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CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

BY DR. ADOLF WUTTKE,

LATE PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY AT HALLE.

WITH A SPECIAL PREFACE,

BY DR. RIEHM,

EDITOR OF THE "STUDIEN UND KRITIKEN."

TRANSLATED BY

JOHN P. LACROIX.

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LETTER OF AUTHORIZATION.

DECLARATION.

WE, the representatives of the family of the late Dr. Adolf Wuttke,

Professor of Theology at Halle on the Saale, have thankfully accepted

the proposition of Professor JOHN P. LACROIX to translate into English

the deceased author's Christliche Sittenlehre (Wiegandt & Grieben,

Berlin, 1864-5), and we gladly second the wish of the esteemed

translator by expressly and formally authorizing him, on our part, to

publish the work in the English language.

MRS. PROFESSOR WUITTKE,

DR. EDUARD RIEHM,

(as Guardian of the children).

HALLE, March 8, 1872.

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NOTE OF TRANSLATOR.

IN my labor upon this translation I have aimed at the truest practical

reproduction, sentence by sentence, of the thoughts of the author. This

method I deliberately preferred, rather than incur the risk of

impairing the clearness of thought by entirely recasting the forms of

speech. In a few cases I have employed unusual compounds, rather than

resort to paraphrases or to an undue multiplication of subordinate

clauses. On the whole, I am persuaded that those who are best

acquainted with the difficulties of the original will be most indulgent

toward the style of the version. This first volume, although only the

Introduction to the entire work, is yet a complete whole in itself,

viz., a survey of the whole current of the ethical thought of humanity

from the earliest dawn of scientific reflection down to the latest

results in Christian theology.

The motives that led me to undertake the translation have beep various.

Esteemed teachers exhorted me thereto, as soon as notices of the work

began to appear. German scholars spoke to me enthusiastically of its

unparalleled excellence. My chief motive, however, has been a compound

of gratitude and hope,--gratitude to the devout thinker whose work had

been, to me, the medium of so much spiritual good,--and a hope of

helping others to the same good. For, in fact, no other human

production has lifted, for me, so many vails from shadowy places in

Revelation and Providence; none has worked so effectually in

definitively directing. my mind and heart toward that Light which

stands, serene and ever-brightening, over against the comfortless

spectacle of the successive and rapid extinguishment of every effort at

social reform which does not kindle its torch at the central Source of

all light. And no labor that I have ever performed has been attended

with such a joyous consciousness that the very toil itself was

self-rewarding.

As to the specific merits of the work, I am happy to refer the reader

to the considerate words of the distinguished theologian of Halle, Dr.

Riehm, in the special preface which he has prepared for this

translation. I could also, were it desirable, fill many pages with

words of highest praise from the most respectable and the most diverse

sources. And the praise is bestowed not only upon its scientific worth,

but largely also upon the spirit of its author. All critics accord in

testifying that we have to do here with a man singularly endowed with

keenness of philosophic insight and with devoutness of Christian faith.

Whether, however, there is need here in America--where there is so

strong a proclivity to run away after every glittering theological or

social novelty, and where there are so many evidences that the general

consciousness both of preachers and of people is not thoroughly enough

grounded upon the central truths of the Gospel--of a work such as this

(a work which, in so masterly a manner, brings the whole moral life

into vital relation to its only possible Source, and which sweeps away

so thoroughly every social or religious theory which does not stand the

touch-stone of plain Bible-truth), it is for others to judge. We have

been led to augur favorably, however, both from our own studies in the

field and also from the expressed views of many of our most progressive

teachers of ethics, viz., that there is a loud call for something more

solidly philosophical and more thoroughly evangelical than is afforded

by our common text-books on Moral Science; [1] and we feel pretty

confident that few who once drink of the fresh thought-stream here

opened will be disposed to dissent from the well-known utterance [2] of

Dr. Hengstenberg, that Wuttke's Ethics ought to have its place in every

pastor's library.

J. P. L.

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[1] See Dr. Warren's Introduction to Vol. II.

[2] See Evangelische Kirchenzeitung, (Berlin), Sept. 4, 1861.

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SPECIAL PREFACE TO THIS TRANSLATION. [3]

THE author of the work which here appears in English, Dr. Carl

Friedrich Adolf Wuttke, has won for himself a distinguished place in

the evangelical Church and theology of Germany. A few items as to his

life and activity, and as to the spirit and character of his endeavors,

may serve to call attention to a work which is widely circulated and

much read throughout Germany.

Born in Breslau, November 10, 1819, in humble life, the young Wuttke

obtained his preparatory education under circumstances of great

difficulty and self-denial. In 1840 he entered the University of

1reslau in view of studying theology, but he found very little

satisfaction in the theology that was there taught. The superficial

Rationalism which then prevailed in Breslau violently repelled him, and

drove him at once and forever to a position of antagonism to this

stand-point. As neither his religious nor his scientific wants found

satisfaction in his theological teachers, he endeavored to satisfy the

latter, at least, by turning his attention primarily and chiefly to

philosophy. To this end he possessed dialectic talents of unusual

excellence, and he received from the celebrated and, then, fully mature

Braniss fruitful inspiration. His academic career he began in 1848, in

Breslau, as Doctor and privat-docent of philosophy. His preferred field

was the Philosophy of Religion. This led him to thorough studies in the

history of reliions. A fruit of his studies he has embodied in his

"History of Heathenism in respect to religion, knowledge, art, Morals

and Politics, (Breslau, 1852-53),--a work which established his

reputation as a scholar. Utilizing his extensive acquaintance with the

historical material, his chief endeavor was to give here a faithful

objective presentation of the subject-matter, and to avoid doing it

violence by forcing it into harmony with preconceived theories,--and

his success was so great as to obtain for him the warm recognition,

among others, of that master of Indian antiquities, Dr. A. Weber of

Berlin. At the same time, however, he was also able to present the

religioso-historical matter in a clear synoptical order, and to

elucidate it from higher religioso-philosophical stand-points.

The more he pursued his studies in the history and philosophy of

religions, so much the more fully and renewedly he became convinced

that the highest and the only soul-satisfying knowledge of the truth is

to be found only by merging one's self into the Holy Scriptures and

into the therein-witnessed revelations of the living God; hence he felt

himself more and more attracted back to the field of theology. In 1853

he obtained the degree of Licentiate in Theology, and changed his field

of instruction from philosophy to that of theology; having been called

to Berlin, in November, 1854, to an extraordinary professorship of

theology, he found an enlarged and appreciative sphere for the exercise

of his gifts.--In virtue of his firm and independent nature--partly

inborn and partly developed in the severe school of experience--he felt

also a pressing need of a firmly-based construction of his theological

views, and of a clear, distinct, and unambiguous expression of the

same. This need was in part met by the Lutheran form of doctrine. It is

true, he saw very clearly the defects and imperfections which a

scientific construction and demonstration of this doctrinal formula

bring to light; taking into consideration, however, its essential

features, he found in it the purest and truest didactic presentation of

evangelical truth. [4] To preserve this form of the truth in its main

features, and by his own deeper study of the Scriptures as well as by

earnest systematic thought so to raise it to a new scientific

construction that it should express the truth of the Bible in a still

richer degree, and that in its form and demonstration it should answer

the requirements made upon it by the present stand-point of theology

and philosophy, and that it might be raised to a more full development

also in fields wherein it had as yet attained only to an imperfect and

very inadequate expression,--such was the life-task to which Dr. Wuttke

felt himself, with ever-deepening conviction, called by God. And this

life-task he endeavored, in the greatest conscientiousness and in the

most unwearied and exhausting labor, to fulfill. And the animating

spring of his labor was the consciousness so repeatedly expressed by

him, that theology is intrusted with the preservation of sacred

treasures. Fidelity in preserving the intrusted truth-treasure,--such

is the animating spirit of his theologico-scientific labor; and with

this fidelity are connected the limits and imperfections of the same.

In this fidelity he was earnestly resolute, even in the face of the

coryphei of theological and philosophical speculation, in rejecting all

views and thought-constructions which seemed to him foreign to the

spirit of the Holy Scriptures, however much they might seem to he

characterized by profundity or by loftiness of thought, and however

much they might bedazzle by brilliant ingenuity and by their artful

application to Biblical ideas. This fidelity made him a decided.

opponent of all efforts which he regarded as bent on seeking an

accommodation between faith and unbelief. In this fidelity he

deliberately consented to sacrifice the favor and approbation of the

majority of his contemporaries; and he neglected no opportunity, where

he felt the duty of championing the pure evangelical truth and of

assailing perversions and misrepresentations of the same, manfully and

with open visor to enter the lists, and to fight it out with keen

weapons and without respect of persons. It is true he has, in his

earnestness, not always awarded due honor to the views of the

ideally-inclined theologians, nor to the results of historical and

critical Scripture-examination. For his own person, however, he was, in

this work, never concerned, nor for the interests of any party, but

solely and simply for Christian truth and for the kingdom of God.

In this sense and spirit he exercised his office of theological teacher

in Berlin. One can well imagine how glad the late Dr. Hengstenberg was

to have found in him so able a co-laborer, and also that he became

warmly and intimately attached to his younger colleague. [5] But also

the other members of the Berlin faculty, though in part of different

churchly. and theological tendencies, fully appreciated his scientific

ability and his faithful and fruitful academic activity; and they

expressed their esteem publicly by conferring upon him, in 1860, the

doctorate of theology.

In the autumn of 1861 he accepted a call to an ordinary professorship

of systematic theology in our university at Halle. Although, as the

representative of a strictly churchly theology, he stood here somewhat

isolated, still the positive evangelical tendency (a tendency based on

faith in the revelations and redemptive acts of God as witnessed in the

Scriptures) of the other members of the faculty (and among them the

universally known and revered Dr. Tholuck) afforded a broad and firm

basis for a richly productive official co-operation. Highly esteemed by

his colleagues for his straight-forwardness, reliableness, punctuality,

and conscientious fidelity in all his official duties, he exercised,

here, his calling as teacher in a circle of hearers, at first

relatively narrow, but which soon grew visibly larger, especially in

the case of his lectures on Christian ethics; and he had the joy of

seeing the seed, he had sown, spring up and bear fruit in many youthful

hearts,--until on the 12th of April, 1870, after a brief sickness, it

pleased the Lord whom he served to permit him, unexpectedly early, to

pass from faith to sight.

Along-side of his more specific professional activity, Dr. Wuttke was

always ready to serve the church by special addresses, in

ecclesiastical and other assemblies, on weighty questions of the day.

Quite a number of these addresses have been published in Hengstenberg's

"Evangelical Church Journal." To one of them, which was delivered in

1858, at a church-diet at Hamburg, is due the preparation of his

widely-popular and excellent work, "The German Popular Superstition of

the Present," which appeared in 1860 in its first, and in 1869 in a new

and enlarged second, edition. This work combines laborious selection

with a lucid grouping of the abundant material, and is inspired by a

vital interest for the health of the German national life and for the

healing of its defects by the divine power of the Gospel.

For the judgment and appreciation of some portions of the work here

presented to the public, it will not be out of place to observe that

the author took a lively and active part also in the political life of

the nation. As early as during the revolutionary storm of 1848 he

defended for a while, as editor of a conservative journal in

K�nigsberg, the cause of legal order and of the government. And during

his activity among us,--though in other respects living in the greatest

seclusion,--he frequently appeared publicly, in political meetings in

Halle and in other towns of the province of Saxony, as the spokesman of

the constitutional party; and once he took part also in the labors of

the national diet, to which the confidence of his fellow-citizens had

called him.

The work here given to the English-reading public, Christian Ethics,

which appeared in 1861-'62 in its first, and in 1864-'65 in its second,

revised and enlarged, edition, is Dr. Wuttke's only considerable

theological work. He has here entered upon a field, the cultivation of

which, his special life-task as above indicated, must have pressed upon

him with very great urgency. Upon no other field had the scientific

treatment of the theology he represented, remained to such a degree

imperfect and unsatisfactory. Although Christian ethics, after the

precedent of Danaeus on the Calvinistic side, had been raised by

Calixtus to the dignity of an independent theological science,

nevertheless the prevalent one-sidedly dogmatic interest hindered and

prevented its thorough development. And when finally, since the last

decade of the last century, a more lively scientific interest was

turned to the subject, then, unfortunately, Christian ethics became

involved in an almost slavish dependence upon the philosophical systems

of a Kant, a Fichte, a Fries, a Hegel, and a Herbart, as they

successively rose and followed each other. From this cramping pupilage,

ethics was indeed emancipated by the Reconstructor of the collective

body of German theology, Schleiermacher, and also radically renovated

from the basis of the specifically Christianly-ethical principle. But

in Schleiermacher, as well as in Rothe, Christian ethics appeared

rather in the garb of theologico-philosophical speculation; it was not

based directly upon the Holy Scriptures; on the contrary, these highly

deserving men endeavored to be just to the positive Biblical basis of

evangelical Protestantism by undertaking to reconstruct the contents of

the Holy Scriptures directly out of the Christian consciousness; in a

word, these ethical systems stood in no manner of close connection with

ecclesiastical dogmatics. On the other hand, Harless had produced an

ethics based directly upon, and derived from, the Scriptures; but in

his method he had disdained the learned structure and the dialectical

procedure of modern science. Wuttke was the first theologian who made

the attempt, upon the foundation [6] of the Lutheran dogmatical

ground-views as enriched and vitalized by personal self-immersion in

the study of the Scriptures, to carry out, by means of the dialectical

method, (which theology had assumed at the time of the supremacy of

philosophy), a strictly scientific, organic structure of Christian

ethics, which should embody in itself the fruits of precedent labors

upon this field, and also polemically elucidate its relation to the

various other ethical systems. In this work, however, he makes no other

use of this dialectical method than simply to purify theological ethics

from all elements foreign or hostile to the Biblico-ecclesiastical

ground-thoughts, and to bring these ground-thoughts to more complete

expression by process of inner self-development. Hence the great

majority of churchly-minded theologians could, with great reason,

welcome in Wuttke the, until then, lacking scientific standard-bearer

upon the field of ethics; and consequently his work met with an

astonishingly rapid circulation and a thankful reception. But also

those who--as the writer of this preface [7] --stand in many respects

upon the ground of other theological convictions, and who do not fully

agree with many views and judgments expressed in the work, have every

reason highly to prize this system of Ethics, and for the following

reasons: because of its firm Biblical foundation,--because of its sharp

and clear vindication and presentation of the ethical ground-thoughts

of the Holy Scriptures against, and in the face of, various widespread

errors and prevalent thought-currents of the day,--because of its

thoroughly carried-out aim, in connection with all the rigor of a

scientific method, to present in broad and clear light the sublime

directness and simplicity of the truth of the Gospel,--because of the

richness of the subject-matter which it presents, and--to mention

especially one single feature--because of the exceedingly valuable, and

hitherto almost entirely lacking, history both of the science of ethics

and also of the ethical consciousness itself.

I doubt not, therefore, that this work will meet with a hearty welcome

also in America and in England, and that too in theological circles

which, while not sharing the special ecclesiastical views of the

author, will yet not fail worthily to appreciate his conscientious

fidelity to Scripture-truth and the scientific significancy of his

labors; and I feel confident that the work will prove serviceable in

the promotion of a healthy and practically-fruitful theological

knowledge.

DR. EDUARD RIEHM,

Professor, in ordinary, of Theology at Halle.

HALLE, March 14th, 1872.

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[3] Dr. Riehm, who has kindly furnished me this general preface, and to

whom I am indebted for many valuable suggestions in regard to my

undertaking, is one of the professors of theology at Halle, and also

editor-in-chief of the Studien und Kritiken.--Tr.

[4] As a German Protestant, Dr. Wuttke had practically only two choices

in his Church-relations, namely, between the Lutheran Church and the

Reformed or Calvinistic Church. The so-called "United" Church of

Prussia has little more than a legal existence, the individual

societies having mostly remained essentially Lutheran or Reformed, as

before the union.--TR.

[5] Dr. Wuttke, however, was free from the ultra-confessionalism of

Hengstenberg; he even favored the "Union." See Neue evangelische

Kirchenzeitung of May 7, 1870.--Tr.

[6] That in the construction of his ethical system, Dr. Wuttke did not

allow the Lutheran symbols to construe the Bible, but on the contrary

measured them by the Bible, and freely criticized them where found

defective, we have both his own reiterated avowal (as where, � 80, he

declares it his purpose to write, not on ethics of this or that Church,

but a Christian Ethics; and where, in his preface, p. 4, he declares

the governing principles of his labors to be "honest loyalty to the

Gospel"); and also his actual contrasting of the Lutheran and the

Reformed ground-views (see � 37), and his ample admission that the

Lutheran view needs to be complemented.--Tr.

[7] I am indebted to Dr. P. Schaff for the following: "Dr. Riehm is a

liberal Unionist of the critical school of Hupfeld, his

predecessor."--Tr.

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION.

THE theology of the nineteenth century has aimed at giving special

prominence to the ethical phase of Christianity; and yet, strangely

enough, the scientific treatment of Christian ethics has shown, as

compared to the other branches of theology, a far inferior

productiveness, and in fact a degree of barrenness. This phenomenon is

not explainable from any precedent over-fruitfulness. nor from any

unquestioning satisfaction with any already-attained

relatively-definitive perfection of the science, nor from the imposing

pre-eminence of any exceptionally great author; on the contrary, every

competent theologian knows perfectly well that no other branch of

theology is so far from having reached any, even relatively, settled

completeness and generally-accepted form and contents, as precisely the

science of ethics. Even the very idea, contents, and boundaries of

ethics, are as yet in many respects so unsettled that the different

presentations of the science have often only very remote resemblances

to each other; and there are some recent theologians who look upon the

ethical field as something like an ownerless primeval forest wherein

they are at liberty to roam at simple discretion and to give free scope

to all sorts of pet speculations. We would of course not wish to shut

the field of theology against philosophical thought; on the contrary,

we regard its scientific completion as possible only on condition of

its permeation with mature philosophical thought-labor. In view,

however, of the not only manifold, but also (in very deep-reaching and

essential ground-principles) self-contradicting philosophical systems

of the time, we could not advise Theology--that guardian of sacred

treasures--to cast itself away, in characterless self-forgetfulness,

into the arms of the first transiently-shining philosophical system,

and to seek its glory only in a pliable self-conformity to the

rapidly-passing Protean forms of the philosophies of the day.

Remarkable indeed, though not precisely very praiseworthy, is the

metamorphic capability of those theologians who have kept pace in their

theology with the entire history of philosophy from Kant down to Hegel,

and have furnished the public at each decade with an entirely different

form of theology. It is not scientific truthfulness to attempt

violently to force together irreconcilable elements; and it is high

time that the day were past when men presume to introduce Spinozistic

and other kindred Hegelian conceptions into Christian ethics as its own

contents proper. We fully recognize the high services of precisely the

latest forms of philosophy, for the science of ethics; but we must

guard against allowing theological ethics, as conscious of its divinely

revealed contents, and as basing itself upon the holy Scriptures, to be

cramped and thrown into the background by these philosophical systems.

Precisely the most recent developments in this field justify us in

entertaining, at this point, a prudent distrust. The manner in which

some have introduced philosophical, or a so-called "theological,

speculation" into the field of Christian ethics, reminds one only too

much of the feats of the suitors of Penelope in the house of Ulysses,

who presume to cast their footstools at the head of the returning

master, and yet prove incapable even of bending the bow of the hero, to

say nothing of shooting through the twelvefold target.

What we attempt in the present work is neither speculative ethics nor

yet Biblical ethics in the sense of a purely exegetico-historical

science, but, in fact, a system of theological ethics based on the

substance and spirit of the Bible, and constructed into a scientific

form, not by the help of a philosophy foreign to that spirit, but by

the inner self-development of the spirit itself. Whether we have

properly comprehended this spirit, and whether we have faithfully

learned from the general history of science, including also philosophy,

others will have to judge; this much, however, we know, that we have

endeavored to acquire such learning only in honest loyalty to the

Gospel. And the fact that we have omitted to employ many technical

forms that have been imposed upon this science by ingenious authors,

will, we hope, be regarded, by those who have grown familiar with said

forms, as at least an indication of a sincere endeavor on our part to

avoid breaking the impression of simple evangelical truth by any

element foreign to the spirit of the Scriptures, however much it may

enjoy the prestige of profundity, and however artfully it may have been

fitted upon Christian ideas.

BERLIN, Dec. 31, 1860.

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

TO THE SECOND EDITION.

WITHIN a surprisingly brief period a new edition of this System of

Ethics has become necessary.

To many critics of' the work we feel ourselves thankfully indebted; of

others, however, we regret to have to say that, instead of scientific

earnestness, they have manifested only passionate hostility. It is

true, we have gone at our work with honesty and plainness of speech,

and have touched somewhat ungently upon certain sore places in the more

recent forms of theology; and the tone of ill-will in which the

opposers have indulged would seem to indicate that the right spot has

been probed; and we are in fact cheerfully ready to be subjected to the

most searching criticism. There is an immense difference, however,

between actual confutation and unworthy abuse. Some critics have

charged this work with being an "attentat" against the "inalienable"

conquests of modern science; this sounds almost as badly as when, in

times past, a certain class of theologians spoke of "attentats" against

the teachings of the Church and against the symbolical books. There is,

in fact, in the field of contemporary unbelief both an "orthodoxy"

which does not stand a whit behind the intolerance of former and much

despised ages in its hereticating of dissenters, and an authority-faith

in the so-called "heroes" of contemporary science, which exalts the

pretentions of the said science to infallibility in exact proportion as

it is zealous against a real faith in the Scriptures, and tramples

their claims into the dust. Just such a deference to writers who let

only their own light shine, (a light kindled not at the divine light,

but only at the faintly-shining wisdom of the anti-Christian world,)

still weighs down like an Alp upon the theology of the present day, and

especially upon ethics; and to do battle against a spiritual despotism

of this character, must be to take a step in the direction of true

progress. Incredulity constitutes, in fact, in our day no slight

recoinmendat4on; will the public, therefore, not let us enjoy the

advantage of a little incredulity as to the Apostolical calling of

certain recent authors who have forced the Pantheism of Spinoza into

the doctrines of Christianity? We are not unaware, however, that only

that one can hope for favor and popularity with the multitude of

to-day, who makes amends for his faith in the living Christ by strewing

incense upon the altars of the divinities of recent literature,--who

fuses together the Apostolical doctrines with the unquestioningly

infallible-assumed "results of modern culture,"--in a word, who selects

the golden middle-way between simple evangelical faith and God-denying

unbelief: the tints just now in vogue are indefinite and indesignable.

We frankly confess that, in scientific respects, we can less readily

come to an understanding with this nondescript olla-podrida theology

than with those who make a clean sweep of Christianity at once. Upon

firm earth one can walk erect, in water one can swim; but in a miry

marsh, which mingles earth and water together, one can neither walk nor

swim. We must submit to let those who imagine that they stand or swim

upon the heights of "modern" culture look disdainfully down upon us,

and reproach us with not being abreast with the times; let them do that

to which they are called; we, however, have a sure prophetic word, and

we think we do well to give heed to it as to a light that shines in a

dark place, until the day dawn and the morning-star arise in the hearts

of all, [2 Peter i, 19]; and we feel confident that in so doing we have

chosen the "good part, which will not be taken from us" when the

specious fruits of the un-Christian culture of the day shall be swept

away, without leaving a trace, by the streams of still newer progress.

To those to whom appreciation for recent science is synonymous with an

unconditional homage to every pretentiously-rising system, we must be

content to appear as non-appreciative; meantime, however, may we not

suggest that these gentlemen would do well to come to an understanding

among themselves as to precisely which of the more recent and violently

inter-contradictory systems represents the real progress proper, and as

to how long it will do so, before we be peremptorily required to

disregard the exhortation of the Holy One, to "hold that fast which

thou hast, that no man take thy crown" [Rev. iii, 11]. We regard it as

the first scientific duty of a true truth-seeker not to suffer himself

to be captivated by the flickering glare of great names and by the

sham-gold of pretended latest discoveries, and not to let himself be

intoxicated and carried away by the indiscriminate applause of the

multitude. We greatly rejoice to see that precisely the most recent

productions upon the field of ethics (Harless, Schmid, Palmer) give

proof of evangelical soundness, and we shall anxiously await to see

whether the rapidly-erring and deteriorating "theology of progress"

will not, in its turn, enter upon this field,--whether Rothe, who

(encouraged and urged on by the well-calculated applause of this party)

shows as yet no signs of hesitation to do service in the ranks of the

sympathizers with Strauss and Renan, will not make up his mind to turn

to the service of sound words, or whether in the interest of an

erroneous system he will drive even still deeper the wounds which he

has already inflicted upon evangelical faith,--to which at bottom his

heart belongs.

HALLE, August, 1864.

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CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

INTRODUCTION.

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I. IDEA OF ETHICS, AND THE POSITION OF THIS SCIENCE IN THE FIELD OF SCIENCE IN

GENERAL.

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SECTION I.

ETHICS, as belonging to the sphere both of philosophy and of theology,

is the science of the moral, and hence Christian ethics is the science

of Christian morals. But the moral lies in the sphere of the freedom of

rational creatures, as in contrast to mere nature-objects. Man, as a

rational being, has the end of his life, not as one realizing itself in

him spontaneously and with unconditional necessity, but, on the

contrary, he has it primarily only ideally, in his rational

consciousness, so that he cannot attain to it by a mere unconscious

letting himself alone, but only by a personally and freely-willed

life-activity; but also, for that very reason, he can fail of it by his

own fault;-- and the essence of this life-development of man, as

relating to the realizing of his rational life-purpose, is the moral;

that is, when normal, the morally-good, and when guiltily-perverted,

the morally-evil.

So much merely preliminarily; the more complete demonstration can be

given only further on. The sphere of freedom is that of the moral;

whatever is moral is essentially free, and whatever is free is moral.

There is, indeed, an immorally-incurred unfreedom, but even this

unfreedom is essentially different from the unfreedom of nature. He

who, in contradiction to the Christian as well as to the

universally-human consciousness, denies moral freedom in general, and

places even man's moral activity into the sphere of unconditional

necessity, may indeed give a description of the seemingly-moral, but he

cannot place upon man a moral requirement; in the presence of the

"must" the "should" disappears. Such a denier would at least have to

regard the contradictory and almost universal consciousness of freedom

as also posited by unconditional necessity--thus surrendering all right

to assail the same. We may therefore here preliminarily presuppose it

as the utterance of the general human consciousness when not perverted

by one-sided theories, that the moral lies neither in the sphere of

cognition nor of natural necessity, but in the sphere of the freedom of

the rational will. Where there is no freedom of will, there we speak

neither of the morally-good nor of the morally-evil. Moral willing,

however, is not of a blind, fortuitous, but of a rational, character;

that is, it wills a rational something, something willed by God, and

that too in a rational manner--or, indeed, it wills it not; but also

this non-willing, that is, the morally-evil, relates, though

negatively, to a rational end.

In the Scriptures, the ethical phase of Christian doctrine is

designated as "the knowledge of God's will in all wisdom and spiritual

understanding" (Col. i, 9); that is, of that which God "requires" of us

(Deut. x, 12; comp. Phil. iv, 8). Of other definitions of ethics we

will mention but the more important. Unquestionably all such are to be

rejected as express merely an outward collection of single moral

thoughts, as, e. g., "an ordered digest of rules by which man, and,

more specifically, a Christian, is to shape his life;" this would not

be a science, but only a collection of material for a science;

moreover, rules are only one phase of the moral thought, for rules must

have a basis, an end, and an inner logical unity, all of which lies

outside of this definition. Many writers designate ethics as the

description of a morally normal development. But, properly speaking,

only that can be described which is real; not, however, that which

simply ought, but is not necessitated, to become real. Even the

describing of the person of Christ as the ideal of the moral, gives

only a part of Christian ethics, inasmuch as Christ could not, in his

actual life, represent all the phases of the moral. And besides, ethics

has not merely to do with the morally-normal, but it has also to treat

of sin and the contest with it as an actual power; and, moreover, it

has not merely to describe, but also to prove and to establish.

The majority of theological moralists present at once the definition of

Christian ethics; but this more restricted notion cannot be understood

without the more comprehensive notion of ethics in general. The

declaration (Harless and others) that ethics is the theoretical

presentation of the Christianly-normal life-course, or the

development-history of man as redeemed by Christ, is both too narrow

and too broad at the same time: too narrow, inasmuch as ethics must

unquestionably speak also of the non-normal life-course, and that, too,

not merely incidentally and introductorily, but as of one of its

essential elements; and too broad, because, in fact, many things belong

to such a life-course which belong not to the sphere of the moral, but

to the objective workings of divine grace upon the moral subject. Such

a definition is rather that of the order of Christian salvation, which,

however, is not wholly embraced in the notion of the moral. It is true,

Christian ethics must take into consideration the workings of divine

grace, but only, however, as its presupposition; the becoming seized

upon by the influence of divine grace leads, indeed, to morality, but

lies not itself in the, moral sphere. According to Schleiermacher,

Christian ethics is "the presentation of communion with God as

conditioned by communion with Christ, the Redeemer, in so far as this

communion with God is the motive of all the actions of the Christian,

or the description of that manner of action which springs from the

domination of the Christianly-determined self-consciousness;" [8] this,

however, is two mutually complementing definitions, each of which

expresses by itself only one phase of ethics.

As to the name applied to the science, the German expression

"Sittenlehre," usual since the time of Mosheim, is ambiguous, being

capable of being understood as the doctrine of customs instead of the

doctrine of the moral. The term ethics is the most ancient, as dating

from Aristotle himself; ethos, radically related to ethos, from the

root ezo, "to set" and "to sit," signifies in Homer the seat, the

dwelling-place, the home, and hence, at a later period, that which has

become the fixed definite home of the spirit--that wherein the spirit

feels itself at home as in its own peculiar element, and hence manner,

primarily in the sense of habit; that is, a manner of action as having

become second nature. In this sense the word ethe occurs also in the

New Testament (1 Cor. xv, 33.) But the signification of the word

advances, further, to that of the moral proper, as objective-grown

custom, which presents itself to the individual with the authority of

law; ethos is therefore a spiritual power to which the individual

subordinates himself, as in contradistinction to the rude lawlessness

of man as uncultured and savage, and which, in so far as it is no

longer a power foreign and opposed to man, appears as character. [9]

The Romans used generally, for this idea, the term mores, and hence

Cicero and Seneca speak of a philosophia moralis. In Germany this

science was formerly called "Moral"--theologia s. philosophia

moralis--and frequently also theologia s. philosophia practica. But

after the word "Moral" had been appropriated by the advocates of

deistic illuminism, and degraded into the most spiritless

superficiality, the term became involved in such prejudicial

associations that later writers preferred to avoid it, and resorted

again to the German term used by Mosheim, or to the one originally used

by Aristotle.

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[8] Christl. Sitte, pp. 32, 33.

[9] Aristot., Eth. Nic., i, 13.

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SECTION II.

As a philosophical science, ethics forms a part of the philosophy of

the spirit,--has as presuppositions speculative theology and

psychology, and stands in the closest relation to the science of

history as the objective, realization of the moral life. As standing

within the science of spirit, it presents, as in contrast to knowledge,

the active phase of the rational spirit-life, whereby man, as having

come to rational self-consciousness, makes into reality that which

exists in hirm primarily only as an idea,--makes his

spiritually-rational nature as existing objectively to him into a

nature freely-willed and posited by himself.

All philosophy has to do essentially with three objects: the thoughts

of God, of nature, and of the human spirit. Ethics, as belonging to the

third sphere, has, co-ordinate to itself within this sphere, the

science of psychology as treating of the nature of the individual mind

and of its development, and the science of history as portraying the

development of the collective spirit; it is in some sense the unity of

the two; it is psychology, in that it presents, in fact, the highest

form of the soul-life, the rationally-free life; and it is history, in

that it embraces man not as isolated, but as an organic member of the

whole, and considers his activity as directed toward the rational

shaping of collective humanity. Ethics gives to history its rational

goal; and all morality has the perfect shaping of universal history as

its ultimate end. A real understanding of history is not possible

without ethics; universal history is the realization of the moral--the

good and also the evil--within humanity; hence history, the actual

contents of which lie of course outside of the sphere of purely

philosophical knowledge, is an important teacher of morality--teaching

by example in sacred history, and by caution and warning in profane.

The position here assigned to philosophical ethics takes the definition

of that science in its widest sense, and embraces also right and art.

While the view which merges morality essentially into either right or

art is very one-sided and a mistaking of the nature of the moral in

general, it would not be less erroneous entirely to shut out the moral

from these two spheres, and to place it simply along-side of them; the

moral is rather, as the superior element, above them, and right and art

have truth only in so far as they are special realization-forms of the

moral; there is, in truth, no immoral right and no immoral beauty,

although by sinful man the wrong is often regarded as right, and the

un-beautiful as beautiful.

Schleiermacher, in his Philosophical Ethics, gives a definition of

philosophical ethics, based on the views of Fichte and Schelling, which

entirely differs from the usual one. In assuming two chief sciences,

that of nature and that of reason, whereof each may be treated either

empirically or speculatively, according as the reality or the essence

of the object is more directly taken into view, he obtains four

sciences in all. The empirical science of nature is natural history;

the speculative science of nature is physics; the empirical science of

reason is history; the speculative science of reason is ethics. Hence

ethics "is the knowledge of the essence of reason," and stands in the

same relation to history as speculation to experience, and is hence

essentially the philosophy of history. Under such conditions it would

be more correct to call ethics the philosophy of the spirit; but

Schleiermacher evades this, no less manifest than necessary,

consequence; logic and psychology belong, according to him, not to

ethics, for psychology corresponds to natural history, and hence is

"the empirical knowledge of the activity of the spiritual;" and logic

belongs, empirically-treated, to psychology, and,

speculatively-treated, to physics. [10] Though, by means of this

strange conception of logic and psychology, the immeasurable sphere of

ethics as fixed by the first definition is somewhat reduced, still

there yet remains for it a very unusually wide field, and it embraces,

with the exception of physics, the whole of philosophical theology and

of the philosophy of history; and as natural history and physics have

like extent of field, differing only in point of view taken, so the

fields of empirical history and of ethics are also co-extensive, and

ethics is nothing other than the speculative consideration of history.

"History is the example-book of ethics, and ethics is the form-book of

history;" but history is, when so viewed, every thing which is not mere

nature; and as, in the highest instance, nature and reason are

essentially identical, nature being reason, and reason nature, hence'

in the highest view of the matter ethics is physics and physics

ethics," whereas in a lower view of the matter ethics is conditioned,

as to contents and form, by physics, and physics by ethics. It is

evident at once that according to these definitions ethics is something

entirely other than what is usually understood thereby in the

scientific world; and it involves not a little courage to undertake to

justify the applying of the term ethics to this extensive field. This

scientifically-unjustifiable extension of the field of ethics has

occasioned much confusion; and Rothe's "Theological Ethics" suffers

also from this lack of limitation, whereas Schleiermacher himself

carefully avoided applying to theological ethics this philosophical

conception, which in fact sprang more from an ingenious thought-play

than from an inner consequential development of the ground-principle.

Indeed, even in his philosophical ethics, Schleiermacher very soon

introduces a much narrower notion, without any logical justification

thereto ill his system. Thus ethics is, presently, made to appear as

"the scientific presentation of human action," which manifestly cannot

be regarded as identical with the notion of the "speculative knowledge

of the essence of reason." But also this new declaration is much too

indefinite; it is not action in general, but moral action, that belongs

to ethics. Should we thus find this narrower definition too

comprehensive still, then we are relieved by the declaration that

ethics is the "speculative knowledge of the collective activity of

reason upon nature," and are at once thrown into a field so narrow as

to be obliged to exclude from ethics a very essential, nay, the most

essential, part of this science. For all morality is not embraced in an

activity of reason upon nature; in however wide a sense "nature" be

taken, still it always stands over against reason as of a different

character,--is that which, in empirical respects, constitutes the field

of natural science, natural history, etc. The moral cultivation of the

heart--humility, truthfulness, the moral disposition in general, the

whole sphere of the purely spiritual life--belongs not at all to this

activity upon nature. On the other hand, this definition is also much

too comprehensive, inasmuch as there may be also an extra-moral and an

immoral interpenetration of reason and nature, and an immoral activity

of reason upon nature; but should it be said that this, now, would not

be the true moral reason, then this would virtually imply that the

moral is to be sought elsewhere than in this activity of reason upon

nature,--would place it in reason as such. As, in the view of

Schleiermacher, ethics is only the speculative reverse-side of history,

hence he requires, consequentially enough, that it be presented

essentially historically. "The style of ethics is the historical; for

only where manifestation and law are given as the same is the view

taken a scientific one. Hence the style can be neither imperative nor

consultative. The form of ethics is the development of a theoretical

view. The formula of the should' is entirely inadmissible, as this

formula rests upon an antagonism to the law, whereas it is the part of

science to present this antagonism as a mere appearance." This

position, (harmonizing with the view expressed in his "Discourses on

Religion,") which, from the stand-point of Pantheistic determinism, is

quite consequential, we simply mention in passing, in order to explain,

in some manner, this position of ethics in Schleiermacher. Even as the

other speculative science, namely, physics, does not present what

should be, but what really is and must be, so also Pantheistic ethics

has to do only with the "is" and the "must be," but not with the

"should;" all reality is here rational; all disagreement with the law

is mere appearance; there exists nothing else than what must be; hence

ethics has simply to present for the reason-life the laws, even as

physics, for the nature-life, and is just as certain of the agreement

of reality with these laws as astronomy is certain of the occurrence of

a calculated eclipse of the moon. On the contrary, so soon as by the

admission of moral will-freedom, even the possibility of an antagonism

of moral reality to the moral law is conceded, ethics presents itself

at once with the should; for the moral law has unconditional validity,

whether man really fulfills it or not. Ethics is only in so far purely

historical as perfect morality is also personal reality; hence

Christian ethics bears, indeed, essentially also a historical

character, because Christ is, for it, the moral ideal;--for others,

however, it bears the form of the "should." Pantheistic ethics makes

collective humanity the real expression of the moral idea,--makes

humanity its Christ. And that Schleiermacher's philosophical ethics is

by no means free of a Pantheistic character, is undeniable.

Hegel conceives of ethics as one of the phases of the Philosophy of the

Spirit, and more specifically as the sphere of the objective spirit in

contradistinction to that of the subjective, which embraces

anthropology, the phenomenology of the spirit, and psychology. The

spirit, as having come to itself and become free, realizes itself, in

that, as free rational will, it posits itself outwardly,--forms for

itself a world corresponding to itself, which is the expression of the

spirit. This objective reality of the free spirit, which becomes for

the individual subject an objective power whereby the subject is

determined in his freedom, and which consequently is to be recognized

by the individual, is, as of a universal character, for the individual,

law. Hence this will of objective rationality is right, which becomes

for the individual, duty. But in that right does not remain a merely

objective power, but makes itself immanent in the individual subject,

so that the individual will becomes an expression of the general will,

and right finds in the subject free recognition--becomes subjective

disposition--so the notion of right transforms itself into that of

morality, which in its turn--by not remaining merely subjective, but by

forming for itself in the spheres of the family, of civil society, and

of the state, a complete rational reality, wherein the free spirit

finds its self-created and perfectly self-answering home--exalts itself

to customariness. [11] Hegel styles this development of the objective

spirit, not ethics--to which he surely had a higher right than

Schleiermacher for his much more comprehensive notion, (inasmuch as the

ethical is the highest phase of this development,) --but the philosophy

of right. The entire contents of this philosophy of right fall indeed

into the sphere of ethics in the wider sense of the term, though the

entire contents of Christian ethics do not fall into the sphere of this

philosophy of right. Ethics has, according to the Christian view, not

merely to create an objective world of rationality, but also to make

the moral personality itself a perfect expression of rationality; hence

many things which Hegel treats of in the philosophy of the subjective

spirit belong to ethics; and this is doubtless the principal reason why

Hegel (much more cautious and less arbitrary in his notions and their

definitions than Schleiermacher) designates the science of the

objective spirit, not ethics, but the doctrine of right.

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[10] System der Ethik, edited by Schweizer, 1835, �� 55, sqq., 60, 61,

87.

[11] Philosophie des Geistes, � 481, sq.; Rechtsphilosophie, p. 22,

sqq.

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SECTION III.

As a theological science ethics forms a part of systematic theology, in

which it stands in closest connection with dogmatics, and has dogmatics

as its immediate presupposition. The two sciences belong together in

organic unity, and cannot be entirely separated from each other.

Dogmatics presents the essence, the contents, and the object of the

religious consciousness; ethics presents this consciousness as a power

determining the human will. Dogmatics embraces the good as reality,

that is, as it, through God, is, or becomes, or, by the fault of moral

creatures, is not; ethics, on the contrary, embraces this good as a

task for the free, and hence moral, activity of man; that is, as, on

the basis of the religious consciousness, it should become in reality.

Dogmatics presents reality, in the sphere of the divine and religious,

for man, as an object of the religious consciousness; on the contrary,

ethics presents the religions consciousness as a power creating a

spiritual reality; that is, it presents a reality as going out from man

as a religions subject. Hence dogmatics bears predominantly an

objective character--relates to knowledge; and ethics predominantly a

subjective character--relates to willing.

Theoretical theology--in contradistinction to practical theology, which

presents the ecclesiastico-pastoral application of the subject-matter

given in theoretical theology--is partly historical and partly

systematic. Ethics has indeed a historical foundation, and stands in

constant relation to history, but in itself it is no more history than

is dogmatics; exegesis and Church history furnish only the material for

ethics. The separating of ethics from dogmatics, with which it was

formerly, and up to the time of Danaeus and Calixtus, intimately

involved, is difficult, and, in fact, not without violence, entirely

practicable; both sciences reach over into each other like two

intersecting circles, and have, under all circumstances, some territory

in common; the general foundations of ethics are based in the

corresponding thoughts of dogmatics.

The usual and quite natural statement, that dogmatics shows what we

should believe, and ethics what we should do, is only proximatively

correct, and is inadequate; for also the moral laws and maxims are an

object of faith; and "what we should believe" bears, even in the

correct expression itself, the character of a moral requirement.

Believing, itself, is of a moral character; ethics cannot confine

itself to the mere outward action, but must have to do also with the

inward, with the disposition. According to Harless, dogmatics presents

the essence of the objective ground of salvation, and of the objective

mediation of salvation, whereas ethics presents the subjective

realization of the life-goal as established by Christ; dogmatics

presents the objective salvation-power as determining the Christian;

ethics presents the personal life-movement of the Christian toward his

highest life-goal; ethics gives answer to the question, What thinkest

thou of Christ? dogmatics to the question, What thinkest thou of the

right manner of the Christian's life in the world? This declaration

limits the two sciences quite too much: dogmatics must in fact speak

also of man and of the order of salvation; and ethics must speak also

of the objective law and of sin. According to Schleiermacher's

theological ethics, ethics presents the Christian self-consciousness in

its relative motion, while dogmatics presents the same in its relative

rest; dogmatics answers the question, What must be, because the

religious heart-state is? ethics the question, What must become out of

the religious self-consciousness and through the same, because the

religious self-consciousness is? This antithesis is not entirely to the

point, for, on the one hand, dogmatics treats not merely of what is,

but also of what becomes, as, e. g., in the doctrines of regeneration

and of eschatology; as, on the other hand, ethics treats not only of

what becomes, but necessarily also of what morally is, as well normally

as abnormally. Virtue is not a mere becoming, but an ens, as

Schleiermacher himself admits; the good when attained, certainly does

not for that reason cease to be an object of ethics. The antithesis of

motion and rest is in this sphere utterly unapt. Schleiermacher

presents the matter also thus: the dogmatical propositions are those

which express the relation of man to God as an interest, namely, as,

under its manifold modifications, it passes over into conceptions;

whereas the ethical propositions express the same thing, but as an

inner impetus, horme, an impulse, which goes out into a cycle of

actions. But also this is not quite correct; for also ethics expresses

a relation of man to God in conceptions or thoughts, which do not per

se include in themselves an inner impetus, as, e. g., in the questions

as to the moral essence of man, as to the moral idea per se, and in the

entire doctrine of goods.

The difficulty in defining the difference lies less in the general

antithesis than rather in those points where both sciences must treat

of the same topics. The doctrines of the moral essence of man, of the

divine law, of sin, of sanctification, of the Church, belong strictly

to dogmatics; but ethics must necessarily treat also of all these

things, so that it might after all seem advisable, in order to avoid

repetitions, to unite both into one science again, as was formerly the

case, and as has been done recently by Nitzsch, and in part also by

Sartorius. But the separate treatment of ethics rests in fact, aside

from weighty practical reasons, upon a wide-reaching inner difference;

and those points which fall within the scope of both sciences, are

nevertheless treated, in each, from a different stand-point, and in a

very different manner. Both of them present a life pf the spirit--of

God or of man--but dogmatics views this life as an objective fact,

while ethics views it as a task for the free activity of the rational

subject; hence dogmatics has essentially an objective and real

character, while ethics has a subjective and ideal one. Dogmatics has

constantly to do with an object transcending the individual, with God,

with Christ, with man in general; ethics has to do primarily always

with the individual moral person, and with the totality only in so far

as it rests upon the moral action of the individual personality. What

dogmatics teaches relates not to me as this single person, but as a

human being in general; what ethics teaches concerns me precisely as a

person. Dogmatics treats of sin per se, as an objective something and

as an historical fact; ethics treats of the same as a personal malady

and as guilt. Dogmatics treats of the kingdom of God as an objective

organism; ethics treats of the same in so far as the moral subject is

an organic member thereof. Dogmatics treats of sanctification as a

manifestation-forum of the kingdom of God; ethics treats of the same as

a subjective life-manifestation of the person. "The kingdom of God

comes indeed without our prayer"--that is dogmatical; "but we ask in

this prayer that it come also to us"--this is ethical. Dogmatics

sketches the physical chart of the kingdom of God; ethics sketches the

ways and dwelling-places therein. The object of dogmatics is absolutely

independent of the freedom of the individual subject--is either eternal

or an historical fact--is in nowise within the power of man; the object

of ethics is, in its reality, absolutely dependent on the free

resolution of the subject--is per se a pure idea, the realization of

which is a requirement upon the free activity of man.--Dogmatics

presents that which is, or was, or will be; ethics presents that which

should be or should not be; hence dogmatics presents always an

unconditionally-secured result, either of an accomplished or of a

destined movement; ethics, however, presents a task, the accomplishing

of which is conditioned on the free assent of man. The contents of

dogmatics relate essentially to knowledge and faith; those of ethics to

volition. Dogmatics wills that man accept the truth; ethics wills that

he do it. Hence man's relation to dogmatics is rather passive--womanly;

and to ethics rather active--manly. In the sphere of dogmatics there is

a revelation of the divine for man; in that of ethics a revelation of

the divine through man, who has received this element into himself. In

dogmatics the movement of the divine goes out from the divine

middle-point toward the created periphery; in ethics, on the contrary,

it goes back from the periphery toward God as the middle-point. In

dogmatics God is conceived of as the ground, as the point of departure;

in ethics as the goal of the life-movement; in dogmatics man's relation

is more epic; in ethics more dramatic. Dogmatics is predominantly

ontological and historical; ethics is predominantly teleological. Both

sciences treat of man and his activity--dogmatics, however, in so far

as man is an object for God; ethics, in so far as God is an aimed-at

object for man. Dogmatics is related to ethics, as psychology to

pedagogy, as physiology to dietetics, as botany to horticulture, as

animal sensation to motion. [12]

From all this it is apparent that ethics has dogmatics necessarily as

its presupposition--that it is the second and not the first. Ethics is

faith as having become a subjective life-power--faith in so far as it

is an operative force, The popular instruction in the Scriptures

implies, throughout, this relative position of dogmatics and ethics, in

that it presents the moral command after the subject-matter of faith,

and bases it thereon; thus already in the Mosaic legislation (Exod. xx,

2, sqq.), and thus again in most of the New Testament epistles. (Comp.

also Matt. vii, 21, 24, sqq.; John xiii, 17; xv, 1, sqq.; 1 Cor. xiii,

2; Col. i, 4-10; 2 Tim. iii, 14, sqq.; Titus i, 1; James i, 22, sqq.;

ii, 14, sqq.; 1 John ii, 4.)

Deviating entirely from this view, Rothe places ethics in a wholly

different field from dogmatics. In his view ethics belongs to

speculative, and dogmatics to historical, theology; they do not stand

along-side of each other, do not run parallel to each other, but belong

to entirely different forms of theology. The difference of the two

sciences lies not in their respective objects, for these objects are in

fact essentially the same, but in the manner of their scientific

treatment. Dogmatics is the science of dogmas, that is, of the

ecclesiastically-authorized articles of faith, and hence has an

empirically-given historical object, and is therefore essentially

historical, and not at all speculative; speculative theology is, on the

contrary, the presupposition of dogmatics. But ethics has nothing

whatever to do with ecclesiastical doctrines, but must be treated

purely speculatively, and is, as a speculative science, a

presupposition of dogmatics. The theology of the evangelical Church has

had from the very beginning, in the introduction of moral theology, no

intention of creating a second science along-side of dogmatics, but has

tended, though without being clearly conscious of it, toward a

speculative theology; and this science would necessarily lead out

beyond the hitherto-observed ecclesiastical rut--would progressively

metamorphose the dogmas. [13] This view, constituting one of the many

eccentricities of the Rothean theology, is utterly without sufficient

ground. It is entirely arbitrary to place speculative theology

along-side of dogmatics, and to declare ethics as belonging exclusively

to the former. Both sciences admit of being treated purely

theologically or purely speculatively, though indeed all their contents

cannot be embraced speculatively; and with the same right whereby the

speculative doctrine of God and of the world is excluded from

dogmatics, may also the speculative portions of ethics be excluded from

this science, and ethics be, then, declared as a purely empirical

science. A large portion of ethics proper lies without the scope of a

purely speculative treatment, as is in fact sufficiently evinced by the

third part of Rothe's ethics. It may indeed be questioned whether

speculation is admissible at all in theology; if it is, however, once

admitted, then it is quite as much in place in dogmatics as in

ethics--as indeed not an insignificant portion of the Rothean ethics is

nothing other than speculative dogmatics; and there is no manner of

justification for degrading dogmatics, as in contrast to the historical

development of the science, into a merely dogmatico-historical

statement of the doctrines of the Church. And in that Rothe regards the

dogmatical field as not at all bordering upon the ethical, he obtains

full liberty to extend immeasurably the boundaries of ethics, so that

this science thus receives a compass elsewhere unparalleled, even in

Schleiermacher's philosophical system. Not merely does Rothe preface

his ethics with a thorough presentation of the whole of speculative

theology by way of introduction (in which connection he reaches far

over, and not any too aptly, into the field of natural philosophy), but

also he receives into ethics itself many entirely foreign subjects, e.

g., eschatology. Moreover, also the facts of redemption through Christ

are presupposed in this ethics, as a Christian one, not however as

furnished by dogmatics, but by the immediate religious consciousness.

Under such circumstances it seems more than arbitrary to declare the

scientific presentation of this consciousness, not as the scientific

presupposition, but as a sequence of ethics.

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[12] Comp. Palmer: Moral, 1864, p. 21, sqq.

[13] Ethik, i, 38, sqq. All references to Rothe are to the first

edition of his Ethik.

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II. SCIENTIFIC TREATMENT OF ETHICS.

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SECTION IV.

OF the three possible methods of presenting ethics, the empirical, the

philosophical, and the theological, the first and most ancient is to be

regarded as the mere fore-court to the science itself. And

philosophical ethics, as resting upon the inner necessity of rational

thinking, can never, even when it is inspired by a Christian spirit,

entirely assume the place of theological ethics, and displace the

latter as a lower stage of the science; rather can it only be the

scientific presupposition and support of the same, without, however,

taking up into itself its actual collective contents; for theological

ethics bears in its foundation and essence predominantly an historical

character--has for its source the historical revelation, and for its

essential contents the (not philosophically necessary) thoughts of the

actual existence of sin and of the collective history of salvation,

whereof the central point is the historical Christ (who is at the same

time the perfect ideal of the moral), and it treats also of the

circumstances of humanity and of individual man, as having become real

within the scope of Christian history, which also, as the results of

fiee action, are not to be regarded as philosophically necessary.

A merely empirical ethics, furnishing only a series of observations and

rules, as with the Chinese, the Indians, the older Grecian sages, and

also to a large extent inside of the scope of Christian history, is

only a collection of material for scientific ethics, but not ethics

itself. In the sphere of science we have to do only with the antithesis

of philosophical and theological ethics, in the place of which,

however, we may not, as Schleiermacher does, [14] substitute the

antithesis of Christian and philosophical ethics. Over against

Christian ethics stands, not' philosophical, but non-Christian ethics;

also a philosophical ethics may be Christian, and a Christian ethics

philosophical; a believing Christian will in fact never otherwise

philosophize than in a Christian spirit.

The antithesis between philosophical and theological ethics is in

itself simple and clear; for philosophical ethics, only that is valid

which is developed from the per se necessary thought, with inner

necessity; it presents the moral as a pure revelation of reason;

theological ethics, on the contrary, conceives it as a revelation of

faith in the personal God and in the historical Christ--as an

expression of obedience to the revealed will of God; hence between the

two methods of presentation there is in fact not merely an antithesis

of method and source, but also of compass. Theological ethics,

embracing also the sphere of the historical facts of free

will-determination, transcends the limits of philosophical ethics. The

two could only then be perfectly co-extensive when the sphere of moral

freedom should be merged into that of unconditional necessity; that is,

when the rational ground and presupposition of the ethical itself

should be denied.--The ethical thoughts which relate to the realized

free acts of man and of Christ can be treated of in philosophical

ethics only hypothetically, so that philosophy shall apply the results

obtained in the sphere of pure thought to the, not philosophically, but

historico-empirically ascertained conditions; that is, not as pure but,

in some sense, as mixed philosophy. But if also the historical facts of

Christianity are to be taken up into philosophical ethics, as Palmer

assumes, [15] then its difference from theological ethics is at least,

not to be placed in the fact that the latter bases itself upon

Scripture; for indeed philosophy cannot come at these facts otherwise

than from the Scriptures, and is then in fact no longer purely

philosophical.

While purely philosophical ethics can develop only the general moral

ideas, but not their application to definite historically-arisen

relations, on the other hand, a purely theological ethics, as

absolutely excluding all philosophical treatment, is defective, at

least, in scientific respects. Theological ethics can appropriate to

itself philosophy, and it is all the more scientific the more it does

this; but it cannot take philosophy as its exclusive ground and source

without ceasing to be theological. Hence theological ethics is, in

respect to extent of contents and to the means at its disposal, richer

than purely philosophical ethics. The highest perfection of Christian

ethics is a vital union of the philosophical and the theological manner

of treatment, namely, in that the ideas given in the moral reason

itself are treated and speculatively developed as such, and receive

from Christian revelation their religious confirmation; while, on the

other hand, the actual truths lying in the sphere of the free activity

of man himself are taken up from revelation and from historical

experience. Such a presentation of ethics preserves its

Christianly-theological character by the fact that, in view of the

constantly-renewed alternation of philosophical systems, and of their

not unfrequently weighty and essential mutual contradictions, it does

not make the validity of the firmly-established truths of revelation

dependent on their agreement with a particular philosophical system,

but, on the contrary, makes the acceptance of philosophical thoughts

and of their sequences dependent on their harmonizing with the certain

truths of revelation. If this relation is otherwise understood, then it

is in fact no longer a theological, but a philosophical, system.

This antithesis between philosophical and theological ethics is

entirely rejected by Rothe, in that he presents a theological ethics

which is essentially speculative, and in that he definitely

distinguishes theological speculation from philosophical, and requires

of theological ethics that it must, as a science, be also speculative,

whereas dogmatics cannot in the nature of things be such. Every

speculation begins with a proto-datum,--philosophical speculation with

the self-consciousness. But this self-consciousness is not mere

self-consciousness, but is at the same time in some manner a determined

one, is also a God-consciousness; the religious subject recognizes his

self-consciousness not as an absolutely pure one, but as always at the

same time affected by an objective determinateness, namely, the

religious. Man is never otherwise conscious of himself than as being

conscious at the same time also of his relation to God. This point may,

says Rothe, be in itself controverted, but in the sphere of piety, that

is, in the theological sphere, it is not controverted: "we deny to no

one the right to question the reality of piety itself, but with impiety

we have, as a matter of principle, nothing to do; there can be a system

of theology only on the presupposition of piety; for all who are

impious our system of speculation has no validity, and, as related to

them, we must continue in error." According to this, there are two

kinds of speculation, a religious and a philosophical; the latter has

its point of departure in simple self-consciousness, the former in the

pious self-consciousness; philosophical speculation conceives the "All"

through the idea of the ego, theological speculation through the idea

of God, but both are � priori; hence theological speculation is

theosophy; it begins with the idea of God, with which idea

philosophical speculation ends; the evidence is the same in both.

Speculative theology must be essentially different for every peculiar

form of piety, inasmuch as the starting-point, namely, the

peculiarly-determined pious consciousness, is different. Hence there is

also a peculiarly Christianly-speculative theology, and likewise for

every Church a special one, and hence also a special

evangelico-Christian theology; and this special speculative theology

has in fact validity only for this particular Church--is for the others

without significancy. This theological speculation, however, is not in

any way bound by the dogmas of the Church in which it originates, but

is independent of them--knows itself as co-etaneous with them; nay, it

must in its every nature be heterodox; its purpose is in fact to

develop the consciousness of the Church still further, and to

reconstruct the existing dogmatical definitions. In the circle of

theological sciences speculation occupies the first and highest place.

The difference between theological and philosophical ethics becomes,

now, perfectly plain. Both are speculative; but philosophical ethics

proceeds from the moral consciousness purely as such; whereas

theological ethics proceeds from the same as it exists in the Christian

individual belonging to a particular Christian Church, that is, as a

peculiarly-determined religious consciousness, and from the

historically-given ideal of morality in the person of Christ.

This view appears to us entirely erroneous. We cannot possibly admit

any other than a purely philosophical speculation, at least as of a

scientific character. In the first place it is incorrect, in point of

fact, that philosophical speculation always proceeds from

self-consciousness as in contradistinction to theological speculation,

which is made to proceed from the God-consciousness. Spinoza starts

directly from the idea of God, and his philosophy will surely not be

called a theological speculation; in like manner also Schelling. Hegel

begins with the idea of pure being; and this is certainly also not

identical with self-consciousness.--Theological speculation, Rothe

holds, differs only in its beginning, from philosophical, in that this

beginning is, in it, somewhat more determined and more rich in

contents, namely, as being already a religiously-determined

self-consciousness. This is the view of Schleiermacher, who also

proceeds from the religiously-determined self-consciousness; however,

Schleiermacher does not undertake to base thereon a system of

speculation, but simply a theological description of the pious

conditions of the soul, and to argue toward their presuppositions,

which in fact cannot, in any sense, be called speculation.

Rothe--herein less consequential than Schleiermacher--goes beyond him

in two respects: first, in that he carries the religious

determinateness, the self-consciousness, even into the confessional

phase; and, secondly, in that he undertakes to make this purely

empirical fact the foundation of a system of speculation. The original

self-consciousness upon which Rothe bases speculative theology, and

more specifically ethics, is not merely religiously determined in

general (as, e. g., with Schleiermacher, a feeling of absolute

dependence), but also Christianly-religiously, nay, even

evangelically-Christianly, etc., and only on the basis of such a quite

specific determinedness is, in his view, a theological speculation

possible. This, however, is, properly speaking, not a theological

speculation, but a Christian, a Protestant, a Lutheran, or a Reformed

speculation, and has in fact validity only for this special

ecclesiastical circle; others, belonging to another Church, may

construct their own peculiar speculations-with the speculations of

others they have no concern, nor others with theirs; and yet all this

is assumed to be not merely science, but in fact speculative science.

We can find in it, however, only arbitrary assumption, and can

recognize such products neither as speculative nor as scientific,

neither as Christian nor as evangelical. In the first place, a real

science, and hence above all a true speculation, cannot rest upon a

merely fortuitous ground, but only upon an absolutely certain one. A

speculation which concerns itself not as to whether its starting-point,

its foundation, is certain and true, is manifestly worthless. Now the

pretended theological speculation of Rothe bases itself upon an

entirely fortuitously-determined religious consciousness, without

inquiring as to its legitimacy, and then speculates thereupon

unsuspectingly, further. Again, as the starting-point of this

speculation is of a fortuitously-determined character, hence it can

never have any validity save for the definite and limited circle of

persons who in fact chance to recognize this starting-point,--has, in

fact, no general significancy, as indeed Rothe himself expressly

admits; and hence there is absolutely no possibility of harmony between

the speculative theologians of different Churches; they must simply let

each other alone, and deliver themselves in monologues; and he who

speculates from the Protestant consciousness must renounce all hope

that a Roman Catholic Christian may understand him, and in any degree

enter into his line of thought--for he cannot do so. But this is a

positive contradiction not merely to all speculation, but in fact to

all science; nay, to the very nature of truth in general, and to

morality itself. Truth--and every science claims to be its

expression--can never be particular, but necessarily claims universal

validity; every real science purposes to convince all men who are

rational and at all capable of scientific thought; hence to renounce

all hope of convincing other men, for the reason that they chance to

find themselves otherwise confessionally-determined, would be

positively immoral. No real science in general is at liberty to

construct itself upon a fortuitously-given ba1sis, and to regard other

equally fortuitous bases as equally valid and unassailable. I cannot,

without treason to the truth, speculate evangelically-Christianly

simply because I find myself in my earlier religious self-consciousness

evangelically-Christianly determined, but only for the reason that, for

convincing grounds, I have recognized this evangelically-Christian

consciousness as per se true, as universally valid truth, and which

therefore excludes, as erroneous, every contradictory view. And for the

simple reason that the truth, in its very idea and essence, can and may

lever be merely subjective, but must have objective and universal

validity, and because all men should come to a knowledge of the truth

(1 Tim. ii, 4), I absolutely dare not construct a system of speculation

which, on principle, excludes the hope of persuading other persons of

different confessions, which purlposes to have for such no convincing

power, and does not regard them as called equally with me to recognize

the truth, which as truth must be absolutely valid for them also.

Without a firm and absolutely verified basis there can be no science. A

speculation upon a chance, fortuitous basis is idle play without

purpose and without worth. There would, in fact, be as many

mutually-excluding and equally-entitled speculations as there are such

chance presuppositions; and what would be the significancy of a science

which aims not at convincing those in error, but only at furnishing an

interesting entertainment for the already convinced? If the assumed

foundation is not to be itself an object of a preliminary scientific

examination, then in fact any and every one would be fully entitled to

say: I find myself not merely so or so religiously, but also so or so

morally, determined,--I find in my moral self-consciousness this

particular desire and this particular aversion, and on the basis of

this determinedness I propose to construct a system of speculative

ethics! The distinction between philosophical and theological

speculation in Rothe's sense would in fact be simply the distinction

between science and unscientific arbitrariness. We fully admit that

only a moral spirit can truly speculate upon the moral, and only a

Christianly-pious spirit upon religion; but that a person is moral or

pious is only an individual fact, but not a scientific basis of a

system,--is a moral presupposition, but not a material principle of the

speculation itself; piety is only the subjective condition, the impulse

toward and the power for speculation, but not the scientific foundation

thereof.--The strange contradiction, that this speculation, though

proceeding from a determined ecclesiastical consciousness as the

unassailable and unquestionable basis, yet at the same time claims to

be entitled to pass out beyond the ecclesiastical consciousness, and

even sets up heterodoxy as one of its requirements (a requirement which

Rothe himself meets in a high degree), we need not here further

elucidate.

Rothe presents theological speculation as co-etaneous, along-side of

philosophical. Now, however, if, as he expressly affirms, philosophical

speculation in proceeding in its development necessarily arrives at the

idea of God, and there ends, that is, precisely at the point where

theological speculation begins, then, in fact, speculation may, from

this idea of God as obtained in a purely scientific manner, simply

advance further, so that consequently we now have a theological

speculation resting not upon a fortuitous and empirical presupposition,

but upon a scientific result,--to which the one assumed by Rothe bears

only a relation of premature over-haste. The entire distinction between

theological and philosophical speculation, we must consequently declare

as scientifically unfounded; and we cannot, with Rothe, look upon the

difference between philosophical and theological ethics as the

difference between a speculation without presuppositions and a

speculation with presuppositions, but only as the difference between a

speculative and a non-speculative ethics, or an ethics resting

essentially on history. Purely philosophical ethics knows nothing of

Christ, of redemption, nor even of sin as a reality, and hence cannot

possibly answer the full idea of a Christian ethics, although it may

and should, in that which it is competent to embrace, be of a very

Christian character: and as the entire moral life of the Christian

rests upon redemption and spiritual regeneration, hence there is not a

single point in this life, where at purely philosophical ethics could

suffice. Hence the view of Schleiermacher, that Christian and

philosophical ethics are of exactly of the same compass, we must regard

as incorrect. [16] In his Philosophical Ethics he himself expressly

declares that the notion of evil has no place in it, but is only

obtained from the experience of real life; but in Christian ethics this

notion is an essentially co-determining element of the whole. [17]

Theological and philosophical ethics do not mutually exclude each

other, but stand in intimate connection, and may go hand in hand; we

must admit both of them, each in its own field, and each with the task

of combining the other as much as possible in itself. But for each of

the two manners of treatment, we must lay claim to universal validity.

Whether we have recognized a truth philosophically or theologically, we

regard this much as settled, that it is a truth not merely for us

Protestant or Roman Christians, but for all men who seek truth at all;

and those who do not admit it, we can regard only as in error. This is

not intolerance, but simple fidelity to the truth; every truth is, in

this sense, intolerant,--claims the right to be accepted of all men.

Ethics is frequently so treated that philosophical ethics, as pure,

precedes, and Christian ethics as applied ethics, follows. This is not

correct; Christian ethics is not a mere application of philosophical,

but has, in so far as it rests on history, an essentially other

character, and other ground-thoughts peculiar to itself.--We purpose

here to present a System of Christian ethics, which, for the reason

that it is to embrace all the phases of the Christianly-moral, must be

essentially theological; but in the inner organizing and in the

developing of the ground-thoughts, philosophical considerations must

furnish the deeper scientific foundation.

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[14] Christl. Sitte, p. 24.

[15] Moral, p. 19.

[16] Christ. Sitte, Beil, p. 4.

[17] Ibid., pp. 35, 36.

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III. HISTORY OF ETHICS AND OF THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN GENERAL.

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SECTION V.

