tenderness of feeling, a merely symbolical

cruelty is not allowed; "thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's

milk" [Exod. xxiii, 19; xxxiv, 26; Deut. xiv, 21]; it makes the

impression of cruel mockery when the milk which is destined to nourish

the young is used in connection with its death. Under the same category

falls the prohibition of killing the calf, the kid, and the lamb, on

the same day with its mother [Lev. xxii, 28], and of taking an

incubating mother-bird at the same time with the nest [Deut. xxii, 6,

7]. The touching account of the care of God for the animals at the time

of the deluge, is an emphatic illustration of the moral sparing of

animals as it should be exercised by man; God includes also animals in

his covenant with Noah, and promises to spare them [Gen. ix, 10, 15].

Christ himself illustrates his own relation to the body of believers in

a gracious picture of a shepherd loving his flock [John x; comp. Matt.

xviii, 12, 13].

The piety-inspired careful sparing of whatever contributes to the

nourishment of man, is so natural an expression of the moral

consciousness that it prevails among almost all, and even barbarous,

nations. Christ sanctions this significant carefulness [John vi, 12].

This sparing has essentially a symbolical meaning,--is an evidencing of

thankfulness for the good gifts of God,--a thankfulness which suffers

not that these gifts of love be destroyed in wanton thoughtlessness and

in purposeless waste, or contemptuously thrown away.

SECTION CXXVIII.

(b) The moral appropriating of nature is either of a purely spiritual,

or of an actual character.--1. Spiritual appropriating consists, in

addition to the legitimate striving after the highest possible

knowledge of nature considered as a manifestation of divine power, love

and wisdom, mainly in the reflective contemplating of nature in its

symbolical suggestiveness of the moral,--God having implanted in it

natural symbols of the moral.

The thoughtful, moral contemplating of nature is at once of a pious and

of a poetical character; [14] it is not a mere play of the fancy, it is

veritable reality. Nature is not moral, but it is the work of Him who

is himself perfect morality. Nature as created by the holy God must

necessarily reflect this holiness as from a mirror; it is the high and

mysterious charm of nature that it is not mere nature, but that

everywhere the Spirit whispers out of its bosom and broods over its

expanse. Nature reveals to us not only God's creative power, wisdom and

glory [Rom. i, 20; Job xxxvii, sqq.; Psa. xcvii; civ; cxi, 2; cxlvii, 8

sqq. ], [15] the heavens not only declare God's glory [Psa. xix, 1

sqq.], but also God's love is made known to us in nature [Matt. vi, 26

sqq.; Acts xiv, 17], and the bow on the clouds [Gen. ix, 12 sqq.] and

the bespangled vault of the skies are symbols of the divine

faithfulness [Gen. xv, 5]. But the moral consciousness finds still more

than this; the phases of beauty that are perceived in nature are

suggestions of spiritual beauty. It is not a groundless fancy when the

mind discovers moral ideas symbolically suggested even in plants; we

feel at once the kindredness of impression upon the sensibilities that

is made by a delicate rose and by modest virginity, by a violet and by

childlike humility, by an oak and by firmness of character. And the

fact that animals so frequently directly remind us of human moral

qualities, is simply evidence that the holy creative Spirit rules in

them and discovers to us; in that which is merely natural, embryonic

premonitions of the moral. The ant, the bee, etc., are natural emblems

of the virtue of industry [Prov. vi, 6]; it is God who causes them

busily to care for a common want,--who works in them in order to speak

to man an unmistakable word of exhortation and instruction. The care of

birds for their young, the fidelity of the dog and of the horse, are

manifestations of a deeply suggestive character in nature. The quiet

gentleness and the patient sufferance of the lamb are applied as types

even to Christ [Isa. liii, 7; John i, 29, 36; 1 Pet. i, 19; Rev. v, 6,

and elsewhere]; Christ himself uses the dove as a symbol of uprightness

of heart [Matt. x, 16]. The animal-fable has something of the mystical

in it and contains deep truth. The attractive and convicting element

thereof is this inner mysterious fact, that something of the divine

rules in the animal, and looks out upon us,--a moral element

unconsciously immanent in nature itself; and that which appears in the

brute as a type of human sin, is more than a mere fancied

resemblance,--is in fact the root of that which in man actually becomes

sin, whereas in the animal it is simply a normal limitedness.

SECTION CXXIX.

(2) The actual appropriating of nature-objects for nourishment, and

thereby at the same time for sensuous enjoyment, involving the

destruction of living natural objects,--rests upon the moral right of

man over nature; and the limitations to the enjoyment of the

nature-objects which serve for food, lie less in the nature-objects

themselves than in the degree to which they are used and in the moral

state of the person, as also in the thought of the morally-becoming.

Also the flesh of animals is allowed to man for food) and hence also

the killing of the same for such purposes, although in connection

therewith all cruelty and all wanton levity is to be avoided. The chase

is moral only in this sense, and not for diversion.--As drink man is

permitted to use not only the strictly natural fluids, but also such as

are prepared by skill, including the vinous; it is simply their misuse

for inebriation that is immoral.

What things are per se appropriate as means of nourishment, is not a

moral but a physiological question. Although for the state of

sinfulness, the disciplinary law of God required man also in this

sphere to distinguish between clean and unclean, and forbade to him a

number of per se appropriate means of nourishment, still this law of

limiting discipline had no validity for humanity while as yet unstained

by sin. Here are applicable the words of Christ: "Not that which goeth

into the mouth defileth a man" [Matt. xv, 11; comp. Titus i, 15; Acts

x, 15; Rom. xiv, 1 sqq. 20; 1 Cor. x, 25 sqq.]. It is not the object

per se that renders an article of food sinful, but the disposition of

the eater, the manner of enjoying it,--namely, when one forgets God in

the sensuous, forgets his own moral dignity in the pleasure, aims not

at the satisfying of the want, but only at the enjoyment, and does not

observe the measure prescribed by the purpose of nourishment.

The admissibility of flesh-food, though very clear from a physiological

stand-point, has yet been contested from a moral point of view.

Asceticism has in all ages laid great stress on abstinence from flesh;

the Indians reject flesh-food unconditionally, inasmuch as, in

consequence of their Pantheistic philosophy, they regard the

slaughtering of animals, otherwise than for sacrifice, as a blasphemous

outrage. [16] The Manichees (and Essenes?) abstained likewise from all

flesh. The rejection of flesh-food in seasons of fasting has less an

objective than an inner ground. According to St. Jerome flesh and wine

were originally not allowed, and were first permitted after the deluge,

but they are not permissible under Christianity. [17] Paul mentions

similar views [Rom. xiv, 2]. Jehovah expressly conceded to man after

the deluge also animals for food [Gen. ix, 3], whereas in the blessing

after creation [Gen. i, 29] there is mention only of plants as food;

from this circumstance some have inferred that, previously, flesh-food

was not in fact allowed; but we find no trace of a previous

prohibition, and we can discover no reason for a change; rather would

there lie in the progressive corruption of mankind a reason for a

limiting of former rights; God's direction to Noah has in fact all the

appearance of an express confirmation of a former right; and the

privilege conferred at creation, of ruling over the fish of the sea,

etc., would hardly have any significance if it did not also include the

right to eat them. Abel brought offerings of the firstlings of his

flock and of their fat [Gen. iv, 4]; now as it was uniformly that which

was most precious to man that was offered as a sacrifice, hence it is

probable that flocks were kept also for the sake of flesh-food, to

which in fact the "coats of skins" [Gen. iii, 21] seems to allude. Were

flesh-food simply a concession to sinfulness, which in fact would have

no comprehensible reason, it would certainly not be prescribed in

connection with the Passover and with sacrifices, and above all Christ

himself would have abstained from it, whereas we know that the contrary

was the case [Matt. xi, 19; comp. Mark ii, 19; John ii, 2 sqq.; Matt.

xxvi, 17 sqq.]. Paul declares abstinence from flesh as a weakness of

faith [Rom. xiv, 2; comp. 21; 1 Cor. x, 25]; to Peter animals are

expressly offered in a vision for food [Acts 11 sqq.], and animals are

spoken of as destined to be slaughtered [2 Pet. ii, 12; Deut. xii, 15,

20]. It is true man can live without flesh, and he certainly has reason

not needlessly and out of mere wantonness to multiply the destruction

of animals; still, however, as it is grounded in the very constitution

of nature that animals serve for food to each other, hence it must be

allowable also for man to take food for himself out of the animal

kingdom. And should there seem to lie in the killing of an animal

something inconsistent with the original peace between man and nature,

and with man's instinctive feelings, and should it be inferred

therefrom that it is only the changing of the original relation of

things, as alluded to in the blessing upon Noah, that rendered

flesh-food morally possible,--still the force of this difficulty will

vanish so soon as we reflect upon the very ancient, pious, and

significant custom,--wide-spread even among heathen nations and

suggested in the laws of Moses [Lev. xvii, 3 sqq.],--namely, of slaying

the nobler animals in general only for purposes of sacrifice, and of

receiving back the flesh, thus consecrated to the Deity, only out of

His own hand. In regard to the primitive usage it is most probable,

therefore, that before the deluge the devout children of God partook

indeed of flesh-food, but only of animals offered in sacrifice, and

that too only seldom, as indeed pastoral people in general use but

little flesh-food. Noah might, in view of the sensuality of the

perished world, have doubted the propriety of flesh-food, and hence God

sanctions it expressly.

It is indeed not to be denied that in the practice of the slaying of

animals in general there lies a moral danger; it tends to blunt our

feelings of natural compassion; and it is not a mere morbid

sensibility, that makes it repugnant to some persons, e. g., to wring

off the head of a dove; moreover it is a well-known fact that those who

are engaged for the most part in the slaughtering of animals are liable

to become hardened and cruel; it does not follow from this, however,

that the slaughtering of animals for food is per se wrong, but only

that the manner of the slaughtering is not a matter of

indifference,--that it should be done with the least possible

suffering, and that not every animal is equally appropriate therefor.

It is in fact repugnant to our moral feelings to slaughter such

domestic animals as by their fidelity to and fondness for us, have

become in some respect our home-companions; it has the look of

treachery on the part of man,--of a betrayal of the confidence which

the animal had placed in him, in a word, of a breach of faith. The iron

necessity of our evil-fraught actual condition may excuse it; but it is

surely not the proper relation of things; and the fact that the general

feeling of almost all cultured nations has a horror of the butchering

of dogs and horses, man's most faithful companions, has its foundation

surely not in any notion of the unwholesomeness of their flesh, but in

a very legitimate moral feeling,--a feeling the disregarding of which

is no mark of a special refinement of culture. Much more natural, and

less questionably morally, is the killing of wild animals, and of such

animals of the flock as have not as yet stood to man in a close

relation of confidence. We cannot here as yet discuss in full the

subjects of food and drink.

SECTION CXXX.

(c) The formative working upon nature, the shaping of it into an organ

for man, is at the same time also an exalting of nature into the

service of the moral life, and hence a forming of it into an expression

of the human spirit,--an educating of nature whereby it is raised above

its immediate naturalness. and is made to receive the impress of human

action, of spiritual discipline. Man ennobles, spiritualizes, nature,

and makes it into his spiritual possession, into his freely-formed

home,--and in forming nature he appropriates it at the same time to

himself.

If the dominating of man over nature,--to which God expressly called

the first man [Gen. i, 28; Psa. viii], and which still holds good in a

somewhat modified manner even in the state of sinfulness [Gen. ix, 2,

3]. and which is promised again in the fullest degree for the yet to be

recovered perfect state [Isa. xi, 6 sqq.],--is not to be regarded as a

mere figure of speech, then it must also imply a forming of the same.

Man forms nature into an obedient instrument of the spirit, and gives

to it a spiritual, historical impress. Nature, in its wild state,

stands to man in an unhomelike, not to say hostile relation,--it is

only in its form as shaped and disciplined by his skill that he feels

at home. God gave nature to man as a theater for his moral activity,

but man is not at liberty simply to sport with it, simply to admire and

enjoy it,--he should really rule over it; but all ruling is at the same

time an appropriating and a forming. Man is to make of nature something

which as yet it is not,--is himself to form it into a

spiritually-molded home for himself. This forming of nature is either a

forming of it into a useful object for the individual, and hence in the

service of labor (� 109), or a forming of it into an image of the

spirit, into a thing of beauty, into a work of art (� 110). A hill-side

cavern is not a dwelling-place for man; his home-protection, he must

construct for himself. If even the bird builds its nest in a way of its

own, so that it bears an impress peculiar to the bird, how much more

must man spiritually shape nature into a home for himself! Of course

the forming of nature does not consist in an abuse of it,--e. g., in a

forcing of trees to be square, in cropping the tails of horses and the

ears of dogs,--but in the further development of the natural beauty and

perfection already existing in nature. The cultivated rose is more

beautiful than the wild one; the improved fruit tree is better in many

respects than the wild-growing one; the domesticated animals have

become in many respects quite other and more perfect creatures than

they were in their wild state; they have attained not only to higher

soul-capacities, but also to a nobler and stronger physique; the wild

dog and the wild horse cannot in any respect bear favorable comparison

with those which have been cultivated by man. The fidelity of these

creatures,--which indeed they show almost exclusively toward man, to

whom they attach themselves much more closely and affectionately than

to their own kind,--is an evidence of the normal dominion of spirit

over nature, and a positive ennobling, and is the thankfulness of the

animal for its culture.

The task of overcoming the wild forces of nature that stand in the way

of individual human life, and of subjecting them to the discipline of

the spirit, is a powerful stimulus to moral activity; and they are in

fact, in virtue of the divine creative plan, perfectly overcomable by

the rational spirit,--if not always by the individual, yet at least by

the collective, spirit. Though it is not true that all nature-objects

exist merely for the outward use of man, nevertheless they are in fact

for man, in a still higher sense,--for his moral delight, for spiritual

enjoyment, for the service of the moral life. The dominion and

discipline which man can and should exercise over the animal world,

does not in the original purpose imply that he is to surround himself

in his domestic life with animals of every sort, but it does imply that

he ought not (as, however, has actually taken place) to acknowledge

them as a power over against himself, and before which he has to

tremble, and against which he can secure himself only by strategy and

deadly violence; on the contrary, he should rise to a consciousness of

his all-sufficient dominating power over them; but to destroy is not to

dominate. That nature-creatures should become to man a torment, a

plague, a death-bringing danger, and that man in the interest of his

self-preservation should have to carry on a war of extermination

against a large portion of them,--all this is, according to the

Scripture view, a consequence of the disturbance of the harmony of

creation; hence, as it is a result of sin, we cannot as yet, here,

treat of it. Even in the fallen state, however, we can still discover

clear traces of the true relation of things; even the lion and the

tiger cannot bear the steady, fearless look of man, and they throw off

their natural awe of man only after having tasted of human blood. Man

can and may, however, actually realize his dominion over nature, only

when he permits himself to be ruled over by the holy Originator and

Lord of nature.

CHAPTER VI.

THE FRUIT OF THE MORAL LIFE AS MORAL END.

SECTION CXXXI.

The end of moral action, as willed by man as moral, is identical with

the end of God in man's creation; in this action man wills perfectly to

realize in himself the image of God,--to develop himself in reality as

a good being, and thereby to realize the good in general. In so far as

the good is a fruit of moral action, it is not a something exterior to

man, but inheres in him,--is his possession, which, as incorporated

into the morally-formed essence of man himself, and as thenceforth

inseparable from him, is a property or quality of his person. In so far

as the good is the property of man, it is his moral estate. Hence, as

the end of the moral activity in general is the good, so is this end,

for the moral man himself; the good as having become a moral estate.

The world is, with its mere creation, not as yet complete, but is

charged with a task which is to be carried out by moral creatures

themselves. Though it is true that all good is from God, still all good

is not from Him immediately; but in man's case it arises through the

free developing of that which was directly created. Man is himself to

create good; though as a creature he is good, yet he is not good in

such a manner as he is to become so; the image of God becomes complete

in him only through his own moral activity; and he makes into a good

entity not only himself, but also the world that comes into contact

with him,--he creates a spiritual historical world which is itself

good. To this good as created by himself he sustains quite other

relations than to that which is directly given to him in his natural

existence. To the first man much good was given, to which he had a

right, and which he could call his own. This good, however, was simply

placed upon him,--was as yet external to him, and not as yet identified

with his spiritual being; he indeed possessed it, but it was not yet

his property,--was not a quality of his. All that I have in my power,

upon which I have an actual claim, is my possession. But the idea of

property is higher; only that is my property which by moral action I

have appropriated to myself, and which consequently essentially belongs

to my personal life-sphere, as my free personal acquisition. A merely

inherited property or power is morally a mere possession, while an

estate or power that is acquired by labor or is morally developed, is a

property; in it I have invested my labor, my soul, my will,--it inheres

in me and in my self-created life-sphere,--is my enlarged personality

itself. Hence property has always a moral element in it,--is moral

fruit, is an acquisition. In the case of the first human beings, the

possession of Eden would have become a property, only in virtue of

their cultivating and caring for it. A moral property is inalienable;

it may, as, for example, in the case of a work of art, come into the

possession of another, but it remains the spiritual property of its

author. A slave is the possession of his master; but consorts not only

possess each other,--they appertain to each other,--each is the

property of the other. Thus in so far as the good becomes and is a

property, it is a good, a moral estate,--and hence it is such only as a

fruit of moral action. The good as an outward possession may be lost;

but when exalted into a moral property, it is permanent; to this Christ

alludes when he says: "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth,"

etc. [Matt. vi, 19, 20].

SECTION CXXXII.

The good to be attained to by moral action is, that perfection which

answers to the divine creative intention,--on the one hand, the

perfection of the individual person, and, on the other, that of the

moral community; that is, it is in part a personal, and in part a

common good. The two forms mutually condition each other, and stand

with each other in constant and closest relation; but both are further

conditioned on the moral communion with God which is aimed at by the

moral activity, and which is the highest moral goal as well as the

ground and essence of all creature-perfection in general; for God alone

is the eternally-perfect good. The real moral life-communion with God,

as distinguished from the merely natural, is consequently the absolute

good, and hence the highest good,--that which is the source and

condition of all other goods. In so far as individual man has the

highest good as his moral property, he is a child of God; in so far as

the moral community has this good inherent in itself, it is the kingdom

of God, which rests on the God-sonship of its individual members.

The thought of a moral communion, and hence also of a moral

common-good, is met with also in the extra-Christian world; the

Republic of Plato was meant to embody it. But where the common ground

of the personal good as well as of the common good, namely, communion

with God, is lacking, there this thought is realizable only as a sum

total of single goods, or only by the all-dominating despotism of the

community-organism over the individuals, as in the system of Plato. A

vital union of the two forms of good is effected only by the Christian

God-consciousness. Some form of communion with God is enjoyed by every

creature as such; this, however, is of a merely natural character, and

needs, in the case of rational creatures, to be exalted to a moral

character. As coming from the hands of nature man is not the child of

God; he becomes truly such only by free moral love to God.

The question as to the highest good,--for the heathen difficult and in

fact not truly solvable at all,--is, from an evangelically-moral

stand-point, readily answerable. There is absolutely no good realizable

or actually realized without standing in relation to God, without

springing from God as its source, and hence none for man without

personal life-communion with God [John xvii, 21; 1 John i, 3; ii, 5, 6]

who is the perfectly good One in an absolute sense [Matt. xix, 17];

only he has the highest good who is rich toward God [Luke xii, 21; Psa.

lxxiii, 25], and who has everlasting treasures in heaven [Matt. vi, 20;

1 Tim. vi, 19]. While heathen philosophers grope about in uncertainty

as to the highest good, Jehovah reveals it in all simplicity and

definiteness to the patriarch Abraham at a time when he was wavering in

faith as to the fulfillment of the prophecies made to him,--reveals it

in these words: "I am thy exceeding great reward" [Gen. xv, 1],--thou

canst aim at and attain to nothing higher; and the highest blessing of

the Old Testament is the "peace of God" [Num. vi, 26; Psa. xxix, 11].

This highest good man cannot have as a merely outward possession, as a

mere gift,--he cannot have it from nature, but only as a

morally-acquired property; even under the economy of redemption from

sin, where not merit but grace prevails, faith which is in fact a moral

work--is the necessary condition. The idea of a kingdom of

God,--unknown throughout heathendom, but prepared for and anticipated

in the Old Testament, and realized in Christianity,--presents the moral

community as in full possession of the highest good, which now becomes,

in turn, for the individual members (by whom it is enjoyed as

God-sonship) the source of higher moral perfection. In virtue of

life-communion with God the highest good bears the stamp of eternity,

in the sense of endless duration; the life of the children of God is an

everlasting life [Matt. xix, 16, 17, 29; xxv, 46; John xvii, 3; 1 John

ii, 25, and other texts], and the kingdom of God is an everlasting

kingdom.

I. THE PERSONAL PERFECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AS THE END OF THE MORAL ACTIVITY.

SECTION CXXXIII.

The personal perfection of the individual person is the realization and

virtualization of God-sonship, that is, of the idea of man, and of the

creative will of God as to man. The moral goal set before man, namely,

the all-sided personal perfection of the human life-powers and of their

manifestation, is, as a fruit of the collective moral activity, never

fully and definitively realized during the temporal life, but is

involved in constant progress, though at every stage of the truly moral

life it is in fact relatively realized.

To be perfect is neither an improper nor an impossible requirement upon

man; on the contrary, it is expressly presented by Christ and the

apostles as the moral goal: "Be ye therefore perfect (teleioi) even as

your Father which is in heaven is perfect" [Matt. v, 48]; "if thou wilt

be perfect, follow me" [xix, 21; Luke vi, 40; 1 Cor. ii, 6; xiv, 20;

Eph. iv, 13; Col. i, 28; 2 Tim. iii, 17; Heb. v, 14; James iii, 2]; the

term teleios implies the contents of telos, that is, the purpose and

goal of the moral life. This perfection of the creature is indeed, as

compared with the divine perfection, of a limited character; such as it

is, however, it really exists, in every case of normal development,

from the very first moment on, and it steadily advances, keeping pace

with every stage of the life-development. Christ himself, even as a

child, is presented as a pattern, while as yet he was increasing in

wisdom and in favor with God and man; that is, he was even as a child

perfect, though this perfection was not yet that of the full man's-age

of Christ [Eph. iv, 13]. Every moral being should and can be relatively

perfect at every moment of its life; even the child is to be so in the

manner of a child [1 Cor. xiii, 11]; and the final and true perfection

is not a merely conceived and never-to-be-realized goal, for such would

not be a goal at all, but it can in fact and should actually be

realized by each and all. Christ as the son of man really reached this

goal, and all who belong to him have, in virtue of their God-sonship,

both the duty and the possibility of attaining to it [Phil. iii, 12,

15; 1 Cor. xiii, 10].