CHRISTIAN ethics cannot be understood without its history, nor the

latter without the history of the systems lying anterior to and outside

of Christianity. But the history of ethics presupposes a knowledge of

the historical development of the moral consciousness in general,

whereof ethics proper is simply the scientific fruit.

The mistakes committed in a large portion of the field of more recent

ethics, spring largely from non-attention to the history of this

science; and yet no other theological science has so long and rich a

history, and so many relations to the history of the human mind

anterior to and outside of Christianity, as, in fact, this very one;

Greek philosophy has had, upon the development of Christian ethics, a

wide-reaching influence. But the history of ethics cannot be separated

from the history of the moral spirit in general, out of which ethics

sprang, and of which it is simply the scientific form; also the moral

consciousness itself has a history, the knowledge of which is of much

higher importance than that of the history of mere ethics. Not every

moral consciousness has produced an ethical system, for only the more

gifted nations have risen to science at all, and ethics is one of the

most difficult; but the moral consciousness of a people, even though

not developed into a scientific form, is to be looked upon as the

historical basis for another higher and ultimately scientific national

consciousness. Even as botany considers the germination and foliation

no less than the blossoms and fruit,--as the history of religious

doctrines presupposes the history of the religious life, as the history

of philosophy presupposes and develops further the history of

civilization,--so also the history of ethics cannot be given without,

at the same time, taking into consideration the history of the moral

consciousness itself; the ethical thoughts of Plato and Aristotle are

not to be understood merely from themselves, but largely only in the

light of the moral spirit of the Greeks in general.

The history of ethics itself, though frequently touched upon, has not

as yet' been sufficiently presented. The most complete work is that of

St�udlin: "History of the Ethics of Jesus," 1799-1823, 4 vols., of

which the work, "History of Christian Morals since the Revival of the

Sciences," which appeared as early as 1808, is to be regarded as a

continuation; and to it is to be added the same author's "History of

Moral Philosophy," 1822 (and, as a short compendium, the "History of

Philosophical, Hebrew, and Christian Ethics," 1816). The rich body of

matter scattered through these works, is much diluted and not always

reliable, and is constructed into no vital unity. The superficial

Rationalistic stand-point precludes a proper understanding whether of

philosophical or of theological ethics. It is stated as a high merit of

the ethics of Jesus, that, in it, are combined the "better elements of

the Platonic and Stoic systems;" the portraiture of the "wise Teacher"

of morals, Jesus, is about as insipid as well possible. Rousseau's

"excellent" moral discussions are lauded to the skies, while Luther is

treated as a person of narrow prejudice; the doctrine of the

inspiration of the Scriptures is repeatedly declared as dangerous to

morality. The "History of Moral Philosophy" and several minor treatises

on the history of special ethical subjects (the oath, marriage, the

conscience) are very superficial and inaccurate.

De Wette wrote a "Christian Ethics," 1819; (more briefly presented in

his "Compendium of Christian Ethics," 1833, in which the history of

ethics constitutes far more than half of the whole book; the first

work, because of the negligent printing, is almost useless for

unprofessional persons, and is very dependent on St�udlin, even to his

typographical errors, though in particular parts surpassing

him).--(Meiner's "History of Ethics," 1800, utterly worthless.

Marheineke's "History of Christian Ethics," etc., 1806,--only a

fragment.) E. Feuerlein's "Ethics of Christianity in its Historical

Chief-Forms," 1855, furnishes only unequal and often unclear or

inadequate outlines; the same author published a "Philosophical Ethics

in its Historical Chief-Forms," 1856-59. Neander's "History of

Christian Ethics," 1864, enters also upon Greek ethics, though here

from a somewhat antiquated stand-point, and is somewhat ununiform,

breaking off the historical development by an unhappy classification,

and furnishing rather single- points than a connected presentation.

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A.--MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ETHICS OF HEATHEN NATIONS.

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SECTION VI.

The most of historical heathen nations have indeed collections of

ethical life-rules, based almost always upon religion, but before the

golden age of Greek philosophy they had no ethics proper.--The

ground-character of all heathen ethical consciousness and of heathen

ethics is, that the starting-point and the goal of the moral is not an

infinite spirit, but either the impersonal nature-entity, or a merely

individually-personal being. The starting-point is not the infinite

God, and the goal is not the perfection of the moral personality in a

kingdom of God as resting upon the moral perfection of the individual

person, and in the communion of the person with the infinite

personality of God, but it is always merely a limited

something,--either a merely earthly civic perfection with the rejection

of a trans-mundane goal (the Chinese), or the giving-up of personal

existence altogether (the Indians), or a merely individual perfection

irrespective of the idea of a kingdom of God embracing the individual

personality as a vital member (the Egyptians, Persians, Greeks, and

Germans).--There is throughout a lack of the knowledge of true moral

freedom; either it is rejected on principle, or it is ascribed only to

a few specially-gifted ones, while the rest of mankind are, as

barbarians, incapable of any moral freedom and perfection. Hence there

is, further, a general lack of a knowledge of humanity as called, in

its totality, to the accomplishing of a moral task. It is uniformly

only one people, or an aristocratic class of a people, that is morally

active; the slave is incapable of true morality. But where humanity

itself is regarded as called to morality--with the Buddhists--there the

moral task is an essentially negating one,--is directed to the

annihilating of personal existence. There is throughout a lack of the

knowledge of the moral depravity of the natural man, and hence of the

necessity of a spiritual new-birth; morality is not so much a struggle,

as rather a simple development. There is indeed a consciousness of

immoral conditions of humanity, yea, of a natural unaptness for the

good; but these conditions are almost always attributed to mere civic

and individual degeneracy, and this unaptness is confined to barbarians

and slaves. And the idea of the highest good is embraced either merely

negatively, or is referred to earthly weal, or is left entirely in

doubt,--at best is sought in merely individual perfection.

The heathen moral consciousness can be understood, evidently, only in

the light of the religious consciousness upon which it always rests.

That, of the majority of heathen nations, we possess only

loosely-connected moral precepts and observations, moral adages and

practical life-rules, but not ethical systems proper, is no obstacle to

our knowledge of their moral consciousness, inasmuch as systems always

bear in fact traces of the subjective character of their authors,

whereas, the popular collections in question, based, for the most part,

on divine authority, are an objective unclouded expression of the

consciousness dominant in a people.

It is the essence of heathenism to possess the idea of God only under

some form of limitation, to conceive of God as a being in some degree

limited; [18] and to this corresponds also the moral consciousness.

Where God is conceived of as an unspiritual nature-being, there

morality bears essentially the character of un-freedom, as it were of

impersonality,--is either a mechanical adapting of self to universal

nature, an absolutely goal-less passive subordinating of self to the

ever-uniform unchangeable order of the world (China), or a

subordinating of the personal human spirit to the divine being

conceived of as nature, with which the free personality is in essential

contradiction (India). Where God, however, is conceived of as a limited

individual spirit, and then consequentially as plurality, there the

personal human spirit stands not in perfect moral dependence upon Him,

but is relatively co-ordinate with Him,--has not God's will as its

unconditional law; the foundation of the moral becomes predominantly

subjective and unsettled; the self-love and the self-seeking pride of

the strong subject appears as the legitimate chief-motive of the moral

life (West-Asia and Europe).

With the prevalence of such views the goal of moral effort, the highest

good, can also be embraced only as a limited something. Among the

naturalistic nations, the Chinese and the Indians, this goal has no

positive contents at all, for the personal spirit as placed under the

dominion of an impersonal nature-power cannot aim to attain to any

thing positive which did not already exist; its goal can only be the

greatest possible self-denial of the personal spirit as over against

nature. In China the moral spirit can attain to nothing which has not

already always existed by nature and hence with necessity; it behooves

not to create a spiritual, moral kingdom, but to uphold the eternal

kingdom of necessarily-determined order as already existing by nature

without any personal act,--to subordinate to, and keep in passive

harmony with, it, one's own worthless individual existence.--In India,

with the Brahmins as well as with the Buddhists, where the

consciousness of the personal spirit has awakened to a much higher

validity, moral effort assumes a truly tragic character, in that the

total, violent contradiction of the personal spirit to the

personality-overwhelming divine nature-entity comes to consciousness.

The ultimate goal of the moral spirit is here not only not a positive

entity, nor indeed even the upholding of an eternally-uniform

world-order, but the passing away of personal existence into the

general indeterminate nature-existence; the highest good is complete

self-annihilation through moral effort.--With the Occidental

Indo-Germanic nations the personal spirit is indeed no longer merged

into the impersonal nature-existence, for the divine is itself

conceived of as personality. But because of the merely limited

individuality of the divine,--which rises to the height of an infinite

personal spirit only in the last results of philosophy, not recognized

by the masses of the people,--the certainty of the moral goal falls

away also. The personal spirit looks not to cease to be, to vanish in

the mechanical whirl-din of the great world-machine, as in China, nor

to melt away into the incomprehensible and ineffable proto-Brahma or

nirvana as in India, on the contrary, it looks to attain to a positive

result, but it finds therefor no assured, firm footing; and, as in this

life the moral hero sinks tragically under the envious disfavor of the

gods or of fate, so also is the lot he has earned in the next world of

an entirely doubtful character; Achilles would fain exchange his lot in

the lower world for the position of a servant upon earth, and Socrates

is not fully confident whether for his philosophical virtue he will

attain to the enjoyment of converse with the great dead. At best,

doubting hope looks only to a merely individual wellbeing, and the idea

of a real kingdom of God, which has its roots in the earthly life of

moral man, and its crown in a transmundane perfection, and of which the

essence is the history of humanity, remains unknown even to the most

highly enlightened heathendom.

The moral freedom of the person is indeed actually denied only by a few

of the more consequential philosophers of India, but yet it is nowhere

recognized in its full truth. With the Chinese, it is smothered under

the weight of all-dictating State-law; with the Brahminic Indians a

radical Pantheism admits only for the less-clearly and less-logically

thinking casses of the masses, a very limited form of freedom; but to

the more educated consciousness all initiatorily-active freedom appears

as illegitimate, as per se sinful, or, more consequentially still, as

mere appearance. Impersonal Brahma is the solely real existence, and

all individuality is but an absolutely dependent, immediate

manifestation-form of this One, utterly devoid of free

self-determination.--The Greek even in the highest philosophy, far

beyond the limits of the national consciousness, concedes free moral

self-determination not to man as man, but only to the free Greek; the

barbarian has only a half-humanity, is utterly incapable of true

virtue, and is not called to free service under the moral idea, but

only to an unfree service under the free Greek. Even Aristotle knows

nothing of a general morality for all men.

One of the most hampering limits of heathen morality, is its total lack

of the idea of humanity. The religion of the Buddhists,--the sole one

which transcends the limits of nationality, and even in many respects

approximates Christian views,--has indeed conceived the thought of

humanity as equally called in all its representatives to truth and

morality, and has sent out missions beyond its national boundaries, but

it has done this only because, religiously and morally, it bears a

predominantly negating character; in the consciousness of the nullity

of all being, fall away also, as null, the limits between nations; but

this morality aims not to build up a spiritual kingdom of moral

reality, but, on the contrary, to liberate the moral spirit from all

reality as being per se null,--even from its own personal existence.

The consciousness of a guiltily-incurred moral depravity of unredeemed

humanity, which gives to Christian morality a so deeply earnest

back-ground, finds in heathendom but faint and even delusory echoes. To

the Chinese all reality is good; the sea of life is mirror-smooth, at

worst, is but superficially disturbed by light waves which the shortest

calm suffices to settle again. To the Indian all existence is equally

good and equally evil,--equally good, in that all reality is the divine

existence itself,--equally evil, in that it is at the same time an

untrue and an illegitimate self-alienation of the solely-existing

Brahma, or, with the Buddhists, an expression of absolute nullity. The

guilt lies not on man, but on God and on existence in general; man

suffers from the untruthfulness of reality, but has not himself

guiltily occasioned it.--The Persian conceives of evil in the world

much more earnestly and with higher moral truthfulness. Humanity is

really morally corrupted, and is so because of a moral guilt, because

of a fall from the good; and man has the task of morally battling

against the evil and for the good. But this fall lies yon-side of human

action and of human guilt,--lies in the sphere of the divine itself.

Not the rational creature, not man, has guiltily fallen, but a god; the

divine is itself hostilely dualistic,--the good god is from the

beginning opposed by the guilty evil one, and the real world-not merely

the moral one, but also nature--is the work of two mutually

morally-opposing divine creative powers. In this--no longer

naturalistic, but moral--dualism there lies a much higher truth than in

the Indian doctrine of unity, according to which the distinction of the

world from God is explained away into a mere appearance, into a

self-deception, either of Brahma, or, and more consequentially, of man;

and man has, in the Persian view, a much higher personal moral task.

But in that this view throws the weight of the guilt from man and upon

the divinity, the moral struggle lacks, after all, its true ground and

truth.--With the Greek even this (in its principal nerve paralyzed)

earnestness of the Persian is thrown into the shade by the, in other

respects, higher theory of an inner harmony of existence. That which in

the Christian world-view is the moral goal, is conceived here as the

essence indestructibly inherent in reality, so that the moral activity

has only to develop the per se essentially faultless germ of the

spiritual essence of man, in order to attain to the highest good. Of a

positive struggle against a potent reality of evil in man, even the

most enlightened philosophers have no consciousness; and whatever

reality of such an evil in existence forces itself upon the sound

feelings and judgment, is sought for, by the intensified

self-complacence of the most highly-cultivated Greeks, not in the moral

essence proper of man, but yon-side of man in the world of the gods,

which world appears itself in the morally better-feeling poets as

morally tarnished, as an object of just censure,--or yon-side of the

god-world in irrationally dominating fate,--or in the extra-Greek world

of mankind, which, as barbarous, is also involved in moral

degradation.--By far the highest view of the moral and of guilt,

appears among the ancient Germanic nations, the world-view of whom was

indeed more fully developed only in Christian times, and not unaffected

by Christian influences.

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[18] See the author's Gesch. d. Heidentums, 1, � 11 sqq.

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SECTION VII.

The obscured and only very partially developed moral consciousness of

savage nations lies outside of the field of history; [19] the more

tender consciousness of the half-civilized nations, especially of the

Peruvians and Mexicans--the former of whom especially developed social

morality to a degree of one-sided maturity, [20] --appears rather as

potent custom than as a clearly self-conscious consciousness. The very

definitely and detailedly developed moral consciousness of the Chinese,

as expressed in numerous and in part sacred-esteemed writings, is

devoid of higher ideas, and is rather merely soberly empirical, purely

political, and directed predominantly only to outward purposes. The

essence of this morality is an effortless conformance to an

eternally-changeless world-order, a remaining in the just

middle-course; there is no consciousness of a forfeited perfection of

the human race, nor of a perfection yet morally to be attained to.

There is pre-supposed the unclouded goodness of human nature, the

entire agreement of the ideal and of reality. There is no call for a

sanctifying of an unholy reality,--there needs only that the individual

existence of man be modeled upon pure human patterns, and conformed to

never entirely erroneous, and always uniform common custom. The bright

point in Chinese morality is obedience, in the family and in the State;

its ground-character is passive persistence in the constantly

homogeneous, goal-less movement of the universe,--a steady pulse-beat

the significance of which lies not in the goal, but in the movement

itself.

The Chinese, whose religious views constitute a barren and tale, but

clear and consequential Naturalism, have special interest for moral

life-rules; the ancient books of their religion, the Kings, which were

collected and digested by Confucius in the sixth century before Christ,

contain in the main simply a very detailed system of morals; so also

nearly all their later religious, philosophical, and historical

writings.

The life of the All bears every-where, even in its spiritual phase, a

nature-character; there is no history with a spiritual goal to be

attained to by moral activity, but only a nature-course with a

constantly uniform character manifesting itself in constant, unvaried

repetition; morality looks not forward, but simply backward to that

which has been and will always remain as it is, and all reformatory

action upon an occasionally somewhat deteriorated present is but a mere

return to, the previous better. Instead of progress the goal of moral

effort is uniformly simply a conserving, or a return to the past. There

is no ideal yet to be reached, but the ideal has already always

existed, and has never suffered but slight becloudings; humanity is

already perfect from the very beginning, without history and without

development; morality never looks to the creating of something which

has not already been,--at best aims only at remedying a slight but

never deeply seated disorder. Good is not that which in the nature of

things ought first to become, but that which already is from the

beginning; the highest good is not a goal and end, but it is that

itself which eternally is; man has and enjoys it as already given from

the start; it is the Paradise into which he is placed by nature

herself, and which he has never really lost,--at the worst, only a few

thorns and thistles have insinuated themselves into it, which however

can only render the Paradisaical life of the "Celestial Kingdom" only a

little more incommodious, for man, but not by any means banish him out

of it, and in fact are very readily to be got rid of. The stream of

world-history flows on of itself without the co-operation of man; man

has simply to yield himself to it, to adapt himself unresistingly to

the eternally-unvarying order of the world, to join himself, as a

passively revolved wheel, into the constantly uniform-moving

clock-work. Hence morality has no high goal, but requires only repose

and order, and a passive submission to the minutely-tutorial civil law

and to the equally valid laws of custom; there is no violent struggle,

but only a quiet persisting and laboring. The highest symbol of

morality is the natural sky, with its eternally-unvarying orderly

revolution. As the real world is the mutual interpenetration of the two

primitive principles, heaven and earth, and the equilibrium and mean

between the two, so consists also morality in the preserving of

equilibrium, in the observing of the just mean; the middle way is

always the best. Hence ethics is by no means rigid and severe,--aims

not at high reality-transcending ideals, is of a mild gentle nature,

sober, practical, temperate, without high inspiration; it requires of

man scarcely any thing which could be difficult to him, or which would

involve much self-denial; he is not required to divest himself of his

natural character, but has only to observe measure in all things. Man,

that is, of course, only the Chinaman, is consequently already

capacitated by nature to fulfill perfectly all the requirements of

morality, and there are in fact also absolutely perfect, sinless men.

Virtue is of easy practice, for it is the natural expression of the

soul-life, and has not to contend against any evil rooted in the heart,

and it meets in fact with no actual hostility to itself in the world;

it awakens not displeasure, but always love, esteem, and honor; for

mankind is in fact generally and, as a whole, good; actual evil is

always a mere exception; the gate is wide, and the way is broad which

leads to life, and many are those who walk upon it.

As being a mere expression of general, natural world-order, morality

stands in direct connection with the course of nature. The observance

of the just mean preserves equilibrium in the All, and every

disturbance of this equilibrium by sin re-echoes through the whole, and

effects, directly, disturbances in nature, especially when the

offending one is the vicegerent of heaven, the emperor,--who is called

by his very office to the presenting of a moral ideal, of a pattern of

virtue. Drought, famine, inundations, pestilence, and the like, are not

so much positively inflicted punishments of a personally-ruling God, as

rather direct natural consequences of the sins of the emperor, and of

the people as imitating him. Instead of an historical connection and an

historical working of sin upon coming generations, as in the Christian

world-theory, there is here a natural connection and a natural working

of sin upon contemporary nature and the contemporary generation. This

naturalistic parallel to the Christian doctrine of inherited sin, has a

deeply earnest significancy. Man in his moral activity has to do not

merely with himself, but with the totality of the universe; by sinning,

he disturbs the order and the harmony of existence in general; every

sin is an outrage against the All, and consequently also against the

highest manifestation thereof, namely, the Middle Kingdom; all sins are

crimes, all are hurtful to the public weal; in the Chinese view nature

suffers by sin; in the Christian, history.

The focus of the moral life is the family; in it manifests itself

directly the divine life,--which consists in the antithesis of the male

or active and of the female or passive, in heaven-force and

earth-material, and in the union of the two. The family life is a

living worship of God, and the family duties are the highest, and have

the unconditional precedence of all others; to the obedience of

children to parents all other obedience must give way. What heaven is

for the world, that the father is for the children, and reverence

toward parents is a religious virtue. Hence marriage is a moral duty

from which no virtuous man can excuse himself; the celibate interrupts

the ranks of the famnily and commits an outrage on his ancestors.

But the full realization of morality appears in the state, which is

simply the all-sidedly developed family. The emperor, as the son and

vicegerent of heaven not governing arbitrarily but by eternally valid

heavenly laws, is the father and teacher of the people,--not merely

protecting right, but also, as a pattern of virtue, guiding and

conserving the morality of the people. In China every thing is the

State, and the State is everything; it is the great ocean into which

all the streams of the spirit-life ultimate, and morality itself stands

absolutely under the guardianship of the State. Not as man, but only as

a citizen of the State and a member of the family, has the Chinaman a

moral life; all morality is accomplished by obedience to the laws of

the State; and between civil and moral law there is no distinction.

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[19] Gesch. des Heident., i, p. 40 sqq., p. 163 sqq.

[20] Ibid., 251 sqq., 303 sqq.

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SECTION VIII.

The Indians, the Brahminic as also the Buddhistic, conceived morality,

on the basis of their consequentially developed Pantheism, essentially

negatively. All finite reality, and above all, that of the human

personality, is null, untrue, and illegitimate,--either because, with

the Brahmins, it is only the self-estranged divinity, or because, with

the Buddhists, the essence of all existence in general is nihility;

hence the ground-character of morality is self-denial,

world-renunciation,--a passive endurance instead of creative activity.

The moral goal, the highest good, is not a personal possession, but a

surrendering of personality to the impersonal divine essence or to

nihility. There is no realizing and no shaping of a moral kingdom based

on personality, nor even a preserving of existing reality, but a

dissolving of the same. All reality, in so far as it is a finite

formation, is evil,--not, however, through the guilt of man, but in

virtue of its very essence from the beginning; and there is no other

redemption than its annihilation. But while, in the purely Pantheistic

doctrine of the Brahmins, the thought of the development of the world

out of God recognizes in fact in existence a divine and hence

relatively good substratum, and regards mankind as emanated from God,

as participant in this divine substance in different degrees, according

as they stand at different distances from the divine

proto-fountain,--the distinctions of caste,--on the other hand, the

doctrine of the Buddhists annihilates, together with the divine

proto-Brahma, also these concentric circles around the ungodded

middle-point, and requires equal, absolutely world-renouncing morality

of all men, even irrespective of the limits of nationality, and changes

the positive self-torture, which appears among the Brahmins as the acme

of pious morality, into a quietistic, self-denying patience resting

upon hopeless grief at the nihility of all existence.

The Brahminic Indians have, in their books of law, ancient and rich

collections of moral doctrines. Almost equally esteemed with the Vedas,

and attributed to a divine origin, is the book of the Laws of Manu, the

parts of which belong to very different ages, though the most recent

belong certainly anterior to the fourth century before Christ; the

moral precepts proper are as yet unseparated from the religious and

civil. Also the Vedas and the later philosophical and legal writings

contain much moral matter.

Basing himself, in contrast to the nature-dualism of the Chinese, upon

the unity of the universe as divine, the Brahmin regards the real World

merely as a, neither necessary nor strictly legitimate, but rather mere

dream-like self-alienation of primitive Brahma, which is destined,

after an essentially purposeless continuance, to be absorbed back into

its source. Hence morality has no positive aim, but rather simply looks

to an escaping from individual existence, a dissolving of personality

into the impersonal. The continuance of personality through

metempsychosis is punishment, not reward. Existing reality is not, as

in China, good as such, but, as separate existence, is evil, and is

good only in its general divine substance; only the latter, but not the

former, may be held fast to. The moral subject is not manc as such;

there is in fact no unitary humanity, but only different, narrower or

wider, circles around the divine middle-point, classes of men differing

essentially by nature both spiritually and morally, and of whom the

lowest stand even below many brutes, and are absolutely incapable of

the moral life; to teach to these latter the Vedas or the Laws, is a

crime worthy of the deepest damnation. Only the three highest castes

are capable of a knowledge of the truth, and hence also of morality.

But also with these the moral duties and capacities are very different,

and the Indian speaks not of the moral duties of man, but always only

of the duties of the castes. The vai�ja's highest good is riches; his

virtue, industrious acquiring; the xatrija's highest good is power, and

his highest virtue, courage; and only the Brahmin is capable of the

highest morality; but this morality directs itself, not transformingly

and productively, upon reality, but only, disdainingly and

renouncingly, away from the same,--not, however, in order to virtualize

a free, self-conscious personality as over against nature, but in order

to merge back the personal spirit, as illegitimate, into the impersonal

essence of the universe. The highest virtue is renunciation, not indeed

merely of sensuous enjoyment, of earthly weal, but of one's own

self-conscious personality; and the acme of this morality is,

consequently, self-annihilation as sought through persistent

self-torture, to the end that Brahma alone may exist. The highest good

of the true man, that is, of the Brahmin, is to become at one with

Brahma, not in the sense of a moral life-communion of the personal

spirit with a personal God, but as a dissolving of the per se

illegitimate personal spirit into the general, the impersonal. That

which is in the present state the sum and substance of all wisdom,

namely, to know that "I am Brahma," attains to full truth by the

dissolving of the ego into Brahma; the goal of morality is, "Brahma

alone is, not I;" and as man, even now, while in deepest

sleep,--wherein he knows nothing of the world and of himself,--is

nearer to divinity than when in his waking hours, so the goal of virtue

is the total falling to sleep of the personal spirit, the exhaling of

the dew-drop that trembles on the lotus-leaf. The holding fast to

personality is the essence of all evil. Nothing can nor should

permanently endure but the divine essence alone, which tolerates

nothing other than itself, and for which all reality of the world is,

at best, only a dream-phantom, a transient hallucination;--even in the

eyes of the deeper instructed of men, the world in general is only a

false imagination of the foolish, and does not really exist at all. The

Chinese aim, in morality, simply to conserve the already-existing; the

higher nations aim at transforming it into a more spiritual reality;

the Indians aim at dissolving it into nonentity. The West-Asiatic

nations see the truth in the future, and long, hopefully, and through

moral effort, for a better reality than is offered by the present; the

Indians look sadly into the present, with indifference into the future,

and with satisfaction only into the past, when as yet nothing else

existed but unitary Brahma, and into that future which simply returns

to the condition of this past. The Chinese work for the present; the

higher nations, for the future; the Indians work not at all, but simply

endure and perish; they aim not at implanting the free moral spirit

into reality, but at tearing it away from the same,--not at

transfiguring reality by the spirit, but at emancipating the spirit

from the same. Indian morality is less a creative working than a

sacrificing, and hence is essentially identical with the practice of

religion, of which the highest phase is self-mortfication--aiming at a

total annihilation of personal existence. The way which the world has

traveled out from primitive Brahma, this way it must travel back again;

nature herself accomplishes this by death; man accomplishes it by

morally-pious self-annihilation. That which is with nature the natural

goal, is with man a moral end. Even as Brahma developed himself out of

his pure transparent unity into the world of plurality, so must man

fold himself back out of his isolated existence again into unity; man,

the highest fruit of mundane existence, must gather himself out of the

dispersion of Brahma in the world, back into unity,--must give up his

separate existence. Man must die away, not indeed to sin, or merely to

sensuousness, but to himself,--must cease to be a real personality,

must renounce every feeling, every volition, every thought, which

contains any thing whatever other than Brahma alone. The fearful

self-tortures of the Indians are not penance for sins, but the highest

virtue-exercises of saints. A vital consciousness of guilt, the Indian

is utterly devoid of; the evil of existence is not his own, is not the

fault of man in general. Whatever is and transpires, is directly

Brahma's act. It is true, evil inheres by nature in all existence, but

it is not to be imputed to man, and there is no other redemption from

the same than the destruction of the finite, even of one's own being.

The entire scope of morality bears a negating character; the truly

knowing one needs not merely not to do any positive works, but he

avoids them from principle, because they belong simply to the realm of

folly.

For man, even in so far as he is an object of the moral activity, the

Indian has no concern; he has a higher love for nature, which stands

nearer related to the nature-divinity, and constitutes the narrowest

circle around the divine center-point. In nature he beholds his mother,

and he loves it reverently as the most direct and most unclouded

revelation of Brahma. The same Indian who can heartlessly see a pariah

famish without so much as stretching out to him a helping hand,

reverently avoids, as a severe sin, the breaking of a grass-blade, or

the swallowing of a gnat; a Brahmin allows himself not, without ground,

to break even an earth-clod.--Marriage and the family-life in general

can only be a transition-stage for the, as yet, morally immature. The

Brahmin who has risen to true knowledge must leave father and mother,

wife and child, and, dead to the world and to himself, live henceforth

only in solitary contemplation of Brahma,--standing for years, in the

forest, upon the same spot, emotionless as a tree-trunk, and seeking or

accepting only the scantiest food; every thing finite must have become

absolutely indifferent to him, until, vegetating on like a plant, and

fading away, he attains to the long-sought death. For society and

politics, only those who belong to the inferior castes can have any

further interest,--for the Brahmin himself these things have no

attraction, and, higher than the warrior-hero and than the

zealously-ruling prince, is he who exchanges a crown for the life of

the hermit.

More remarkable still is the moral consciousness of the Buddhists,

whose world-historical and influential religion--an off-shoot of the

Brahminic--was founded by the Indian prince Sakya-Muni in the sixth

century before Christ,--the sole heathen religion which sent out

missions beyond the national limits,--so that within a few centuries it

extended itself throughout all middle, southern, and eastern Asia, as

far as into Japan. The sacred books of the Buddhists are chiefly of

moral contents, for here religion passes over almost entirely into

morality.

While in Brahminism the ground and essence of all existence is the one

absolutely indeterminate and un-positive proto-Brahma, Buddhism goes a

step further, and declares this indeterminate, empty substratum to be

nonentity itself. All things are sprung of nonentity; hence nonentity

is the contents of all being,--hence all reality is per se null, and

finds its truth only in that it returns to nothing. As the beginning,

so is also the end of all being, and hence also that of man and of his

moral efforts, nonentity. Every thing is vain, in heaven and upon

earth; heaven and earth themselves are vain, and upon the ruins of a

crumbling world sits, eternally enthroned, empty Naught. The moral

element of this atheistical religion lies in the fact that the Buddhist

is really and truly in earnest with the comfortless thought, and,--in

striking contrast to the lustful, pleasure-seeking atheism of modern

times,--presents to man the God-forsaken world as in fact really such,

and forbids to him all enjoyment of the same,--that he has no joy in

it, but makes deep grief at all existence the foundation of all

morality. The Buddhist is fully conscious of what it signifies to place

nature above spirit, to seek God only in nature and in the world in

general. Not being able to rise to the conception of a personal God, he

disdains the impersonal nature-God, and chooses rather to live without

God in the world,--only, however, as one who has no hope at all.

Buddhism in its pure form is a religion of despair, and its ethics

answers to this character, and is essentially different from the

Brahminic. Here no divine proto-Brahma unfolds himself into a world;

and hence the different castes of mankind have no longer any essential

meaning; no one man stands, by nature, nearer to the divinity than

another, but all men are equal; there is no plant-like branching-out of

a divine proto-germ, but only a homogeneous sea of equally-worthless

sand-grains. With the Brahmin moral freedom is essentially trammeled,

and in fact, consequentially regarded, annihilated, by the fact that

Brahma alone works all and in all; but for the Buddhist no such

limitation exists. No divinity forcibly interferes with human action.

Moral effort, however, has no reality, as a highest good, for its goal;

the ultimate goal is annihilation, and this thought is here much more

deeply and sadly embraced than with the Brahmins. While with the

Brahmins, man and the entire world sink back into the divine essence,

with the Buddhists they fall into utter annihilation; and the goal of

all life and effort is a traceless extinguishment--nirvana. The

Buddhist strives not; he only patiently endures the pain of inner

nothingness, that falls to the lot of all living existence. The entire

history of the world is but one grand tragedy; in deep pain worries on

all that lives, until it succumbs to death, and the consciousness of

this pain is the beginning and the end of all wisdom. In comparison

with this acme of all wisdom, namely, the knowledge of the four-fold

misery inherent in the world, that is, birth, old age, disease, and

death, all other questions lose their importance. All reality is vain

and irrational; this is the basis of all morality. Hence, man should

break loose from all love to real existence,--should renounce all

earthly pleasure; the only feeling that beseems the sage is that of

pain and compassion. For a positive moral acting, aiming at the

production of a reality, there is here no place; man strives only to

urge his way out of this world of pain, for misery is the essence of

the world, and all moral wisdom consists in the greatest possible

breaking away from all liking for the same. In the God-void world, man

feels homeless,--finds therein no rest and no satisfaction; his future

is annihilation; his present, the renouncing of all joy. The

world-renunciation of the Brahmin is rather active and manly, for by

the throwing off of his finite existence he returns into Brahma. The

world-renunciation of the Buddhist is rather passive and womanly,--does

not rise to positive self-torture and to real self-destruction; on the

contrary, the Buddhist waits, still and patient,--supports the misery

of life in unmurmuring pain, until his existence falls away; the

characteristic of this world-theory is a quiet, gentle grief, for the

thought of the empty nothingness of all things cannot inspire to manly

action; and the pain of existence should not be additionally heightened

by voluntary act. Man is simply to disdain the world,--not because he

compares it with a better sinless one, but because evil and misery are

inseparable from it. Separated from all the world, and as a homeless

wanderer, or as a hermit in forest or desert, the pious man should live

in beggar-garb, devoid of adornment, utterly possessionless, entirely

isolated, indifferent to joy and grief, and dead to all emotions.

Marriage, as productive of new existence, is per se of evil, and is

absolutely forbidden to the saint; the family bonds have no

significancy for him, and sensuous enjoyment is in his eyes a pure

folly. The most ancient and pure doctrine of Buddhism requires such

renunciation of all men, and it is only a deteriorated form of later

times that conceded that all did not need to lead this spiritual life,

but that a portion of the people might content themselves with an

inferior severity.

Buddhistic ethics contains but few positive precepts; almost all of

them are negative; virtue consists essentially in omitting; "thou shalt

not," is the almost unvarying beginning of the precepts; all of them

aim simply at preventing the spirit from taking delight in

existence,--forbid worldly pleasure, but do not create a moral reality;

and, as relating to other living creatures, beast as well as man, they

guard against all multiplication of the already so widely-prevalent

misery. Hence there goes here, hand in hand, with the intensest

world-despising, the greatest gentleness toward all living beings; no

creature may be tormented, nor even slaughtered; in order to alleviate

the pain of another creature, man should rather himself endure it.

Hence the Buddhists have been, in fact, the gentlest of heathen

nations; but their gentleness is not so much an expression of active

love as rather merely of compassion,--is simply a non-interfering, a

sparing, but not a positive helping. The dumb, patient enduring of

pain, a complete indifference to joy and sorrow, is not the heroic

pride of a deeply self-conscious personality, but the womanly,

submissive patience of a heart broken with pain.

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SECTION IX.

The moral consciousness of the Egyptians and of the Semitic nations,

especially of the Assyrians and Babylonians, is, as yet, only very

imperfectly and partially known, so that a very definite characterizing

of it is not yet possible. So much appears to be reliably ascertained,

that among these nations (which constitute the transition from

naturalistic East-Asia to the Occidental nations among whom the divine

is conceived of as a personal spirit) both the moral bases and the

essence of the moral subject and of the moral task, are conceived in a

higher and more spiritual manner than was the case among the earlier

nations,--in a manner which brings personality to a greater validity.

The Pantheistico-naturalistic character of the religious and moral

world-theory is overcome, and a morally dualistic one struggles more

definitely into the fore-ground. Morality passes over from the mere

preserving and persisting of the Chinese, and from the self-renouncing

of the Indians, into a struggle against evil, as super-humanly

originated, though not exclusively dominant, and as in fact ultimately

to be overcome.

Egypt stands on the dividing-line between the naturalistic and the

personally-spiritual world-theory; the divine is indeed primarily and

originally, as yet, a pure nature-power, but it struggles up into

spiritual personality, and such a personality is recognized also in

man; among the Semitic nations this consciousness comes into the

fore-ground more prominently still. The presupposition of the moral is

no longer the perfect and uniform goodness of existence, as with the

Chinese, nor the essential evilness of the same, as with the Indians,

but an inner moral antagonism of existence. Over against the

personal-become good divinities, stands evil as a divine entity

different from them, and which is primarily less spiritual, and

expressive rather of mere nature character; and man in his moral

struggle stands in the -midst of this antagonism,--has to determine

himself for the divine good, and against the not less divine evil.

Thus, in virtue of the contest of the antagonism dominant in the world,

the moral subject becomes more nearly independent and free, than among

the purely naturalistic nations; his moral task becomes, by far, more

earnest and arduous,--calls far more emphatically for personal

self-determination. Hence these nations have produced grander

world-historical characters than the earlier ones,--have become

world-historically militant nations. And the goal of the militant

struggle is the ultimate victory of the good over the evil by the

personal spirit, which is also itself not destined to be dissolved back

into a general impersonal nature-existence, but, triumphing over mere

nature, preserves its own personality.

But this breaking-forth of the rational spirit and of its moral task

into greater distinctness, manifests itself otherwise among the

Egyptians than among the Semitic nations. It is among the Egyptians

that the personal nature of the moral spirit comes first to full

self-consciousness. The spirit is a something other than nature and

higher than it,--is not destined to servitude under it, but to

personal, free moral self-determination and to personal immortality,

over against death-dominated nature. But this antithesis of the moral

personal spirit to nature does not as yet rise, in the earthly life, to

complete victory. Even as Osiris succumbs to the evil divinity, Typhon,

so must man ultimately succumb in the struggle with unspiritual

nature,--only, however, in order to attain in the yon-side to the full

enjoyment of spiritual personality. The morning-twilight of the freedom

of the rational spirit dawns in Egypt, but it is not as yet day. It is

only through struggle, through suffering and dying, that the spirit

becomes free,--in the world of the gods as well as in the world of man.

Osiris becomes a true ruler only in the next world, and so with man

also; only out of death spring forth life and victory. Also over the

Egyptian's moral life a dusky vail is thrown, a melancholy breath

poured out,--as with the Indians, though relieved by a brighter hope.

To the Indian all moral life is but a rapidly passing meteor, vanishing

away without trace; to the Egyptian it is a conflict, painful indeed,

but resulting in an ultimate permanent victory of the moral person. Man

has not as yet complete freedom and complete personal validity, but he

will have them after death if he only struggles manfully here below;

and he is conscious of entire personal responsibility for his life and

his fortune after death. His personally-moral life falls not a prey to

a universally-dominating nature-necessity, but to the personal decision

of the first personal victor (Osiris) over nature and over death. By

Osiris, the king of the yon-side world, where alone true life first

begins, man's moral life is judged--weighed in the scales of

righteousness. In personal communion with Osiris, the just man lives,

happy thenceforth. Osiris, the highest representative of spiritual

divinity, the forerunner and pledge of immortality, the firstborn among

those who have died and are now living after death, is also the highest

representative of Egyptian morality, the ground-character of which is,

a persistent battling for righteousness. The ostrich-feather, the

symbol of truth and righteousness, is one of the highest badges of

honor.--But it is only in the next world that true righteousness is

realized; here upon earth rule as yet, invincibly, the powers of evil.

Hence the Egyptian, in contrast to the Chinese, turns all his love and

his interest to the yon-side life. The dwellings of the living were for

the most part paltry huts; the dwellings of the dead are monuments of

the highest art and of an unparalleled zeal for labor; the tombs hewn

out the rocks, and the pyramids intended for the sepulchers of kings,

belong among the wonders of the ancient world, and bid defiance to the

ravages of time. The present life is, as with the Indians, lightly

esteemed, not, however, because of the nullity of all existence in

general, but because it is contrasted with a higher life, which, as the

highest good, is a richly promising moral goal. Reminders of death

attend the Egyptian wherever he turns, and the mummies and the images

of the dead were an eloquent memento mori even at his most convivial

banquets. "The Egyptians," says Diodorus (i, 51), "regard the time of

this life with very little esteem; the dwellings of life they designate

as inns, but the graves as everlasting mansions."

The heathen Semitic nations, especially the Assyrians and Babylonians,

base themselves, in religion and morality, entirely on the ground of

the subjective spirit, of the individual personality. The general unity

of naturalism they have given up, but. they have not as yet risen to

that of the infinite spirit. The spirit appears only in the

multiplicity of single forms; hence these nations never appear in

history as a unity, but always as a plurality. In religion as well as

in morality there is manifested the reckless independence of the (now,

for the first time, vigorously and mightily self-conscious) subjective

spirit, from any and all unconditional objective authority, whether of

nature or of spirit,--an untamedness and intractableness of the strong

individual will, daring deeds, but also a violent wildness of the

unbent will and of the passions,--a highly excited turmoil-without goal

or purpose. Man, as a personal individual, comes into the fore-ground

as possessed of paramount rights. Morality is devoid of any certain

basis and rule; the strong individual will breaks through all barriers.

It is the era of great heroes, and of great tyrants and

God-despisers,--from Nimrod who began to be a mighty one upon earth, a

mighty hunter before Jehovah (Gen. x, 8), to Nebuchadnezzar, who

daringly exalted himself against God. The moral consciousness, as

bewildered by an over-intense self-consciousness, manifests

predominantly a defiance on the part of this strongly egotistical

subject against all objective power, even against God; cruelty and

coarse sensuousness characterize even the rites of religion, and hence

much more also the moral life. Nineveh and Babylon attained, in

ante-Christian times, to the culminating-point of the godless,

pleasure-seeking, luxurious life. Religion and morality stand here in

the most violent contrast to those of India; the rude, the violent, the

tumultuous tolerates no law, no regulated order.

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SECTION X.

TO a higher stand-point, though not to a higher development thereof,

than the earlier nations, rise the merely transitorily world-historical

Persians. The violent dualism of two mutually morally-opposed personal

gods, calls also morality to an earnest moral struggle against

ante-mundane, god-sprung evil; the moral personality comes much more

emphatically into the fore-ground than ever before; the moral task

becomes more difficult, but it has the certain promise of ultimate

victory over evil, not merely in a yon-side life, but within the scope

of history itself. Morality has here, for the first time in heathendom,

a positive goal inside of the field of history, namely, the realizing

of a kingdom of the good upon earth; and the Persians are the sole

heathen people who make a definite prophecy the foundation of their

religiously-moral striving. Hence the essence of Persian morality

consists in a definitely hope-inspired conscious struggle against evil

as potent in the world, as well as in, and upon, man himself, and

which, both in its guilty origin and in its effects, appears Las a not

natural but moral and utterly illegitimate corruption,--in a

progressive purification of man from every thing which springs from

all-invading and all-infecting evil,--in a word, in struggling against

the world of Angramainyus. Man stands forth with his moral will,

legitimated and victorious, over against a potently ruling divinity.

The Persians, whose world-historical significancy proper extends from

Cyrus to Alexander the Great, have not been able within this short

period to develop their religiously-moral consciousness into a

scientifically matured form. The chief source for the same--the

Avesta--is far inferior in contents and development of thought to the

so-rich and deeply-suggestive sacred writings of the Indians; and yet

the moral view, as a whole, is a higher one. The real world, in which

man has morally to work, is here no longer the immediate divine essence

itself, but it has come into existence essentially by a personal,

divine act. The spirit, in its personal reality, is no longer a mere

momentary phenomenon upon the alone-eternal nature-ground, as in China

and India, nor is it fettered and hemmed by nature, as over-potent in

this life, as is the case in Egypt; but it is already the higher

creative power over nature, although not as yet a perfectly free and

omnipotent Creator. Hence the world, in its relation to the moral

spirit, is no longer a foreign and heterogeneous element, but as a

spirit product, is unhostile and even congenial to the spirit; man

begins to feel at home in the world, and hence he places no longer the

goal of his moral striving merely in the yon-side, but he conceives it

as to-be-attained-to within the field of history. This goal of moral

effort is, however, not to be reached by a mere simple, natural

development of man, but by a constant and earnest struggle against

positively extant evil. Evil is no longer, as with the Buddhists and,

in part already, with the Brahmins, the substance of the

world,--inheres not in the essence of existence as inseparable

therefrom, but has in fact become, through the moral fault of the

personal spirit,--is a guilty fall from the originally good. This is a

thought more strongly approximative of the Christian world-theory than

we have as yet met with in our development of the history of the moral

consciousness. Wherever evil is regarded as naturally necessary, there

the vitality of the morally evil is paralyzed; the Chinese entertain

not this view, simply because they conceive of evil in general only

very superficially; the Indians conceive of it far more profoundly and

earnestly, but they recognize not the moral root of the same; the

Persians regard all evil as springing exclusively from personal act.

This act, however, is not an historical one, but a pre-historical one;

not a human act, but a divine one. The unitary divinity per se,

however, cannot do evil, as is attributed to the Indian Brahma, but the

good God, Ahura-Mazda, remains free of all evil; it is another no less

personal god, that by free self-determination, chose the evil and now

thrusts his world into the world of Ahura-Mazda, and is involved in all

real evil whose proto-source he is,--namely, Angra-mainyus, that is,

"the evilly disposed," the author of death, of falsehood, of all

impurity, and of all hurtful creatures,--the spirit which constantly

denies the good.

Although, according to this, man has thrown off the guilt of evil

reality from himself upon the world of the gods, still he conceives of

his moral nature and life-task, in regard to this evil, more highly

than did the earlier nations. Man, as created good by the good god, is

placed, with complete personal freedom, in the midst of the moral

antagonism of the world, and has now actually to accomplish in his own

person the moral task of coming constantly into closer communion with

Ahura-Mazda, and to contend against Angra-mainyus and all his works.

Morality is a struggle, and rests not upon mere natural feelings and

impulses, but upon the distinct consciousness of the holy will of the

good god,--upon the Word expressly revealed to men. By this view,

morality is made to throw off all nature-character, and is placed in

the purely spiritual sphere, and at the same time the subjective

caprice of the Semitic nations is overcome, and, for the moral, an

objective law obtained, a law that is to be received purely

spiritually. The revealed holy Word is the mightiest weapon against

Angra-mainyus.--This moral struggle is a much more vigorous one than in

Egypt, for it is joyously and hopefully conscious of final victory,

even within the sphere of history. The Egyptian regards his god--who is

at the same time his moral example--as defeated for the present world,

and driven to the future world; the Persian feels himself called even

here to a courageous co-militancy with Ahura-Mazda, who persistently

struggles against evil, and does not succumb to it, not even in the

present world. The Persian regards himself as a co-worker with God, and

does not mournfully long for the next world; for his moral effort, he

has a high object, namely, to combat against a god and the evil

creation of that god,--also a high goal, namely, the redemption of a

world from evil,--and also a high confidence in victory, for there will

ultimately come the Rescuer, �aoschyan�, that is, the Helper, who will

accomplish the victory. It is not by mere chance that the Persians--who

usually showed themselves hostile to foreign religions, and especially

to all sensuous idolatry--manifested constantly a high regard for the

Jews, in whose higher idea of God they met in fact with a somewhat

related element.

In correspondence to its religious presupposition, Persian morality

bears primarily a negating character, though in a wholly different

manner than among the Indians. While the system of the latter is

directed against existence, and especially against the personal nature

of man, Persian morality on the contrary directs itself, with the most

complete consciousness of the validity of the personality, negatingly

against every thing which belongs to the world of Angra-mainyus.

Self-purification from every thing which stands really, or even merely

symbolically, in relation with evil, death, or corruption,--the killing

of poisonous and hurtful animals, and the like, are not merely moral

requirements, but even acts of worship, and the Avesta gives, on these

points, very precise and detailed directions.

But also the positive phase of the moral life is much more highly

developed in the moral consciousness of the Persians than in that of

the earlier nations. The Persians acquired among their contemporaries

the reputation of high moral earnestness as in contrast to the

luxuriousness of the Semitic nations. They were, in their prime, a very

vivacious and vigorously active people; indolence springs of

Angra-mainyus; labor, especially agriculture, internal improvements,

etc., are required by the good god, and are sacred duties; this is

somewhat as it is in Chinese morality, but from a different reason; the

Chinese labor for the present, the Persians for the future.--The moral

relation to other men is here kindly and noble;. a high esteem for the

personality, in every respect, forms the basis of social virtue.

Honesty, strict truthfulness, and a high feeling of personal honor,

distinguish Persian morality very widely from East-Asiatic. It is a

morality of vigor and manliness.

Where evil is no longer regarded as a merely abstract something, as a

quality of existence in general, but as a concrete guilt reality, not a

mere neutrum, but as borne by personality, there only can the moral

struggle against the same be really earnest. The Chinaman labors

quietly and busily in mechanical persistence; the Indian patiently

endures; the Egyptian mourns, and longs to pass out of this world; the

Shemite riots and enjoys; but the Persian battles with a manfully-moral

earnestness. The defective phase of his moral consciousness is

essentially this, that he throws evil off from himself upon the sphere

of the gods,--that he has not recognized the evil of his own heart.

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SECTION XI.

The moral consciousness of the Greeks is very different from that of

the Persians; though rising above it, it yet seems to throw the

approximation to the Christian view, that lay in the Persian

consciousness, farther again into the back-ground.. The heathen mind

could not remain stationary at Persian dualism; the Greeks endeavor to

bring about a reconciliation of the antagonism of the universe, by

throwing this antagonism into the past, and by regarding the present as

an expression of the harmony of existence as effected at the very

beginning of history by a victory of the personal spirit over the

nature-powers that opposed it; the dualism of hostile antagonism gives

place to a dualism of love. No evil god and no nature-power hostile to

the personal spirit, offer obstruction to the moral activity. Morality

is not a struggle, but a progressive development of man as lper se good

and pure; by following his own inwardly harmonious nature, by enjoying

the intrinsically beautiful existence of the world, and by exalting

sensuous enjoyment by means of spiritual culture, and by equally

developing all the phases both of his sensuous and of his spiritual

life, man arrives at the harmonious perfection of his personality,--at

the highest goal of moral effort. The beautiful is per se the good; in

enjoying and creating the beautiful, man is moral. The battle is not

against a world of evil that is to be destroyed, nor in championship of

a moral idea that is to be realized; but its end is simply to develop

the full personality of the hero. The Greek battles for the sake of

battling; the battle is even enjoyment, is heroic play. The Greek ideal

is the vigorous, youthful personality,--in the world of gods,--the

youthful Apollo, in the world of heroes, Achilles, until, at the close

of Grecian history, it assumes a world-historical form in Alexander the

Great. But the entire ideal element inheres in the person of the hero;

a permanent moral world-historical reality, the Greeks could not

create; they lacked the positively world-historical purpose;

Alexander's world-conquering deeds aimed at, and were able to effect,

only an exaltation of the person of the hero, and necessarily ended in

anarchy at his death, and the Greeks became an easy prey to that nation

which aimed with iron-persistency at the positive purpose of a unitary

historical reality, and absolutely subordinated the person to the same.

The moral idea is, with the Greeks, more an object of artistic

enjoyment than of moral realization. For the positive basis of the

higher moral life, the family, their moral consciousness is extremely

defective, and the idea of man as man, has not as yet come to

consciousness; only the Hellene, but not the barbarian, is regarded as

a truly moral personality. Slavery is the indispensable foundation of

the free state.

The precedent antagonism of existence, which comes to consciousness in

all heathen religions,--primarily as an antithesis of nature and

spirit, which rises with the Persians to a moral character,--is, with

the Greeks, not indeed entirely overcome (heathenism in fact never

rises beyond it), but in fact reduced to harmony, a harmony, however,

which, as viewed from a Christian stand-point, must be regarded as

delusive. The consciousness of this antagonism comes to expression in

myths concerning ancient combats between the spiritual gods and Titanic

nature-powers; the gods came off victorious, and the present world

expresses the peaceful reconciliation of the earlier antagonisms;

every-where, both in the world of gods and of men, spirit and nature

are in harmonious union; there is nowhere mere spirit, and nowhere mere

nature. What appears as a hostile power over the personal spirit, was

already vanquished anterior to human history; no inimical, evil god

disturbs the beautiful harmony of existence; the Titans have been

thrust into Tartarus. The foundation of Greek morality is therefore joy

in existence,--love as enjoyment; man has not to sacrifice his

existence and his wishes, but only to heighten the former, and to

fulfill the latter, in so far as they express the character of harmony,

of the beautiful; he has not, as with the Indians, to renounce the

world, but on the contrary to enjoy it, as bearing every-where the

stamp of the beautiful, and to remain in genial peace therewith,--has

not, as the Persian, to battle against its reality as permeated with

evil, but simply to pluck from it the fruits of happiness. Greek

morality is the morality of him who is complacently self-satisfied,

without any severe inner struggle.

The Hellene has, in his consciousness of the harmony of existence, on

the one hand a powerful stimulus to virtue; he endeavors to preserve

this harmony, and hence is in general amiable, frank, and honorable; to

a certain degree he shows also magnanimity toward his

enemies,--respects the moral personality; but, on the other hand, he

has in this consciousness also the tendency to make light with the

moral; he believes himself already to have attained to the good, and

not to need to undergo a severe struggle for its possession,--believes

himself to have already, in his natural proclivities, also the right.

Hence he is inclined to take life unseriously; even unnatural lusts

pass for allowed, if they only appear under the form of the beautiful.

The beauty of the manner beautifies the sin, and the worship of

Aphrodite lends to sensuality itself a religious sanction. Greek

effeminacy and luxuriousness--despised only by the Spartans--became

even a by-word among the Romans; and even the dark passions of hate and

revenge found in the Greek consciousness little condemnation; no Greek

took offense at the barbarous mistreatment of the hero Hector. The most

virtuous citizens were not respected, but banished; sycophants were

honored, and the friends of truth hated or killed.

A high sense for beauty raises indeed the moral consciousness to a high

and harmonious conception of moral beauty, and the poets sketch moral

ideals with master-hand; but these ideals are more for esthetic

enjoyment than for moral inmitation. Even morality becomes to the

Hellene a matter of mere spectacle, and in no heathen nation is the

contrast between the ideal and the real life so great, as in that one

which conceived the ideal the highest. For the practical life the

requirements of the moral consciousness were other than for poetry; the

same people which admired female ideals, such as Penelope, Antigone,

and Electra, as presented in song and upon the stage, placed womanhood

and marriage, and the family-life in general, much lower in real life

than did the Chinese or the ancient Germans; and it was not merely in

the censured license of the frivolous world, but also in the moral

views of the most highly cultured, that talented concubines (especially

after the example of Aspasia, notorious for her connection with

Pericles, and also honored by Socrates) stood higher than house-wives

proper, and became the real representatives of female culture, and

ideals of female grace. Sparta, by its legislation, overthrew on

principle the proper life of the family; the penal laws against

bachelors which finally became a necessity, furnish proof, how popular

this anti-family legislation was. [21] Solon found it necessary in the

interest of the State to protect by penal enactments the merest natural

duties of the marriage-state, at least within the bounds of a minimum

requirement; [22] --so great was already in his day the general

disinclination to wedlock, which, though forming the foundation of all

true morality, was regarded in the Golden Age of Greece as little

better than a necessary evil. The bringing about of abortion and the

exposing of new-born children, was a right of parents, which was not

only protected by laws, but even defended by the most esteemed

philosophers. The perverseness not only of frivolous practice, but of

the general moral consciousness, is manifested most strikingly in the

prevalence of unnatural vice, as apologized for even by philosophers

themselves; and the dark picture of St. Paul not merely of Greek

morality itself, but also of the moral consciousness of the Greeks

(Rom. i, 21 sqq.), is perfectly corroborated by historical reality. In

certain efforts of recent date to clarify the Christian world-view by

the help of the "classical" one, these facts ought not to be left out

of sight. The heathen Germans stand in this respect very much higher

than the Greeks.

However fully the moral consciousness of the worth and dignity of the

personality is developed, still the dignity of true manhood is conceded

only to the free Hellenes, who constituted by far the smallest number

of the Greek population. (In Attica at its highest prosperity there

were 400,000 slaves, in Corinth 460,000). The barbarian and the slave

have no right to the full dignity of personality. Freedom without

slavery is, in the eyes of a Greek, an absurdity. The generally

prevalent mild treatment of their slaves was more an expression of

natural kindheartedness, and of personal interest than of conceded

right; the Spartan slave-massacres were the expression of an undisputed

right of the State and of the free citizens; even Plato and Aristotle

are unable to conceive of a State and of political freedom without the

personal unfreedom of slavery. The so-called notion of

"humanitarianism" limits the practice of this virtue to the possessors

of slaves; and the higher the right and the might of the free citizens

are placed, so much the more complete and striking becomes also the

rightlessness of the slaves. That slaves are but domestic animals

possessed of intelligence was a general maxim, recognized even by

philosophers.

Though the reality of the moral consciousness and of the moral life of

the Greek is in many respects far below that of other heathen nations,

still the moral idea that underlies this reality is a higher one. That

which, in the Christian worldview, forms the presupposition of all

truly moral life, namely, the reconciliation of the contradiction and

of the antagonism in the world of reality, the higher right and the

higher power of the personal spirit over unfree nature, this is

recognized by the Greeks, though indeed with heathen perversions, in a

higher manner than is the case among the earlier heathen nations. Only

man as redeemed by the historical redemption-act from the power of his

sinful naturalness, and as now for the first having risen to a truly

free moral personality, is capable, according to the Christian view, of

accomplishing true morality;-- also the Hellene makes the

reconciliation of the antagonism, the actual harmony of human nature

and of existence in general, the presupposition of morality, and

conceives this reconciliation as one that falls indeed before human

history, but yet is accomplished by the free act of the personal

spirit; whereas with the earlier nations (where the consciousness of

the inner antagonism and contradiction is also recognized) the right of

the personal spirit is either rejected, or else thrown for its

realization into the far future, either into the life after death, or

at least toward the close of the world's history. It is true, this

thought of a reconciliation is made possible only by the fact that the

consciousness of moral guilt is kept away from the antagonism that is

to be reconciled, and that this antagonism is conceived rather as of a

primitive cosmical character, and moreover that not man but the

personal gods enter into the sphere thereof, and, battling,

overcome,--so that there is left for man nothing further than the

enjoyable repetition of the same in artistic play; the Olympic games

are a commemoration of the battles of the Titans; and, accordingly, the

entire moral life becomes to the Greek an artistic play;--nevertheless

the ground-thought is still of high significancy,--the thought that

only man as having become free through the reconciliation of the

antagonism of real existence is capable of morality. But that the

carrying-out of this thought is weakened down on all sides, that the

Greek does not in his moral consciousness rise out of his esthetic play

to full earnestness of life, this is in fact simply the heathen

character of this consciousness. And even in the fact that to the

Hellene, morality appears so easy, there lies a presentiment of the

true thought, that to the morally emancipated man the moral law appears

no longer as a yoke or burden, but is, on the contrary, the direct,

unforced, bliss-inspired and blissful life-outgush of sanctified human

nature. To no nation of heathendom does morality become so light a task

as to the Hellenes. The Hellene knows no moral code of laws compelling

the moral subject to obedience, with objective authority; and even the

moralizing philosophers themselves, in striking contrast to the

Chinese, the Indians, and even the Persians, tarry almost exclusively

in the sphere of general thoughts, and give only seldom definite

precepts for the details of life. The moral subject bears the law

within himself, and bows himself under no foreign objective law. And

this is in fact but a heathen perversion of the per se true thought,

that with the spiritually-regenerated the law of God is: written in

their hearts,--that to them his yoke is easy and his burden light. As

the Chinese and Persian consciousness shows some resemblance to that of

the Hebrews, so the Greek consciousness has analogies to the Christian,

especially as the latter is presented by that Apostle who labored among

the Greeks. That with the Greeks the analogical thought rests upon an

untrue foundation, and worked hurtfully in its carrying-out,--that it

led to sinful presumption, and created a morality actually inferior in

many respects to that of the Chinese, the Indians and Persians,--this

evinces not the fallaciousness of the thought per se, but only the

perversity of the natural man, who turns all the truth attainable by

him into the service of sin, and thus confirms the weighty utterance

that only he "whom the Son makes free is free indeed." He who is

inwardly unfree, and yet imagines himself free, is morally in greater

danger than he who is unfree and also knows himself as such. The Greek

appears morally more responsible and more guilty than the other

heathen, because he has a higher knowledge; and the Apostle's moral

sentence upon the heathen [Rom. i, 18 sqq.] falls upon the Greeks with

much greater force. than upon the other heathen.

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[21] Plato: Symp., p. 192.

[22] Plutarch: Solon, c. 20.

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SECTION XII.

To a philosophical form, [23] the moral consciousness of the Greeks

rose, with some distinctness, for the first, through Socrates; before

him we find little more than a practical morality expressed in

disconnected moral maxims, without further proof or development.

Socrates, who speculated less on metaphysical questions than simply on

the good, not only bases the moral upon philosophical knowledge, but

finds in fact in this knowledge the essence and the highest degree of

the moral. To know is the highest virtue, and out of this virtue follow

directly and with inner necessity all the others; a contradiction

between knowledge and volition is inconceivable; practically, morality

manifests itself in the subordinating of the irrational desires to

rational knowledge, and especially in obedience to civil laws.

Unconscious of the might of evil in the natural man, Socrates conceives

the moral essentially only as measured by a rational calculating of

outward fitness to ends. His significancy for moral philosophy lies in

his calling attention to rational knowledge as the source of the moral,

and to the no longer arbitrarily subjectively-determined good as the

end of rational effort.

The Greeks occupy themselves very early with the nature of the moral;

the most ancient so-called Wise Men are, for the most part, moralists.

It was very long, however, before the Greeks reduced their

isolatedly-presented, and rather empirically-based, moral maxims to any

sort of unity and order. Philosophy proper occupied itself primarily

with purely metaphysical questions, and the moral views expressed were,

with the earlier philosophers, for the most part, a mere supplement of

observations and life-rules but loosely connected with their

speculations proper.

Socrates was the first who, as it was said, called philosophy from

heaven to the sphere of the earth; it is with him essentially moral,

and, from merely metaphysical speculations, he turns away with a

certain displeasure; even in his consideration of the idea of God,

greater prominence is given to the moral phase of the divine activity.

With him the knowledge of the good is the chief end of philosophy; but,

for the simple reason that here ethics springs exclusively from

philosophy, the element of knowledge far outweighs in it the element of

the heart. The ethics of Socrates is a coldly rational calculating; it

has not, as has Christian ethics, an historical basis and

presupposition, but is invented purely � priori. Man is by nature

thoroughly good,--is, in his freedom, not simply at first as yet

undecided, but he has by nature a decided tendency to the good, just as

reason has a natural affinity for the truth. Evil is by no means to be

explained from mere volition, but only from error. The human

understanding can err, and the act resulting from error is the evil;

without error there would be no evil, and it is absolutely impossible

that man should not also will that which he has recognized as good. It

needs, therefore, only that men be brought to a knowledge of the good,

and then they will also act virtuously. The motive to the moral is not

love, but knowledge; to instruct is to make better; the philosopher is

also the virtuous man, and only the philosopher can practice true

virtue; the ignorant man is also immoral. Self-knowledge--the gnothi

seauton--is the presupposition of all morality,--not, however, in the

sense familiar to Christians, of a knowledge of the heart as inclined

to sin, but only in the sense of a knowledge of the logical nature of

the thinking spirit; in his dialogues, Socrates does not think of

bringing men to a knowledge of their moral guilt,--he simply aims to

convince them as to how little they as yet know. Hence ethics is with

him a one-sided doctrine of knowledge. There is properly-speaking only

one virtue, and this is wisdom, that is, knowledge; and all other

virtues are only different forms of this one virtue. [24]

Practically, wisdom manifests itself mainly in self-mastery, that is,

in governing by knowledge all appetites, dispositions, feelings, and

passions. Man must always remain master of himself,--must in all

circumstances, however different, always act strictly according to his

knowledge and in harmony with himself,--must not let himself be led by

unconscious desires; and, inasmuch as a man's knowledge cannot be taken

from him, anti as the changeable movements of feeling are under the

control of knowledge, hence man has in this faculty of knowledge also

complete happiness, and the wise man is necessarily also happy; and

this happiness depends exclusively on himself. Therein consists the

freedom of the sage.--Knowledge, virtue, and happiness are consequently

not essentially different from each other,--are simply different phases

of the same thing. In that Socrates essentially identifies the good

with knowledge, he raises it above the arbitrary caprice of the

individual subject, seeing that truth is not dependent on the good

pleasure of said subject. Thus the good has a validity independently of

the individual, and all rational men must recognize the same thing as

good. Hence the moral idea has attained to contents of a general and

necessary character; and Socrates recognizes the objective significancy

of the same, in that he ascribes right wisdom to God alone. [25]

These general thoughts form the scientific basis of the subsequent

currents of philosophy. Socrates himself does not rise beyond them and

enter into details. Whenever the question is as to giving to these

general thoughts more definite contents, he refers to the laws of the

State, in the fulfillincg of which man fulfills the requirements of

morality. Hence his morality is merely Greek civic virtue,--has no

higher ideal contents. To obey the laws of the State is the sum of all

duties; a dikaios is the same as a nomimos. To do good to one's

friends, and evil to one's enemies, is a moral requirement, [26] though

indeed to suffer wrong is better than to do it,--the doing of evil to

one's enemies being in fact not a wrong, but a legitimate retaliation.

[27]

In general the tendency of Socrates is toward a dry, prosaic

utilitarianism. His moral views, in so far as they are not idealized by

Plato, are devoid of all ideal enthusiasm. And in his own moral life he

by no means rises beyond ordinary Greek morality; and it required all

the superficiality of modern deistic "illuminism," to undertake to

place Socrates as a moral ideal by the side of Christ. In Plato's

Symposium, Socrates surpasses all the others in drinking, and even

outquaffs the whole company without getting intoxicated himself; and

yet even this Platonic Socrates is already considerably idealized. In

Xenophon. [28] he goes with a friend to a hetaera, who is sitting as a

model for a painter, and instructs her in the art of enticing men. The

manner in which it has been attempted to justify this, is not of the

most happy. If, in such a case, Socrates knows of nothing better than

to indulge in plays of dialectical skill, evidently his judgment of the

matter itself is not very condemnatory. And in other respects his

bearing toward lasciviousness, [29] gives evidence of deep

erroneousness of moral consciousness even in the philosopher himself.

Of moral and family love, Socrates has, so far as our knowledge of him

goes, scarcely a presentiment. When his wife comes, with her child,

into the prison, to take leave of her husband after his condemnation to

death, Socrates simply turns to his friends, and says dryly, "Let some

one, I pray you, take the woman away from here, to her house;" and she

is led out by a slave; and in his last long farewell speech to the

world, Socrates bestows upon wife and children not a single word. For

his virtues, such as they were, he is worthy of praise, but still he

manifestly does not rise above mere Greek virtue.

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[23] Wehrenpfennig: Verschiedenheit d. eth. Princ. b. d. Hellenen,

1856.

[24] Aristotle: Eth. Nic., vi, 13; iii, 6, 7; Eth. Eud., i, 5; vii, 13;

Magn. Mor., i, 1, 9; ii, 6; Xen.: Mem., i, 1, 16; iii, 9, 4, 5; iv, 6,

6; Plato: Lach., p. 194 sqq. Apol., p 26; Diog. L., ii, 31.