SECTION CXXXIV.

All moral attainments, and hence all the elements and forms of

perfection or of the true good, are a moral possession, and hence a

property. Every possession is an enlargement of the existence, the

power and the life-sphere of the moral person, in virtue of moral

appropriation,--is a breaking down of the limits of the original

individuality, a uniting of the isolated existence with the life of the

whole. Corresponding to the distinction between special and general

appropriating (� 104), and, from another point of view, to that between

natural and spiritual appropriating (� 101), the possession acquired by

moral appropriating (which is at the same time necessarily also a

forming) is, on the one hand, partly of a more external

character,--bearing upon the individual as such and widening his

life-sphere, and hence, as relating to others, of an exclusive

character,--and, on the other, in part of a more inward, spiritual and,

in so far, not merely personal, character, but, on the contrary,

promotive of communion.

(a) The outward possession-legal property, temporal means--is, as the

fruit of moral labor, a real and legitimate good, and hence also a

legitimate end of moral effort, though it becomes at once sinful when

it is made the end per se, the highest good itself, when it is placed

above the inward possession and not rather vitally united with it, when

the effort for it aims merely at the enjoyment and not. also at the

moral culture and the moral communion naturally involved in it,--when

it does not become a channel of communicative love.

If appropriating is per se a moral activity, then is also the striving

after temporal possessions not only a right but also a duty.

Possessions distinguish man from the brute, and civilized man from the

savage; the Diogenic form of wisdom is by no means very profound. Labor

finds in possessions its normal fruit; possessions are labor as having

become reality. The brute is possessionless because he does not labor.

In property man ceases to be a mere isolated individual of his species;

he creates for himself a world about himself which he can call his own;

his property is the outward manifestation of his inward peculiarity.

The fact that he who possesses much is also much regarded and esteemed

in the world, is, indeed, often very hollow and baseless, though in

reality it springs from the per se correct consciousness that

possessions are the fruit of labor,--the result of moral effort. He who

acquires nothing for himself passes in the world, not without reason,

for unrespectable. Of a special virtue of possession-despising, as with

the mendicant monks, there can, in the ante-sinful state, be no

question; and even after the fall, possessions are presented as a

perfectly legitimate end of moral effort, and their being increased as

a special divine blessing. Cain and Abel possess already personal

property; and the God-blessed possessions of the patriarchs occupy a

very large place in their morally-religious life [Gen. xii. 5, 16;

xiii, 2; xiv, 14; xxiv, 22, 35, 53; xxvi, 13, 14; xxvii, 28; xxx, 27,

30, 43; xxxi, 42; xxxii, 5, 10, 13 sqq.; xxxiii, 11; xxxix, 5; xlix,

25; Exod. xxiii, 25; Lev. xxv, 21; Deut. ii, 7; vii, 13; xv, 14 sqq.;

xvi, 15, 17; xxviii, 3 sqq.; xxxiii, 13 sqq.; xxiv, 25; comp. 1 Kings

iii, 13; Psa. cvii, 38; cxii, 2, 3; cxxxii, 15].

Property being the enlarged life-sphere of the moral person,--in some

sense his enlarged personality itself,--the moral phase thereof lies

not merely in its antecedent ground, namely, labor, but also in its

moral use and application. To its enjoyment man has a moral right, as

such enjoyment is the reward of labor; but to the exclusive enjoyment

of it for himself alone he has no moral right, seeing that he is bound

to other men by love, and love manifests itself in communicative

distribution.

SECTION CXXXV.

(b) The inner possession, namely, the perfection of the personality

itself in its essence and life,--perfectly realized in the person of

the Son of man alone,--is,

(1) The perfection of knowledge, namely, wisdom; that is, that

all-sided knowledge of God which rests on a true love of God, and which

in virtue of moral effort has become a true property of the person, and

which consequently also constitutes a life-power determinative in turn

of the moral life itself,--and hence involving also a knowledge of the

being, essence, and end of created reality, especially also of one's

own life (�� 60, 104). As influencing the moral life, wisdom is

necessarily also practical; and as taking into view the actual

circumstances of existence and their application to the moral end, it

assumes the form of prudence.

Wisdom is presented in the Scriptures as the first and most essential

element of the highest good, and in fact always under its two phases,

as a knowledge of the truth, and as power to fulfill it. It is not a

mere knowledge in which man forgets himself in the object, not mere

science, but a knowledge which merges the person himself into the life

of the truth,--which fills the soul with vital, life-creating truth.

The object of wisdom is not this or that particular truth, but the

truth,--is the self-consistent complete whole. Knowledge is not yet

wisdom; with scantier knowledge there may be more wisdom than with a

richer knowledge; a much-knowing one may even be a great fool. Wisdom

is essentially not world-science but God-science; it is, as a

manifestation of God-sonship, never without a life in God,--is in its

essence piety; without God-knowledge and God-fearing there can be only

folly [Psa. cxi, 10; xxv, 14; Job xxviii, 28; Prov. i, 7; ix, 10].

Wisdom is more than knowledge and science, inasmuch as it always aims

at unity, at the central point, at the whole,--always unites the person

himself with God and with the All, both cognoscitively and actively; it

is moral knowing. Its essence consists not in the compass and in the

fullness of the knowledge, but in the harmony, the true foundation, the

truth and the moral potency of that which is known. There is no wisdom,

therefore, without constant moral effort; but also none which does not

itself produce a moral life. Such wisdom is presented as the most

essential element of the highest good, and to acquire it, as a high

duty [Prov. ii, 2 sqq.; iv, 5 sqq.; viii, 11; xvi, 16; xxiii, 23; John

viii, 32; xvii, 3; Acts xvii, 27; Rom. xii, 2; xvi, 19; 1 Cor. xiv, 20;

Eph. i, 18; iii, 18; iv, 13; v, 10, 17; Phil. i, 9, 10; iii, 8; iv, 8,

9; Col. i, 9, 11; iii, 10, 16; 1 Tim. ii, 4; 1 Pet. iii, 15; 2 Pet.

iii, 18; James i, 5], and the non-recognizing of the divine as deep

guilt [Rom. i, 20, 21; iii, 11; 1 Cor. i, 21; 2 Tim. iii, 7; 2 Thess.

i, 8]. Wisdom associates all knowledge with God, and uses it all in

moral self-revelation,--is pious and moral at the same time,--goes back

always to the primitive ground, and forward to the ultimate end; hence

it leaves nothing in its isolation and separateness, but brings all

things, man included, into relation to the whole, and the whole into

relation to every part; it is knowing in its truly rational character;

the fear of the Lord, it is wisdom.--As wisdom makes knowledge the full

property of the person,--as it belongs not merely to the understanding

but also to the heart, and is in fact intelligent love,--hence it is

necessarily also active life,--begets love and works from love, awakens

a striving to manifest the attained truth in the reality of life. A

wisdom which does not generate life,--which remains locked up in the

subject,--is folly [Deut. iv, 6; Prov. viii, 11 sqq.; James iii, 13,

17].

Prudence (phronesis, different from sophia, Eph. i, 8) is indeed in the

sphere of sinful humanity not identical with wisdom, and can even exist

as a merely worldly quality apart therefrom; but where sin is not yet

actual, this difference is merely formal. Wisdom, as essential

rationality itself, embraces truth per se as a harmonious whole;

prudence, on the contrary, takes into account actual reality with a

view to bringing it into relation to the moral idea as embraced by

reason,--in order to find for the moral idea its realization in each

conjuncture, and the means thereto; hence it is simply wisdom as

relating to specific real circumstances. Hence true prudence can

neither exist without wisdom, nor wisdom without prudence, and moral

duty involves both of them in inseparable unity. The harmonizing of

prudence with open-hearted simplicity becomes difficult only in a world

of sin. Considerateness and circumspectness are designations of

prudence as applied in cases difficult of decision [Luke xiv, 28, 29],

especially in so far as it guards against the promptings of over-rash

feelings.

SECTION CXXXVI.

(2) The perfection of feeling, as a moral fruit, is the feeling of pure

pleasure in the divine, and of unmitigated repugnance to the ungodly,

and, as based on faith, the feeling of pure joy which springs from the

consciousness of the morally-wrought harmony of one's own existence

with God and with the universe. As relating to existence other than

that of the moral subject, this perfection is perfect love as a power

grown essential and inherent in the personality; in relation to the

moral subject himself it is the perfect bliss of the child of God, the

repose of the soul in God.

So long as the feeling of self is not yet reduced to full harmony with

the love of God (� 92), so long also is feeling, as relating to the

godly and the ungodly, not pure and not decided. As the ear must first

be made skillful by attentiveness and practice in order to be able

readily to distinguish beautiful from discordant notes, so also must

feeling, first be made sensitive by moral exercise in order to be able,

at every moment, unhesitatingly to love and to hate at once in the

right manner. Such decisiveness, such purity of feeling, constitutes an

essential part of the perfection of the life in God, that is, of

blessedness; blessed are they who are pure of heart; blessed they who

find no occasion of offense in Christ and in the ways of God [Matt. xi,

6.] Mere joy is not yet blessedness; the merely natural pleasure in

existence, even were it of a Paradisaical character, is not enough to

satisfy the spiritual nature of man; only that which is morally

wrought, or at least morally appropriated, renders blessed. Even a

normal child rejoices more in its own playful creating than in mere

eating and drinking. The nine Beatitudes of Christ [Matt. v] relate,

all of them, to the moral, and not one of them to a mere state of

enjoyment. All blessedness, however, is love, and true love is

blessedness; but only morally attained love is true love; even love to

God becomes truly blissful only when it is the expression of

already-attained God-Sonship. The moral man feels blissful when he

views the harmony of being not as simply immediately existing and as

merely contemplated by himself, but as in moral freedom recognized,

willed, and realized by himself,--namely, in so far as, on the one

hand, those features in the objective world which are originally as yet

exterior and uncongenial to man are overcome, and the dominion of man

over nature realized, and in so far as, on the other, a spiritually

moral world is brought into being with which the individual knows

himself in moral harmony; but the consciousness of this double harmony

produces loving blessedness only when it rests on the consciousness of

a morally virtualized filial relation to God. True blessedness exists

only in union with God; peace of soul only in the eternal.

That such blessedness is not simply an inheritance in the future but

the destination even of the present life, is implied in the moral idea

itself, as well as in the thought of the divine love. God has not

appointed us unto wrath, but to obtain blessedness [1 Thess. v, 9];

"but whoso looketh into the perfect law of liberty, and continueth

therein, he being not a forgetful hearer, but a doer of the work, this

man shall be blessed in his deed" [James i, 25]; though this thought

may hold good on the part of one redeemed by grace, only under certain

limitations, yet it is unconditionally valid of man per se and as

unfallen; with him moral activity is per se blessedness, and there is

no blessedness without moral activity. "Blessed are they that hear the

word of God and keep it" [Luke xi, 28],--keep it not merely in memory

but in their heart, in love and in volition; "blessed are they that do

his commandments" [Rev. xxii, 14].

SECTION CXXXVII.

(3) The perfection of the moral will, that is, the full moral freedom

of self-determination as effected by wisdom and love, the perfect

mastery over one's self, the completed possession of one's self,

constitutes the fully developed personal character. As distinguished

from all mere fortuitous character-forming, the truly moral character

is the copy of the divine holiness as attained to through free moral

culture,--the moral law as become the real free property of man, the

harmony of the human with the divine will as become a dominant power, a

moral nature, so that consequently the willing and accomplishing of the

ungodly becomes to man a moral impossibility,--so that the love to God

becomes perfect hatred against sin. The constantly advancing

development of the moral striving toward this holiness, constitutes the

ever-progressive sanctification of the soul, the ultimate fruit of

which is the perfect freedom of the will, and as contained therein the

enjoyment of blessedness.

In that the moral activity becomes fact, that is, becomes a moral

possession of the person, it transforms the original, as yet,

undetermined will-freedom into a determined moral will-quality, into

moral character. Character-formation illustrates clearly the nature of

moral freedom. An, as yet, undetermined character has a much wider

possibility of choice in single cases than a definitely shaped one; a

characterless man is unreliable because his freedom has no moral

determinedness, but is merely external freedom of choice. Character is

reliable, and upon the degree of its firmness rests the confidence

which it inspires; we know in advance with certainty how, in a definite

moral conjuncture, such and such a character will choose. This is now

surely no limitation of freedom, but rather its moral maturity. The

freedom is all the more perfect, true, and mature, the more it is

character-firm, the more it has moral determinedness; and the highest

moral freedom is that where the person can no longer waver in any moral

question, where it has become for him a moral impossibility to choose

the immoral,--and this is the state of holiness. Holiness is related to

innocence as morally-acquired good to ante-moral natural good--as moral

property to mere possession.

Human holiness as a copy of the divine holiness differs from the latter

in this, that with God holiness constitutes his essence itself, and the

possibility of sin is not in any sense conceivable; whereas human

holiness is simply a morally-acquired good, and presupposes the

possibility of sin, which in fact it has morally overcome. God's

holiness is eternal; human holiness is, in its true character, the goal

of development,--depends on progressive sanctification, which advances

from a mere non-willing of the sinful to hatred against it and to

abhorrence of it. The moral requirement of complete heart-purity and

holiness may not in any manner be lowered, as if a limited measure

thereof were enough, and as if a lower requirement were to be made of

feebly constituted man than, e. g., of the angels. According to the

testimony of Christ, men are in fact to become equal to the angels

[isangeloi, Luke xx, 36]; and also in their moral essence they should

and must not remain below them. Man ought (and the word ought expresses

the fundamental condition of all morality in general) to become morally

perfect, and hence holy. This requirement is fully maintained even in

the state of sinfulness, where primarily, that is, before the

completion of redemption, the entire fulfilling of the same was not

possible. The legislation from Sinai places this moral requirement, as

the fundamental idea of morality, in great prominence: "Ye shall be

holy, for I am holy, the Lord your God" [Lev. xi, 44, 45; xix, 2; xx,

7]; and the apostles adopt the same words as fully valid also for

Christians [1 Pet. i, 15, 16]. The utterances of the Scriptures

elsewhere fully harmonize therewith [Eph. i, 4; iv, 24; 1 Thess. iii,

13; comp. Matt. v, 48; Luke i, 75; and other passages], and the fact

that the faithful of God are so frequently styled "saints" is clearly

an expression of their moral destination.

Man is originally innocent, but not yet holy; he is not, however, to

remain merely innocent, but is to advance to real holiness. Man is

created in innocence unto holiness. The mere unconscious retaining of

the first innocence would be a lingering in the child-consciousness;

and the going beyond it,--not of course in the direction of sin but

only in that of conscious holiness,--was the true normal course;

Christ's holiness was not mere innocence. As a morally-acquired

property, holiness as distinguished from the mere possession of

innocence, is a permanent quality, and constitutes the moral character

itself of man; he for whom there is yet possible a single sinful

moment, has not yet attained to holiness. There is not only a natural

but also a moral must; and when the child Jesus says: "Wist ye not that

I must be about my Father's business?" [Luke ii, 49], this is a direct

reference to this moral "must" of a holy soul. Holiness is consequently

not a quality of single actions, but it is character-peculiarity; not

the single volitional act, the single frame of mind is holy, but the

heart itself. This purity of heart is not a merely negative state, a

mere non-presence of sin, for that would be only innocence, but it is a

moral fruit, a morally-acquired power over sin, and hence where sin has

once actually existed it cannot be attained to by a mere ceasing to

sin, but only by ceaselessly militant santification. Sanctification

(hagiasmos) is consequently by no means a merely negative bearing, even

in the ante-sinful state, but is a positive forming of the will and

heart unto holiness. The sanctification mentioned in the Scriptures [1

Cor. i, 30; 2 Cor. vii, 1; 1 John iii, 3; Heb. xii, 14, and other

passages] designates of course only the putting off of existing

sinfulness as taking place in virtue of redemption; but when Christ

says of himself: "For their sakes I sanctify myself, that they also

might be sanctified through the truth" [John xvii, 19], this

self-sanctification of the holy One is indeed primarily to be

understood of his giving himself in sacrifice, but it alludes at the

same time also to the perfecting of the moral life-development of the

Son of Man unto the plenary possession of morally-acquired holiness in

his character as man; such sanctification is the duty of man as man.

Through progressive sanctifying culture of the will man becomes

perfectly master over his heart, over his will,--the moral becomes easy

to him, becomes his second nature, whereas his first nature is the as

yet not morally formed one. The will of the person is now no longer

different from the divine will, but it is, in full freedom, at one

therewith; the divine will has fully become the inner essence and the

vital power of the disposition of the person, not merely in general but

also in particular, so that in each special case the will with

unfailing certainty chooses the right,--even as a true artist possesses

full mastery over his hand, so that it never introduces a false tone or

makes a false stroke. Practice leads to mastery; and the

morally-matured man is master over his own will.

It is only in this mastery that man is truly free, namely, in that he

has then overcome every thing in himself which, as a

morally-to-be-mastered material, was as yet different from the moral

idea itself. But freedom is bliss; he who has become truly free in his

will is thereby necessarily also happy. Master over himself, he is also

at the same time master over all that is unspiritual, over nature; and

in having put himself into complete and free harmony with God, he

participates in the lordship of the absolute Spirit over nature. "The

Father that dwelleth in me he doeth the works," says Christ in

reference to his miraculous works--the works of the Spirit upon nature;

"verily, verily," says Christ to his disciples, "he that believeth on

me, the works that I do shall he do also; and greater than these shall

he do" [John xiv, 10, 12]; for God who dwells in him, as he in God, the

same does the works; having become free in God, man has nothing more

either within or without himself which could prove a hinderance to the

moral will of the rational spirit,--which would say, No! to the

striving of the Holy Spirit; as an expression of true and complete

freedom, and not as the caprice of the immature and unsanctified

spirit, this promise of Christ holds good for all his faithful

followers. The hard rind of unspiritual nature must be broken through,

the longing of the vanity-bound creature must be fulfilled; nature must

be "delivered from the bondage of corruption unto the glorious liberty

of the children of God" [Rom. viii, 19-22]; all that is natural must be

spiritualized, must be exalted into the complete untrammeled service of

the free spirit; such is the freedom, such the blessedness of the

children of God.

In the possession of knowledge, of purified feeling, and of the mastery

of the will, as attained to by moral appropriating and self-forming,

man becomes morally cultured, as distinguished from the as yet morally

immature and crude man; and in such culture he is truly free. The very

first man was called unto perfect culture, and it is quite the opposite

of correct to conceive, with Rousseau, the first human beings as living

in a state of happy barbarism. As far back as the Biblical account

reaches we find even in the state of sin no trace of an actual

cultureless barbarism. The fact that Adam was to till his garden was of

itself an implication of his destination to culture, for barbarians

never till the soil; Adam's sons appear, from the very first, as

persons of culture with a definite savagery-excluding- calling; Cain

was a founder of villages [Gen. iv, 17]; and among his immediate

descendants appear inventors of manifold articles of skill [Gen. iv,

21, 22]; and from that time forth we find traces of a progressive

culture. The progenitors of the Israelites are by no means half-savage

nomads; their wandering-about is only a temporary state of necessity,

for they are in search of a home; and their entire form of life gives

evidence indeed of great simplicity, but yet also of high spiritual and

moral culture. True culture is always a fruit of moral effort, and a

culture that aims at mere temporal enjoyment and profit is but a

deceptive self-defeating counterfeit.

SECTION CXXXVIII.

(c) In that the morally-good becomes an acquired possession of man, his

real property, it has become an essential element of his moral nature,

and hence is not an inert state, but an active power generative of new

moral life,--has become a creative, operative disposition, and is

consequently itself per se a directly active motive to moral action.

The morally-good has become virtue, which is accordingly, on the one

hand, a good not innate and embraced in the nature itself of man, but a

morally-acquired possession, and on the other a power generative in

turn itself of the good.

"All Scripture, given by inspiration of God, is also profitable for

doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in

righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished

unto all good works" [2 Tim. iii, 16, 17]; the moral perfection

attained to by the sanctifying activity is itself in turn a stimulus to

the good, a capacitation, a skilledness and power for moral activity;

such is the inner idea of virtue. Man as come into possession of virtue

is no longer the original man possessed of merely naturally-moral

power, but he is man as armed with morally acquired and hence

heightened power. There are no innate virtues, but only innate

capabilities of virtue. The merely natural man has moral freedom as a

simple and as yet undetermined freedom of choice; the virtuous man has

his freedom as exalted to a determinedness for the good; he has no

longer an equally balanced choice between good and evil, but his

morally acquired peculiarity of character inclines spontaneously to the

good. Man can never merely possess virtue, he must let it be operative;

a dormant virtue is none at all. Hence, varying from the usual view

which distinguishes and contrasts goods and virtues, we consider virtue

directly as a good. The contrasting of virtue as a power and of goods

as a possession is inaccurate; all power is a good, and every good is a

heightening of power; hence men of the world seek so zealously after

earthly goods, as they thereby enlarge their power. That virtue is not

a dormant possession, but strictly an operative power, does not make it

differ essentially from all other goods; no real property exists merely

to lie idle, no talent is to be buried; but it is to be put to usury

and made constantly to acquire more. Money is a good; for him, however,

who does not put it to use, it does not really exist; it becomes a real

good only when it becomes a power, when it is employed in heightened

life-activity. Virtue, however, is a much higher good than that which

is given us directly and from nature, or as an outward possession.

In the New Testament the notion of virtue is variously expressed; arete

[Phil. iv, 8; 1 Peter ii, 9; 2 Peter i, 3, 5] is not strictly virtue,

but is rather the notion of the morally good in general. Usually the

notion of virtue is expressed by dikaiosune, in so far as this quality

is a personal possession [Luke i, 75; Rom. vi, 13; Eph. iv, 24; v, 9,

and other passages], also by hagiosune [1 Thess. iii, 13], by

agathosune [Rom. xv, 14; Eph. v, 9], and likewise also by eusebeia, in

so far as the root of virtue rather than virtue itself is meant; for

Christian virtue, charisma is also used, as designating its resting

upon divine grace. In the Old Testament the notion proper of virtue is

wanting; under the predominance of the thought of the law and of right,

the morally correct character is designated as "righteousness," in

virtue of its answering to the law and claims of God; hence this is

merely a designation of the form. Before the full accomplishment of

redemption, the inner essence of virtue was neither fully realizable

nor comprehensible.

SECTION CXXXIX.