[25] Plato: Apol., p. 23.

[26] Xen.: Mem., ii, 6, 35.

[27] Plato: Rep., i, p. 335; Crito, p. 49.

[28] Mem., iii, 11.

[29] Ibid., i, 3, 14, 15.

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SECTION XIII.

From Socrates there sprang up several mutually-differing schools, the

peculiarity and difference of which lie especially in their ethical

views.--The Cynics (through Antisthenes) develop the doctrine of

Socrates as to the ethical significancy of knowledge, into one-sided

prominence in its practical application. Knowledge works directly the

good; virtue, as resting exclusively on knowledge, is the highest goal

of human life. It manifests itself essentially in the struggle against

irrational desires; desirelessness is the highest virtue.--Over against

the Cynics, the Cyrenaics (through Aristippus) emphasize the other

phase of the wisdom-life, namely, happiness. Happiness is the highest

good, and therefore the highest goal of the moral; virtue is only a

means to this end. And happiness consists in the feeling of pleasure,

in enjoyment. Hence enjoyment is the goal of the moral striving; in it

alone man becomes free, because in it the desires that press and

disturb him come to quiet.

Both of these schools undertake to find an objective ground for the

moral; in fact, however, neither of them finds any thing more than a

strictly subjective one; the Cynics take their starting-point in

subjective knowledge, and in the will as determined thereby; the

Cyrenaics, in feeling. Both schools are equally one-sided developments

of tendencies that existed in germ in Socrates. If knowledge, virtue,

and happiness are essentially the same thing, then it is indifferent

which of these phases is made the starting-point,--whether it be said

that virtue consists in an unconditional obedience to knowledge, or in

the striving after happiness; and hence the Cynic is right when he

asserts, that in following knowledge we need not inquire as to the

sensation of pleasure or displeasure, for true happiness follows from

virtue of necessity; and if sensation should seem to contradict this,

then it is simply to be despised as a false one. The Cyrenaic is

likewise consequential when he asserts, that in following the feeling

of happiness we need not inquire as to philosophical knowledge, for as

happiness follows from virtue of necessity, hence in the feeling of

pleasure we have certain proof that we are practicing virtue, and hence

also that we correctly understand the good.

The Cynics give exclusive predominance to the rational tendency in

Socrates; there is for the good in the widest sense of the word no

other decisive criterion than knowledge. And the knowledge of the good

and the manner of action that rests exclusively upon this knowledge,

are the sole thing which has real worth for man. Only the good in this

sense is beautiful, and only evil is deformed; whatever else is

pleasant for the senses or feelings is entirely worthless; and even all

knowledge that does not relate to the good is useless. True freedom

consists in perfect indifference to whatever lies outside of the

individual spirit. All evil rests upon error,--has its source in false

impressions and ideas, but not at all in the heart. The wise man is, in

virtue of his knowledge, free from all evil.--The independence of the

personal spirit is here most one-sidedly conceived of, as a

contemptuous turning-away from all objective reality,--as an

over-confident trusting in one's (evidently very immature and

fortuitous) subjective knowledge, as a complete self-isolation of the

persistently opinionated subject. Hence there result an absolute

indifference to all outer existence, even to all historical reality and

to social custom, a throwing off of all reverence for the objective

reality of the spirit as developing itself in history. However much of

truth may lie in the ground-thought of Cynicism, still its practical

development on the basis of its defective presuppositions leads almost

necessarily to a caricature,--to an unbridled insolence of the immature

spirit, giving birth to such phenomena as that of Diogenes. There is

manifested in this school the pride of easily-satisfied

self-righteousness, the haughty self-isolation of the subject as

breaking loose from all objective realization of the rational spirit.

The Cyrenaics pushed to its extreme the other phase. A happiness which

I do not feel as pleasure, is none at all. If virtue makes happy, then

I must at once also feel it. Hence that which is truly good, must at

once evince itself as such in the sphere of the sensibilities; and,

conversely, that which impresses me pleasurably must be good, otherwise

there would be another form of happiness than that produced by virtue.

Hence between one pleasure and another there can be no essential moral

difference; consequently the feeling of pleasure or of displeasure is a

perfectly safe guide in the sphere of the moral. Hence the chief point

in practical wisdom is, to procure for one's self the feeling of

pleasure; from this principle the inquiry must first take its start. By

observation, for example, I find that temperateness is a virtue,

because intemperateness occasions suffering. Hence true wisdom as

founded on this basis consists in the rational governing of the measure

of each particular pleasure, and not in the knowledge of any general

principles; such principles, other than the one just given, do not

exist, but each enjoyment is governed by its own particular measure,

which is discovered for the most part simply through experience.

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SECTION XIV.

Plato gives to Greek ethics a deeply suggestive scientific basis and

form. The world is an expression of the divine ideas, a thing of

beauty. That which answers to the divine idea, namely, the god-like, is

good. Man has the task, in virtue of his rational spirituality, to

realize the good, consciously and with freedom; the essence of virtue

is, pleasure in the good as being the truly beautiful,--love. As

expressing in itself the harmony of the soul; virtue is also the

condition of true happiness; not the direct pleasure-feeling, however,

but rational knowledge, decides as to the good, and such knowledge

works the same directly. Hence virtue is neither indifferent to

pleasure, nor does it consist therein, but it produces it. However, all

virtue, because of the imperfection essentially inherent in existence,

remains ever imperfect in the earthly life; the corporeal nature of man

itself is a hinderance.--Virtue is in its essence unitary, but because

of its relation to the manifold soul-powers and life-manifestations, it

manifests itself fourfoldly, as wisdom, manliness, temperateness, and

justness, of which the first is the fundamental one, and dominates the

others.--Morality, however, is not a something belonging merely to the

individual person, but has its full reality only in the moral

community-life, the State, which rests not so much on the family and on

moral society, as rather constitutes, itself, the exclusive form of the

moral society-life, and in fact itself produces the family and all

other moral forms of communion, out of itself, and dominates them with

unconditional authority. The absolutism of the State swallows up into

itself every right of the moral personality and of the family, and it

is not as man, nor as a member of the family, but solely as citizen,

that the individual is capable of realizing true morality. But also

only an inferior number are capacitated thereto; and therefore these

few who are capable of true wisdom are called, by this very fact, to

the unlimited governing of the others. The moral task is consequently

not a general one for humanity,--is not the same for all, and is in its

full truth not possible for all.

Plato, far surpassing Socrates in spiritual profundity, developed with

creative originality the thoughts which his master had possessed rather

only as mere presentiments, into a scheme of profound speculation, very

different from the popular moralizing of the son of Sophroniscus. His

ethical thoughts, which are not shaped into a rounded system, are

expressed more especially in the following of his works: Protagoras,

Laches, Charmides, Euthyphron, Gorgias, Menon, Philebus, Politicus, and

in his work which presents the realized moral organism, the Republic or

State.

In the thought of the rational spirit, which Plato conceives more

deeply than was ever done before, he obtains a much more solid

foundation for the moral than did the earlier philosophy. The world is

in its essence, not indeed created, but formed by God, the absolute,

rational spirit,--is the most perfect possible expression of his

thoughts, a copy of the divine eternal ideas. The realization of an

idea is the beautiful; hence the cosmos is an object of beauty. [30]

The rational immortal spirit of man--his ideal phase--has the task of

realizing the beautiful, the ideal, and the highest end of human life

is ideality, that is, it is, to become like God; this God-likeness,

which consists in justness and in sincere piety, is the good, and the

highest good is God himself. [31] This thought of God-likeness,

however, Plato does not further develop, nor indeed could he do so,

seeing that the God-idea itself, as embraced from a heathen

stand-point, was too unclear. The idea of the good is here not derived

from the idea of God, but conversely it is undertaken to determine the

idea of God from the idea of the good, as being fundamental and per se

certain. Evidently we have not to do here with the Christian thought of

God-likeness. The thought of a divine command falls back behind the

thought of the idea of the good as innate in reason itself. This mode

of viewing the matter lies in the nature of the case, seeing that in

fact there could be here no question of any other revelation of the

divine will. The good which is conceived merely in a general and rather

indefinite manner as the inner harmony and order or beauty of the soul,

as the untrammeled domination of reason, and hence rather under a

formal than a material aspect, [32] is per se a something divine and

true, and as such to be aspired to; and the individual pleasure-feeling

is not the measure of virtue, nor the good itself. [33] It is true,

virtue alone renders truly happy, that is, works complete inner harmony

of soul, and there is no happiness without virtue, for virtue itself is

simply such a harmony or beauty of soul, [34] and to do wrong is the

greatest of all evils, greater than to suffer wrongs, [35] but

happiness is not one and the same with every chance pleasure-feeling.

[36] It is not this feeling, in its dependence on the accidentalities

of outer circumstances and of the frame-of-mind, but only the idea of

the good, that can be known and truly identified; [37] hence the

pleasure-feeling cannot be the decisive criterion as to the good, and

the good cannot be aspired to merely for the sake of the pleasure. The

knowledge of the idea of the good--which, like the consciousness of any

and of every idea, is not the product of a reflective course of

thought, that is, not derived knowledge, but on the contrary a direct

reason-knowledge, and the highest of all that can be known--is the

foundation and presupposition of virtue; without knowledge there is no

virtue; virtue is not a natural quality of man, but is learned and

appropriated by learning. [38] And the knowledge of the good leads with

inner necessity to the practicing of that which is recognized as good;

evil rests essentially upon error, and is never committed with

consciousness and intentionally; [39] herein Plato perfectly harmonizes

with Socrates. The will has, over against knowledge, no discretion

whatever, but is the direct and necessary expression thereof. The

lower, sensuous desires can indeed withstand reason, but the will of

the spirit itself cannot do so. That also the heart--the spiritual

essence of man himself--may have a natural tendency to evil, Plato has

not the least conscious suspicion. Nevertheless an obscure presentiment

of the entrance of corruption into the universe does find expression in

his notion, that the present enchainment of the spirit to a body is not

an original and normal, but a guiltily-incurred state of things. In

fact, according to Plato, the soul existed as a rational personality

once before in a bodiless state, and only in consequence of a moral

transgression was it joined to a trammeling corporeality, so that it is

now, as it were, fettered in a cell or a dark cavern. [40] Also for

still another reason, the good, though indeed the highest end, is yet

never fully attainable in the earthly life. For inasmuch as the real

world is not solely and purely the work of the absolute God-will, but,

on the contrary, a product of two factors,--whereof the one is the

formless proto-material which is in fact a relative nonentity (me on),

and the other the ideal God-will,--and as the former, because not

posited by God himself, does not perfectly yield to the formative

working of God when impressing his ideas upon it (even as the impress

of a seal never reflects perfectly clearly every feature of the

same),--so the world is not an absolutely perfect one, but only the

best possible one,--is not the pure and mere expression of the rational

spirit, but there lingers in it a never entirely-overcomable irrational

residuum,--an evil lying in the essence of the world itself, which

though not sprung from the fault of moral creatures, is yet the ground

and source of all moral guilt,--a proto-evil. [41] So also is there in

man himself a primitive antagonism never entirely overcomable in the

present life, namely, between reason and the lower animal desires,

which latter should in fact be morally dominated by reason. [42] In

Plato, therefore, there is lacking to the moral consciousness that

joyous confidence which characterizes Christian morality. "Evil can

never be annihilated, for there must always be something over against

the good; it cannot, however, have its seat among the gods, but it

inheres in mortal nature; therefore man should strive as soon as

possible to flee hence and to escape thither." [43] "True philosophers

are minded to strive after nothing other than to decease and be dead,

seeing that, so long as we still have the body, and our soul is united

with this evil [the body], we can never attain to that whereafter we

aspire;" [44] and they lay not violent hands upon themselves simply

because they are placed by God in this life as upon a watch, which they

are not at liberty to abandon at will. [45]

Hence morality consists primarily in this, that man turns himself to

the ideal, the spiritual, and away from the merely sensuous. This is,

however, only one phase of morality, the ideal; the other phase is the

real one. Even as God, in impressing his ideas upon matter, shaped the

world into an object of beauty, so must also man actively merge and

imprint himself into the actual world-existence, and shape it into

beauty. Hence virtuousness is delight in the beautiful. And the

beautiful is harmony, not merely sensuous but also spiritual. The

essence of virtue is, as this delight in the beautiful, love, or

eros,--a thought that is developed by Plato with very great emphasis

(especially in his Phaedrus, Lysis, and Symposium). This is, however,

by no means the Christian idea of love--that love in which man knows

himself at one with another in virtue of communion with God,--but it is

a love to the manifestation, to the beautiful. Not the divine per se is

loved, but the concrete, and even essentially sensuous manifestation.

It is not a love of soul to soul, but one that clings to the sensuous

form. Hence it has in Plato's state no significancy for the family. It

is true, eros exalts itself from the sensuous to the spiritual, to

soul-beauty; [46] the sensuous element, however, remains the basis, and

does not receive its worth simply from the spiritual. The beautiful is

per se, and in all of its manifestations, a revelation of the divine,

and the divine is accessible to us only under the form of the

beautiful; where beauty is, there is also the divine. This is the

characteristically Greek stand-point; beauty and grace excuse all sin;

even the frivolous is recognized as good, provided it is only

beautiful. The recognition of love under every form, even under that of

unnatural vice, is so characteristic of the Greek, that even Plato

attempts a philosophical justification thereof, which is far from

complimentary to Greek ethics. [47] In love, here, predominates by no

means self-denial, as is the case, with Christian love, but simply

pleasure; I love another not for his sake, but for my own sake. This

love knows nothing of a self-sacrificing suffering, but only a

self-enjoying, at farthest only a suffering of longing and jealousy. It

is true, mere sensuous love as directed to merely fleshly enjoyment, is

blamed; [48] but where a higher spiritual love, not merely to the body

but also to the soul, exists, and in the beautiful the divine element

is recognized, there sensuous love, even when it assumes the form of a

misuse of sex, finds its justification, and becomes a virtue, and even

a religious enthusiasm. [49] "Beautifully enacted, it is beautiful;

otherwise, however, shameful." [50] The very circumstance that Plato

speaks so repeatedly and so extensively and with visible approval of

this absolutely vicious love [Rom. i, 27], while at the same time he

scarcely touches upon the morally close-related mere sexual love, and,

in his long discourses on eros, honors wedlock love with not a single

word, and further that he attempts to repress [51] the feeling that

instinctively impresses itself upon him, that there is something

shameful therein, by the help of strangely ingenious turns of thought

and disguises and enthusiastically poetical expressions, which cannot

but make upon the modern reader a truly distressful impression,--all

this is a notable and significant index of the moral bewilderment of

the Greek spirit.

Plato's development of the idea of the moral is as follows: Virtue, as

essentially constituting a unity, appears primarily as wisdom, sophia,

consisting in a knowledge of the truth and of the good; upon wisdom as

the chief virtue, depend all the other virtues. Now, in that wisdom

brings to the consciousness what really is, and what is not, to be

feared in our moral efforts and in our struggle against hostile powers,

it develops our natural zeal in acting into the virtue of manliness or

courage, andreia. And in that it teaches us what is the inner harmony

of the soul, and what is the proper subordination of sensuous and

irrational desires to reason, it develops the virtue of temperateness

or prudence, sophrosune, which preserves the right inner order of the

soul through the domination of reason over all lower life-forces and

pleasure-desires; these lower desires are not crushed out, but simply

kept within proper limits, and placed in the service of reason. In that

wisdom guides to outward activity the harmony of the inner soul-life in

its relation to other men, it develops the virtue of justness, which

preserves harmony with and among men, in that it respects the rights of

each individual; it presupposes the' other three virtues, and indeed

gives them their proper force and significancy. [52] To justness

belongs also piety or holiness, hosiotes, which preserves man in his

proper relation to the gods;--Plato uses here, constantly, the plural.

[53] A more full development of the virtues Plato has not given; and

the necessity of precisely the four ones actually given is based more

on the nature of the State than on that of the moral person. A special

treatise on duties is not given; and, in consideration of the notion

that an inwardly harmonious and hence virtuous soul finds, of itself,

the proper course in each particular conjuncture, [54] such a treatise

appears indeed as superfluous. That morality is not conceived of as of

a merely individual character, but, on the contrary, as realizing

itself essentially in moral communion, is a great advance of the moral

consciousness; but in that this thought is carried out in the most

rigid one-sidedness, and, as it were, with a theoretical

passionateness, and in that it lacks the proper historical and

religious bases, Plato has arrived, in his enthusiastically and

persistently pursued ideal of a State, at a positive caricature, which

has brought upon the great philosopher, in the eyes of those who look

upon the real world with practical sobriety, the appearance of

ridiculousness, or at least the reproach of an utterly unpractical

theorizing; [55] and it has often been undertaken to rescue the

reputation of the great man by simply holding his state-theory as a

mere ideal not in the least designed for realization. But both this

reproach, and also this attempt at vindicating his honor, do injustice

to the philosopher. Unquestionably his work on the State is the most

mature and the most fully perfected of his writings,--one upon which he

wrought with the highest and most enthusiastic preference. (His work on

the Laws has greater reference to the real world, which as yet was very

different from his ideal State, and expresses rather a preliminary

expedient, until the true state finds a bold creator.) That his ideal

of a state was not intended by him for realization, has no good

evidence in its favor, and is on the whole incredible; on the contrary,

it cannot be doubted but that Plato made repeated attempts, and with

well-grounded hopes, at realizing his state-theory by the help of

Dionysius the Younger in Syracuse; [56] and his own declarations as to

the practicability of his state-theory confirm this. [57] From our own

social views these theories differ very widely, it is true; but to a

Greek, and especially to the state-institutions of the Doric tribes,

which were regarded by Plato with great admiration, they were by no

means foreign, and they have already in the laws of Sparta an actual

prototype in very essential points. Precisely in its contrasts to the

Christian view of moral communion, to the idea of the Christian Church

and of the Christian state, the Platonic state is very instructive. Not

individual man, but the state, is the moral person proper, by which all

the morality of the individuals is conditioned, produced, and

sustained.

Not the moral individual persons make the state, but the state makes

the moral persons. Without the state, and outside of it, there is no

morality proper, but only unculture. Hence the task of the state is to

make its citizens into morally good persons,--to undertake the cure of

souls. [58] The state,--which in its inner constitution as a harmonious

moral organism, answers to the three phases of the soul-life of man,

and represents (1) reason or thought and knowledge, and (2) courage or

zeal, thumos, and (3) sensuousness, in the three classes of society,

namely, (1) the savans, who therefore rule, (2) the warriors, and (3)

the producers, that is, the instructing, the protecting, and the

providing classes, [59] --realizes inner harmony, and hence at the same

time justness and happiness, in that it does not permit each individual

to act and work at his personal discretion, and to select his own

life-calling, but on the contrary in that it assigns to each his

special and appropriate position in the whole,--a position which the

individual must unquestioningly accept and fulfill, without

intermeddling in any manner in any other form of activity. A rigorous

separation of ranks and of professions by the state itself, is the

unconditional presupposition of a healthy state-life. The rulers have

the task of assigning the individuals to the particular classes,

according to their capabilities. [60] The productive class, which

corresponds to sensuous desire, has as its special virtue,

temperateness or modesty, which it realizes by keeping itself within

its proper bounds. Courage and wisdom belong to the two higher classes;

these two are the gold and silver, while the productive class is but

ignoble brass. The producer is not to concern himself with state

matters, but simply to attend to handicraft and agriculture. [61]

Slavery is presupposed as a mere matter of course; however, where

practicable, only non-Greeks are to be sold as slaves. [62]

The rulers have wisdom as their essential virtue; there can never be in

the state but a few of them, and it is best when there is but one, and

this one a philosopher. The good of the whole requires the exclusive

dominion of the best,--an absolute aristocracy or a monarchy. [63] And

as wisdom can find the right course in each particular case, whereas

laws must always be merely general, and often do not apply to

particular conjunctures, hence the power of those who rule should not

be cramped by many laws, but must have scope for free movement, and

must decide in each particular case with entire discretion; and the

wise ruler will often, without law and against the will of the

citizens, and hence with force, realize the weal of the state, and

force the citizens to let themselves be made happy. [64]

The truly free personality is conceded accordingly only to the sage,

who is at the same time the ruler; all the other citizens of the state

are, in their entire life, absolutely subject to the state, the

spiritual essence of which finds its expression not so much in abstract

law as in the perfected personality of the ruling sage. Though the

members of the third class are left more free, still this is done only

out of contempt; "even if shoe-cobblers are bad, still they bring

little danger to the state." [65] The true citizen, the one possessing

the virtue of wisdom and manliness, is under the absolute guidance of

the state; the absolutism of the state is without limitation. The two

higher classes, as the proper and complete representatives of the

spiritual essence of the state, the sentinels of the same, are reared

and educated, and determined in their collective life by the state. In

their education first importance is given to music and gymnastics, in

order that they may learn to love and practice harmony; the education

of the future rulers--who can become rulers only at the age of fifty

years, after having passed the test of severe trials--requires,

additionally, special acquaintance with mathematics and philosophy.

[66] To any other religious culture than that given by philosophy,

Plato, who clearly saw the worthlessness of the popular religion, could

not refer. [67]

The state as including in itself and guiding all morality, and as

realizing justness, has all and every right; the individual citizen of

the state has rights only in so far as the state concedes them to him;

even to his life he has no right, so soon as he is no longer capable of

benefiting the state; the physicians are charged with the duty of

letting the incurably sick perish without help. [68] The state alone is

entitled to property; private property is not to be allowed. The

producing class labors not for itself, but solely for the state. [69]

With this principle Plato supposes himself to have quenched at once all

the sources of contention and disquiet. Even the act of poesy stands

under the rigid censorship of the state; and dramatic poetry is not to

be tolerated at all. [70] The appropriate meters to be used in poetry

are carefully prescribed, and of musical instruments only the cithara

and the lyre are allowed. [71]

The family is not the foundation, but only a branch of the state, and

merges itself into it. Personality has here no right of its own. No one

consort belongs to the other, but both belong exclusively to the state.

Wedlock proper is consequently inadmissible, on the contrary the

citizen is obligated to the begetting of children in the interest of

the state; in this connection personal love to the sex has no validity,

but only civic duty. The citizen is not permitted to choose for himself

the wife (who is conceded to him only temporarily), but the state gives

her to him,--ostensibly by lot, but in reality the rulers are to "make

use of falsehood and deception," and cunningly to guide the lot

according to their own judgment, so as always to bring together the

most suitable pairs. Men are under obligation to beget from their

thirtieth to their fifty-fifth year; women to bear from their twentieth

to their fortieth year. This of itself implies that there is to be no

permanent marriage relation; on the contrary a change of wives is

expressly required; no one is permitted to regard any woman as his own

exclusive possession. [72] It is laid down as a principle for the free

and active citizens proper, "that all the women should be in common to

all the men, and that no woman should live solely with one man, and

that also the children are to be in common, so that no father shall

know the child begotten by him, and no child its own father." [73]

Hence the children are, immediately after their birth, to be taken away

from their mothers, and to be reared in common on the part of the

state, and the greatest possible care is to be taken that the mother

shall never again recognize her child. The children are nursed by the

women in common and interchangeably; feeble and physically imperfect

children are to be exposed. [74] After the lapse of the determined

period of life, the procreation with the persons specifically assigned

by the state, and as having taken place at the order of the state, is

to cease, and, from this time on, both the men and the women may form

temporary connections with each other on the principle of elective

affinity, with the one proviso that births must be prevented, or, where

this cannot be done, the child must be left to perish without food.

[75] --The woman is not a family-mother, but only a state-citizen, and

she has political duties, in real and even magisterial state-offices,

to fulfill. The women must perform the same work as the men,--must even

take part, entirely nude, in the gymnastic exercises,--must march out

in war, though in battle they are to occupy only the rear-ranks; for

indeed between men and women there is no other difference than simply

that the former beget, and the latter bear, and that the former are

stronger than the latter. [76]

This family-undermining absolutism of the state has to do, however,

only with the first two classes, while the producing class are less

affected by this care of the state for them, and may act with greater

freedom. The great task toward which all moral community-life is

directed, namely, to realize the idea of the body politic, by means of

the moral freedom of the individual, Plato was unable to accomplish

otherwise than by an unconditional and unquestioning non-permission of

the free personal self-determination of the individual. Objective

morality entirely swallows up the subjective. This is, however, not

peculiar to the view of Plato, but is the Greek tendency in general.

Plato manifests rather a decided progress toward the development of the

free moral personality. While in the legislation of Sparta, somewhat as

in that of the Chinese, the impersonal law held ruthless domination,

and disallowed of the personal self-determination of the individual in

very essential things, and while in the democracy of Athens the

irrational caprice of the masses was the predominant power over the

individual, in the Platonic state the personal spirit of the wisely

taught and tested regent attains to domination. From the stand-point of

heathen antiquity, which knows of no right of the person over against

the state, but concedes the absolute right of the state over the

individual, this is a progress; and that which appears therein as

unnatural and as a harsh one-sidedness indicates not so much the

untruthfulness of the consequential progress, as rather the

untruthfulness of the fundamental view common to all the Greeks.

That the spirit of wisdom and power can be and is to be poured out upon

all flesh [Joel iii, 1], and that there is no difference before God,

but that all are equally called to be children of the truth and of

wisdom, this thought is unknown to entire heathendom, and therefore

also to the greatest of heathen philosophers. Of a morality absolutely

valid for all men and without exception, Plato knows nothing; without

slavery, society does not appear to the Greek as possible; but the

slave is not called to, nor capable of, free self-determination, and

hence also not of true morality; and even of the free, only a

relatively small number are accessible to true wisdom and virtue.

Capability and incapability for the good are transmitted through

natural generation from parents to children. [77] The reason for this

dividing of humanity into a minority who represent reason, and into an

irrational, passive multitude who require absolute guidance, lies not

exclusively in the general Greek national consciousness, but also in

the philosophical world-theory of Plato in general. The primitive

dualism of existence manifests itself also in humanity. Even as the

world is not an absolutely pure and perfect expression of the spirit,

and as the rational spirit is not an absolute power, but has simply to

shape a formless proto-material not created by it, and to impress

itself upon it, without however being able entirely to master and

spiritually transfigure it,--so also in humanity the men of the

rational spirit, namely, the philosophers, stand over against the

spiritually dependent and relatively unspiritual multitude, whose

destination it is to be absolutely guided and shaped by the former.

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[30] Especially in his Timaeus.

[31] Rep., pp. 500, 505 sqq., 613 (Steph.); Theaet., 176; Menon, p. 99;

Euthyphron, p. 13.

[32] Gorgias, p. 504 sqq.; Phileb., 64, 65.

[33] Gorgias, p. 495 sqq.; Phaed., p. 237 sqq.

[34] Gorgias, 470 sqq., 504-509; Menon, p. 87 sqq.; Rep., pp. 352, 444,

583, 585; Phil., pp. 40, 64.

[35] Gorgias, pp. 469 sqq., 477, 527.

[36] Phil., p. 11 sqq.; Gorgias, p. 494 sqq.

[37] Gorgias, pp. 464, 500; Menon, p. 87 sqq.

[38] Menon, p. 87 sqq.

[39] Prot., pp. 345, 352 sqq., 358; Menon, p. 95; Gorg., p. 468.

[40] Timaeus, p. 41; Phaedrus, p. 246 sqq.; Rep., p. 514 sqq.

[41] Tim., p. 46 sqq., 54; Polit., 269; Rep., 611 sqq.; Phaedrus, 246

sqq.

[42] Rep., 436 sqq., 589; Gorg., 505.

[43] Theaet., p. 176.

[44] Phaedo, p. 63 sqq.

[45] Ibid., p. 62.

[46] Symp., 209 sqq.

[47] Symp., p. 181 sqq., 216 sqq.; Phaedrus, p. 250 sqq.

[48] Gorg., p. 494; Phaedrus, p. 250; Symp., p. 180 sqq.

[49] Phaedrus, p. 251 sqq.

[50] Symp., p. 183.

[51] Phaedrus, p. 237 sqq.; comp. 230, 242; Symp., p. 183.

[52] Protag., pp. 332, 349; Rep., p. 428 sqq., 442 sqq., 591.

[53] Euthyphron, p. 6 sqq.; Gorg., pp. 507, 522.

[54] Polit., pp. 294, 297.

[55] Made as early as by Aristophanes, and even by Aristotle: Polit.

ii, 1-5, 12.

[56] See K. F. Hermann: Gesch. u. Syst. d. plat. Phil., 1839, i, 67.

[57] Rep., p. 471 sqq.; 499, 502, 540; Legg., 709.

[58] Gorg., p. 464.

[59] Rep., p. 369 sqq., 412 sqq., 435.

[60] Ibid., pp. 412-415.

[61] Polit., p. 289 sqq.; Rep., pp. 374, 397.

[62] Rep., p. 469.

[63] Polit., p. 292 sqq., 297; Rep., pp. 473, 540.

[64] Polit., pp. 293-296; Rep., pp. 473, 540.

[65] Ibid., p. 421.

[66] Ibid., p. 402 sqq., 424, 519 sqq., 535.

[67] Ibid., p. 386 sqq.

[68] Ibid., p. 405 sqq., 409.

[69] Ibid., pp. 416, 464.

[70] Ibid., p. 391 sqq., 568.

[71] Rep., pp. 398, 399.

[72] Ibid., 449 sqq.

[73] Ibid, 457.

[74] Ibid.. 457 sqq.

[75] Rep., 461.

[76] Ibid., 451 sqq., 471, 540.

[77] Rep., 459 sqq., 546.

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SECTION XV.

The essential advance of the ethical view of Plato beyond earlier

theories consists in this, that he emancipated the idea of the good

from all dependence oil the individual pleasure-feeling, that he

conceived it as unconditionally valid and lying in God himself, and

that consequently he regarded morality as God-likeness, as an image of

God in man, and hence as a phase of the spiritual life constituting an

essential part of rationality itself, and that in consequence thereof

he conceived morality as a per se perfectly unitary life, and reduced

the plurality of moral forms of action to a single principle, namely

wisdom.--But the characteristically heathen dualism, which (though

reduced by him to its minimum) is yet not entirely overcome, rendered

it impossible for him to rise to the full freedom of the personal

spirit in God and in man, and hence to the full knowledge of the moral

idea. The real personality is recognized neither in its rights and

power; nor in its guilt. There remains in all existence, even in the

most highly developed moral life, a never entirely overcomable residuum

of an unfree, unspiritual, and morally spirit-trammeling matter, over

which God himself is not absolutely master. But the limitation of the

moral lies not in the guilt of the personal spirit, but in the

unspiritual (and not by it entirely controllable) nature-ground of

things. The possibility, and therefore also the requirements, of the

moral are different for the different classes of men, but even the most

free is not entirely free. The moral freedom of the freest, namely, the

philosophers, is trammeled by the fetters of a corporeality not in

harmony with the moral task, that of the rest of men by lack of

knowledge and of moral capacity, and that of the free Greek citizens,

additionally, by the power of the rulers as extending beyond the

expressed laws, and that of the unfree Greek citizens, still

additionally, by the weight of the entire mass that presses upon them

from above. From this progressively and descendingly increasing

unfreedom there is no redemption within the sphere of historical

reality, but only yon-side of history, through death.--Morality bears,

neither in its progressive realization nor in its guilty perversion,

the character of historicalness,--is in no respect a power essentially

modificatory of universal history, and consciously aiming at such

modification as its end; and even the ideal state is and remains simply

the very limited activity-sphere of a special moral virtuosity of the

governing individual spirit, without a higher world-historical purpose

in relation to the totality of humanity.--Also the moral consciousness

itself rises not entirely above the character of the merely individual;

the connection of the same with the God-consciousness is only of a

loose character,--is not really based in the same.

The gain accruing to moral knowledge through the labors of Plato is not

to be lightly estimated. Light and order are given to the previously

dark and confused mass. There is henceforth no more question of merely

isolated and not deeper-grounded moral rules, but morality has acquired

a firmer basis,--has come here for the first to serious

self-examination. In fact, Plato occupies himself so predominantly with

the foundation-]laying thoughts that he does not reach the task of

carrying out a special doctrine of virtue or duty. In these

ground-thoughts there are, in so far as is possible from a heathen

stand-point, some approximations to a Christianly-moral consciousness;

and they would have been more marked still, had the philosopher only

succeeded in severing the chain which still held the already floating

ship fast anchored to the soil of naturalism, namely, by overcoming the

thought of an unspiritual proto-material as offering a hinderance to

the personal God,--in a word, had he succeeded in changing the me on

which lies at the basis of the real world, into an ouk on. But neither

Plato nor the heathen spirit in general was able to do this. Even

Aristotle was able only silently to vail the, also to him, troublesome

thought of dualism, but not scientifically to master it. But wherever

the rational spirit is not absolutely the ground and life of every

thing, there also the full idea of morality is not possible; for only

the thought of the complete mastery of the spirit over every thing

unspiritual, and the confidence of untrammeled liberty, assure to

morality foundation-ground and courage.

Though in the recognition of the limits of freedom there lies an

approximation to the Christian thought of the natural depravity of the

human race, yet there lies in it, on the other hand, also an all the

greater departure from the same; for these limits are not placed in the

sphere of moral guilt, and hence of moral freedom, but yon-side of

morality in the sphere of a nature-substratum not to be overcome by the

moral spirit. The hampering of morality has not sprung from an

historical act, and hence is not to be overcome by an historical act.

The consciousness of the moral imperfection of the world, which despite

all the idealism of the Platonic world-view comes often to painful

expression, leads not to the thought of a needed redemption. The sage

emancipates himself, so far as, in view of the imperfection inherent in

the essence of all existence, it is possible, from the limitations of

his moral life, and he emancipates others only through philosophical

instruction and through absolutistic state-guidance, but not through a

sanctifying communion-grounding historical act.

In the idea of the state there lies indeed the presentiment,

that-morality, in its true character, is not a merely individual

quality, but, on the contrary, has an historical significancy and task,

but Plato does not rise beyond the mere presentiment; and when he is on

the very point of passing beyond the limits of a merely individual

morality, and into the sphere of an historical one, he hesitatingly

checks his step and turns back. His State forms no link in history, and

has no history as its goal. As it is not sprung of history, but only of

the ingenious intellect of a theoretical philosopher, so it is designed

to be nothing other than the platform upon which the geniality of the

individual personality of the philosophic regent may find scope for

itself. Neither people nor ruler are to be the representatives of an

historical idea; on the contrary, the people is only the passive

material for the formative hand of the state-artist, and the ruler only

the executor of a philosophic theory. The state itself is to be only an

individual organism along-side of many other state-organisms, likewise

ruled by individual geniality. Hence it must also be only very small;

even a thousand citizens suffice. The thought of regarding the state as

a vital member in an historical collective organism, lies very far from

Plato. Hence, though his state is a moral organic system, yet it has

no, world-historical character; it has neither behind it an historical

presupposition, nor before itself an historical goal. That humanity in

general is a goal of the moral striving, that it may be brought

together into a moral unity, that a state of peace among all nations is

to be aimed at--of all this Plato has not the remotest presentiment;

rather does war appear, even for his ideal state, as in accordance with

order, and as a necessary matter of course; for in fact Greeks and

non-Greeks are enemies by nature. [78] Let this state-ideal of the

profoundest Greek philosopher, as presented without any trammeling from

a resisting real world, be compared with the Old Testament theocratic

state as brought to realization among a stubbornly resisting people,

and which had, from the very beginning, a world-historical goal, and

which kept in view, and had as the basis of its entire organization,

the thought of the salvation, and hence also of the peace and unity, of

entire humanity,--and the result will be very suggestive.

Most manifestly appears the weakness of Platonic ethics in its relation

to the religious consciousness. The beautiful conception of the

God-likeness of the moral man, Plato is not able to carry out; the

founding of the moral upon the divine will is foreign to him, and must

have been so, for the Greek knows nothing of a revelation of this will,

and the philosopher could not invent one; he was only able to refer to

the rational consciousness of man himself; but to raise this

consciousness to a universally-extant and valid one Plato did not

venture to hope, and hence he placed simply the authority and even the

strong dictatorial power of the philosophers, in the stead of the

authority of a divine revelation. Also his profoundly-conceived

God-idea, which far surpassed all previous results of heathenism, Plato

did not venture to carry out in its entire ethical significancy, and to

make it consequentially the basis of the moral. It is true he is far

removed from the folly of certain modern theories, which present

morality as entirely independent of piety; he in fact makes piety a

very essential element of all moral life, and derives even from the

idea of a divine judgment after death, a very potent motive for

morality; [79] still, piety is with him not the foundation of all the

virtues, but only a single one of the same, and that too not the first

one, but only a form of justness; and even such as it is he ventures

not to refer it directly to the philosophically-recognized God-idea,

but only to the gods of the popular religion. But as he himself exposes

the immoral character of the Greek mythology with a noble indignation,

and on that account, bitterly censures the so highly and

universally-revered Homer, nay, even would have his poems, for moral

reasons, banished from his ideal state, [80] it is consequently

difficult to say how he could justify and require piety toward these

gods. There remains here a wide-reaching and unbridged chasm in his

ethical teachings.

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[78] Rep., p. 373, 469 seq.

[79] Gorg., p. 523 sqq.

[80] Rep., p. 377 sqq., 386 sqq., 598 sqq., 605.

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SECTION XVI.

The completer of the Platonic philosophy, and of Greek philosophy in

general, namely, Aristotle, who in many respects passed independently

beyond Plato, and who was less idealistic than he, and more devoted to

the study of sober reality, presented ethics for the first time as a

special systematically carried-out science,--in connection with Physics

on the one hand, and with Politics on the other. The greatest possible

repression of the dualism of the primitive elements of existence, as

still yet admitted by Plato, leads Aristotle not to a deriving of the

moral idea from his more fully developed God-idea, but to a still more

confident grounding of the same in the rational self-consciousness,

which appears here less clogged than in Plato. A sound psychology

affords for ethics a scientifically firm basis, but the repression of

the Platonic antithesis of the ideal and of reality gives it a morally

feebler character.

Of the three different presentations of Aristotelian ethics, only the

Ethica Nicomacheia (that is, ad Nicomachum) is, in the eyes of the

trustworthy results of criticism, [81] to be regarded as a genuine work

of Aristotle, though probably not prepared by himself for publication,

but only sketched for personal use in his lectures; while the Eudemic

ethics (Eudemia) is very probably a work of Eudemus, a disciple of

Aristotle, and is derived mostly from the first-mentioned work, with

some original additions,--the so-called large ethics (megala) being a

digest from both. In his Politics, which Aristotle separates from

ethics, though as subordinate thereto, morality is contemplated in its

complete realization in the state as the moral community-life. Hence

this work is evidently to be reckoned to his Ethics, and to be regarded

as its carrying-out.

Aristotle gives to ethics its name--which it has ever since borne--and

a scientific form which served as a model for the entire Christian

Middle Ages. His comprehensive Ethica, consisting of ten books,

contains indeed many excellent thoughts, and, above all, gives evidence

of a close observation of reality, and in this respect is by far more

sober and less idealistic than Plato; as a system, however, it is still

very defective, and contains chasms on very essential points. Only

relatively few general thoughts are really scientifically developed; by

far the larger part is treated rather empirically and aphoristically;

Aristotle expressly renounces all attempts at scientific strictness of

demonstration and development, for the reason that, in his view, the

subject does not admit of this, but only of probability. Hence the form

of presentation--in direct contrast to Plato's uniformly spirited and

either scientifically or poetically inspired style,--sinks not

unfrequently to dry common-sense observations, and lingers for the most

part entirely within the sphere of the popular grasp. [82]

Aristotle does not rise to the full idea of the absolute God--an idea

which is attained to only in the thought of creation--but he halts

immediately before reaching it; he pushes, however, still further into

the back-ground the primitive antithesis between God and the not truly

real proto-material of things, which was already very much enfeebled in

Plato, without, however, entirely overcoming it. He is loth to admit a

primitive antithesis of being, but he also fails to pronounce the word

which alone leads beyond it,--the word with which the Old Testament

begins. The world is in his view not merely the best possible one, but

it is the absolutely perfect expression of the will of the rational

spirit. Hence he gets rid also of that notion of Plato, of an evil that

pervades all real existence, and especially humanity. All reality is,

on the contrary, good; also the corporeality of man is no longer an

imprisonment inflicted for a previous guilt, but it is the normal organ

of the soul. And of an historically-originated depravity, Aristotle has

no notion whatever. It is true, the great mass of the populace are so

qualified by nature that they have no inner tendency toward virtue, but

are guided by sensuous impulses and fear (Eth. Nic., x, 10), but the

better-gifted free-born man is by nature thoroughly good, and hence has

in his own reason the pure fountain of moral knowledge. On this

presupposition Aristotle can have perfectly free and confident scope on

the basis of the subjective spirit; and notwithstanding that lie

conceives the idea of God as the rational absolute spirit, more

profoundly than Plato, still he connects the study of nature and of the

moral spirit much less closely with the God-idea than does Plato. From

the very circumstance that he finds in the real world a much more pure

expression of the divine thought than Plato, he is enabled to confide

himself more unquestioningly to reality, to merge himself trustingly

into the real world, to read in its traces the words of divine truth;

and he has also much less need of the supernatural element, which,

because of the God-opposed undivine substratum of the universe, was

highly necessary in the system of Plato.

Hence in Aristotle morality is entirely rooted in the soil of the

subject; it appears less as the holy will of God to man, than as the

absolutely normal essence of the spiritual life, as called-for by the

rational human spirit itself. While there was in Plato at least the

foreshadowing of the truth, that the goal of the moral striving lies in

God-likeness and in the pleasure of God in man, and hence bears an

objective character, in Aristotle the subjective character comes

decidedly into the fore-ground, namely, in the thought that this goal

is the personal well-being of the moral subject. In Plato the highest

and truest is and remains an object of the yon-side, an absolutely

ideal somewhat that is never perfectly presented in reality, and never

entirely to be attained to,--in Aristotle all ideality becomes also

real, and all that is true a quality of the this-side, and that, too,

not as brought into reality from without, but as wrought out from

within. The real world is also in moral respects a perfect expression

of the idea, and no longer a mere feeble impression thereof,--is the

original, is an organism that potentially unfolds itself with its own

inherent power. Hence we find no longer any longing and thirsting after

a better and ideal world, no poetical contemplating, no painful

consciousness that the spirit is fettered and bound in bands of

unfreedom by an unspiritual substratum of the universe; with Aristotle

life has no longer a tragical character; from his world-theory there

spring no longer any dark and mysterious tragedies; his theory is a

quieting, genial one; and with the falling away of the longings of

unsatisfaction, falls away also poetry; the sober prose of the spirit

as contenting itself with the world as it is, takes its place. And in

this very contentedness there lies a greater antithesis to the

Christian world-theory than is presented in the Platonic consciousness

of an inner antagonism of existence. The rather mystical

contemplativeness of Plato gives place to a calculatingly rationalistic

view.

The psychological examination of the presuppositions of ethics, is much

more largely and deeply carried out by Aristotle than by Plato, and

constitutes the bright point in his philosophy; but that his ethics

has, in fact, predominantly only a psychological character, and is

rooted neither in religion nor in history, is its weak side. While

Plato makes at least an effort to give to morality an ideal character

transcending reality, the ethics of Aristotle rather confines itself

with unquestioning satisfaction to the sphere of the reality of man,

without even raising the query, whether this reality is in a state of

normal purity, or on the contrary of deterioration; and it is

characteristic of their respective views of the moral, that the thought

of personal immortality which stands forth so prominently in Plato, and

which gives to the moral striving its proper tone and consecration,

retires in Aristotle into a very dubious back-ground. In fact, he

directly declares it as absurd (atopon) to affirm, that no one is happy

until after he has died (Eth. Nic., i, c. 11, 13); he knows only of a

morality of the this-side. And he expressly declares death as the

greatest of all evils (phoberotaton ho thanatos); "for it is the end of

every thing; and for the deceased there appears to be no longer either

any good or any evil" (Eth. Nic., iii, 9), and hence death robs man of

the highest goods (iii, 12).

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[81] Spengel, in his Abhandl. d. Kgl. Baierschen Akad., philos.-philol.

Klasse, 1841, iii, 2; 1846, p. 171 sqq. Brandis: Aristoteles, 1851, i,

p. 111 sqq.; ii, p. 1555 sqq.

[82] Compare Biese: Philos. des Arist., 1838 sqq., 2 vols.,--a studious

presentation, though not sufficiently digested philosophically.

Brandis: Arist., 2 Abth., 1857 (especially pp. 1335-1682); profound but

too detailed. Trendelenburg: Histr. Bietr. z. Phil., ii, 1855, p. 352

sqq.

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SECTION XVII.

All striving has a goal, and this goal is for the rational striving a

good, and hence the highest goal is the highest good; and this highest

good is a perfect felt well-being, which is not a merely passive state,

but a perfect active life of the rational spirit; and hence it consists

essentially in virtue, which in its turn includes per se in itself the

feeling of happiness.--Virtue itself is either thought-virtue or

ethical virtue, according as it relates to reason or to sensuousness.

Thought-virtue is acquired by learning, ethical virtue by practice. As

the good consists in harmony, and hence in a proper measure, hence the

non-good consists in a too-much or a too-little. Hence virtue is always

the observance of the proper mean between two unvirtues. The

presupposition of all moral action is the perfect freedom of the will,

a doctrine to which Aristotle,--in opposition to the view of Socrates

that the knowledge of the right necessarily leads to its

practice,--holds distinctly fast.

The rational spirit is not a reposing or merely passively moved entity,

but an activity. The thinking spirit is at the same time a

volitionating, an acting, and a working spirit. All volitionating aims

at something as an end, namely, in all cases, that which appears to

him, who volitionates, as a good. Hence the good (to agathon) is

primarily that whereon the striving is directed in view to its

attainment. Now there are many and different ends and goods, whereof

some are related to others merely as co-adjutant, as means to higher

ends and goods. But if the striving is a rational one, that is, a sure

and consistent one, then there must be a last end, a highest good,

which is not a mere means to another end, but which is aimed at for its

own sake, and for the sake of which alone we aim at all other goods,

and which is hence an absolutely perfect end, a toleion, which has its

end, to telos, within itself. Honor, riches, knowledge, etc., are

goods, though they are not sought for their own sake, but always for a

higher purpose to which they are but the means,--are but the partial

goods of one perfect good; and this good is the perfection of one's own

existence and life, the well-being, eb(atpovia, that is, the vitality

of the life as perfect in itself, and as being its own end,--zoes

teleias energeia. This well-being is not sought in the interest of

another good, but for its own sake, and is hence the highest good

(Nic., i, c. 1 sqq.; comp. Eud., i, 1). This "eudaemonia" is by no

means one and the same with our notion of happiness, but includes the

same in itself. Happiness is only the one, the subjective phase,

namely, the happiness-feeling that is connected with this

"eudaemonia,'" whereas the "eudaemnonia" itself has essentially and

primarily an objective significancy, namely, the being well-conditioned

or blessed, the possession of the all-sidedly perfect life. Hence it is

not without meaning when a special examination is entered upon as to

whether the pleasure-feeling is included in the "eudaemonia" (Nic., i,

c. 9).--The good is accordingly by no means a mere idea never entirely

realizable in the this-side, as with Plato, but it is a full reality

already in the present life,--finds this reality in the actual being

and life of the sage; it is not a merely abstract general something;

but a definite quality inherent in individual existence; not a yon-side

something transcending all special goods, but one that is realized in

the totality itself of these goods (Nic., i, 4). This totality,

however, is not a mere sum, for were this the case the highest good

might be increased by some newly added good, but it is a unitary whole,

whereof the different goods are but the special forms (Nic., i, 5).

Well-being as a purely human good is not mere life, for life exists

also with plants and animals, nor yet the mere sentient life, for this

exists also with animals; but it is the rationally-active life, and

hence the perfectly active life of the rational spirit,--is not mere

being and determinatedness, but a self-determining, an energeia,--is

not merely a good, but works the good on and on (Nic., i, 6, 7). This

implies of itself that the highest good, well-being, is not outside of

or merely subsequent to virtute; on the contrary, virtue itself

constitutes a part of the essence of the highest good, which in fact

consists in activity, though it is not per se the whole highest good;

for to perfect well-being belongs also the happiness-feeling, the

feeling of pleasure, which results upon the successful issuing of the

virtuous activity. Hence this happiness-feeling is not a something

independent of virtue, and existing outside of and along-side of it; on

the contrary the virtuous life already contains happiness as its

necessary constituent; for only he is virtuous who does the good

gladly, who has joy in virtue. In so far, therefore, one may indeed say

that the highest good consists in the practicing of virtue, and of all

the virtues (Nic., i, 7-9). However, Aristotle admits that to perfect

well-being belong also such goods as are not already directly given in

virtue itself, such as are even independent thereof, as, e. g., earthly

affluence, good descent, beauty, health, a happy close of life, etc.

(Nic., i, 9-11). With this very true concession to the natural

consciousness as unprejudiced by any one-sided system, the

consequentiality of Aristotle's ethical system is manifestly broken.

For if there are real goods, and conditions of the highest good, which

are independent of moral perfection, and if consequently the truly

virtuous man may possibly be without the highest good, then there

prevails no moral world-order, and morality is deprived of its

assurance; and as it is a legitimate goal to strive for the highest

good, hence it follows that man must strive after still other

possessions outside of morality, and which do not depend thereon, and

which he can consequently acquire only in extra-moral and hence immoral

ways. But as Aristotle does not recognize any guilty corruption of

human nature, hence the above concession involves him in an absolutely

insolvable dilemma, in a violent contradiction with his own system. He

prefers, however, to be in contradiction with himself, rather than, in

the interests of his system, to deny manifest experience, to the true

understanding of which he does not possess the key.

But wherein now consists virtue, and hence the most essential element

of well-being? In man there is a two-phased life, sensuousness and

reason, which are often in conflict with each other. Sensuousness, in

so far as it is not purely vegetative, namely, the nutritive activity

of the physical life, but sensuous desire, may be and should be

governed by the reason. Virtue assumes accordingly a twofold form; in

the first place it relates to the proper condition of reason itself,

and in the second place to the proper condition of the sensuous nature,

as consisting in the subordination of the same to reason; in the first

sense it is thought-virtue, in the second ethical virtue (arete

dianoetike and ethike). The former is mainly wisdom; the latter

includes temperateness, liberality, etc. That the former belongs among

the virtues, appears from this, that we praise it in a person as his

merit (Nic., i, 13). The word ethical as applied here to virtue is

taken in its narrower sense, as relating to practical habits. It is

clear at a glance, that this division of the virtues is entirely

inadequate, unless the one or the other class of virtues is taken in a

wider sense than is strictly admissible. For there are purely spiritual

virtues, e. g., humility, truthfulness, fidelity, thankfulness, which

are in no way connected with sensuousness, and are yet not intellectual

or thought-virtues. But if we take wisdom, as in Plato, in the wide

sense of an inner harmony of the rational soul in general, then very

manifestly the ethical virtues which consist in the controlling of the

sensuous nature, would not be co-ordinate but subordinate thereto.--The

thought-virtue can be taught or learned, especially by abundance of

life-experience; on the contrary, the ethical virtues are acquired by

frequent repetitions of the same actions, that is, by habituation,--are

essentially facilities in acting, acquired by practice. By nature we

have no virtue, but only the possibility and capability thereof; and

the capability becomes a real virtue only by practice and habit. Hence

virtuous actions are primarily not the consequence, but the ground and

presupposition of virtue. It is only by repeatedly acting virtuously

that man becomes virtuous (Nic., ii, 1, 2). How it is possible to act

virtuously before one has virtue, and what motive man can have to act

virtuously before he is virtuous, Aristotle asks indeed, and he

recognizes the difficulty of the question, but he does not solve it.

The indication that we possess virtue is this, that in our virtuous

acting we feel also delight. Virtue is neither a passion, such as

anger, fear, love, hatred, etc., because the passions are natural

movements not springing from our will, nor bearing as yet per se any

moral character, nor is it a faculty, for this is given by nature, but

it is a facility (exis), that is, the moral manner of our bearing

toward the passions; and indeed it is that particular facility whereby

man becomes a good man, and his work a good work (Nic., ii, 5). [83]

This is of course as yet a very insignificant and purely formal

definition. In order to give it some contents, Aristotle resorts to

this course: In every matter there is only a single form of the right,

but manifold forms of the wrong,--even as in regard to a mark there are

many directions-for shooting by it, but only one for hitting it, for

which reason also the right is much more difficult to find and to do

than is the unright. The unright in a manner of acting is either a

defect or an excess; the right is the correct measure, and hence the

mean between the two. Hence virtue is (and this is its complete

definition) a freely-willed facility in observing the middle-way

(mesotes) as correctly determined for us by reason and by the judgment

of the judicious (Nic., ii, 6; iii, 8; comp. Eud., ii, 3). [That in

this connection only the ethical virtues are meant, appears from the

entire context. But by this circumstance the general definition of

virtue becomes again more unclear.] The middle-way is in all things the

best. Virtue aims consequently not at a mean between good and evil, but

at the best, and the best is the mean between too much and too little.

Thus, bravery is the mean between cowardice and fool-hardiness;

temperateness, the mean between dissoluteness and insensibility to

pleasure-sensations; liberality the mean between prodigality and

niggardliness; love of honor stands mid-way between unbounded

ambitiousness of fame and an absolute indifference to the opinion of

others; evenness of temper, between irascibility and stupidity, etc.

(Nic., ii, 7). From this it follows that any two mutually-opposed

faults stand to each other in a much more violent contrast, than does

either of the two to the corresponding virtue (Nic., ii, 8).

It is very manifest that this merely quantitative distinguishing of

good and evil does not touch the essence of morality at all, and in its

practical application undermines all certainty of the moral judgment,

which is thereby transferred from the sphere of the conscience into

that of the calculating understanding. In this view evil' is not

qualitatively, that is, essentially, different from the good, but it

differs only in number and degree; hence there is between the two no

radical antithesis, but only a gradual transition; in fact the

transition from one vice to the opposite one passes necessarily through

the corresponding virtue. Aristotle himself becomes conscious of the

defectiveness of his definition of virtue; he concedes that there are

also actions and tempers in regard to which the notion of the too-much

or too-little is not at all applicable, as, e. g., delight in

misfortune, envy, murder, theft, adultery, which are all per se and in

their essence wrong, and do not simply become so by rising to a certain

height; there can be, for example, no permissible degree of adultery,

and so of the other cases (Nic., ii, 7). And if notwithstanding this he

is still unwilling to discard his definition of virtue, this only

evinces the utter perplexity of the theorist; for by making this

concession, his definition is completely undermined, inasmuch as it is

thereby implied that the difference between good and evil is not a

quantitative but a qualitative one. And the matter is made much worse

still by the express admission, that virtue is often not in the actual

middle between the two opposite-standing faults, but stands nearer to

the one extreme than to the other,--that bravery, e. g., stands nearer

to fool-hardiness than to cowardice, liberality nearer to prodigality

than to niggardliness, etc., and that of two errors the one is usually

less hurtful than the other (Nic., ii, 8),--for by this admission not

only is the ground-principle entirely overthrown, but also all

possibility of a certain judgment as to morality is cut off. By wlhat

rule is one to find in the diagonal the correct virtue-point, if this

point is an eccentric one? Aristotle himself feels the great difficulty

which results from charging the moral consciousness of the individual

with the duty of such a calculation;;and he knows no better counsel to

give than that given by Circe to Ulysses in regard to his sailing

between Scylla and Charybdis, namely, to steer nearer the less

dangerous Scylla,--to go nearer the extreme that is less remote from

the mean virtue, than to the other, and to incur the risk of the less

fault of the two; and in order most easily to find the middle-way, one

must sometimes deviate (apoklinein) on the side of excess; and

sometimes on the side of defectiveness (Nic., ii, 9). More patently

than this, Aristotle could hardly possibly have confessed the

insufficiency of his definition of virtue.

Morality presupposes the freedom of the will; only that which takes

place from free self-determination is morally imputed to a man, is

praised or blamed. Virtue belongs exclusively to the sphere of freedom;

that is unfree which is either forced or which is done from ignorance;

passionate movements of feeling, such as anger or sensuous desire, do

not destroy the freedom of the will, for man can and should control

them by reason; even in case of moral violence, by the excitement of

fear, etc., the freedom of volition remains; involuntary is only the

forced action which takes place with inner resistance (Nic., iii, 1-3;

comp. Eud., ii, 6). From willingness as the more comprehensive notion,

the resolution is, as the narrower, to be distinguished, namely, the

will as deliberately directed to a definite and possible-regarded goal

(Nic., iii, 4, 5). A resolution is free also in regard to the

recognized good or evil. Every resolution is, it is true, directed to a

good,--with the sage always to the truly good, but with others to that

which to them seems to be good; from this it does not follow, however,

that men always sin simply from error, and that where there is a real

knowledge of the good, the resolution must necessarily be directed to

this, as is taught by Socrates and Plato. Such a view is contradicted

even by the general moral judgment both of individuals and of the

State, which makes man, as soon as he has come to understanding,

responsible for all the evil which he does, and imputes it to him as

guilt. It is- true, many do evil simply from the error of their moral

judgment or from the worthlessness of their character, but both that

error and this worthlessness are their own fault, and do not excuse

them; in fact man can even purposely do what he has recognized as evil,

namely, by inquiring not after the good, but only after the agreeable;

and the opinion that no one does evil voluntarily and consciously,

conflicts with undeniable experience and with the essence of

will-freedom (Nic., iii, 6, 7; v, 12; vii, 2, 3). In this connection

Aristotle makes the significant and almost surprising observation, that

the character which has become evil by guilt can just as little he

thrown off again at mere volition, as the person who has made himself

sick by his own fault, can become well again at mere volition; once

become evil or sick, it stands no longer within his discretion to cease

to be so; a stone when once cast cannot be caught back from its flight;

and so is it also with the character which has become evil. This

thought might have led further; Aristotle, however, does not follow it

out, and he leaves unanswered the closely related question, as to how,

then, a reformation in character is possible. Moreover, he does not

concede to evil any other than an individual effect,--knows nothing of

any natural solidarity of evil in self-propagating, morally-degenerated

races. Every man, at least the. free-born Greek, is, on the contrary,

perfectly good by nature, and the sensuous nature with which every one

is born has, in reason, its perfectly sufficient counterpoise.

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[83] Comp. Trendelenburg: Histor. Beitr., i, pp. 95, 174.

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SECTION XVIII.

In carrying out his system into details Aristotle treats first the

ethical virtues, and as their chief representatives: courage,

temperateness, liberality, magnanimity (from which the love of honor

is, as of a lower quality, to be distinguished), the proper control of

temper, and, as predominantly social virtues: amiability, truthfulness,

readiness in good-natured wit, shame, but especially justness and, as

closely-related therewith, fairness or equity. As intellectual or

thought-virtues are examined, more largely, prudence and wisdom; and

their significancy is more closely defined than in Socrates and Plato.

As considered under another phase, namely, in respect to the degree of

the moral power virtualizing itself in the doing of the good, the moral

character is distinguished, into virtuousness in the narrower sense,

into temperateness, and into heroic or divine virtue.

The carrying-out of the ethical matter proper, though rich in

suggestive thoughts and observations, is devoid of a general scientific

development from one central principle; nor do we find as yet any

strict organic classification. The Platonic division of the virtues (�

14), though made the basis, is neither strictly observed nor further

developed. Differing from Plato, Aristotle does not first discuss

wisdom as the root of all the other virtues, but, on the contrary,

manliness or courage (andria) which stands mid-way between fool-hardy

daring and cowardice. It relates not to all the evils that are to be

assailed, but essentially to death; and also not to every mortal

danger, but more especially to the most honorable of these dangers,

danger upon the battle-field, and besides also to mortal danger by sea

and in sickness (Nic., iii, 9-12). This limitation, though explainable

from the warlike national character, is not based in the moral idea;

and for courage in the full sense of the word in the face of all evils,

Aristotle finds no place at all in his system of virtue. The motive to

courage is not the thought of an eternal crown,--for death is for the

virtuous man the most fearful of all evils, for precisely for him life

has the greatest worth,--but this motive is only a delight in duty and

in the beautiful (Nic., iii, 12).--The second virtue is temperateness

or moderation (sophrosune), which consists in the observance of the

right mean in regard to sensuous pleasure, even as, on the other hand,

courage relates to evil, that is, pain. The extending of this virtue to

other than the sensuous, and that too the lowest sensuous feelings of

taste and of sensibility, is expressly disallowed; and hence there

remain moral phenomena, both virtues and vices, which find no place

whatever in the classes of virtue admitted by Aristotle. As to the

question, by what rule the proper measure is to be judged, we are not

answered; virtue is simply placed in the middle between the

immoderation which surrenders itself passionately to sensuous pleasure,

and which sinks man to the brute, and an entire desirelessness or

insensibility to sensuous pleasure, which, however, only rarely or in

fact strictly speaking never exists,--for then man would be no longer

human (Nic., iii, 13-15); in which case the finding of the virtuous

mean between the two faults would be a rather difficult

matter.--Liberality or generosity, as the third virtue, is the

observance of the middle-way in the use of property. It gives

cheerfully, out of delight in the beauty of the action, but only to

such as deserve it; that it rests on love is not stated. As especially

important, is extensively discussed, liberality for public and

generally useful ends, for theatrical entertainments, for popular

diversions, for the feasting of the collective citizenship, for the

outfitting of war-ships, and for the keeping up of a state of luxury in

the interest of the dignity of the person,--the virtue of megaloprepeia

(Nic., iv, 1-6). Of the moral dangers of riches for the moral

disposition itself, aside from the two errors of prodigality and

niggardliness, nothing is said; on the contrary, riches is regarded as

a high and much to be desired good.--Magnanimity (megalopsuchia)

belongs only to men of high gifts, and is, as opposed to empty

pretense, on the one hand, and to self-disparaging pusillanimousness,

on the other, the proper respecting of self, the moral pride of the

great man,--while the proper self-respect of the ordinary person is not

magnanimity, but only modesty; the former virtue stands higher than the

latter. Only he can be magnanimous who is adorned with all the virtues,

that is, the truly great man; and he puts this virtue into practice, in

that he strives after true honor, that is, after the esteem of the

great and noble, as the highest of external goods, while he disdains

the honor and reproach which come from unimportant men. But proper

magnanimity is only possible when, with the inner virtue-merit there is

associated also an outwardly happy and eminent condition, such as rich

possessions, a highborn family, power, etc., for this brings honor;

hence the magnanimous man will seek, though not primarily and chiefly,

after these things, not so much for their own sake, as simply for the

honor associated with them. In less great souls the virtue of

magnanimity gives place to the love of honor which looks only to

inferior degrees of honor, and which holds the mean between immoderate

ambition and pusillanimity (Nic., iv, 7-10).--The virtue of equanimity

or gentleness, (praotes) occupies the mean between irascibility and

phlegmatic insensibility, and hence consists in the proper tempering of

anger, and is practically of difficult observance. Not to indulge in

anger at all is stolidity, and not to defend one's self against

offenses is dishonorable and cowardly. It is advisable not to repress

wrath, but to let it come to expression; the indulging of vengeance

stills wrath. Aristotle regards revenge as a something entirely

legitimate, and simply warns against over-indulgence. More specific

limitations of this dangerous virtue he regards as impracticable,

holding that feeling decides this best in each particular case, and

that minor deviations from the right mean are here not to be censured

(Nic., iv, 11).

Without any strict logical connection, Aristotle now passes to treat of

the social virtues. Between the vices of a fawning seeking for

approbation and a yielding to the wishes of every one, on the one hand,

and an unsocial abruptness, on the other, stands the virtue of friendly

and polite amiability, a virtue which (in distinction from personal

love) relates not to definite loved persons, but to all with whom we

come into association, and does not rest on love (Nic., iv, 12).

Between vain-boastfulness and ironical self-disparagement, lies the

virtue of truthfulness of discourse, especially in relation to the

speaker himself, in other words, straightforwardness and honesty. But

inasmuch as too strong self-praise is more offensive to others than

self-disparagement, hence it is advisable to speak rather too humbly

than too highly of one's self (Nic., iv, 13). A third social virtue

relates to social intercourse and jesting, and is, in contrast to

buffoonery and excessive irony, on the one hand, and sardonic

moroseness on the other, cheerful facetiousness and gracious aptness in

wit (eutrapelia) (Nic., iv, 14; comp. Eud., iii, 7). Aristotle speaks

here merely incidentally of shame, that is, the fear of disgrace, which

is indeed not per se a virtue, but only an instinct; it becomes a

virtue only under special circumstances, namely, when a mature person

has really done something of which he must feel ashamed, and also in

youth, because here the passions are violent, and shame is a check

against them. The morally matured man, however, is never to have

occasion to feel ashamed, for he is not by any means to think of

himself as being so constituted as to be capable of doing anything

shameful (Nic., iv, 15). Of the true moral significancy of shame, which

is so suggestively indicated in Gen. iii, 7, Aristotle has no

conception.

The most important social virtue, the one which in fact includes all

the others in so far as they relate to our conduct toward others, is

justness, which consists in respecting the laws of the State and the

rights of others, so that every man is treated as he deserves and as he

has a right to claim. In a narrower sense justness relates only to the

"mine" and the "thine," to property and earnings. The principle of the

just mean is here of difficult application, as there is manifestly no

immoral form of conduct which can contain too great an observance of

the rights of others (Nic. v, 1-14.)

Related to justness, and belonging thereto in the wider sense of the

word, is the subordinate virtue of equitableness or fairness. It

accomplishes--in contrast to the rigid observance of the letter of the

civil law--true justness outside of the requirements of the law, which

can in fact only express the general, and cannot apply to every

individual case; hence it is an improving and perfecting of the law, in

that in the interest of justness one does not in certain cases insist

on a right which the outward law concedes (Nic., v, 15). Against his

own self man cannot, properly speaking, do injustice; even suicide, as

being voluntary, is not an injustice to one's self, but only to the

State.

In respect to the intellectual or thought-virtues, of which only

prudence and wisdom are more especially treated (Nic., vi, 1-13), the

thought of the middle-way is of course no longer applicable; they do

not themselves observe the just mean, rather is it they themselves that

discover it. Prudence or sensibleness (phronesis, more than prudence as

the word is usually taken, but also not synonymous with reasonableness,

as Brandis would have it) is the spiritual facility of making in each

particular case suitable practical decisions in regard to what is good

or evil for the actor. Wisdom (sophia) is of a higher character, and

given to prudence its right basis. It is the proper knowledge of the

ultimate grounds of true knowledge, and the deriving of the same from

these grounds, and hence refers to the immutable, whereas prudence has

to do with the mutable and transitory; wisdom relates to the

universally valid; prudence, to that which is befitting for the

individual; and hence prudence is the specific practical application of

wisdom, which latter expresses rather the moral idea per se. Hence

prudence or sensibleness is the applying of moral wisdom in the ethical

virtues. Wisdom and prudence do not constitute the whole of virtue

itself, as Socrates affirms, but they are, as orthos logos, the

necessary presupposition of all the other virtues.