Inasmuch as all moral motive consists in love (� 91), and inasmuch as

virtue, as a moral property, is also an actuating power, hence virtue

is essentially love to God, and is consequently per se not multiple but

single. In so far, however, as the relation of this one-fold virtue may

be different both as to the moral person and as to the object, it

appears under the form of a plurality of virtues, which, however, as

merely different phases and manifestation-forms of the one virtue, are

never to be entirely separated from each other, and can never exist

alone. These diverse manifestation-forms of virtue may be reduced to

four cardinal virtues:--(1) Moral love preserves itself for the object

in its proper relation to it, and thus manifests itself in the virtue

of fidelity.--(2) Moral love preserves the object in its moral rights,

and hence in its legitimate peculiarity,--as the virtue of

justness.--(3) Moral love preserves the moral subject himself in his

moral rights, and hence at the same time within his moral limits, in

that it places upon the moral activity of the same a definite

measure,--the virtue of temperateness.--(4) Moral love preserves at

once both itself, the moral object and the moral subject in their moral

rights, in that it actively opposes all hinderances that stand in the

way of it and of its realization,--the virtue of courage.

We do not adopt the Platonic classification of the virtues which has

found its way into a large portion of works on Christian ethics, for it

is only by violence that it can be accommodated to the Christian

consciousness. The cardinal virtues which we adopt, result logically

and naturally from the notion of love as a disposition of the soul; and

it is, by no means, accidental that they correspond to the four

temperaments. The so-called temperament-virtues are simply the natural

germs of the real virtues. The virtue of courage corresponds to the

warm or choleric temperament; that of temperateness to the cold or

phlegmatic; that of justness to the quick or sanguine,--for sanguine

persons are very receptive for whatever is objective, accepting it just

as it presents itself, yielding themselves to it, doing it no violence;

sanguine persons are very companionable. The virtue of fidelity

corresponds to the melancholic temperament, which, directed inwardly

and dwelling within itself, and largely closed to outward influences,

is not easily led astray.--The four virtues are so intimately connected

with each other that each contains within itself in some measure all

the others. Temperateness is justness in so far as it restrains man

from that which does not become him; it is fidelity in so far as it

regards love to God and to God's will as having the highest claims, and

does not allow the individual self to become too prominent; and it is

courage in so far as it actively confines the unspiritual and the

irrational within their proper limits. Justness is fidelity in so far

as it preserves love for and verifies it upon the object; it is

temperateness in so far as it respects every-where the measure and the

limits of the moral person and of the object; and it is courage in so

far as it carries out and vindicates the just. Fidelity is courage in

so far as it asserts itself in the active overcoming of all

hinderances; it is justness in so far as it manifests to the object

only the measure of love which is really felt for it; and for the same

reason it is temperateness. Temperateness and fidelity correspond to

each other in so far as they both retain the moral person in a proper

bearing in relation to the object; justness and courage correspond to

each other in so far as they both resist all influences that are

unfriendly to the moral. Temperateness and courage are purely human

virtues in so far as both presuppose a creature-limit of the moral

personality, and hence they can in no sense be predicated of God;

fidelity and justness are also divine virtues [1 John i, 9] because

they presuppose only a difference of the personal subject from the

object, and a claim of the moral. The former two have in their

manifestation a negating character,--presuppose an antagonism in which

one phase must be made subordinate; the latter two bear a more

affirmative character,--are an express recognition and carrying out of

the moral rights of the object. Of a conflicting of the virtues. with

each other there is no possibility.

Of the cardinal virtues here presented, three coincide with the

Platonic virtues; but in the place of wisdom our classification gives

fidelity. With the Greeks the making of wisdom the fundamental virtue

was quite consequential; for all the other virtues were a fruit of

moral knowledge, but not of love. From a Christian stand-point, where

the moral freedom of the will is conceived more highly and is not

placed in so unconditional a relation of dependence upon knowledge as

with the Greeks, and where, consequently, virtue inheres essentially in

the love-inspired will, wisdom is indeed conceived as a high

morally-to-be-acquired good, as the presupposition and attendant of all

virtue, and is also in fact closely associated with love, (� 135), but

still it cannot be regarded as a virtue proper. The first and most

essential manifestation-form of virtue as love is persistent love,

namely, fidelity, which consequently cannot be classified under any one

of the other virtues as a subordinate manifestation, but it must be

placed at the head, as the virtue dominating all the others.

(1) Fidelity (pistis), thrown very much into the background in heathen

ethics, for the reason that, there, the absolutely firm basis of all

morality, faith in the true God, was lacking, comes in the Christian

consciousness into the foreground. Human virtue, as lasting love, is an

image of the divine fidelity, which is presented in the Scriptures as

one of the most prominent of the divine attributes, and is almost

always associated with love, grace, and mercy [Gen. ix, 9 sqq.; Exod.

xxxiv, 6; Deut. vii, 9; ix, 5; xxxii, 4; 1 Sam. xii, 22; Psa. lxxxvi,

15; 1 Cor. i, 9; x, 13; 1 Thess. v, 24; 2 Thess. iii, 3; 2 Tim. ii,

13]. God's fidelity is loving grace; the fidelity of man is humble

obedience, and is hence a manifestation of piety,--is, in ground and

essence, fidelity toward the faithful God [Matt. xxv, 21; 1 Cor. iv,

2]; the holy walk of the Christian is summed up in the word: "Be thou

faithful unto death" [Rev. ii, 10; comp. Psa. lxxxv, 11, 12; Matt. x,

22; Luke xvi, 10-12; 1 Cor. vii, 25].--True fidelity relates not to a

mere idea, to a mere law, but to a spiritual reality, and chiefly to

the personal spirit; love loves only a loving spirit. A merely

conceived law cannot be loved; hence there can be no real fidelity to

such, which is not in reality fidelity to the holy law-giver. Fidelity

toward man is morally without anchor unless it is based on fidelity to

God; for fidelity can be based only on a perfectly firm foundation.

Fidelity to a creature in the absence of fidelity to God, would not be

a virtue but sin. Fidelity is the truthfulness of love; a changing love

is mere inclination, and is not moral; truth changes not, and hence

also moral love changes not.--As relating to industrial activity in a

temporal calling, fidelity appears as diligence, which is only then

morally good, and hence a virtue, when it is a conscious persistence in

our God-appointed moral task [Prov. x, 4; xii, 27; 1 Thess. iv, 11].

(2) Justness or righteousness is the constant willingness to the actual

recognition of the rights of every moral personality, as well those of

God as those of man; it is love in the fulfilling of the command:

"Render unto Cesar the things which are Cesar's, and unto God the

things that are God's" [Matt. xxii, 21],--the imitating of the

righteousness of God which gives to each that which is his due. In the

Scriptures justness or righteousness is one of the most important of

the moral notions, and it appears even in its widest sense as the

respecting of the suum cuique; it is a manifestation of love, and a

never fully to be absolved debt [Rom. xiii, 8]; and in so far as it is

a manifestation of reciprocal love it is thankfulness (� 125). It is

for the reason that justness lovingly fulfills the claims of God that

it can lay claim to the essence of virtue in general; it is virtue in

so far as virtue is a disposition of soul recognizing the claims of God

upon us. Christ sums up all our moral relations to our fellows under

the one head, justness, and makes of this, in its fuller sense. the

fundamental idea of morality: "All things whatsoever ye would that men

should do to you, do ye even so to them, for this is the law and the

prophets" [Matt. vii, 12]; this is not merely ordinary civil justice,

but the higher,--that which is an expression of love. But all love

seeks to maintain the harmony of existence, and hence the divine order

of the world, that is, the rights of whatever truly is; and all human

justness is a copy of the divine [Deut. x, 17, 18.]

Justness adapts itself to the differences of existence and of rights;

God has different rights from those of man, and among men there exist,

even in an unfallen state, different rights, according to their

differing conditions and relations; parents have different rights from

those of the children, governors from those of the governed; justness

gives not to each the same, but to each that which is his due [Rom.

xiii, 7-9], and thus realizes the harmony of existence. Even toward

nature there is a justness, inasmuch as nature, in virtue of its being

good, has a claim upon the moral spirit (� 127). Real justness

therefore presupposes wisdom; its practice becomes difficult, however,

only where the harmony of existence is already disturbed by sin. The

Scriptures describe justness manifoldly in its single manifestations

[e. g. Lev. xix; Job xxxi; Psa. xv; ci; Ezek. xviii, 6-9; Isa. i, 17;

Jer. xxii, 3; Zech. vii, 9, 10; viii, 16, 17; Luke vi, 38]; the

Decalogue itself is but a description thereof. That Christian justness

or righteousness is not a merely human virtue but essentially a gift of

grace, need here only to be mentioned in passing. As virtue simply and

purely, it appears only in the person of Christ [1 John ii, 1, 29; Acts

iii, 14; 1 Pet. iii, 18].

(3) Temperateness, the self-discipline of the heart, the sophrosune of

the Greeks, is presented in the New Testament in the narrower sense of

enkrateia, while sophrosune, has, here also, only the more specific

sense of modesty and irreproachableness of behavior [1 Tim. ii, 9;

perhaps only in verse 15 in a somewhat wider sense], but the adjective

sophron is used in a more general sense [1 Tim. iii, 2; Tit. i, 8; ii,

5]. Temperateness in the wider and full sense is the self-restraining

of the subject within his normal moral limits, a subordinating of all

self-seeking desires to unconditional obedience to the moral law, and

hence, on the one hand, as relating to sensuousness, a controlling of

the sensuous desires by the moral reason, and, on the other, as

relating to the spiritual, a controlling of self-love by love to God

and to our neighbor,--a maintaining of the rights of the rational

spirit in its true essence. That temperateness is at once also justness

is self-evident; it is but another phase of the same virtue. Even as

relating to the sensuous desires it is also justness, in so far as

these are restrained within their moral limits out of regard to the

higher rights of the spirit. Modesty, patience, and obediateness are

special phases of this virtue; so also are shame, pudicity and

chastity, as a keeping of sexual sensuousness within bounds, a

subordinating of it to its higher moral conditions; shame and pudicity

are rather the inner elements, the state of the heart, and chastity

rather the outward manifestation; they are an expression of the fact

that this sensuous instinct has absolutely no right per se, but only in

the service of wedlock-love.--Temperateness presupposes indeed a

difference and a possible antagonism between selfish desires

(especially the sensuous ones) and the morally-rational consciousness,

though not an actually-existing antagonism and opposition. In its

manifestation it is more a negating virtue than justness, and yet its

essence is very affirmative.--This virtue becomes most difficult where

the individual energy stands forth most strongly over against general,

rational right, and hence in the period of youthful vigor when the

consciousness of personal strength and of self-will delights to cope

with objective barriers, and seeks to cast them off as trameling

fetters,--when the strongly self-conscious individuality delights to

enjoy this consciousness, whether in the enjoyment of sensuous

pleasure, or in that of unbounded freedom, or in that of

will-assertion. Fidelity, justness, and courage are, for vigorous

youth, much more easily attained to and preserved than the virtue of

temperateness; but as all the virtues are only different phases of

virtue in general, and as they are all connected with each other in a

vital unity, hence the violation of one of them is necessarily also a

violation of the others; intemperateness is, in every respect, per se

also an infidelity, an unjustness and a cowardliness, and it leads

directly to a further development of these vices.

(4) Courage, the moral readiness to combat against whatever opposes the

moral end,--expressed by the Greeks by the more limited andreia, and in

the Scriptures by the higher and more inward notion of parrhesia [Eph.

iii, 12; 1 Tim. iii, 10, etc.],--is the being joyous and confident in

the carrying out of the moral idea on the basis of hopeful faith [Matt.

v, 12; Acts ii, 29; iv, 13, 29, 31; ix, 27, 28; xiii, 46; xiv, 3;

xviii, 26; xix, 8; xxvi, 26; xxviii, 31; Rom. viii, 31 sqq.; 2 Cor.

iii, 12; v, 6, 8; xii, 10; Eph. iii, 12; vi, 19, 20; Phil. i, 20; 1

Thess. ii, 2; Heb. xii, 3; Psa. cxviii, 5 sqq.]. The moral life of the

Christian is a constant struggle [Luke xiii, 24; 1 Tim. vi, 12] as well

against the outward hinderances of the moral life as also against the

inner opposing desires and against carnal sloth and fear. Though both

these forms of hinderance do not hold good in a strict sense for the

unfallen state, still we must doubtless admit that there were

relatively corresponding relations of a normal kind. During the

development of man toward his ultimate perfection there constantly

exists an, as yet, extra moral reality, namely, nature within and

without him, which is to be brought within the dominion of moral

reason, and which is, as extra-moral, also per se a barrier that is to

be overcome by moral effort; however, it is not an active antagonism,

and the effort does not involve suffering. Self-love, in itself

perfectly legitimate, needs also to be brought into perfect

subordination to the love of God, and the mastering of it requires

conflict and courage. This "parrhaesia" is not mere feeling, not mere

in4vard peace, but it is essentially a combat-courting courage, a

persistence in the moral struggle in virtue of joyous trust in God.

Absolutely sure of victory, it fears nothing and undauntedly carries

out what it undertakes.

SECTION CXL.

In so far as God himself is the object of love, and in so far as, in

the creature, the divine phase, the image of God, is brought into

prominence, the above four virtues appear under a special form

expressive of the essence of piety, as piety-virtues, which, however,

do not stand along-side of the other virtues, but are in fact the

highest and God-directed phase of the same. Fidelity as relating to God

appears as moral faith; justness as moral devotedness or pious

obedience; temperateness as filially-pious humility, as

child-mindedness; and courage as hope or confidence.

The piety-virtues, only partially corresponding to the so-called

theological virtues, are the essence proper, the ground, the kernel and

the crown of the virtues in general,--are neither super-ordinate nor

co-ordinate to the four cardinal virtues, but are their essential

substance and spirit itself.

1. Faith, designated in Scripture by the same expression with fidelity,

is the loving response to God's fidelity to us, and, as an expression

of our fidelity toward the faithful God, is a high moral

requirement,--is a loving confiding of our own being and life to the

faithful love and truthfulness of God, a holding-fast of love to God.

Were faith a mere holding for true, then it would not be a moral

requirement, and hence the possession of it not a virtue; as fidelity,

however, it is a virtue (� 113). Faith is reckoned to man for justness

or righteousness [Rom. iv, 3; Gal. iii, 6], for the reason that, as

fidelity, it is itself justness toward God, and the root and essence of

all righteousness.

2. Obedience toward God, moral decotedness, hupakoe, is the inclination

and willingness that God's claim upon us should be perfectly realized

in our moral conduct, and hence that we should do that which, as God's

creditors, we owe to Him [Rom. viii, 12]; we meet God's claim upon us

only by perfect, voluntary and joyous submission to his will [Exod.

xix, 8; xxiv, 3, 7; Deut. iv; xi, 1; xii, 1, 32; xiii, 4, 18; Jer. vii,

23; Luke i, 38; James iv, 7; 1 Pet. i, 2, 14, 22; comp. Gen. vi, 22;

vii, 5; xii, 4; xxi, 13 sqq.; xxii, 1 sqq.]; the obedient are by that

very fact the just [Hos. xiv, 9; Mal. iii, 18; Matt. xxv, 37; 1 John

iii, 7]; obedience is the fruit of faith [Heb. xi, 8], the expression

of the child-mindedness of believers toward the Father. The Son of man

is the holy pattern of obedience [Rom. v, 19; Gal. iv, 4; Phil. ii, 8;

Heb. v, 8; Isa. liii].

3. Humility, tapeinophrosune, the moral and reverential confining of

ourselves within the limits fixed by God for us as creatures and for

each of us, in his special moral calling, is an absolute duty even of

sinless man, inasmuch as the moral creature, as related to God, is and

has nothing which is not to be recognized as depending upon God's

support; hence it holds good also of the angels [Col. ii, 18], and of

Christ as the Son of man in his subordination to God [Matt. xi, 29;

comp. xx, 28; Phil. ii, 6-8; Heb. xii, 2; John xiii, 4 sqq.]. All moral

humility is at bottom humility before God [James iv, 10; comp. Gen.

xxxii, 10; Luke xviii, 14], even as the first sin consisted in a lack

of humility; when humility before men does not rest on this ground, it

sinks to abjectness and servile-mindedness; it is only in humility

before God that man learns to harmonize humility before men with a

proper respect for his own moral dignity. All humility rests on faith

and is also obedience; its essence, however, is a keeping within

bounds, a self-retention within our divinely-appointed position [Matt.

v, 3; xxiii, 11; Luke xxii, 24 sqq.; Acts xx, 19; Rom. xii, 3, 16; Eph.

iv, 1, 2; Phil. ii, 3; Col. iii, 12; 1 Pet. v, 5; James iv, 6].

Child-like humility aims not at high things, but only at the highest,

which in fact are accessible only to child-mindedness,--retains always

toward God its filial character [Matt. xviii, 3, 4]. Humility is a

purely Christian virtue; to Greek ethics it was almost unknown (� 21).

4. Hope, elpis, mentioned in connection with faith and love as a high

virtue [1 Cor. xiii, 13], directs itself with firm confidence toward

the highest good as the goal to be attained to, toward the idea of the

good [Rom. viii, 24], and is not a mere expecting of a future

happiness, but a joyful trusting faith-born confidence that God means

it well with us, and will also actually enable us to reach our moral

goal, provided we honestly strive toward it,--is, in a word, that moral

courage in God that is sure of its victory, and that has consequently

already overcome all inward obstacles to the outward victory; it is not

merely an involuntary state of feeling, but a morally-acquired good.

All hope is faith [Heb. xi, 1], but it is also moral self-surrender and

child-like humility, for it expects the victory not from itself but

from God. The hope that is fixed merely upon created things is vain and

sinful; but moral hoping in God does not end in disappointment [Rom. v,

5], and all moral courage is based upon it [Psa. ix, 10; xxv, 2; xxxi,

15; xl, 4; lvi, 4 sqq.; lxii, 6; xci, 2; cxii, 7; John xvi, 33; Rom.

iv, 18; v, 2, 4, 5; xii, 12; Phil. iii, 1; iv, 4; 1 Cor. i, 10; iii,

12, etc.]. God is a God of hope [Rom. xv, 13], because all hope is

based on him, and relates to his promises. The word of the faithful God

is the ground, the contents and the vitality of all true hope. Hope is

a virtue belonging essentially only to the kingdom of God; among

heathens only the Persians have as much as a darkly-groping hope; the

Greeks looked but dismally into the future, and their ethics knows

nothing of hope as a virtue; in the Old Testament, however, we meet

with it almost on every page; it is the key-note of the

religiously-moral life, constantly bursting out in inspired strains;

the Christian's hope, as fulfilled in Christ, awakens and gives ground

for new hope.

As all virtue whatever is a force and a motive to moral action, much

more is this true of the piety-virtues. All moral action directs itself

essentially toward a yet to be attained good, and which consequently

exists primarily only in thought; hence the moral motive is not merely

love to an existing entity, but at the same time also love to a, as

yet, not existing one, to a merely conceived one, the realization of

which, however, is, in virtue of our love to the truly existing

primative ground of all morality, absolutely sure to us,--hence it is,

essentially, faith in the living and truthful God, and hope of the

realization of the highest good. In virtue of this pious believing and

hoping, as springing from our love to God, fidelity in our temporal

calling becomes joyous perseverance; and in our working for the

spiritual and the eternal, it becomes enthusiasm.

Observation. The systematic development of the cardinal virtues has

ever been one of the most weighty and difficult points in ethics. Plato

was the first to present the four virtues, which were adopted by Sts.

Ambrose and Augustine, and which then held sway through the entire

Middle Ages and up to the most recent times; and to these were added

and superordinated, without any clear connection, the three theological

virtues (� 31). The Greek classification of the virtues is, however,

entirely unadapted to the Christian notion of virtue, as the violent

construction of them, to which even Augustine had to resort, abundantly

manifests; while with the Greeks the fundamental virtue was wisdom, in

Christianity it is love, love to the loving, personal God; this love to

God was entirely lacking to the Greeks, because with them its certain

object was also lacking. Protestant ethics sought out, therefore, with

a correcter consciousness, new paths, and that too from the very

beginning (� 37). The three cardinal virtues of Calvin: sobrietas,

justitia, pietas, do not, however, exhaust the material, and they admit

of no proper organic union, because pietas is not co-ordinate to the

other two, but superordinate. Schleiermacher's cardinal virtues (� 48):

wisdom, love, discretion and perseverance, are, in spite of all the

dialectical skill bestowed in their development, of a merely artificial

character, and are least of all adapted to Christian ethics,--to which

in fact he does not apply them; the Platonic virtues admit of a much

more natural development. In the system of Schleiermacher, love is by

no means presented in its full Christian significancy, least of all as

love to God (which is in fact regarded as an unapt expression), but it

is presented only as the "vivifying virtue, as working forth out of

itself into the world, namely, into nature,"--as manifesting reason in

its action upon nature; reason is the loving element, nature the loved;

love to God is true only as love to nature (Syst. �� 296, 303 sqq.);

this is almost the very opposite of the Christian notion of love. C. F.

Schmid accepts this classification under a more Christian form,

without, however, developing it in greater fullness (Christl. Sittenl.,

p. 528).--Most peculiar of all is Rothe's classification (Eth. 1 ed., �

645 sqq.). He gives two virtues of the self-consciousness or

rationality, and two virtues of self-activity or freedom. (1.)

Individually-determined rationality is geniality,--aptness for an

absolutely individual cognizing, so that the same can absolutely be

accomplished by no other person-the artistic virtue proper; to it

belong courage, composedness, modesty, grace, sympathy, confidence,

etc. (2.) Universally-determined rationality is wisdom--aptness for a

universal cognizing, so that the same may absolutely be accomplished by

every other spirit in the same manner; it appears under the forms of

considerateness, impartialness, sobriety, instructiveness, benevolence,

fairness, etc. (3.) Individually determined freedom is originality, the

virtue which specifically qualifies for individual forming,--the social

virtue proper; to it belong valor, temperateness, chastity, dignity,

unselfishness, fidelity, etc. (4.) Universally determined freedom is

the strength which leads to a universal forming, that is, to laboring

and acquiring,--the public or civic virtue proper; it appears under the

forms of persistence, patience, self-control, eloquence, beneficence,

magnanimity, etc.

II. MORAL COMMUNION AS A FRUIT OF THE MORAL LIFE.

SECTION CXLI.

All moral activity is of a communion-forming character, and all true

communion is an expression of love,--in nature an expression of

immanent divine love, in humanity, an expression of human love. The

highest end of the moral life is indeed the full morally-acquired

communion with God, but man, as an individual being placed in natural

and spiritual relations to other creatures, fulfills his moral destiny

not in an exclusive communion with God, but only in a communing at the

same time with the children of God, and hence he has it as a moral duty

to form this his relation to other men into a moral communion, without

which his personal perfection cannot 1,e reached. The most primitive

natural communion is sexual communion, from which naturally arises the

second form. that between parents and children; both forms are to be

raised from the merely natural. to the moral communion of the family.

As all love presupposes some form of communion, though it be ante-moral

and merely natural, hence the moral forming of this communion is not an

absolutely new creating of a communion, but the spiritual exalting of

one that already exists naturally. Though moral communion with God is

the highest good, still this does not exclude, but includes, a

communing with other rational creatures, for God is himself in

communion with them. Mystical quietism is but a refined self-seeking,

and conflicts with the essence of Christianity; for God did not create

mere isolated beings, but destined them for each other; "it is not

good," not in harmony with the moral destination of the race, "that man

should be alone," for an isolated person lacks a very essential sphere

of moral activity-that upon which he can not only (as in his relation

to God) appropriate and obey, and not only (as in his relation to

nature) dominate, but also, as relating to beings like himself, form

and appropriate at the same time in mutual moral reciprocity. Without

moral communion with other men morality cannot come to its full

development; communion is not a mere inactive condition, but it is a

productive good, a condition of new, higher morality. This of itself is

a condemnation of the hermit-life; of such a life the Scriptures know

nothing; solitude may indeed be salutary as a preliminary preparation

for a calling that requires great collection of soul [Luke i, 80], as

indeed the Son of man himself resorted thereto for a while [Matt. iv];

but the Sabbath-introspection of the soul cannot, as opposed to an

active life among men, be made the exclusively-legitimate life. The

recluse life, even where the severest discipline is exercised against

the sinful nature, is an immoral renouncing of the moral duties of man

toward his fellows, a dissolving of the kingdom of God into mere atoms,

into mere isolated individuals, and hence it was utterly foreign to the

earliest Church.

The communion of man with his fellows is primarily of a merely natural

character; but man is to have in his whole being and nature, and above

all in his spiritual nature, nothing which he has merely naturally

received and not also morally appropriated to, and formed for, himself.

The communion of the sexes, as well as that between parents and

children, is primarily as yet extra-moral,--does not yet distinguish

man from the brute; both forms of communion need to be raised to a

moral character, otherwise they will sink to an immoral one; even

parental love may be sinful.

(a) THE FAMILY.

SECTION CXLII.

Natural sexual love is, as a manifestation of the divine love ruling in

nature, per se a type of moral communion, but it does not itself

suffice to create this. The merely natural, and hence extra moral,

element of the same is confined entirely to the unconscious natural

inclination; the exalting of the mere inclination to real love is never

an ante-moral or extra-moral process, but springs of moral

determination; the actual accomplishing of the sexual communion should

never follow upon mere natural love, but must, as a free act, be simply

a manifestation of the already realized moral communion of the persons

in virtue of moral love. Without this condition it is not extra-moral,

but anti-moral, as an actual destruction of moral communion.

Sexual communion is the first possible communion, and hence has in

nature its first incitation. As man was not an absolutely other and new

creation but the divinely-animated nature-creature, so also is the

first moral communion not one that was absolutely new-created by man,

but a morally-exalted natural communion. Sexual love prevails

throughout animated nature,--is its highest life-function, and,

therefore, also the highest manifestation of the divine love as ruling

in nature The flower develops in its sexual bloom its highest force and

splendor; the brute has, in sexual love, the highest pleasure-feeling,

that of a perfect, mutually life-unifying harmony with its like; it is

the feeling that it is not a mere isolated unit, but a living member of

a higher whole. It is not man's duty to suppress this

life-manifestation, but to exalt it,--to raise the

unconsciously-prevailing love of the animal into a conscious and moral

love. Though in idea the same, the sexes are in reality different,

mutually complementing each other to the full idea of man. The somewhat

clumsy myth as to the original androgynous forms of humanity, as given

in Plato's Symposium, is but a distorted echo of the thought, much more

suggestively expressed in the Biblical account, of the formation of Eve

from a rib of Adam.

Love, according to its inner idea, is not only preservative but also

communicative, awakening new life and promoting it; hence the

propagation of the human race is conditioned on the highest earthly

love. All love is an appropriating and a forming at the same time. In

sexual love the sexes mutually appropriate and form each other as

natural beings, though in different degrees; the spiritually moral

appropriating and forming must, however, precede the natural, as its

moral consecration and conditionment; the reversing of this relation,

the letting the moral and personal love simply follow the sexual

communion, is morally impossible, as thereby the latter is degraded to

a purely bestial, immoral character, and cannot become the

starting-point of a moral communion.

A possession is moral only as property, that is, in virtue of its

having been morally-acquired and appropriated; now the communion of the

sexes is the complete giving up and appropriating of each party as the

property of the other; hence when it is not a manifestation and fruit

of an already-accomplished, morally-personal, spiritual unity,--of the

appropriation of the persons as moral and hence as permanent

inalienable property,--it is then not only not a simply natural action

but an immoral throwing away of one's moral personality, an

irremediable ruining of the moral personality of the other. Lost

innocence is irrecoverable; mere sexual communion without moral love is

a defamation. But moral love is in its very essence permanent; that

which is by love appropriated to the person as property is

inalienable,--can be destroyed only with the personality itself.

Whoredom is not mere bestiality, but, as a moral self-abandonment, it

is below bestiality; for the brute does not throw itself away. Even in

the case of the first man, moral love preceded sexual communion. "And

Adam said: this is now bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she

shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man" [Gen. ii, 23

sqq.]. This is a child-like, natural expression of moral love, the full

consciousness of the harmony and unity between man and wife; the wife

is the man's other ego, belongs to him, is destined to him as property,

as also he to her; she is of, and for, him. Hence to this expression of

moral love joins itself, as a sequence, the further thought: "therefore

shall a man leave his father and his mother and shall cleave unto his

wife, and they shall be one flesh;" the becoming one in the flesh

follows only from and upon the being one in spirit; they become one

also sexually, because they have mutually recognized each other as

joined in a personally-spiritual unity. The moral consciousness of the

personal belonging of the one to the other, the free recognition of

their mutually-possessing each other as property, is the indispensable

antecedent moral condition of sexual communion. Without this moral

condition, that which is the acme of the nature-life, the innermost

center of nature-mysteries, the synthesis of all that is wonderful in

nature-force, namely, the generative act,--which, as moral, is a sacred

act,--becomes an absolutely immoral one, and sinks man toward the brute

more than any other natural action.

SECTION CXLIII.

Moral sexual love being a love of the persons to each other, and the

moral personality of the one being per se equal to that of the other in

moral worth, and consequently also in moral rights, hence that giving

up of the one person, as a complete moral possession, to the other,

which is required by sexual communion, is only then possible when this

surrender is a mutual one, that is, when the two persons belong to each

other exclusively; and hence moral sexual love exists only in the

marriage of two persons, in view of sexual communion and consequently

of complete personal life-communion. Polygamy is morally

impossible,--is but legally regulated whoredom, makes a real personal

love-surrender, and hence marriage itself, impossible. For the same

reason, marriage is morally indissoluble. Marriage is not a mere right,

is not simply allowed, but it is a divinely-willed and expressly

ordained moral communion, and hence the entering upon it is not a

merely natural but also a religious action, which, standing as it does

under the express, promise of the divine blessing, is very naturally

invested with a religious consecration.

The extra-Christian notion of polygamy absolutely excludes the moral

essence of marriage; in it the woman is indeed the man's property, but

not man the woman's; this involves a difference in the moral worth and

rights of the sexes, which, from a moral stand-point, is impossible;

for it denies the moral personality of the woman; and in fact, in

polygamy, woman is only a slave. Of the polygamy of the Old Testament

it is not here the place to speak. The primitive divine institution of

marriage recognizes only the marriage with one woman, and the New

Testament presupposes this throughout [Matt. xix, 3 sqq.; 1 Cor. vii,

2; xi, 11; Eph, v, 28; 1 Tim. iii, 2].

As marriage rests entirely on personal love to a person, hence it is

not a mere legal relation; and as in it the persons belong entirely to

each other,--are to each other a mutual property, the essence and

strength of which is love,--hence to view marriage as a merely legal

relation not only falls below the moral idea of marriage, but is per se

immoral, for a contract-relation presupposes the non-presence of

mutually-confiding love,--excludes a perfect moral

life-and-body-communion, the reciprocal belonging to each other as a

moral property; on the contrary, such a contract tends to raise between

the two persons, as exclusively bent on their personal advantage, the

separation-wall of distrust, and delivers the one consort to the other

for mere stipulated service and use. As little as a contract-relation

is conceivable between parents and children in their mutual family

duties, just so little is it morally possible between husband and wife.

Sexual communion when based on a mere legal contract is only

respectable concubinage; it stands essentially on an equal footing with

polygamy.--The generating of children is not so much the purpose as

rather the blessing of marriage; its purpose is absolutely the

fulfilling of moral love; marriage is and continues in full validity

even where this blessing is wanting. The legal principle that "the

chief end of marriage is the generating and training of children," is

consistent rather with a legalized concubinage or with polygamy than

with the moral idea of marriage, and would in consistency require that

barrenness be regarded as a perfectly valid ground for divorce.

For the simple reason that consorts belong to each other as moral

property, marriage admits morally of no dissolution. A moral property

is inseparably united with the moral peculiarity, and hence with the

personal essence of the individual,--is, like this essence,

inalienable. It is as impossible morally to dissolve a marriage as it

is for a person to separate from his personal life, his peculiar

character, and hence from his own self; and, as a violent internal

anarchy of the spirit, namely, in insanity, is conceivable only in a

sinfully-disordered state, so also is a dissolution of marriage

conceivable only in a state of sinfully morbid disorder,--it is in fact

an ethical insanity, a moral ruin of the two self-separating consorts.

Christ affirms this moral impossibility of divorce [Matt. xix, 3-9],

and bases his doctrine on this significant reason: "They are no more

twain, but one flesh; what therefore God hath joined together, let not

man put asunder." This is not two reasons but only one; God has joined

together marriage in his primative instituting of it, that is, by his

creative will, which established the essence of marriage to consist in

the fact that the two consorts should be one flesh, one single

absolutely inseparable life as to soul and body, even as every living

body is a single inseparable whole, and any dissevering of it, the

death of the same. The indissolubility of marriage is still more

strongly emphasized by Christ by his citing the words of the Creator at

its institution: "I For this cause shall a man leave father and mother,

and shall cleave to his wife, and they twain shall be one flesh." Man

is not to abandon his father and mother with his love, though he may

outwardly withdraw from them in order to build up a family of his own;

but still more intimate than the bond between parents and children, is

the bond between husband and wife, who mutually fully belong to each

other. Now if the bond of love and unity between parents and children

can never be dissolved without great moral violence, still less can the

bond between husband and wife be morally dissolved. The unity of the

"flesh" is not to be understood merely, nor even chiefly, of the bodily

union, but alludes to the highest and perfect moral union of the whole

life of both body and soul. A merely spiritual unity is designated by

mia kardia kai psuche [Acts iv, 32], but husband and wife are also heis

mian sarka [1 Cor. vi, 16; comp. vii, 4; Eph. v, 28 sqq.]. Adultery

alone works divorce, and all divorce is in its moral essence adultery

[comp. 1 Cor. vii, 10], and, as relating to the children, a ruthless

annihilating of the family.

It is of high significancy that the Scriptures expressly affirm the

divine institution of marriage, and give to moral marriage a promise of

special blessing [Gen. i, 28; ii, 24; ix, 7; Matt. xix, 4; comp. Psa.

cxxviii, 3; cxxvii, 3-5]. Hence marriage cannot in any sense be

implicated in unsanctity or lowness, so as to be inconsistent with a

truly spiritual and holy life; otherwise God, when he introduced woman

to man as called to be holy, would have encouraged him to turn aside

from his high destination, and Adam would have had not merely the right

but in fact also the duty of declining this gift of divine love; the

creation of the woman would really have been the first temptation. In a

normal, uncorrupted state of humanity it is not only the right, but

also the duty, of the morally and corporeally mature individual to live

in this God-instituted state of marriage; it is not marriage itself but

the particular choice of the consort that is left to the particular,

personal preference of love. God's declaration: "It is not good that

the man should be alone; I will make him an help-meet for him,"

distinctly implies that celibacy per se is not the better but the less

good state,--as well for man, for he ought to have a help-meet, as also

for woman, for her express destination is to be a help-meet for the

man. Of the relations of marriage after the fall into sin, it is not

here the place to speak.

The fact that in all not totally savage nations marriage is not

constituted simply by the consent of the two persons, but by some sort

of solemn and, most usually, religious ceremony, is a significant

implication of the moral essence of marriage; and the importance that a

people places on the religiously-moral consecration of marriage, is a

pretty safe criterion of its morality in relation to the sexual life.

SECTION CXLIV.

The two consorts stand to each other, as moral persons, on an equal

footing; they both find their union in a complete devoted love, and

hence, in fact, in a loving, free subordination to the moral law. The

consorts complement each other also in spiritually-moral respects; and

it is only in respect to this harmony-conditioning complementing that

the woman is in many things rather guided than self-determining. This,

however, is not a real domination of the man over the woman as over a

subject, but only a conditional super-ordination of the man as the

actively-guiding unity-point of the common life. As a moral relation

marriage rests on freedom, that is, on free mutual choice; consequently

it presupposes the moral maturity of the two lovers. This freedom of

choice, however, is not irrational caprice, but determines itself in

view of the true life-harmonizing, reciprocally-complementing, personal

peculiarity of the two parties, and receives its moral ratification by

its being freely recognized on the part of the moral community, and

primarily of the family.

But moral equality is not sameness. As the final destination of all

moral beings is the same, hence a difference of the moral worth of the

sexes is not conceivable [Gal. iii, 28; 1 Pet. iii, 7]. The inferior

position of the female sex in all non-Christian nations is a sign of

moral unculture, which even the Greeks did not entirely put off. The

account of the creation of woman indicates her true dignity; taken from

man's heart, she belongs to man's heart, and is not a slave at his

feet; she is a part of him,--is not merely flesh of his flesh but also

soul of his soul. The antithesis of sex. which is not of a merely

bodily character, conditions indeed also very different moral duties;

but these duties are absolutely equal in moral worth. The precedency of

the woman in the interior of the family is in no respect less than that

of the man in the civic sphere; and though, in virtue of this

difference, the woman is, in many respects,--especially in those of the

external, public life, that is, of the outward-directed

activity,--properly subject to the man as the natural leader in this

sphere [Eph. v, 22, 23], yet, as an offset to this, the man is in his

turn properly dependent on the woman in the sphere of female activity;

it is not to the credit of the man to dominate in the kitchen and

nursery. Each rules, by the constitution of nature, in his own sphere;

and it is perfectly in order for the woman, in her sphere, to exercise

a determining influence on the man (� 69). The historical

tyrant-relation of the man over the woman is not the original and true

one, and is inconsistent with true confiding love and with the dignity

of womanhood, and is expressly explained in the Scriptures as a

punishment for sin [Gen. iii, 16]. On the other hand, however, a

certain guiding super-ordination of the man is the original and normal

relation, and is in no respect a fruit of the fall; Adam was as guilty

as Eve: sin was effectual only in changing the original normal

subordination of the woman into a relation of servitude. Though the

woman is, in more than one respect, the "weaker vessel" [1 Pet. iii,

7], nevertheless she is a "co-heir of grace;" and she has, though

indeed another and peculiar, yet not a less noble moral life-task than

the man; as the help-meet of man it is hers faithfully to preserve and

foster that which the stronger and more independent-willed man actively

creates. The strong vital initiative, the fixing of the goal, and the

task of producing, are the work of the man; in this work the woman is

to be for him, to aid him, to have him for the vital central-point of

the activity peculiar to her [1 Cor. xi, 8, 9]. Though the woman had

first sinned, and the man was thus led astray by her, yet the offended

and sentencing God turns himself first to Adam, and requires account of

him, and then afterward to Eve; Adam was in duty required to strengthen

and dissuade the yielding and sinning woman, and not to let himself be

led by her.

The contracting of marriage is neither a mere business-transaction nor

a fruit of a simple falling in love; where moral love does not form the

marriage, there it is desecrated. Hence marriages cannot be planned and

brought about simply by parents, no more than can the parents practice

virtue for their children; the moral must be accomplished by each for

himself. The free personal choice that is absolutely necessary to

marriage proper is not to be made arbitrarily or by hap-hazard; it aims

essentially at the realization of the complete life-unity of the two

persons, to the end of moral communion. This unity, and hence this

perfect harmony, presupposes a difference and at the same time a

similarity of the spiritually and bodily self-complementing persons.

The difference consists in the normal spiritual and corporeal

antithesis of the sexes in general, and, in particular, in the

respective peculiarity of the persons, which finds, largely, in the

opposite peculiarity its complement, and hence its moral satisfaction;

a fiery, impassioned temperament is advantageously complemented by one

that is gentle and calm. The similarity consists in the essential

agreement of the persons, not merely in their moral and spiritual, but

also in their physical peculiarities,--a similarity which can well

exist in the midst of large difference. Without the similarity there

would be no unanimity; without the difference there would be no mutual

complementing, and hence no mutual attraction. The selecting for

marriage is a finding of the complementing personality, and is free and

unfree at the same time. There lies, indeed, in this finding, something

of the mysterious, something which transcends the dialectical

consciousness; and an anticipatory feeling antecedes, even in a normal

state of things, the definite recognizing of the person; the matter

should not rest, however, at the stage of mere feeling, but the person

should at once exalt it to a rational consciousness,--should

transfigure the ante-moral love-feeling into rational love.

The morally-rational character of the contracting of marriage is

recognized by usages prevalent among all not utterly uncultured

nations, and is guaranteed by the fact that it is not left to the mere

discretion of the individuals, but is subject to the ratifying

recognition of the moral community, and hence primarily of the parents

concerned [comp. 1 Cor. vii, 37]. Though parents are not entitled so

far to represent their children as to choose consorts for them, yet

they are perfectly entitled to ratify the choice of their children by

their approval.

SECTION CXLV.

Marriage as productive is the basis of the more extended family, which,

like marriage, is not a merely natural but essentially a moral

relation. The family members stand to each other either in the relation

of equality, as husband and wife or as brothers and sisters, or in that

of super-ordination and subordination, as parents and children. The

relation between parents and children is the first inequality among

men, and the presupposition and type of all other relations of

super-ordination and subordination. Parents and children stand to each

other in the relation of moral personalities, and hence also of mutual

moral duties; parents have, in relation to their children,

preponderatingly the duty of forming, and hence of educating, during

the progress of which, however, the constantly and necessarily

therewith-connected duty of sparing, rises gradually to greater

prominence as the development advances, until finally it predominates,

and the child has attained to its moral majority. As, however, in a

process of normal development, the parents also constantly advance

spiritually and morally, hence they always retain their super-ordinate

relation to the children even as matured; their formative influence on

the children can never cease, and never gives place to a relation of

moral equality with them. The children, on their part, continue always,

though not in a constantly like manner, subject to the parents in

reverential obedience, which, however, as itself resting upon love to

God, is ever also conditioned thereby.

The difference between consorts and blood-relatives rests on the

difference between moral and natural communion. In both cases the

communion is not only spiritually-moral but also corporeally-natural.

With consorts, however, the bodily-natural communion rests on an

antecedent moral communion; and with blood-relatives the moral

communion rests on the precedent corporeally-natural communion; the

former become corporeally one because they love each other, the latter

love each other because in blood they are already one; the former

proceed from an original state of separation, toward union; the latter

tend from their original union to a state of separation;

blood-relationship proper precludes sexual communion. The fact that

relatives are bound to each other by especially close bonds of love

[Gen. xiii, 8, 9; xiv, 14 sqq.; xviii, 23 sqq.; xxix, 13 sqq.; Exod.

xviii, 5 sqq.; Ruth i; ii, 20; Luke i, 38, 40, 58; comp. Job xix, 13;

Psa. xxxi, 12; lxix, 8], does not conflict with the more general love

of neighbor.

In the family begins, now, moral society with all its normal

differences. Husband and wife do not as yet constitute a society, for

they are one flesh; nor do parents and children form one, for although

they are one spirit, yet they stand to each other in the relation of

super-ordination and subordination. Persons who are entirely alike, and

who stand to each other in absolutely like relations, constitute indeed

a multitude, but not a society; where there is no vital all-guiding

nucleus, no throbbing heart for the body, no soul for the acting

members, there is no living whole, no society. Inequality, unlikeness,

lies in the essence of every moral society,--not an inequality of the

moral rights of personalities, but an inequality, a difference, of

spiritually-moral position in and relation to society. Parents are the

first princes, and true princes are the fathers of their people; patres

was the title of distinction of the Roman senators; "elders" is used in

a like sense for the leaders of moral society in almost all the free

constitutions of antiquity and also of the church. Parents are the

guides of their children by the grace of God, for children are a gift

of divine grace [Gen. xxi, 1; xxv, 21; xxix, 31; xxx, 6, 17 sqq.;

xxxiii, 5; Exod. xxiii, 26; Deut. vii, 14; Ruth iv, 13; 1 Sam. ii, 21;

Psa. cxxvii, 3; cxxviii, 3; comp. 1 Tim. ii, 15]; therein lies the

right as well as the duty of the parents. Guiding the children in God's

name, standing in God's stead for them [Eph. vi, 1; comp. Lev. xix,

32], they have not only a right to reverential obedience, but also the

duty of reverence-awakening training. Parental love is per se strictly

natural, hence it is found even in the natural man [Gen. xxi, 16; xxxi,

28, 43, 50, 55; 1 Kings iii, 16 sqq.; Isa. xlix, 15; Matt. ii, 18; Luke

xv, 21 sqq.; John iv, 47 sqq.], and consequently very much more so in

the pious [Gen. ix, 26, 27; xxi, 11, 12; xxii, 2; xxiv; xxviii, 1-4;

xxxvii, 3, 34, 35; xlii, 36 sqq.; xliii, 14; xliv, 22, 30; xlv, 28;

xlvi, 30; xlviii, 10 sqq.; Exod. ii, 2 sqq.; 2 Sam. xii, 16 sqq.; xiii,

30 sqq.; xiv; xviii, 33; xix, 1 sqq.; Prov. x, 1; xv, 20; Jer. xxxi,

15; Matt. ii, 14; Luke ii, 35, 44; John xix, 25].