Aristotle passes now to another manner of considering the moral

bearing, namely, not, as thus far, in reference to its material

quality, but in reference to the degree of moral energy therein

virtualized. Over against the threefold gradation of the immoral that

is to be distinguished in this respect, namely, viciousness,

incontinence, and brutality,--wherein the moral consciousness and the

moral will are either badly constituted or feeble, or entirely

wanting,--stands the threefold gradation of the moral, namely,

virtuousness in the narrower sense, continence, and heroic or divine

virtue; the latter makes man entirely like the gods, but is attained to

only seldom; but equally seldom is also the opposite extreme,

brutality. Incontinence is a weakness of the moral will, for the person

knows that his desires are evil, nevertheless he follows them, and

hence sins (what Socrates declares as impossible) consciously and from

passionateness. On the contrary, he who is continent or firm in

character acts constantly in harmony with his rational insight. The

feeble and hesitative manner in which Aristotle attempts to answer the

perplexing questions which present themselves in this connection,

indicates very clearly, how little knowledge he has of the perversity

of a corrupted heart (Nic., vii, 1-7). While Socrates covers the

majority of sins with ignorance and error, and thus palliates their

guilt, Aristotle, who recognizes the manifold contradiction between

knowledge and volition, goes so far in the other direction, as to admit

inborn faults and passions, and even inborn unnatural vices, and to

find therein a degree of excuse for the deviating of those who are thus

afflicted, from better knowledge; "the fact of having such

proclivities, lies outside of the sphere of the morally evil;" and when

man is dominated by such evil proclivities, it is only in an improper

sense that his conduct is to be called immoral (Nic., vii, 6). How such

an innateness of evil proclivities is to be explained1 we are not

informed. The proclivity to anger especially is to be judged very

mildly,--there. lies in it even something rational, as in contrast to

the sensuous desires, and at all events no presumption; and its

justification lies in its universal prevalence. In general it is

excusable to follow one's natural proclivities, and this all the more

so the more they are universal (Nic., vii, 7). The incontinent are not

properly speaking vicious, but only similar to the vicious, and for the

reason that in them there is no evil purpose (Nic.. vii, 9.)

After an extended consideration of friendship as a special field of the

moral activity, Aristotle concludes with an extensive discussion of

pleasure (hedone) and well-being (eudaimonia) as results of virtuous

conduct. Pleasure is not identical with the good,--is not the highest

good, but many kinds of pleasure are goods, and hence to be aimed at,

while others are not so. Pleasure is the result of a power-exertion in

coming to its goal, and hence is an attendant of life-development per

se; now, according as this power-exertion is good or evil, so is also

the pleasure attending it, and only the pleasure which is connected

with an exercise of virtue is true pleasure (Nic., x, 1-5). Well-being

is not a mere condition, but is essentially life-activity, and indeed

such a life-activity as is not a purposeless play, but a rational

practicing of virtue. Now as cognition is the highest spiritual

exertion of power, hence the acquiring of the knowledge of wisdom is

coincident with the highest well-being; all other activity is less

constant and permanent, less free and independent,--rests less upon

itself and has its end less within itself. Hence the practically-acting

life stands only in secondary importance, as in fact also the life and

the happiness of the gods, or of God, consists not in such an

outward-working activity, but only in reflection. In third importance

stand the outward goods of fortune: health, riches, etc. Now, though

such goods are indeed also necessary to well-being, still they are

needed only in a moderate degree, and the sage can be happy even with

relatively small goods of fortune; for he who develops and perfects the

thinking spirit with great zeal is the most beloved of the gods, and is

the happiest, for he is most like the gods (Nic., x, 6-9). Herein this

ethical system returns to its starting-point, though we cannot say that

this return results from a natural and organic development. Indeed, the

fact that wellbeing is indicated as the highest good, at the outset of

the ethical development, and that now it presents itself in the end as

the result of the moral life-activity, would seem to present an

excellently rounded development-course of the system; but Aristotle

essentially disturbs this organic development of his thoughts by his

preference (surprising, in view of his previous discussions) of the

contemplative life to the outwardly-active life, and for the assumed

reason that the former, as being the truly divine life, far transcends

the latter; and when he is at the very point of making the transition

from merely individual morality into the consideration of the moral

community-life,--which rests quite predominantly on the

practically-working activity of all the individuals and is primarily

the result thereof,--he throws this activity with a strange disdain

into the background, behind the purely intellectual activity of the

unsocial individual spirit. In this connection Plato is at least more

consequential, in that he by no means directs the philosopher to the

merely contemplative life, but concedes to him political domination as

his peculiar right and his highest calling. It is evidently no very

virtue-encouraging thought, that the highest well-being should be

one-sidedly placed in an activity, for which only the fewest virtues

are requisite.

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SECTION XIX.

The idea, already so strongly emphasized by Plato, of a moral

community-life, is developed by Aristotle further still, and more

judiciously, without his being able, however, fully to divest it of the

one-sidedness of the general Graeco-heathen world-view. The idea of

humanity as a moral whole is entirely wanting to him also; individual

morality has absolute, predominance. The family is indeed somewhat more

highly conceived of than in Plato, because the reality of life is more

impartially observed, but yet it is not recognized as the basis of the

moral whole, but only as a subordinate manifestation-form of morality

as bearing upon the moral community-life. Wedlock-love and family-love

in general is only a special form of friendship as expressive of

individual morality. Friendship, however, is not so much a duty as an

expression of the striving after individual well-being,--bears not an

objective but a subjective character.--But also friendship forms

neither the basis nor the transition to a moral community-life; the

community-life, on the contrary, is based directly upon the laws as

expressive of the moral idea, and as constituting the state, the task

of which is, under the guidance of the morally higher-gifted, to tutor

and direct the great multitude of the morally-immature, and to

habituate them to the good.

To the examination of friendship Aristotle devotes two entire books of

his Ethics, in great detail. Friendship is indeed virtue, but not a

special virtue along-side of the others; it is rather a special

manifestation-form of virtue in general. Its definition is more

comprehensive than is usual in modern times, and includes in itself

love in general, but it is by no means identical with the Christian

idea of love; it has not an objective and general, but only a

subjective and individual significancy; it loves not for the sake of

the loved one, but for the happiness of the lover,--seeks primarily not

the weal of the other, but its own, loves not man as man, but only this

or that person according to individual election, to the exclusion of

others. The idea of general love to man, as a duty, is to Aristotle

also as well as to the Greek in general, utterly foreign. The highest

attainment consists in true friendship to one or to a few chosen ones.

Toward the rest of mankind there is shown only a very feeble and

luke-warm good-will, a justness and fairness which respect essentially

only particular rights,--humaneness in the usual sense of the word.

Aristotle connects the examination of friendship directly and expressly

with that of pleasure, and places it before the more particular

development of the latter, and considers it also under such a phase as

that it appears not so much as duty as rather as a virtualization of

the striving after happiness. Friendship seeks indeed also the weal of

the other, but first of all it seeks reciprocal love, and can exist

only where it finds this; nevertheless, that friendship which loves

only for the sake of the pleasure and the benefit, is not the true and

lasting love, but only that which exists between those who are good and

resemblant in virtue, inasmuch as here the per se lasting good and the

person himself are loved; in the friend I love, at the same time, that

which is for myself a good; such true friendship, however, is seldom,

and can never exist at the same time with many persons (Nic., viii,

1-7; ix, 4, 5). Friendship in the narrower sense presupposes a certain

moral similarity between its subjects; but in a wider sense it may also

exist between the dissimilar, especially where the one person has a

spiritual preeminence over the other, and where consequently the kind

of the love is with each party a different one. Under this category

belongs the love between husband and wife, parents and children, and

between the higher and the lower in rank. The higher of two persons

will, and ought to, be more loved in this relation, than he himself

loves, because loving is measured by the worth of the beloved object

(Nic., viii, 8, 9). This feature is characteristic of the predominantly

individual and subjective character of love, in Aristotle's system.

Even parents and children stand to each other only in this individual

relation,--they adapt the degree of their love according to the

individual worth of the other; the family has not an objective

character which is to be held sacred under all circumstances, and which

is superior to all individual choice; the degree of love diminishes

with the increase of the worth of the subject as compared with the

worth of the object; and for self-sacrificing maternal love, Aristotle,

although he observes it, has no just appreciation.

Of wedlock and of sexual love, Aristotle speaks on the whole only

incidentally and very inadequately. Wedlock is the most natural of all

friendships, and has for its end not merely the generation of children,

but also the aiding and complementing of each other in all the

relations of life (Nic., viii, 14; comp. Oecon., i, 3). The husband, as

the stronger, has the duty of protecting the wife and remaining

faithful to her (Oecon., i, 4), and the right to rule over her,--not

absolutely, however, but only in the sphere belonging to him (Nic.,

viii, 12). Children stand to their parents in a permanent

debt-relation,--cannot divest themselves of their obligation to them,

though the father may cast off his son (Nic., vii, 16). The obligation

of children to fulfill the will of the parents is not, however,

unlimited, because other obligations may modify it; the chief duty of

children is to show reverence to their parents, and when they need it,

to assure them sustenance (Nic., ix, 2).

In his further discussion of friendship Aristotle makes many ingenious

observations. Those to whom one has shown benefits, one is accustomed

to love more than those from whom one has received benefits, because

every one esteems especially highly that which himself has done,

whereas he feels the debt-relation as in some sense disagreeable (Nic.,

ix, 7). It is true, Aristotle does not exactly praise this feeling, but

he finds it very natural, and has for it no blame. The truly good man

loves himself perfectly, but this legitimate self-love is not an

enjoyment-seeking selfishness, for he loves in himself only the better

part, and he promotes his own weal, in that he loves and works the

good; and even when he makes sacrifices for others, he wins for himself

the higher good (Nic., ix, 9).

In conceiving of the essence of the family as a mere friendship, it is

natural that Aristotle should not make it the basis of the wider

community-life, the State, but that he should place it rather in the

sphere of individual morality, and that he should make the transition

to the discussion of the state, neither from friendship nor from the

family, but rather derive the thought of the state immediately from the

general thought of morality, and transfer all the moral significancy of

the family to the thus self-based state. This transition Aristotle

makes thus: the teaching of virtue suffices not for the great multitude

to induce them to virtue, seeing that they are guided almost

exclusively by fear and not by knowledge. The multitude must be trained

to virtue and constantly guided, and hence stand in need of laws; the

training of a father suffices not for this, because it lacks the

necessary authority and coercive power; only the rationally-governed

state has both of these, and is hence the necessary condition of a more

general realization of morality (Nic., x, 10).

Aristotle is too judicious an observer of reality, idealistically to

expect all salvation from mere instruction, and not to admit the moral

unimpressibility of the great multitude; he speaks thereof in the

strongest expressions; "the great multitude obeys force rather than

reason, and punishment rather than morality;" "the majority abstain

from evil not because it is disgraceful, but because they fear

punishment; guided only by their passions they aim at nothing but

sensuous pleasure, and shun nothing but the pains that are contrary

thereto; but of the morally beautiful, and of the true joy therein

contained, they have not the least notion, seeing that they have never

tasted it" (Nic., x, 10); and this moral incapability he expressly

refers to the nature that is inborn in them, and only a few happy ones

are free of this innate imperfection; "this nature itself lies

evidently not within our own power, but is by some kind of divine

causality conferred on the truly happy." To explain this broad

difference of natural endowment, he does not make the least attempt,

and in this he stands far below Plato, who derives the imperfection of

human nature (which he also admitted, but conceived of as universal),

from a previous guilt in a life antecedent to the earthly life.

Aristotle renounces also all hope of radically bettering the morally

unreceptive multitude, as indeed he knows of no possibility of doing

it; he contents himself with keeping them in check, and with placing

them under the discipline of an objective moral reality, the state, or

at least with accustoming them, by force and by potent custom, to order

and to obedience, and with restraining them from the outbreaks of

inborn passion; to be truly free in moral respects, however, is the

exclusive privilege of the few who are naturally-gifted.

Aristotle recognizes thus the necessity of a moral community-life,

which, as upheld by the pre-eminent moral spirit of the few

specially-endowed individuals, furnishes, itself, the basis of the

morality of individuals in general, and develops, and guides, and keeps

it in bounds. This is a weighty thought far transcending the

shallowness of modern rationalistic liberalism, which recognizes no

other objective form of the moral community-life, than that which has

grown up on the broad basis of the morality of the great multitude,--a

merely abstract product without any power and effectiveness of its own.

Aristotle regards it as absurd to base a moral community-life upon the

disposition and the spiritual sovereignty of the masses; he calls for

the sovereignty of the spiritual and moral heroes,--the exclusive

authority of the most highly gifted personalities; but he is, as yet,

too deeply involved in the peculiarities of the heathen world-view, to

penetrate to the bottom of the defectiveness of human nature, as

partially recognized by him, and to find the true solution of the

enigma, and to divine the nature of the true remedy; he knows only

man's outward phase, but not the depths of the human heart. He ventures

not to entertain any doubt as to the moral nature of the state-sages

and philosophers, and he knows no other redemption, than (as in

contrast to the profound spiritual blindness and the moral stupidity of

the masses) in an immeasurable exaltation of the insight and the moral

strength of the state-leaders and the sages.--Aristotle sees, in the

state, not a remedial institution actually realizing true morality, but

only a police-organism acting outwardly, checking the evil, and

restoring outward discipline. The state can only ameliorate, but not

radically cure; true wisdom and morality are not imparted by it to

those who are by nature incapable thereof. This view throws light upon

the decided preference of Aristotle for a contemplative life,

uninvolved in any political activity. The highest goods can fall to the

lot only of the few; the fact is not, that many are called while but

few are chosen, but that only a few are called and chosen; there

prevails here an absolute predestination, not, however, from a

monotheistic, but from a fatalistic ground.

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SECTION XX.

The State is related to the individual citizens of the state and to the

smaller social organisms--the household-life and the local

community--as the absolutely determining and enlivening whole to the

members,--is not so much the product as rather the ground of all

morality. The threefold gradation of dependence in the household-life,

and above all, the relation of master and slave, as resting upon a

primitive nature-destination, is the presupposition of the state.

Placing a higher worth upon the natural social relations than Plato,

and confining himself more fully to historical reality, Aristotle

escapes the unpractical idealism of Plato, but also attains to less

definite results, and furnishes rather a criticism than a

self-consistent theory of the nature of the state. Emphasizing the

development of the individual citizen to free self-determination more

strongly than Plato, he modifies the despotic absolutism of the latter,

and presents as the moral chief-task of the state the moral

disciplining of the free citizens. But the state-idea attains to a

universally-human significancy neither in its outward nor its inward

relation; humanity both in the barbarian and in the slave, is of an

imperfect grade, and capable of no moral emancipation.

Of the Politics of Aristotle we have to do only with the more strictly

ethical contents. He does not connect this work directly with his

Ethics, but treats of its subject-matter from a more practical

stand-point; hence he gives, on the one hand, in his Ethics, the more

general thoughts of the doctrine of the state, and, on the other, he

repeats in his Politics some of the thoughts of his Ethics.

The state is the highest moral communion, and hence realizes the

highest of all goods. Its type is the household-life; its task is not

merely to afford protection and help for the life of the individuals,

but essentially to found and promote the true life, that is, the

spiritually moral life, of the whole. The state is not itself the

product of the already developed moral life of the individuals, but it

is the presupposition thereof; outside of the state there is no moral

development; only he who belongs to the state can be moral; the whole

is antecedent to the parts, and the rational man is a part of the

state; the state is the first, the citizen of the state the second;

outside of the state lives only the animal or God (Pol., i, 1, 2).

Hence the moral relation of the household-life is a presupposition of

the state only in so far as it is a constituent element of the same,

but not in such a sense as to imply that it already existed before the

state and independently of the same. It is peculiarly characteristic

that of the threefold foundation of the household-life, as stated by

Aristotle, namely, the relation of man to wife, of father to children,

and of master to slave, he treats of the first two only merely

incidentally and briefly, but of the third chiefly, and very

thoroughly. Aristotle furnishes for the first time, and in its

entirety, a formal theory of slavery,--a phenomenon very significant

for the history of ethics.

The opinion that slavery is not a something entirely natural, but is

based only upon violence and arbitrary laws, Aristotle emphatically

rejects. A household-life without possessions and without serving

instruments is not conceivable, and hence also not without slaves,

which are in fact living instruments and possessions. Even as the

artist and artisan stand in need of instruments, so the housefather, of

slaves, which are consequently absolutely his property, and subject to

his discretion; this is a natural, and not a merely legal relation,

strictly analogous to the relation of soul and body,--the former as the

absolutely dominating, the latter as the absolutely dominated factor.

And reality corresponds to the want. Men differ in fact from each other

in such a manner that the ones, as being really rational, possess

themselves, and represent the soul of humanity, whereas the others

represent the body of humanity,--are corporeally strong, and adapted

for bodily toil, but are spiritually unfree and ignoble, and, though

distinguished by reason from the brute, are yet not governed by reason

but by sensuous desires. These are destined by nature to be slaves, and

it is well for them that, as the property of others, they are

spiritually dominated (Pol., i, 3-5). And Aristotle expressly says that

those who are destined by nature to slavery are the non-Greeks, the

barbarians. Greek prisoners-of-war are slaves not indeed by nature, but

by law, and hence legitimately.--What the significance of slavery is,

appears clear from the fact that it is a characteristic of a slave that

he may be injured with impunity (Nic., v, 8),--that the notion of

justness holds good only between such persons as have rights, and hence

not between master and slave; that the legitimate and uncensurable

manner of ruling over slaves is the tyrannical, the end of which is

simply the profit of the master (Nic., viii, 12; Pol., i, 8, 9), and

that to a slave as such a relation of love or friendship can as little

have place as to a horse or ox,--in which connection, however, it is to

be observed, that in so far as the slave is also a human being a

certain inferior form of love is admissible. The slave has indeed also

a degree of virtue, for he is required to obey and to be modest and

-temperate, but his morality differs from that of the master, not

merely in degree but in essence; while the master is capable of all

virtue, the slave is utterly incapable of the power of deliberation (to

bouleutikon) and hence evidently of the thought-virtues--prudence and

wisdom (Pol., i, 9). The more humane directions as to the treatment of

slaves (Oecon., i, 5; of questionable authenticity) are to be

interpreted in the light of these principles.

Aristotle subjects the Platonic state to a very keen and sound

criticism; the community of goods and of wives he rejects, as both

unnatural and morally corrupting, and even impossible (Oecon., ii, 2

sqq.). Of his own views Aristotle is more reticent than Plato, and he

gives rather merely general thoughts than specific details. Only that

one should take active part in political life who possesses all civic

virtue, and especially far-seeing insight; but such virtue can exist

only where there is leisure for its development, that is, in such

persons as are free from the necessity of laboring for the common wants

of life,--and hence not in day-laborers, artisans, or farmers (Oecon.,

iii, 5; vii, 9). The soil must be cultivated by slaves. Leisure stands

higher than labor, and is indeed per se happiness. A proper

state-constitution must have for its end the weal of all the free

citizens constituting the state; it may be equally well monarchic, or

aristocratic, or republican (the latter being that wherein all the

truly free citizens take part), and over against these stand as their

perversions: tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy, all of which look to

the good, not of the whole, but only of individual persons, or of

classes in society (Oecon., iii, 6-8; iv, 1 sqq.). It is best for the

State when the best citizens bear rule; and the best one is not to be

bound by trammeling laws, but stands free above the law, although in

general Aristotle places the validity of the law higher than Plato, and

is not hopeful of finding such "best" ones very frequently. The mass of

free citizens are indeed to have part in deliberating upon the laws and

in promoting justice, but not in actually governing (Oecon., iii, 9

sqq.). Aristotle inclines most strongly to a monarchy limited by laws,

and, in this, has his eye manifestly upon Alexander the Great.

The state provides for the public worship and for the moral culture of

the citizens; hence it prescribes, in order to the obtaining of a

vigorous population, the institution of marriage. Maidens are to marry

at their eighteenth year, and men at about the age of thirty-seven, in

order that the children may stand in a proper relation to the age of

the parents, and in order that the differing duration of the productive

period of the two sexes may stand in some degree of harmony, and the

children be robust. The laws are to prescribe the manner of life of the

woman while pregnant, and the physical and spiritual training of the

children. In relation to the exposing of children, the maxim holds

good, "that no physically imperfect (peperomenon) child is to be

raised." Where, however, the traditional usages forbid the exposing of

children, there the excessive increase of the population is to be

prevented by forbidding the procreating of more than a legally fixed

number, and the fetus is to be destroyed before the period of sensation

and quickening (Oecon., vii, 15, 16). The education of the children

stands, as a matter of high importance, under the care of the state;

overseeing this education up to the seventh year, the state then

actually undertakes it itself; for the citizens belong not to

themselves, but to the state. The boys--and the question is only as to

these--are to be instructed in grammar and drawing, because of the

utility of these sciences, and in gymnastics in order to the

development of courage, and in music in order to the employment of the

leisure which becomes the free citizen (labor being confined to the

slave), and in order to the awakening of the sense for harmony (Oecon.,

viii, 3-7).

Though Aristotle presents numerous forms of state-constitution as

possible, and as good and appropriate according to existing

circumstances, yet to the state of true human freedom he is not capable

of rising. Even his most free and most democratic constitution rests

absolutely on the basis of slavery, and on the antithesis of the

Greeks, as true men, to the slave-like barbarians. The education of the

citizens is, in Aristotle, quite similar to the education of a cavalier

in the age of Louis XIV. and XV. It is easy enough to be liberal-minded

when all the labor falls to the lot of those who, as unfree, have no

share in political life. The fact that a so-called anti-Christian

"humanistic" culture of modern times regards the Greeks as the

champions of true humanity, of humanitarianism in the broadest sense of

the word, and their age and their world-theory as "the paradise of the

human mind," from which we of modern times have to learn and receive

true humanitarian notions,--is no striking evidence of great

impartiality of view. Though Aristotle concedes to the different

classes of citizens in the state a somewhat greater freedom and

independency of development than Plato, in that he does not attribute

all right exclusively to the absolutism of the state, still this

recognition of a relatively free self-development does not by any means

reach down to the laboring classes; the laborers are absolutely passive

and for the most part personally rightless members of the state,--are

but the immovably soil-bound roots of the tree whose richly-developed

branches and leaves wave freely in the air above. The distinction and

the classification of the ranks in society are not a moral ordinance,

but a merely natural and hence unfree one,--rests not upon a moral

self-subordination to a moral idea, but upon the compulsory necessity

of extra-moral nature-differences,--springs not from a like moral

dignity and task; but from the naturally different moral nature of the

different classes of mankind. The slave and the laborer are morally

entirely different and inferior beings, and have neither the task nor

the capability of even comprehending the full moral idea, much less

that of realizing it; this is the privilege of the higher classes of

free citizens. A moral redemption of the great multitude from this ban

of moral unfreedom and incapacity is an utterly foreign thought even to

the philosopher; nay, he would feel called upon, should he conceive of

even the possibility of such a redemption, to assail and prevent it

with all his might, for with it would fall to the ground, for the

Greek, not merely all reality of the state, but also all possibility of

a social community-life. It is only among the rudest barbarians that he

can conceive of a moral equality of the individuals; and the Christian

idea of humanity, as moral, must have appeared to the Greek as well as

to the Roman as a falling back into rude barbarism; and the war of life

and death as carried on against Christianity by the otherwise so

tolerant Romans, had, at bottom, not so much a religious as rather a

social motive; it was the perfectly correct consciousness, that

Christianity, although essentially a purely religiously-moral power,

would inevitably radically undermine the foundation-principles of the

heathen state, and shatter to pieces the entire absolutely slave-based

social fabric. The thought of recognizing the slave and the barbarian

as morally equal to the freeman, and as called to equal moral dignity

and eternal glory, appeared to the Greek, no less than to the Roman, as

a treason to human society, as a high crime against the solely possible

foundations of a rational state. Beyond this world-theory Plato and

Aristotle did not rise.

As in relation to those within the Greek state, so also in relation to

the non-Greeks, is the thought of humanity, in Aristotle, radically

defective. The non-Greeks belong only in a very loose sense to humanity

at all,--are really but half-men, destined by nature to be dominated

over by the Greeks, as born for ruling. War upon them is treated of by

Aristotle, unhesitatingly, under the head of the legitimate occupations

of life, and more specifically under that of the chase: "War is, in its

very nature, a branch of industry; for the chase is a form of the

industrial activity, which comes to application as well in relation to

wild beasts, as also in relation to those men who are destined by

nature to be ruled over (pephukotes archesthai) but are not willing

thereto,--so that consequently such a war is a just one " (Oecon., i,

8). War is regarded by no means as an evil, but as a normal

life-manifestation of the nations, as a necessary condition of the

virtualizing of one of the most essential of the virtues. The relation

of the moral community-life to the rest of mankind is consequently in

no sense one which looks to the realizing of a moral communion, but is

a purely negating and destructive one. Ethics proclaims not peace but

war,--aims not at emancipating and redeeming, but at subjugating;

non-Greek humanity is not an object of moral influencing, but of

violent subjugating. The Greek knows no mission of the word, but only

of the sword.

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SECTION XXI.

The form of Grecian and heathen ethics which attained in Aristotle to

its highest perfection, is that of the natural man as contented in and

with himself; it lacks the consciousness of the historical reality and

of the historical development of sin,--of the antagonism of the reality

of natural man, as sprung from an historical act, to the moral idea,

and of the earnestness of the moral struggle against sin; instead

thereof we find the introduction of a proud distinction between a

multitude incapable by nature of true morality, and an elect minority

of free-born men capable of all wisdom and virtue, and among the latter

a lofty virtue-pride of man as having attained without severe inner

struggle to an easily-won self-satisfaction. Humility is not a virtue

of a free sage, but only of the slave and plebeian, as born unto

serving obedience.--Morality rests only upon the knowledge (independent

of the religious consciousness) of the per se good, but not upon

love,--neither upon love to God nor upon love to man; love is not the

ground, but only a co-ordinate manifestation-form of virtue. Hence also

the solely true moral community-life is only a product of wise and

rational calculation, but not of love; and the primitive community-life

of moral love, namely, the family, is not the basis, but only one phase

of the state-life. The moral view of Aristotle, and indeed of the

Greeks in general, is consequently not merely manifoldly different from

the Christian view, but indeed radically opposed thereto.

It is very important clearly to realize this inner antithesis of

Aristotelian and Christian ethics, and all the more so as Aristotle has

had, even up to the latest times, a so great and so largely bewildering

influence upon the shaping of Christian ethics. Though not wishing to

undervalue the high scientific significancy of the Aristotelian system,

we are yet not at liberty to find in it thoughts which are really

foreign to it.

The Christian consciousness rests entirely upon the recognition of the

general necessity of redemption, and indeed not simply in reference to

a moral defectiveness inborn in man, but to one that has fallen to all

men through historical guilt. Of this Aristotle knows nothing. When

Brandis says: "The doctrine of hereditary sin would not have seemed

foreign to him," inasmuch as he saw very clearly the corruption of

human nature, [84] we think he is quite incorrect. It is true Aristotle

ascribes to the great multitude, and above all to those who are born

for service and labor, an inborn badness, and he describes it in the

strongest colors and as a real insuperable incapacity for true virtue;

and it is under this head that falls the confirmatory utterance cited

by Brandis, namely, that it is good, in the state, to be dependent, and

not to be at liberty to do whatever one may please, "for the liberty to

do what one pleases cannot hold in check the evil that is inborn in all

men" (to en ekasto ton anthropon phaulon) (Pol., vi, 4). Were this to

be taken in its full and unlimited sense, Aristotle would thereby come

into contradiction with his other so definite and repeated declarations

as to the perfect will-freedom of those who are capable of true virtue,

and thus overturn his entire ethical system,--which rests absolutely on

the presupposition of this freedom. The fact is, he is speaking here as

a statesman and not as a moralist, and alludes therein to the great

multitude of those who, though arriving at magisterial offices, are yet

not philosophers nor truly free. Indeed, he expressly says that the

truly good should not by any means be limited by laws, but stand

absolutely above all law; [85] and though he admits that such persons

are very rare, yet he presupposes that there are actually some such.

Now the fact that Aristotle unquestionably excepts the true

philosophers as the elect few, from the otherwise all-prevalent moral

corruption, does not offer any thing similar to the Christian doctrine

of natural sinfulness, but indeed the very opposite,--is not, as the

Christian doctrine, an expression of deep humility, but on the

contrary, of unmeasured pride, as despisingly conscious of a

superiority to the rest of mankind. To make exceptions to the general

prevalence of sinfulness limits not merely the thought of this

sinfulness, but entirely overthrows it; the virtue-merit of the few

chosen ones--and these are of course always the philosophizing

moralists themselves--stands forth all the more glaringly the deeper

the rest of mankind are degraded. It affords no similarity to the

Christian consciousness when, to the few philosophers, that character

is attributed which Christianity ascribes exclusively to the God-man.

To what height the proud self-consciousness of the philosopher, as

pretendedly perfect in his virtue, rises, some idea may be obtained

from the following description of the virtue of magnanimity:

"Magnanimous is he, who, being worthy of great things, esteems himself

as in fact worthy of them. . . . The greatest of out. ward goods is

honor; hence the magnanimous man has to act with propriety in respect

to honor and dishonor. . . . As the magnanimous man is worthy of the

greatest things, he must necessarily be a perfectly good one; to him

belong whatever is great in every virtue; . . . hence it is difficult

to be really magnanimous. . . . In great honors, and honors shown him

by eminent men, the magnanimous man rejoices moderately, as at that

which he deserves, or which even falls below his desert; for, for a

perfect virtue there is no entirely sufficient honor. Nevertheless he

accepts it, because there is no greater one for him. But the honor

shown him by ordinary men, or for inferior things, he disdains, for

they are not worthy of him." After having observed, that in order to

true magnanimity also outward gifts of fortune are requisite, and that

the magnanimous man thinks only very lightly of men and things, and

regards only few things so highly as to expose himself to danger for

them, Aristotle says of him further: "He is inclined to do good, but

disdains to receive benefits, for the former is characteristic of the

eminent, and the latter, of the inferior; and he gives more liberally

in return, for thereby he who was before a creditor is made a debtor.

Also he gladly recollects those to whom he has done favors, but not

those from whom he has received benefits! for the receiver of a benefit

becomes subordinate to him who renders it, whereas he is fond of being

superior to others; therefore he also hears mention, with pleasure, of

the former (his own good deeds), but with displeasure of the latter

(the received benefits); . . . he remains inactive and hesitating when

no great honor or great work is involved; he does only a little, but

that little is great and honor-bringing; . . . he acts boldly and

openly, for he cherishes contempt for others; he speaks the truth, save

when he speaks with irony; and he does this when lie has to do with the

great multitude; . . . he admires nothing, for nothing appears to him

as great. . . . The movements of a magnanimous man are slow, his voice

restrained and his pronunciation measured. For he who is interested in

few things, is not in haste; and he who regards nothing as great, is

not zealous." (Nic., iv, 8, 9). This portraiture of one who, as judged

from a Christian stand-point, is but a courtly fool, is the

virtue-ideal of Aristotle.

A very essential defect of Aristotelian ethics is the falling into the

back-ground of the religious character of the moral; and in this

respect it is far inferior to that of Plato. The moral stands out alone

in entire self-sufficiency, not needing any other ground or basis than

itself; the good is good without reference to God,--is good in and of

itself, and is at the same time the motive of its own realization. That

the moral is essentially God's will, that it brings man into

life-communion with God, that man has an immediate moral life-relation

to God, that piety is the ground and life of all virtue,--of all this

we find in Aristotle but a few very faint and wavering hints. And this

is especially surprising in view of the fact that the world-theory of

Aristotle is, in other respects, by no means inimical to a close

connecting of the moral with the religious, seeing that his God-idea is

a very highly developed one, and that lie derives all life of the world

and of its contents absolutely from the proto-causality of the highest

self-conscious reason, that is, the personal God. It is not so much the

consequentiality of his philosophical system, as the feebleness of the

religious consciousness and life in Aristotle himself, that occasioned

him to develop the religious phase of the moral so imperfectly; he does

not reject this phase, he even alludes to it, but he does not develop

it.

Morality in Aristotle lacks therefore its essential motive; for, in

that he himself expressly and repeatedly declares. against Socrates,

that from the knowledge of the good the willing of the same does not

necessarily follow, but, on the contrary, a contradiction may occur

between willing and knowing, he thereby indeed evidently shows that he

has observed real life with greater impartiality than Socrates, but he

has also thereby rendered impossible any clear understanding of the

moral life. For if knowledge does not invariably result in willing,

what then is the impelling power which calls forth willing, or the lack

of which works non-willing? It is not love, for love appears not as

directed toward the good per se, or toward God as the highest good, but

only toward the individual manifestation, as individual

friendship,--not as a motive to virtue, but as one particular virtue

along-side of many others. The willing of the good springs not from

love, but appears as something entirely independent and unbased,

along-side of knowledge and along-side of love; and for the very reason

that Aristotle knows not the moral power of love, he can discover for

the civic virtue of the great multitude no other motive than fear.

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[84] Arist., ii, p. 1682.

[85] Polit., iii, 13: kata de toiouton ouk esti nomos, autoi gar eisi

nomos

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SECTION XXII.

After the time of Aristotle, philosophy declined with accelerating

rapidity, degenerating more and more into a shallow popular moralizing,

loosely grouped around a few superficial foundation-thoughts, and

consisting, for the most part, simply in unconnected observations on

isolated topics. The decline of thought manifests itself in a

constantly growing inappreciation of the objective significancy and

validity of the moral idea, which latter assumes more and more an

individually-subjective character, even in cases where it seemingly

subordinates the subject to itself, as in Stoicism,--or subordinates

the same to nature, as in Epicureanism,--and the decline reaches its

lowest point in the total doing away with all general and objective

significancy of the moral idea, in Skepticism.

The moral theories that rise after Aristotle are in no sense vigorous

and truly philosophical products of thought; they are but feeble

out-shoots of the antecedent, more vigorous spirit-life, without bloom

and without fruit. Moreover they stand less closely connected with

Plato and Aristotle than with certain other tendencies of thought that

sprang from the influence of Socrates. On the basis of the Cyrenaics

sprang up Epicureanism; on that of the Cynics, Stoicism; while the last

form of Greek philosophy, also in the sphere of ethics, namely,

Skepticism, may be regarded as a further development of the tendency of

the Sophists.

By Socrates this much was gained, that the moral, rational subject was

recognized in his freedom and rights, that the moral idea in general

had come to consciousness. With Plato and Aristotle, however, this

freedom and this idea are not of a merely individual, subjective

character, but they are brought into relation to the living whole of

rational reality. A course of action is not good for the reason that I

regard it as such, but I must regard it as good because it is good per

se; the moral has essentially a general and objective validity. The

later philosophy holds one-sidedly fast to the position. gained by

Socrates,--makes of the subjective consciousness the highest criterion

of truth, even in moral things, and that too in its individual,

absolutely self-dependent character, apart from any organic union with

the rational whole. The good is good because I recognize it as such. In

this subjectivistic tendency, philosophy turns away from Aristotle and

falls into the channel rather of the earlier schools, but with a still

stronger emphasizing of the subject. Hence also the interest for

general and for natural philosophy grows less, and attention is

concentrated on the subjective, on morality, and this consists now

essentially in subjective opinions; lacking in fundamental ideas, it

becomes feeble, lax, shallow; it comes into the hands of the masses,

and, in this marsh-like out-spreading, it becomes stagnant and

spiritless; in the place of philosophical schools proper we find

hostile parties, as it were, confessional sects of the mass of the

cultured, a party spirit which supplies for these sects the place of

their already-vanished religion; every cultured person sought to belong

to some such philosophical. sect, and he selected and molded it

according to his own taste, and. the choice itself of the school became

really simply a matter of taste.--The original antithesis of Greek

philosophy, as Materialism and Spiritualism, as Ionic and Eleatic

philosophy, which appeared later as the antithesis of the Cyrenaics and

the Cynics, repeats itself, especially in the sphere of ethics, as

Epicureanism and Stoicism; the former regards the spirit as determined

by nature; the latter, nature as determined by the spirit.

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SECTION XXIII.

The doctrine of the Epicureans,--which was widespread among the mass of

the cultured, and which subsequently became even the dominant spirit of

the age, but which still remained without any scientific development,

as, in fact, it was incapable of such,--is the consequential unfolding

of the individual pleasure-principle, the theoretical expression of

irreligion and immorality. The subjective pleasure-feeling is the

highest criterion of truth and of the good; the yielding to natural

proclivities, even the sensuous, and the greatest possible enjoyment of

the present, are the highest virtue,--prudent calculating for prolonged

pleasure, the highest wisdom,--anxious concern as to a future

retribution and a divine world-government, the greatest folly; our

striving an& thinking should regard only this life.

Epicurus, (ob. 271 B. C., see Diog. L., x, 1 sqq.), who stood most

closely related with the school of the Cyrenaics, obtained very soon

for his doctrine--which has so much to recommend itself to

worldlings--a wide acceptance; and while the solid thinking of

Aristotle became almost forgotten, this thought-sparing, self-styled

philosophy continued to spread wider and wider,--formed, in fact, by

far the most numerous of the sects, and sustained itself until long

after the advent of Christ. The more superficial the wisdom, so much

the greater the party that clings to it. This doctrine, as comprehended

in a very few thoughts and forms of expression, soon became fixed and

stationary and received no further development, but nevertheless an all

the wider practical application. From the so wide-spread sect there

have not come down to posterity even the names of self-styled

philosophers of any great eminence, to say nothing of systems of

thought.

Happiness is the highest good, and hence to strive after it the highest

wisdom and morality; all cognition looks to it as its end. For man only

that is true which he feels, which he becomes acquainted with through

the senses, namely, concrete sensuous reality. Whatever transcends this

is at least doubtful, and to fear the doubtful and supersensuous

disturbs happiness. Fear of the gods and of a life after death must

vanish away, for of them we have no knowledge. Sensuous feeling, and

hence the individual pleasure-feeling, is the highest criterion of all

truth, and hence also of the morally-true, the good.. But we feel only

the sensuous, the corporeal, hence only this is for us true and real.

Individual being, and hence multiplicity, is the solely true

existence,--and hence, first of all, the individual subject;

consequently to carry out the rights of the subject is the moral task.

This task looks in no sense whatever to the realizing of a something

transcendent to the individual,--of an idea; man is not to follow an

all-prevalent law, but, on the contrary, his individual nature,--is

not, in any sense whatever, to deny himself, but in fact to cling to

and assert this his particular existence, such as it is. Alan is not an

upholder of a spiritual world, on the contrary, he is himself

absolutely supported and guided by nature,--should merge himself

harmoniously into nature, should therein feel himself well. This

feeling of one's self-well is the chief end of life, and therefore the

solely true measure of the good. Enjoyment is the end; the yielding of

one's self over to one's own naturalness, is the means.

Now, for this manner of life there was of course no great degree of

wisdom requisite; nevertheless direct unconscious desire may lead

astray, and hence it must be guided by considerateness. Man must

consider in each separate case whether an immediately inviting pleasure

is not connected with a subsequent greater pain, and in this case he

must avoid it, or at least confine it within the necessary limits, and

that simply in order to render the pleasure-feeling a lasting one. The

pleasure of the soul is greater than that of the body, because it is

more lasting, and hence it is more to be sought after; however, the

difference is not essential, inasmuch as the soul itself is but a

refined body. Higher than the pleasure which consists in the present

gratifying of a natural impulse, is the pleasure of being satisfied,

that is, when desire and the soul are in a state of comfortable repose;

for this reason a certain degree of temperateness and moderation are

among the conditions of happiness. Hence virtue is indeed an element of

a wise life, not for its own sake, however, but as a means to a higher

pleasure-enjoyment,--even as one takes medicine as a means to health.

Right and wrong, to which the virtue of justness relates, are nothing

per se; right is only the contents of mutual compacts that are entered

into for reciprocal benefit; their violation is the wrong. Where there

are no compacts there is neither right nor wrong, and hence also no

justness or righteousness. Moreover, only so far as it redounds to my

utility, have I to practice justness; and the evil of unjustness is

simply the damage I incur,--especially through judicial infliction.

Friendship is of much value, wedlock-love properly of none at all. From

offices of state the wise man keeps himself aloof; he acquires for

himself wealth as far as practicable, and thus provides for his future.

An essential condition of happiness is the being free from all fear of

spiritual powers--of the gods and their displeasure, of death and a

retribution in the "yon-side." Gods there may indeed be, but as they

are to be conceived of as in a state of bliss, hence they cannot

possibly have any concern for the world and for men. Death does not

fall within the scope of feeling, and hence does not exist for us at

all,--does not concern us in the least. So long as we have feeling,

death does not exist, and when death does exist, then we have no

feeling; hence it disturbs our happiness only when we foolishly harbor

a fear of it. But, that with death, all is over with man, is a matter

of course, as in fact the soul also is but a fortuitous combination of

manifold atoms which, at death, again fall apart. In order to get rid

of the tormenting superstition of a life after death, one needs but to

study physics. The all-comprehending and dominating chief-condition of

happiness is, therefore, prudence,--which in each particular case

chooses and determines the proper measure and the proper means of

pleasure. Man is, consequently, lord of his own fate, and herein

consists his freedom; fortune, as mere chance, has but a minor share in

our destiny. But that perfect happiness is not to be reached in the way

recommended Epicurus knew very well, and he himself depicts the

miseries of humanity in very dark colors; he does not, however, throw

the blame for them upon man, but upon the imperfectness of the

fortuitously-arisen universe itself; and, by this course, he does not

fall out with his system, but in fact finds for it a fresh

justification; the more numerous the miseries to which man, without his

own fault, is exposed, so much the stronger stimulus, and so much the

greater right has he, to strive after the enjoyment of life.

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SECTION XXIV.

The subjectively-idealistic Stoicism which took its start from Zeno,

teaches a morality of conflict,--of struggle on the part of the

rational spirit (as being alone of worth, and as being absolutely a law

unto itself) against sensuousness, of thought against pleasure, as

belonging to a lower sphere. Virtue is the solely true good, and all

other seeming goods are either indifferent or irrational. But this

struggle rests simply on the thought of an unreconciled and

irreconcilable antagonism of existence,--knows not the higher thought

of the inner unity of all veritable existence,--rests on the pride of

the subjective understanding and of the absolutely self-legislating

individual will, over against all objective reality, even over against

a moral commonalty with laws binding on the individual subject.

Stoicism leads, therefore, on the one hand, to an unbounded

virtue-pride, and on the other, to a querulous despising of reality,

also to a disregarding of caprice-checking custom, nay, even to a

suicidal non-esteeming of one's own temporal life,--pretending to an

inner peace, but really betraying evidence of un-peace. Any moral

significance, and any even slight presentiment of absolute ethical

truth, ore to be found only in the more general thoughts of the Stoics;

but all the more dubious, arbitrary, nay, even perverted, is the

particular application of these thoughts to definite life-relations.

Stoicism stands on the one hand incomparably higher in spiritual vigor

and dignity than Epicureanism, and forms a direct antagonism thereto,

but, on the other hand, it passes far beyond the truth in the direction

of the opposite extreme, and its one-sided unnaturalness manifests even

more clearly than Epicureanism the insufficiency of heathen principles

for arriving at true moral wisdom.--Zeno, a contemporary of Epicurus,

illustrated the teachings of his system (see Diog. Laert. viii) by

moral strictness of life, and by the commission of suicide at an

advanced age; his writings are lost. His school, which collected within

itself the nobler class of minds, and which, while less numerous than

that of the Epicureans, yet exhibited far more spiritual activity than

the latter, continued to exist until the downfall of

paganism,--especially among the Romans, where, though much toned-down

and transformed, it was represented not only by the rather eclectic

Cicero, but also by Seneca, [86] by Epictetus (toward the close of the

first century A. D.), [87] and by Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. [88]

On the dualistic antithesis of matter and spirit rests the

corresponding ethical antithesis between merely sensuously-natural

objective existence and the rational spirit in the individual free

subject. Not the mere nature-entity, but the spirit, is the true

entity, and it is such in full, freely self-legislating

self-sufficiency; its destination is to manifest itself as independent

in relation to nature, and to base itself entirely upon itself. Not the

passive, but the active entity is the solely true one,--not enjoyment

but activity; it is only as active that the spirit is in its true

reality, whereas, as merely enjoying, it sinks below spirituality. Man,

as related to objective existence, is a self-poised absolutely freely

self-determining being,--is, as a rational spirit, perfectly

self-sufficient, needs nothing outside of himself in order to be a

spirit, to be free, to be happy; he should not let himself be

determined by any thing whatever external to himself. Whatever is to

have worth for man, and hence is to form a part of, and to contribute

to, his perfection and happiness, must proceed from and depend upon

himself alone; every thing else, whatever it may be, concerns him not,

is indifferent to him,--can, and may, neither hinder nor promote his

perfection and happiness. It is in being self-dependent that the wise

man is truly free.--The essence of man, in distinction from the brute,

is not enjoying and feeling, but thinking; it is not in enjoying, but

in thinking, that he is free, that he is a rational spirit; and the

more he seeks to enjoy external objects and finds pleasure therein, so

much the more is he dependent and unfree, so much the more is he

irrational,. and hence so much the less a true man. Thinking and not

feeling is, therefore, the decisive criterion of the truth and of the

good; hence there should be first judging and then acting. All

rational, and hence moral, activity must rest on knowledge; to act from

mere feeling is irrational; there is no virtue without knowledge.

Philosophy itself is a practice of virtue, and knowledge is the first

and highest virtue. Out of the knowledge of the good springs, of itself

and from inner necessity, pleasure in the good and a striving after it,

just as from a knowledge of the evil springs an abhorrence of the same.

But these movements of the sensibilities are not the ground, but only

the attendants of the moral activity; the ground thereof is knowledge

alone. From erroneous knowledge, however, spring irrational

sensibility-movements and strivings of the soul, that is, the passions,

which are consequently to be regarded as a soul-disease. Now, though

all evil springs from error, yet is man nevertheless responsible

therefor, for the error itself is guiltily incurred. It is by the

knowledge of the good, that is, by perfect consciousness, that volition

is distinguished from impulse or instinct. The will aims at the

truly-known good, impulse at the merely seemingly good. Knowledge, as

an essential manifestation of rationality, is, like the latter itself,

germinally innate in man, and hence it is in all men essentially the

same; simply the further development and the particular application of

the same is left to one's own judgment.

The essence and the fundamental thought of the good is conformity to

nature (homologia, convenientia, to kata phusin, convenienter naturae

vivere). Nature is taken here, not as outer sensuous nature in

contradistinction to the self-conscious spirit, but as the general

order of the world, as the natura rerum, the inner conformity-to-law of

the All, and, above all, the rational nature and conformity-to-law of

one's own spiritual existence and life. Hence conformity to nature is

agreement with one's self--the inner order and spiritual health of the

life. Even the brute puts forth effort primarily not from pleasure and

for pleasure, but for natural self-preservation and self-development.

The true nature of man, however, is not the sensuous nature but the

reason. To live right signifies, therefore, to live according to

reason. Hence evil is a contradiction to the rational nature of man,

and the direct opposite of the good,--differs from the good not merely

quantitatively, but also qualitatively and essentially,--is the

anti-natural and anti-rational.

Virtue is, therefore, in its very essence, a "being well;" hence it has

a feeling of happiness as its immediate and necessary consequence, and

thus it is itself per se the highest good. He who is truly virtuous is

happy in the same manner as God; he who is vicious is necessarily

wretched. Not this happiness-feeling, however, but the good as such, is

the rational end of the moral activity; virtue is to be sought for its

own sake without reference to the happiless-feeling; the

pleasure-sensation is indeed the consequence, but not the end of moral

action. There are, in fact, other pleasure-sensations than those which

flow from virtue, and other pain-sensations than those which follow

from vice; also external things, things not dependent on us and our

free determination, such as health, riches, etc., may excite

pleasure-sensations, and hence contribute to our external happiness.

Now, if the end of our striving were not the good per se, but

happiness, then our effort would be directed toward a something that is

not fully within our power; but nothing can be truly good, and hence

truly to be sought after, which is not dependent upon us and within the

scope of our will. The pleasure which arises independently of us from

external things may be agreeable, and hence these things may be useful,

but real goods they are not. Hence the antithesis of the honestum (to

kathekon, to kalon) and the utile. Thus the happiness and perfection of

the sage rests entirely upon himself; he is the free creator of his

well-being; all that is really good depends solely upon himself; all

that is not dependent upon him affects and disturbs him not. Every wise

man is a rich man, a king.--As the good differs from the evil, not in

degree but in essence, hence all the virtues are essentially equal to

and homogeneous with each other; for a virtue inferior to another could

be possible only by its being somewhat participant in evil; but this is

impossible from its very idea. Hence whoever has one virtue has them

all; and they are all intimately involved in each other. Likewise, all

vices are essentially equal to each other, and, e. g., to kill a cock

needlessly is just as bad as to commit parricide.

From the Stoic notion of the self-based freedom of the sage, as well as

from their view of the essence of virtue, it follows that there may be

entirely perfect men, men who are free of all error and of all

immorality, fully possessed of all knowledge and virtue and happiness.

That there really are such is taken for granted; and delineations of

this self-acquired glory are given in the most glowing colors, and form

a favorite topic of Stoic philosophy. On the other hand, we find not

the least trace of the notion of a natural corruption of mankind; there

is admitted (as was the case in Aristotle's system) simply a difference

between the rude multitude little inclined to, and little capable of,

the good, and the more happily-gifted ones,--the latter being of course

the Stoics themselves; and it is given as an essential characteristic

of a sage, never to repent of any thing. [89] --In consequence of the

diametrical antagonism between good and evil, there is no mean moral

sphere between the two, no sphere of moral indifference. There are

indeed things that are per se indifferent to man, and which can hence

per se neither increase nor diminish his worth and happiness, but their

actual application is in each particular case either good or bad. In

classifying the virtues, the Stoics, for the most part, follow Plato.

Zeno himself based the moral on religion; also some of his disciples

understand by the "nature" with which man is to be in harmony, the

divine contents and the divine conformity-to-law of nature, and hence

that which harmonizes with the divine will; and they conceive of reason

as a manifestation of the divine activity in things. But the later

Stoics, for the most part, lost sight of this religious character of

the moral, and presented it as quite independent of religion,--as a

spiritual life-sphere resting strictly and independently upon itself.

In Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius the religious element comes again more

into the fore-ground; they recognize reverence for the gods, or for

God, as a virtue and as a ground of the moral,--conceive of

virtuousness as God-likeness, and viciousness as godlessness, and even

attribute high worth to prayer, though here, of course, there is no

trace of penitential prayer, but for the most part, only the spirit of

the Pharisee's prayer: "God, I thank thee that I am not as other men."

[90] It is in fact not impossible that in the more religious tendency

of later Stoicism there is a degree of influence from Christianity.

This view of the moral produced in fact among the Stoics an earnest

moral striving, though without enthusiasm or heart, and only in the

manner of a cold logical calculating. Feeling amounts to nothing at

all; of the potency of love there is not a trace; thought passes

directly over into action, and feeling merely accompanies the act as a

something entirely indifferent. The love of neighbor is regarded only

as a mode of action, but not as an affair of the heart. The sage ought

indeed to help the wretched according to his means and according to

their worthiness, but to feel compassion, or even to act as if one felt

it, would be unworthy of a wise man; for the truly wise man is above

all suffering; and the wretched suffer only from lack of knowledge,

because they regard external things, which are not within their own

control, as real goods. [91] The friendliness to man which is so

earnestly recommended by the Stoics flows not from love, and their

patience under received injustice springs only from contemptuous pride.

Hence, while, on the one hand, wrath, revenge, envy, slander, etc., are

condemned as unworthy of the sage, partly because every passive

feeling-movement is immoral, and in part because the sage is too proud

to allow himself to be disturbed by the acts and manners of

others,--yet, on the other hand, it is held as an unworthy weakness to

forgive others for their injustice, for that would be equivalent to

declaring the injustice as indifferent, and to lightly esteeming

justice. [92] The Christian principle, "Forgive and ye shall be

forgiven," has no force for a Stoic, because he believes himself never

to be in circumstances to need forgiveness.

The morality of the Stoics is a constant contest of the spirit against

sensuous nature and against the unspiritual and irrational in the

objective world in general; but as this contest is directed against a

primordial and never entirely-overcomeable antagonism in existence

itself, and hence can never lead to an objective victory, it assumes

consequently not so much an actively outward-working character, as

rather that of a passive resistance against irrational reality. The

sage does not undertake to produce a real world of the moral spirit; on

the contrary, he retreats within himself in proud contempt of the

actual world; only himself, but not the outer world, can he make

perfect;--the real struggle is carried on not by a victory-confident

assaulting of immoral reality, but by a contemptuous turning away from

the same,--by an indifference to pleasure and pain, the depicting of

which is given again and again in endless reiteration. This blunt,

indifferent enduring of pain is not the fruit of a pious faith in a

divine world-government or of love toward mankind, but it is the proud

defiance of the absolutely self-relying subject as against a world

imbued with a primitive and essential irrationality. This indifference

toward all that excites the sensibilities restrains indeed the Stoic

from Epicurean sensuality, but is very far from leading to a true

resistance of one's self; the sensuous is only despised, but not

positively assailed. Stoic ethics requires no severe self-denial, no

fasting, no renunciation of sensual enjoyment; it only requires that

one be moderate and that one place no value on the enjoyment; but after

all, this restraint was, for the most part, but a mere flourishing of

rhetoric;--Seneca accepted, with the greatest suavity, riches upon

riches, which his pupil Nero conferred upon him.

The lightly esteeming of the non-spiritual extends also to the physical

life. The Stoics indeed regard the instinct of self-preservation as a

fundamental impulse of human nature, and as a strictly normal

expression of the law which requires harmony with one's self and with

nature, but it is not inconsistent therewith that they should regard

life itself as an object of indifference--seeing that it is not within

man's own control. Death must not be feared, but must-as a power not

within our control--be despised; and in so far as it is a nature-law,

and one that liberates us from a painful bodily life, it is to be

regarded even with pleasure. The thought of immortality is, in this

connection, regarded merely as a possibility; if the life of the soul

continues on, then the wise man is happy; but if it ceases, then ceases

for him also all pain; in neither case is there the least ground for

fear.--But the Stoic goes still further. The wise man is a free lord

over himself; but in death he is overcome by an external power. It does

not become the sage, therefore, to let the close of his life depend

merely on any such extraneous power; it is but a virtualization of his

own self-dependent freedom, that he should close his life when it

pleases himself, that is, when he has satisfactory reasons therefor. To

the Stoic, suicide is, under certain circumstances, not only allowed,

but even a duty, a heroic virtue. Among the circumstances that justify

suicide, irrespective of self-sacrifice for country or friends, are the

following: great distress, poverty, incurable disease, physical

maiming, and other oppressive afflictions, deprivation of liberty, and

in general, any essential hinderance to living freely and in conformity

to reason, such as infirmity from age; all these are divine hints that

it is time to take one's voluntary departure; "The door is open,"--is a

saying which the Stoic fondly reiterates as an expression of his

perfect liberty, even in regard to the ending of his life. [93] Suicide

is defended with great zeal, and almost with enthusiasm, by Seneca, on

the ground that it is an assertion of the true self-dependence and.

freedom, of man; for this reason man may and should proceed to suicide

even when the above freedom-hindering evils are merely in threatening

prospect, inasmuch as, if he does not, he may in the end be hindered

from the accomplishment of this self-liberation. Only a single way

leads into life, but thousands lead out of it. No one is wretched save

through his own fault; for if misfortune falls upon him, he is at

liberty to depart; life keeps none back. The wise man lives only so

long as life pleases him; the lancing of an artery opens to him the way

to freedom. Death is, after all, unavoidable, why then adjourn it till

the evil day? The foulest death is better than the cleanest slavery;

the prudent man seeks the easiest death; yet if it cannot be otherwise,

he does not shun even a painful suicide. [94] --And the practice

corresponded to the theory. Zeno himself is said to have hanged himself

at an advanced age, because he. had broken one of his fingers; his

disciple Cleanthes starved himself to death because his gums became

sore. The frequent suicides among the Roman Stoics are a matter of

notoriety.--This doctrine and this practice are often regarded as in

conflict with the general view of the Stoics, which, in fact, denies

that pain is a real evil. The inconsistency is only apparent, and

contains, at all events, a very true confession. If man has no higher

consolation against the miseries of existence than the pride of the

self-centered, self-satisfied individual spirit, then it is simply mere

truthfulness when he confesses that he is not equal to the misery of

real life,--that he has not the moral power entirely to overcome it by

morality, and to say with joy, "We glory also in tribulations." The

Stoic knows nothing of an almighty father-love of God, and less still

of any personal guilt; lie lacks the entire basis upon which the

courage of a Christian heart can even grow stronger amid all the

buffetings of life; he rises only to a defiance of the miseries of

reality; but this defiance, seeing that it is not exalted to moral

courage by the pious confidence of a God-thirsting heart, is not equal

to the task of humbly bowing itself under suffering, but only to that

of destroying itself in bitter accusation against the moral order of

the world, and in the consciousness that the real world is not worthy

longer to contain such a sage.

Stoic morality is of a purely individual character, aims only at

virtualizing the free self-dependence and self-sufficiency of the

individual subject. For an objective reality of the moral thought, and

for a moral community-life, the Stoic has no appreciation, and hence

also none for the naturally-moral basis of society, namely,

marriage,--which, in fact, as requiring self-submission to an objective

moral reality, appears as a trammeling fetter for the individual

subject; and it is doubtless only from the striving after the

maintenance of the complete self-sufficiency of the wise subject in the

face of all objective moral reality, that are to be explained the

strangely perverted views of the sexual relations that prevailed among

the Stoics. By them marriage itself was lightly esteemed, and, while

passionate love and lustfulness were condemned, sexual communion

outside of marriage was expressly defended against all criticism; [95]

and of Zeno and Chrysippus, it is made out with a good degree of

certainty, that they required community of wives among the wise, and

that they declared allowable, sexual communion between nearest

blood-relatives (even between parents and children), and also whoredom,

self-pollution and pederasty. [96] It must not be forgotten that in

these opinions--with the exception of incest, which is readily

explainable from their one-sided, calculating spirit,--the Stoics had

the moral consciousness of the Greeks on their side, and that for their

community of wives they were countenanced by the teachings of

Plato.--Also in other respects their moral relations to other men are

neither frank nor pure. The lofty contempt which the sage indulges in

toward all non-sages, disengages him also from many moral duties toward

them; thus he is not under obligation always to tell them the truth;

falsehood is allowable not only in war, to the enemy, but also in many

other cases,--especially in view of attaining an an advantage. [97]

The morality of the Stoic is the pride of the natural man who is

conscious of being a moral creature, but who has no suspicion of a

morality higher than and transcending the individual subject, nor of a

personal moral depravity. His oft-repeated high-sounding descriptions

of self-complacency make any thing but an agreeable impression. This

pride restrains him, it is true, from many unworthy acts; in

consequence, however, of his total lack of an objective standard, it

did not guard him from grave moral errors, nor from an almost fanatical

hate against a higher world-theory, which, at a later period, offered

itself to him in Christianity; and Marcus Aurelius was not in the least

deterred by his so high-sounding discourses on kindness, tolerance, and

charity, from letting loose a fearful persecution upon the

Christians,--in whose martyr-courage he could discover only criminal

obstinacy.--Though Stoic ethics was distinguished from the

essentially-related ethics of the Cynics by the fact that it discarded

the unspiritual and unrefined form of the latter, and that it respected

the spiritual under every phase, and hence also in art, and placed a

high estimate upon the worthy appearance of the body and upon

cleanliness, nevertheless at bottom it does not really transcend the

same. It does not rise beyond the mere formal notion of the moral as a

conformity to nature; the material constructions to be put upon the

contents of the moral idea are left to the subjective discretion of the

individual; and though it really stands higher than Epicurean ethics,

still it did not spiritually vanquish the same. Instead of an

absolutely and objectively valid moral idea, and of the expression of a

divine will, we find only man's subjective knowledge of his own nature;

the contents of the moral law, the Stoic discovers only by the

observation of his own personal peculiarities; and the possibility that

this self of his might be a morally perverted one he does not even

remotely suspect.

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[86] From him are extant numerous moral writings in popular rhetorical

style.

[87] His lectures, for the most part merely popular moral exhortations,

are preserved in Arrian; besides these we have the Enchiridion

Epicteti, Which has been much used even in Christian times.

[88] From him we have Ta eis eauton, (moral meditations)--disconnected,

and, in many cases, merely suggested thoughts and life rules, with much

repetition and without regular development.

[89] Cic.: Pro Muraena, 29.

[90] Arrian: Dissert. Epict., iii, 24, 96 sqq.; iv, 10, 14 sqq., (ed.

Schweigh.); M. Aurel. Ant.: eis eauton, ix, 40.

[91] Epict.: Enchir., 16; M. Anton., v, 36; vii, 43; Diog. L., vii,

123; Cicero: Pro Muraena, c. 29; Seneca: De clementia, ii, 5, 6.

[92] Stobaeus: Eclogae ethicae, ii, 7, p. 190 (Heeren); Diog. L., vii,

123; Cic.: Pro Mur., 29.

[93] Diog. L., vii, 130; Arrian, i, 9, 20; i, 24, 20; i, 25, 18 sqq.;

ii, 1, 20; M. Anton., v, 29; Cic.: De Finibus, iii, 18.

[94] Epist. ii, 5 (17); vi, 6 (58); viii, 1 (70); De ira, iii, 15, (ed.

Fickert).

[95] Epict. Enchir. 33.

[96] Diog. L., vii, 13, 33, 131, 188; Sext. Emp.: Hupotuposeis, iii,

24.

[97] Stob.: Ecl. eth., ii, 7, p. 230 (Heeren).

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SECTION XXV.

Epicureanism and Stoicism are two diametrically opposed but also

mutually requiring and complementing phases of the Greek spirit; both

are equally one-sided, both are equally remote from the Christian

ethical idea;--both refer all moral truth back to the individual

subject. In the place of Christian morality, the Epicureans offer

joyous voluptuousness; the Stoics offer the high-minded pride of

complete self-righteousness; neither party feels the least need of

redemption, of divine grace; for the Epicureans regard the per se

sinful as right, while the Stoics imagine themselves to have overcome

the same through their pee se pure individual will.

Epicurean ethics emphasizes the nature-phase in man; Stoic the

spirit-phase; the former teaches an unresisting, voluptuous giving-over

of self to sensuous nature, the latter an earnest but only partially

successful resisting of the same; the former is absolutely indifferent

as to moral knowledge,--natural instinct supplies the place of

knowledge; the latter manifests a busy seeking after knowledge, and

esteems it as a virtue; the former is a crude realism,--in all

essential features a materialistic naturalism; the latter is a

one-sided idealism,--in all essential features a ploddingly-calculating

spiritualism; the former bears a feminine character,--is passive,

yielding, lax; the latter bears a masculine character,--is active,

earnest, rigorous; the former suited better the effeminate Ionic tribe

and the Orient, the latter rather the stern Doric tribe and the Romans.

The Epicurean seemingly gives sway to the universal, namely, to nature,

to which the individual subordinates himself; in reality, however, the

individual subject is set free from the bonds of the universal, of the

spiritual, of rationality; the Stoic also seemingly subordinates the

individual subject to a general thought, namely, the moral idea; in

reality, however, also here the universal is made to yield to the

individual subject; in the place of a general moral idea we find,

strictly speaking, only the calculating opinion of the individual; it

is the self-will of the subject in the face of the spiritual objective

world, namely, history, that asserts itself as rational freedom.

According to both systems, therefore, the truth is found only within

the subject; nature and existence in general have value for the

Epicurean only in so far as they can be enjoyed, that is, in so far as

they are for the individual subject,--in every other respect existence

is indifferent; in the eyes of the Stoic, existence is truth only in so

far as it appears in the subject; the sage is the embodiment of the

moral order of the universe, which, apart from him, exists but very

imperfectly. In both systems the higher thought of Plato, namely, that,

by the moral, the real harmony of existence, the harmony between nature

and spirit, is realized, is one-sidedly perverted; the Epicurean

effects this harmony only by sacrificing the rationally-personal spirit

to nature, the Stoic by sacrificing nature to the individual personal

spirit; it is no longer a harmonizing, but a giving up, of one of the

two phases of existence.

Though Stoic ethics is in many respects graver, and more worthy of man

than Epicurean, nevertheless both systems are equally remote from the

Christian view. The Epicurean does not recognize the spiritual

personality as the highest factor; the Stoic does not recognize the

rights of objective reality; but Christianity recognizes both as

absolutely belonging to each other. In both systems, the natural man,

the individual subject, thrusts himself in his fortuitous reality into

the foreground, as having the highest claims; in both the subject is of

himself perfectly competent to attain to all perfection,--as no need,

in this work, either of God or of history; neither has even the

faintest presentiment of the moral significancy of history, of humanity

as a unity. In both, therefore, there is absolutely no humility of

moral self-denial, but either a mere lustful devotion to

world-enjoyment, or a haughty contempt of the external world,--and

hence in neither of them is there the least felt need of redemption;

the sole redemption from the burden, not of guilt but of an evil world

of reality, is, suicide with the Stoic, and sensuous intoxication with

the Epicurean. In neither system is there manifest the least

approximation to the Christian principle,--no progress beyond Plato and

Aristotle, but rather simply the moral consciousness of heathenism in

its incipient dissolution,--which is consummated in Skepticism.

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SECTION XXVI.

The subjectivism that predominated in Epicurean and Stoic ethics finds

its consequential and scientifically-rigorous carrying-out,--and at the

same time Greek and heathen ethics in general, its dissolution and

honorable self-destruction,--in Scepticism, which declares all judging

of good and evil as futile, and all modes of action as

indifferent.--Neo-Platonic philosophy, which seeks to rescue heathenism

as against Christianity, and which perverts Christian ideas to heathen

purposes, presents in its but partially developed ethics little more

than a dreamy mysticism--a quietistic self-merging into the one

universal divine essence; and it is only for non-philosophers that

there is need of a, not scientific but, practical code of morals.

Roman philosophy made no original contributions to ethics. Apart from a

but slightly independent adoption of the doctrines of Stoicism, it

presents nothing more than a feebly eclectic character, and does not

rise beyond superficial calculating observations and opinions.

Skepticism has often been misunderstood not only in its scientific, but

also in its world-historical significancy; it arose gradually and, as

it were, spontaneously, without any one specially prominent founder, as

a protest of the general rational consciousness against the

self-sufficiency and presumption of the previously existing

philosophies,--and, in the sphere of ethics, as the scientific

conscience of heathenism. Subjectivism, when consequentially carried

out, leads inevitably to skepticism. Socrates had contended with moral

earnestness against the subjectivism of the Sophists, and had attempted

to find a solid basis also for ethical philosophy; in this commendable

effort, however, he succeeded as little as did, after him, Plato and

Aristotle and the Stoics. In these efforts they did not rise beyond

mere formal definitions of the moral, and were obliged to derive the

material contents of the same from the primarily merely

fortuitously-determined essence of the individual subject. The sole

thought that leads to a true basing of the moral consciousness, namely,

that the moral is the will of God, was only dimly caught sight of, and

could not in fact, from the heathen stand-point, be carried out with

any degree of certainty. That, now, the vail was torn off from the

false method of taking the finite subject as the criterion and the

infallible source of universally-valid and objective truth, and of

attributing to subjective opinion an absolutely valid objective

significancy, and that subjectivism was exposed in all its nakedness

and invalidity,--this was the scientific service of Skepticism,--which,

having shown traces of itself as early as in the age of Aristotle

(Pyrrho), attained to greater prevalence in the century before Christ

(�nesidemus of Alexandria), and fully developed itself in the second

century after Christ (Sextus Empiricus), and thus like a devouring rust

gradually undermined the last self-confidence of heathen philosophy,

save in so far as it did not seek refuge. behind the mystical nebulae

of Neo-Platonicism.

Skepticism is in fact simply the product of the antithesis between

Epicureanism and Stoicism. The former said: the feeling of pleasure and

displeasure alone decide as to the morally-good; the latter said: not

feeling but thinking decides; Skepticism lets the two cancel each

other, and says: neither feeling nor thinking is capable of any real

decision as to what is good. Man cannot at all know what is per se

good; all our feelings, experiences and thoughts have merely and

exclusively a subjective significancy,--furnish no truth in regard to

things per se. This is not a mere feeble courting of doubt, not a mere,

"I know not whether this or that is good," but a decisive, "I know

positively that I cannot know it, and I know also that there is nothing

that is per se good;" and this knowledge of the lack of knowledge is

the true wisdom and the true virtue. What is good or not good is

determined solely by civil law and by adopted custom, and there is no

occasion for seeking for another or higher basis therefor. Nothing is

per se, and in its essence good or evil. This consideration furnishes

the basis for true soul-repose and happiness,--seeing that we then need

no longer be disturbed by feelings of desire or of disgust, but that we

look upon every thing with calm indifference. The true and highest good

consists therefore in this, that we be absolutely indifferent toward

all things that are usually regarded as goods. As, on one occasion,

during a storm, Pyrrho saw some swine very unconsciously devouring

their food, he is said to have exclaimed: "The wise man must also be

equally imperturbable!" If there were any thing that is good or evil

per se, all men would be found to see it; whereas in fact the judgments

of men differ in all things, and the opposing philosophic schools

proclaim the most opposite things as good or evil. The truth is, that

in every case, the judgment as to good or evil is determined by the

spiritual or bodily peculiarity of the person judging, and hence gives

no certainty as to the essence of the thing per se, but is always

simply indicative as to what chances to seem good or evil to him. Hence

a science of the moral, a system of ethics, is absolutely impossible,

and all teaching as to the moral is futile. But, as now,

notwithstanding this, it is necessary to live and act in some manner,

so it is most advisable to act according to the existing laws and

customs,--not, however, because they are good, but because this course

is most advantageous.--Though Sextus Empiricus,--who has said most on

this head,--does not show his best powers on the field of ethics, yet

it is not to be denied that his attacks against the results of all

previous ethics contain much truth, and that from the heathen

stand-point the Skeptics were, on the whole, justified in their doubts.

Their skepticism gives evidence of a significant self-consciousness in

heathen science; and even though its results were unsatisfactory, still

there was need of just such a radical sifting and exposure in order to

bring to sober reflection the falsely-secure and self-deluding spirit

of heathenism, and to render it more receptive for a better-founded

world-theory.

Neo-Platonic ethics can hardly be regarded as a genuine phase of Greek

thought proper. Entering the lists in antagonism to the new world-power

of Christianity for the purpose of rescuing heathenism, mingling

together into a nebulous conglomerate all the fragmentary notions of

Oriental and Occidental religions and philosophies, and supplementing

them with Christian thoughts, Neo-Platonic philosophy manifests also in

its but crudely-formed ethics little more than the distressful features

of a spirit slowly and painfully dying of the mere senility of age,--a

spirit which, without considerate choice of its means, is feverishly

possessed with the one desire of arousing up by artificial

nerve-stimuli its already half-dead life-forces to one last desperate

up-flickering into life,--a tragically-grand desperation-effort of a

mortally-wounded combatant,--the titanic rebounding of the spirit of

antiquity when pierced through the heart by the arrow of a higher form

of truth; (Plotinus, the greater disciple of Ammonius Saccas, the

founder of the school, living mostly in Rome, ob. A. D. 270; his

disciple Porphyry, ob. A. D. 304; Proclus, who lived mostly at Athens,

ob. A. D. 485--the last philosopher of Occidental heathenism.)

Deviating from all previous Greek philosophy, the Neo-Platonists place

the idea of God in the fore-ground, and deduce from it, and bring in

relation to it, all principles of morality. But this God-idea itself is

further remote from the Biblical idea of God than is even that of Plato

and Aristotle. God is no longer the infinite personal Reason, but the

absolutely undetermined abstract Unity, which unfolds itself, in

Pantheistic emanation, into the world of multiplicity,--which world is

consequently not a separate reality different from God, but simply the

shadow of God himself,--the reverse-side of the divine, the fading-away

of the pure divine light, and hence of essentially negative

essence.--Now as all knowledge must aim at beholding all things in God

and God in all things, hence also all moral activity is directed

exclusively to this one end, namely, to unite one's self with God, to

press one's self out of the world of plurality, to renounce one's self

as an individual being, to wish to be and actually to be nothing more

than a transient phase of the alone truly-existing unitary divine

essence. The moral activity aims not at the producing of a real world

of the good different from God,--aims not at realizing any thing which

is not already real and perfect from eternity, but, on the contrary,

aims at reducing back the soul from its immersion in the world of

reality into the solely and the alone-existing good, that is, into God.

God is not merely the highest good, but in fact the absolutely sole

good; and whatever is different from God is, in so far as it is so, not

truly good. Hence the sole path of salvation is the return from

plurality to unity, and the first and most essential condition thereto

is the beholding of God, an indulging in a mystical speculation, which

is possible only in that one forgets one's self,--spiritually dies

away,--so as to permit God alone to prevail. The more I am a particular

self-hood claiming personality, so much the more remote am I from God.

Morality consists, therefore, not in a developing of this personality,

but in a suppressing of it, not in a becoming like God, but in fact in

becoming God himself. The self-conscious personality is not the

God-like, but the God-foreign; for God himself is not a personality--is

not this or that--has no manner of determinateness, but is that which

is sublime above all determinateness, all quality, and hence also above

spiritual personality; whatever is in any manner determined is not God,

but has gone out from God, and hence is, in so far, extra-divine; and

the same path which reality has traversed in passing firom undetermined

unity to manifoldly-determined plurality, morality traverses again in

the' opposite direction,--passes back from plurality and

determinateness to the unitary and undetermined. In all these phases of

thought, an Indian influence is unmistakable.

As true cognizing is not dialectical but contemplative, namely, a

spiritual beholding of God, so also true morality is not an

outward-going activity, but rather a non-acting, a restraining of

active volition, a dissolving of all particular personal volitionating

into the one divine essence. Whoever has the highest good needs and

wishes for no other good. But the highest good exists in no sense

whatever apart from God, in the world, but solely in the

reality-transcending and indeterminate God. For such an outward

working, such a creating of a real kingdom of the good, there is no

occasion whatever; for all that really exists is good already in so far

as it is the divine essence, and hence cannot be an object of change or

resistance; and in so far as it is the divine essence as

self-estranged, it is evil, and hence should not be loved and

confirmed; there remains, therefore, for the moral activity no other

work than simply to withdraw itself from the world and, not so much

into itself as much rather, into God. Hence there is no need of

striving, of combatting, and of laboring, but only of reposing; to the

eternal keeping-silence, the eternal repose, of God, corresponds the

silent repose of the sage and moral man. Active virtue is not the

highest form of morality, but is only a praiseworthy moral quality of

such as have not yet risen to the stage of true wisdom,--Such are the

chief fundamental thoughts of this Neo-Platonic philosophy, the

influence of which made itself felt as late as in the Christian

mysticism of the Middle Ages. On the whole, we could not properly

expect from this last attempt of heathen philosophy at

self-preservation, any rigorous consequential carrying-out of

fundamental principles; and hence we in fact often find thoughts in it

which but imperfectly harmonize with it as a system. Still, the most of

these seemingly irreconcilable views are doubtless to be accounted for

in the light of the distinction which it made between wisdom proper

(which is attainable only for the elect few) and the moral instruction

of the populace at large. For the latter there is in fact need of other

moral precepts, seeing that men at large are not yet in such a

condition as to be able, through beholding and yielding, to merge

themselves into the absolutely One.

Roman philosophy, though enjoying high repute in the Middle Ages, and

even as late as in the last century, has, however, for the

philosophical development of the science of ethics scarcely any

significance. The Stoic Romans did little more than indulge in general

popular discussions on the philosophy they had adopted from the Greeks;

the Epicurean Romans simply applied their views practically. Cicero is

simply a discreet Eclectic, though without speculative genius. He

discusses moral questions in clear but superficial processes of

reasoning, without finding for them a firm philosophical ground, or a

really scientific solution. The rhetorical form of his

ethico-philosophical writings does not redeem them from that

tediousness which inheres in any verbose display of unprofound

observations. Zealously opposing Epicureanism, Cicero holds fast in

general to the Stoic system, modifying it with Platonic, Aristotelian

and other elements, and this too not without many instances of

misunderstanding. His most important ethical work is his De officiis,

which is based mostly on the Stoic Panaetius. In this work he examines,

first, the notion of the morally-good (honestum), then that of the

useful (utile), and the mutual relation of these so often conflicting

principles. The "useful" he finds to be only seemingly different from

the good; the fact is, whatever is good is also useful, and whatever is

truly useful is also good, not, however, for the reason that it is

useful, but the converse; hence to strive after the good renders

necessarily at the same time also happy. Of the other writings of

Cicero, belong also here the Quaestiones academ., the Disputationes

Tusculanae, and his essays: De senectute, De amicitia, De legibhus, De

finibus.--Cicero blames, in the Stoics, that they conceive of the good

only partially, that they regard not the entire man, but only his

spiritual phase, and lightly esteem the corporeal, so that in fact

while professing to follow nature they do not do her justice,--that

they place on an equal footing all the virtues as well as all the

vices, and admit no intermediate gradations, and also that because of

their one-sidedness they involve themselves in many contradictions.

Though finding the source of the moral consciousness in reason,--which

is an efflux from the divine reason, and by which therefore we become

like God,--he yet derives ethics only in a very slight degree from the

essence of reason itself, but rather from the experience of life. From

this lack of a firm philosophical foundation, we can understand why

Cicero placed an especially high value on his discussion upon the

collision of duties. On the condition of a real deduction of the

various forms of duty from one fundamental principle, there would be no

possible place for such a discussion; but to the moralist who takes his

starting-point from empirical observation, this field appears as of

especial difficulty and importance. The question: Which of several

morally good actions which cannot be reconciled with each other is to

be chosen as the better? Cicero answers very unsatisfactorily and

unphilosophically, on the mere ground of the social comfortableness

resulting therefrom (De off., i, 43 sqq.). Nor does he succeed in all

his sonorous periods on universal benevolence, etc., in rising beyond

the narrow views characteristic of heathen ethics.--Plutarch, a Greek

with Roman education (about A. D. 100,) furnishes in his numerous moral

writings many good observations on the moral lifes and gives evidence

of a noble disposition of soul, though he does not rise beyond popular

essays and observations, relating for the most part to particular moral

topics,--gives neither a system, nor rigorous, clear principles. In

general he follows Plato, and rejects the extremes both of Epicureanism

and Stoicism.

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B.--OLD-TESTAMENT AND JEWISH ETHICS.

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SECTION XXVII.

The ethics of the Old Testament presents, in its entire essence, a

direct contrast to all heathen ethics. Without systematic form and

without scientific development, it is yet perfectly self-consistent in

its ground, its essence and its end. In harmony with the idea of God as

a spirit absolutely independent of nature, and himself omnipotently

conditioning the whole sphere of nature, the ground of all morality is

absolutely and exclusively God's holy will as revealed to the free

personal creature; the essence of the moral is free, loving obedience

to the revealed divine will; the ultimate end of morality is the

realizing of perfect God-likeness, and hence also of perfect

God-sonship and bliss, not merely for the individual, not merely for

the people Israel, butt for all humanity,--and hence the realization of

a humanity-embracing kingdom of God; the most immediate historical end,

however, is to impart a knowledge of the need of redemption from

depravity as incurred by the sin of man himself. Hence the law appears

in fact predominantly, not as an inner natural one, but as a purely

positive, objective, historically-revealed one, in order that man may

become conscious of his natural estrangement from the truth. In this

form it does not have an ultimately definitive, but a transitory and

essentially disciplinary end; and the realization of the kingdom of God

can only be prepared for, but not fully accomplished, by the Israelitic

people; it is a morality of hope.

As in the presentation of Christian ethics, further on, we shall have

to glance in considerable detail also at its historical antecedent,

namely, Old Testament ethics, hence we need here give only the general

characteristics of the latter. [98]

The antagonism of the moral idea of the Old Testament to the views of

collective heathenism, is radical and fundamental; there is here no

shadow of a transition from the latter to the former. Pre-Christian

revealed ethics dld not, however, have a scientific, systematic form,

and indeed could not have it, inasmuch as the key to its correct

understanding was to be given only in the days of the Messiah, and as

the Hebrews were not to be a perfect, independently-developed nation,

but to find their full truth only in Christianity.--The Hebrews do not

undertake to find the ground of the moral consciousness in the human

spirit itself, for the man whom they know as real is no longer the pure

image of God,--has no longer the unobscured natural consciousness of

God and of the moral,--and even unfallen man needed to be awakened to

this consciousness by the revelation of Gold. The entire ground of the

moral consciousness is therefore sought in God's positive revelation to

man, as indeed the ground of the moral on the whole is absolutely the

holy will of God,--not as an abstract law immanent in, though partially

hidden from, human reason, but as an express command of the personal

God and made known to man by a historical act of revelation. God speaks

and man hearkens; and the moral activity is in its entire essence a

child-like obeying of the divine command made upon man. Here there is

no longer any room for a doubt, unless it be a sinful one,--no need of

a philosophical analysis. In case there is need in particular

conjunctures for a more definite decision, then God gives it himself,

either directly, as with the patriarchs and the divinely-called and

enlightened prophets, or, mediately, through the sa-me, or indeed also

through specific signs, such as the lot [Num. xxvi, 55, 56; xxxiii, 54;

xxxiv, 13; Josh. vii, 14 sqq.; xiii, 6; xiv, 2; xviii, 6 sqq.; xix, 1

sqq.; xxi, 4 sqq.; 1 Sam. x, 20 sqq.; Prov. xvi, 33; xviii, 18], the

high-priestly Urim and Thummim [Ex. xxviii, 30; Num. xxvii, 21; 1 Sam.

xxiii, 6 sqq.; xxviii, 6; xxx, 7, 8; comp. 2 Sam. ii, 1; v, 19, 23

sqq.], and others [1 Sam. xiv, 8 sqq., comp. Gen. xxiv, 12 sqq.]. The

command of God to man presents itself in a strictly positive definite

form: "thou shalt," "thou shalt not," "thou mayest."' For any other

reason than God's will, man has no right to ask; he is simply to

believe the word of God--this alone leads him to righteousness. To

personal free self-determination and maturity, man is to attain simply

and solely through child-like faith-obedience to the word of the

Father. He who questions and hesitates where God speaks, cannot

possibly be moral, since he is lacking in faith. Unhesitating,

unreluctant, joyous submission to God's definite command, is the

beginning, the end and the essence of all morality. Types of such

faith-obedience are Noah [Gen. vi, 22; vii, 5], Abraham [xii, 4],

Jacob, Moses, Samuel, David, and others. The simple fact that God wills

it, is the absolutely sufficient reason; the fear of God is the

beginning of wisdom. The antecedent condition of the moral, as lying in

the bosom of man himself, is, however, the image of God--the pure

knowledge and the untrammeled will of moral freedom. Man should, but he

is not compelled; his salvation is placed within his own hand; the

thought, "If thou hearkenest to my word, it shall go well with thee,"

pervades the entire Old Testament from beginning to end. Between God

and man there subsists an absolutely personally-moral relation. Even as

God, as the true and perfect personality, is the holy prototype of all

morality, and as the simple thought of this God is directly presented

as the perfectly sufficient ground for all moral life: "Ye shall be

holy, for I the Lord your God am holy" [Lev. xi, 45; xix, 2], "I am the

almighty God, walk before me and be thou perfect" [Gen. xvii, 1],--so

also is man's complete personality recognized and respected by God even

in the already sin-corrupted race. God does not himself immediately

work all willing and acting in man, does not force him to obedience,

but He makes a covenant with man, with his people,--comes as a holy

personality into moral relation to man as a free moral personality. The

fulfillment of the covenant-promise is conditioned on the

covenant-fidelity of man.

The purpose, the goal of the moral is not the merely individual

perfection of the moral subject, but it is, on the one hand, the

salvation and perfection of the whole human race,--a thought entirely

unknown to heathendom--and, on the other, the full and blissful

life-communion of the person with God; "I will be your God, and ye

shall be my people" [Lev. xxvi, 12; Jer. vii, 23];--not merely the

individual subject but the moral community, the people of God (entire

humanity is to become this people), is to be received into this

communion with God.

Immediately upon the creation of man the thought of the moral presents

itself clearly and definitely [Gen. i, 26-ii, 24]. (1.) The objective

presupposition of the moral is presented, namely, the living personal

God as the prototype of man and of his life, and nature as good and

normal and as existing independently over against man,--and, then, the

subjective presupposition, namely, man as a personal spirit like unto

his Creator.--(2.) The goal of morality as a task, a duty, namely, the

realizing and completing of the divine image, is expressed under one of

its phases, as the dominion of man over nature; this implies the

realization of free personal spirituality in likeness to God--the

legitimate "being as God." In the strong emphasizing of this dominion

over nature, (so utterly in contrast to all actual experience,) there

is plainly indicated the ideal essence of the moral task; its full

realization however is not to be attained to at once, but is the final

goal, and lies in the future. In striking contrast to all heathen

views, according to which man is either absolutely subject to nature,

or at least has nature before him as a cramping, and

never-entirely-to-be-overcome power, we have here the true relation of

the rational spirit to nature, namely, his complete freedom, his

destination to entire mastery over it, that is, we have the full

personality of man as the key-stone of the collective morally-religious

world-theory. That this dominion of the spirit over nature is not to be

a childish magical interfering with nature, is evident from the simple

fact that man is called to it only as being an image of the

nature-dominating God, and that immediately before and after his call

thereto the God-established permanent regularity of nature is alluded

to as in some sense a right of nature, and that man is at once directed

to the orderly and conserving culture of nature [ii, 15]. The dominion

over nature is not the entire goal of the moral striving, it is,

however, a very expressive suggestion of, the same, and is within the

comprehension of the child-like and as yet immature spirit.--(3.) The

legitimate freedom of choice and its enjoyment are guaranteed to man as

a right, in the sphere of the discretionary [i, 28-30; ii, 16].--(4.)

The unambiguous declaration is made that morality is not a something

belonging merely to the individual person, but that on the contrary man

can accomplish his task only as a member of a moral community; it is

not good that man should be alone; he ought not to remain in isolation,

but should form a part of a family, should enter into association with

moral humanity, and it is only on this condition that the good is truly

realizable for the subject.--(5.) In the anticipatory allusion to the

observance of the Sabbath as based on the divine example [ii, 2, 3] is

presented the ideal phase of human activity,--the re-collecting of the

personal spirit from the distractions of the outer life into the calm

of meditation; man is not at liberty completely to merge himself into

earthly temporal cares,--should constantly have before him, in all his

temporal activity, also the eternal as the true and highest good. The

heathen either buries himself up in temporal activity and enjoyment, or

contemptuously turns himself entirely away from the same; the saint of

the Old Testament lives and acts in God's good-created world, but does

not merge himself into it,--withdraws himself from it into the Sabbath

repose of a heart in communion with its God. In the simple feature of

Sabbath observance itself, Old Testament morality presents itself in

sharp and definite contrast to all heathen ethics, and places the moral

task of man higher than the latter.

Hebrew ethics, however, does not linger, as was almost exclusively the

case with heathen ethics, in the purely ideal sphere,--in the

consideration of the good per se,--does not conceive of evil as a mere

possibility or as a merely exceptional or isolated reality, or as a

nature-necessity back of all human guilt (which are all, in fact,

heathen views)--but looks evil earnestly and squarely in the face, and

regards it as a sad, all-prevalent reality, the guilt of which lies in

the free act of man, and is participated in by all without exception.

The morality of the chosen people of God looks, therefore, not merely

to a warding off and an avoiding of evil as a something as yet external

to our heart, and merely threatening us, but to a zealous, constant

combating of the same, not outside of us in an originally defective

world, but within in the inmost guilt-laden heart of the subject

himself. Sin is of historical origin,--an historical reality and power;

and morality, the nature of which presents itself now quite

predominantly as a vigorous combating against sin, appears also itself

in a uniformly historical character,--is promoted and guided by a

divine history-chain of ever richer-unfolding gracious guidances, and

gives rise to a moral history, to a redemption-history, to a kingdom of

God here upon earth inside of humanity,--at first, in faith and hope,

and afterwards (after it has reached the goal promised by God from the

very start, and embraced by the people with pious confidence, and kept

constantly in view) in full, blissful reality. Heathenism knows indeed

evil, knows vice, but it does not know sin, for sin is of a

morally-historical character; hence it knows also of no historical

overcoming of the same, no expecting, no preparing for, nor realization

of, a kingdom of God in humanity; the Persians alone have an obscure

presentiment thereof, perhaps not without a ray of light received from

the people of God, with whom they were in contact, and whom, from their

residence among them, they learned highly to esteem.

On the entrance of sin into the world there arises at once a separation

among men between those who permit themselves to be fettered by sin and

those who retain God and his salvation in view, between the children of

the world and the children of God; God, however, looks in compassionate

love also upon the former and plans for them a redemption, the

world-historical preparation of which is confided to that people which

He separates out from among the men of sin, and paternally guides; God

separates to himself the man of faith,--him who trusts in God with

rock-like firmness and cheerfully and unconditionally obeys his word

even where he is unable to comprehend it and where it diametrically

contradicts his own natural consciousness. God places before Abraham,

from the very start, not a merely personal, but a world-historical

goal: "In thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed" [Gen.

xii, 3], and he repeats this promise again and again in progressively

more definite features; as in Adam all die, so in Abraham are all

nations to be blessed and to be brought to the Accomplisher of

Salvation. For the first time in the history of humanity we find here,

and in contrast to all heathendom, a definite world-historical goal of

the moral life; not man, but God has established it in compassionating

grace, and has sealed it in successive and progressively richer

promises; and an individual man is elected to co-operate in the

fulfilling of this promise, which is not given to him as an individual

but to humanity,--to cooperate in such a sense as that this man, that

this people itself, may become capable of really participating in the

fruit of the redemption accomplished by the act of grace,--by becoming

the maternal womb which is to bear and give birth to the Saviour. But

the individual has part in this moral work only when he accepts the

promise in faith, and it is only when he accepts the promise in faith,

and only on the basis of this faith, that he is able to attain to true

obedience of life.

This people, so strictly cut off from all the rest of the race, this

people hated, oppressed, down-trodden by the rest of mankind, becomes

thus, from the very beginning, of world-historical significance, in a

much higher sense than any other pre-Christian people. The heathen

nations which actively entered into and shaped history sought only

themselves but not humanity; the Israelitic people, shut up exclusively

to the promise and to faith,--a people already spiritually developed

and molded into a moral organism before it had as yet where to lay its

head, and which was as yet seeking its earthly home,--a spiritual

people without any nature-basis, and which received its earthly home

only as a gracious gift of God, conferred on moral conditions [Lev.

xxv, 23],--this people, in its God-willed and commanded separation from

all heathen nations, in its so often, even up to the present day,

reproached "particularism," was, after all, absolutely the only people

which had in view, from the beginning, the true "universalism,"

(namely, the salvation of collective humanity), as its highest goal,

and which sought to do nothing else than to prepare the way for this

salvation of humanity [Gen. xii, 3; xviii, 18; xxii, 18; xxvi, 4; Deut.

xxxii, 43; 1 Chron. xvi, 23, 28; Isa. ii, 2 sqq.; xi, 10 sqq.; xxv, 6

sqq.; xlii, 1, 6; xlv, 20, 22, 23; xlix, 6; lii, 15; liv, 3; lv, 5; lx;

lxi, 11; lxii, 2; lxv, 1; lxvi, 18 sqq.; Jer. iv, 2; xvi, 19; Amos ix,

11, 12; Hag. ii, 7 (8); Zech. ii, 11; vi, 15; viii, 20 sqq.; xiv, 16;

Micah iv, 1 sqq.; Mal. i, 11; Psa. ii, 8; xviii, 49; lxvii, 2; lxxii, 8

sqq.; lxxxvi, 9, 10; xcvi, 7, 10; cii, 15; cxvii, 1]. The Israelites

had therefore, from the very beginning, the deepest interest for

history, and for the goal of history as clearly presented by prophetic

promise; the divine prophetic benedictions upon the patriarchs relate

much less to their own person than to the history of humanity as

proceeding from them; the Hebrew is clearly conscious that all his

moral striving contributes to conduct the God-guided current of history

to the God-promised realization of salvation; instead of the gloomy,

despairing tragic consciousness of the most highly cultured of all the

heathen nations, we find here a full confidence in the ultimate

fulfillment of the redemption longed-for by man and promised by God.

The Israelites have and could have this high world-historical mission

only because they were made to conceive of themselves from the very

beginning as, not a nature-people, but as a spiritual people which

obtained for itself its natural prosperity only through moral fidelity.

As the people of God, they name themselves not Hebrews, from their

natural descent, nor yet from Abraham, nor from Isaac, nor indeed from

Jacob's first name, but from his later God-given name, Israel, which he

received after he had wrestled with the angel [Gen. xxx, 24 sqq]. From

Abraham and Isaac descend also other tribes, which do not belong to the

people of God; only Jacob's descendants belong all thereto. Nor is

Jacob the progenitor of the people of God in his earlier self-willed

and self-confiding life, but solely in his spiritually-transformed

life, after that, praying and beseeching, he had wrestled, in bitter

repentance, with Jehovah as offended at his many sins and deceits, and

after that, in self-denying humility having put off all

self-righteousness, he had thrown himself child-like at the feet of God

and confided all his well-being to His blessing. It becomes the people

of Israel, as a spiritual people, to have also a spiritual and not a

merely natural man as their father, and the true bearing of this father

to God is expressed in the words: "I will not let thee go unless thou

bless me." Whoever would belong to this spiritual people of God must

divest himself of all his mere naturalness; this is symbolized by the

covenant-token of the people with God, circumcision.

The Israelite, in his moral strivings, has the highest good hopefully

and confidently in view, and not for the individual person alone, but

for humanity.-- The idea of the highest good, the fundamental thought

of all morality, has, in the Old Testament history, a very distinct

development. It appears in God's promises, on the one hand, as a grace,

and, on the other, as a reward for trusting fidelity,--neither of which

is by any means to be separated from, or regarded as contradictory to,

the other. In the first blessing after the creation, as we have already

seen, the thought of the highest good is already indicated; by sin,

however, the blessing is changed into a curse, the highest good is

thrown into the far distant, and is only obscurely alluded to in the

promise of the ultimate victory of the seed of the woman over the seed

of the serpent [Gen. iii, 15], and henceforth the thought of the

highest good is associated with the victory over evil, with redemption.

And though mankind,--originally destined to possess the whole earth

[Gen. i, 28; Matt. v, 5],--receive now merely in small numbers, as

members of the people of God, only a very small space of the earth for

their possession, yet is also this typical foretaste of the possession

of the highest good associated at the same time with promises of

victory over the sin-symbolizing heathen inhabitants thereof; the

highest good even in its feeblest foretastes is conditioned on trustful

struggle and victory. In the blessing upon Noah [Gen. ix] there are

indicated as the highest good, in the first place, the multiplication

of the human race through Noah, and the dominion over nature (now,

after thle fall into sin, under a somewhat changed form), and, then, in

the express covenant of God with Noah, the full personal communion of

believing man with God. To Abraham, the prophetic benediction is

essentially enlarged, including the multiplication of his family under

God's guidance, the guaranteeing of an earthly father-land as a gift of

God, and the blessing of entire humanity through the people of God as

springing from him. God had expressly called Abraham away from his

natural father-land; he is to receive another one in its stead, one

that is morally acquired from God's hand through believing submission

to God; all earthly good is to bear also a spiritual character, is to

be an outgrowth from spiritual good; even the most natural earthly

good, the home, is to be obtained as a grace in reward of faith.

Homeless upon earth for several centuries, the people Israel are to

find, first, their eternal home, so as, then, after having been trained

by God's hand, and ripened for his service through sufferings and

submission, to receive an earthly one as a gift of grace; and this home

is to be for them a symbol of the eternal one, a shadow of the highest

good. Even in the first promise to Abraham, there beams out through

this earthly good a faint gleam of the heavenly one: "in thee shall all

families of the earth be blessed;" Abraham is to be, not merely by his

example of faith, but also really, by his family, the beginning of a

kingdom of God for entire humanity; to be himself in this kingdom of

blessing, and this kingdom in him, this is, for him, the highest good.

Exactly similar promises of temporal and likewise spiritual goods, God

gives to Isaac and to Jacob [Gen. xxvi, 3-5; xxviii, 13-15; comp. xxxv,

9-11; xlviii, 4]; Isaac's blessing upon his son Jacob relates, it is

true, primarily only to temporal good [xxvii, 28, 29]; xxviii, 3, 4],

but nevertheless with allusion to the higher good. It is true, temporal

well-being [Gen. xxxix, 2, 3, 5, 23; Lev. xxvi, 3 sqq.; Deut. v, 29;

vi, 3, 18, 24; vii, 13 sqq.; viii, 6 sqq.; xi, 9 sqq., 21 sqq.; xii,

28; xv, 4-6, 10; xxviii, 1 sqq., comp. Psa. lxxxi, 13, 14], and a

continuance in the land, and long life [Exod. xx, 12; xxiii, 26; Deut.

iv, 40; v, 33; vi, 2; xxx, 2 sqq.; xxxii, 47], are very often

presented,--not indeed with reference merely to the individual, but

also to the nation, as a divine blessing for pious fidelity,--as a high

good and end; but as early as at the time of the actual conclusion of

the covenant of God with the people on Sinai, the highest good appears

as of a spiritual character: "If ye will obey my voice indeed and keep

my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all

people; for all the earth is mine; and ye shall be unto me a kingdom of

priests and a holy nation" [Exod. xix, 5, 6]; the highest blessing is

the peace of God [Num. vi, 26; Psa. xxix, 11], the love of God, the

compassion of God, and his covenant with men [Deut. vii, 9, 12, 13;

xiii, 17, 18], so that they "may live long" [Deut. v, 33] and that God

might be their "righteousness" [vi, 25]; and in the first commandment:

"I am the Lord thy God, thou shalt have no other gods before me" [Exod.

xx, 2, 3], the objective phase of the highest good is definitely

expressed; any thing else, save God, that man might regard as the

highest good, is in fact but a worthless idol; and hence the rejection

of the covenant of grace works an everlasting rejection of him who

rejects it [1 Chron. xxviii, 9].

In view of this high spiritual conception of-the highest good, it

appears as in the highest degree a surprising fact that the thought of

a life after death is not directly brought to bear upon the moral

life,--is not presented as a motive of action, or as a phase of the

highest good,--a peculiarity that is all the more striking when we

consider that the children of Israel had lived for four centuries in

Egypt, and that Moses had been educated in the wisdom of this country,

where precisely this thought of immortality very powerfully shaped the

entire moral and religious life, and when we further consider that this

thought itself was most unquestionably recognized among the children of

Israel [Gen. v, 24; xv, 15; xxv, 8; xxxvii. 35; xlix, 26, 29, 33; Deut.

xxxi, 16; xxxii, 50; 1 Sam. xxviii; Job xxvi, 5; 2 Kings ii; Psa. xvi,

10; xlix, 15; Prov. xv, 24], as it would also be naturally presumable

that a people which places so high a value upon the personality, could

not be ignorant of this thought, which so largely prevailed throughout

heathendom. This manifestly intentional placing in the back-ground of

the thought of immortality as bearing upon the moral life, is to be

explained from the peculiarity of the purpose which God had with this

nation, in view of the salvation of mankind.--(1.) The people of Israel

is a world-historical one as no other ante-Christian people was; the

entire hopes and striving of the nation are directed toward the

ultimate salvation of the human race as the highest goal; the primarily

feeble, but constantly more definite-growing Messianic thought throws

temporarily into the back-ground the interest in future life of the

individual person. The entire hope of Israel looks forward to the

highest good, the true salvation, but this highest good consists, even

for the pious Israelite, only in the future redemption that is to be

accomplished by a world-historical divine act; the Redeemer had first

to spring from the line of David before the life after death could have

real worth for the saint, or be his highest good; before this event,

the transmundane life was a beclouded one, not only for the

consciousness, but also per se,--was not as yet a truly blissful life

in the presence of God [Psa. vi, 5; xlix, 15 sqq.; lxxxviii, 10-13;

cxv, 17; Isa. xxxviii, 18]. As Abraham rejoiced that he should see the

day of the Lord [John viii, 56], so also longed Abraham's seed for this

day, from which time forth, only, the life after death could be a truly

blessed one. The saints of the Old Covenant did not pass their lives as

having no hope, but their hope was primarily an historical one,--was

fixed upon the historical fulfillment of the promises, and aspired

toward a heavenly home only from, and on the basis of, this

fulfillment.--(2.) Though for the redeemed Christian the thought of a

future life is a very important element of his moral consciousness,

nevertheless for the as yet not truly regenerated man there lies in the

same no inconsiderable danger, namely, the danger of selfish

reward-seeking, of a narrow-hearted directing of his moral striving

exclusively toward his personal well-being instead of toward the

salvation of humanity. Though the saints of the Old Covenant

participated in many gracious gifts, so that they cannot be regarded as

merely natural men, still, they were not as yet in the highest sense

spiritually regenerated; and, in fact, in the necessary

redemption-preparing requirement of strict obedience to the

objectively-given law, they stood all the more exposed to this danger

of regarding their future salvation as a reward for good works, as is

actually evinced by the rise of Pharisaism. From this danger God

preserved the Hebrews, in that while He indeed promised them a gracious

reward for their fidelity, He yet presented as such reward, on the one

hand, only such goods as most evidently could not be, for the pious,

the highest good, and, on the other hand, the fulfillment of the divine

promises within the sphere of history, namely, redemption, so that they

were necessarily brought to the consciousness that the highest good was

not the reward of their own works, but the fruit of a future divine act

of grace.

Although the law had essentially also the purpose of awakening the

consciousness of the antagonism of the sinful nature of man against the

holy will of God, thus implying that the full consciousness of the

sinful perversion of human nature was a state that had as yet to be

attained to, nevertheless this consciousness exists from the very

beginning, and that too very vividly, as we shall hereafter see; and it

is especially noteworthy that notwithstanding the high reverence which

the Israelites had for their patriarchs and for the prophets of God,

still they were very far from regarding them as moral ideals. It is

true, there are mentioned pious and just men, such as Enoch and Noah;

and the faithfulness of Abraham shines forth typically even into the

New Covenant; but they are never presented as real holy types of

morality, (not even in Gen. xxvi, 4, 5; 2 Chron. vii, 17; Mal. ii, 15);

on the contrary, the historical records relate, even of the most

revered characters, manifold sins, and sins which the Israelites

unquestionably regarded as such; thus, for example, of Abraham [Gen.

xii, 11 sqq.; xx, 2 sqq.], and of Jacob [xxvii, 14 sqq.; xxxi, 20], and

of Reuben, of Simeon and Levi [xxxiv, 14 sqq.; xxxv, 22; xlix, 14

sqq.]; and of the other sons of Jacob [xxxvii]; and of Judah, the

ancestor of the kings, there is recorded scarcely any thing but evil;

he even begets Pharez--from whom David, and hence also the Messiah,

were to descend--in unconscious incest and conscious whoredom

[xxxviii]; Moses slays the Egyptian and buries him secretly, and this

was also certainly regarded as a crime [Exod. ii, 11 sqq.]; he resists

faint-heartedly the divine call, [Exod. iii and iv] and subsequently

wavers in his faith, and is, for that reason, shut out from the Land of

Promise [Num. xx, 7 sqq.; Deut. xxxii, 49 sqq.]; and that which is said

to him holds good in another sense of all the saints of the Old

Covenant, namely: "thou shalt see the land before thee, but thou shalt

not enter into it;" and however pre-eminent David and Solomon are in

courageous faith and in wisdom, still they were- not pure examples even

for the Israelites; the Israelites knew of only one Servant of God who

was perfect and pure and holy, namely, the longed-for Anointed of the

Lord. And accordingly the saints of the Old Covenant kept themselves

far from all self-glorification, and aspired to a higher goal. The

undevout self-righteousness and work-holiness of the later Pharisaism

is totally repugnant to the spirit of the Old Covenant; for the law

requires most certainly not merely the outward work, but above all and

essentially also a morally-pious disposition,--bears, in

contradistinction to the later Jewish outward legality, a very positive

character of inwardliness. The basis and essence of all morality are

the requirement, that man "should love God with all his heart, with all

his soul, and with all his might" [Deut. vi, 5; x, 12; xiii, 3]; he is

to take the divine law to his heart, and to observe it with his whole

heart and his whole soul [Deut. v, 29; vi, 6; xi, 13; 18 sqq.; xxvi,

16; xxx, 2; Josh. xxii, 5]; God desires not merely the external works,

he requires our heart [1 Chron. xxii, 19; Prov. xxiii, 26]; the saint

not only fulfills the law, but "his delight is in the law of the Lord"

[Psa. i, 2; cxii, 1; cxix, 24, 35, 70; Job xxii, 22, 26; Deut. xxviii,

47]; and all obedience is simply joyous thankfulness for God's gracious

guidance [Exod. xx, 2 sqq.; Deut. iv and v; vi, 20 sqq.; viii, 3 sqq.;

x, 19 sqq.; xi, 1; xv, 15; xvi, 12; 1 Chron. xxix, 9 and others]; and

therefore not merely the sinful act, but equally also the lust to evil,

is sinful and damnable [Exod. xx, 17; Prov. vi, 25].

Old Testament morality has essentially a preparatory character,--refers

forward to a higher and as yet to be acquired morality; hence it bears

in part a symbolical form,--expressing by external signs, that, the

full realization of which, was possible only after the time of the

accomplishment of redemption, and thereby constantly keeping before the

eyes of the people what the ultimate moral purpose of the divine

economy with Israel was,--although this purpose could not as yet be

fully realized. In order to keep constantly awake and to intensify the

moral consciousness of the antagonism of the divine will to the sinful

nature which had now become natural to actual man, the antagonism of

the "clean" and the "unclean" is rigorously insisted upon and carried

out, and that too not merely in the sphere of the purely spiritual and

moral, but also in that of nature, where the moral is only symbolically

prefigured. Man is required to learn, in free obedience, to distinguish

and choose between the godly and the ungodly, and that too not

according to his natural impulses and feelings, nor by the merely

reflective observation and examination of things, but solely by the

minutely-particularizing positive divine law. To man, as not yet

actually redeemed and sanctified, but as yet involved and entangled in

the bonds of sinfulness, the law presents itself, and properly so, as

of an objectively-revealed character, as foreign to his natural state,

and to which there is nothing correspondent in his inner nature unless

it be a loving willingness to unconditional obedience. Educative

disciplining to obedience is the essential end of many of the positive

laws, which must consequently appear to the truly emancipated and

redeemed as a. yoke, whereas, for him who is only as yet struggling

toward freedom, they are a wholesome discipline.

Old Testament morality presents a moral task not only to the individual

person, but it also keeps in view, from the very start, the necessity

of moral communion. It conceives of the moral significance of the.

family more highly than any of the heathen systems; in giving to

reverence for parents a religious ground, it guarantees at the same

time the moral rights of children as against sinful parents; and if it

is not as yet able to raise marriage to the height of the Christian

view, inasmuch as only the truly spiritually-regenerated are in a

condition to appreciate and fulfill its full significance [Matt. v, 31;

xix, 8], nevertheless it does give to it the truly religious and moral

basis. It changes the slavery of Israelites into a very mild

service-relation, and protects, by extremely humane regulations, that

of non-Israelites from arbitrary and severe oppressiveness. The

differences among mankind are no longer natural, but spiritually-moral;

even foreign slaves have part in the worship and in the blessings of

the people of God. The moral organization of society into the state is

presented in the Old Testament, from the very start, in its highest

moral significancy, as a unity of church and state--as a theocracy--in

which the entire moral community-life of the people rests on a

religious basis,--in which Jehovah alone is king, and the God-called

and enlightened prophets the organs of his will,--organs to whom the

people submit themselves in believingly joyous obedience. But here

also, as well as in the case of marriage, God gives simply the

unambiguous idea, and, because of the hardness of the hearts, concedes

another state-organization more correspondent to the sinful

circumstances of the people, namely, the purely human institution of an

earthly monarchy,--reserving the full realization of the higher idea,

for the future. But even this earthly kingdom is to be an image of the

divine kingdom, and the kings, the faithful instruments of the holy

will of God-kings "after God's own heart;" the Old Testament recognizes

neither despotic nor democratic caprice-domination as morally

admissible. Of all this we must speak again further on.

As Old Testament redemption-history presents essentially an educative

preparation for the historical accomplishing of the redemption-act,

hence it is clearly manifest that this preparation must be a

historically-progressive one, and that consequently Old Testament

ethics itself must have an historical development. This, as yet, very

unsatisfactorily-treated portion of Biblical theology cannot, however,

be fully presented in the brief space to which the plan of our

historical Introduction confines us; we therefore remark here only two

points, (1), that the essential character of the moral view (and the

question is here simply as to essential features) is contradictory to

the heathen view, and different from the Christian, and, throughout all

the writings of the Old Testament, self-consistent and the same: and,

(2), that the prophetic redemption-history is closely connected with

the legislative, seeing that Moses himself was the greatest among the

prophets. The prophets, in the narrower sense of the word, do not give

an essentially new moral revelation, but, on the contrary, uniformly

proceed on the basis of that of Moses,--referring, on the one hand,

exhortingly to its requirements, and rebuking the unfaithfulness of the

people to its spirit, but, on the other, directing attention with

constantly greater distinctness to the goal of this moral

development-process of the people of Israel, that is, to their world

historical destination,--and, above all, they seek to ward against the

danger of legal holiness and self-sufficiency, the danger of the

selfish contentment of the single moral subject with his own individual

development,--which lies in every strictly-developed system of

laws,--that is, against the danger of a merely external performing of

the works of the law, as was at a later period actually presented in

Pharisaism; they earnestly urged to the inner purity of the heart, and

bring to an increasingly clearer consciousness the morality that

transcends that of the mere individual, namely, the general moral task

of the totality, of the people of God. While the earlier ethics has

more the character of a doctrine of laws and duties, the ethics of the

prophets bears rather that of a doctrine of goods.--The Proverbs of

Solomon, in contrast to the Mosaic Laws which present themselves as

direct revelations from God, consist predominantly in rules of

practical life-wisdom and life-prudence, drawn from the rich

life-experience of a heart pious, though indeed often erring, and

strengthened and ripened in the true fear of God; they appeal therefore

less to a believing submission to an express divine command than rather

to the free spontaneous assent, natural to a pious God-consciousness;

they aim not at the disciplining of a, as yet, morally immature spirit

by a legal yoke, but at the purifying, ripening and moral strengthening

of the spirit as already consciously dwelling in God; they are not the

sternly demanding voice of a prophet, but the witness of a preacher; it

is not directly Jehovah, but it is the pious servant of God, who speaks

to the pious, In Moses the question is every-where as to obedience;

with Solomon the constant theme is wisdom, a quality which is scarcely

mentioned by Moses, and for the simple reason that the discipline of

the law needed to precede and prepare the way, before the free

subjectivity of wisdom could come to realization. This coming into the

fore-ground of the thought of wisdom evinces the progress of the moral

consciousness out of the child-like condition of subjection to an

objective law, to the riper manhood of a freer self-determination on

the basis of personal moral knowledge. Wisdom is here by no means mere

worldly prudence, but its beginning and essence is the "fear of the

Lord" [Prov. i, 7], and complete, hearty, God-confiding is its

life-spring [iii, 5; xvi], and soul-repose and God's approbation its

fruit [iii, 12, 18, 22 sqq.; viii, 17, 35; xv, 24; xxviii]; and hence

for individual man it is the highest good [iii, 13 sqq]. This wisdom is

very far removed from the "magnanimous" wisdom of the Greeks; it takes

cognizance above all things of the sinfulness of the natural heart, and

requires watchfulness over the same [iv, 23] and humility before God

and man [iii, 34; xi, 2; xvi, 18; xviii, 12; xxvii, 2; xxix, 23]. While

in the Solomonic Proverbs there is a manifest elevating of Mosaic

legality toward the personal freedom of the pious sage, still it is not

to be overlooked that there lies in the stand-point they assume, as in

contrast to the Mosaic, also the danger that the subjective presumption

of the individual person may rise to an unwarranted height, and work

detriment to the true heart-humility that springs from a consciousness

of one's own want of conformity to the law. And it is not unworthy of

note that the Christian consciousness of the Apostles found much less

occasion to appeal to the wisdom of man; they discourse far preferably

of self-denying, humbly loving faith.--The Ecclesiastes of Solomon,

after referring to the comfortless experience of a heart temporarily

immersed in world-enjoyment, totally overthrows all world-pleasure and

the vain hope of finding in the finite any real good; the mere negative

knowledge that "all is vanity" prepares the way for a seeking after the

true, the highest good, which, however, is but remotely suggested

[Eccles. xii, 7, 13] but not fully presented; the skepticism, at first

sight so seemingly wide-reaching and so entirely despairing of

satisfaction, has a back-ground of very profound educative wisdom.

In the fact that the moral is not derived from the natural conscience

of man, seeing that the conscience is no longer the pure expression of

the original God-consciousness, but that, on the contrary, the

historically-revealed will of God is the exclusive source of the moral

command, there lies an essential reason why Hebrew ethics did not

develop itself into a philosophy; the very thought of such a philosophy

conflicts with the fundamental presuppositions of the Old Testament

consciousness. The time had not yet come when the conscience, and human

knowledge in general, had so far become free as to derive truth also

from within themselves. As yet man was called simply believingly to

obey, but not freely and philosophically to create.

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[98] In addition to general works on Old Testament theology, which

treat mostly of the ethical phase only incidentally, and to the works

mentioned in � 5, may be cited, G. L. Bauer: Bibl. Moral des A. T.,

1803, 2 vols.,--extremely Rationalistic; (Imm. Berger: Prakt. Einl. ins

A. T., continued by Augusti, 1799-1808, 4 vols.)

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SECTION XXVIII.

The Old Testament Apocryphal Books, [99] abandoned by the fire of the

prophetic spirit, and in part affected by foreign philosophical

influences, treat predominantly of morality. The moral law,--in the Old

Testament canon an essential element of the educative divine revelation

as a whole,--is here considered rather in itself and as unconnected

with the world-historical goal of the Theocracy, and is thereby

degraded into a merely individual, empirically-grounded moral

system.--In the Talmud the law appears as entirely unspiritualized,--as

fallen into complete lifeless externality, dissolved into its ultimate

atoms.

The moral thoughts of the Apocrypha give clear evidence of some degree

of obscuration of the consciousness of redemption-history, both in

respect to its presupposition, namely, the fall and its consequences,

and in regard to its true nature in the Ancient Covenant, and also in

regard to its historical goal--the expected redemption-act by Christ.

With the obscuration of this thought go naturally enough hand in hand a

manifest coming into the fore-ground of a certain holiness by works, in

the manner of the heathen moralists [comp. Sirach iii, 16, 17 (14, 15),

33 (30); xxix, 15-17 (12, 13); xvii, 18 (22) sqq.], a one-sided

laudation of wisdom and righteousness in obliviousness of the question

whether indeed there are any such wise and righteous persons to be

found, and also in many respects a proud self-satisfaction with one's

own wisdom and virtue, together with a censorious and contemptuous

looking-down upon the unwise and unrighteous many,--a certain

coldly-rational self-complacent tone, especially in Sirach,--a

suspicious complaining and an almost bigoted abstaining from true

love-communion with others [comp. Sirach xi, 30 (29) sqq.; xii; xiii;

xxv, 10 (7); xxx, 6; xxxiii, 25; sqq.],--a zealous cautioning against

the wickedness and falseness of others instead of a warning against the

wickedness and deceptiveness of one's own heart; and there is

frequently a manifest lack of the proper humility of the truly

self-understanding conscience; and the obtaining of personal happiness

is often presented too one-sidedly as a direct motive to virtue, so

that the ethical view is sometimes tinged with a shallow utilitarianism

[comp. Sirach xiv, 14 sqq.].--The book of Wisdom, showing traces of

Alexandrino-Piatonic influences, and accordingly containing the four

Greek virtues [viii, 7]. does not keep far clear of work-holy boasting

[ e. g. vii and viii]; and though it admits the sinful corruption and

weakness of all men [ix; xii, 10 sqq.; xiii, 1 sqq.; ii, 24], it yet

brings them into a false connection with theories from other sources

[viii, 19, 20; ix, 15; e. g., pre-existence of the soul, and dualistic

relation of the body as an essential trammeling of the soul]. The book

of Sirach gives expression both to a deep piety and to a rich practical

life-experience, and though in the eyes of Rationalism it is the most

valuable book of the Old Testament, it is still very far superior to

modern Rationalistic shallowness [comp. xxv, 32 (24); xl, 15, 16; xli,

8 (5), sqq.; viii, 6 (5)]; it manifests, however, on the other hand,

also a want of depth in its view of sinfulness and of the need of

redemption [comp. xv, 15-17; xxxii, 27 (Septuagint, xxxv, 23); xxxvii,

17 (13); li, 18 (13) sqq.], and often places the outward ungenerous

prudence-rules of a distrustful understanding in the stead of higher

moral ideas [e. g. viii, 1 sqq.; xlii, 6, 7], and, as differing from

the book of Wisdom, alludes to no supernatural goal of morality in a

transmundane life; it may indeed teach the spiritually regenerated much

moral life-wisdom and prudent rational foresight, but it cannot bring

the natural man to self-acquaintance and humility. From the stand-point

of Christian ethics, this book is very far remote; the essence of love

is unknown to it. The book of Judith presents in narrative form a

highly questionable morality [ix, 2 sqq.; comp. Gen. xxxiv; xlix, 5-7].

As in Sirach the vigorously-growing tree of Old Testament ethics begins

to show signs of failing vitality, so in the Talmud (A. D. 200-600) we

find the dead and decayed or petrified trunk. [100] Abandoned by the

spirit of faith and hope, the Jews, in their faithlessness to their

Redeemer, lost also the spirit of love; and human ingenuity changed the

law which was readily enough borne by hoping faith, into an unspiritual

yoke utterly subversive of moral fieedom. The strictly objective

character of the Old Testament law, so necessary for disciplinary

purposes, had -its vital complement in an expectant faith. This latter

ele1m.ent becomes in the Talmud deceptive and wavering, and gives place

almost entirely to the doctrine of the law; and the lifeless, idealess

law, multiplied thousandfoldly by the ingenuity of human exegesis and

inference, takes even the most insignificant and external actions into

a dictatorially-regulative tutelage. Man acts no longer as prompted by

his inner consciousness, for his inner life-source is dried up, but

according to the outward law as multiplying its branches through all

the channels of human life.--The Talmud contains, besides its more

spiritual elements, which are mostly taken from the Old Testament, a

system of casuistry unparalleled for its trivial and childish entering

into minutiae, such as was possible in fact only on just such a soil,

namely, matured Pharisaism. For the Jew, the authority of the Scribes

takes the place of the moral conscience; to him who honestly holds fast

to the law, the multiplicity of precepts becomes a yoke subversive of

true morality, while to those who are less sincere the manifold

contradictions in the same give pretext for a disingenuous relaxation

of duty.

Observation. Islamism,--which finds its place in the history of the

religious and moral spirit not as a vital organic member, but as

violently interrupting the course of this history, and which is to be

regarded as an attempt of heathenism to maintain itself erect, under an

outward monotheistic form, against Christianity, and to arm the entire

unbroken essence of the natural man against the spirit of an inner

new-birth,--has indeed given rise to a peculiar ethical system, though

one which has so little of depth peculiar to itself, that we need here

only allude to it in passing. [101] The ethics of Islam bears the

character of an outwardly and crudely conceived doctrine of

righteousness; conscientiousness in the sphere of the social relations,

faithfulness to conviction and to one's word, and the bringing of all

action into relation to God, are its bright points; but there is a lack

of heart-depth, of a basing of the moral in love. The highest good is

the very outwardly and very sensuously conceived happiness of the

individual. The potency of sin is not recognized; evil is only an

individual, not an historical power; hence there is no need of

redemption, but only of personal works on the basis of prophetic

instruction; Mohammed is only a teacher, not an atoner. God and man

remain strictly external to, and separate from, each other; God--no

less individually conceived of than man--comes into no real communion

with man; and man, as moral, acts not as influenced by such a

communion, but only as an isolated individual. The ideal basis of the

moral is faith in God and in his Prophet; the moral life, conceived as

mainly consisting in external works, is not a fruit of received

salvation, but a means for the attainment of the same; pious works, and

particularly prayer, fasting and almsgiving, and pilgrimaging to Mecca,

work salvation directly of themselves. Man has nothing to receive from

God but the Word, and nothing to do for God but good works; of inner

sanctification there is no thought; the essential point is simply to

let the per se good nature of man manifest itself in works; there is no

inner struggle in order to attain to the true life, no

penitence-struggle against inner sinfulness; and instead of true

humility we find only proud work-righteousness. To the natural

propensions of man there is consequently but little refused,--nothing

but the enjoyment of wine, of swine-flesh, of blood, of strangled

animals, and of games of chance, and this, too, for insufficient

(assigned) reasons. The merely individual character of the morality

manifests itself especially in the low conception that is formed of

marriage, in which polygamy is expressly conceded, woman degraded to a

very low position, and the dissolution of the marriage bond placed in

the unlimited discretion of the man; there hence results a very

superficial view of the family in general; the moral community-life is

conceived of throughout in a very crude manner. Unquestionably this

form of ethics is not an advancing on the part of humanity, but a

guilty retrograding from that which had already been attained.

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[99] Comp. St�udlin: Gesch. der Sittenl. Jesu, i, 358; Cramer: Moral

der Apokr., 1814; (also in Keil and Tzschirner's Analekten, 1814, ii,

1, 2,); R�biger: Ethica libe apocr., 1838; Keerl: Die Apokr. d. A. T.,

1852, somewhat unfair; comp. Hengstenberg: F�r Beibehaltung der Apokr.

[100] Mishna translated by Rabe, 1760, 6 vols.--Talmud Babli, the

Babylonian Talmud, by Pinner, 1842.--Schulchan Aruch by L�we, 1836, 4

vols.--Fassel: Die mosaisch-rabbin. Tugend-u. Pflichtenl., 2 ed., 1842.

[101] Imm. Berger: Ueber die Moral des Koran in St�udlin's Beitr�ge zur

Phil., v, 250, (1799), superficial.--Weil: Mohammed, 1843.--Sprenger:

Leben u. Lehre des Moh., 1862.

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C.--CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

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SECTION XXIX.

In Christianity alone morality and ethics are enabled to reach their

perfection,--the former being perfected in the person of Christ

himself, the latter being in process of self-perfection in the

progressive intellectual activity of the church.--The subjective and

the objective grounds of morality are given, in Christianity, in full

sufficiency. On the one hand, the moral subject has attained to a fill

consciousness of sin, of its general sway, of its historical

significancy, and of its guilt; on the other, he has, by redemption,

become free from his bondage under sin. and risen again to moral

freedom,--has again attained to the possibility of accomplishing his

moral task. On the one hand, the objective ground of the moral--God--is

now for the first, perfectly, personally and historically revealed to

man, and God's will not merely manifested in unclouded clearness in his

Word and through the historical appearance of the Redeemer himself, but

also, by the holy, divine Spirit as imparted to the redeemed, written

into their hearts; on the other, this God stands no longer in violent

antithesis to the sin-estranged creature, but is in Christ reconciled

with him, and, as a graciously loving Father, is present to him and in

constant sanctifying and strengthening life-communion with him.

The goal of morality has become an other,--has risen from the state of

hope to a constantly-growing reality. God-sonship is not placed simply

at the remote termination of the moral career, but is from the very

beginning already present; the Christian strives not merely in moral

aspiration toward it, but lives and acts in it and as inspired by it;

he cannot possibly live or act morally if he is not already God's

child; he has his goal already from the very beginning as a blessed

reality, and his further goal is in fact simply fidelity in this

God-sonship,--a sinking deeper into it, a strengthening and purifying

of it by a constantly greater triumphing over the sinfiul nature which

yet clings to the Christian, namely, the "flesh" which lusts against

the spirit; and for collective humanity the moral goal is and has been

realizing itself from the beginning in ever increasing fullness,

namely, in the fact that all nation-separating barriers progressively

fall away, and that the Word of life increasingly assumes form in the

God-fearing of all nationalities,--constituting the kingdom of God in

its gradual rising to full historical reality in a universal Christian

church.

The essence of morality has risen from the stage of the obedience of a

faithful servant to that of the loving, confiding freedom of the

children of God. Man has the command no longer as a merely outward,

purely objective one, uncongenial to his subjective nature, but as an

inward one dwelling within him, and as become his personal possession,

and hence as no longer a yoke, a burden, but as an inner power at one

with his personality itself. Man lives and acts no longer as a mere

individual subject, but he lives and acts in full life-communion with

the Redeemer, and through him with God,--by virtue, on the one hand, of

the love of faith, and, on the other, of the gift of the Spirit: I

live, and yet not I, but Christ lives in me. Tile moral idea is not a

mere revealed Word, it is the Son of God as become man, the personal

Redeeter himself, not merely in his truth-unvailing doctrine, not

merely in his truth-revealing Spirit, but pre-eminently in his person

itself, both as the historical, pure example of all holiness, as also

as the One who is with us always even to the end of the world.--Love to

that God who is manifested in redemption as himself the highest love,

is the motive of the moral life--its essence and its power; it is a

life of holy communion in every respect,--a life in and with God, a

life with the children of God and in the communion of the

redeemed.--The morality of hope has passed over into a morality of the

joyous victory-consciousness,--is rather an actual manifestation of the

already-attained, grace-awarded highest good, than a mere longing,

aspiring after it. The ideal goal of morality is not in the least of a

doubtful character, but is absolutely assured. While the fundamental

feeling of the heathen virtue-sage is that of a proud

self-consciousness of personal merit, the fundamental feeling of the

Christian is the feeling of grace-accepting, thankful, loving humility;

while the fundamental virtue of the Greeks is self-acquired wisdom,

that of Christian morality is child-like faith in God's loving

revelation both in Word and in historical act.

There is no need here of detailed developments or proofs; we desire

simply to present the ground-character of Christian ethics as in

contrast to heathen ethics. This much is clear from what we have

already said, that morality must assume here an entirely other form

than in heathendom, and even in many respects a different one from that

in the Old Testament. No heathen ethical system looks to the formation

of aI kingdom of God embracing all mankind; the freedom of the will is

either denied or restricted to a very few favored ones, and with these

it is regarded as unaffected by the historical power of sin; heathenism

knows nothing of personal love to God as a moral motive, and of the

personal love of God to all men as its antecedent condition.

Christianity takes it just as earnestly with the reality, the power and

the guilt of sin, as with the real, historical, overcoming of the same

through Christ. Man, as not from nature free, but as become free by

historical redemption-act and by the personal appropriation of the

same, is the true subject, capable of all true morality; and hence the

realization of this morality depends no longer on a mere

nature-conditionment, but solely on man's free self-determination for

or against his redemption. That which is presumptuously presupposed by

the Greek philosophers as already possessed by the elect few who are

capable of true morality, namely, true will-freedom and a personal

moral consciousness springing from the inner essence of the soul, all

this has attained to its full truth only. in Christianity, namely, in

that the false security of a merely natural freedom and power is

overcome and remedied. Both freedom and power are procured for all who

wish them, and that not by self-deception, but by a real moral

redemption-act of the alone holy One.

That the highest good is not a something to be attained to exclusively

by moral action, but, on the contrary, in its essence a power

graciously conferred on the willing heart, a power which has true

morality simply as its fruit and subjective perfection, and which

manifests this morality essentially as faithfulness, as a preserving

and virtualizing of the received grace,--this is a thought utterly

foreign to all heathendom, and which is placed, even in the Old

Testament, only in the promised future; and upon this thought, as upon

the consciousness of personal guilt and divine grace, rests the so

distinctively Christian virtue of humility, as that of a pardoned

sinner. There is scarcely anywhere to be found so violent an ethical

antithesis as that between the high-esteemed virtue of magnanimity in

Aristotle (which corresponds to the pride of the Pharisee in the

parable of Christ,) and the Christian humility of that Publican who

ventures no other prayer than this: "God be merciful to me a sinner."

Such magnanimity appears to the Christian as mere self-blinding pride,

while this humility appears to the Greek as servile-mindedness.

Heathen ethics is always simply of a purely individual character, or,

if it relates to a moral community-life, then only of a merely civil

character, as consisting in obedience to laws purely human, and valid

only for a particular people; or where, as in China, the state is

regarded as of divine origin and essence, there individual morality

becomes essentially a mere mechanical self-conforming to an eternally

on-revolving unspiritual world-order; Christian morality is, on the

contrary, never of a merely individual character, but absolutely and

always an expression of moral communion--on the one hand, with the

personal Saviour and God, and, on the other, with the Christian

society; its essential nature is therefore love in the fullest sense.

of the word, and it is never of a merely civil character but belongs to

a purely moral community-life,--a life that rests in no respect on

nature-limits or on unfreedom,--namely, that of the Church as the

historical kingdom of God.-- In contradistinction to worldward-turned

heathenism, Christians make the foundation and essence of all moral

life to consist in the constant direction of the heart to God; and

especially in prayer--(which, as exalted by the communion of devotion,

becomes the principal phase of the entire religious life, and

conditions and preserves a direct personal life-communion with

God)--the entire moral life shapes itself into an expression of the

religious consciousness as certain of its reconciliation with God. The

Christian stands not alone in his moral life, nor is he merely a member

of a moral society, but he stands in constant vital personal

life-communion with God, and derives therefrom constantly new moral

power. And precisely because Christian morality is not of a merely

individual character, but is rooted in and grows out of the holiest of

communions, is it truly free; the law stands no longer simply over

against man, so that his relation to it becomes one of mere service,

but, as in contrast to the self-sufficiency of the heathen mind (which

finds in the natural man the pure fountain of the moral consciousness),

it has become a perfectly inward personal law, one that constantly

generates itself anew out of the sanctified heart of the spiritually

regenerated.

But prayer, wherein man enters into communion with God, is, as also the

example of the ancient church shows, essentially intercession,--implies

moral communion. The development of morality into a collective life of

the moral society,--into a collective morality,--is an essentially new

phenomenon. Heathendom knew indeed the indefinite and merely

impersonal, abstract power of national custom, as well as the very

definite but unfree-working power of the civil law and of political

rulers, but it knew nothing of a free moral power of the truly moral

community. The Christian community itself is the clearly duty-conscious

upholder, promoter and conservator of the morality of the individuals;

it has the duty of the moral overseeing, furthering and guiding of all

its members, and hence also of moral discipline, and, as involved in

this, also the power of inflicting moral discipline upon the

unfaithful,--consisting essentially in the withdrawing of communion

with them, in the excluding of them from the moral whole as being

non-tolerant of any immoral element. The community-life is of so purely

moral, so intensely unitary, a character, that the unfaithfulness of a

single member thrills through the moral whole, and, because of the

intimate love of the whole for all the individuals, is painfully felt

and reproved and rejected by the society. The totality stands surety

for the morality of the individual, and the individual for that of

totality; the moral life of the spiritual organism has attained to its

truth. The thought of church-discipline,--which raises morality-above

the sphere of mere individuality, without, however, giving to the

community-life the power of outward coercion, such as that of the

state, but on the contrary preserves and gives effect to this life as a

purely spiritual power,--is an essentially Christian thought, and is

only there practical where the moral idea and its realization in the

community-life are taken really in earnest.

In the emancipation of the human spirit by redemption, in the taking up

of the moral idea into the inner heart of the consciousness, there lie,

now, the possibility of, and the incentive to, a scientific development

of the moral consciousness. Heathendom developed an ethical science

only on the basis of a presumed freedom and autonomy of the spirit of

the natural man; the Old Testament religion developed none at all,

because in it the divine law was as yet an absolutely objective and

merely passively-given one, to which man could stand only in an obeying

relation. But Christianity regains for the human spirit its true

freedom,--makes the merely objective law into an also perfectly

subjective one, into one that lives in the heart of the regenerated as

his real property, one that enlightens the reason and becomes thereby

truly rational; and hence there is here given the possibility of

shaping this pure moral subject-matter as embraced in the divinely

enlightened conscience, into free scientific self-development. But

Christian ethics, naturally enough, developed itself as a science only

after its presuppositions, namely, the dogmatical questions in regard

to God, to Christ and to man had attained to some degree of ripeness in

the dogmatic consciousness of the church, and hence it appears for a

long while predominantly only in closest involution with dogmatics, and

in popular ecclesiastical instruction in the form of rules and

exhortations, and in part also in ecclesiastically-defined

life-regulations enforced by ecclesiastical discipline. The notion that

the ancient church could and should have passed over the great dogmatic

questions and devoted itself primarily and predominantly, or in fact

exclusively, to the development of a system of morals as the essence

proper of Christianity, is very erroneous. If we once perceive and

admit that the Christian world-theory in general, in respect to God, to

the creature, and especially to the nature of man, is of a character

diametrically opposed to the heathen view, and if we admit that

morality cannot be of an unconscious and merely instinctive character,

but must rest on a rational consciousness, then it is perfectly clear

that the consciousness must first be scientifically informed in regard

to the reality of existence, before that the consciousness of that

which, in virtue of the character of this reality, becomes moral duty,

can be further developed The religious consciousness of the moral was

indeed given in high perfection in the first form of Christianity, but

the scientific development of the moral could realize itself only very

gradually and subsequently to the development of dogmatics.