It is the part of parents to cultivate their children into

morally-matured personalities; this is not merely a right of the

parents, but also of the children, and hence, for the former, a duty;

they are to impart to their children the spiritually-moral attainments

of their own spiritual development, and consequently also those of

humanity in general, so that the children shall not have to go through

again, in the very same manner, the same absolutely new-beginning

development as the parents, for this is simply the manner and

characteristic of nature-objects, but that they may place themselves in

the current of history, and learn and appropriate to themselves its

spiritual results, and then, in their turn, carry them further forward.

All spiritual forming of the, as yet, spiritually immature is an

historical working,--an initiating of the, as yet, immature spirit into

the current and working of history. Now, as the child is in fact to

ripen on into a morally-mature personality, and yet from the start

already is, both in essence and in faculties, a moral personality,

hence the forming of the same by the parents is never a strictly

exclusive influencing, and hence, on the part of the child, never a

merely inactive receiving, but always also a spiritually-moral

co-operating of the child, a constantly increasing initiative

self-forming of the same, so that consequently from the very start

there must always be united with the formative activity upon the child,

also a sparing bearing toward it; and such a forming is in fact

education.--Education,--which, as aiming at the moral goal, namely,

harmony with God and with the totality of moral being, must always be

at the same time a natural and a spiritual, a special and a general

forming, directed toward bringing the child to God and to God-sonship

[Gen. xviii, 19; Deut. vi, 7; xi, 19; xxxi, 12, 13; xxxii, 46; Psa.

lxxviii, 3 sqq.; xxxiv, 12; Isa. xxxviii, 19; Eph. vi, 4; comp. Luke

ii, 27],--is a characteristic manifestation of rationality; the brute

needs no education, as it is never destined to become free and moral.

All created beings are, in their essence, naturally good; but it is

only by education that they become morally good, and truly rational and

free. Wherever the morally uncultured and unmatured undertake to

establish liberty, there it soon results in unbridled license, and, as

an attendant thereof, in the coarse tyranny of the stronger. In the

want and requirement of education are implied a recognition and

admission that the entire true essence of the child is not conferred

upon it immediately by nature, but must he first acquired by free

spiritual acts, and that too not by merely individual acts, but by the

spiritual appropriation of the already extant spiritual attainments of

humanity,--by spiritual obedience toward the spiritually and morally

mature. The child cannot educate itself, nor can it on the other hand

simply be educated without its own moral co-operation; but it must

willingly let itself be educated.

Reverence for parents, and, what is only another phase of the same

thing, for the aged in general, is regarded by all nations, with the

exception of the totally savage, as a sacred duty [comp. Gen. ix, 23];

and it is a sure sign of a deep moral corruption of the spirit of a

people where there is a declension in the reverence of children for

parents, and, in general, of youth before old age; and more especially

so when this declension is not undeserved. In a morally-normal

development-course of humanity it is absolutely inconceivable that old

age should so deeply decline as to fall behind the wisdom and moral

maturity of the youth; the superior wisdom and knowledge of divine and

human things would, in virtue of the higher inner and outward

experience, continue to be the imperishable possession of old age; and

it belongs among the most distressing evidences of the sinful disorder

of the human race, that in fact old age does frequently sink back to

childishness, and needs to be taken under the guardianship of the

children. If any one can regard this as the natural order of life, let

him also regard as foolish and groundless the pain which every, not

totally perverse, child's heart experiences at the sight of such a

sinking of the gray head, before which it would fain only bow in

reverence.

Children have, toward their parents, predominantly the duty of

appropriating, which, however, gradually passes over more and more into

a self-forming, though without ever entirely breaking off from the

formative influence of the parents; and the sparing bearing of the

children toward the parents can never, save under utterly corrupted

conditions, be transcended by their formative bearing toward them. The

formative influence of the children upon the parents, that exists

indeed from the very beginning, can, even after they have become

morally mature, assume only a secondary rank. This

predominatingly-receptive relation of the children to the parents is

that of filial reverence [Gen. xlv, 9 sqq.; Exod. xx, 12; Lev. xix, 3;

Prov. xxx, 17; Matt. xv, 4; Eph. vi, 2], the outward expression of

which is obedience [Prov. xxiii, 25; Eph. vi, 1; Col. iii, 20]. Christ

himself is the pattern also in this [Luke ii, 51; John xix,

26].--Children, when entering into wedlock and establishing a new

family, enter thereby indeed into a greater independence of the parents

[Gen. ii, 24], but the bond between parents and children, the duty of

the former to care for the weal and the honor of the latter [Gen. xxxi,

48 sqq.; Deut. xxii, 13 sqq.], and that of the children to show

reverence for the parents, is not thereby dissolved.

The right of parents to obedience, and the duty of children to show it,

are, however, essentially conditioned on the agreement or disagreement

of the parental command with divine will, and can never become per se

and unconditionally binding, For this right is not a merely natural but

a moral one; the merely natural dependence of children on their parents

extends, as with brutes, only so far as the state of actual

helplessness and need extends; the moral dependence, however, is a

permanent one that is never to be dissolved. The moral right of the

parents to obedience rests on the fact that they do not represent their

own individual will, but the divine will. And for this very reason the

guilt of parents is so deep when they misuse their moral mission to

educate in God's name, and lead the child away from God, placing their

own sinful will in the stead of the divine will.

SECTION CXLVI.

Brothers and sisters sustain toward each other, in the same manner as

consorts, though only in morally-spiritual respects. complementing

relations; and their mutual love forms an essential element in the

morality of the family-life; but this complementing is, because of the

predominant like-character of the parties, never perfect and

all-sufficient, and hence brothers and sisters naturally seek for

complementing elements also outside of the family-circle. This form of

love which passes beyond the merely natural communion and freely

selects for itself the complementing personality, is friendship.

Also the mutual love of brothers and sisters is primarily of a purely

natural character and requires to be exalted to a moral one [Gen.

xxxiii; xxxiv; xlii, 24 sq.; xliii, 16 sqq.; xliv, 18 sqq.; xlv, 1

sqq.; 1, 17; Exod. ii, 4 sqq.; Psa. cxxxiii, 1; Luke xv, 32]. Brothers

and sisters can never personally complement each other to such an

extent as that the need of friendship outside of the family-circle

should not arise; they are originally too homogeneous, too similar, to

render attainable that full harmony that both requires, and perfectly

consists with, large difference. Brother and sister complement each

other much more than brother and brother or sister and sister; and they

in fact usually unite themselves more intimately with each other than

do brothers or sisters among themselves; nevertheless there remains

also here, and especially as spiritual maturity draws near, an

unbridged chasm, and there is felt the need of a harmony more

vital--one that is conditioned on a more strongly developed antithesis.

It is not a loveless turning away from the family, but a strictly

legitimate impulse, when the boy and girl seek after outside

friendship. This does not interfere with the family-love, but heightens

it. Friendship is an enlarged brother-and-sister love, or rather it is

its complementing of itself outside of the family proper; it is

brotherly love as resting upon purely spiritual affinity. Hence

friendship is usually stronger in the period of transition from the

original narrow family-circle into new and more independent forms of

life; and on the establishing of a new independent family-circle it is

usual for the friendship of the consorts with others to grow less

strong, and for new friendships to be less easily formed; wedlock-love

occasions an enfeebling of friendship; he who in youth has Wad true

friendships usually turns out to be an affectionate consort; and

friendship with persons of the other sex very readily develops itself

into real sexual love, and is consequently not without its essential

dangers.

SECTION CXLVII.

The necessity of the complementing of family love by friendship,

indicates of itself the reason of the moral impossibility of marriage

between near blood relatives. The instinct that prompts brothers and

sisters to seek friendship outside of the narrower family-circle,

prompts them also to seek for themselves consorts outside of the same.

The requisite antecedent condition of marriage, a difference of the

bodily and of the spiritual peculiarities of the persons, exists most

feebly in near blood relatives; and marriage is, in its very essence, a

free moral communion which does not spring from a natural communion,

but, on the contrary, itself gives rise to this. As marriage

presupposes a moral equality, and is a relation of homogeneous

reciprocal love, hence it would be, between parents and children, a

revolting crime, inasmuch as here the relation of reverence is

insuperable; also, as between brothers and sisters, it is, for all save

the second generation of the race, absolutely inadmissible, partly for

the reasons already given, and ill part because of that deep awe of the

parental blood which holds good also as towards brothers and sisters.

The antecedent moral presupposition of marriage is riot filial or

brotherly love, but friendship.

The obstacle to marriage as found in blood-relationship is one of the

most difficult of ethical questions, not so much, however, because of

any kind of doubt as to its legitimacy, as rather in reference to the

moral grounds for this recognition, which in fact is almost universal

and which prevails in almost all, even heathen, nations. With the

adducing of mere outward grounds of fitness, such as the avoidance of

near-lying temptation, very little is gained; also it is difficult to

establish this prohibition, as a nature-law, from the practice of

animated nature in general, for brutes do not observe it. The grounds

lie deeper and are essentially of a spiritually-moral character. In the

first place, however, a distinction is to be made between ascending and

collateral blood relationship. Marriages between parents and children

and within other ascending and descending degrees of relationship are

an outrage even for our natural feelings in general [Lev. xviii; xx, 11

sqq.; 1 Cor. v, 1 sqq.; comp. Gen. xix, 30 sqq.]. The insuperable

relation of reverence between children and parents [comp. Gen. ix, 23]

renders morally impossible any sexual mingling, inasmuch as sexual

communion rests upon the closest confiding equality of the persons;

whatever conflicts with filial and paternal love is absolutely immoral,

and this would unquestionably be attendant upon sexual communion. The

same is of course true of grand-parents and grand-children. The case

stood originally somewhat different as far as regards marriage between

brothers and sisters; in this respect there occur in the general

consciousness some, though indeed very rare, exceptions. The Peruvians

punished such marriages with death; and yet for political reasons they

prescribed them for their ruling Inca. In the case of the children of

Adam, God made an exception in the interest of the indispensably

essential unity of the human race (� 88). And the unconditional

prohibition of such marriages could only come into force when the

possibility of other alliances was fully realized. In the legislation

of Moses, the sexual mingling of brothers and sisters was visited with

anathemas and death [Lev. xviii, 9, 11; xx, 17; Deut. xxvii, 22]; and

as early as in the time of Abraham such marriages were utterly foreign

even to the heathen consciousness, as is evidenced by the fact that

Abraham, in order to protect himself, caused Sarah to pass as his

sister [Gen. xii, 13; xx, 2]. (That Sarah was really Abraham's

half-sister in the stricter sense is not proved by Gen. xx, 12, as the

expression "daughter of my father" may also designate Terah's

grand-daughter, and it is not improbable that she was the daughter of

Haran, Abraham's brother, and that her earlier name Iscah [Gen. xi, 29]

was exchanged for the title of honor, Sarai [my mistress, my wife]; in

verse 31 she is called Terah's daughter-in-law, which would hardly be

said had she been his daughter; and whatever the facts may be, the

contracting of this marriage falls before Abraham's call.)

The most immediate ground for the inadmissibility of marriage between

brothers and sisters lies in the fact, that though here the requisite

likeness of disposition in the parties does exist, yet on the other

hand there is lacking that degree of difference which is essential to a

vital complementing harmony; brothers and sisters are entirely too

homogeneous in their bodily and spiritual natures to give rise to a

vital, fruitful, reciprocal influencing. Narcissus fell in love with

his own image, and passed, for this very reason, for a simpleton; and

brother and sister are to each other, each, the image of the other. No

sensible man will select for himself as a friend one who is only his

strictly-resembling second-self, but, on the contrary, such a one as,

by his difference, will stimulatingly-complement himself; the same

holds good of husband and wife; of these, because of their constant

uniformity of life in marriage, it holds good in fact in a still higher

degree. This explains also the well-known fact that an actual falling

in love between brother and sister is among the rarest of occurrences,

even under circumstances where moral corruption has taken deep root;

(illustrated in the case of Amnon, 2 Sam. xiii, 1). To attempt to

explain this natural phenomenon simply from the express law is

inadmissible, and for this reason among others, because this law, as

existing among all cultured heathen nations, can in fact be explained

only from a natural conviction, and because this sentiment prevails

even where in general no regard whatever is had to religious and moral

laws. This reason, however, is not fully sufficient, because while

indeed it has reference to, and accounts for, unhappy marriages, yet it

does not explain why some marriages should be regarded as criminal;

and, besides, in many cases, where only too great differences exist

between brothers and sisters, it would not apply at all. A second

reason for this inadmissibility reaches deeper, namely, that marriage

as distinguished from a merely natural communion, must rest essentially

upon a purely moral free choice and act; it exists in its truth only

where it does not proceed from natural communion as developing itself

into complete love, but where it first creates this natural communion;

its purpose is to create love and spread it abroad, and not merely to

affirm a love which is already strong from nature. Blood-relationship

and marriage are two different moral ordinances and bonds, which are

not to be intermingled with each other; marriage looks to the uniting

of a previously existing antithesis by love, and not to the uniting or

ratifying, a second time, of an already existing natural unity. It is

because of this peculiarity that marriage forms the basis of all moral

community-life, and must therefore express in itself the essential

character of this life, namely, purely spiritual love. If the marriage

of brothers and sisters were admissible, then the family would tend to

hedge itself in upon its purely natural basis,--would grow up

animal-like to a merely natural, but not to a purely spiritual,

communion. There is need of the general dissemination of love, as St.

Augustine remarks, and this would be obstructed by the possibility of

marriage between brothers and sisters; and family self-seeking in

narrow-hearted seclusion would become almost inevitable; marriage looks

not merely to the uniting together of two persons, but also of two

families. The moral development of a people as a whole imperatively

requires this breaking down of the walls of family seclusiveness,

namely, the non permission of the marriage of brothers and sisters;

hence this prohibition is of high world-historical significancy.--The

chief ground, however, and one which expresses itself chiefly in our

natural feelings, is reverence for the parental blood which has passed

from the parents over upon the children, and which calls for a

respectful avoidance of fleshly-sensuous enjoyment. Man sees in his

brother or sister not merely the image, but also the blood of his

parents [comp. Lev. xviii, 9; vii, 8, 11 sqq., where this thought is

implied]; and the feeling of reverential awe and shame that springs

from this consciousness precludes any feeling of sexual love. And in

general the feeling of reverence is uncongenial to sexual love; and

when, as not unfrequently occurs, a maiden has stood in a reverential

relation to the man who offers himself to her as husband, there the

transition from this feeling of reverence to that of conjugal love

costs her a severe and poignant struggle.--Where sin has actually taken

deep root, there arise other grounds for the inadmissibility of the

marriage of blood-relatives. But we must confine ourselves here to the

expression of the fundamental idea.

SECTION CXLVIII.

The family is a unitary vital whole also in relation to its moral

property; it is not a mere sum of simply isolated persons of like name,

but a body and a soul--a moral person with a common moral honor and a

possession of its own, in which all the single members participate.

The family has as a living unity, also one spirit, a common moral

life-purpose and a common moral peculiarity; the common life-purpose

consists in the mutual promotion of the moral life in one God-inspired

spirit; the common peculiarity is, spiritually, the moral honor of the

family, and, outwardly, its temporal possessions. The moral

acquirements of one family member, especially of the head, pass over to

the whole family, and the deserts of the parents bear, in virtue of the

divine order of the world, fruits of blessing for the children, and are

rewarded upon them [Gen. xxvi. 4, 5, 24; xlix, 10, 26; Exod. xx, 6;

Deut. v, 10; vii, 9; 2 Sam. ix, 7; xxi, 7; 1 Kings xi, 34; Psa. xxv,

13; xxxvii, 25 sqq.; cxii, 2, 3; Prov. xiv, 26; xvii, 6; xx, 7; Jer.

xxxii, 18; comp. 1 Cor. vii, 14; Rom. xi, 16]; and the sins of the

fathers are visited upon the children, and are for them a shame and a

misfortune [Gen. ix, 25; xx, 7, 17 sqq.; xlix, 7; Exod. xx, 5; xxxiv,

7; Lev. xxvi. 39; Num. xiv, 18; Deut. v, 9; vii, 9; 1 Kings xi, 39; 2

Kings v, 27; Job v, 4; xxi, 19; xxvii, 14; Psa. xxxvii, 28; cix, 9, 10;

Prov. xi, 21; xvi, 5; Isa. xiv, 21; Jer. xviii, 21; xxxii, 18; Lam. v,

7; Hos. iv, 6; comp. Matt. xxvii, 25], and the sins of the children

upon the fathers, as their disgrace [Lev. xxi, 9; Prov. x, 1; xvii, 25;

xxviii, 7; comp. Deut. xxii 13 sqq.],--whereof we shall speak elsewhere

more fully. The consciousness, deeply rooted in all cultivated nations,

of a transmission of deserts; of a moral nobility of family-lines, has

a profoundly moral basis; but this moral solidarity of the family is

conceived even by the Old Testament more clearly and more distinctly

than was ever done in any heathen nation. This is morally a very

weighty thought. Man is made to feel that he does not live and act as a

merely isolated individual, but, on the contrary, every-where and

always as a member of a moral whole,--that the fruits of his actions,

be they good or evil, pass over to those who belong to him and with

whom he is morally connected, and hence that in sinning he commits an

injustice not merely against himself, but also against all whom he

calls his own. So the family is a divine ordinance, so is the

solidarity of moral deserts and guilts such also; this is not injustice

but sacred justice, for the simple reason that man is never a merely

isolated individual. That which is true of the spiritually-moral

property of the family is true also of the material property, and upon

this rests the principle of inheritance.

(b) MORAL SOCIETY.

SECTION CXLIX.

Moral society is the family as enlarged by its own natural growth and

by friendship, but which, in this enlarging, assumes also. an

essentially different character. Social communion differs from

family-communion by the greater retreating into the back-ground of the

natural unity and at the same time of free personal choice; society

itself assumes an objective, and, in some sense, nature-character; and

the place of natural and free moral love is supplied by custom, which

becomes more or less an objectively-valid power over the individuals.

It differs, furthermore, from the family in this, that it involves a

communion of a far more general character, one that absorbs into itself

the individual person far less, and requires and brings about a more

interrupted and only occasionally-exercised moral intercourse of its

members. The members of society sustain to each other the relation of

friendliness, which is larger in extent, but feebler in inner quality

and power, than friendship. That form of love which manifests itself in

friendliness, and which consequently constitutes the moral essence of

society, is the love of neighbor, which, as distinguished from more

intimate love, does not elect its own object, and is not directed

toward particular persons but toward man in general. Social communion

realizes itself through mutual, spiritual and natural, communicating,

of which the latter form is the expression and the medium of the

former. Spiritual communication may, however, take place only within

the limits conditioned by the family, and hence only with some degree

of moral reserve,--should never become family-confidentiality.

The family throws itself open indeed, in a normal state of things, to

and for, society, but it does not merge itself therein,--rather is it

the uniform and indispensable moral basis and presupposition thereof;

it is a morbid state of society that does not rest on the family, but

rather throws it into the back-ground, and more or less assumes its

place. Only the moral integrity and the deep-reaching moral nature of

the family give to society moral vitality; without these elements

society declines to selfish, enjoyment-seeking characterlessness.

Society cannot, from its very nature, require as large a personal

giving up of individual peculiarities as does the family; it rests

essentially on a greater independence of its individual members to each

other,--gives greater scope to the equal right of the individuals to

independent peculiarities, than is the case with unreservedly-confiding

love or reverence; it is made up therefore strictly only of the truly

independent, and hence of the spiritually and morally mature; minors

should belong predominantly only to the family, and should not as yet

enter society; premature ripeness for society damagingly affects not

only the taste for family-life but also the moral character of the

person; and the most common reason for the characterlessness of the

fashionable world, is the too early supplanting of the family-life by

society-life. In society the individuals stand less in a strictly

personal relation to each other,--stand not in the relation of a

special, personal love, personally complementing each other, but rather

as the single members of a more extensive generality. Here each one

sees and loves, in the other, not so much the special personality as

rather simply a single representative of society as a whole. In order

to the exercise of social virtue, not so much depends on the personal

choice of the individual--on the fact that I have to do with precisely

this or that, to me, congenial personality--as on the fact that the

person be simply a member of human, of moral, society in general. Hence

the members of society make also less demands upon each other for

mutual devotion and confidentiality than the members of a family; in

the place of such perfect, mutual self-devotion as the property of

others, come tender deference, politeness, friendliness and

complacency. Politeness, which has nothing in common with

hollow-hearted pretense, is not shown to the person as such but simply

as a member of society, and should not be confounded with a

manifestation of friendship, as this regards only the person. Forms of

politeness are an expression of love, of friendliness, of humble

deference, to another; they are manifestations of honor to whom honor

is due, and it is due to every upright man [Rom xii, 10; xiii, 7; 1

Pet. ii, 17; v, 5; and, for examples, see Gen. xviii, 2 sqq.; xxiii, 7,

12; xxxii, 4, 18; xxxiii, 3, 6, 7, 13, 14; xliii, 26, 28; xliv, 18

sqq.; Rom. xv, 14, 15; etc.].

The boundary lines between the family and society are very delicate,

but also very legitimate; and he who, from a misconception of this

difference, oversteps these limits and demeans himself in society as in

the family, that is, does not show that proper reserve which seeks not

to press itself upon others,--in a word, he who shows himself

over-confidential, is regarded, and rightly so, as indelicate,

characterless, or impudent; and when the person so acting is a female,

she is looked upon as unwomanly or shameless. French gallantry, for

which, happily, we have no German word, is a treating of the female

members of society as if they were family-members; it treats every

maiden as if she were an affianced sweetheart; it manifests the

appearance of love where neither its reality nor the design of

realizing it exists; this is an immoral disintegration and invasion of

the family by society, a breaking down of the limits between them. With

the growth of gallantry the dissolution of the family usually increases

also; and the gallant society-man usually is or turns out to be a very

ungenial husband. That devotion, that full, mutual, spiritual

self-communicating, and that confidentiality, which, within the family

as well as within the bounds of friendship, are not only a right but

also a duty become sinful when shown to society at large. Hence the

personal love that manifests itself in the family is less in compass,

but greater intensity in, than that love of neighbor which extends to

all members of society without exception, as well as also without

choice, and which manifests itself in the equally generally due spirit

of friendliness [Matt. v, 47; Gal. v, 22; 1 Cor. xiii, 4; Eph. iv, 2,

32; Col. iii, 12; 2 Tim. ii, 24; Prov. xii, 25; Ruth ii, 8 sqq.]. He

who loves and treat the members of his family merely with the

friendliness of neighbor-love sins quite as much as he who

promiscuously treats any or every one he meets with as a personal

friend or as a consort; and this holds good not simply and merely of

society as sin-disordered, though of course the difference is here much

greater than in a state of innocence. Christian neighbor-love is indeed

designated as brother-love, and the members of the moral community are

to regard each other as brethren, even as also Christ calls his

disciples his brethren [John xx, 17; Heb. ii, 11] or his friends [John

xv, 13, 14], but this must not be so taken as to do away with the

difference between family-love and neighbor-love; but, on the contrary,

it rather simply implies that the latter is a form of love that is to

be shaped after the pattern of brotherly love proper. Society is to be

progressively more closely allied to the family,--is to be more and

more affectionately and intimately united together on the basis and

after the pattern of the family; and the closer bonds of the family are

not thereby relaxed but in fact confirmed. The Son of man who embraced

entire humanity in his love, loved yet his disciples with a closer love

than he felt for others; and even among the disciples there was one

"whom the Lord loved" by pre-eminence--who lay upon Jesus' bosom; and

also Lazarus was a special friend of the Lord [John xi, 3, 33 sqq.],

although Christ's love to these persons was still always something

essentially other than human friendship--the Friend never predominating

over the divine Master.--Of the distinctions that naturally form

themselves in every society, and hence of the classes of callings, we

cannot as yet here treat, as their sharper separation springs of and

presupposes a sinful perversion of humanity.

As, on the part of the moral person, love in society is more of a

general and, so to speak, impersonal character, so also is this love

met from without by the objective reality of the moral, not so much as

personal love in a personal form, as rather under a general and

impersonal form--as a merely spiritual power, as custom. Custom is

indeed upheld by the individual members of society, but it does not

proceed from them as particular single persons, but rather from the

collective public spirit of the whole. Custom is a fruit of the moral

life, not of the individual, but of the collective public; it is the

virtue of society as peculiarly-constituted; and, as such, it has a

right to be respected by the individual; and the duty of the individual

to conform to custom cannot be limited by mere caprice, but only by the

higher moral law itself and by the legitimate peculiar duty of the

individual subject. It is not requisite, in order to entitle social

custom to the right of being respected, that in each particular case a

definite moral or other rational ground be readily adducible for its

continuance; this is in many cases even impossible; and though, of

course, the custom, if legitimate, must ever have its sufficient

reason, yet this reason is not always a universally-moral one. A

respectful deference for that which has become historical in society is

a high moral duty, provided simply that society itself is not already

morally perverted. The ebullient juvenile vigor of the intensely

self-conscious youth gladly recalcitrates against the historical

reality of society,--is loth to recognize for itself any other limits

than such as are imposed by the general and, as yet, not

historically-determined moral law. The moral law, however, is not of a

merely universal character, but shapes itself in society into a

particular historical form; moral society has the same right to the

forming and retaining of a peculiar character as has the individual

person; and as the individual is entitled to be respected and spared in

his moral peculiarity, so is entitled also, and with still greater

right, the moral collective whole [Gen. xxix, 26]. It is a sign of

moral crudity when individuals disregard social custom in cases where

it is not positively evil, and oppose themselves to it for the simple

reason that they do not regard it as absolutely necessary,--as, for

example, in the style of clothing and in the forms of social

intercourse. It is true, each individual is entitled to his own moral

judgment as to a custom, and an immoral or irrational custom may by no

means be spared or conformed to; on the contrary, there arises here the

duty of reformatorily influencing society itself. But of such a

perverted state of things we are not as yet here treating. The proper

moral respecting of custom is good-mannered or becoming behavior

koomios, 1 Tim. ii, 9; iii, 2]. The female mind embraces the moral more

as an expression of custom; the male more as that of the law.

As all communion of love is a mutual imparting, so is it also with

social love; the basis and at the same time the moral limit of this

imparting or communicating, is the family. The family throws itself

open occasionally for society,--imparts itself to society, welcomes its

members hospitably into itself. Hospitableness or hospitality [Gen.

xviii; xix; xxiv, 31 sqq.; Exod. ii, 20; Lev. xix, 33, 34; Judges xix,

20, 21; Job xxxi, 32; Matt. xxv, 35; x, 41, 42; Luke xi, 6; Acts

xxviii, 7 sqq.; 1 Pet. iv, 9; Rom. xii, 13; 1 Tim. iii, 2; v, 10; Titus

i, 8; Heb. xiii, 2] is properly a virtue practiced not by the

individual, but predominantly by the family. It is the occasional

letting in of society into the family, the outward manifesting of the

love that prevails in the family toward those who stand to us simply in

the relation of members in society. It is only the family that can

exercise true hospitableness--that can constitute a hospitable house;

this manifests itself, even in our present so radically perverted state

of society, in the fact that it is always the housewife who takes the

lead of the guest-circle, and gives it the family-consecration.

Hospitality is one of the first and most natural manifestations of

neighbor-love, hence it is highly esteemed even among many uncultured

nations; it exists always in its highest form where also the family is

preserved in high moral integrity, as, for example, among the ancient

Germanic races. It is a very special and important characteristic of

hospitality, that it is not exercised merely toward friends proper, who

in fact already belong to the outer circle of the family, but also, and

historically even primarily, to strangers who are as yet not known

personally at all, that is, to man simply in his quality of neighbor.

SECTION CL.

The recognition of the moral character of a person on the part of moral

society, is his social honor; each and every one has, normally, a moral

right to such recognition by every other morally honorable person, and

should strive to obtain and retain it. The actual manifestation of

personal honor, as a moral possession, is personal dignity. No honor is

morally valid save in so far as it is, at the same time, honor before

God. The moral society into which the individual is incorporated by

virtue, on the one hand, of custom, by which he as well as the

collective society is influenced, and in which lie consequently

recognizes the morality of society, and, on the other hand, by virtue

of the honor which he enjoys in the eyes of society, and in which

consequently his morality is recognized by the society, is for him his

moral home.

Only he has honor who has acquired a moral character; the characterless

is honorless. Honor is the reflection of the personal character in the

consciousness of society,--is its recognition by the same. Honor is the

reverse phase of love; only the moral man can rightly love, and in

loving he thirsts also to be loved, and hence to be recognized in his

moral personality by others; the immoral man as such is not loved,

because he is not in the possession of honor. Though honor is based on

moral character yet it is not identical therewith,--it is character as

having become objective in the moral consciousness of society. God's

honor is not his holiness and his divine essence themselves, but the

recognition of the same on the part of rational creatures; and as God

vindicates and seeks his own honor [Exod. xiv, 4; 1 Sam. ii, 30; Psa.

xlvi, 10; Isa. xlii, 8; xlviii, 11; Ezek. xxviii, 22; comp. John v, 23;

Rom. xi, 36; xvi, 27], so also the moral man seeks, and rightly so, his

honor, but only such as is at the same time honor before God, namely, a

recognition of his conduct and spirit as those of a child of God, and

hence an honor which is at the same time the witness of a good

conscience before God [Psa. iii, 3; lxxiii, 24; cxii, 9; John v, 44;

xii, 26, 43; Rom. ii, 6, 7, 10, 29; v, 2; 1 Cor. iv, 5; 2 Cor. x,

18],--the pleasures of God in him who loves Him [2 Cor. v, 9; Col. i,

10]. In this sense honor before men and the children of God is a high

good [Psa. vii, 5; xlix, 11; lxxxiv, 12; Prov. iii, 16, 35; viii, 18;

xi, 16; xxi, 21; xxii, 4; xxix, 23; Phil. ii, 29], and to disesteem

such honor is either to think unworthily or to be too high-minded.

Personal honor and social custom condition man's moral home. Society

and country are only in so far a home as they are expressive of the

spiritually-moral life of society. My fatherland is not where I am

outwardly prosperous, but where I enjoy myself morally,--feel myself

vitally at one with a moral community. Mere nature forms a sort of home

only for the savage; a true home is of a spiritual character, and

nature is such only as brought within the sphere of history, as

transformed by man. It is at home that man enjoys his existence; the

far-off is tempting mostly only for him who is as yet in process of

development toward spiritual and character-maturity; the seeking of a

new home is in normal circumstances less an affair of the single

individual than of whole branches of a nation, namely, in cases of the

founding of new colonies; but here in fact the moral home migrates

along. To be shut out from one's home is properly regarded as a severe

misfortune; the declaration that he should be a fugitive wanderer in

the earth was the bitterest element in the curse upon Cain; among

ancient nations banishment was the severest of punishments.

(c) THE MORAL ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY.

SECTION CLI.

As single persons unite themselves into a family and develop in it a

vitally organic life in common, so in turn society unites itself into a

higher-organized copy of the family, into a society-family, into a

homogeneous moral organism,--organizes itself into a real unitary life;

social custom rises from being primarily a purely spiritual, impersonal

power, and becomes a real personally-represented and actually self

executing power,--that is, it becomes social right as expressed in law,

in which form morality becomes for and over the individual an objective

reality and power, and is not a mere formula but is in fact embodied in

and tested and executed by moral personalities. There is no law without

a personal representative and executor of the same.

If at first view society appears as a mere falling apart of the family,

as a loosening of the narrower bond of love and duties as existing in

the family itself, as a dissolution of the family-generated collective

spirit into mere independent individual spirits, as a freer-making of

the single individuals,--and if it is nevertheless, at the same time, a

necessary progress beyond the mere family-life,--still there can be no

resting at mere society and social custom, but society must in turn in

its further development return back to the fundamental character of the

family,--must exalt itself to the ideal of the family and of its moral

organism, even as the plant, when unfolded out of the seed into

branches and leaves, in turn generates again in the fruit the original

seed. This return of society to the family takes place not merely

through the fact that society itself becomes the occasion to constantly

new unitings of families, but essentially by the fact that it itself

takes on the character of a family of a higher grade,--that custom

itself (which rules in society only as a bodiless spirit) assumes full

objective reality, attains to flesh and blood and vital force, so as to

vindicate and execute itself against whatever individual will may

oppose it. Social custom depends for its realization entirely on its

favorable recognition on the part of individuals; it falls away

powerless where it meets with extended resistance; but when raised to

the state of social right or law, it Can itself compel recognition in

the face of such resistance,--can force its opposers to submit

themselves to general rationality as incarnated in the law. Just as

mere custom is society-virtue as sentiment, so is law

society-character,--with firm will-force for carrying itself out.

Custom is, as it were, the heart-rich idealistic bride-state of public

morality; right as enunciated in law is its marriage-state with the

full earnestness of obligation; the former rests on the discretion of

the individual; the latter binds the individual unconditionally and

with the power of active compulsion. That is surely a very bad legal

condition of society where right is accomplished only by coercion and

fear; and the normal condition of society is that where the law is

inscribed in, and a vital force of, every individual heart, and that,

too, as law and not as a mere and, as it were, simply beseeching

custom; and where it does not find free recognition, there it should

not bow its head and suffer in silence, but it has been intrusted by

God with the sword for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise

of them that do well [1 Pet. ii, 14; Rom. xiii, 1-4]. That would be a

bad-ordered family where the father, as against his disobedient

children, merely be, wailed in inactivity,--where he should not

virtualize his true moral love by palpable chastisement; and organized

society has, as the higher-developed family, also the love-duty of

coercion and penal chastisement. Morality cannot and ought not to have

a merely subjective form; it should attain also to objective

reality,--should become a power above the individual person, and that,

too, not as merely conceived, but as having full reality; and this

condition is realized only in the fact that right or objective morality

is not a mere thought, a mere written code, but that it has its

personal upholders and executors; this is not merely human order, it is

divine order.--As the highest form of the moral community-life,

positively-organized society cannot do away with the earlier stages,

the family and society in the larger sense of the word,--but as it is

itself based upon them, it must necessarily contain them within itself,

and foster and promote them. A state which, as was the case with

Plato's, swallows up the family is totally illegitimate and in utter

conflict with the moral idea. That unlimited autocracy of the state

which assumes to be the sole and absolute source of right is a heathen

notion, and, within the Christian world, anti-moral.

SECTION CLII.

The difference, as necessarily existing in every moral communion, of

the morally-advanced and the morally less-matured, and which finds its

first expression in the relation of parents and children, forms also

the basis of organized society. In this society the duty of forming, of

guiding and of educating falls mainly to the former; that of

appropriating and obeying, to the latter. The guiding rests entirely on

morally-religious culture, and aims by general forming to make of

society a moral art-work, a moral organism. The difference between the

guiding or ruling ones and the guided and obeying ones, is therefore

per se strictly identical with the difference between the morally and

religiously higher-developed (the prophets and priests) and the as yet

to-be-developed, namely, the general public, the body of society. In so

far as the moral organism expresses the antithesis of priest-prophets

and people-congregation in the sphere of religion, it is the church; in

so far as it expresses the antithesis of the ruling and the ruled in

the sphere of law or right, it is the state. In a normally constituted

and absolutely sin-free society church and state are perfectly

identical, and the moral organism appears as a theocracy; its definite

popular form would be a fully developed patriarchal state. The

religious and the legal commonalty in their perfect unity are the

morally developed family; and as its inner law and essence are

absolutely the moral law itself, which rules at the same time as a

vital power in the hearts of all its members, hence the

theocratically-organized religiously-moral society is the historical

realization of the kingdom of God on earth, and its perfecting is the

goal of all rationally-moral effort, of the individual as well as of

society as a whole; and the spiritual and moral development of humanity

toward this ultimate end forms universal history.

We have nothing to do here with the actual church and the actual state,

which are both essentially conditioned on, and constituted in view of

combating, sin, but with the ideal moral community-life which is free

of all sin. The family continues to be the moral basis and the pattern.

The inner difference between the guiding and the guided can, in a

sinless state of things, be only of a very mild and a merely relatively

valid character. In a perfect religious community all the mature

members are of priestly character, are invested with the duty of

spiritual guidance; and in a perfect civil society all the mature

citizens participate in the spiritual and moral guidance of the whole;

and the more perfect the collective development of all the members, so

much the more does the fundamental relation of fathers and children

retire into the back-ground, and assume rather the form of the gentler

antithesis of the two sexes in marriage.

As in the normal family, religious and moral life are united, and the

father is also the spiritual and priestly guide of the religious life,

hence in the ideal social organism, church and state are simply one and

the same thing; they are but two absolutely inseparable phases of the

same spiritual life. All religion becomes social reality, and all

social life rests on religion; the normal state is also a church,. and

the true church develops out of itself a corresponding social

community-life,--as was seen in the early Christian church, and as, in

recent times, the Unitas Fratrum, from a correct presentiment of the

goal of Christian history, has partially carried out. That the father

of the people should also be the chief bishop, is implied in the

prototype of the moral commonalty; but whether in this particular the

ideal is to be applied to the very unideal present reality of the

world, it is not here the place to decide. The patriarchal state is the

primitive manner of morally organizing society,--the one most nearly

related to the family prototype; and the family-chief of the closely

related tribe is at once its chief leader and its priest; lie

represents, however, not his single personal will, but the moral will

of the whole, which is in turn itself a faithful expression of the

divine will. For this simple reason the ideal form of the social state

is necessarily and essentially a theocracy; for it is only in a vital

communion with God that the rulers of the people have their right,

their law, their power; and it is not the mere divine law that is the

all-guiding factor, but the living personal God himself, who enlightens

and guides his trusting children, and governs directly through his

prophets and anointed ones. The divine right of a true magistracy is

based on this idea, but is valid as a moral right only in so far as

humble submission to God rules in the hearts of the rulers. The

theocracy of the Old Testament [Exod. xix, 3-6; Deut. vii, 6 sqq.;

xxxiii, 5; 1 Sam. viii, 6 sqq.; Isa. xxxiii, 22] is only a faint shadow

of that which was to have been realized in sinless humanity, and of

which as partially regained through redemption only glimpses are caught

in prophetic vision [Isa. ii, 2; iv, 2 sqq.; ix, 6 sqq.; xi, 1 sqq.;

xxxii, 15 sqq.: lxv, 17 sqq.; Ezek. xxxiv, 23 sqq.; xxxvi, 24 sqq.;

xxxvii, 24 sqq.]. The mysterious phenomenon of the priest-king of

Salem, Melchizedek [Gen. xiv, 18 sqq.; Heb. vii, 1 sqq.; Psa. cx, 4],

like a reminiscence of a long-forgotten better age floating down into a

totally different present,--perhaps the last scion of those who had

remained faithful to the Covenant of Noah outside of the family of

Abraham,--is in some respects the expression of a true theocracy as it

exists in a higher manner only in Christ. With the Israelites royalty

and priesthood were in fact separate; Aaron and David represent the two

sides of the one theocratical idea; Samuel approximated this idea, but

was more a priest than a king. The theocratical form of society was

realized in Old Testament times only in its first beginnings, in the

family-state of the patriarchs. The people of Israel was both outwardly

and inwardly too little at peace both with the world and with God to be

able to sustain a theocratical form of government; it is only in

"Salem" that the Prince of Peace can rule.

The moral commonalty in its double form as church and state is, on the

one hand, a complete preserving and virtualizing of the personal moral

freedom of the individuals, in that the collective will, as manifesting

itself in laws and in the government, is at the same time the will of

the individual, and on the other, a real objective presentation of the

moral idea with a determining power for and over the individual, but

which acts as a limit to the freedom of the individual only when this

freedom has fallen from its harmony with God into irrational caprice.

In the ideal state all morality becomes right or law, and all law is a

pure expression of morality. When this moral commonalty has become a

full reality, then it is the kingdom of God as having attained to

historical form and reality. The kingdom of God comes not, it is true,

with outward show [Luke xvii, 20, 21], inasmuch as it exists primarily

in the hearts of men; but when it has come into the hearts of men--when

God has assumed form within them--then will also the kingdom of God

itself take upon itself a form, and the collective history of the

God-imbued portion of humanity (the true church) is simply this

gradually self-developing form. As soon, however, as sin has entered

into reality, then church and state at once fall apart, and dissolve

themselves in turn into discordant and contradictory subdivisions, and

the kingdom of everlasting peace becomes a plurality of kingdoms of

endless strife. The moral or ideal destination of universal history is,

to be the uniformly undisturbed evolution of the kingdom of God; to

confound its criminal reality with the unclouded ideal, is to deny

ethical moral truth. But universal history, in its pure and normal

form, is the development of humanity as unitary (� 88); of this

humanity the statement would hold good in the most perfect manner, that

"the whole earth was of one language and of one speech" [Gen. xi, 1].

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[9] Rothe appears to have become dissatisfied with this exposition of

the conscience. In his revised edition (Theol. Ethik, 2 Auf., 1867, �

177, Anm. 3) he carries his dissatisfaction with the term conscience so

far as entirely to exclude it from his work. He declares the word as

"scientifically inadmissible," inasmuch as it is devoid of "accurately

determined logical contents;"--it is but a popular expression for the

collective moral nature of man.--Translator.

[10] See, for the Romish view, Thom. Aqu., Summa, II, 1, qu. 108, 4;

Bellarmini, De Controv. Fid. II. 2, De Monachis, c. 7 sqq.--For the

opposite view: Joh. Gerhard, Loci Th., Loc. 17 (De Evang.) c. 15; M.

Chemnitius, Loci, De Diser. Praecept. et Cons.

[11] See the author's Gesch. des Heidentums, i, 141, and his Deutscher

Volksaberglaube, 1860.

[12] Tertull.: Apolog., c. 39; Wuttke: Gesch. d. Heident., i, p. 177.

[13] See Wuttke's Gesch. des Heident. I, pp. 127 sqq., 268 sqq., 311;

II, pp. 64, 343 sqq, 547 sqq.

[14] Compare: Z�ckler, Theologia naturalis, 1859.

[15] Bridgewater Treatises, vol. 9; K�stlin, Gott in der Natur, 1851.

[16] See Wuttke's Gesch. des Heident, II, p. 466 sqq.

[17] Ep. 79 ad Salvin., I, p. 500; ed Vallars.; adv. Jovinian., t. I,

pp. 267, 342.