The three natural chief epochs of church history constitute also those

of the history of Christian ethics.

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I. THE ANCIENT CHURCH UP TO THE SEVENTH CENTURY.

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SECTION XXX.

Morality, as never separated from piety, and as uniformly based on

loving faith in the Redeemer, and as upheld, fostered and watched over

by the church-communion, appears in its inner phase as essentially love

to God, and to Christ and to his disciples as brethren, and in its

outer phase as a strict rejection of heathen customs, which latter

feature, both in consequence of the persecutions suffered and because

of the deep corruption of the extra-Christian world, assumes the form

not unfrequently of a painfully-anxious self-seclusion from the same;

and when, with the victory of Christianity over heathenism, from the

time of Constantine on, worldliness pressed into the church itself,

then, as a natural counterpoise against this worldliness,

world-renunciation was made to apply, among the more pious-minded

Christians, even to the sensuously-worldly phase of the Christian life,

and was intensified, in the hermit-life, even to morbidness; and in

consequence of the distinction which gradually sprang up in the church

itself out of this antithesis in the Christian life, namely, between

the moral commands, on the one hand, and the evangelical counsels on

the other (which latter were thought to condition a superior degree of

holiness), the moral consciousness was essentially beclouded.

The moral views of the early Church are at once distinguishable from

those of later Judaism by their profound grasping into the pious heart

as the living fountain of a true and free morality, and from those of

heathenism by the purity and rigor of the fundamental principles

involved; and the unavoidable militant resistance against the

demoralized heathen world naturally enough heightened this rigor to a

degree which, but for this, seems no longer required. The essential

difference of the Christian moral law from that of the Old Testament is

fully recognized as early as from the time of Barnabas (Ep. c. 19). The

rigorous element shows itself especially in respect to all sensuous

pleasure and all worldly diversion, to marriage, to temporal

possessions, and to political power, and to whatever is in any manner

implicated with heathenism. In contrast to heathen laxity, the ancient

Christians were all the more anxiously watchful against all dominion of

sensuous desire, esteeming fasting very highly, though not as a

commanded duty, and eschewing the demoralizing and religion-periling

influence of the heathen stage and of other amusements; and the

severity of their sufferings under the hatred of the world naturally

enough made all worldly pleasure appear as in diametrical antagonism to

Christian-mindedness. In a well-grounded persuasion of the dangers

involved, the Christians declined to accept official positions in the

heathen State. Chasteness even in thought was rigorously insisted upon;

marriage was held more sacred than had ever been done before, and the

sensuous element of the same was guarded within strict limits; and in

view of the troubles of the times, and of the expectation of a near

second-coming of Christ (which pretty generally prevailed in the first

two centuries), very many inclined to a preference of celibacy,

without, however, regarding it as a specially-meritorious course of

conduct; second marriages, however, were generally viewed as an

infidelity to the first consort. Riches were mostly looked on as of

questionable desirableness; the taking of interest was regarded (in.

harmony with the Old Testament view) as not permissible; beneficence

and generosity to the brethren on a wide-reaching scale, was held as

one of the most essential virtues; fidelity to truth, especially in

confessing the faith, even in the face of threatening death, was a

sacred duty, and its faithful fulfillment was the Christian's brightest

testimony before his heathen persecutors. The oath was generally

regarded as not allowable. Tender love toward each other, and a noble

love of enemies, were the Christian's honor. The moral and

warmly-fraternal community-life of the believers was a matter of

astonishment even to the passionate enemies of Christianity. Slavery

was at once essentially done away with by being transformed into a

fraternally-affectionate service-relation; and when the State and laws

became Christian, it was also greatly mitigated legally.

Notwithstanding the rigor of the moral view of the Christians, it

nevertheless differs essentially from that of the Stoics, because of

its fundamental character of joyous faith and love; it is in no respect

a harsh, stiff or dismal, but, on the contrary, a thoroughly vigorous,

youthful and joyous self-sacrificing life, in the full enjoyment of

inner peace and of a conscious blessedness. These features were

measurably lost only when the Christian Church itself ceased to be the

pure moral antithesis of the un-Christian world, and when, having

become a State-Church, it admitted into itself even worldly, and in so

far, also, heathen elements. And it was now an essentially correct

consciousness which inspired the more pious of the believers with a

disinclination to the life and pursuits of the great mass of

Christians, and drove them into separating themselves from them. The

error, however, was this, that instead of separating the unpious from

the Church itself, they chose the separation, within the Church, of the

pious from communion with the mass of the Church, and thereby rendered

the exclusion of the immoral from the Church more impracticable than

ever,--in other words, that, instead of morally purifying the natural

elements that inhered both in themselves and in the society, they

despisingly withdrew the spiritual from all contact with the natural.

The first theoretical as well as practical separation of the ascetes

(as imitated from the distinction, prevalent in the heathen world,

between philosophers and the unphilosophical multitude, and as

extending even to their costume), who thought by extreme

world-renunciation to attain to an especially high moral perfection,

and, as consequent thereon, also the distinguishing of a general

Christian morality from a higher (and in some sense voluntary) ascetic

morality, manifests itself in the third century in the currents of

Alexandrian thought which had been so largely influenced by heathen

philosophy,--as yet but feebly in Clemens Alexandrinus, [102] but

already very damagingly in Origen. [103] The victory of Christianity

over the heathen state in the fourth century, and the in-rushing both

of the great and also of the populace into the Church, occasioned, on

the one hand, a progressively growing relaxation of ecclesiastical

discipline and a darkening of the moral consciousness in the great

masses, and, on the other, in natural antithesis thereto, an

increasingly radical exalting of the monastic life, in which the

Christian conscience of the multitude found, as it were, an atoning

complementing of their own imperfect secularized life. The ordinary

requirements made upon the life of the ordinary Christian became less

deep-reaching; but all the more rigorous were those made upon the

ascetic life--wherein Christian morality was now thought to exist in

its highest perfection. The distinguishing of mere ordinary moral duty,

as the inferior, from moral perfection, became increasingly more

familiar to the general Christian consciousness. The two true elements

of Christian morality, namely, the turning away from the sinful world,

and the aggressive living and working in and for the same, fell apart

into two different channels, which respectively served, for the sum

total of moral merit, as complements to each other; the superabundant

merit of the sanctity of the ascetes fell to the good of the

little-meriting world-Christians. In the sphere of morality a division

of labor, so to speak, took place, and, in consequence thereof, there

was subsequently developed in the sphere of moral merits a system of

labor and traffic so artfully organized that it required all the boldly

initiatory vigor of the Reformation to bring again to the light of day

the plain fundamental principles of evangelical morality. To the

present period of the history of Christian ethics belong, however, only

the feebler beginnings of this corruption.

The development of monasticism introduced a dualism into Christian

morality, in that it proposed for the ascetes a morality essentially

different from that of the rest of the Christian world, the latter

being based upon the divine command, and the former upon pretended

divine counsels; with this error were more or less affected Lactantius,

Ambrose, Chrysostom, Jerome, and Augustine. In consequence of this,

general Christian morality was degraded to a mere minimum; the truly

good was made to be different from the divine command, and this good

was considered no longer as the imperative will of God, but only, as it

were, a divine wish, the fulfilling of which procures for man a special

extraordinary merit, but the non-fulfilling of which awakens no divine

displeasure. The more general prevalence of this view involved the

overthrow of purely evangelical ethics, and the beginning of the

perversion of the moral life of the Church in practical respects. By

far the greatest portion even of the dogmatic and ecclesiastical errors

of the Romish and Greek Churches has sprung from this very notion of a

special sanctity in monasticism,

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[102] Strom., p. 775, 825 (Potter).

[103] Comm. in Ep. ad Rom., 507 (De la Rue).

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SECTION XXXI.

Ethics itself appears not as yet in scientific form and apart from the

presentation of the subject-matter of dogmatics; it appears more in the

popular edificatory than in the scientific writings, and approaches

more nearly a scientific form in the works written in self-defense

against the heathen. The first connected and somewhat comprehensive

presentation of ethics--by Ambrose--in the manner of Cicero, is

scientifically of little value; while the brilliant, penetrative, and

ingenious moral thoughts of Augustine, (which, along with Aristotle,

formed the foundation of Mediaeval ethics), deviate sometimes in daring

originality from the earlier ecclesiastical view, and also bring some

confusion into purely evangelical ethics by an overvaluing of monkish

asceticism. After the time of Augustine, ethics is for the most part

limited to the mere collecting of the views of earlier writers, and to

popular instruction. The mystical thoughts of the pseudo-Dionysius the

Areopagite became influential only in the Middle Ages. [104]

The strict moral life of the early Christians furnished indeed in its

inner experiences weighty matter for ethics; ethics proper, however,

confined itself at first to the framing of life-rules, which, resting

on the fundamental thought of faith and love, were enforced and

supported by Scripture texts and by apostolical tradition, by the

example of Christ and of the saints of sacred history, and by spiritual

experience, and, at a later period, also by the example and authority

of the martyrs, and by the definitions [canones] of the synods, but

they were not as yet digested into a scientific whole. From the moral

philosophy of the heathen the Church Fathers kept themselves

substantially clear, though they adopted from the Platonic and Stoic,

and from the later popular philosophy of the Eclectics, many forms and

thoughts. The earlier Fathers, also Irenaeus, involved themselves in

perplexities by the fact that, basing themselves primarily on the Old

Testament writings, they often presented the moral life of the

Patriarchs too fully as a pattern for Christians, although they

recognized, throughout, the merely preparatory purpose of the Old

Testament law.

In their genuine writings the apostolical Fathers confine themselves to

simple evangelically-earnest exhortations. [105] --At a very early date

there was manifested an antithesis of such on the one hand, as with

full fidelity to the Christian faith yet used in the service of

Christianity the best results of heathen culture, and, of such on the

other, as regarded it as the primary duty of the Church to emphasize

and insist on the total contrariety of Christianity to heathenism, and,

above all things, also in the morally-practical life, to break off all

yet-existing relations with the heathen world, and to present the holy

society as, in itself, a totally new world. Both tendencies--the former

prevailing more among Greek, the latter more among Latin

Christians--were equally legitimate, but both in equal danger of

one-sidedness; the former with the aid of Greek philosophy laid rather

the foundation for a scientific construction of the moral

consciousness, the latter developed rather a rigorous, and even harsh,

legality of the moral life; Origen and Tertullian respectively, are

prominent representatives of this antithesis.

The philosophically educated Justin the Martyr gives special emphasis,

in defense of Christianity, to its high moral (and by him very

earnestly conceived) views and practical workings, and to its

difference from the merely preparatory Old Testament law; he insists

very strongly on the freedom of the will as a condition of the moral;

but he manifests already a preference for celibacy as a higher

perfection, doubtless not without being somewhat influenced thereto by

the Platonic notion of the nature of matter.--Clemens Alexandrinus

enters more direct upon the nature of the moral. In his Exhortation to

the Heathen (Logos protreptikos, cohortatio), he exposes the

defectiveness of heathen ethics, and in single characterizing strokes

contrasts with it Christian ethics, as the higher; in his Paedagogos,

designed for beginners in Christianity, he gives a more specific but at

the same time more popular presentation of the subject; but in his

Stromata: he raises the Christian faith-consciousness, and

morality-consciousness to a much higher scientific form, evidencing

truly philosophic ability. The divine Logos,--who manifests himself in

fact in all true philosophy of the heathen, but in a still higher

degree in the Old Testament, and most fully and purely in the New

Testament,--is also the pure fountain of the moral consciousness; with

the Hebrews the divine law was essentially objective; but in

Christianity it is, by virtue of the activity of the divine Logos,

written into the hearts of all believers. The highest law is love to

God, and, as based thereon, love to our neighbor; the highest goal is

likeness to, and life-communion with, God; the condition of the moral

is will-freedom, which, although hampered, yet not destroyed, by the

fall, is now restored in Christianity; the Logos, that is, Christ, is

the pattern of salvation and the leader thereto. In his very detailed

inquiries in the sphere of the moral life, Clemens shows himself both

earnest and judicious; he esteems marriage very highly, and manifests

no preference for celibacy. A visible fondness for the rational

contemplation of the divine, as in contrast to the lower sphere of mere

faith (corresponding to the prevalent Greek distinguishing between

philosophers and ordinary men), interferes somewhat, however, with his

interest in active outward life.--On the use of earthly goods, he

treats in detail in his work: Quis dives salvetur.

Origen has rich thoughts on the moral, scattered through his many

writings, but especially in his Homilies and Commentaries and in his

work against Celsus. His Scripture-exegesis is always pregnant with

thought, though often venturesomely interpreting and allegorizing,

especially in the Old Testament. Freedom of will he insists on fully as

strongly as does Clemens, with whom in other respects he essentially

harmonizes. His moral views are rigid, but not harsh; the moral

disposition alone constitutes, in his view, the worth of the deed; but

his over-estimation of the monkish life and of martyrdom, and his

doctrine that man can do more of the good and meritorious than is

commanded of him, becloud somewhat the otherwise evangelical character

of his ethics. His well-known dogmatical tendency to un-churchly

opinion shows itself less prominently in the sphere of ethics, and even

his notion of the pre-existence of souls does not essentially interfere

with his moral ideas.

In striking contrast to the freer idealistic tendency of the

Alexandrians, and in harshest Occidental realism, stands the African

theologian Tertullian. Greatly delighting in spiritual eccentricities,

and inclined to daring exaggerations of per se true thoughts, this

writer presents Christian ethics in his numerous moral writings on

special topics (especially in his De idololatria, De pudicitia, Ad

uxorem, De monogamia, De exhortatione castitatis, De spectaculis, De

oratione, etc.), in a very rigorously legal spirit, especially

insisting upon its self-denying, world-renouncing, ascetic

phase,--already far leaning toward the monkish view, and exerting a

wide-spread influence on the Occident. And this juristic-minded man,

with his strong inclination to rigorous formulae, is true to himself

also in the sphere of morality. His passing over to Montanist views

does not essentially modify his previous moral views, as they were in

fact from the first not inconsistent therewith.--While, on the one

hand, he emphasizes more strongly than the Greek Fathers the natural

corruption of all men as resulting from the fall, without, however,

doing away with moral freedom, on the other hand, he raises (though not

without having the precedent of the church in his favor) the

requirement of holiness in Christians so high that he regards as

admissible, at farthest, only a single repentance after baptism, and,

for reiterated severe sins, such as defection from the faith, adultery,

whoredom, murder, knows of no forgiveness whatever; [106] the

distinction--here appearing more strongly than ever before--between

venial and mortal sins, received subsequently a somewhat different

significancy. The greatest sin is defection from the true

faith--idolatry; [107] hence the Christian must avoid in word and deed

every thing which is connected with heathenism,--e. g., he may not

crown himself, may not visit theatrical spectacles, etc. Tertullian

insists also, and with almost painful anxiety, on attention to all

outward actions and manners,--e. g., he gives long and detailed

disquisitions on the clothing and decoration of women, whom he would

like to see attired in a natural and modest simplicity,--not without

many theoretical whims (De habitu, muliebri, De cultu foeminarum, De

velandis virginibus). Marriage he regards indeed as a divine

institution, although, in view of the expectation of a speedy second

coming of Christ, he prefers celibacy as the more perfect and pure

state; and second marriages he unconditionally forbids as a heavy

sin,--in the face of the utterances of Paul. Fasting he requires not

merely as a penance, but as a protective means of virtue, conducive to

a higher perfection, namely, in that it turns the soul away from the

earthly and toward the heavenly; and he attempts to reduce it to

definite rigorous rules (De jejunio). To accept political offices and

to wear the insigna thereof, conflicts per se with Christian humility,

seeing that because of their connection with heathen religion they are

inconsistent with Christian sincerity, as also, because of the function

of officers to execute and to torture, inconsistent with Christian

gentleness; [108] military service, the Christian must unconditionally

refuse. [109] The notion of a Christian state is utterly foreign to

Tertullian; he knows only of the heathen state. The enduring of

martyrdom may, as the highest victory of Christian virtue, by no means

be evaded by flight or otherwise; all shrinking is here unworthy

cowardice (De fuga in persecutione; Scorpiacum). Unshaken patience in

all manner of suffering in general, he describes and discusses with

great ability (De patientia).

Cyprian, a great admirer of Tertullian, but more churchly than he, and

in his moral judgments more mild, developed, one-sidedly, still

further, the ascetic phase of Christian morality; abstinence from

enjoyment, steadfastness in suffering, martyrdom, and beneficence to

the poor, appear, to him, as the highest virtues; strict churchliness,

obedient submission to the visible church and its episcopal guides, as

the foundation of all Christian morality; heretical opinions and

schismatic separation, as the ground of all moral corruption. While in

Tertullian morality appears more as an individual manifestation of the

religious personality, in Cyprian it is rather an expression of the

community-life of the church. As to marriage and celibacy, he judges as

Tertullian. (De unitate ecclesiae; Exhort. ad martyrium; De bono

patientiae; De opere et eleemosynis; De zelo et livore; De oratione

dominica; and many letters).

The severe dogmatic conflicts of the fourth century which so deeply

rent the Oriental church, turned the current of thought somewhat away

from ethics, so that we here find scarcely any thing but merely popular

and not scientific presentations of the ethical, and that too for the

most part simply in homilies and practical elucidations of

Scripture.--Basil the Great--as yet largely devoted to ethical

questions--gives (besides his homilies and several other writings of

kindred nature) in his Ethica a short, popular, little-digested, but

plain and Gospel-inspired synopsis of New Testament ethics,--comprised

in eighty rules expressed in strictly Biblical forms. In other respects

he manifests indeed an over-estimation of monasticism and of outward

works in general, as well as an under-estimation of the natural

corruption of man. His brother, Gregory of Nyssa, likewise emphasized

moral freedom quite strongly, even in man while as yet unregenerate,

and applied many of the ideas of Greek philosophy to Christian ethics,

and moreover found also the moral ideal in the monkish life.--This life

was still more exalted by Gregory of Nazianzus, who also presents

already quite definitely the doctrine of the evangelical counsels as

distinguished from the universally-binding moral laws, [110] although

in other respects he gives expression to many excellent thoughts on

Christian ethics.--The liberally-cultured, John Chrysostom,--who was no

less profound in feeling than rich in thoughts and in acquaintance with

man, and who was inspired with high moral earnestness and moral

love,--presents in his masterly Homilies an essentially pure,

evangelical and deep-reaching moral view, in a striking, warm and clear

style,--to such an extent as no other Church Father has done; and even

where, in the delineation of the natural conscience and of its freedom,

he presents, by the help of philosophical examples, the favorable

phases rather too prominently, and where he treats over-fondly of

monasticism and the monkish life, and ascribes, in repentance, too high

a value to outward works, especially to fasting and alms-giving, still

the evangelical ground-thought is by no means pushed into the

back-ground. Love to God is, with him, the ground, the beginning, the

essence of all morality. His somewhat idealistic turn of mind betrays

him sometimes into unpractical views, e. g., into the wish (born of his

love to monasticism) for the introduction of a community of goods.

[111] --Imitating Chrysostom also in his weaker points, the likewise

philosophically educated abbot, Isidore of Pelusium, treated, in

numerous epistles, largely of special topics in ethics, and sometimes

bordered on Pelagian views.

In the more practically-inclined and less dogmatically-rent Occident,

we find, already in the fourth century, more comprehensive treatises on

the moral subject-matter of Christianity, but--as differing from the

more idealistic and philosophic Greek doctors--in a rather realistic,

legal, juridical manner; and it is characteristic that precisely the

most excellent of the ethical writers among the Latin Fathers were

originally jurists and rhetoricians.--Lactantius, in his Institutiones

divinae (III-VI), treats of the ethical quite largely, critically

assailing heathen ethics, and defending spiritedly the ethics of

Christianity. The highest good, as the ground-question of ethics, lie

finds in the blissful communion of the immortal spirit with God, a

communion which is to be attained to only in the Christian religion,

and of which, in heathendom, not even the conception is to be found.

Christianity alone, but not heathen philosophy, affords a knowledge of

the moral goal, and of the moral way, and furnishes also in Christ the

moral example, and moral strength, and lastly, in pure unselfish love,

the true moral motive. The unchurchly and dualistically-inclining

notion entertained by Lactantius, of a certain primitively-ordained

necessity of evil (ii, 8, 9, 12; vi, 15; De ira Dei, 55) has not much

interfered with his other moral thoughts.--Ethics attains, in a feeble

and ill-adapted outward imitation of Cicero, to a scientific form,

though without really scientific development, through the labors of

Ambrose, whose work De officiis ministrorum, though for a long time

highly prized, is yet rhetorical in style, and feeble in scientific

contents; and yet, notwithstanding that it introduces, undigested, many

foreign thoughts and forms into the field of Christian thought in order

to conceal a manifest lack of theological culture, it still commends

itself by the warmth of a sincere heart, by its enthusiasm for active

piety and by ingenious trains of thought. Though treating in this work

primarily of the duties of clergymen, Ambrose yet considers also pretty

extensively those of Christians in general; as a whole, however, it has

little order and consecutiveness, and, notwithstanding its frequent

prolixity and repetitions, leaves many points but slightly touched. He

cites many Biblical examples, especially from the Old Testament; in his

exegetical method he is quite faulty; that which is not expressly

taught in Scripture either by word or example, he regards as unallowed,

e. g., jesting. The four virtutes principales (the expression virtutes

cardinales occurs only in the manifestly unauthentic work, De

sacramentis), he adopts from Plato; he gives them, however, a much

higher significancy; and, by finding for them a greater unity in piety

and love, as also by penetrating deeper into the subjectivity of the

love-inspired and morally-acting heart, he demonstrates, despite all

his defectiveness in scientific construction, the great superiority of

Christian ethics over heathen. He places the highest good in the bliss

resulting from a knowledge of God, and in moral perfection, the two

being inseparably connected with each other. A preference for celibacy

he shares with his contemporaries, but in enthusiastic laudations

thereof he even outdoes most of them. The duty of beneficence he pushes

so far that, like Chrysostom, he passes over into advocacy of a

voluntary community of goods (i, 28); and he regards self-defense, even

in case of murderous assault, as unallowable. The

scientifically-insignificant exegetical writings of Ambrose deal also

very largely with ethical questions.--St. Jerome, in such of his

writings as treat of the moral, is, for the most part, intent on

exalting the, by him, fanatically espoused monastic life, but rather

rhetorically than scientifically, and with frequent inconsistencies;

treating marriage disdainfully, and in fact hostilely, he finds any

good in it at all only because it produces children who may devote

themselves to the unmarried life (Ep. 22, 20, ad Elustoch., ed Veron.,

t. i); his passionately violent assailing of Jovinian (in Rome) who

contested the meritoriousness of the monastic life and of ascetic

works, found in the spirit of the age great applause.

Much higher in spirit and penetration than the views of the other Latin

Fathers, stand St. Augustine's ethical disquisitions,--De doctrina

christiana, De civitate dei, De moribus ecclesicae catholicae, De

libero arbitrio, and other works--without, however, presenting a

connected ethical system. In Augustine the Occidental church not only

manifests her radical antithesis to the fundamental and dangerous

errors of the Pelagian school, but she further develops at the same

time the ethically-significant and healthful antithesis to the more

dogmatically and theosophico-speculatively inclined Greek church,

namely, in that this Father emphasized much more strongly than did the

Greek church the antagonism of the natural man to God as well as man's

moral impotency, and hence his need of redemption, and also in that he

conceived the Christianly-moral life as the expression of a complete

spiritual transformation, whereas the Greek Fathers tended to regard it

rather as a bettering of the, in his moral essence, but

slightly-disordered natural man. Occidental ethics makes more reference

to the Saviour; Oriental, more to the Creator; the former has therefore

conceived more deeply, than the latter, the moral consciousness of

Christianity, and has developed it more fully. And from this time on,

the history of Christian ethics finds but little that is worthy of

attention outside of the current of Occidental thought. As it was the

special task of the Greek church to ward off from the Christian

doctrine of God and of Christ, all heathen and Judaistic notions, and

definitively to refute them, so was it the task of the Latin church to

confute and overcome these same elements in the field of ethics; and

this task was in the main accomplished by St. Augustine. The freedom of

the will as it appears in the Greek church, and especially also in

Chrysostom, is by no means identical with the freedom of the

regenerated Christian as insisted upon by the evangelical church, and

the confidence which many of the Greek Fathers place in the moral

inclination of the piously-stirred heart, is not yet free from every

trace of that over-estimation of the purity of human nature so

characteristic of heathenism; also moral action is as yet obscured by

the thought of the meritoriousness of the same. These remaining traces

of heathen and Jewish views were, in their ground-thought at least,

eradicated by Augustine; the thought of unmerited grace whereby man

attained to the capability of a moral life, and to the highest good,

was placed by him in the foreground, and thus the foundation was laid

for a true evangelical ethical system. His doctrine (far exceeding

Scripture warrant) of the total unfreedom, for good, of the natural

will and of an unconditional election of grace, has a less misleading

influence on his moral views than might have been expected,--it simply

gives to them the character of deep earnestness, but does not dampen

the power of moral admonition.--Man in his enslavement under sin to

moral unfreedom is raised to real moral freedom only on the basis of a

divine election of grace, by means of a spiritual regeneration through

faith in Christ. Natural man is not able to will and to accomplish the

truly good; the virtues of heathen and of unbelievers, though indeed

often very admirable, have yet no real merit, no truly moral worth.

Between virtue and vice there lies no medium ground; whatever is not

virtue, and hence whatever springs not from faith, from the right

intentio, is necessarily sinful; natural man is free only to evil; even

the desire for redemption is lacking to him, and is purely a work of

gracious influence. Still there are among sin-dominated humanity great

differences of personal guilt, and even the heathen have yet a free

choice between the more, and the less, evil; to true righteousness,

however, they cannot attain.--The destination of man, and hence his

moral goal and the highest good, is to return to God from whom he has

fallen away, to become reunited with Him by God-likeness. This is

possible only through love to God, which is consequently the ground and

essence of all good. The world and whatever belongs to it, is not the

goal of moral effort,--is not the highest good itself, but only a means

to this end. Love to the world in itself is therefore not true moral

love, but is only lust; spirit never has true love save to spirit. But

man is not to himself the highest end, because he is not per se capable

of blessedness; the highest end, and hence the highest object of love,

is God, upon whom all blessedness rests. All true love rests on love to

God, and to love men otherwise than in God, is sinful; also self-love

is only then moral when it flows from love to God. Hence love to God is

the first and highest command, and the one from which all others

spring; this love works obedience to God's command, wherein alone rests

all the moral worth of an action; love is the sole true motive to the

good,--fear is only a feeble incipiency of wisdom. Hence virtue is in

its essence simply love to God, is nothing other than ordo amoris,

[112] and therefore obedience to the divine will, which will is the

eternal law of all morality.

Love to God as the ground-virtue unfolds itself into the four cardinal

virtues: TEMPERANTIA, amor integrum se pracbens ei, quod amatur;

FORTITUDO, amor facile tolerans omnia propter quod amartur; JUSTITIA,

amor soli amato serviens et propterea recte dominans; PRUDENTIA, amor

ea, quibus adjuvatur, ab eis, quibus impeditur, sagaciter seligens.

[113] It is with great ingenuity that the Greek classification of

virtue is thus embraced and presented in higher unity, as an unfolding

of love under four forms, but the violence of the process is too

manifest not to make felt at once the unadaptedness of the Greek

classification for the Christian idea; it is new wine in old vessels.

To these virtues, borrowed from Greek philosophy, Augustine adds, as

superordinate thereto, the three virtues subsequently known as the

theological virtues: faith, love and hope, without succeeding in

placing them into a clear relation to the other four; [114] and this

unclear and clumsy twofold classification prevails from now henceforth

and until the close of the Middle Ages. Faith springs from the merely

germinal love to God; but only from faith springs the true

all-dominating love to God, and from faith and love springs hope,

namely, a longing for the highest good, for the blissful enjoyment of

God in union with Him, in the vision of Him,--in perfected love;

objectively therefore the highest good is God himself as the perfect

truth, the infinite eternal life itself.

Evil or sin is in essence and origin a lack of true love, that is, a

love not to God but to the world and its lusts, and primarily a love to

self that does not rest on love to God, that is self-seeking. From

self-seeking springs evil desire (concupiscentia) which becomes a power

over the spirit. Evil become real in no sense whatever from God, but

through the free choice, through the guilt, of free creatures,--is a

guilty ruining of the originally good. The distinction (referring

primarily to the administration and practice of penance) between venial

and mortal sins (peccata venalia et mortifera s. mortalia), Augustine

defines in the thenceforth prevailing sense, thus,--that the latter

include all sins consciously and voluntarily committed against the

Decalogue, and particularly idolatry, adultery, and murder, which,

unless atoned for by ecclesiastical penance, involve damnation, whereas

the former may be atoned for, or gotten rid of, by the repentant person

himself, without special church-penance, through prayer, alms-giving

and fasting. [115]

As to the requirements of morality in detail, Augustine is no less

earnest than judicious, forming quite a contrast to the manifold

laxities of the age, and to many errors and extreme views of earlier

Church Fathers, and, on the whole, he conceived of Christian morality

much more profoundly than had yet been done by church writers; but his

more especial merit consists in this, that he brought clearly and

definitely into prominence the foundation of all morality, namely,

faith and the essence of faith, to wit, love to God, and that he

referred the validity of outward works more definitely than had been

done before to the inner disposition of the actor. A truly evangelical

spirit breathes through the greater part of his moral views; and even

where, in harmony with the spirit of the times, he laudingly emphasizes

outward good works, and particularly fasting, alms-giving and monastic

asceticism, he still always lays greater stress on the state of the

heart than on the work itself. His greatest departure from a purely

evangelical consciousness is the recognition of the, then, already

long-prevalent distinction between the divine commands and the divine

counsels; the latter refer essentially to the giving up of allowed

enjoyments, and especially to the abstaining from marriage. The man who

leaves the counsels unobserved, sins not; he who fulfills them,

acquires for himself higher virtue; wedlock-virtue is merely human

virtue, but virginal chastity is angelic virtue. Marriage is indeed per

se holy and pure, and prevailed also in the state of sinlessness, [116]

but for the state of sinfulness, from which in fact the redeemed are

not as yet totally free, celibacy is higher than marriage; and if all

men would but live unmarried, there would thereby be straightway

brought about the end of the world and the perfection of the kingdom of

God. [117] But Augustine wisely avoids the self-contradictory extremes

of Jerome, and tolerates even second marriages.--In contrast to heathen

ethics, which looks, for all salvation, to the State and to its

unlimited sway, Christians, even in the days of Augustine, placed (not

without very good reasons) very little confidence in the worldly State.

The Christian state--to the realization of which the. Germanic nations

were more especially called--had not yet become real; and the

nominally-Christian Roman State lingered as yet essentially in heathen

forms. In his ingenious work De civitate dei, Augustine contrasts with

the earthly State the purely spiritual divine State, deriving the

former from the self-seeking of God-forsaking man, as prevailing since

the brother-murder of Cain,--since which time the earthly and heavenly

State have been in a condition of divorce (xv, 5). "The two kinds of

love produced two kinds of state: the earthly state springs from

self-love which ripens into contempt of God; the heavenly, from love to

God which ripens into contempt of self" (xiv, 28). The divine State

develops itself independently of the sinful earthly one, until it

attains to its true manifestation in Christ; this state is not an

outwardly force-exercising one, but a spiritual kingdom, and is indeed

destined to sanctify and transfigure the earthly State,--to change it

from a merely world-state into an organ of the divine state, but not to

merge itself into it.

The great decline of the scientific life in the Occident from and after

the close of the fifth century, manifested its effects also in the

field of ethics. Little more was done than to make collections of the

opinions (sententiae) of the Fathers, and to apply them to purposes of

Church-discipline and of popular instruction. But there was no further

creative production. In reducing to greater system the discipline of

penance, the interest was turned rather to the discriminating, defining

and classifying of sins than to the scientific examination of the moral

in general. The knowledge of Greek ethics disappeared almost entirely,

and the work of Bo�thius, De consolatione philosophiae (about A.D.

542), [118] --which is but feebly touched with Christian influence, and

which for the most part expresses, eclectively, mere Graeco-Roman

philosophy,--passed in the earlier Middle Ages for an excellent work of

Christian philosophy.--Gregory the Great, basing himself on Augustine,

wrote moral expositions (Moralia) of the Book of Job, of Solomon's

Song, etc., and other rather edificatory than scientific works of the

same class; most influential was his Regula pastoralis, which treated

of the clerical calling more especially under its moral phase. Isidore

of Hispalis (Seville) (ob. 636) treats, especially in his Sententiae,

on many moral points, mostly, however, by way of judicious digesting

from preceding Fathers, especially from Augustine and Gregory the

Great,--furnishing for the early Middle Ages a principal help in

ethical study.--In the Greek Church Maximus the Confessor (ob. 622)

gives in his "Chapters on Love" [119] a tolerably complete presentation

of ethics; John Damascenus (ob. 754) furnishes, in his chief work, the

ground thoughts for an ethical treatise, and in his "Holy Parallels" a

rich collection of patristic sentences.

Standing entirely apart, and of influence only in the Middle Ages, is

the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (fifth century) who introduced

Neo-Platonic mysticism into Christianity, and whose

Pantheistically-inclined world-theory invades here and there also the

moral sphere. [120] God is all in all,--is the being in all being, the

life in all that lives, is the good absolutely. Hence evil cannot exist

by itself, but must always be a negating something on the good,--is not

an existing something, but essentially only a lack and more an

appearance than a reality, and it turns again into the good. The goal

of all life, and hence also of the moral, is the returning into God,

the changing into God, of whatever is as yet distinct from God; the

highest wisdom is therefore the turning-away of the spirit from

whatever is not God,--the unclouded beholding of the one, the nameless,

the pure divine light, in which God directly imparts himself to man. An

outwardly active morality is, according to this view, the opposite of

true wisdom.

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[104] The ethical views of the Ebionites and Gnostics offer many

interesting phases, but they have too little influence in the shaping

of the ethics of the church, and are, without a fuller examination, too

obscure to justify us in entering upon the subject here at all: comp.

Neander: Gesch. d. christl. Sittenl., pp. 111, 137.

[105] Heyns: De patrum ap. doctrina morali, 1833; Van Gilse, the same

subject, 1833.

[106] De poenit., c. 2, 6; De pudicitia, c. 2, 19; comp. Adv. Marc., 4,

9.

[107] De idolol., c. 1 sqq.

[108] De idol., c. 17, 18, 21.

[109] De corona militis, c. 11; De idol., c. 19.

[110] Orat. III, invect. in Jul., p. 94 sqq. (ed. Col.); Orat. iv, c.

97 sqq. (ed. Bened.)

[111] Homil. in Act., opp. (ed. Montf.) ix, 93.

[112] De civ. dei, xv, 22.

[113] De moribus eccl., c. 15 (25) sqq., 25 (46); De lib. arb., 1, 13;

2, 10.

[114] Enchiridion, s. de fide, spe et charitate; de doctr. christ., 1,

37; 3, 10, et al.

[115] Sermo, 351; Enchir., 70, 71; comp. De fide et op., c. 19 (34); De

civ. dei, 21, 27.

[116] De Genesi ad litt., 9, 3 sqq., 7.

[117] De Sancta virginitate; De bono conjugali; De nuptiis et concupis.

[118] Fr. Nitzsch: System des Bo�th., 1860, p. 42 sqq.

[119] Kephalaia peri agapes.

[120] Especially in De divinis nominibus; De coelesti hierarchia; De

myst. theol.

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II. THE MIDDLE AGES.

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SECTION XXXII.

The ecclesiastical consciousness, as having arrived now at greater

repose, but as also in a state of spiritual paralysis, limits itself

primarily to the preserving and digesting of the views already-attained

to, and to the constructing of systems of life-rules on the basis of

the decisions of the Fathers and of church councils,--at best

elucidated anew by examples from the Scriptures or from the legends of

the saints. The practical decisions on the subject of church penance

gave rise gradually, in connection with these collections of rules, to

a very minutely-specifying system of casuistry, which, however, related

primarily chiefly to transgressions. The moral views themselves were

already largely estranged from evangelical purity, and an ascetic

monk-morality, not binding upon all, passed as the ideal of Christian

virtue, while the general morality, binding upon all, was to a large

degree neglected.

The libri poenitentiales, for the use of confessors, are based for the

most part on the decisions of synods and on ancient practice, but are

also in some degree complemented by their respective authors; they give

for the most part little more than imperfectly classified and

illogically connected registers of single sins and of the

church-penances and penalties imposed therefor, the latter of course

without established and certain norms (Theodore of Canterbury, Bede,

Halitgarius and others). These books form the beginning of a

casuistical treatment of ethics, which was subsequently extended to

other questions than sins, especially to cases of conscience.--Attempts

at a more independent and more connected, but yet, on the whole, purely

practical treatment of ethics--mostly simply on single points,--were

made by Alcuin (De virtutibus et vitiis; De ratione animae), largely

borrowing from Augustine; also by Rhabanus Maurus, by Jonas, Bishop of

Orleans (about 828), by the earnestly sin-rebuking Ratherius of Verona

(ob. 974), by Damani (ob. 1072), the excessive eulogist of

self-castigation, and by the learned Fulbert of Chartres (ob. 1029).

In proportion as the zeal of love abated, and worldly-mindedness

increased in the church at large, in the same proportion arose, as in

antithesis to this secularism of the church, a zeal for a special

holiness transcending the general morality required of all. Directions

for the monkish life form a favorite topic for ecclesiastical

moralists; the merits of the ascetic life are more warmly lauded than

the practical Christian life in the civil or domestic spheres, and

wedlock is progressively more deeply disparaged as in contrast to

entire renunciation; consorts are loaded with praise, who divorce

themselves in order to practice such renunciation; and according to

Damiani's assertion, even St. Peter had to undergo the martyr-death in

order to wash away the stains of his wedlock-life (De perfectione

monach, c. 6).

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SECTION XXXIII.

The philosophy of the Middle Ages, and especially Scholasticism, was

occupied for a long while almost exclusively with speculations on

dogmatical and metaphysical questions, leaving ethics almost untouched;

wherever, however, it brought ethics within the sphere of its

intellectual activity, there it treated the same merely in connection

with dogmatics, and for the most part in the light of the opinions of

Augustine, and, later, of those of Plato and Aristotle,--often

bunglingly combining the latter with the former.--The brilliant but

idealistico-Pantheistically inclined mystical philosophy of John Scotus

Erigena, which threw its lights, as well as its shades, into the field

of morality, seems--as not understood--to have had little influence on

subsequent ethics, save in the mystical school.

The spiritualistico-idealistic tendency of the Schoolmen could

primarily treat of the moral only collaterally, at least until the

dogmatical and metaphysical fields had attained to some degree of

philosophical maturity and self-consciousness. The potent influence of

Augustine made itself felt also in the ethical field, and his

ground-thoughts re-appear in almost all the Schoolmen. The freedom of

the will is, however, distinctly recognized, although, in man after the

fall, as in a trammeled condition; but also Greek philosophy was

powerfully influential on ethics, not merely as to the form, but also

as to the subject-matter. The Platonic classification of the virtues

was already early combined with the three theological virtues,

notwithstanding the inconsistency and impracticability of such a

uniting of two entirely different stand-points. In how far John Scotus'

attempted translation of Aristotle's Ethics into Latin was of

influence, is doubtful; the application of Aristotle to Christian

ethics appears in a more direct form, first, in the thirteenth century.

The deep-thinking John Scotus Erigena (at the court of Charles the

Bald, then at Oxford, ob. 886), who was not understood by his own age,

and who had but little connection with it even in his errors, touches

in his chief work, De divisione naturae, also upon the more general

ethical topics, and molds them to his idealistico-Pantheistical

system,--a system based on the Neo-Platonic views of Dionysius the

Areopagite, and which--very different from recent naturalistic

Pantheism--denies not the absolute personal God, but on the contrary

the independent reality of the world. The world is only another

existence-form of the eternal God himself; God alone is real; the

creature, in so far as it is conceived as distinct from God, is

nothing; it exists only in so far as it is wholly identical with God.

God is whatever truly exists, because He himself does all and is in

all; Good in not merely the most excellent part of the creature, but He

is its beginning, its middle and its end--the essence and true being in

all things. The coming into being of the world is a self-outpouring of

God, a theophany. God is manifest not only in Christ, but also in the

entire universe,--in the highest degree in the rational creature, and

here indeed most purely in the saints. The believing and cognizing of

the saints take place solely through God; God cognizes himself in man

as cognizing Him. Man is therefore God's image, because God himself

comes to manifestation in him. As now every thing ideal, and hence the

ideal world, precedes, in the mind of God, its outward realization, so

is also the spirit of man earlier than his body,--which latter is but

the shadow of the spirit, and is in fact by it created, and that too as

a perfect and immortal one (ii, 24).--Man, however, is now no longer in

the condition in which he originally was; the body is frail and subject

to death; this condition can have been brought about only by sin. But

how is sin possible if God is in fact all in all? Answer: every thing

is real only in so far as it is good; but in so far as it is not good,

it exists not. Hence evil is a mere non-being, a merely negative

something, but in no sense a real entity. God can cognize only that

which is, not that which is not,-- hence He cognizes and knows not

evil; for if He knew it, then it would be real, and hence would not be

evil (ii, 28). This normal Dei ignorantia banishes evil from the sphere

of being into that of mere appearance. All evil is merely the shadow of

the good, and is accordingly only upon the good,--is essentially only a

lack,--a non-being, not a positive entity. Sin consists in this, that

man, as on the one hand identical with, and, on the other, distinct

from God, fixes his attention solely upon this distinctness from

God,--directs himself toward himself and toward nature, and not toward

God (i, 68; ii, 12, 25). Only by this confessedly per se inexplicable

(v. 36) fall into sin, is it that the body of man became material and

mortal and a clog to the spiritual life (ii, 25, 26; comp. iv, 12, 14,

15, 20); man thereby ceased to be truly a spirit,--became subject to

natural desires; previously the lord of nature, he now became a slave

to it.--The ultimate goal of all life, and hence also of the moral, is

the return into God (ii, 2, 11), namely, so that this differentness

from God, all corporeality and individuality, ceases and passes over

into God himself,--is transformed into Him (i, 10; v, 20, 27, 37, 38).

Hence all moral effort is directed toward this uniting of one's self

with God, toward the breaking down of the hampering limits of

individual naturality, and realizes itself in a gradually progressive

development (v, 8, 39). Morality must accordingly bear a predominantly

spiritualistic and ascetic, negating character,--must disdainfully turn

itself away from finite reality (iv, 5). Into details Erigena enters

but little. It is perfectly consequential in him that he regards

marriage, which rests on the difference of the sexes, as having

originated solely in consequence of sin, whereas sinless man was

sexless (ii, 6; iv, 12, 23). And yet marriage is now allowable, only,

however, in view of the propagation of the race, irrespective of

sensuous pleasure. Though the mystico-speculative bases of these

ethical thoughts were of a very unchurchly character, still the

thoughts themselves answered very well to the ascetic spirit of the

then prevalent morality.

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SECTION XXXIV.

It is only in the twelfth century that ethics is seriously treated of

by scholastic science;--first by Hildebert of Tours (ob. 1134), for the

most part in the light of the Roman Eclectic and Stoic

philosophies;--then by Abelard, who, however, treats, mostly in a mere

preliminary manner, of the more general questions, giving proof of

great acumen, but also sometimes enfeebling the significancy of

sin;--very fruitfully by Peter Lombard, who presents, in the light of

Augustinian thoughts, and with the help of ancient philosophy, a very

clear and well-arranged total of Christian doctrine, of which ethics,

though but briefly presented, constitutes an essential part;--but with

greatest thoroughness and fullness by Thomas Aquinas, who made large

use of the Aristotelian philosophy in perfecting a system of Christian

speculation, and that, too, without thereby working serious detriment

to the Christian idea.-- In Duns Scotus a sophistico-skeptical

treatment of ethics began already to effect, in many respects, an

enfeebling of the moral idea, and to prepare the way for the

double-dealing morality of the Jesuits.--Through almost all the

scholastic presentations of ethics there prevails a pretty great

uniformity of spirit and manner of treatment, springing mostly from

Augustine and Aristotle, and subsequently from Peter Lombard and Thomas

Aquinas; evangelico-theological and ethnico-philosophical elements are

often brought together, without that the latter element is always

successfully mastered and molded into a Christian character. Ingenious

and often truly speculative processes of thought, but frequently also

trivial and fruitless hair-splittings, also a pedantic carrying out of

particular schemata, and a preference for certain typical numbers in

the distribution of the subject-matter,--such are the general

characteristics of scholastic ethics.

Contemporaneously with scholasticism prevailed also the science of

casuistry, which had also to do with practical life; this science was

ill fact influenced by scholasticism to a higher development, and it

attained to its highest perfection in the fourteenth and fifteenth

centuries.

Hildebert of Tours (about 1100) treated ethics for the first time in a

special work: Philosophia moralis de honesto et utili (Opp. Par. 1708,

p. 961 sqq). In philosophical contents it is as yet feeble and

dependent, and belongs rather to the sphere of Roman popular

philosophy, especially that of Cicero and Seneca, than to speculative

science proper; and the Christian element is thrown largely into the

shade by that which is borrowed from heathen moralists; the four Greek

virtues are servilely carried out; the relation of the honestum and

utile is extensively discussed; and as a whole the work is immature and

superficial. --Nearly cotemporaneously appears Abelard's Ethica, s.

Scito te ipsum,--not a comprehensive system, but properly only a

philosophico-theological introduction to ethics; it treats somewhat

un-uniformly of general questions, and particularly of the essence of

sin and of its imputation. The toning-down of Christian

thoughts,--elsewhere observable in Abelard, in his over-estimating the

natural capability of man,--shows itself also here. He distinguishes

between a natural tendency to evil (called by him a "will") and the

freely-resolved approving of the same; the former is not per se sinful

and forbidden of God, for it has its seat in the sensuous and fragile

nature of man, and it is not even yet a sin when it overcomes the

reason; it becomes sin only by a real approving of sin; and it is for

the simple reason that there is a natural tendency to evil in us, that

the virtuous opposing of it becomes a moral desert. From this it

follows, on the one hand, that man, in virtue of his very nature,

cannot avoid all evil, though indeed this unavoidable evil is not

imputed to him as guilt, and, on the other, that the essence of sin

consists wholly and alone in the conscious choosing of it, and neither

in the evil tendency preceding it, nor in the act proceeding therefrom.

By the carrying-out of an evil intention the guilt of that intention

becomes not greater, and by the omitting of its carrying-out, not less.

Moral merit and guilt lie consequently entirely and alone in the

disposition; actions themselves, per se considered, are morally

indifferent. Hence he who does a bad act without a bad intention, does

not sin. True, there is necessary also in order to the truly good not

merely a well-meaning, but also a correctly-cognizing intention.

Therefore it is that, while, because of the heathens' lack of a correct

knowledge of the law and the truth, their unbelief and even their

persecuting of the Christian martyrs cannot be imputed to them as real

sins, yet, on the other hand, they cannot without faith become really

saved; and the prayer of Christ on the cross for his persecutors shows

that they did wrong in ignorance, and were in need of

forgiveness.--There are thoughts here in Abelard which, while per se

true, are yet one-sidedly pushed into the extreme, and thereby become

erroneous. Thus, he explains the distinction, prevalent in the ethics

of the Middle Ages, between mortal and venial sins, to mean this, that

under the latter we are to understand those the immorality of which is

indeed known to us in general, but is not clearly conscious and present

to our mind at the moment of our consenting to them, and which are

consequently committed rather in a state of forgetfulness. The ethics

of Abelard was, not without reason, severely assailed by Bernard of

Clairvaux, and is in many respects a fore-runner of the system of the

Jesuits; but in his own day the conscience of the church was as yet

somewhat quick and tender, and the synod of Sens (1140) expressly

condemned the more questionable features of the same.

The subject of ethics was treated with great skill, but rather

ingeniously than profoundly, by Peter Lombard (ob. 1160), more

especially in the third book of his Libri sententiarum,--a work which

was for later schoolmen a very influential model and a high authority,

though the relatively brief manner of treatment touches only upon the

principal points. With a fully-developed system we are not as yet

furnished; it is rather a dialectical analysis and examination of ideas

than a profound speculative development from a fundamental principle.

The ethical notions are presented first in definitions, then proved and

illustrated by texts from Scripture and from the Fathers, and thereupon

follow dialectical inquiries, comparisons of opposed views, and a

definitive judgment.

The notion "good" has both an objective and a subjective significancy.

The good as object is the goal of the subjective good, the good will;

this good object is blessedness; eternal life in God, and hence God

himself in so far as he comes into communion with man (II, Dist. 38,

40). The presupposition of all morally good is will-freedom. This

freedom is primarily a threefold one: freedom from necessity, freedom

from sin as a dominating power, and freedom from misery. The first is

unforfeitable,--exists also in sinful man; the second is enjoyed by the

redeemed, the third by the saved. Before the fall man had perfect

freedom,--could, by his own strength, keep free from sin, though not

attain to perfection save as aided by divine grace, as, on the other

hand, he could in his own strength also turn to sin. Hence will-freedom

is that capacity of the rational will whereby it, by the assistance of

divine grace (gracia assistente), chooses the good, or, by not sharing

in the same (eadem desistente), the evil. In the rational will there is

a natural striving, though but feeble (licet tenuiter et exiliter), to

choose the good; but, by the assistance of grace, it becomes powerful

and efficacious (eficaciter), whereas man per se can effectually turn

to evil. By the possibility of choice in the two directions, human

liberty differs from divine liberty, which latter can eternally choose

only the good. After the fall into sin, the truth: poterat peccare et

not peccare, was changed into, potest peccare et non potest non

peccare; that is, into a freedom very much trammeled indeed, though not

yet sunk to necessity; the inwardly enfeebled and corrupted nature of

man impels him constantly to sin, and allows him not to will and to

accomplish the truly good. The redeemed, however, is free from this

predominancy of evil desire,--has indeed as yet moral weakness, but

also the assistance of divine grace; hence he can also yet sin,--in

fact it is still true of him: non posse non peccare, but only as to

venial sins, not as to mortal sins. In his ultimate perfection,

however, the redeemed attains to a condition transcending the condition

of unfallen man, namely: non posse peccare,--where all weakness is

overcome, and man has risen to a moral impossibility of choosing evil;

thus the threefold freedom becomes a fourfold one (II, Dist: 24, 25).

Virtue is the right quality of the human will as turned toward the

good. The ground-virtue is, therefore, love to God, as the substance of

all good; and all virtues are closely involved in each other, so that

he who truly possesses one, possesses them all, and he to whom one is

lacking, lacks them all; no one can have simply one virtue, for love is

the mother of all the virtues, and he who has the mother has also the

children (III, Dist. 36). In agreement with Augustine, Peter Lombard

presents three chief-virtues. which, however, are only different phases

of the one love to God, namely: faith, hope, love (fides, spes,

charitas). (1) FIDES est virtus, qua creduntur, quae non videntur,

namely, in the sphere of the religious; this faith is threefold:)--(a)

credere DEO, to believe the word of God; (b) credere DEUM, to believe

in the existence of God; both these forms of faith are possible to the

evil; (c) credere IN DEUM, to love God in faith, and to unite one's

self with him; this is true faith, which leads also to truly good works

(III, Dist. 23). (2) SPES est virtus, qua spiritualia et aeterna bona

sperantu, i. e., cum fiducia exspectantur. This virtue is only briefly

and insufficiently developed, and is not clearly enough distinguished

from the first; for the statement that hope refers only to future good,

while faith refers also to evil and to the past and to the present

(III, Dist., 26), gives, after all, only the difference of a part from

the whole. (3) CHARITAS est dilectio, qua diligitur deus propter se, et

proximus propter deum vel in deo; God must be loved for his own sake,

but our neighbor (and every human being is such) only for God's sake

(III, Dist. 27 sqq.).--From another point of view,--and which is not

properly brought into harmony with the first, but only joined to

it--four other virtues (virtutes principales vel cardinales) are

adopted, after the example of Plato and Augustine, and presented,

namely: justitia, fortitudo (which manifests itself in suffering),

prudentia, and temperantia (III, 33); after which, without any further

development of these four virtues, are given the seven gifts of the

Holy Spirit (taken from Isa. xi, 2, 3, in the Vulgate version, namely:

wisdom, understanding, counsel, strength, knowledge, piety,

God-fearing), as the conditions of the practice of virtue, and as

spiritual virtues. Some further discussion of special points is given

in connection with a presentation of the ten commandments and of the

sacraments.

In the steps of Peter Lombard follows, in all essential points,

Alexander Hales (ob. 1245), though he develops some points more fully,

and contributes thereto original matter,--especially is this the case

in his discussion of the moral law, which he distinguishes into the

natural, the Mosaic, and the evangelical (Summa univ. theol., pars

III). He separates the moral part of theology more distinctly than had

yet been done from the dogmatical, as the "doctrine of manners," and

distributes it into the doctrine, first, of the divine law, second, of

grace and the virtues, and, third, of the fruit of virtue.--(William of

Paris [ob. 1249] discussed the more important points of morality in

separate treatises grounded on Augustine and Aristotle). More learned,

and especially distinguished by extensive use of Aristotle, are the

ethical portions of the writings of Albertus Magnus (ob. 1280), though

in other respects they do not contain very, much original speculation,

and in some respects they show already a strong casuistical tendency.

It is through Thomas Aquinas that scholastic ethics was most highly

perfected both in form and in substance, and raised to a system of

profound speculation. His great work, Summa theologiae, prima et

secunda secundae, combines, in comprehensive thoroughness, a clear

intellectual insight with deep religious knowledge and moral life

experience. The style of presentation is indeed somewhat discursive,

especially in the citing and refuting of opposite opinions, and runs

often into unprofitable distinctions and splittings of ideas, but the

substantial contents are in the main so sound and excellent, that the

almost autocratical authority enjoyed by Thomas Aquinas, especially in

the field of ethics--(an authority which has maintained itself unabated

in the Romish Church up to the present day)--is essentially a

well-merited one; the later ethics of the Romish Church could indeed

fall below this model, but it has not surpassed it; and also for

Protestant ethics have the works of this author been of great

influence, and they are even yet of weighty import.

The ethics of Thomas Aquinas, which is directly connected with his

dogmatics, is distributed into a general and a special part, of which

the former treats of the virtues and vices in general, and the latter

of the same in detail, so that the whole is made to appear

predominantly, though not exclusively, as the doctrine of virtue.--Man

is the image of God principally in virtue of his reason; but an

essential element of reason is the freedom of the will, namely, the

free determining of our own activity. All activity, and hence also that

of irrational creatures, has an end; hence human activity must have a

rational end, and one which man knows as such, and which is aimed at by

free will-determination, whereas irrational creatures seek their end

unconsciously and from natural instinct. But rational ends are such

only in so far as they do not constitute a mere interminable plurality,

but converge and terminate in one last and highest good, upon which

consequently all rational activity is directed. This one highest end,

and hence the highest good, which the rational creature seeks to attain

to, cannot consist in outward, perishable, and hence unessential

things, but only in the one absolutely imperishable, the divine,

namely, in communion with God, and hence in the absolutely perfect life

of the rational creature,--in blessedness. God is the objective,

blessedness the subjective, phase of the highest good. The human soul

per se, and without being united with God, cannot be happy; hence the

highest good is not a something belonging to the soul per se,--has its

ground not in the soul but in God; the highest good in its objective

phase, considered as an object, is not a created, but an uncreated and

divine entity, which, however, is appropriated to himself by man. But

this uncreated entity cannot be appropriated by sensuous perception,

but solely through a spiritual grasping, through cognizing, through

spiritual beholding or intuiting. Hence blessedness rests on an

intuiting of God, and toward this, therefore, the rational activity of

the soul is directed. This blessedness, as resting on the highest

activity of the reason, cannot be wholly reached in this earthly,

manifoldly-limited and dependent life, and, moreover, as being of an

unending nature, it cannot be merited by finite actions,--it can only

be appropriated by religious intuition, by contemplation, namely, in

that God lovingly imparts himself, and therewith at the same time

blessedness, to man. This appropriating is, however, not a merely

passive bearing, not a will-less beholding, but a willing, loving, and

love-enjoying embracing of the divine. In that the rational striving

attains to perfect satisfaction and rest in God as the highest good,

blessedness is enjoyment, the feeling of delight; this is, however, but

one of the phases of blessedness,--the other is the visional

cognizing.--The will of man,--ever directed toward a good,--is indeed

free,--can be forced neither through an outward nor through an inward

power to a given choice, nor is it so forced by God, for God leaves

every created being to act according to its inborn nature; and hence

the will can direct itself as well to a false and merely seeming good,

as to the true good,--but this true good itself stands not within the

free determination of man, but is absolutely determined by God and by

the inner necessity of the case itself; man can, freely-willing, strive

for it or fail of it, but he cannot posit any other good than the true

one. There is no other highest good than God. The will is good when it

hearkens to the reason; but the reason is truthful only when it

hearkens to God and accepts illumination from him. Hence every action

is evil which deviates from reason, and is evil also when this reason

is in error (II, 1, 19); whatever does not spring from the conscience

is sin; but the will that follows an erring reason is also not good,

but evil, in so far as the error was avoidable. Hence only that action

is truly good which follows, not merely reason in general as

fortuitously determined in this or that particular person, but true

reason,--which is conscious of the divine will, and determines itself

thereafter.

The readiness of the soul for well-acting is virtue,--which is

consequently to be conceived of not as mere action, but as a permanent

power and tendency for acting, as a habitus, as a power of the rational

will. The virtues are primarily of a natural character; that is, such

as belong to man as such, to his natural rational being, and are

developed by exercise and habituation, although they cannot in

themselves attain to perfection (ii, 1, qu. 55-59, 63). They are

distinguished as knowledge-virtues and moral virtues (comp. �� 17, 18);

the former are wisdom, science, understanding and, connected therewith,

prudence, and, in a somewhat peculiar sense, also art-skill. The moral

virtues relate to desire; they fall into four cardinal virtues (ii, 1,

qu. 60, 61; ii, 2, 47 sqq). (1) Virtue considered as a good of the

reason, and as expressing the essence of the same, is prudence; this

virtue is, as distinguished from wisdom, not the lord, but the servant

of morality,--gives not the end proper, but only the means to the end

of the practical reason. (2) The virtue which expresses the practical

will-direction of the reason toward moral actions, is justness or

righteousness; it relates to the realizing of the right,--is the

constant and fixed will to give to each his right, and hence has to do

with what we owe to others. It is true, man can in a certain sense be

just also toward himself, namely, when reason holds in proper control

the passions. Justness is the highest of the moral virtues, and

includes in itself also piety, thankfulness, etc. (3) The virtue which

expresses the practical will-direction of the reason toward the

checking of all reason-resisting desires and passions, is

temperateness. It holds within rational bounds all desires and

pleasure-feelings which relate to sensuous goods, and all

displeasure-feelings which spring from the lack of such goods.

Modifications of this virtue are shame, reverentiality, abstinence,

gentleness, modesty, humility, etc. (4) The virtue which expresses the

practical will-direction of the reason toward the carrying-out of

rational purposes as against opposing natural inclinations and

affections, especially against fear in the face of dangers,--is

courage. It wards off whatever would hinder the activity of the reason,

and thus preserves man, as against all sensuous and irrational

impulses, within the limits of rationality; it is, on the one hand,

defensive, a firm calm enduring of hostile influences, and, on the

other, offensive, in that it actually assaults the dangers; the first

phase, however, is, for Christian morality, the predominant. The

highest stage of Christian courage is martyrdom, wherein the main

element is love. The several chief virtues are subdivided by Thomas

Aquinas in a very far-reaching and excessively detailed manner, into

very numerous special manifestation-forms.

Above all the moral virtues, stand (not as co-ordinate therewith, but

as in fact exalting them into a Christian character) the theological

virtues, that is, the supernatural ones--those which have for their

object the divine, the supernatural, and are not grounded in us by

nature, but given (infusae) to us by God (ii, 1, 62 sqq.; ii, 2, 1-46);

through these alone is perfection possible to man, even in the other or

moral virtues.(1) Faith; this virtue relates not to the finite, but to

God, and has as its presupposition, divine revelation. It is a thinking

with an inner assent of the will, and must manifest itself also

outwardly in confession. The object of faith is, in part, purely

supernatural, transcending our knowledge and reason, and in part it can

be discovered even through natural reason; but also that which is

discoverable through reason has in fact been revealed by God out of

love, and for purposes of culture. Faith is raised to a vital form only

by the increment of love (fides formata); without love it is crude

(informis). As faith is the foundation of all morality, so is unbelief

the greatest sin; but as faith is a virtue, hence it is not allowable

to bring a non-Christian to faith by force. The matter is, however,

very different with heretics and apostates, for these have broken their

vow, and hence fall under punishment; heresy deserves capital

punishment (ii, 2, 10, art. 8, 9); and when a prince falls from faith

and in consequence thereof, incurs the: ban of the Church, then are his

subjects ipso facto free and absolved from his dominions and from their

oath of fealty (ii, 2, 12, art. 2),--(2) Hope has for its object

eternal blessedness, that is, the subjective phase of the highest good;

it pre-supposes faith inasmuch as it is only by faith that eternal

blessedness becomes known to us. With hope must be associated

God-fearing, inasmuch as God is the executor of just punishments.--(3)

Love is the most perfect of the virtues, and its presupposition is

faith and hope. It is an intimate union of man with God, a possessing

of God, and the shaping-form of all the other virtues, inasmuch as man

is to do all good out of love to God; it endures forever, whereas faith

ultimately passes over into sight, and hope into the possession of

blessedness. This love, which is primarily love to God, and as such is

not in us by nature, but is a divine grace-gift, enlarges itself

spontaneously into love to men and to all creatures, as also into a

love of man for himself and for his own body as created by God. But all

love to the created must spring exclusively from our love to God, and

it cannot relate approvingly to the evil that is in creatures, but

rather seeks to eradicate it. Our enemies and bad men in general we are

to love, not as bad, but as men, and for the sake of their rational

nature. The degree of our love to creatures is to be in proportion to

the union of the same with God. God himself is to be loved above all

things, above even ourselves.

This double classification of the virtues is doubtless the weakest side

of the ethics of Thomas Aquinas and of the schoolmen in general. The

theological and the natural virtues do not possibly admit of being

brought into any clear relation to each other; they are based upon two

utterly foreign and heterogeneous stand-points, and can be reduced

neither to a condition of co-ordination nor of- subordination, but on

the contrary, they constantly cross and cramp each other, and lead, on

the one hand, to many repetitions, and, on the other, to an arbitrary

distribution of the special virtue-manifestations. That love, even love

to the creature, should appear solely as a theological virtue, is

entirely unnatural. The separating of faith from wisdom is no less

erroneous, inasmuch as Christian wisdom rests essentially on faith in

God. The distinction made between knowledge-virtues and moral virtues

suffers not only under all the defects of its prototype in Aristotle,

but becomes more perplexed still by the distinguishing of both these

classes from the theological virtues, inasmuch as a very essential part

of that which Aristotle ascribes to wisdom must here be transferred to

faith. And the matter is made still worse by the fact that the moral

virtues are not presented strictly according to Aristotle, but

according to the four chief virtues of Plato, who does not find any

place for special knowledge-virtues, so that while, now, wisdom does

not, yet prudence does, appear as a moral cardinal virtue, whereas in

fact prudence belongs unquestionably along with wisdom to the

knowledge-virtues, as is the case in Aristotle (� 17). The fact is, the

entire Greek schema is totally inadequate for the expression of the

Christian virtues, and the violence of the process is felt at e-very

step of the attempt. Even the utterly untenable position of Aristotle,

that virtue always lies in the middle between two opposite aberrations

(� 17), is adopted by Thomas Aquinas, and applied even to the

knowledge-virtues; to the theological-virtues he applies it only in

this respect, that, in them, we are to reach a definite measure

corresponding to our nature (ii, 1, 64),--to say the least, a strange

application of the middle-way of Aristotle.

On the virtues in general, Thomas Aquinas makes also the following

observations, mostly in the spirit of Aristotle: every virtue is

heightened in its power by exercise; all of them stand in connection

with each other, and when they appear in their perfection, no one of

them is without all the others. The virtues, according as they are

viewed under different aspects, are, as to worth, in part equal and in

part unequal; the knowledge-virtues are per se nobler than the moral

virtues, inasmuch as reason is nobler than desire; but in respect to

their activity, the moral virtues stand higher, as they are more

fruitful in results. The perfect practice of virtue depends on the

directly God-conferred seven gifts of the Spirit (ii, 1, 68), which

make the person willing to follow the promptings of the Holy Spirit,--a

thought which occurs already in Ambrose and in Gregory I., but in

respect to which, even the intellectual acumen of a Thomas Aquinas does

not succeed in making clear the relation of these gifts to the

corresponding virtues; especially the theological.

The moral activity determines itself according to a law; this law

belongs to the sphere of reason. The eternal law is the universe-ruling

divine reason, not the fortuitous reason of the individual. The laws of

nature, and also those of the practical reason (ratio practica) are an

efflux from the eternal law, and the human laws of the state and of

society are in turn an efflux from both. The laws which lie merely in

the natural reason do not suffice for morality; but there is needed, in

order to the supernatural end of blessedness, also a positive divine

law, which is made known and evidenced to all by revelation, and which

at the same time also preserves the natural consciousness from all

doubt (ii, 1, 90 sqq).--In the field of Christian morality the law

proper, which is absolutely binding on all Christians, is to be

distinguished from the counsels, which are left to free choice, though

the following of them works a higher perfection and leads more speedily

to the goal of salvation. The Old Testament law, as a law of servitude,

had no such counsels; but the Gospel as a law of freedom has them, in

order to bring men rightly to a consciousness of their freedom. The.

clinging to the earthly hinders our arriving at the heavenly; hence the

counsels hasten this arriving, in that they free man as far as possible

from earthly enjoyments which are otherwise not forbidden to him; they

therefore require poverty, perpetual chastity (that is, non-marriage),

and the yoke of obedience (obedientiae servitus), the latter very

erroneously based on Matt. xix, 21 ("follow me,") and on John x, 27

(ii, 1, 108, art. 4; comp. ii, 2, 186).--The Christian law as

distinguished from the natural law cannot be fulfilled by our own

natural power, but only in virtue of the grace-gifts infused into the

hearts of believers; and in so far man acquires for himself, by his

virtue, no merit before God. Without grace no one can acquire the life

of blessedness; on the presupposition of grace, however, man can in

fact acquire a merit before God, and thereby an increase of grace and

of the love of God, and hence also a heightening of his blessedness

(meritum condigni) (ii, 1, 114).