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\* heis mian sarka: [1570]1

\* agathosune: [1571]1

\* andreia: [1572]1

\* arete: [1573]1 [1574]2

\* hagiasmos: [1575]1

\* hagiosune: [1576]1

\* enkrateia: [1577]1

\* eleutheros, eleutheria: [1578]1

\* elpis: [1579]1

\* isangeloi: [1580]1

\* hopheile: [1581]1

\* hupakoe: [1582]1

\* a: [1583]1

\* agathe suneidesis: [1584]1

\* b: [1585]1

\* g: [1586]1

\* dikaiosune: [1587]1

\* eusebeia: [1588]1 [1589]2

\* thelein: [1590]1

\* koomios: [1591]1

\* kopos: [1592]1

\* kathara: [1593]1

\* kale: [1594]1

\* kalon: [1595]1

\* kopia: [1596]1

\* krinon: [1597]1

\* kolasin echei: [1598]1

\* logismoi: [1599]1

\* mia kardia kai psuche: [1600]1

\* pistis: [1601]1

\* parrhesia: [1602]1

\* pleroma: [1603]1

\* prassein ta idia: [1604]1

\* sarx: [1605]1

\* sunoida: [1606]1

\* sophron: [1607]1

\* sophia: [1608]1

\* suneidesis: [1609]1

\* sophrosune: [1610]1 [1611]2

\* teleioi: [1612]1

\* teleios: [1613]1

\* telos: [1614]1

\* tapeinophrosune: [1615]1

\* phobos Theou: [1616]1

\* phronesis: [1617]1

\* charisma: [1618]1

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\* tvv: [1619]1

\* tvv: [1620]1

\* yd: [1621]1

\* ysr: [1622]1

\* lvv: [1623]1

\* mspt: [1624]1

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Index of Latin Words and Phrases

\* � priori: [1625]1

\* Liberum arbitrium: [1626]1

\* Opera supererogatoria: [1627]1

\* PER SE: [1628]1

\* Reservatio mentalis: [1629]1

\* Summae casuum: [1630]1

\* Ultra posse nemo obligatur: [1631]1

\* Unitas Fratrum: [1632]1

\* aequale temperamentum qualitatum corporis: [1633]1

\* communicatio idiomatum: [1634]1

\* consilia: [1635]1

\* de gustibus non est disputandum: [1636]1

\* gratus, jucundus, suavis: [1637]1

\* habitus: [1638]1

\* liberum arbitrium: [1639]1

\* malum originis: [1640]1

\* neutrum: [1641]1

\* opera supererogationis: [1642]1

\* patres: [1643]1

\* pietas: [1644]1

\* praecepta: [1645]1

\* reductio ad absurdum: [1646]1

\* sanctum sanctorum: [1647]1

\* sapientia et notitia dei certior: [1648]1

\* sensu medio: [1649]1

\* sobrietas, justitia, pietas: [1650]1

\* suum cuique: [1651]1

\* vice versa: [1652]1 [1653]2

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134. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=26&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.1

135. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=26&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.1

136. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=26&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.1

137. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=26&scrV=24#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.1

138. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=27&scrV=26#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.5

139. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=27&scrV=27#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.5

140. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=27&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.1

141. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=28&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.17

142. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=29&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.10

143. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=29&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.10

144. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=29&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p285.1

145. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=29&scrV=26#vi.iii.ii.ii-p303.1

146. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=29&scrV=31#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.2

147. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=30&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.2

148. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=30&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.2

149. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=30&scrV=27#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.1

150. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=30&scrV=30#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.1

151. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=30&scrV=43#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.1

152. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=31&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.5

153. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=31&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.11

154. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=31&scrV=42#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.1

155. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=31&scrV=43#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.11

156. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=31&scrV=48#vi.iii.ii.ii-p289.13

157. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=31&scrV=50#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.11

158. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=31&scrV=55#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.5

159. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=31&scrV=55#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.11

160. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=32&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p301.3

161. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=32&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.1

162. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=32&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.1

163. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=32&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p262.9

164. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=32&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.10

165. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=32&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p201.6

166. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=32&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.1

167. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=32&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p301.3

168. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=33&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p292.1

169. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=33&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p301.3

170. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=33&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.10

171. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=33&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.21

172. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=33&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.2

173. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=33&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p301.3

174. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=33&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p301.3

175. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=33&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.1

176. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=33&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p206.2

177. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=33&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p301.3

178. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=33&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p301.3

179. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=33&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p206.2

180. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=34&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p292.1

181. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=37&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.17

182. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=37&scrV=10#iv.i.i.iv-p2.1

183. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=37&scrV=34#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.17

184. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=37&scrV=35#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.17

185. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=39&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.1

186. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=41&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p181.8

187. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=41&scrV=51#v.i.ii.i-p5.5

188. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=41&scrV=52#v.i.ii.i-p5.5

189. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=42&scrV=24#vi.iii.ii.ii-p292.1

190. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=42&scrV=25#vi.iii.ii.ii-p201.7

191. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=42&scrV=36#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.17

192. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=43&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p201.7

193. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=43&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.17

194. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=43&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p292.1

195. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=43&scrV=26#vi.iii.ii.ii-p301.3

196. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=43&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p301.3

197. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=44&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p292.1

198. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=44&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p301.3

199. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=44&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.17

200. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=44&scrV=30#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.17

201. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=45&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p292.1

202. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=45&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p289.1

203. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=45&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.10

204. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=45&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p201.5

205. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=45&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p201.7

206. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=45&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.17

207. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=46&scrV=30#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.17

208. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=48&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.5

209. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=48&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.17

210. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=49&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.11

211. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=49&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.1

212. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=49&scrV=25#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.1

213. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=49&scrV=26#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.1

214. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=50&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.5

215. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gen&scrCh=50&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p292.1

216. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=2&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.18

217. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=2&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p292.2

218. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=2&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p206.3

219. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=2&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p207.3

220. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=2&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p304.2

221. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=2&scrV=24#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.8

222. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=3&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p162.1

223. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=3&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p163.15

224. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=3&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p160.3

225. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=3&scrV=14#vi.ii.i.ii-p5.1

226. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=3&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p163.1

227. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=6&scrV=27#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.11

228. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=14&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.1

229. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=18&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p285.2

230. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=18&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.6

231. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=19&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p313.2

232. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=19&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.8

233. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=19&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.3

234. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=19&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p181.5

235. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=19&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p182.1

236. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=20&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.12

237. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=20&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.2

238. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=20&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p163.2

239. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=20&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p135.4

240. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=20&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.4

241. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=20&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.2

242. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=20&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p289.2

243. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=20&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p194.4

244. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=20&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p194.1

245. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=20&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p194.4

246. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=21&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p129.5

247. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=21&scrV=29#vi.iii.ii.ii-p129.5

248. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=21&scrV=32#vi.iii.ii.ii-p129.5

249. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=23&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.7

250. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=23&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.5

251. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=23&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p159.1

252. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=23&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p129.5

253. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=23&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.12

254. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=23&scrV=25#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.2

255. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=23&scrV=26#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.3

256. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=24&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.3

257. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=24&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.3

258. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=25&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p163.13

259. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=28&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p181.1

260. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=29&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p182.1

261. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=30&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p163.14

262. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=31&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p127.1

263. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=31&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p126.1

264. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=31&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p126.1

265. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=32&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.20

266. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=32&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.11

267. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=33&scrV=12#v.i.ii.i-p5.1

268. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=33&scrV=17#v.i.ii.i-p5.1

269. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=34&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.3

270. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=34&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.12

271. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=34&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p159.1

272. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=34&scrV=26#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.12

273. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=35&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p127.1

274. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=35&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p127.2

275. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=36&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p126.1

276. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=36&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p126.1

277. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Exod&scrCh=39&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p181.2

278. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=7&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p295.2

279. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=7&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p295.2

280. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=8&scrV=66#vi.iii.ii.ii-p182.2

281. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=11&scrV=44#vi.ii.i.iii-p2.1

282. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=11&scrV=44#vi.iii.ii.ii-p242.3

283. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=11&scrV=44#vi.iii.ii.ii-p163.6

284. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=11&scrV=45#iv.i.i.ii-p2.5

285. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=11&scrV=45#vi.ii.i.iii-p2.1

286. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=11&scrV=45#vi.iii.ii.ii-p242.3

287. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=17&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p217.18

288. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=18&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p294.1

289. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=18&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.18

290. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=18&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.18

291. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=18&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p294.5

292. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=18&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p295.2

293. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=18&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p294.5

294. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p255.2

295. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=2#vi.ii.i.iii-p2.1

296. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p242.3

297. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p289.3

298. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p163.3

299. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p194.2

300. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p73.1

301. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.16

302. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p129.3

303. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.11

304. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=30#vi.iii.ii.ii-p163.16

305. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=32#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.10

306. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=33#vi.iii.ii.ii-p304.3

307. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=34#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.17

308. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=34#vi.iii.ii.ii-p304.3

309. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=35#vi.iii.ii.ii-p194.5

310. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=36#vi.iii.ii.ii-p194.5

311. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=19&scrV=37#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.18

312. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=20&scrV=7#vi.ii.i.iii-p2.1

313. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=20&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p242.3

314. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=20&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p294.1

315. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=20&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p129.6

316. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=20&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p129.6

317. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=20&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p294.5

318. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=21&scrV=9#v.ii-p4.1

319. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=21&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.26

320. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=22&scrV=24#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.10

321. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=22&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.14

322. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=22&scrV=32#vi.iii.ii.ii-p163.3

323. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=25&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.6

324. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=25&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.6

325. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=25&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.18

326. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=25&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.3

327. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=26&scrV=29#vi.iii.ii.ii-p99.1

328. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lev&scrCh=26&scrV=39#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.13

329. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh=6&scrV=26#vi.iii.ii.ii-p226.9

330. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh=8&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p182.3

331. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh=14&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.21

332. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh=14&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.14

333. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh=14&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.21

334. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh=15&scrV=38#vi.iii.ii.ii-p181.3

335. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh=16&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.21

336. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh=31&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p103.3

337. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Num&scrCh=31&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p182.4

338. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=2&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.4

339. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=4&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.4

340. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=4&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.20

341. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=4&scrV=40#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.1

342. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=5&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.15

343. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=5&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.3

344. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=5&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.3

345. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=5&scrV=29#vi.iii.ii.ii-p79.1

346. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=6&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p79.1

347. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=6&scrV=4#vi.ii.i.ii-p3.2

348. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=6&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p66.3

349. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=6&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p287.2

350. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=7&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p313.3

351. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=7&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.9

352. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=7&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.9

353. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=7&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.4

354. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=7&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.3

355. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=7&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.15

356. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=7&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.19

357. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=7&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.9

358. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=7&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.4

359. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=7&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.4

360. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=9&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.9

361. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=9&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.4

362. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=9&scrV=26#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.12

363. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=12#iv.ii-p5.4

364. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=12#iv.ii-p5.10

365. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.23

366. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p66.3

367. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=12#vi.ii.i.iv-p2.6

368. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p11.1

369. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p79.15

370. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=12#iv.iii.i.ii-p14.1

371. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.23

372. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=13#vi.ii.i.iv-p2.6

373. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=13#iv.iii.i.ii-p14.5

374. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=14#vi.ii.i.ii-p3.2

375. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=15#iv.iii.i.ii-p14.4

376. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=16#iv.iii.i.ii-p14.2

377. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=17#vi.ii.i.ii-p3.2

378. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p254.5

379. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=17#vi.ii.i.iii-p2.2

380. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p254.5

381. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=19#iv.iii.i.ii-p14.3

382. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.18

383. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p79.1

384. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=10&scrV=21#iv.iii.i.ii-p14.4

385. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=11&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.4

386. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=11&scrV=1#iv.iii.i.ii-p14.1

387. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=11&scrV=8#iv.iii.i.ii-p14.5

388. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=11&scrV=10#iv.iii.i.ii-p14.3

389. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=11&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p66.3

390. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=11&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p287.2

391. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=11&scrV=26#v.i.ii.iii-p2.4

392. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=12&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.4

393. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=12&scrV=1#iv.iii.i.ii-p14.1

394. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=12&scrV=2#iv.iii.i.ii-p14.3

395. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=12&scrV=7#iv.iii.i.ii-p14.5

396. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=12&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p217.17

397. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=12&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p217.17

398. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=12&scrV=32#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.4

399. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=13&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.4

400. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=13&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.4

401. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=14&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.13

402. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=15&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.4

403. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=16&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.4

404. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=16&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.4

405. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=22&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p206.4

406. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=22&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.8

407. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=22&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p180.1

408. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=22&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.15

409. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=22&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.15

410. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=22&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p129.4

411. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=22&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p129.4

412. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=22&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p289.14

413. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=22&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.28

414. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=24&scrV=25#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.4

415. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=25&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.3

416. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=25&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p194.6

417. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=26&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p113.4

418. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=27&scrV=15#vi.ii.i.iv-p2.8

419. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=27&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p194.7

420. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=27&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p294.6

421. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=28&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.4

422. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=29&scrV=33#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.3

423. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=31&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p287.2

424. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=31&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p287.2

425. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=32&scrV=4#iv.i.i.ii-p2.3

426. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=32&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.4

427. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=32&scrV=39#vi.ii.i.iv-p2.8

428. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=32&scrV=46#vi.iii.ii.ii-p287.2

429. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=33&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p313.3

430. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=33&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.19

431. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=33&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.4

432. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrCh=6&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p207.4

433. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrCh=19&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p304.4

434. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Judg&scrCh=19&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p304.4

435. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ruth&scrCh=1&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p285.3

436. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ruth&scrCh=1&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.7

437. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ruth&scrCh=1&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.12

438. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ruth&scrCh=2&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p302.8

439. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ruth&scrCh=2&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p207.7

440. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ruth&scrCh=2&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p285.3

441. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ruth&scrCh=4&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.5

442. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=2&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p152.1

443. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=2&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.6

444. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=2&scrV=30#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.2

445. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=8&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p313.4

446. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=9&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p201.8

447. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=10&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.14

448. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=12&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.5

449. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=15&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p207.5

450. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=15&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p160.5

451. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=18&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p71.7

452. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=18&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p71.7

453. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=18&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p201.9

454. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=20&scrV=41#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.13

455. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Sam&scrCh=9&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.4

456. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Sam&scrCh=12&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.19

457. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Sam&scrCh=13&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p295.1

458. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Sam&scrCh=13&scrV=30#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.19

459. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Sam&scrCh=14&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.19

460. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Sam&scrCh=14&scrV=33#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.22

461. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Sam&scrCh=18&scrV=33#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.19

462. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Sam&scrCh=19&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.19

463. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Sam&scrCh=20&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.17

464. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Sam&scrCh=21&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.4

465. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrCh=3&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.5

466. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrCh=3&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.12

467. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrCh=11&scrV=34#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.5

468. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrCh=11&scrV=39#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.16

469. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrCh=19&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.8

470. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Kgs&scrCh=5&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p207.6

471. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Kgs&scrCh=5&scrV=23#vi.iii.ii.ii-p207.6

472. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Kgs&scrCh=5&scrV=27#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.17

473. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Kgs&scrCh=10&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.1

474. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Esth&scrCh=1&scrV=8#v.i.ii.iii-p2.5

475. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=5&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.18

476. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=9&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.2

477. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=11&scrV=8#v.i.ii.ii-p4.3

478. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=19&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p285.5

479. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=21&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.18

480. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=27&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p202.4

481. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=27&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p2.15

482. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=27&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.9

483. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=27&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.18

484. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=28&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p79.4

485. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=28&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.2

486. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=31&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p255.3

487. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=31&scrV=32#vi.iii.ii.ii-p304.5

488. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=32&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.i-p3.1

489. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=35&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.9

490. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=37&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p214.3

491. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=41&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p78.1

492. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=1&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.5

493. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=1&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p63.2

494. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=2&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.5

495. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=2&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.15

496. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=3&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.8

497. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=7&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.15

498. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=8&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p220.2

499. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=9&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p263.6

500. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=10&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.1

501. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=15&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p255.4

502. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=15&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p202.6

503. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=18&scrV=31#vi.iii.ii.ii-p81.1

504. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=19&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p214.6

505. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=19&scrV=8#vi.ii.i.ii-p4.1

506. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=19&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.20

507. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=22&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.1

508. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=22&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.1

509. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=24&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p112.2

510. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=25&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p263.6

511. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=25&scrV=8#iv.i.i.i-p2.3

512. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=25&scrV=8#iv.i.i.ii-p2.4

513. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=25&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.6

514. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=25&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.1

515. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=27&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p81.1

516. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=29&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p181.4

517. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=29&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p226.10

518. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=31&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p285.6

519. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=31&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p263.6

520. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=34&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.5

521. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=34&scrV=9#iv.i.i.i-p2.5

522. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=34&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p81.1

523. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=34&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p287.3

524. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=34&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p202.6

525. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=34&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.1

526. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=37&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p81.1

527. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=37&scrV=25#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.6

528. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=37&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.19

529. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=37&scrV=37#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.4

530. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=40&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.5

531. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=40&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p263.6

532. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=40&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p160.6

533. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=40&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p189.5

534. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=45&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p177.1

535. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=46&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.3

536. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=49&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.15

537. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=50&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p160.6

538. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=50&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.1

539. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=50&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.20

540. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=51&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p160.6

541. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=51&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p160.6

542. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=51&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p160.6

543. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=56&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p263.6

544. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=62&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.1

545. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=62&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p263.6

546. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=62&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p81.1

547. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=63&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p149.12

548. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=63&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p142.1

549. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=65&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.1

550. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=66&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.10

551. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=69&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p285.6

552. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=73&scrV=24#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.8

553. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=73&scrV=25#vi.iii.ii.ii-p226.5

554. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=78&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p287.3

555. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=84&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.15

556. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=84&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p81.1

557. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=85&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.14

558. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=85&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.14

559. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=86&scrV=5#iv.i.i.i-p2.3

560. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=86&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.6

561. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=89&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.7

562. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=91&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p263.6

563. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=94&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.1

564. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=97&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p214.4

565. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=101&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p255.4

566. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=102&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.1

567. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=103&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p76.2

568. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=103&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p76.2

569. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=104&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p214.4

570. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=105&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p163.8

571. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=105&scrV=45#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.20

572. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=106&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p152.2

573. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=107&scrV=38#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.6

574. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=109&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.19

575. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=109&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.19

576. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=110&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p313.10

577. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=111&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p214.4

578. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=111&scrV=10#vi.ii.i.iv-p2.4

579. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=111&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p79.3

580. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=111&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.1

581. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=112&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p63.2

582. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=112&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.6

583. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=112&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.6

584. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=112&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p79.3

585. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=112&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p263.6

586. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=112&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.8

587. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=115&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p79.6

588. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=117&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.6

589. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=117&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.6

590. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=118&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p257.13

591. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=118&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p205.1

592. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=119&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.20

593. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=122&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.4

594. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=127&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.7

595. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=127&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p278.3

596. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=128&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p278.3

597. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=128&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.7

598. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=132&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p231.6

599. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=133&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p292.3

600. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=145&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p148.2

601. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=145&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p149.1

602. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=145&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p149.14

603. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=145&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.1

604. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=145&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p148.2

605. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=145&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p149.1

606. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=145&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.1

607. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=147&scrV=5#v.i.ii.ii-p4.1

608. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=147&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p214.4

609. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=1&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p79.2

610. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=1&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.3

611. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=1&scrV=29#vi.iii.ii.ii-p79.7

612. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=2&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.4

613. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=3&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.16

614. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=3&scrV=35#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.16

615. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=4&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.4

616. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=6&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p214.11

617. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=8&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.21

618. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=8&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.4

619. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=8&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p79.2

620. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=8&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.16

621. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=9&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p79.2

622. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=9&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.3

623. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=10&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.20

624. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=10&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.27

625. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=10&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.18

626. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=11&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.16

627. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=11&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.20

628. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=12&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.2

629. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=12&scrV=25#vi.iii.ii.ii-p302.7

630. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=12&scrV=27#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.18

631. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=14&scrV=26#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.7

632. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=14&scrV=34#iii.i.i.i-p8.1

633. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=15&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.2

634. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=15&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.11

635. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=15&scrV=9#iii.i.i.i-p8.2

636. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=15&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.20

637. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=15&scrV=29#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.11

638. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=15&scrV=33#vi.iii.ii.ii-p79.2

639. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=16&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.20

640. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=16&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p79.2

641. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=16&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.4

642. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=16&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p81.2

643. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=16&scrV=26#v.i.iii.iii-p2.3

644. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=17&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.7

645. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=17&scrV=25#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.27

646. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=18&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p201.10

647. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=20&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.7

648. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=20&scrV=12#v.i.iii.ii-p2.1

649. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=20&scrV=27#v.i.ii.ii-p4.8

650. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=20&scrV=27#vi.iii.ii.i-p3.2

651. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=21&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p160.9

652. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=21&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.16

653. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=21&scrV=27#vi.iii.ii.ii-p160.9

654. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=22&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.16

655. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=23&scrV=23#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.4

656. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=23&scrV=25#vi.iii.ii.ii-p289.7

657. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=28&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.27

658. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=28&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.11

659. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=29&scrV=23#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.16

660. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=30&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p289.4

661. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=31&scrV=25#vi.iii.ii.ii-p182.5

662. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eccl&scrCh=4&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p160.8

663. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eccl&scrCh=6&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p135.1

664. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eccl&scrCh=12&scrV=13#iv.ii-p5.3

665. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eccl&scrCh=12&scrV=13#vi.ii.i.iv-p2.5

666. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=1&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p160.10

667. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=1&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.12

668. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=1&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p255.6

669. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=2&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p313.6

670. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=4&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p313.6

671. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=7&scrV=15#v.i.ii.iii-p2.3

672. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=7&scrV=16#v.i.iv.i-p4.1

673. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=7&scrV=16#v.i.ii.iii-p2.3

674. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=9&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p313.6

675. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=11&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p313.6

676. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=11&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p220.4

677. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=14&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.21

678. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=26&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.21

679. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=29&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p149.13

680. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=32&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p313.6

681. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=33&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p313.5

682. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=38&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.22

683. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=38&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p287.4

684. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=40&scrV=26#v.i.iii.ii-p2.2

685. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=40&scrV=28#v.i.ii.ii-p4.2

686. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=42&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.4

687. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=43&scrV=1#v.i.ii.i-p5.2

688. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=45&scrV=3#v.i.ii.i-p5.2

689. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=45&scrV=4#v.i.ii.i-p5.2

690. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=48&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.4

691. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=49&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.13

692. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=49&scrV=23#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.4

693. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=53&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.19

694. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=53&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p214.12

695. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=55&scrV=8#v.i.ii.ii-p4.2

696. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=55&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p142.9

697. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=55&scrV=9#v.i.ii.ii-p4.2

698. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=55&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p142.9

699. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=56&scrV=5#v.i.ii.i-p5.2

700. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=65&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p313.6

701. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=65&scrV=24#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.3

702. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh=6&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p160.11

703. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh=7&scrV=23#vi.iii.ii.ii-p189.6

704. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh=7&scrV=23#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.5

705. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh=17&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p205.2

706. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh=17&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p205.2

707. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh=18&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.22

708. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh=22&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p255.7

709. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh=29&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p142.2

710. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh=29&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p142.2

711. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh=31&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.21

712. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh=31&scrV=33#vi.iii.ii.i-p3.3

713. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh=32&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.8

714. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh=32&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.22

715. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Lam&scrCh=5&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.23

716. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrCh=18&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p255.5

717. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrCh=24&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p181.6

718. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrCh=28&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.5

719. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrCh=34&scrV=23#vi.iii.ii.ii-p313.7

720. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrCh=36&scrV=24#vi.iii.ii.ii-p313.7

721. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Ezek&scrCh=37&scrV=24#vi.iii.ii.ii-p313.7

722. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh=4&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.24

723. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh=6&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p160.7

724. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Hos&scrCh=14&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.10

725. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Mic&scrCh=6&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.22

726. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Mic&scrCh=6&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p11.2

727. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Mic&scrCh=6&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.19

728. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Zech&scrCh=7&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.20

729. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Zech&scrCh=7&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p255.8

730. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Zech&scrCh=7&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p255.8

731. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Zech&scrCh=8&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p202.5

732. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Zech&scrCh=8&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p255.8

733. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Zech&scrCh=8&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p255.8

734. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Mal&scrCh=3&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.11

735. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=1&scrV=25#v.i.ii.i-p5.6

736. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=2&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.22

737. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=2&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.14

738. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=4&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p267.2

739. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p262.11

740. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p238.2

741. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p142.13

742. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p257.5

743. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p203.1

744. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p194.3

745. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p78.3

746. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p194.3

747. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=25#vi.iii.ii.ii-p78.3

748. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=31#vi.iii.ii.ii-p29.1

749. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=34#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.1

750. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=35#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.1

751. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=37#vi.iii.ii.ii-p202.3

752. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=46#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.21

753. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=46#vi.iii.ii.ii-p207.1

754. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=47#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.21

755. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=47#vi.iii.ii.ii-p302.1

756. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=48#vi.ii.i.iii-p2.5

757. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=48#vi.iii.ii.ii-p242.7

758. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=48#vi.iii.ii.ii-p228.2

759. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p149.15

760. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p150.1

761. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p163.4

762. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p152.7

763. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.39

764. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p189.3

765. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.28

766. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.39

767. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p196.1

768. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p196.1

769. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p182.6

770. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.7

771. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p223.1

772. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.7

773. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p223.1

774. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p226.6

775. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=26#vi.iii.ii.ii-p214.7

776. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=6&scrV=33#iv.iii.i.i-p2.2

777. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=7&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p149.2

778. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=7&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.4

779. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=7&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.28

780. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=7&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p201.1

781. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=7&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p254.4

782. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=7&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p189.7

783. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=9&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p160.12

784. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=10&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p33.4

785. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=10&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p33.4

786. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=10&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p214.16

787. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=10&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.15

788. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=10&scrV=37#vi.iii.ii.ii-p75.2

789. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=10&scrV=39#v.i.ii.v-p5.1

790. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=10&scrV=40#vi.iii.ii.ii-p163.9

791. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=10&scrV=41#vi.iii.ii.ii-p163.9

792. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=11&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p238.1

793. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=11&scrV=11#v.i.ii.v-p7.2

794. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=11&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p217.8

795. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=11&scrV=29#vi.iii.ii.ii-p262.3

796. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=11&scrV=49#vi.iii.ii.ii-p163.10

797. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=12&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p26.8

798. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=12&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p26.8

799. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=12&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p160.12

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801. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=12&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p90.2

802. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=12&scrV=50#vi.iii.ii.ii-p189.7

803. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=14&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p101.2

804. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=14&scrV=23#vi.iii.ii.ii-p150.7

805. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=15&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p289.5

806. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=15&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p149.15

807. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=15&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p25.1

808. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=15&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p216.1

809. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=15&scrV=36#vi.iii.ii.ii-p101.2

810. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=17&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p60.2

811. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=18&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p55.1

812. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=18&scrV=3#v.i.iv.i-p4.2

813. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=18&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p262.20

814. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=18&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p55.1

815. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=18&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p262.20

816. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=18&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.18

817. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=18&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.18

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819. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=18&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p150.2

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821. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=19&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p277.1

822. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=19&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p278.2

823. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=19&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p15.3

824. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=19&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.7

825. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=19&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p226.11

826. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=19&scrV=17#iv.i.i.i-p2.4

827. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=19&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.6

828. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=19&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p2.1

829. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=19&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.7

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832. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=19&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p15.1

833. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=19&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p228.3

834. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=19&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.7

835. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=19&scrV=29#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.7

836. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=19&scrV=29#vi.iii.ii.ii-p226.11

837. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=20&scrV=26#vi.iii.ii.ii-p201.2

838. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=20&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p262.4

839. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=20&scrV=41#vi.iii.ii.ii-p304.6

840. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=20&scrV=42#vi.iii.ii.ii-p304.6

841. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=21&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p206.5

842. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=21&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.4

843. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=22&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p181.7

844. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=22&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p254.1

845. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=22&scrV=36#vi.iii.ii.ii-p16.1

846. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=22&scrV=37#vi.iii.ii.ii-p66.4

847. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=22&scrV=39#vi.iii.ii.ii-p73.2

848. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=22&scrV=39#vi.iii.ii.ii-p71.1

849. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=22&scrV=39#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.1

850. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=22&scrV=40#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.1

851. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=23&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p262.11

852. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=23&scrV=37#v.i.ii.iii-p2.9

853. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=25&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p185.1

854. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=25&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p52.1

855. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=25&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.11

856. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=25&scrV=35#vi.iii.ii.ii-p304.6

857. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=25&scrV=37#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.12

858. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=25&scrV=40#vi.iii.ii.ii-p48.1

859. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=25&scrV=45#vi.iii.ii.ii-p78.3

860. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=25&scrV=46#vi.iii.ii.ii-p78.3

861. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=25&scrV=46#vi.iii.ii.ii-p226.11

862. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=26&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p217.11

863. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=26&scrV=36#vi.iii.ii.ii-p150.7

864. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=26&scrV=39#vi.iii.ii.ii-p150.10

865. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=26&scrV=39#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.24

866. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=26&scrV=42#vi.iii.ii.ii-p150.7

867. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=26&scrV=42#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.24

868. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=26&scrV=48#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.18

869. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=27&scrV=25#vi.iii.ii.ii-p297.25

870. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Mark&scrCh=2&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p217.9

871. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Mark&scrCh=2&scrV=27#vi.iii.ii.ii-p135.2

872. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Mark&scrCh=6&scrV=32#vi.iii.ii.ii-p150.8

873. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Mark&scrCh=10&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.8

874. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Mark&scrCh=11&scrV=24#vi.iii.ii.ii-p149.3

875. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Mark&scrCh=11&scrV=24#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.15

876. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Mark&scrCh=12&scrV=31#vi.iii.ii.ii-p73.3

877. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Mark&scrCh=12&scrV=33#vi.iii.ii.ii-p160.13

878. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Mark&scrCh=14&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p129.2

879. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Mark&scrCh=16&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p60.3

880. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Mark&scrCh=16&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p60.3

881. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=1&scrV=38#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.6

882. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=1&scrV=38#vi.iii.ii.ii-p285.4

883. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=1&scrV=40#vi.iii.ii.ii-p285.4

884. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=1&scrV=58#vi.iii.ii.ii-p285.4

885. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=1&scrV=60#v.i.ii.i-p5.7

886. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=1&scrV=75#vi.iii.ii.ii-p242.8

887. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=1&scrV=75#vi.iii.ii.ii-p249.6

888. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=1&scrV=80#vi.iii.ii.ii-p267.1

889. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=2&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p109.1

890. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=2&scrV=27#vi.iii.ii.ii-p287.6

891. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=2&scrV=35#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.23

892. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=2&scrV=44#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.23

893. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=2&scrV=49#vi.iii.ii.ii-p243.1

894. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=2&scrV=51#vi.iii.ii.ii-p289.10

895. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=6&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p150.9

896. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=6&scrV=32#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.22

897. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=6&scrV=32#vi.iii.ii.ii-p207.2

898. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=6&scrV=33#vi.iii.ii.ii-p207.2

899. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=6&scrV=36#vi.ii.i.iii-p2.6

900. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=6&scrV=38#vi.iii.ii.ii-p255.9

901. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=6&scrV=40#vi.iii.ii.ii-p228.4

902. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=6&scrV=45#vi.iii.ii.ii-p109.3

903. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=7&scrV=38#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.3

904. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=7&scrV=38#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.16

905. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=7&scrV=45#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.19

906. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=9&scrV=24#v.i.ii.v-p5.2

907. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=9&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p150.9

908. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=10&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p60.4

909. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=10&scrV=27#vi.iii.ii.ii-p66.5

910. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=10&scrV=27#vi.iii.ii.ii-p71.2

911. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=10&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.6

912. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=11&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.18

913. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=11&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p304.7

914. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=11&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.41

915. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=11&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p239.3

916. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=12&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p226.4

917. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=12&scrV=33#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.9

918. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=13&scrV=24#vi.iii.ii.ii-p257.14

919. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=14&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p236.4

920. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=14&scrV=29#vi.iii.ii.ii-p236.4

921. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=15&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.9

922. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=15&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.23

923. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=15&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.15

924. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=15&scrV=32#vi.iii.ii.ii-p292.4

925. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=16&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.16

926. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=17&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p14.4

927. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=17&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p60.4

928. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=17&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p14.4

929. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=17&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.16

930. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=17&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.3

931. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=17&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p14.3

932. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=17&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p207.8

933. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=17&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p14.5

934. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=17&scrV=20#iv.iii.i.i-p2.4

935. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=17&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p314.1

936. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=17&scrV=21#iv.iii.i.i-p2.4

937. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=17&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p314.1

938. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=17&scrV=33#v.i.ii.v-p5.2

939. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=18&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.18

940. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=18&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p149.7

941. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=18&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p262.10

942. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=20&scrV=36#vi.iii.ii.ii-p242.2

943. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=21&scrV=34#vi.iii.ii.ii-p175.3

944. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=22&scrV=24#vi.iii.ii.ii-p262.12

945. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=22&scrV=42#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.25

946. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Luke&scrCh=22&scrV=42#vi.iii.ii.ii-p189.2

947. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=1&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.i-p3.5

948. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=1&scrV=29#vi.iii.ii.ii-p214.13

949. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=1&scrV=36#vi.iii.ii.ii-p214.13

950. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=2&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p217.10

951. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=3&scrV=36#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.10

952. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=4&scrV=24#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.32

953. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=4&scrV=34#vi.iii.ii.ii-p189.10

954. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=4&scrV=38#vi.iii.ii.ii-p124.12

955. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=4&scrV=47#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.16

956. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=5&scrV=23#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.6

957. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=5&scrV=30#vi.iii.ii.ii-p189.4

958. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=5&scrV=44#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.9

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961. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=8&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p2.7

962. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=8&scrV=32#v.i.ii.ii-p3.1

963. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=8&scrV=32#vi.iii.ii.ii-p108.1

964. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=8&scrV=32#vi.iii.ii.ii-p142.3

965. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=8&scrV=32#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.5

966. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=9&scrV=31#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.5

967. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=9&scrV=31#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.13

968. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=10&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p211.17

969. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=10&scrV=3#v.i.ii.i-p5.3

970. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=10&scrV=17#v.i.ii.v-p5.3

971. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=11&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p302.12

972. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=11&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.38

973. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=11&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p81.3

974. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=11&scrV=23#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.38

975. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=11&scrV=33#vi.iii.ii.ii-p302.12

976. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=11&scrV=41#vi.iii.ii.ii-p150.11

977. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=11&scrV=41#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.37

978. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=12&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p206.6

979. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=12&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p129.1

980. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=12&scrV=25#v.i.ii.v-p5.3

981. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=12&scrV=26#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.9

982. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=12&scrV=43#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.9

983. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=13&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p182.7

984. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=13&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p206.6

985. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=13&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p262.7

986. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=13&scrV=34#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.2

987. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=13&scrV=35#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.2

988. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=14&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p245.1

989. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=14&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p60.5

990. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=14&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p245.1

991. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=14&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.36

992. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=14&scrV=30#vi.ii.i.iv-p2.1

993. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=15&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.2

994. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=15&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p302.11

995. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=15&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p302.11

996. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=15&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.2

997. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=15&scrV=27#vi.iii.ii.ii-p109.5

998. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=16&scrV=23#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.5

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1004. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=17&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.5

1005. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=17&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p152.8

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1007. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=17&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p243.7

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1012. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=20&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p302.9

1013. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Acts&scrCh=2&scrV=29#vi.iii.ii.ii-p257.6

1014. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Acts&scrCh=2&scrV=42#vi.iii.ii.ii-p150.3

1015. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Acts&scrCh=3&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p255.11

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1017. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Acts&scrCh=4&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p109.4

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1035. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Acts&scrCh=17&scrV=26#vi.iii.ii.ii-p57.2

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1037. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Acts&scrCh=17&scrV=27#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.6

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1065. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=1&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.16

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1067. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=2&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.10

1068. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=2&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.4

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1092. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=6&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p175.1

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1095. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=7&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p189.1

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1114. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=11&scrV=35#vi.iii.ii.ii-p78.2

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1116. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=11&scrV=36#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.7

1117. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=12&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p172.2

1118. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=12&scrV=2#vi.ii.i.v-p2.1

1119. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=12&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.7

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1121. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=12&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.3

1122. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=12&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p301.1

1123. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=12&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p149.9

1124. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=12&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p263.8

1125. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=12&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p304.10

1126. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=12&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p262.14

1127. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=13&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p310.2

1128. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=13&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p2.9

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1132. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=13&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p254.3

1133. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=13&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.3

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1135. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=13&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p66.2

1136. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=13&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p175.2

1137. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=13&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p175.2

1138. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=14&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p216.4

1139. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=14&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p26.6

1140. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=14&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p217.3

1141. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=14&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p217.12

1142. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=14&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p113.2

1143. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=14&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p175.4

1144. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=14&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p203.2

1145. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=14&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p216.5

1146. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=14&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p217.13

1147. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=14&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p3.2

1148. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=15&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p26.7

1149. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=15&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p203.2

1150. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=15&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p152.3

1151. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=15&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p263.11

1152. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=15&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p249.12

1153. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=15&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p301.4

1154. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=15&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p301.4

1155. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=16&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p124.1

1156. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=16&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p124.1

1157. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=16&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.24

1158. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=16&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.7

1159. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=16&scrV=27#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.7

1160. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=1&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.7

1161. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=1&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p263.10

1162. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=1&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.17

1163. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=1&scrV=30#vi.iii.ii.ii-p243.3

1164. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=2&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p228.5

1165. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=3&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p124.13

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1168. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=4&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.12

1169. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=4&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.11

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1172. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=5&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p294.2

1173. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=6&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p26.5

1174. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=6&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p277.5

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1176. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=6&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p172.1

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1180. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=7&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p275.2

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1186. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=7&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p41.17

1187. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=7&scrV=23#vi.iii.ii.ii-p39.1

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1228. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=14&scrV=20#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.8

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1237. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scrCh=5&scrV=1#v.i.iii.iii-p3.1

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1252. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scrCh=11&scrV=27#vi.iii.ii.ii-p124.5

1253. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scrCh=12&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.23

1254. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scrCh=12&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.23

1255. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scrCh=12&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p257.8

1256. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Cor&scrCh=13&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.26

1257. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrCh=2&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.2

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1262. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrCh=4&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.16

1263. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrCh=4&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.27

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1266. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrCh=5&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p71.4

1267. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrCh=5&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p73.5

1268. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrCh=5&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.4

1269. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrCh=5&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p302.2

1270. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Gal&scrCh=5&scrV=24#vi.iii.ii.ii-p157.1

1271. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrCh=1&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p242.5

1272. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrCh=1&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p236.3

1273. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrCh=1&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p152.9

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1275. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrCh=1&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p142.6

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1289. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrCh=4&scrV=25#vi.iii.ii.ii-p202.1

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1293. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrCh=5&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.5

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1296. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrCh=5&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.9

1297. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrCh=5&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p142.12

1298. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrCh=5&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.9

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1302. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrCh=5&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p281.3

1303. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrCh=5&scrV=23#vi.iii.ii.ii-p281.3

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1305. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrCh=5&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p275.3

1306. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrCh=5&scrV=28#vi.iii.ii.ii-p277.7

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1312. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrCh=6&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p289.6

1313. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrCh=6&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.11

1314. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Eph&scrCh=6&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p287.5

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1330. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Phil&scrCh=2&scrV=29#vi.iii.ii.ii-p306.17

1331. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Phil&scrCh=3&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p263.9

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1337. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Phil&scrCh=4&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p113.3

1338. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Phil&scrCh=4&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p263.9

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1341. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Phil&scrCh=4&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.29

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1343. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Phil&scrCh=4&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.10

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1348. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Col&scrCh=1&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.11

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1362. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Col&scrCh=3&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p73.6

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1374. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Thess&scrCh=3&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p124.10

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1386. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Thess&scrCh=5&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p163.11

1387. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Thess&scrCh=5&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p149.8

1388. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Thess&scrCh=5&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p76.4

1389. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Thess&scrCh=5&scrV=24#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.8

1390. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Thess&scrCh=5&scrV=26#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.27

1391. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Thess&scrCh=1&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.19

1392. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Thess&scrCh=3&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.9

1393. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Thess&scrCh=3&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p203.8

1394. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Thess&scrCh=3&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p133.2

1395. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=1&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p73.7

1396. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=2&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p149.5

1397. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=2&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p152.10

1398. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=2&scrV=4#v.i.ii.ii-p3.2

1399. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=2&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.12

1400. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=2&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p149.11

1401. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=2&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p130.2

1402. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=2&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p181.9

1403. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=2&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p256.4

1404. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=2&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p303.3

1405. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=2&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p181.9

1406. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=2&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p256.5

1407. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=2&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p286.8

1408. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=3&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p175.7

1409. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=3&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p256.7

1410. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=3&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p275.4

1411. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=3&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p303.3

1412. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=3&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p304.11

1413. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=3&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p257.4

1414. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=4&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p101.1

1415. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=4&scrV=4#iv.i.i.i-p2.2

1416. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=4&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p152.4

1417. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=4&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p25.2

1418. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=4&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p152.4

1419. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=4&scrV=88#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.13

1420. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=5&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p304.11

1421. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=5&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p124.11

1422. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=6&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p257.15

1423. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=6&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p33.6

1424. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=6&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p33.6

1425. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=6&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.13

1426. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=6&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p226.7

1427. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scrCh=1&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p3.5

1428. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scrCh=2&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.10

1429. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scrCh=2&scrV=24#vi.iii.ii.ii-p302.6

1430. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scrCh=3&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.18

1431. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scrCh=3&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p248.1

1432. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scrCh=3&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p228.8

1433. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scrCh=3&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p248.1

1434. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scrCh=4&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.15

1435. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Titus&scrCh=1&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p256.8

1436. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Titus&scrCh=1&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p304.12

1437. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Titus&scrCh=1&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p25.3

1438. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Titus&scrCh=1&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p113.5

1439. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Titus&scrCh=1&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p216.2

1440. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Titus&scrCh=2&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p175.8

1441. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Titus&scrCh=2&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p256.8

1442. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Titus&scrCh=2&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p203.4

1443. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=2&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p302.10

1444. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=5&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p150.6

1445. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=5&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.18

1446. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=5&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p228.9

1447. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=6&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p124.3

1448. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=6&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p206.10

1449. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=7&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p313.9

1450. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=9&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p2.10

1451. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=11&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p141.1

1452. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=11&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p263.4

1453. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=11&scrV=6#iv.ii-p3.1

1454. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=11&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.14

1455. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=12&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p262.6

1456. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=12&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p257.12

1457. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=12&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p243.6

1458. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=13&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.11

1459. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=13&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p304.13

1460. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=13&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p200.1

1461. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=13&scrV=16#vi.iii.ii.ii-p206.10

1462. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=13&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p3.7

1463. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=13&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p152.15

1464. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=13&scrV=21#vi.iii.ii.ii-p189.9

1465. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Heb&scrCh=18&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p163.12

1466. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=1&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p149.4

1467. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=1&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.15

1468. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=1&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.7

1469. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=1&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.16

1470. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=1&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.16

1471. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=1&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.17

1472. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=1&scrV=17#iv.i.i.i-p3.1

1473. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=1&scrV=25#vi.iii.ii.ii-p239.2

1474. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=1&scrV=27#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.14

1475. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=2&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p71.5

1476. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=2&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p73.4

1477. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=2&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.10

1478. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=2&scrV=19#iv.i.i.iii-p5.1

1479. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=3&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p228.10

1480. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=3&scrV=9#v.i.ii.i-p3.3

1481. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=3&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.22

1482. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=3&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.22

1483. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=4&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.14

1484. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=4&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p262.19

1485. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=4&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.7

1486. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=4&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p148.1

1487. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=4&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.7

1488. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=4&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p262.8

1489. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=4&scrV=12#vi.ii.i.iv-p2.7

1490. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=5&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.7

1491. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=5&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.31

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1495. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=1&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.8

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1497. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=1&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p242.4

1498. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=1&scrV=16#vi.ii.i.iii-p2.3

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1501. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=1&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.8

1502. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=1&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.8

1503. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=2&scrV=9#iv.i.i.ii-p2.7

1504. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=2&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p203.5

1505. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=2&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p249.3

1506. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=2&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p203.5

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1508. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=2&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p203.5

1509. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=2&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p301.2

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1513. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=3&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.8

1514. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=3&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.13

1515. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=3&scrV=15#vi.iii.ii.ii-p163.7

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1517. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=3&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p255.12

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1523. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=5&scrV=4#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.16

1524. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=5&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p262.18

1525. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=5&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p301.2

1526. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1Pet&scrCh=5&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p198.28

1527. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scrCh=1&scrV=3#iv.i.i.ii-p2.8

1528. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scrCh=1&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p249.4

1529. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scrCh=1&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p249.4

1530. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scrCh=2&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p217.16

1531. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scrCh=3&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p235.14

1532. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=1&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p109.2

1533. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=1&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p226.2

1534. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=1&scrV=9#vi.iii.ii.ii-p251.1

1535. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=2&scrV=1#vi.iii.ii.ii-p255.10

1536. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=2&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p226.2

1537. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=2&scrV=6#vi.iii.ii.ii-p226.2

1538. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=2&scrV=17#vi.iii.ii.ii-p189.8

1539. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=2&scrV=25#vi.iii.ii.ii-p226.13

1540. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=2&scrV=29#vi.iii.ii.ii-p255.10

1541. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=3&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p243.5

1542. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=3&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p261.13

1543. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=3&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.9

1544. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=3&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p73.8

1545. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=3&scrV=22#vi.iii.ii.ii-p153.6

1546. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=4&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.13

1547. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=4&scrV=7#vi.iii.ii.ii-p73.8

1548. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=4&scrV=8#vi.iii.ii.ii-p76.1

1549. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=4&scrV=11#vi.iii.ii.ii-p76.5

1550. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=4&scrV=12#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.12

1551. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=4&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.12

1552. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=4&scrV=18#vi.iii.ii.ii-p79.14

1553. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=4&scrV=19#vi.iii.ii.ii-p76.5

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1557. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=5&scrV=2#vi.iii.ii.ii-p197.15

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1562. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrCh=2&scrV=3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p124.6

1563. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrCh=2&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p83.18

1564. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrCh=2&scrV=10#vi.iii.ii.ii-p253.13

1565. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrCh=3&scrV=5#v.i.ii.i-p5.4

1566. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrCh=14&scrV=5#vi.iii.ii.ii-p202.7

1567. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrCh=14&scrV=13#vi.iii.ii.ii-p124.6

1568. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrCh=22&scrV=14#vi.iii.ii.ii-p239.4

1569. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=15&scrV=14#v.i.ii.iii-p2.7

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1571. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p249.11

1572. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p257.1

1573. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#iv.i.i.ii-p2.6

1574. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p249.1

1575. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p243.2

1576. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p249.9

1577. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p256.2

1578. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#v.i.ii.iii-p2.2

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1593. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p2.6

1594. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p2.5

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1607. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p256.6

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1614. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p228.12

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1627. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#vii-p450.1

1628. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#iv-p0.3

1629. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#vii-p524.1

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1636. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p111.1

1637. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#iv.i.i.i-p2.8

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1644. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#vi.iii.ii.ii-p265.2

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1656. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#i-Page\_iii

1657. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#ii.i-Page\_iv

1658. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#ii.i-Page\_v

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1660. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#ii.ii-Page\_vii

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1666. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#ii.ii-Page\_xiii

1667. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#ii.iii-Page\_xiv

1668. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics2/cache/ethics2.html3#ii.iii-Page\_xv

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