Opposed to the morally-good stands evil; to the virtuous act, sin; and

to virtue as a habit, vice (ii, 1, 71 sqq.); sin and vice are in

contradiction to true reason, and hence in general to the essence or

nature of man. In reference to the kind of pleasure felt or sought in

sin, sins are divided into spiritual and fleshly sins. In reference to

their guilt and punishableness, they are classed into venial and mortal

(peccata venalia et mortalia); the former consist in the turning to the

finite without a conscious and designed turning-away from God, and they

involve finite punishments, either here upon earth or in purgatory;

mortal sins consist in a conscious and designed turning-away from, and

hence in a conscious rebelling against, God and his will,--are contrary

to the order of love, and hence involve eternal punishment. The gravity

of the guilt is measured by the importance of the object, by the

motives, by the degree of consciousness and of freedom, and by the

spiritual character and position of the subject in society. In

reference to the positive or negative contents of the action, sins fall

into sins of commission and of omission (peccata commissionis et

omissionis). In reference to their manner of commission, sins are sins

of the heart, of the mouth, and of act (peccata cordis, oris, operis).

In sin there is to be distinguished a twofold consent of the rational

will, namely, to the pleasure in the sin, and to the sinful deed

itself, the latter being the more criminal.--The causes of sin, as act,

are in part direct, namely, erring cognition and volition-the regarding

a seeming good as a real one, and the willing it, and, in part,

indirect, namely, first, inner ones, such as imagination, sensuousness,

ignorance, passion, and other already committed sins; and, second,

outward or tempting ones, such as evil spirits and bad men; temptation,

however, presupposes, in order to its effectualness, a sinful welcoming

of it. God is not the cause of sin, though indeed, in virtue of his

righteousness, He is the mediate cause of the consequences of sin, e.

g., of the hardening of the heart. The sinful corruption which

transmits itself from the first man to all following generations, that

is, original sin, is, formally, the being destitute of original

righteousness, and, materially, the tending of the soul-powers to false

goods,--concupiscentia (75 sqq). The particular sins are severally

treated of in connection with the virtues of which they are the

violation.

In his, not seldom very casuistical carrying out of details, Thomas

Aquinas, notwithstanding his moral earnestness, does not, on the whole,

incline to theoretical rigor, but leaves pretty free scope for personal

determination in particular cases, and even in the face of outward

human law. The right of property, for example, is, in his opinion, not

unconditional; and in extreme cases of necessity, where the saving of

life is involved, the right of self-preservation takes precedence of

the right of property, and a person sins not when, in such a case, he

openly or secretly takes from the refused superfluity of another that

which he needs (ii, 2, sq. 66, 7).--To take interest for money loaned,

he regards, in agreement with general ancient-Christian and Mediaeval

opinion, as unallowable; otherwise the same thing would be paid for

twice; he who sells a loaf of bread, may not demand another special

payment for the eating of the same; he who lends receives, in fact, the

purchase price with the return of the simple sum lent; however, it is

not unallowable, in case of need, to pay interest to others for

money.--The duty of truthfulness admits, indeed, of saying less than

one knows to be the truth, but not more; for the little is a part of

the whole. All lies are sins, though in different degrees; a conscious

lie for the injury of another is a mortal sin, but a lie said in sport

or a lie of courtesy (mendacium officiosum) in indifferent things, and

where it injures no one, is a venial one (ii, 2, sq. 110, 4).

Duns Scotus (ob. 1308), whose really speculative acumen went but too

often astray into sophistical and skeptical reasonings, involved the

moral idea, and above all its special application, in more than one

respect, in uncertainty, namely, by his sophist-delight in the

discovering and in the ingenious solving of contradictions and

difficulties. A minutely spun-out quatenus makes room for the most

opposite assumptions, and opens the way, to subjective discretion, for

a lax construing of the law. Many elements in Scotus remind us

strikingly of the later aberrations of the Jesuitical view. The notion

of the freedom of the will he conceives, in opposition to Thomas

Aquinas, as essentially a mere norm-less discretion, both in man and in

God; while Aquinas held that man, as really rational, has, in his

rational knowledge of the good, a motive--not a compelling one, it is

true, but a motive--to the good, so that he cannot determine himself

equally easily for the rational and the irrational, but has in fact a

primitive, a constitutional inclination to the good, and that

consequently the will does not by any means stand entirely neutral (ii,

1, 9, 13, 17, 58), Duns Scotus maintains, on the contrary, that

according to this view the will is not at all free, but is determined

by knowledge; according to his view, the will, as free, is not ini the

least bound by rational knowledge, but stands perfectly neutral, and

can with like facility decide for, or against, the known good. [121]

Likewise, also, is the freedom of the divine will in nowise to be

conceived of as characterized by any inner necessity, so that, for

example, God could not equally well will the opposite of that which he

actually does will. A course of order is not willed by God and

established as a law because it is good per se, but it is good simply

and solely because God has willed it precisely so; but He might just as

readily have willed the opposite thereof. Hence also God is not bound

by his commands, and He can in fact annul them,--not merely the

positive laws of Revelation, but also the natural laws of morals; only

from the two first laws of the Decalogue, as resulting directly from

the essence of God, can God not dispense. [122] It is evidently in the

interest of this lax notion of liberty that Duns Scotus admits also of

morally indifferent actions--not merely such manners of action, as,

being neither commended nor forbidden, constitute the sphere of the

allowed,--but also real, positive actions which are neither good nor

evil, that is, which are not done out of love to God, but also not in

opposition to Him. [123] Hence in regard to particular moral cases;

Duns Scotus shows himself often very lax. Falsehood and

misrepresentation he declares as, under certain circumstances,

allowable. [124] An oath of promise obligates to its fulfillment only

when the person had at the time of swearing it the intention of

fulfilling it,--though of course an oath in which one did not have this

intention, is a moral sin. [125]

Scholastic ethics as a whole bears a pretty unvarying outward form. The

method is, as the several points present themselves, first, to state

the various opposing views with the reasons in their favor, and then to

pass a decision upon the point itself; mere dicta of the Fathers,

especially of Augustine and of Dionysius the Areopagite, and often also

of the Philosophus, that is, Aristotle, suffice in and of themselves as

conclusive proofs; texts from the Scriptures fall rather into the

back-ground.--Despite the undeniable acumen shown by the schoolmen in

the development of processes of reasoning, there is yet manifest also a

lack of the courage to derive their philosophical systems purely and

simply from the Christian consciousness. Graeco-Roman ethics was in

fact, to the schoolmen, not a merely preliminary and preparatory study,

but it was with them of quite too determining an influence, also in

respect to the subject-matter of their science. They endeavor, indeed,

with great earnestness to exalt extra-Christian philosophy into the

sphere of Christian thought; it proves, however, an element too mighty

for them, and they do not wholly escape entangling the Christian

consciousness in the heathen, and thus robbing it of its peculiarity.

They felt indeed the antagonism, but did not overcome it, and the

prevalent lifeless juxtaposing of the two elements shows only their

embarrassment, but not their ability to dominate the foreign

material.--The almost universal resorting to certain favorite numbers

in the division and classification of the subject-matter, particularly

to three and seven, and also to four and twelve, is indeed based on an

obscure consciousness of an inner order of the spiritual life; but this

order does not come to a scientific consciousness, and the real reason

for its observance is, after all, the typical significance of these

numbers as sacred. That there should be presented precisely seven

beatitudes, seven (diversely-stated) mortal sins, etc., seems without

inner ground; and frequently this using of numbers sinks to jejune

play, as, e. g., when a certain writer introduces every-where the

number twelve,--in the dividing of his subject, in assigning reasons,

in citing objections, etc.

The ethical subject-matter treated of by the schoolmen was subsequently

wrought over in large, though but little systemetized summaries in

connection with appropriate citations from the Fathers, and placed

within reach of the wider circles of the ecclesiastical world. To the

period of Thomas Aquinas himself belongs the Summa of William Peraldus,

[126] an essentially casuistical and pretty well digested appreciation

of scholastic science; after which we may mention the Speculum morale,

attributed to Vincent of Beauvais (ob. 1264), but originating in the

fourteenth century; [127] and also the much used and very complete and

erudite Summa of Antony of Florence (ob. 1450). [128]

John of Salisbury (ob. 1180, as Bishop of Chartres), who opposed

scholasticism proper with brilliant ability, but was rather empirical

in regard to the source of knowledge, though in other respects of rich

philosophical culture, undertook to give to the moral views of the

Church a scientific expression; in his efforts he based himself most

largely on Gregory the Great. To be perfect is God's essence, to become

perfect is the task of man as God's image; man becomes perfect, and

hence happy only by moral activity,--which activity rests, on the one

hand, on the knowledge of the truth, and, on the other, on love to God.

Since the fall into sin man can know the truth only in virtue of divine

revelation and illumination, and he can realize the good only by the

assistance of divine grace. Because of the evil desire inborn in all

men, there is no virtue without a constant struggle of our love to

righteousness, as strengthened by redemption, against our innate evil

desires. Even as the essence and source of all sins is the natural

desire as developed into pride and presumption (so that consequently

all virtuous effort directs itself primarily against the pride of the

heart), so the essence of all Christian virtue is that humility which

springs from love to God, and which seeks to lay aside all self-will

and to give God the glory in all things. Hence the moral worth of

actions lies not in the work, but in the disposition; but from the

right disposition there follows with moral necessity also the right

work.--Morality is not, however, a merely individual task, it finds its

full truth only in the moral community-life, which comes to expression

in the church and in the closely therewith-connected Christian state.

The State has, as a real moral organism, also a moral task, namely, to

execute righteousness according to the divine will, and not only to

protect the morality of the people, but also to foster and guide it.

Hence the law which governs the state is to be an expression, not of

human discretion, but only of the divine will, to which even the prince

must absolutely subordinate himself; hence it must rest on God's

revealed Word, and the vicegerents of God, that is, the representatives

of the religious community-life--the Church,--must be also the

animating soul of the Christian state; for, in fact, in its moral task,

the Christian state is identical with the church. God-fearing is the

life-power of the Christian state, and this state must therefore above

all things recognize and honor both the moral right of the church and

also the priests as the higher and, so to speak, divine element in

worldly society. The priests indeed should not and may not themselves

guide and administer the state; they are rather simply by their moral

example, by doctrine, by exhortation, and by reproof, to influence the

same, but the princes to whom by divine ordinance the guidance of the

state belongs, have received the sword only from the higher moral

community, the church, in order to execute justice in the name of the

Christian idea; and so likewise stands the military order, knighthood,

not merely in the service of the prince, but quite as fully, and in

fact primarily, in the service of God, and hence of the church. A

prince who breaks away from divine law, who rebels against the divine

ordinances, and hence also against the church, has, as a tyrant,

forfeited his moral right to the crown, and it is not merely legitimate

to offer resistance to him, but also in any manner whatever, even by

treachery or assassination, to get rid of him [Policraticus iv, 2]. The

political doctrine of John of Salisbury is a Mediaeval Christian

counterpart to Plato's doctrine of the state, with which he was not

acquainted, and is in fact an attempt to introduce Augustine's Civitas

Dei into the worldly state. [129]

The fondness of Schoolmen for proposing difficult controversial

questions led them inevitably into the province of casuistry; and this

science--which had sustained itself alongside of

scholasticism--subsequently borrowed from scholastic science much

congenial material, and in part also a scientific form. Hence at the

decline of scholasticism in the fourteenth century, casuistry entered

in fact upon its brightest days. The works entitled Summae casuum

conscientiae, were very much used in connection with confession and

penance, and, as they generally contained also much matter relative to

church law, also in ecclesiastical administration. In them we find a

very imperfectly digested, and often merely alphabetical, summary of

specific single moral questions, which relate in the main to what is

allowed or disallowed, and the decision of which is given less from

general principles than on the basis of the utterances of the more

highly esteemed Fathers. The questions are often not taken from life at

all, but are siniply invented in order to exercise ingenuity, as in

riddle-solving; and in some of these works there is manifested a

peculiarly fond lingering over extremely impure subjects. In the

presence of the too exclusively considered individual case, the general

principles involved in it are often wholly lost sight of, and ethics is

in danger of degenerating into a sophistry of special-pleading,--into a

treating of the moral merely empirically and skeptically; thus we find

questions often extensively discussed, as doubtful, which cannot be in

the least practically doubtful for the unsophisticated moral

consciousness. The best known of these works are the Summae of Raymund

of Pennaforti in the thirteenth century, [130] and of Astesanus in the

fourteenth [131] (the Astesana, is cautious and judicious, contains

also many general considerations, and is pretty systematic and

comprehensive); Angelus of Clavasio in the fifteenth century [132] (the

Angelica, perhaps the most extensively used; alphabetical, with much

worthless matter, and often treating of indelicate questions);

Sylvester Prierias, General of the Dominicans, the well-known opponent

of Luther, gave in his Summa moralis, [133] generally called Summa

summarum, an alphabetical compilation from others. (The Pisanella [1470

and often], revised by Nicolas of Ausmo, 1471, '73, '74, '75, '78;

Galensis, 1475; Rosella, 1516; Pacifica, 1574. The Biblia aurea, 1475,

'81,--also in German, alphabetical.)--Also the Decretum of Gratian

contains, in its first part, much that appertains to casuistical

ethics.

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[121] Quaestt. in libr. Sentent. ii, dist. 25, ed. Lugd., 1639, t. 6,

p. 873 sqq.

[122] Ibid. iii, dist. 37, t. 7, p. 857.

[123] Ibid. ii, dist. 41.

[124] Ibid. iii, dist. 38, p. 917.

[125] Ibid. iii, dist. 39, p. 980.

[126] Summa s. tractatius de virtutibus et vitiis, from the fifteenth

century, (without date or place of printing, then at Col. Agr., 1479

fol.; Basle, 1497, 8vo.) often reprinted.

[127] Not in his Opp., 1481, but separately printed as a part of the

great Speculum naturale, etc., 1473, and subsequently.

[128] Summa theol., 1477, 1478, 1480, 1496; 1740, 4 vols.

[129] Especially in his Policraticus.--(Reuter: Joh. v. S., 1842).

Schaarschmidt: Joh. Saresb., 1862.

[130] Summa de casibus poenitentiae, Verona, 1744; upon this is based

the work of John of Freiburg, Augsb., 1472, and frequently.

[131] S. d. cas. consc. (at first without date or place) about 1468-72

fol.; then at Col., 1479; Norimb., 1482, and often later.

[132] S. cas. consc., 1486 without place, fol.; Venet., 1487 4to.;

Norimb., 1488, and often.

[133] Printed in 1515 4to.; Argent., 1518 fol.

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SECTION XXXV.

The writings of the Mystics contain in the field of ethics many

profound thoughts, though without rigidly scientific form. This is the

case with Richard of St. Victor and Bonaventura. Less mystical than

simply practical, and strongly emphasizing the subjective phase of

morality, was the influence of Bernard of Clairvaux, and later, of

Thomas � Kempis; while Eckart, and in part even Tauler, conceive the

moral in the main negatively and quietistically (in the spirit of a

Pantheistically-infected mysticism) as spiritual poverty,, as the

turning-away of the spirit from all that is created. Occupying a

mediating position between mysticism and scholasticism, also John

Gerson seeks to give form to ethics, but he already begins to show

signs of that paralysis of the moral spirit which had spread into the

widest circles previously to the Reformation; Raymund de Sabunde deals

in more popularly-practical modes of thought. In the spirit of the

Reformation, and as its precursors, worked, in the field of ethics,

also Wickliffe, Huss, John of Goch, and Savonarola.

In contrast to the growingly-Aristotelian, dialectical treatment of

ethics, the mystical anti-scholastic current of theology clings, more

or less closely, to the writings of the supposed Areopagite (� 31), but

keeps for the most part clear from the daring speculations of John

Scotus Erigena, and gives, in general, thoughtful meditations and

profound glances of insight rather than rigorous and clear processes of

reasoning. The freedom of the will is, by most of the Mediaeval

mystics, pretty strongly emphasized; but the active working in the

outer world is made largely to give place to the purely contemplative

life.

Richard of St. Victor (about 1150) treats, in several special works, of

the inner life of the pious heart in its union with God,--a life which

through contemplatio as distinguished from cogitatio and meditatio,

passes over into self-forgetting love. The divine is not attained to by

laborious thinking and doing, but by an immediate and spiritual, freely

self-devoting vision or beholding, to which receptive state of the soul

God lovingly manifests himself as in-streaming light. And the soul

becomes receptive by the progressive cleansing of it from the dross of

the earthly life, from the striving after the creature,--by

self-immersion into itself, not in order to hold fast to itself in

antithesis to God, but in order to aspire toward him in ardent

love-desire; the goal is perfect, blissful rest in God; the condition

is the operation of grace and the willing, joyous laying-hold upon the

same on the part of the subject.--Bonaventura (ob. 1274) attempts to

fuse dialectics with mysticism, but, notwithstanding his frequently

almost overflowing subjectivity of feeling, his mysticism is less

sustained and less deep than that of Richard St. Victor, and lingers

more in the sphere of practical piety.--Bernard of Clairvaux (ob.

1153),--opposing scholasticism in many respects not without good

grounds, and confining himself mainly to the practical sphere,--has

also carefully examined the subject of ethics in some of its parts; (De

diligendo deo; De gradibus humilitatis et superb.; De gratia et libero

arbitrio; De consideratione.) To true virtue belong two things: divine

grace and a free, active embracing of the same; without freedom there

is no responsibility. But freedom is threefold: first, freedom of

nature as opposed to necessity; second, freedom of grace,--attained to

through Christ,--that is, emancipation from the bondage of sin; and,

third, freedom of glory which is realized in eternal blessedness, but

enjoyed here only in moments of spiritual vision. Freedom of choice is

from nature, but by grace it is regulated and attracted toward the

good, though not forced. By simple free-will we belong to ourselves; by

the willing of the good we belong to God; by the willing of evil, to

Satan. The decision lies in our own hand; no one is forced to

salvation. Love, as constituting the essence of the moral, has four

degrees: first, man loves himself for his own sake; second, he loves

God, not, however, for God's but for, his own sake, because without God

he can do nothing; third, he loves God for God's sake, out of

thankfulness for experienced love; fourth, he loves also himself solely

for God's sake; this highest stage, that of true morality, is, however,

but seldom enjoyed in this life. The essence of wisdom, on the whole,

is, to behold and to love the invisible essence of God in all things,

to give up all that we have to God, and to live only in God and for

God. All true virtue is an expression of humility, whereby, in true

self-knowledge man becomes nothing in his own eyes; humility leads in

twelve stages to the truth, which truth in turn develops itself in

three stages, the highest of which is the direct spiritual beholding of

God. Humility, love, and the beholding of the truth, are the three

aliments of the soul, corresponding to the Son, the Spirit, and the

Father. The mystical element in Bernard shows itself mainly in the

development of the doctrine of contemplation. Many of his principles he

borrows from the ethics prevalent in his day, as, e. g., the four

cardinal virtues, and also the notion of the middle-way as the essence

of virtue.

Master Eckart (a Dominican at Cologne, ob. 1329), [134] distinguished

for profound insight, but not unfrequently overpassing, in his fervid

soarings, the limits of the Christian world-theory, was of very great

influence on subsequent mystics; taking his departure from Dionysius

the Areopagite, he pushes the thought of the union of the soul with

God, as the highest good to such a height as almost to lose sight of

the individual existence of the creature, and of its distinctness from

God,-- not, however, in the sense of modern Pantheism, but in that of

John Scotus Erigena; The world is, strictly speaking, nothing at

all,--is rather mere appearance than reality; God alone is real in

whatever exists; God alone is the object of true love, and in this love

all morality is comprehended. Hence the entire striving of man must be

directed to this end, namely, to becoming at one with God, to laying

aside his separate existence, to turning away from all that is created,

to wishing nothing, loving nothing, knowing nothing but God alone--to

merging himself into God, to transforming himself into God. If God is

to come into the soul, then the creature must be driven out; if man is

to become rich in God, then he must become poor in the creature. When

man turns himself away from all that is finite, when he forgets himself

and the world, and directs his soul exclusively toward God, then God

pours himself into his soul,--God is born in the soul, and the soul has

eternal rest in God. Virtuous working in the world is not the highest

working, for in it man disperses himself into the multiplicity of the

finite; he who has found God, who has God dwelling in himself, divests

himself also of works,--seeks only the inner work, reposes in God

alone; nay, he aims not at his own blessedness, for in fact this is

also a clinging to self, to the created,--he aims only at giving

himself wholly up to God, at sacrificing himself to God, at reducing

himself to nothing, at cutting off and throwing away from himself

whatever is finite or creature-like, or different from God; he breaks

himself loose not only from sin, but also from the world and from his

own self. Not man is to work, but he is to let God exclusively and

alone work in him; such purity of heart, such freedom from all self,

also from all personal volition, is the highest good, is the spiritual

birth of God in the soul; we possess all good when we are united with

God's nature, and a single glance at God "in his nakedness" is of more

avail, and unites the soul more with God, than all the works of

Christendom could accomplish.

In a similar spirit, although less bold in emphasizing the mystical

element, wrote and lived Tauler, Eckart's disciple (a Dominican at

Cologne and Strasburg, ob. 1361). He presented, in his "Imitation of

the humble Life of Christ," [135] a system of pure mysticism, and

which, for that very reason, was one-sided and dangerous to the

Christian consciousness. The essence of morality is spiritual poverty;

the way to life, to "equality with God," is to become spiritually poor,

to be separated from all that belongs to the creature, to cling to

nothing among finite things; as, however, all that is finite must cling

to something, hence man is to cling only to that which is above

himself, to God. The poorer man is in the creature, so much the richer

is he in God; God is intuited only immediately, without ally

intervention of the creature; in so far as man looks to the creature he

is distant from God. Man must put off from himself all that is

multiple, manifold, in order to become rich in the One,--must be poor

in knowledge in so far as knowledge relates to the finite and is

involved in finite forms,--poor in virtue in so far as it is an acting

in the finite (only the disposition is divine),--poor even in grace in

so far as the soul in its union with God stands no longer in a mere

relation of grace to God, but is actively led by God in harmony with

himself in a divine manner. The sole true knowledge is the direct

spiritual beholding of God. The sole virtue is simple love to God. God

is free from every thing that is creatural; in spiritual poverty man

becomes also free from and divested of all things,--presses, as a free

soul, into the uncreated good, into God, and is no longer affected by

earthly pleasure or by pain. Hence true divine freedom springs from

poverty and humility; false freedom, from pride. God is a pure

activity--a mere working; therefore also poverty is a pure working with

God; now there are three kinds of work: (1) natural work, in part

bodily and sensuous; this work must take place with moderation and in

the Holy Ghost, and the senses must be indulged in their necessary

wants; and in part, spiritual, as knowledge and love; also this work

must take place only in so far as necessary, must be turned aside from

all not absolutely essential things; otherwise it leads to pride. (2)

Grace-work; in man, this work is primarily learning, namely, acquiring

a knowledge of the Scriptures and of all the efficacy of the Holy

Spirit, and hence also a knowledge of good and evil. When man permits

himself to be guided by the divine Spirit that dwells within him, then

he becomes a friend of God; as such, he must divest himself of all

temporal things, and renounce them, for they are all null and void; he

must simply follow Christ, and in so doing he attains (3) to the divine

work in man; man is now one spirit with God, and seeks nothing but God;

his work is God's work, and God's work is his own work; and God's

spirit speaks to him no more in symbol and form, but in full life,

light, and truth. All the powers of the soul keep holiday, arid are at

rest, and let God alone work, and this is the highest work of which

they are capable. The human spirit loses finally its own self, loses

itself in God and knows no longer any thing but God; God puts himself

in the place of reason in man, and works man's works; the soul merges

itself into God and remains eternally hovering in God,--drowns itself

in the unfathomable sea of divinity. Hence by the renouncing of all

that is temporal, by true poverty, man becomes divested also of outward

works. He who has no longer any thing wherewith to help his fellow-man,

is in fact no longer required to do so; also external works belong to

the sphere of the temporal, and hence man must pass through them and

beyond them up to true poverty and vision; in this one work he works

all works, and in this one virtue he has all virtues.--In Tauler the

one phase of the moral, namely, union with God, is pushed one-sidedly

into untruth, so that the right of the creatural individuality is

relatively lost sight of, and hence we find in many respects

Pantheistical forms of thought.--John Ruisbroch of Brussels (ob. 1381)

wrote in a similar spirit, but strayed into a still more transcendental

heart-mysticism, though his, works abound rather in allegorizing

portrayals and confident assertions than in scientific demonstration.

The comprehensiveness of a Gerson (ob. 1429) could not bring to a check

the decline of the inner spirit of the church, which was now seriously

affecting also the general moral consciousness. Scholasticism and

casuistry had, by their interminable subtleties;. largely obscured the

more simple moral modes of thought-;: and while puzzling themselves in

fruitless speculation over the imaginary difficulties of

cunningly-invented cases of conscience, they lost all sense for moral

straightforwardness; and found abundant pretexts for making exceptions

from the moral rule. The Franciscan, Jean Petit of Paris, was able, on

occasion of the murder of the regent, the Duke of Orleans, in 1407, to

find reasons for openly justifying the murder of tyrants, and the

Council of Constance did not venture to pronounce a decided disapproval

of this doctrine; and not only that, but it gave, for the first time,

serious countenance to the notion of moral probabilism, that is, the

doctrine that a morally doubtful action is permissible on condition

that several esteemed Fathers can be cited in its favor. [136] Gerson,

who opposed the doctrine of Petit with but half-heart, was also himself

involved in the general laxity of the moral consciousness; he also

countenanced probabilism. He held that the vow of celibacy was violated

only by actual marriage but not by fornication, and for this sin he

shows an excessive leniency. [137] The notorious morality of the

Jesuits is not peculiar to them, but is only the further development of

a spirit that was already powerful in the Romish church before the time

of the Reformation. In other respects Gerson seeks, in his numerous

writings on specific moral topics, to mitigate the erroneousness of the

prevailing moral views; the monastic life and the doctrine of the

divine counsels, he does not esteem so highly as did the spirit of his

age; he finds the difference between venial and mortal sins rather in

the subjective intention than in the objective nature of the sin. The

mystical element appears in Gerson under a very moderated form.

Thomas � Kempis (ob. 1471), the author of the most widely known of all

books of devotion: De imitatione Christi (translated into all European

languages, and published nearly two thousand times), shows himself in

this book as a thoroughly practical, moderated mystic, of deep moral

life-experience, and of genuine, heart-felt, morally-vigorous piety;

and hence his work is not less prized in the Protestant than in the

Romish church. The thoughts are presented in a clear, genuinely-popular

style, and the rich heart-depth is thereby thrown all the more brightly

into relief.--The book known as German Theology, published first by

Luther in 1516, but springing from an unknown author of the fifteenth

century, is based on Tauler, and is characterized by a somewhat more

strongly speculative mysticism than that of Kempis,--emphasizing in an

almost one-sided manner the turning-away from self and from the world,

and the becoming united with God as the one eternal good, so that the

moral right of the personality is thrown quite too far into the

back-ground, and too little distinction is made between the personality

itself and the "selfhood" that is to be done away with.

Less peculiar in contents than in form, and differing equally from

scholasticism and from mysticism, are the moral views of Raymund de

Sabunde (of Toulouse, about 1430). [138] Appropriating to himself the

results of preceding theological and philosophical thought, he

undertook, rather from the stand-point of experience, of the

observation of nature, and of the common sense of mankind, to place

these results within reach of the understanding of the masses. The

freedom of the will as directed toward the good is the highest

possession of reason; called to the highest place in the scale of

created beings, man should, by free conduct, show himself worthy of

this calling,--should establish and preserve the harmony of the

created. As man has received nothing from himself, but every thing from

God alone, hence his first duty is thankful love to God who first loved

him (tit. 96 sqq., 109 sqq.); love to self becomes moral only through

love to God. Other creatures give us good only in so far as God works

through them, and hence our love to them must be subordinated to our

love to God; but out of this love to God follows also a love to that

which He has created, and hence, first of all, to man as God's image;

hence the requirement to love one's neighbor as one's self (120 sqq).

Through love to God, man constantly grows in God-likeness, for amor

convertit amantem in rem amatam (129 sqq.), though this is not to be

taken in the sweeping sense of the Mystics. Evil consists in this, that

we honor and love the creature not in God but for itself, and is

consequently idolatry; the root of all evil is this impious love to

self, that is, it is self-seeking and self-will; the devil seeks

nothing but himself.--As in consequence of sin a general corruption of

man's nature has been brought about, and as the power of sin over man

is paralyzed only by redemption, hence Christian morality rests

entirely on loving thankfulness to Christ, and involves a constant

struggle against the remains of sin that still infect us.

The evangelical tendency which during the time of the universal

domination of the Romish church had never entirely disappeared, and

which, especially since the appearance of the Waldenses, had been

growing more positive in its opposition to the corrupted church,

directed its efforts from the very first against the anti-scriptural

and arbitrary ordinances of said church, especially against the

work-holiness of monastic morality, in order to vindicate the moral

freedom of the Christian personality, and also against the sophistical

laxity of the more recent period; this tendency insists above all upon

faith-born love as the source and essence of all true morality, and

rejects the notion of supererogatory merit as arising from the

observance of the so-called evangelical counsels.--So taught Wickliffe

in his Trialogus, but rather as assailing than as positively building

up; all sin, he refers to a lack in true faith; a correct knowledge of

faith precludes sin; true virtue is not possible without true faith; a

correct knowledge of faith precludes sin; true virtue is not possible

without true faith; hence by a man's virtue one can judge of his faith.

Wickliffe's over-rigid and almost deterministic predestinarianism

simply stands, unmediated, along-side of his moral views, and merely

impedes their freer scope.--Also Huss combats, in the ethical field,

chiefly only against the errors of Romish dogmas and morals, without

himself establishing any thing essentially new.--Violent and keen, and

generally, though not always, purely evangelical are also the assaults

of Nicolas de Clamengis [Clemangis] in France--ob. about 1440--against

the corruption of the moral consciousness of the church). [139] --John

of Goch, of Malines (ob. 1475) assailed, from an Augustinian

stand-point, the commingling of the evangelical with the Mosaic law,

also the system of vows, and outward work-holiness in general; faith as

working by love is the essence of Christian freedom and morality. [140]

The influence of Savonarola in Florence lay more in his fiery zeal for

pure evangelical morality than in fruits of scientific thought; in his

mode of thinking, the phase of the God-possessecl affections stands

forth with most prominence; a mystical subjectiveness is combined with

a fervent work-activity. [141]

If we leave out of view these teachers of the church who were

forerunners of the Reformation, we find in general in the

ecclesiastical ethics prevailing before the opening of this Reformation

a threefold character: a casuistical, a scholastic, and a mystical one,

corresponding to the three phases of the soul-life, namely, to the

empirical understanding, to the speculative reason and to the loving

heart. The mystical form of ethics is the pure antithesis to the

casuistical; the former rests on heart-union with God, the latter on

the analyzing understanding; the former, upon an inward ineffable

vision, the latter, upon outward calculating observation; the former

strays at times int6 the borders of Pantheism, and hence has some

points of contact with the cosmic theory of India; the. latter is

rather in danger of repeating, in the Christian sphere, the Jewish

externality and chicanery of Pharisaism and Talmudism;--the former

reduces all plurality, all heterogeneousness, to a homogeneous

unity,--endangers the practically moral working-life in the world; the

latter dissolves the moral idea into an atomistic plurality of single

cases devoid of uniting bond;--mysticism turns itself away disdainfully

from all objective reality even of the moral life; casuistry threatens

to bind up and to smother the moral in narrow legal forms; mysticism

turns away from the circumference toward the center, but does not

return again from the center to the circumference; casuistry proceeds

and stumbles by a reverse course;-the former tends to a

lightly-esteeming of the active life, the latter to a hypocritical and

external work-holiness. Speculative ethics, especially in Thomas

Aquinas, stands higher than in either of the other two forms, but lacks

too much in evangelical directness and simplicity; and because of its

double dependence on Greek ethics, on the one hand, and on the

evangelical church-creed, on the other, it has not only compromised its

legitimate and essential freedom, but, at the same time, also its

truth. Notwithstanding this, however, it stands (especially in its

highest perfection in Thomas Aquinas) far more closely to the

evangelical consciousness than the later form of Roman Catholic ethics

as presented by the zealous champion of the Romish church, the Jesuits.

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[134] Schriften, edited by Pfeiffer, 1847,--(mostly sermons; larger

scientific works of his appear to be lost. C. Schmidt in Stud. u.

Krit., 1839; Martensen, 1842; J. Back, 1864.

[135] Edited by Schlosser, 1833 (in modern German); his sermons are

mostly practico-edificatory. The work, Medulla animae, is not by Tauler

C. Schmidt: J. Tauler, 1841.

[136] Marheinecke: Gesch. d. christl Moral, etc., 1806, p. 161 sqq.;

St�udlin: Gesch. d. ch. Mor. seit. d. Wiederaufl., etc., p. 63 sqq.;

Wessenberg: Kirschenversamml., 2, 247.

[137] Opp., Antv., 1706, t. iii, 917 sqq.

[138] Theologia naturalis, Solisb., 1852.--Matzke: R. v. S., 1816.

[139] De corrupto eccl. statu, and in briefer essays and letters, Opp.,

1613.

[140] Ullmann: Reformatoren vor d. Ref., 1841, i.

[141] Rudelbach: Sav., 1835; F. C. Meier, 1836.

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III. THE EPOCH OF REFORM.

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SECTION XXXVI.

The antagonism of the evangelical ground-thought to that of Romanism

manifested itself also in ethics. In the evangelical or Protestant

church the sinful corruption of the natural man was conceived much more

deeply, and consequently the moral task of the Christian much more

earnestly; and, as a consequence of the impossibility of meriting

salvation by our works, Christian virtue was conceived, in much greater

freedom from self-seeking, as the-simple fruit of faith; and the notion

of supererogatory works became impossible in view of the decided

recognition, that the life even of the most holy always falls short of

moral perfection. The Scriptural view excludes a very essential portion

of Romish ethics from that of the evangelical church. [142]

The semi-Pelagian enfeebling of the effects of sin that prevailed in

the Romish church, deprived ethics of its proper deep-reaching

foundation. The more deeply the moral corruption of man is conceived

of, so much the greater becomes also the significancy of redemption,

and likewise also of the moral struggle of the regenerated Christian

against sin. Hence the, at first thought, surprising phenomenon that

the rigid predestinarianism of Calvin did not lead to a decline in

moral effort, but on the contrary to a very vigorous moral life. In the

deep earnestness of their conception of the moral task, both

evangelical churches, the Lutheran and the Reformed, stand alike.

The Holy Scriptures are the sole fountain of Christian ethics, just as,

living faith in Christ as the sole cause of salvation, is also the

subjective ground and the living fountain of morality. All blessedness

is imparted to us without our meriting it, and solely of grace; but

good works, as the necessary effects of true faith, are the certain

verification of the same. The moral law is not. as in the Romish

church, predominantly objective, but is of a strictly inward character.

No one can do more than what God requires of him, for man is called to

perfection; all that is truly good is a requirement of the divine law

and not of any mere counsels, which, without the forfeiture of a

God-pleasing life, might in so far be left undone,--all the good that

we can do, we are also under obligation to do. The so-called counsels

of the Romish church are rather a hindering than a furthering of the

good, for they stand in the way of active love, and nourish the

delusion of personal merit. Monastic vows are not consistent with vital

faith. As man is saved only in virtue of redemption through Christ,

hence his salvation rests solely on the worthiness of Christ, and not

on personal merit; all true virtue must be simply a fruit of faith, and

hence of an already-acquired divine sonship, and consequently, though

it may verify this sonship, it cannot first acquire or heighten it.

Evangelical ethics is therefore apparently much less comprehensive in

its subject-matter than that of the Ronlish church,--treats a not

inconsiderable portion of the latter merely condemnatorily, as, e. g.,

the entire subject of asceticism, and of opera supererogatoria as

fulfilling the counsels; on the other hand, however, it has a deeper

ground and a higher earnestness. Romish asceticism simply hides from

view the inner lack of a truly evangelically moral depth. He who has

understood the entire and profound earnestness of the moral life-task,

and is conscious, how far the reality still falls below the moral

prototype, can never come upon the thought of attempting, in addition

to the moral task proposed to us by God, to perform still other

additional works, in order to attain to a still higher degree of

sanctity. All these self-imposed works are really an implication that

God placed the moral goal of man too low, and that He is thankfully

pleased to accept the voluntary and non-owed over-payment of those who

feel themselves superior to the ordinary assessment.

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[142] Comp. H. Merz: System der christl. Sittenlehre in seiner

Gestaltung nach den Grundsetzen des Protestantismus im Gegensatze zum

Katholicismus, T�b., 1841,--ingenious, but prepossessed by speculative

theories, and doing injustice to both sides.

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SECTION XXXVII.

The Reformers themselves treat the moral contents of the Christian

consciousness for the most part only practically; Melanchthon. develops

in his Loci merely the ground-thoughts, though he also attempts, on the

basis of Aristotle, a philosophical establishing of the foundations of

ethics; Calvin gives only brief outlines, independently of the earlier

scholastic method. The antithesis of the two evangelical churches

manifested itself also in wide-reaching differences of ethical views.

As an independent theological science, ethics was somewhat earlier

treated in the Reformed than in the Lutheran church. In the latter, it

was at first either combined, in its mere ground-principles, with

dogmatics, or treated merely practically and popularly; G. Calixtus,

however, treated it as a science distinctly separate from dogmatics,

though only in its scanty beginnings. From this time forward it was

frequently treated independently, though for the most part, even as

late as into the eighteenth century, only as casuistry; and Pietism,

which embraced so earnestly the ethical contents of Christianity,

although with some formal narrowness, prepared the way for a profounder

scientific treatment of ethics.

Luther himself, who embraced the evangelical ground-truths so clearly

and distinctly, was not called by the general scope of his activity to

the preparing of a system of scientific ethics proper. His warfare

against Romish work-holiness, and against the formal, subtle and

freedom-hampering casuistry of the Romanists, must have awakened in him

a certain disinclination to a rigidly-scientific development of ethics,

and an anxiety lest such a work might sink the free moral activity of

the Christian from the sphere of faith-communion with Christ into

unfree and juridical forms. He expressed it repeatedly, that the true

believer needs no law at all, because faith itself is both law and

power, and spontaneously works the God-pleasing out of free love

without being hampered by an objective law. As the apple-tree bears its

fruit not in virtue of a law given to it, but out of its own proper

nature, so are all Christians so tempered by faith that they

spontaneously do well and righteously better than all laws could teach

them to do. Even as the tree must exist antecedently to its fruit, and

as the fruit does not make a tree good or bad, but the tree makes the

fruit, so must man be good or bad before he does good or bad works. The

Christian's love is to be an outward-gushing love, flowing from within

out of the heart, out of his own little fountain; the spring and the

stream are themselves to be good,--are not to derive their waters from

without. Christ was a Redeemer, not a Lawgiver, and the Gospel is not

to be turned into a book of laws. With such views, so directly

antagonistic to the common Romish teaching, if we except the Mystics,

it was natural that a rigidly-drawn-up system of ethics might seem a

hampering to faith-born freedom,-- might seem like an adulterating of

the teachings of the Gospel with the doctrine of the law. This period

of agitated contest was therefore little adapted to the scientific

development of a system of ethics; this science was in fact the fruit

of the evangelical life as having come to inner peace and stability,

and as grown ripe through long experience in faith.

Of the chief Reformers, only Melanchthon,--who was of solid classic

culture, and who gave proof, at the time of his scientific maturity,

both of decided fondness for, and of a thorough understanding of,

Aristotle,--indicated, in his theological writings not only the

ground-thoughts of evangelical ethics, but gave even the outlines of a

system of philosophical ethics. Besides his valuable comments on the

Ethics and Politics of Aristotle, [143] he wrote, on the basis of

Aristotelian principles, Philosophiae moralis epitome, 1538. [144] In

this work Melanchthon keeps philosophical ethics and the Christian

knowledge of the moral strictly separate. The former is capable of

comprehending and presenting only a part of the divine law; it gives

only the natural law; but this is also a true divine law, which is

implanted in human reason; and the philosophical knowledge of the same

is a legitimate requirement and is an education toward the higher

truth, as also the true foundation of all civil legislation, and is

consequently by no means to be despised; moral reason is the mirror

from which the wisdom of God is reflected forth [Corp. Ref., pp. 21-27;

comp. 277]. The method of the work follows the plan of the ethics of

Aristotle, but presents far more solid principles. Man is the image of

God, and his goal is the true development and manifestation of this

image. Hence the end of man is to know and to recognize God, his

prototype, arid to manifest, in and through himself, the glory of God,

by willing and complete obedience [28 sqq]. Of the virtues that fall

within the scope of philosophical ethics, righteousness or justness

takes first rank, and this virtue is pretty fully discussed [63 sqq.],

especially in its civic significancy; more briefly are treated the

virtues of truthfulness, beneficence, thankfulness, and

friendship.--His philosophical ethics appeared, in 1550, entirely

re-written and more independent of Aristotle, as Ethicae doctrinae

elementa et enarratio libri quinti Ethicorum, and afterward in 1554,

'57, '60, and frequently after Melanchthon's death. [145] This

excellent work, though not comprehensive,--shorter even than the

previous work, and presenting only the general bases of the moral, and

examining more fully only certain special and, in part, civic

questions,--is written in a clear, concise, and beautiful style, and is

a worthy commencement toward a system of evangelical and, in fact,

essentially philosophical ethics,--since the seventeenth century

undeservedly laid aside, and also-in more recent times almost

forgotten.--A knowledge of the virtues is necessary, because it shows

that God is; for the eternal and immutable distinction of the moral and

the immoral in our reason cannot be fortuitous, hut must proceed from

the eternal, prescribing reason itself; it shows also how God is,

namely, wise, free, truthful, just, beneficent, merciful, etc.; it is a

witness of God's justly retributing judgments, and is a life-norm for

men in outward (not spiritual) actions and in discipline. Natural

reason, however, can discover neither the ground of the enfeeblement

which has resulted from sin, nor the means of salvation therefrom;

hence philosophy, without the Gospel, does not suffice [Corp. Ref.,

165-167]. Moral philosophy is the scientific presentation of the moral

law of nature in the sphere of external morals and discipline, and is,

in this field, in harmony with the Decalogue, and in so far also with

the Gospel; for the moral law is the eternal and immutable wisdom and

measure of the justice of God, obligating all rational creatures, and

condemning those who come into conflict with it; but the Gospel

preaches repentance, and promises forgiveness of sins on the ground of

redemption by grace. Now, though moral philosophy knows nothing of this

promise, yet, as being a part of the law, it also, on its part, leads

toward the Gospel, and is therefore not to be despised [C. R.,

167-170].--Ethics inquires first of all after the goal of the moral

course. This goal or end is God himself, who lovingly communicates

himself to us, and hence the true knowledge and reverencing of God. God

created man unto his image, hence He wills that He should himself be

manifested in and through man, namely, in that man becomes morally like

unto Him; only in a derived sense can it be said that virtue is the end

of man, as the highest good. The good is that which harmonizes with the

God-set goal; hence evil is a disturbing of the divine plan; and evil

is primarily a malum culpae, in pure antagonism to the divine will, and

then, secondarily, a malum poenae, which by the divine, righteous will

is made to follow upon the guilty malum culpae; God is in no sense

whatever the author or accomplice of sin,--to affirm this would be

blasphemy,--though He is indeed the author of the punishment [C. R.,

170-183].--Virtue, as an acquired tendency to obey right reason, is

conditioned on the fact that, on the ohe hand, reason guides the will

by a right judgment, and that on the other the will freely,

persistently and firmly lays hold upon this judgment, and has pleasure

in so doing. A knowledge of the law and a free-will are the

characteristics of the divine image as created in man by divine love;

virtue is the moral realization of this image,--is thankful, answering

love for received love. In reason, as darkened by sin, this knowledge

and freedom are indeed enfeebled, but not annihilated, and there

remained in man a moral consciousness of right and wrong, and some

degree of freedom to act conformably to this consciousness. Hence, the

will is then truly good when it corresponds to the moral consciousness

in so far as this consciousness harmonizes with the divine will. Hence

virtue--more definitely stated--is the tendency of the will constantly

to hearken to the moral consciousness for God's sake and out of

thankfulness toward him [183 sqq]. The thought of the moral freedom of

the will is, now, thoroughly, carefully, and very emphatically

developed by Melanchthon, and an attempt made to establish it by

Scripture (in harmony with Loci, iv, edition of 1559). Man as man, and

hence even unredeemed man, has in the moral sphere a free discretion to

prefer morality to crime, to perform outward moral works and to

preserve discipline, and it is God's will that such discipline and

order be freely preserved--not merely from fear, but also for

conscience' sake. Indeed, genuine God-fearing, right trust and right

love to God, steadfastness in confession, and hence, in fact, all the

truly God-pleasing spiritual virtues, are impossible without the

assistance of the Holy Spirit; in this assistance, however, man is not

purely inactive like a statue, but reason must attentively lay hold on

the Word of God, and the will must not resist, but must yield to the

gracious workings of the Holy Spirit, and aspire after divine support.

Absolute predestination and Stoic fatality are equally to be rejected.

The passions--by which Melanchthon understands both the impulses of

feeling and the desires--are not to be suppressed as irrational, as the

Stoics teach, but are to be taken into the service of the moral reason,

and those that have become evil by sin are to be resisted

[201-207].--The distribution of the virtues is best made according to

the Decalogue. But the commands of the first table cannot be adequately

known in a purely philosophical manner; nevertheless, some points may

be made. Every effect is dependent on its cause, and must remain in

harmony therewith; man is an effect of God, consequently he ought to

remain in harmony with God, and not break off the bond that unites him

with God. Moreover, as the image of God, man has the duty of remaining

in likeness and harmony with God [214, 215]. In the commandments of the

second table appears, first, the virtue of justness, and in fact

primarily in a general character, in the relation of those who guide

and those who are guided, in which relation obedience to parents and to

the magistracy, and piety in general, appear as a moral law of nature.

Justness in its special form--that which gives to every one his

dues--appears in the three following commandments, which require the

preserving of every one in his rights, in respect to life, to

wedlock-fidelity and to property. The second chief virtue, as expressed

in the eighth commandment, is truthfulness, which is a necessary

requirement of the rational nature of man; for in fact reason consists

essentially in a knowledge of the truth, and consequently it also

requires the truth. The two last commandments enjoin temperateness, but

they are not developed in detail. To these three chief virtues the

others are joined as branches, namely, steadfastness to truthfulness,

and thankfulness, beneficence, diligence, etc., to justness, especially

justness toward God [215-222].--In his second book, Melanchthon gives a

development of the virtue of justness in detail, with the omission of

the other virtues. Justness, or righteousness in the evangelical

sense--the virtue which acquires for man eternal salvation--cannot be

attained to by mere human effort because of the prevalence of sin, but

is imparted to man by grace in virtue of redemption; in moral

philosophy the question is therefore only as to the justness which

consists in the outward fulfilling of positive laws. This justness is,

in part, of a general character, consisting in obedience to law both

human and divine [as in Rom. ii, 13; Psa. cxix, 121], and in part of a

special character; the latter is, in its turn, of a distributive and of

an exchanging character; as distributive it relates to social order, as

well to social superordination and subordination as to the calling of

the proper persons to particular offices, and to rewarding and

punishing, and hence, in general, to the upholding of proper

discipline,--as exchanging it relates to the moral intercourse and

commerce of men among each other as equals. The practice of justness,

and hence also obedience toward those holding office and authority,

takes place not merely in virtue of human laws, but also in the

fulfilling of the divine will; the proper human ordinances of society

are God's ordinances. A violation of the law of nature, and hence also

disobedience toward the legitimate ordinances of civil authority, is

consequently not merely a civil misdemeanor, but also a sin against

God, a mortal sin. The ordinances of the natural law are in part

unconditional, and hence divine and perpetually-valid commands, such as

obedience toward God, parental duties, the virtue of truthfulness; and,

in part, only conditionally-valid, such as the keeping of peace and the

communistic use of property; the latter feature, in fact, would be

obligatory only on condition that mankind were not corrupted by sin; in

consequence of sin, however, the forcible protection and distinct

separation of property become necessary [222-234]. The guilt of

transgressions of the law is different according as the person does or

does not act with a clear consciousness of the law and of the deed;

guiltily-incurred error excuses not the deed, but rather heightens the

guilt, inasmuch as it is our duty to seek after the truth. Also violent

passions do not make the unlawful action an involuntary one, for man

-may and ought to control his passions [237-240].--Hereupon, and

apropos to the assumption of power on the part of the Pope over secular

governments, Melanchthon treats of the nature of, and the difference

between, the spiritual and the temporal powers, in essential agreement

with what he had said in his Loci [20, 21]; this is followed by

disquisitions on questions of civil right, on taxes and contracts.

In his Loci Melanchthon gives the general bases of the moral

consciousness in strictly Biblical form [Loci 3-6; 8-11]. The Old

Testament law is not identical with the eternal moral law, but contains

besides this law (which is indeed not fully included in the Decalogue,

but only indicated in its chief features) also the ceremonial and the

civil law, both of which had validity only until the advent of

Christianity. The moral law is the immediate and pure expression of the

divine wisdom and justness themselves, and hence was not first given by

Moses, but was always valid from the very beginning. Melanchthon's

somewhat extensive examination of the several divine laws in the order

of the Decalogue, may serve in many respects to complement his

philosophical ethics. He writes, here, free from the cramping fetters

of the long-observed schemata, and reckons among the "works" of the

first commandment: a proper knowledge of God, God-fearing, faith, love,

hope, patience, and humility. The Romish doctrine of the counsels he

refutes and rejects. The distinction between mortal and venial sins he

indeed retains, but he conceives it much more deeply,--understanding

under the latter such sins as are committed by Christians without evil

intention and with inner resistance to the evil, and are followed by

honest repentance, and under the latter those which are committed

premeditatedly and against conscience [Loc., 11]. In addition to this,

Melanchthon examines in special treaties and letters many particular,

and especially practico-moral, questions, [146] in a very judicious

manner.

In his scientific conception of the ethical task, Melanchthon furnishes

an essential complement to that of Luther, who fixed his attention

simply on the fact of the moral life of the regenerated as such,

without shaping the development of this fact out of the inner heart of

the Christian life, into an ethical science. Melanchthon himself,

however, did not complete this task, but simply began it; and although

we find in him frequently a slight over-estimation of Aristotle, still

we perceive in the vigorous manner in which, in his last ethical

writings, he breaks loose from all cramping and foreign forms and

thoughts, and lays an entirely new, purely Christian foundation, how

clearly he comprehended his task,--the carrying-out of which was

delayed by the soon-following inner struggles of the evangelical

church; only a few writers--Chytraeus, Victorin Strigel and Nicholas

Hemming--followed, in, as yet, feeble attempts, upon the path marked

out by Melanchthon. [147]

The rigid predestinarianism of Calvin seems at first thought still more

unfavorable for the development of ethics than the stand-point of

Luther; in reality, however, the Reformed church developed an

independent system of ethics earlier than the Lutheran. The

juridically-dialectic ground-character of the Calvinistic

world-conception necessarily led sooner than the more

mystically-inclined subjective Lutheran view, to a rigorous development

of the practical phase of religion. In his Institutio [iii, 6-10]

Calvin gives a short, plainly-biblical presentation of the bases of

Christian morality,--which, of course, can be actually practiced only

by the predestinated, but which is however for them, as being called to

purity, an unconditional duty. That virtue cannot actually obtain for

us salvation--communion with God--but is simply the necessary fruit of

the salvation already obtained by grace, and the constant bond of this

communion as established by grace, Calvin affirms very definitely.

Therein, precisely, consists, in his view, the essential superiority of

Christian to philosophical ethics, namely, that the former gives much

deeper-reaching motives for the good than the latter, to wit, thankful

love in return for God's love as revealed in redemption, and confiding

love to the Redeemer, in whom we have at the same time the perfect

personal pattern of the moral life. Out of this love to God in Christ

flows a love of justness or righteousness (in the Biblical sense of the

word) as the basis of the entire religious life. But the essence of

Christian righteousness consists in perfect self-denial, that is, in

the renunciation of all self-will and self-reason as opposed to

God,--in an unreserved surrender to God and his will; it draws us away

from love to the world, but must not sink into self-mortification and

false asceticism. Man must not, by arbitrary non-Scriptural ordinances,

impose upon himself a yoke. The moral life manifests itself [according

to Titus ii, 12] in three chief virtues: soberness, righteousness and

piety; to the first (sobrietas), which relates to the subject himself,

belong also chastity, temperateness and the enduring of privation; the

second relates to other men, and gives to each his dues; the third

separates us from the impurity of the world and unites us with

God.--Calvin gives expression, on the whole, also in his other numerous

moral essays, especially in his exegetical writings, to a moral view

which is no less earnest than sound, and generally keeps clear of all

un-Biblical austerity. To the Romish seeking of holiness by abnegation,

he opposes the thought, that the goods of this world are designed not

merely for our absolute wants, but also for our moral delight; their

enjoyment is not forbidden, but it should be made to contribute to the

glory of God. The strict church discipline established and exercised by

Calvin was indeed an offense to a gainsaying world, but was morally

perfectly justifiable. His unevangelical view of the right of capital

punishment against heretics, belongs less to the sphere of ethics

proper than to that of civil right.

In all essential points the ethical systems of the Reformed and of the

Lutheran churches are in harmony; there is manifest throughout,

however, a general characterizing difference in the coloring given to

the otherwise essentially harmonizing forms; this difference we cannot

here follow into its finer shades; [148] a few of the more general

traits will suffice. The ethics of the Lutheran church bears

predominantly an anthropologico-subjective character, that of the

Reformed a theologico-objective character; the former proceeds from the

inner life-source of the regenerated heart, and constructs, therefore,

only hesitatingly an ethical system proper,--as, in some degree,

superfluous; the latter sets out from the unconditional will of God to

man, and hence felt much earlier the need of a scientific expression of

the moral law, objective to the consciousness; the former wears rather

a Paulino-free stamp, the latter rather an Old Testament stamp; in the

Reformed church sermons on morals have a much more prominent place than

in the Lutheran. Lutheran ethics expresses, also in its christology,.

the transfiguration of the human through indwelling grace, Reformed

ethics, rather the glorifying of God in and through the elect. With

both, the goal of morality is the glory of God,--in the Lutheran

church, however, more through the witness of the salvation-experience

of the redeemed, in the Reformed, more through the offering of willing

obedience under the law; in the former predominates rather the

manifestation of the filial relation, in the latter, rather that of

submissive service; in the former there is greater freedom in the

self-determination of the believing subject, even to the danger of

Antinomianism, in the latter greater rigor of outward discipline,

incurring danger of Puritanic rigorism and pedantic externality. The

moral life of the Lutheran church bears, so to speak, a lyric

character, that of the Reformed a practico-juridical one; hence the

former expressed itself, naturally enough, in the sublimest soaring of

church hymnology, the latter crystallized itself into a sharply-defined

and regular church discipline; in the former predominates the mystical

heart-element of union with God, in the latter predominates a rational

contrasting of God and man. In the former all that is natural is

ethically exalted and taken into the service of the holy; whereas, in

the latter, the spiritual is exalted bly being divested of the natural.

The morality of the Lutheran church develops itself rather from the

fullness of inner life toward knowledge, that of the Reformed rather

from knowledge toward life-fullness; the former is more immediate,

natural and unconscious, the latter is more mediate, calculating,

doctrinary; the former is directed more inwardly, the latter more

outwardly; the former is more an outgush out of the deep and

overflowing feeling of love and bliss, the latter, more an intentional

act of the earnest but calm will,--as also, in the Lutheran view of

salvation, the attention is fixed more upon the all-embracing love of

God, and in the Reformed more upon the decrees of the will of God; Mary

and Martha are types of the respective ethical tendencies. The Lutheran

Christian does good works because he is certain of his salvation

through faith; the Reformed does them in order that he may become

certain of his saving faith, and hence of his election,--good works are

to him necessary unto salvation, though not its cause. The Lutheran

needs the law and its discipline, strictly speaking, only in so far as

he has as yet in himself sinful elements which need to be taken into

discipline; but to the Reformed, the law is a real and necessary guide

for the regenerated heart itself. Hence, to the Reformed, the Gospel

wears essentially also the character of law in the Old Testament sense,

and the Old Testament law is taken lit6rally as yet binding,--hence the

rigid observance of the Sabbath and the prohibition of statues and

pictures. In the Lutheran catechism the ten commandments precede the

confession of faith; in most of the Reformed churches they stand after

the same, and constitute, in the French and English service, an

essential part of the liturgy. This seemingly insignificant

circumstance is in fact very significant; in the Lutheran view the law

has essentially the purpose of educating toward the true freedom of the

children of God, which freedom itself, when once attained to, has no

longer any need of an outward law; in the Reformed view the law is an

essential part of the Christian faith-life itself, but an objective,

purely-divine element still external to the regenerated subject. The

Lutheran is fearful rather of work-holiness, the Reformed rather of

non-conformity to the law; the former has the law rather as his inward

personal property, the latter rather as a categorical imperative

external to his own subjective will. To the Lutheran, Moses and Christ

stand in sharp contrast to each other; to the Reformed they are most

intimately united; "one must live as if there were no Gospel, and die

as if there were no law," says, very significantly, the Reformed divine

Baile (Praxis pietatis, 1635). To the Lutheran, Christ is, in ethical

respects, rather the beloved Saviour, out of love to whom and in

communion with whom he lives in holiness; to the Reformed he is more

the moral pattern by which man is constantly learning, and which he

endeavors to imitate. Hence Lutheran ethics appears predominantly as

the doctrine of virtue and of goods, Reformed ethics as the doctrine of

the law. The Lutheran Christian conceives the good essentially as the

morally-beautiful, and hence he has also appreciation and love for the

beautiful in general,--gives expression to art, and makes it even a

moral agency; the Reformed conceives the good essentially as the right,

and hence he has little taste or love for art as a moral power, but all

the higher an appreciation for the legally-disciplined development of

the church and of moral society; to the former the highest virtue is

believing love; to the latter, righteousness. The moral consciousness

of the Lutheran conceives the highest good rather as a power directly

given by grace and reflecting from itself the moral life; the Reformed

consciousness makes the moral life an essential factor in the obtaining

of the highest good. Hence, in the ethical sphere, the antithesis of

the Lutheran doctrine to the Romish is more violent than that of the

Reformed; hence also the Reformed church, but not the Lutheran,

developed a theocratical form of the church, and placed in general much

greater emphasis on the legal and governmental development of the

purely moral community of the church as in contrast to the state, and

as a determining power for and over the same, whereas the subjective

inwardliness of Lutheran Christians manifested little interest for such

development. Such are the differences which, while they indeed manifest

a general ethical antithesis of the two forms of doctrine, yet in fact

constitute only two corresponding and manifoldly-complementing, but not

mutually-excluding phases of the same unitary evangelical

consciousness.

The theological ethics of the evangelical church was treated as a

separate science, [149] first by the learned Reformed divine Danaeus

(Daneau, ob. 1596) in his Ethica christiana (1577, '79, '88 and

1601),--in a rigidly Calvinistic sense, with a large using of

Augustine, Aristotle, and the Schoolmen, in strong opposition, however,

sometimes to the two latter sources, resulting in a learned and

thoughtful work, though as yet somewhat immature. He endeavors

especially to solve the apparent contradiction between the doctrine of

predestination and the requirements of the moral consciousness, though

not with very happy results; the special treatment of duties he bases

on the Decalogue; in respect to Church-discipline he requires the

greatest rigor,--for heretics, capital punishment. (In connection with

this ethics stands his Politica christiana, 1596-1606). The antithesis

which Danaeus makes between Christian ethics and Aristotelian

philosophical ethics, was rejected by Keckermann (ob. 1609 in

Heidelberg), who considered ethics as essentially a philosophical

science, and Aristotle as its true founder; [150] while the severely

Puritanical Amesius (in Holland, ob. 1634) emphasized again very

strongly the distinction of Christian from philosophical ethics,

placing Christian ethics along-side of dogmatics. [151] (The

distinguishing of ethics and dogmatics as the two parts of the body of

Christian doctrine, appears also in the Reformed divine, Polanus of

Basle.) [152] Walaeus (in Holland, ob. 1639) attempted in his

compendium of the ethics of Aristotle (1620) to imbue this work with a

Christian spirit. More important, despite its rather popular style, is

the peculiar work of the moderate Calvinist Amyraud (Amyraldus, at

Saumlur, ob. 1664). [153] He distributes ethics historically, into the

ethics of the pure unfallen state, into that of heathenism, and of

Judaism and of Christianity; the first part contains the general

philosophical considerations. The historical treatment of the subject

gives a just appreciation also of heathen ethics, without intermingling

Christian ethics therewith.--The ethics of the Reformed church was

casuistically treated by the Puritan Perkins (of Cambridge, 1611), also

by the above-mentioned Amesius, and by the German Alsted (1621, 1630),

who distributed the subject-matter according to the chief heads of the

Catechism. Also Forbesius � Corse treated the subject in the order of

the Decalogue, in his learned though quite practically-written work on

moral theology, considered as the special doctrine of duties. [154]

Ethics was treated in a popular, edifying manner by La Placette,

Pictet, Basnage, and by the Englishman Richard Baxter. The scientific

and purely theological form of Reformed ethics was still further

developed, in the eighteenth century, by Hoornbeek (1663), by Peter of

Mastricht (1699), who follows Amesius, by Heidegger (1711), by Lampe

(1727), and by others. In the middle of the eighteenth century the

rigid form of Calvinistic ethics begins to give way, and the influence

of the philosophy of Wolf commences to break down the confessional

antithesis in the field of morals.

In the Lutheran church there was at first but little done beyond the

already-mentioned further developments of the philosophical ethics of

Melanchthon, with the exception of a single, though not purely

theological, attempt of the Melanchthonian Hamburger, Von Eitzen: [155]

theology is so involved in dogmatical controversies as to have in

general but little inclination toward a scientific development of

ethics; it treated the weightier and more general questions only

briefly, in dogmatics, in connection with the doctrines of free-will,

of sin, of the law, and of sanctification, leaving the more detailed

treatment of the subject rather for such practical writers as worked

toward the Christian edification of the masses,--writers who were in

some respects related to the Mystics, and among whom two deserve

especial attention. The first of these, John Valentine Andreae, of

Wurtemberg (ob. 1654), is a very morally-earnest spirit, thoroughly

dovoted to practical Christianity, of slightly mystical tendencies, of

thorough scientific culture, and of deep acquaintance with human

nature. Strongly impressed with the Calvinistic church discipline in

Geneva, Andreae devoted his unwearying efforts to the bringing about of

moral discipline also in the German church, though he found a rather

unreceptive age, and was much deceived in his, at times, somewhat

idealistic hopes. His numerous moral writings,-- often clothed in

poetical and especially allegorical forms, and sometimes satirical,

though always hiding, even in hilarity, a very deep and often

melancholy earnestness,--are always directed to definite special

objects, and hence present no connected whole. Holding fast to the

faith of the church, he yet rebuked indignantly the unfruitful

hair-splitting spirit of dogmatic controversy, and insisted on the one

thing needful; at the same time, it is true, he occasionally too

lightly esteemed man's scientific right to a clear knowledge of the

contents of faith, as well as the significancy of the doctrinal

differences between the churches; and, in his desire for a moral

reformation of the church, he too little considered the importance of

pure doctrine, and was too indulgent toward many opposers of the

same.--The second, John Arndt, (ob. 1621), was spiritually kindred to

Andreae and held him in high esteem; Arndt was an evangelical Thomas �

Kempis, and combined evangelical fidelity of faith with mystical

subjectivity and practical zeal for morality, and exerted a

deep-reaching, beneficent influence on the evangelical churches. His

work entitled Four Books of True Christianity (at first in

1605-10)--with the exception of the Imitation of Christ, the most

widespread of German books of devotion-bears indeed sometimes a rather

strong mystical coloring (in this respect following somewhat in the

path of Tauler and of the "German Theology"), and under-estimates, in

many respects, the significancy of the objective means of grace, and

lays chief emphasis on the mystical, direct union of the soul with God;

nevertheless it constituted so essential and so salutary a

complementing of the somewhat one-sidedly theorizing theological spirit

of the age, and so powerfully stirred up the partially-dormant moral

consciousness, that Arndt will always occupy an eminent place in the

history of morality and of practical ethics, A per se unimportant and

yet fruitful attempt at a purely theological system of ethics,

unconnected with dogmatics, was made by George Calixt of Helmst�dt; his

Epitome theologiae moralis (p. I, 1634; 1662,) is only a short,

incomplete outline, giving in fact only an introduction. The purpose of

ethics is, to describe the way to blessedness, the life of the already

spiritually-regenerated Christian; regeneration itself is presupposed;

the foundation, even of Christian morality, is the ten commandments,

which are a revealed re-establishment of the original law of nature;

but the difference of Christian ethics from Old Testament ethics is not

made prominent enough. In the footsteps of Calixt followed J. C. D�rr

of Altdorf, who, for the first, gave a tolerably complete and learned

treatise on ethics; [156] he distinguishes between virtues toward God,

toward others, and toward ourselves; in regard to theatrical

spectacles, to jesting, etc., he shows a less rigid severity than the

ethical writers of the Reformed church; and this difference of view is

manifest also among the other Lutheran moralists, if we except the

Pietists. Of the same tendency was also G. T. Meier, of Helmst�dt,

whose erudite and profound introduction to ethics [157] examines, for

the first time, with critical discrimination the presuppositions of

this science. (H. Rixner, in a briefer work in 1690.) Aristotle is used

also in these theological treatises on ethics, without, however,

damagingly influencing their theological character.

The ethics of the Lutheran church was treated more frequently

casuistically than in a systematic form; it bore this character even as

late as into the eighteenth century, and forms, properly speaking, only

an amassment of material for a subsequent scientific development. As

occasioned by the casuistry of the Romish church, the casuistry of the

evangelical church, in express antithesis thereto, manifests, on the

basis of Scripture and of spiritual experience, a greater certainty and

simplicity, and preserves a middle-ground between the sophistical

laxity of the Jesuitical view and the rigid severity of the

Calvinistic. Many of these works contain also many dogmatic questions

together with their decisions. The distribution of the subject-matter

follows, for the most part, the order of the catechism; the answer is

given on the basis of the Scriptures, and then confirmed by the

decisions of the Fathers and of later writers, especially of Luther and

of the other Reformers. The first work of this kind, after the

already-mentioned Consilia of Melanchthon, is by Baldwin of Wittenberg,

[158] and obtained great popularity; it treats chiefly of the. casus

conscientiae, that is, of such moral questions as the common conscience

cannot immediately and satisfactorily decide, but in regard to which it

may fall into doubt, and which consequently can be decided only by a

careful weighing of the word of God. He classifies these cases

according to the moral objects: God, angels, the subject himself, and

other men. (L. Dunte of Reval, gave a thousand and six decisions on

conscience-questions of a moral and dogmatical character, in 1643.)

Olearius of Leipzig, who had already previously presented ethics in

tabular form, examined thoroughly, and with the most minute and

discriminating exactness, the purpose and the nature of casuistry;

[159] casuistry was more fully carried out by Dannhauer, [160] by G.

K�nig, [161] but especially circumstantially by John Adam Osiander,

[162] who introduces into the subject almost the entire body of

dogmatics; he classifies the cases in the order of the Decalogue; under

the sixth commandment, e. g., he proposes the question whether in a

case of extreme necessity it is allowable to eat human flesh, and, in

opposition to the Jesuits, negatives it (ii, p. 1367). The work of

Mengering (superintendent in Halle) Scrutinium conscientiae

catecheticum, that is, a "Reproving of Sin and Searching of the

Conscience," etc. (3 ed. 1686, 4to.), more especially intended for

moral self-examination, is classified minutely and circumstantially

according to the Decalogue, and is morally earnest and judicious,

though it presents also a few peculiarities ( e. g., p. 752, as to the

inadmissibility of tobacco-smoking, then called tobacco-drinking). Only

in part, belongs in this place the voluminous work: Consilia theologica

Witebergensia, that is, ("Wittenberg's Spiritual Counsels,"

etc.--(Frankfort on the Main, 1664)--which contains, in an immense

folio, judgments of Luther and of his co-laborers, and decisions of the

Wittenberg faculty on doctrinal points, moral and ecclesiastico-legal

questions (also matrimonial questions). Of a similar character is the

Opus novum quaestionum Practico-Theologicum (Frankfort, 1667, fol.),

which treats, in the order of the common Loci, sixteen hundred and

sixty-seven questions,--also that of Dedekenn: Thesaurus consiliorum

theol. et jurid. (1623), revised by John C. Gerhard (Jena, 1671, 4

vols. fol.).

Also the theological "Bedenken" of the eighteenth century belong to the

sphere of this casuistical ethics. Among these works those of Spener

occupy a peculiar and significant place, and constitute, together with

his other more or less ethical writings, a turning-point in the

development of the evangelical moral consciousness. Their significancy

rests less in their single judgments than in their peculiar

ground-thoughts. Spener,--who was imbued with the spirit of Thomas �

Kempis, of Andreae and of Arndt, and in part, even of Tauler, and who

restlessly labored in the path trod by these men for a moral bettering

of the Christian church,--called forth by the Pietism which proceeded

from him, a deep-reaching, beneficent movement in the moral life and in

the moral views of the evangelical church, although indeed in

consequence of his one-sided emphasizing of the practical, he treated

science itself somewhat too lightly, and set too high an estimate on

certain outward forms of devout morality, and thus needlessly limited

the legitimate liberty of a regenerated Christian. Spener's Pia

desideria [163] are directed essentially to an improving of the

ecclesiastical life, to a stronger emphasizing of holiness in the

spiritual activity of the church, to a stirring-up of the

church-membership to churchly spontaneity, to the bringing about of a

more edifying manner of doctrinal. preaching, and, on the other hand,

against the misuse of the doctrine of justification by faith. His

ethical works proper, though only bearing on particular cases,

especially of the inner life, are found in his Theological

Considerations, [164] which exercised a wide-reaching and wholesome

influence on the church.--Spener insisted with much more earnestness on

the significancy of spiritual regeneration for the moral life than did

the orthodoxy of the day, in its one-sided emphasizing of theoretical

faith. The man of the Holy Spirit has nothing in common with the sinful

world and its lusts; his total life-stream flows from a new and

absolutely. holy fountain; worldly pleasure is foreign and uncongenial

to him, and therefore to be avoided. The morality of the Pietists was

distinguished primarily by an especial rigor in regard to the sphere of

the allowed, inasmuch as it viewed as absolutely unallowable many

worldly enjoyments which in the Evangelical Lutheran church had, thus

far, been regarded (too unsuspiciously, it is true) as adiaphora, and

consequently as not strictly unallowable, especially such as dancing,

card-playing, theater-visiting, banqueting, gayness of dress, and the

like; it denied altogether that there are any morally indifferent

things; whatever is not done to the glory of God, and springs not of

faith, is sin; and these amusements cannot consist with a pious frame

of the heart,--cannot take place in faith, and to the glory of God.

This is, however, only an outer manifestation of a very deep-reaching

antithesis of Pietism to the hitherto prevalent views of the Lutheran

church. The high evangelical thought of Gospel-freedom and of

justification by faith alone, had in fact, in the time of the declining

church-life, led, in many respects, to erroneous courses, and had often

allowed the moral earnestness of holiness to give place to mere formal

orthodoxy, and also sometimes occasioned, in contrast to the severe

earnestness of the discipline of the Reformed church, too. careless a

regard for the outward forms of the moral life, and had enlarged beyond

measure the sphere of morally-indifferent things. The notion had

obtained for itself vogue, that whatever is not forbidden in Scripture

is allowable. It was the reaction of a truly Christian conscience,

which caused Pietism to discard this somewhat presuming maxim, and, in

any case, the thought which it opposed thereto was strictly legitimate,

namely, that there is nothing indifferent in the entire life-sphere of

a regenerated person, but that every thing without exception must stand

in living relation to the new spiritual life-principle, and that

whatever does not admit of a true association. with the same is not

simply indifferent, but is un-Christian. Pietism may have made many

mistakes in the application of this thought, but the thought itself

had, as in contrast to the one-sided orthodoxy then prevalent, its own

good right. Furthermore, Spener brought again into the fore-ground the

thought which, while indeed dogmatically admitted, had yet never been

sufficiently emphasized morally, namely, that faith without works is

dead; the sanctification of the heart and life does not simply follow

upon, and stand in connection with, true faith, but is in such faith

already itself directly contained; there are not two spiritual

life-streams, but only one; the moral personality itself as justified

by faith admits of no falling apart of faith and morality; all

religious life is immediately and necessarily at the same time

moral,--is not simply followed by the moral as a second collateral

element. In the eyes of declining orthodoxy, religion had become too

much a mere objective something by which the religious subject is

simply embraced and influenced, but not thoroughly permeated; Pietism

brought religion and its divine spirit-principle again entirely within

the Christian subject, and caused the subject, as now transformed, to

create a new Spirit-witnessing, objective morality. The Christian

conscience is quickened and made more vigorously active by Pietism; the

views thus far prevalent in the Lutheran church are, in the eyes of

Pietism, not strictly conscientious, seeing that they tolerate many

manners of action which do not flow from the Christian conscience, and

are not consistent with it.--The morality of Pietism is by no means of

a predominantly outwardly-active working character,--is in fact very

different from the more recent activity of the "inner mission," but is

predominantly subjective,--is one-sidedly directed toward the

morally-pious heart-condition of the subject, and sustains to the outer

world rather a rejecting, negating and uninterested relation; the

ascetic tendency which constantly grew more prominent, especially among

Spener's followers, rose even to a manifest preference of celibacy to

marriage, and to an avoidance of political offices (in the spirit of

Tertullian), and to a refusing of military service. When its orthodox

opponents reproached Pietism with an unevangelical seeking of

sanctification by works, with a tendency to the monkish spirit and the

like, they did not do it full justice; and it was in vain that they

undertook to check the historically-justified movement, and,

notwithstanding all their hostile exaggerations, they saw very clearly

the questionable narrownesses of the movement they opposed--more

clearly than they saw their own; and it is not exclusively through

Pietism, but also in virtue of the opposition which it awoke, that the

religiously-moral consciousness of the church was stimulated to a

higher life.--The Pietistic tendency proper, because of its

disinclination to abstract science, produced no ethical works of

importance; most important are: Breithaupt: Theol. moralis (1732, 4to.;

Institt theol., 3 parts, 1716), and the moral parts of Joachin Lange's

Oeconomia salutis (1728.) But the popular Pietistic works, written for

the masses of the church, were more influential.

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[143] In Ethica Arist. comment., 1529, treating only the 1st and 2d

books; in 1532 were added the 3d and 5th; re-written in 1545 as

Enarratio aliquot librorum Eth. Ar., etc.,--in the Corpus Reformatorum

of Bretschneider and Bindseil, t. xvi, p. 277-416.--Comment. in aliquot

politicos libros Aristot., 1530, in Corp. Ref., ib., p. 417 sqq.

[144] Corp. Ref., xvi, pp. 21-164. The following editions, 1539, '40,

are largely changed; three later ones, 1542-'46, are like that of 1540.

[145] Corp. Ref., xvi, pp. 165-276; not printed in the earlier Opp.

[146] De conjugio; quaestiones aliquot ethicae, de juramentis, etc.,

1552; in Corp. Ref., xvi, 453 sqq. Consilia s. judicia theol., ed.

Pezellii. 1660.

[147] J. C. E. Schwarz in Stud. u. Krit., 1853; Pelt., ib., 1848.

[148] Comp. Schneckenburger: Vegleichende Darstellung des luth. u. ref.

Lehrbegriffs, 1855; Tholuck: Das kirchl. Leben des 17 Jahrh., i, 199

sqq., 218 sqq., 301 sqq.; ii, 140 sqq., 239 sqq.

[149] On the history of the earlier Reformed ethics, see Schweizer in

Stud. u. Krit., 1850.

[150] Systema ethicae in his Opp., 1614.

[151] Medulla theologiae, 1630, and frequently, a brief compendium; De

conscientiae et ej. jure vel casibus, 1630, and

subsequently,--casuistical.

[152] Syntagma theol., 1610.

[153] La morale chrestienne, 1652 sqq., 6 t.,--rare in Germany; see

St�udlin iv, 404 sqq.; Schweizer in Stud. u. Krit., 1683.

[154] Opp., Amst., 1703.

[155] Comp. Pelt in Stud. u. Krit., 1848.

[156] Enchiridion theol. mor., 1662; later as: Compend., 1675-98 4to.

[157] Introd. in univ. theol. mor. studium, 1671. And as the beginning

of a development of ethics itself: Disputt. theol., 1679.

[158] Tactatus luculentus, etc., 1628, '35, and later.

[159] Introd. brevis in theol. casuisticam, 1694.

[160] Liber conscientiae, 2 ed. 1679, 2 t., and Theologia casualis,

1706.

[161] Casus consc., Altdorf, 1676, 4to.

[162] Theol. casualis, 1680, 6 t., 4to.

[163] Appearing first in 1675 as a preface to Arndt's Postille,

afterward separately,--often printed.

[164] Theologische Bedenken, 1700, 1712, 4 vols.; Letzte theol.

Bedenken, 1711, 3 vols.; Consilia et judicia theol., 1709, 3 vols., and

many other smaller works.

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SECTION XXXVIII.

The ethics of the Roman Catholic church, after the Reformation, was

treated for the most part as a constantly increasing and more

minute-growing body of casuistry. The highest development of the same,

and at the same time the greatest perversion of Christian ethics, also

in regard to its moral contents, appeared in the semi-Pelagianizing

ethics of the Jesuits. The place of the unconditional validity of the

moral idea is here largely usurped by outward adaptability to the weal

of the visible church, as the highest end; the place of the unshaken

authority of the Scriptures and of early Christian tradition, by the

authority of certain special Doctors; the place of moral conviction, by

probabilism; the place of moral honesty, by a sophistical construing of

the moral law to the present fortuitous advantage of the church and of

the individual, and by the falsehood of reservationes mentales; and the

place of the moral conscience, by rational and cunning calculation;

thus the essence of the moral law becomes entirely unsettled; and the

practical application of moral principles, an unserious exercise of

sophistry.

At first thought we are surprised at the exceeding fruitfulness of the

Romish theology of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in ethical

writings, in comparison with which the evangelical church, and

especially the Lutheran, is very barren. Opposition to the

faith-principle of the Evangelical church, led the Romish church to an

especial development of the practical phase of religion, as in fact, in

the order of the Jesuits, a vigor of activity hitherto unknown in the

Romish church makes at this time its appearance; and precisely this

order was the chief representative of Romish ethics.--The more purely

scientific form of ethics lingered in general strictly within the

limits of the scholastico-Aristotelian rut. Francis Piccolomini, a

much-lauded Aristotelian, in Italy (ob. 1604) produced a comprehensive

and discursive moral philosophy [165] based on Aristotle and Plato; but

his writings do not give proof of any independence, and fail to satisfy

the Christian consciousness.

The Order of the Jesuits, as calculated in its very nature for action,

for the championship of the endangered Romish church, was called by its

fundamental principle to the development of a special system of

morality,--a system the highest end of which is the glory of God

through the exaltation of the visible church. The majority of the

Jesuitical presentations of ethics treat, for the most part, only of

the more or less classified circle of single cases, while the more rare

systematic works follow very closely the traditions of scholasticism.

[166] --Very soon after the Reformation the Jesuits appeared in the

field of ethics; we will mention only the more important. Among the

Spaniards were: Francis Tolet (a cardinal, ob. 1596, Summa casuum

conscientiae, often printed); Azorio (Institutiosnes morales, 1600,

3t.; 1625, 2t.); Vasquez (Opusc. mor.; 1617); Henriquez (Summa, 1613

fol.); Thomas Sanchez, whose learned work, De matrimonio, [167] was

highly esteemed, (but which, in the invention and discussion of

indelicate questions, transgresses the bounds of all propriety), and

who by his sweeping doctrine of probabilism deeply unsettles the

foundations of all morality; (of him are further: Opus morale s. Summa

casuum, Col. 1614, 2t.; Consilia s. opuscula mor., Lugd. 1635, 2 fol.);

Francis Suarez, in numerous very ingenious works; Alphonso Rodriguez

(Exercitium perfectionis, etc., 1641); Antonio de Escobar, one of the

most important of the casuists (Liber theol. moral., etc., Ludg., 1646;

Universae theol. moral. problemata, Ludg., 1663, 7 fol.); and Gonzales

(Fundamentum theol. moralis., 1694, 4to.) Among the Italians were:

Tamburini, and Filliucci (Moral. quaest., 1622, 2 fol.) Among the

French: Bauny, and Raynauld. Among the Germans: Layman (Theol. mor.,

1625, 3 4to.); Busenbaum, of Munster, whose Medulla casuum consc. has

had, since 1645, more than fifty editions, [168] --an able, clear,

compact manual in tolerably systematic order, and authoritative almost

throughout the whole Order, although in many respects assailed, even by

popes, and in some countries proscribed. Among the Netherlanders:

Leonard Less (in several works), and Besser (De conscientia, 1638,

4to.) The contents and manner of treatment of most of these works are

very similar.

The peculiar character of Jesuitical ethics rests on the fundamental

purpose of the order as a whole, namely, the rescuing of the Church,

the bride of Christ, as endangered by the Reformation in its very

foundations, and hence the rescuing of the honor of God from a most

pressing danger. In a struggle of life and death one is not very

careful in the choice of means, and in all warfare the sentiment holds

good, though involving manifold violations of ordinary right, that the

end sanctifies the means. The rescuing of the Romish church at any

price is the task, even should it involve an entering into alliance

with the dark powers of this sinful world, and with the passions and

sinful proclivities of the unsanctified multitude. The one exclusively

aimed-at end makes use of the systematized totality of moral ends as

mere means, and the morally-contracted view taken of this one end leads

naturally and of itself to morally unallowable means. The real, visible

church is not measured by the idea of the true or ideal church, but all

moral ideas are measured by the visible church. The Jesuits were well

aware that they were an essentially new phenomenon of the churchly

life,--that they stood upon purely human invention and power; we need

not be surprised therefore to find that in their moral system human

invention and human authority stand in the foreground. The expressed

opinion of a church doctor forms a sufficient basis for a legitimate

moral decision. The eternal and objective foundations of the moral are

exchanged for the subjective view of individual persons of eminence.

The contradictions thereby resulting render the single subject all the

less trammeled,--enable him to follow the decision which he most

prefers. Another of their peculiarities is their discipline; the

required unconditional obedience to the commands of superiors takes the

place of the personal conscience, and paralyzes its power; it becomes a

duty of the members of the order to have no personal conscience

whatever, and to subordinate the individual conscience unconditionally

and blindly to the general conscience of the order; a collective

conscience, however, is a poor one, and poorest of all when it is

represented by one single person. Thus the Jesuit accustoms himself

from the very start, blindly to follow the authority of a single

eminent man, and Probabilism is, in his moral theory, an inevitable

matter of course.

This, then, is the distinguishing characteristic of Jesuitical

ethics,--that in the place of the eternal objective ground and

criterion of the moral, it substitutes subjective opinion, and in the

place of an unconditional eternal end, a merely conditionally valid

one, namely, the defending of the actual, visible church against all

forms of opposition,--that in the place of the moral conscience, it

substitutes the human calculating of circumstantial and fortuitous

adaptation to the promotion of this its highest end,--that it attempts

to realize that which is per se and absolutely valid by a wide-reaching

isolating of the means, but in so doing subordinates morality to the

discretion of the single subject.--While the ethics of the Jesuits

appears as lax and quite too indulgent toward worldly, sinful

proclivities and fashions, yet this is only one phase of the matter. A

merely worldly-lax moral system, in the usual sense, seems but little

applicable to the members of a brotherhood the first rule of which is a

perfect renunciation of personal will and personal opinion and

self-determination, in a word, unconditional obedience to every command

of superiors, and which has actually accomplished in the missionary

field the grandest of deeds, and numbers, among its members, multitudes

of heroic martyrs. This lack of strictness in one direction rests by no

means on mere worldliness, on pleasure in the delights of this life,

but follows, on the one hand, of necessity (as well as does also the

rigor of obedience) from the subjectively-arbitrary presupposition of

the entire order, from the lack of an objective, unshaken foundation,

and rests, on the other hand, strictly on calculation,--is itself a

cunningly-devised means to the end,--is intended to awaken, especially

in the great and mighty of the earth (and the masses of the people are

such under some circumstances), a love to the church, to the mild,

friendly, indulgent mother; and these concessions to the world formed a

contrast to the severer moral views of the evangelical church, and

especially to the over-rigid discipline of the Reformed church; and the

contrast was tempting.--The purpose--zealously pursued by the Jesuits

in the interest of Romish domination--of becoming soul-guarding fathers

and conscience-counselors, especially for men and women of eminence,

required, on the one hand, that the Jesuits themselves should acquire

for themselves the highest possible repute in ethics,--and hence it was

requisite that they should become the literary representatives

thereof,--and, on the other, that this ethics should be molded in

adaptation to this end,--should make itself not disagreeable and

burdensome, but should become as elastic as possible in view of

different wants,--should be a "golden net for catching souls," as the

Jesuits themselves were wont to call their own pliableness. The more

ramified and complex the net-work of casuistic ethics became, so much

the more indispensable were the practiced conscience-counselors, or

more properly, conscience-advocates; the more stairways and back doors

they were able to turn attention to in conscience affairs, so much the

more prized and influential they became. This explains the great

compass and the peculiar character of Jesuitical ethics. The becoming

accustomed to slippery and precipitous ways, and the pleasure in the

ready-finding of sophistical authority for morally novel positions, led

of itself unconsciously into still deeper error. "Accommodation" was

the magic word which opened the way for a surprisingly-rich storehouse

of moral rules. Confession, where made to Jesuits, lost much of its

seriousness, and nowhere else was absolution so easily obtainable for

those who were to be won over, nowhere penance and satisfaction so

readily done with,--and this not merely in fact, but also from

principle. Penance is to be chosen as light as possible; the confessor

may impose as penance, on the confessing one, the good or evil which

h1e can do or suffer on the same day or in the same week; the penance

may, when there exists a sufficient reason, be even performed for one

person by another, etc. [169] Also in most cases it is not a very

serious matter even if the absolved one neglects entirely the imposed

penance.

The development of Jesuitical ethics is by no means a phenomenon

essentially new; the bases therefor were already long extant; it is

only a further building upon the same foundations. The Pelagianizing

view of the moral ability of the human will and of the meritoriousness

of outward works lay already at the basis of the entire system of

monkish holiness, and the Jesuits went only one step further when they,

in contradiction to Thomas Aquinas, taught often almost entirely as

Pelagius. The earlier casuistry in its lack of fixed principles had

already shaken the moral foundation; and the too great indulgence in

sophistry on particular, and, in part, entirely imaginary, cases, had

beclouded the unsophisticated moral consciousness; the doctrine of

probabilism had been already sanctioned at Constance, and in many

respects practically applied. The entanglement of the church with the

then so manifoldly-complicated state of European politics, with worldly

passions and rancors, and its very worldly struggles against the

worldly state, had already long since undermined the purity of the

ecclesiastical conscience, and the maxim, that the end sanctifies the

means, had already been long practiced and approved by the church

before it was, by the Jesuits (if not sanctioned in express words, yet

in fact on the largest scale) put into practice; the per se not

incorrect distinguishing of venial from mortal sins offered easy

opportunity of indefinitely enlarging the sphere of the former by a

limitation or a ready transforming of the sphere of the latter, while

at the same time the ever-growing readiness in granting indulgences was

making the sphere even of mortal sins of a less terrifying character,

especially for those at whose command stood the keys to the

treasure-chambers of indulgence; and in fact it was these especially,

namely, the rich and noble, who enjoyed the advantages of the

generosity of Jesuitic ethics. Jesuitic ethics did not indeed harmonize

with the moral consciousness of the ancient church; its representatives

were also well aware of this, and they hesitated not to admit that they

did not recognize ancient church tradition as a criterion for morality,

but wished rather to lay the foundations for a new tradition.

The chief means used for the purpose of lightening moral duty was the

so-called moral probabilism, namely, the principle that in

morally-doubtful cases the authority of a few eminent church-teachers,

or also even of a single one (if he is a doctor gravis et probus),

suffices to furnish a sententia probabilis as to a moral course of

action, and hence to justify the performing of it, even if the opinion

followed were per se false; nay, according to some, even if this

teacher himself had declared it as only morally possible, without

really approving of it. Hence, as soon as I can hunt up for an action

which seems to me of doubtful propriety, or even positively wrong, a

consenting opinion of an ecclesiastical authority (and of course it is

best if I find it among the Jesuit doctors themselves), then am I

perfectly screened by the same; [170] in which connection it is to be

taken into account that there is scarcely any one moral question which

is not answered by different doctors in an entirely contrary sense.

That thus the most opposite manners of action may be equally readily

justified, the Jesuits knew very well; and Escobar even found, in the

actual variety of views as to the moral, an amazing trace of Divine

Providence, inasmuch as thereby the yoke of Christ is in so agreeable a

manner rendered easy. [171] Although probabilism was not so

immoderately extended by all the Jesuits, nevertheless it was the

decidedly dominant teaching; and when the general of the order,

Gonzales, in 1694, disapproved of it, many were minded to regard him as

thereby deposed because of heresy, and only the protection of the Pope

saved him. [172]

Probabilism is not a merely fortuitously discovered expedient, but it

is in fact an almost inevitable consequence of the historical essence

of Jesuitism. As the order itself arose neither on the basis of

Scripture nor of ancient church-tradition, but sprang absolutely from

the daring inventive power of a single man breaking through the limits

of ecclesiastical actuality, hence it is not at all unnatural that it

should make the authority of a single spiritually preeminent man its

highest determining power, and subordinate to this the historical,

objective form of the moral consciousness. When the learned moralists

came to be regarded as the determining authority in morals, then the

Jesuits were the masters of the world, for they were themselves the

most excellent doctors. Though they absolved the inquirer from so many

burdensome chains of commanding duty, though they led him in the

selection between opposed authorities to a subjective discretion of

decision, yet at least this point was reached, that he recognized the

Jesuit priests as his liberating masters. The doctrine of probabilism

can by no means be explained as a simple sequence of the Romish

tradition-principle; for here the deciding element is not the authority

of the church, but simply individual teachers and in fact not, the

majority of authorities, but it is expressly permitted to follow [173]

the lesser authority in face of the greater, and to select among

several authorities the one which best pleases, even if it be the less

probable one. [174] Hence also the father-confessor is not at liberty,

as against the probable opinions of those who confess to him, to appeal

to other and higher authorities, but he must admit the former even

should he hold them for entirely false, [175] and a doctor, when asked

for moral advice needs not to impart the same exclusively according to

his own judgment, but may also suggest the judgment of another though

contradictory to his own, in case it is more favorable to, or more

desired by, the inquirer (si forte haec illi favorabilior seu

exoptatior sit); hence he may give to different persons a directly

contrary answer to the same question, "only he must in this matter use

discretion and prudence." [176] Many go so far as to maintain that I

not only need not follow the opinion most probable to me, but that I

may even follow that one of which I hold only that it is probable that

it may be probable (Tamburini).--But how is the doctrine of probability

to be reconciled with the Catholic doctrine that the assent of the

church is necessary in order that any course of action may be

ecclesiastically valid? Bauny gives the answer: All that doctors teach

in printed books has, in fact, the assent and approval of the church,

provided that the church has not expressly declared it as invalid.

Though probabilism per se, as a mere formal principle, endangers

morality in a high degree, substituting in the place of the moral

conscience individual and arbitrary authority, and rocking the soul

into false security, still it were possible that the danger of this

principle should not actually realize itself, in that it might be

presupposed that the theological authorities would, in all essential

moral thoughts, harmonize with each other and with the Scriptures, and

would show some difference only in regard to more external, unimportant

questions. In this case the erroneousness of the formal principle would

in some measure be remedied by the correctness of the material

contents. The question rises therefore: What do the doctors who are

presented as moral oracles, positively teach as to the moral?

One would be largely deceived were one to expect to find in the moral

writings in question merely the loose world-morality of moral

indifference, selfishness, and pleasure-seeking; on the contrary, they

often present anxiously, minute and strict prescriptions, especially in

churchly relations, so that the evangelical liberty of a Christian man

would feel itself thereby in many respects largely cramped. One must

here distinguish, however, between the ordinary popular morality--as it

were, for home use, and indeed also for show--and the higher morality

which relates to the fundamental purposes of the Jesuit order, that is,

to the furtherance of the Romish church, and which is chiefly practiced

by the great, in church and state, and hence also by the Jesuits

themselves.--To the semi-Pelagianizing explaining-away of the sinful

corruption of human nature, corresponds, on the other hand, a lowering

of the moral requirements made of man; for the natural man, downy

cushions are spread. We are not obligated to love God throughout our

whole life, in the full sense of the word, nor even every five years,

but more especially only toward the close of life. [177] In fact, the

French Jesuit Sirmond denies the obligation of love to God on the

whole; it is sufficient if we fulfill the other commandments and do not

hate God; [178] and he found in his Order warm concurrence. So also is

the love of neighbor, and especially of enemies, lowered to a degree

corresponding to anti-Christian, heathen ways of thinking. And even the

duties of children are placed lower than is the case among the Chinese.

The fourth commandment is fulfilled by the fact that one shows due

honor to his parents, though without loving them; for love is not

required in the commandment. To be ashamed of one's parents, to banish

them from one's presence, to treat them as strangers and the like, is

not a severe sin; but, on the contrary, it is allowable for the son to

accuse his father of heresy before the Inquisition (Busenbaum), and

according to a majority of the Jesuits, as also in the opinion of

Diana, he is obligated thereto; and the same holds true of brothers and

sisters, and of consorts. [179] Some of them declare it even as

allowable that a son should wish his father's death, or should rejoice

at the occurrence of his death, because he has now the happiness of

coming into his inheritance (Tamburini, Vasquez), or that a mother

should wish the death of her daughter, in case the latter is ugly

(Azorius). Malignant revenge is indeed forbidden, but not the taking

revenge in vindication of one's honor.

In respect to moral imputation and condemnation, most of the teachers

make--in view of rendering moral desert easy--the remarkable

distinction, that the action answering to the divine law is good and

meritorious as such, without it being requisite thereto that the

intention should be good; and that, on the contrary, sin exists only

where there is really an intention of sinning. Hence if the intention

is a good one, that is, promotive of the weal of the church, then the

act which serves to its carrying-out cannot be sinful; and there can be

a mortal sin only where the person in the moment of the act had the

definite intention of doing evil, and a perfect knowledge of the same.

But passion and evil habit becloud one's knowledge and hence render the

sin venial, as does also weighty evil example; [180] and a probable

opinion entirely excuses even a mortal sin. In an unimportant matter

even the transgression of a divine law is not a mortal sin. Ignorance

of the law excuses the mortal sin; and inveterate ignorance, the

father-confessor may overlook in silence. Repentance over a committed

sin is indeed necessary to the forgiveness of the same, but a very

slight degree of repentance suffices, or even a desire to have

repentance, or the fear of eternal punishment; and, in case of repeated

sins, it is enough to feel repentance for only one of them, provided

that all are confessed; nay, it even suffices that I should feel

pained, not because of the sin, but because of its bad consequences, e.

g., disease, dishonor; [181] it is therefore not to be wondered at when

some of the doctors assert, in contradiction to others, that it is

sufficient in order to the obtaining of absolution that we feel a

regret at our lack of repentance (Sa, Navarra). An actual bettering of

one's life needs not to follow immediately upon repentance, as in fact

the habit of sinning renders the sin itself venial. Venial sins (and in

the eyes of the Jesuits this field is uncommonly large) need not to be

confessed, and it is not even necessary, in connection with the

sacrament of penance, to repent of them, and to form a resolution to

avoid them.

Not undeserved is the notoriety of the chapters in Jesuitical ethics on

falsehood, on the sexual sin, and on murder. One may intentionally use

ambiguous words in one sense though knowing that the hearer understands

him otherwise; and one may for a legitimate end, e. g., for

self-defense, or to protect one's family, or to practice a virtue,

utter words, which, as uttered, are entirely false, and which express

the true sense (which may be the opposite to the sense really

expressed) only through mental additions restrictio s. reservatio

mentalis); of such cases the moralists abound in remarkable

illustrations; [182] e. g., when some one wishes to borrow something of

me which I do not like to let him have, I am at liberty to say, "I have

it not," namely, by adding mentally, "in order to give it to thee;" if

some one asks of me something which I do not wish to tell, I am at

liberty to answer, "I know it not," namely, as obligated to communicate

it; if I am asked as to a crime of which I am the sole witness, I am at

liberty to say, "I know it not," mentally adding, "as a thing publicly

known;" if I have hidden away a quantity of provision of which I have

need, then I may swear before the court, "I have nothing," mentally

adding, "which I am bound to disclose." A priest threatened with death

may, without real intentio, that is, merely in appearance, pronounce

absolution, administer sacraments, etc. An adulterous wife, when

questioned by her husband, may swear that she did not commit adultery,

adding mentally: "on this or that day," or "in order to reveal it to

thee." He who comes from a scene of pestilence, but is convinced that

he is not infected, may swear that he does not come from such a place.

When a poor debtor is pressed by a hard creditor, he may swear before

the court that he owes nothing to the other, in that he adds mentally,

"in order to pay it right away." I may deny, before the court, every

trespass or crime which has any manner of excuse, namely, by adding

mentally, "as a crime." Is, qui ex necessitate vel aliqua utilitate

offert se ad jurandum nemine petente, potest uti amphibologiis, nam

habet justam causam iis utendi (Sanchez, Diana). In general, all such

untruths are allowed EX JUSTA CAUSA, namely, quando id necessario est,

vel utile ad salutem corporis, honoris aut rerum familiarum, or when an

improper question is addressed to us; on the contrary, to swear falsely

without a good reason is a mortal sin (Diana); this is--though not in

express words yet certainly in sense--the maxim which is disavowed by

the more recent Jesuits, namely, that the end sanctifies the means. A

promise obligates to its fulfillment only when one actually had, at the

time of promising, the intention of fulfilling it. [183] Hence an oath

is binding only when one meant it earnestly; otherwise it is to be

regarded as a mere blame-worthy indeed, though not obligating, piece of

trifling (Sanchez, Busenbaum, Escobar, Less, Diana), and it obligates

only in the sense in which, by mental reservations, it was intended,

and not in that in which, by its form of expression, it would have to

be understood by the other; and knowingly to mislead any one into a

false oath, who, however, acts in good faith, is no sin, since in fact

he who unknowingly swears falsely does no evil thereby; [184] to swear

falsely from bad habit, is only a venial sin. If any one swears that he

will never drink wine, then he seriously sins only when he drinks much,

but not when he drinks but little (Escobar). He who swears before a

court that he will tell all that he knows, is not bound to tell that

which he alone knows (Less). [185]

The sexual relations are discussed by the Jesuits in a so

immorally-detailed circumstantiality that the laxity of moral judgment

(elsewhere without parallel) is rendered thereby all the more

pernicious and condemnable. [186] A maiden who has committed unchastity

for the first time is not required, even when she is, as yet, under the

oversight of her parents, to give, in making her confession, this

circumstance, namely, that it is the first and hence more serious case,

for the freely consenting virgin does a wrong neither to herself nor to

her parents, inasmuch as she has discretionary power over her virginal

purity. (Quum sit domina sua integritatis virginalis). [187] For all

possible kinds of unchastity, apologies and excuses are invented; [188]

and Tamburini even fixes with great exactness the taxes for public

women. Tile discussions of the moralists on these subjects are, in many

respects, of so indelicate a character, that the judgment of the

Episcopal censor, printed in the work of Sanchez, (t. 2.), namely,

summa voluptate perlegi, sounds almost too na�ve.--Under the head of

murder, the Jesuits had the task of accommodating themselves to the

then prevalent moral notions of the South-European nations, and the

result of their labors was an ingeniously constructed code of murder.

[189] The murdering of a person, even of an innocent one, may under

circumstances be allowable, not indeed simply in case of self-defense,

but also in other cases,--for example, in case of severe insult,

inasmuch as the insulted one would otherwise pass as dishonored; and

even when the insulted one is a monk or priest, he may, according to

some authorities, kill his opposer (Escobar i, c. 3, Less, and others);

and several Jesuits directly maintained that any one, even a priest or

monk, is entitled to anticipate an intended slander or false accusation

by secret murder; for this would not amount to murder, but simply to

self-defense; [190] and this was expressly applied to the case where a

monk should have reason to fear the disclosures of his mistress. When a

knight, in fleeing from the enemy, cannot otherwise rescue himself than

by riding over an infant child or a beggar, then is the killing of

these innocent persons allowable, save only in case that the child is

not as yet baptized (Escobar, c. 3, 52),--which would apparently be

rather difficult for the knight to know. Killing in self-defense is

allowable even where the self-defender is caught in a crime, and that,

too, where the killing is beforehand intended, e. g., when he who is

caught in adultery kills the injured husband (Escobar i, 7, c. 2, 5,

13; 3, 35; i, 8, n. 61). A woman may stiletto her husband when she

knows definitely that this same fate threatens her from him, and when

she knows no other escape (Less). He who has secretly committed

adultery may kill the single witness thereof who is on the point of

accusing him, for this witness is not under obligation to make this

accusation; however, adds the Jesuit, civil law has unfortunately not

assented to this probable opinion (Escobar i, 7, n. 39). He who without

his own fault is required to accept, or to challenge to, a duel, does

wisely to put his opponent out of the way by secret murder, for thereby

he protects himself from the assault, and his opponent from a serious

sin. [191] Escobar is unwilling to see him who murders his enemy

secretly shut out, just like a common murderer, from the right of

asylum (6, 4, n. 26). According to some teachers--the majority,

however, think otherwise--a pregnant maiden may procure an abortion in

order to escape the shame. [192] According to Azor, a physician may

administer a less certainly effectual medicine although he has with him

a more certain one, and even when it is more probable that the less

effectual one may do harm; for he has after all some probability on his

side. [193] Tamburini justifies the castration of singers for the

service of the church. The doctrine--notorious in church-history--of

the justifiableness of tyrant-murder, we need only mention in passing,

as well as also the almost demagogic doctrine of the merely-relatively

valid and purely human right of princes, and of the right to disobey

law on the part of the people, as being themselves sovereign. [194] In

this political respect is especially notorious the work of the Spanish

Jesuit, Mariana, (De rege. 1598, 1605), according to which, a king who

oppresses religion or violates the laws of the state may be killed by

any of his subjects, openly or by poison; the murderer, even if his

attempt fails, renders himself meritorious in the eyes of God and man,

and wins immortal renown (comp. the view of John of Salisbury, � 34).

It is chiefly these revolutionary doctrines that brought the order to

its fall; with its other moral views the secular world could have put

up with much better grace.

The maxims of the Jesuits disseminated themselves like an infectious

disease far beyond the circle of their own Order, as is shown by the

comprehensive works of the already mentioned Sicilian, Antony Diana

(clericus regularis), [195] who taught, under the express approbatio of

his ecclesiastical superiors, and also of the Jesuits, the doctrine of

probabilism in its worst forms. One may act according to a probable

opinion and disregard the more probable one; man is not under

obligation to follow the more perfect and the more certain, but it

suffices to follow simply the certain and perfect; it would be an

unendurable burden were one required to hunt out the more probable

opinions; [196] the most of the Jesuits taught the same thing. In

relation to murder, he teaches like Escobar; I am at liberty to kill

even him who assails my honor, if my honor cannot otherwise be rescued.

[197] When some one has resolved upon a great sin, then one is at

liberty to recommend to him a lesser one, because such advice does not

relate absolutely to an evil, but to a good, namely, the avoiding of

the worse; for example, if I cannot otherwise dissuade a person from an

intended adultery than recommending to him fornication instead thereof,

then it is allowable to recommend this to him, not, however, in so far

as it is a sin, but in so far as it prevents the sin of adultery; Diana

appeals in this connection to many like-judging Jesuit doctors. [198]

If a priest commissions Peter to kill Caius, who is weaker than Peter,

but nevertheless Peter comes out second best and gets killed himself,

still the priest incurs no guilt, and may continue in the

administration of his office. [199] He who resolves upon committing all

possible venial sins, does not thereby involve himself in any mortal

sin [200] He who ex aliqua justa causa rents a house to another for

purposes of prostitution, commits no sin. [201] To eat human flesh, in

case of necessity, he holds with the majority of the Jesuits, as

allowable. [202] He who in virtue of a promise of marriage induces a

maiden to yield to him, is not bound by his promise, in case he is of

higher rank or richer than she, or in case he can persuade himself that

she will not take his promise in serious earnest. [203] Marriage

between brother and sister can be made legitimate by Papal

dispensation. [204] -- In such moral perversity of view Diana seems

only to have been surpassed by the Spanish Netherlander Cistercian,

Lobkowitz, [205] who, in his skepticism, entirely breaks down the moral

consciousness, and declares that nothing is evil per se, but only

because it is positively forbidden; hence God can dispense even from

all the commandments (comp. the views of Duns Scotus, � 34),--can, e.

g., allow whoredom and other like sins, for none of these are evil per

se. Monks and priests are at liberty to kill the female misused by

them, when they fear, on her account, for their honor. This writer

declares himself expressly and decidedly in favor of the views of the

Jesuits.--Also the Franciscan order became infected with the maxims of

the Jesuits, as is proved by the very voluminous work of Barthol.

Mastrius de Mandula, [206] which was published under the express

sanction of the officers of the order, and who justifies restrictiones

mentales even in oaths, [207] and also the murder of tyrants, [208] the

murders of the slanderers of an important person, castration and

similar things, [209] as well as also probabilism.

The moral system of the Jesuits is not, strictly speaking, that of the

Romish church; many of their more extreme maxims the church has

condemned, and the more recent Jesuits themselves find it advisable no

longer fully to avow their former principles. Nevertheless Jesuitism,

together with its system of morals, is the ultimate consequential goal

of the church in its turning-aside from the Gospel, just as (though in

other respects widely different therefrom) Talmudism was the necessary

goal of Judaism in its rejection of the Saviour. The error consists in

the placing of human discretion and authority in the stead of the

unconditionally valid, revealed will of God. Even as earlier

Catholicism had intensified the divine command by self-invented,

ascetic work-holiness into a seemingly greater severity,--had aimed at

a higher moral perfection than that required by God,--so Jesuitism with

like presumption lowered the moral law, out of consideration to

temporal relations, to a merest minimum requirement,--contented itself

with a much lower moral perfection than the divine law calls for, and

sought out cunning means for lightening even this minimum. Jesuitical

ethics is the opposite pole of monastic ethics; what the latter

requires too much, the former requires too little. Monastic morality

sought to win God for the sinful world; Jesuitical morality seeks to

win the sinful world, not indeed for God, but at least for the church.

Monasticism said to God, though not in an evangelical sense: "if I have

only thee, then I ask for nothing else in heaven or earth;" Jesuitism

says about the same thing, but says it to the world, and particularly

to the distinguished and powerful. The former turns away in indignant

contempt from the worldly life, because the world is immersed in sin;

the latter generously receives the same into itself, and turns

attention away from guilt, by denying it. It is true, the Jesuits

represent also a monastic Order, but this order is only a means to an

end, and resembles the other nobler orders about as much as wily Renard

resembles the pious Pilgrim; and the well-known hostility of the older

orders to this brilliantly rising new one, was not mere jealousy, but a

very natural, and, for the most part. moral protest against the spirit

of the same.

Other casuists are: Jacobus � Graffiis, a Benedictine (Consiliorum s.

respons. cas. consc. 1610, 2, 4to.); Pontas of Paris (Examen general de

conscience, 1728; Latin, 1731, 8 fol., alphabetical); the French bishop

Genettus (ob. 1702, Theologie morale; also in Latin, 1706, 2, 4to.,

earnest and rigid); the Dominican Perazzo, in his Thomisticus

ecclesiastes (1700, 3 fol.), digested the ethics of Thomas Aquinas into

an alphabetical register; Malder of Antwerp treated it more

systematically (De virtutibus theologicis, 1616).

In a more systematic form, a purer Christian spirit, and, in many

respects, opposed to Jesuitical views, and corresponding rather to

Mediaeval ethics, is the moral treatise of the French bishop Godeau

(1709); Natalis Alexander (1693) treated the same subject in a similar

spirit, in connection with dogmatics.

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[165] Universa philosophia moribus, Venet. 1583; Frkf., 1595, 1629.

[166] Perrault: Morale des Jes., 1667, 3t.; Ellendorf: Die Moral und

Politik des Jesuiten, 1840--not sufficiently scientific; Pragm. Gesch.

d. M�nschsorden, 1770, vols. 9 and 10.

[167] Genuae, 1592? 1602; Antv. 1607, 1612, 1614, 1617, 3 fol.; Norimb.

1706; the first edition has become rare; in the later editions, after

1612, the smuttiest passages are omitted or modified.

[168] Rewritten and enlarged by Lacroix, 1710, 9t., Col. 1729, 2 fol.,

and frequently.

[169] Filliucci: Moral. quaest., I, trac. 6 c. 7; Escobar: Liber th.,

VII, 4 c. 7 (especially n. 181, 182), comp. Ellendorf, 263 ssq., 312

ssq.

[170] Laymann: Theol. mor. 1625, i, p. 9; Escobar: Liber h., prooem.,

exam. 3; Bresser: De consc. iii, c. 1 sq., and in almost all the

others.

[171] Quia ex opinionum varietate jugum Christi suavita sustinetur

(Univ. theol. mor., t. i, lib. 2, 1, c. 2 in Crome, x, 182.)

[172] Wolf: Gesch. d. Jesuit., 1, 173.

[173] Escobar: Th. mor., prooeem., iii, n. 9, and many others.

[174] Sanchez: Op. mor., i, 9, n. 12 sqq., n. 24.

[175] Escobar: Th. mor. prooem., iii, n. 27; Laymann, i, p. 12; so also

Diana: Resol. mor., ii, tract., 13,11 sqq., Antv., 1637; Summa, 1652,

p. 216.

[176] Laymann, i, p. 11.

[177] Escobar: i, 2, n. 7 sqq.; v, 4, n. 1 sqq.

[178] Defensio virtutis, i, 1.

[179] Diana: Resol. mor. i, tract., 4, 4, 5.

[180] E. g., Laymann: i, 2, c. 3; i, 9, 3; Escob.: i, 3, n. 28;

Conseuetudo absque advertentia letale peccatum non facit.

[181] Escobar: Tr. 7, 4, c. 7.

[182] Sanchez: Opus mor., iii, 6, 12 sqq.; Summa: i, 3, 6; Diana: ii,

tr. 15, 25 sqq.; iii, tr. 6, 30, where many cases are cited and

approved; Ellendorf: pp. 42 sqq., 52 sqq., 124 sqq., 157 sqq.; Crome:

x, 142 sqq.

[183] Escobar: iii, 3, n. 48.

[184] Ibid., i, 3, n. 31.

[185] Compare Diana: iii, t. 5,100 sqq.

[186] Escobar: i, 8; v, 2; Busenbaum: iii, 4; especially Sanchez; De

matrim.; so also Diana; comp. Ellendorf: 30 sqq., 95 sqq., 288 sqq.,

331 sqq.

[187] Escobar: Liber, etc., princ. ii, n. 41; so also Bauny.

[188] E. g., Diana: ii, t. 16, 54; 17, 62 ssq.; iii, 5, 87 sqq.; iv, 4,

36, 37,--in the spirit of many of the Jesuits.

[189] Especially Escobar: i, 7; comp. Ellendorf: 72 sqq.

[190] Sanchez: Summa, t. i, 2, 39, 7; Amicus: De jure et justitia, v,

sec. 7, 118; comp. Diana: iii, tr. 5, 97, ed. Antv. 1637.

[191] Sanchez: Opus mor. ii, 39, 7.

[192] Crome, x, 229; Escobar, i, 7, n. 59, 64.

[193] In Escobar: Princ. iii, n. 25,--who, however, himself disapproves

thereof.

[194] Perrault, ii, 304 sqq.; St�udlin, 503; Ellendorf, 360 sqq.

[195] Resolutiones morales, Antv., 1629-37, 4 fol., Lugd. 1667, Venet.,

1728.

[196] Res. mor., Antv., 1637, ii, tract. 13; iv, tr. 3; Summa, 1652, p.

214.

[197] Ibid., iii, 5, 90; Summa, pp. 210, 212.

[198] Res. mor., Antv., 1637, iii, tract. 5, 37.

[199] Ibid., ii, tract. 15, 17.

[200] Ibid., iii, tr. 6, 24.

[201] Ibid., iii, tr. 6, 45.

[202] Ibid., 6, 48.

[203] Resol. mor., Antv., iii, 6, 81; in the spirit of Sanchez and

Less.

[204] Ibid., iv, tr., 4, 94; sanctioned by several Jesuits.

[205] Theol. mor., 1645, 1652; the work itself I have not been able to

find; comp. Perrault: i, 331 sqq.

[206] Ibid., 1626.

[207] Disp., xi, 52, 171, 172, 183, (ed. Ven. 1723.)

[208] Ibid., viii, 27.

[209] Ibid., viii, 25, 28; xi, 110 sqq.

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SECTION XXXIX.

In striking antithesis to the morals of the Jesuits, stand the

teachings of the Augustine-inspired Jansenists, who, in opposition to

the subjectively-individual character of the Jesuitical system, hold

fast to the immutable objectivity of the moral law, and teach the

latter in a very rigid manner, much resembling that of Calvinists; but

yet because of their leaning upon the earlier mysticism of the church

they come short of carrying fully out the Reformatory principle.--The

mystical theology--present in Jansenism only as a co-ordinate

element--perpetuated itself in the Romish church, in natural antagonism

to the cold casuistic morality of the Jesuits, but rather in a

popularly devotional than in a scientific form, and rose, in the

Quietism of Molinos, to a one-sided turning-aside from all vigorous

moral activity, while Fenelon shaped a modified and moderated mysticism

into a noble, moral system of devout contemplation.

Jansen of Louvain (afterward bishop of Ypres), presses, in his

Augustinus (1640), the doctrine of Augustine against the semi-Pelagian

system of the Jesuits, and occasioned thereby a powerful theological

movement which led almost to schism, and which demonstrated again by

historical results that even the most rigid teaching of predestination

brings about higher moral views than the doctrine of Pelagianism and

semi-Pelagianism,--and for this simple reason, that, in the former

system God is brought absolutely into the fore-ground, while, in the

latter, the individual subject is put forward into a false position.

Love to God and to his will is the essence of all morality; where God

is not loved in an action, there the action is not moral; mere love to

created things is sinful; but our love to God is poured out into our

hearts by God himself, and hence stands in need of grace, which

inclines the will directly and irresistibly to the working of the good.

The four chief virtues and the three theological virtues, as adopted

from Augustine, are only different manners of loving God; God is their

ultimate goal, as also their source; his gracious working and our love,

both inseparably united, constitute their impelling power; fear does

indeed bring about order, but not virtue.--Although the book of Jansen

was' burned at Rome, and forbidden by Papal bulls, still his opinions

continued to disseminate themselves in the Netherlands and in France,

and bade defiance to Jesuitism. The writings of Arnauld, Pascal,

Nicole, Quesnel, developed the moral principles of Jansen still

further, and though they in fact remained far remote from evangelical

purity of faith, and even defended as a high virtue the afflicting of

the body by fasting and other severe acts of penance, even to

self-mortification, still they were thoroughly in earnest for moral

purity,--required complete moral self-denial out of love of God, and

placed the moral worth of all actions, and even of their ascetic

practices, essentially in the disposition of the heart; and their

ground-principles were definite and clear, and proof against all

sophistry. [210] Arnauld assailed effectually the ethics of the

Jesuits. Pascal's (ob. 1662) "Pens�es" (1669 and later), consisting of

thoughts on religion without any very close connection, attained to a

very wide circulation. That the presentation of these quite plain

thoughts could produce so great an impression, is evidence of how

deeply had sunk the Christian life, and of how great was the necessity

of reformation. Peter Nicole (ob. 1695) worked effectually, through his

numerous popular and essentially Scripture-inspired writings on special

moral topics, toward a purer form of ethics; [211] and this was done in

still wider circles by Quesnel's "Moral Reflections" (at first in 1671,

on the Four Gospels, afterward on the entire New Testament) which were

affected with a slight tinge of mysticism;--(Sainte-Beuve:

"Resolutions," etc., 1689, 3, 4to.). The open or underhanded opposition

of the Jesuits to these writings simply awakened the attention of the

people all the more to the great difference between the parties, and

that, too, not to the advantage of the Jesuits.--The chief strength of

Jansenism lay in its opposition to the Jesuits; its own positive

contents, as an emphasizing of the practical phase of Augustinianism,

was not consequentially carried out; it was not able to disenthrall

itself from the unevangelical ground-thoughts of the corrupted church,

but halted at half-ways; and hence though it had a wide-reaching, it

did not have a permanent and profound, influence. Discarding the system

of external work-holiness and insisting on the inner element of the

moral life, it yet did not clearly and purely embrace the evangelical

thought of faith, which first lays hold on grace and then freely

carries out the life of grace; but it regarded morality not merely as

an evidence of salvation, but also, though without merit in itself, as

a means of salvation; hence its insisting on painfully-anxious ascetic

practices.

The mystical current of ethics, with which the Jansenists always

manifested a sympathy, was represented by Francis de Sales (bishop of

Geneva, ob. 1622, and subsequently canonized) in several works; [212]

by Vergier (abbot of St. Cyr, ob. 1643) a Jansenist, who was already

powerfully working in the direction of Quietism, and who encouraged the

severest, and even cruel, self-mortifications; [213] and by Cardinal

Bonaa (ob. 1674.) [214] Most remarkable, however, though quite

consequential, was the manner in which mysticism was transformed into

Quietism [215] by the Spaniard, Michael Molinos (afterward in Rome,)

whose work entitled "Spiritual Guide," originally (1675) in Spanish,

soon disseminated itself throughout Romish Europe. [216] As the goal of

morality is union with God through an entire turning away from the

creature, hence true morality must manifest itself, not in acting in

the outer world, but in turning away from it. Such is the doctrine

which Molinos derives from his favorites among the earlier mystics,

from Dionysius the Areopagite down. In contemplation, in the path of

faith, in immediate spiritual vision of God, without the intervention

of an inferential process of thought, the soul already possesses

eternal truth. True vision, inward rest and inward composure,--the

remaining silent in the presence of God, the beholding of God without

figure or form, and without distinguishing between his attributes, as

the absolutely One,--all this is not a self-acquired active state, but

a passive one imparted by God himself to the soul, so that consequently

God alone works in man, and the soul itself remains m6tionless and

inactive,--yields itself entirely to the solely-working divine

activity,--is entirely united with God; this is the true, pure manner

of prayer, which cannot be uttered in words, but is a holy

keeping-silence of the soul. Satiated in this union with God the soul

is entirely filled with the divine, and hates all worldly

things,--feels a repugnance to every thing earthly, forgets every thing

created, is divested, in its inner solitude, of all affections and

thoughts, of all inclinations and all creature-will,--withdraws itself

into its most innermost depths, and enjoys, in its total

self-forgetfulness (entirely merged into God), perfect inner rest, and

holy peace; self-mortification and self-denial are but disciplinary

helps for beginners in the acquiring of salvation, but do not

themselves lead to perfection; this is attained only through sinking

into one's own nothingness, through 'self-annihilation," through the

putting on of, and becoming united with, God.--Molinos, though at first

favored by the Pope, was afterward delivered over, by the influence of

the Jesuits, to the Inquisition, and was required to disavow his

doctrines (1687), and died in prison. Many of the propositions

condemned were only inferences drawn from his writings, though not

expressly taught by himself.--In spite of this and other persecutions,

mysticism still continued to exist, also in its quietistic form, in the

Latin nations. (Madam Bouvier de la Mothe Guion--ob. 1717--represented

it in numerous writings, mostly published by Poiret, in. which she

sometimes goes in fervent mystical depth of love, even beyond

Molinos,--the out-gush of a glowingly enthusiastic womanly

heart.)--F�nelon, archbishop of Cambray, favored the doctrine of Madame

Guion, and endeavored by moderating her quietistic views to conjure the

opposition; and his writings, which portray in simple, noble eloquence

the pious life of the Christian, and keep free from the extremes of

one-sided mysticism, and uniformly place love to God in the foreground

as the essence of the moral, offer and propose, in opposition to the

pettifogging dialectics of Jesuitical morality, the Christian

spirituality of the heart. His mystical masterpiece (Explication des

Maxims des Saintes, 1697, and often subsequently) was condemned by the

Pope and proscribed; F�nelon yielded.

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[210] Comp. Reuchlin: Geschichte von Portroyal, 1839, and the same

author's Pascals Leben, 1840,--neither work entirely unprejudiced.

[211] Kirchenhistor. Archiv. v. St�udlin, etc., 1824, 1, 127.

[212] Oeuvres, Paris, 1821, 16 t., 1834.

[213] Opp. theol., 1642, 1653.

[214] Manuductio ad coelum, 1664, and frequently; Opp. Antv., 1673,

1739.

[215] Walch: Einl. in d. Rel. streit. ausser. d. ev. K., 1724, ii, p.

982; St�udlin u. Tschirner: Archiv., i, 2, 175.

[216] Walch: Einl. in d. Rel. streit. ausser. d. ev. K., 1724, ii, p.

982; St�udlin u. Tschirner: Archiv., i, 2, 175.

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SECTION XL.

Independently of the Reformation,--because averse to Christianity

itself, and standing rather in connection with the already previously

existing breaking-loose from the evangelically-moral consciousness

which showed itself, as godlessness on the one hand, and as humanism on

the other,--there was developed, in antithesis to the Christian

religion and to Mediaeval philosophy (as also in antithesis to the

riper Greek philosophy, and consequently to the historical spirit in

general) an essentially new philosophical movement, which, while moving

forward under manifold modifications of form, gradually won a

progressively greater influence on theology, and in fact chiefly also

on theological ethics, leading the same astray, on the one hand, into

deep-reaching errors, but also, on the other (and in fact because of

these errors) bringing it to a riper self-examination and to a clearer

self-consciousness. Showing a preference,--in contrast to the precedent

of the better form of scholasticism,--to those ancient moralists who

already represented the decadence of Greek thought, namely, to the

Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Skeptics, or indeed also, merely in a

general way, to the so-called humanistic spirit of antiquity,--this

movement (which found favor especially in Italy and France, because of

the there-increasing demoralization of the higher classes), shows

itself at first, for the most part, simply in the form of general

maxims and sentiments, and attained only rarely to a more scientific

shape. Scarcely anywhere save in Germany did this current of thought

rise to scientific earnestness and philosophical development, and

thereby to a more substantial moral character. Spinoza broke off all

connection with ancient and Mediaeval philosophy, and developed a

consequential Pantheistic system, in which ethics assumes the form of

an objective describing of the absolutely unfree, purely

mechanically-conceived moral life, as determined with unconditional

nature-necessity by the life of the universe, although, because of the

unhistorical originality of his manner of thinking, he exerted but

little influence upon his (for this element, yet unreceptive) age. All

the greater, however, became the influence of the philosophy of

Leibnitz, representing as it did a world-theory the opposite of that of

Spinoza, and placing itself rigidly on monotheistic ground, and

standing in a much closer connection with history;--especially was this

influence extended through the labors of his somewhat independent

disciple, Christian Wolf, who created a very detailed and morally

earnest system of ethics, essentially under the form of the doctrine of

duties, which, as a purely philosophical opposition-movement to the

above-mentioned non-Christian and anti-Christian current, attained to a

not undeserved influence on Christian ethics in Germany, and gave rise

in Crusius to an evangelically deeper, though not philosophically

carried-out, development of moral science.

It is utterly incorrect and anti-historical to deduce the collective,

and (as some have done) even the anti-Christian philosophy of modern

times from the Reformation, or even to regard it as standing in any

close connection therewith. The essence of the Reformation is not the

freeing of the individual subject from all objective authority.

Historically, we are forced to hold fast to the fact that both before,

and during, and after, the time of the Reformation, there were

prevailing still other entirely different spiritual influences than the

religiously-evangelical one,--influences which were in part entirely

independent of the Reformation and of its spirit, nay, even utterly

opposed thereto, and in part, though occasioned in their development by

the movement of thought going out from the Reformation, were yet not

caused thereby. The renewed cultivation of ancient classical

literature, especially of the belletristic as distinguished from the

philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, played, in the Reformation-movement,

only a very subordinate and essentially negative role, namely, in that

it undermined the credit of scholasticism. The deep earnestness of the

religious life in the evangelical church, the required inward purity,

and the repentance of regeneration, consisted but illy with a love for

the exaltation of the natural man, as exhibited in Greek literature;

and it was much easier for humanism to find an undisturbed patronage

within the Romish church,--which, though indeed not theoretically

approving of the movement, had yet practically already long since

accorded it favor. Humanism was the name self-assumed by this movement,

which in antithesis to the Christian world-theory placed man, in his

natural development, into the fore-ground even of its moral

world-theory, and threw as far as possible into the back-ground his

need of redemption, and which had consequently in Christianity only a

scientific and esthetic interest. The unbelieving impiety which

prevailed widely in the Romish church of that age, and which found its

way even into the Papal chair, had a much more lively sympathy for

heathen literature than the evangelical church. The Pelagian character

of humanism stood in fact nearer to the view of the Romish church than

to that of the evangelical. Luther turned the unevangelical Erasmus

indignantly away; Rome offered him a cardinal's hat.

It was quite natural, although it had nothing at all to do with the

evangelical Reformation, that there should now rise in opposition to

the one-sided idealism and spiritualism of scholasticism, an equally

one-sided realism and naturalism, which would naturally enough find

encouragement in the spirit of the age as weaned off from the Mediaeval

ideals of chivalry and poetry, and as immersed in material interests

and in the prose of politics. This thoroughly non-Christian

naturalistic tendency, which attained to a more spiritual content only

in the sphere of German thought, manifested from the very start a

decided aversion to all history, an aversion which constantly grew more

marked and positive. This anti-historical spirit began already to show

itself in the attempt to call again into life, in disregard to the

entire history of Christian thought, an ante-Christian world-theory,

namely, to effect a rehabilitation of the spirit of the heathen thought

of Greece and Rome. At a later period the movement went still

further,--broke even with the history of philosophy, pushing it

entirely aside even in its ancient form,--and the "philosophical"

century thought to display its strength in speaking disdainfully of the

spiritual products of a Plato and an Aristotle, and in regarding as

philosophers only third and fourth rate minds, such as Cicero, and in

basing itself, in boundless self-sufficiency, purely and simply upon

itself. It required all the pretension of the so-called philosophical

century to accept men, such as Rousseau and Voltaire (who had in fact

scarcely the faintest conception of solid philosophical thought-work),

as the greatest philosophers of the world's history. From the history

of thought, these men were unwilling to learn any thing, but solely

from nature; every one wanted to philosophize on his own

responsibility; every thing had to be entirely new; the new era wished

to owe nothing to the past, but contemptuously to tread it under foot;

and the reaction from this anti-historical, and hence unspiritual

tendency, begins only quite late--with Schelling. Now as the

Christianly-moral world-theory has a thoroughly historical character,

hence the history of this essentially naturalistic form of ethics

admits of no possible organic incorporation into the history of

Christian ethics; it simply moves side by side with the Christian

current,--breaks, especially at a later period, disturbing, confusing,

and perverting, into it,--but is with only slight exception not a

furthering element of its development.

Erasmus, who enters the ethical field in several treatises, [217] does

not as yet himself directly assail the Christianly-moral consciousness,

but only presents with prudent reserve the ethics of Plato and Cicero

as very closely related to Christian ethics, and mingles faint

Christian views with Grecian, and thereby reduces them to the level of

Pelagianism. His assaults on the moral abuses of the church are devoid

of Christian depth.--Pomponatius (of Padua and Bologna, ob. about

1525), [218] who, under the patronage of the Papal court, assailed the

doctrine of personal immortality, professed, in point of ethics, to

belong to the Stoic school,--taught absolute determinism, and presented

the Christian view only ambiguously along-side of the

heathen.--Lipsius, in the Netherlands (ob. 1606) went still further in

the exaltation of Stoicism, [219] though his opinions received no very

favorable commendation from his unbridled life and from his threefold

change of faith--Romish, Lutheran, Reformed, and then Romish again.--In

all essential features belongs here also the Socinian ethics of Crell,

which is in many respects kindred to the later Rationalistic system,

and presents (in a spirit of pure Pelagianism) Christian ethics simply

as improved Aristotelian ethics, and prefers the latter to the ethics

of the Old Testament. [220] --Agrippa of Nettesheim (of Cologne, ob.

1535), undermined, by a far-reaching skepticism, the certainty of all

moral consciousness, and explained this consciousness simply by mere

fortuitous habit and by fortuitously-adopted public manners; [221] his

magico-alchemistic superstitiousness forms the back-ground thereto.

(Giordano Bruno, the forerunner of Spinoza, produced no system of

ethics.)

Less influential upon his own age than upon recent times, was the

philosophy of Spinoza. His chief work, Ethica (1677), which appeared

only after his death, constitutes almost an entire philosophical

system, of which the ethical part proper forms indeed the largest but

not the most philosophical and important. This perspicuous and

mathematically-exact treatise presents not so strictly a speculative

development of the subject-matter as, rather, rational elucidations and

proofs of assumed propositions, among which, however, some very

important ones, which needed to be demonstrated, are presented merely

as axioms not needing proof, or are disguised in definitions. That the

Jewish, but also Judaism-rejecting, philosopher should feel himself

obliged also to ignore the history of the human spirit in general, was

naturally to be expected; his system (if we except the philosophy of

Descartes, which had likewise but little connection with earlier

philosophy, and whose monotheistical character Spinoza assails) has no

historical antecedents proper, but in fact begins anew the

philosophical thought-work from the very beginning, and develops the

Pantheistic world-theory so consequentially and undisguisedly as is

nowhere else to be found.--God, as the solely existing substance whose

two attributes are thought and extension, has not a world different

from and outside of himself, but is this world himself, as considered

simply under a particular aspect. All particular being is only a mode

of the existence of God; and all these modes are conditioned by the

absolute necessity of the divine life, and cannot be otherwise than as

they really are; all that is, is what, and as, it is, from necessity;

of every thing which is or takes place the principle holds absolutely

good: omnia sunt ex necessitate naturae divinae determinata. Hence this

holds good equally also of man, who is likewise a particular mode of

the being of God. When we say: "the human soul thinks something," this

is the same as to say: "God thinks," not however in so far as God is

infinite, but in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human

spirit. Hence human thought is just as necessarily determined as is all

being in general,--and hence knows per se, and necessarily, the

truth.--Now, thinking has two phases: knowing and willing. Of willing

the same holds good as of knowing, namely, it is absolutely determined

in all its activity. Every will-act has a definite cause, by which it

is absolutely determined. Willing can never contradict knowing, but is

the immediate and necessary product of the same, and is, strictly

speaking, identical therewith; willing is affirming, and non-willing is

denying. He who believes that he speaks, or keeps silent, or does any

thing else, by free choice, dreams with open eyes. Men delude

themselves into thinking that they are free in their volitions, only

because they are not conscious of the cause which absolutely determines

them; all that takes place through the activity of the will is

necessary, and therefore good. This doctrine renders the heart calm and

makes us happy; with it we have no longer any occasion for fear, for we

know that every thing takes place according to the everlasting decree

of God, with the same necessity as it follows from the idea of a

triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right angles,--teaches

us to hate, to despise, to mock no one,--teaches us unlimited

contentment (ii, prop. 48, 49).

All this is clear and consequential; but how can the existence of a

moral consciousness be reconciled therewith? How can any thing be

morally required or done, if every thing takes place with unconditional

necessity, and if will-freedom is only a false appearance? That there

can be no question of a moral command proper, of an "ought," Spinoza

himself virtually admits, inasmuch as he declares it his purpose to

speak of human actions just as if the matter in question were lines,

surfaces, and solids (iii. prooem.) We are active in so far as any

thing takes place within or without us, of which we are the perfect

cause; and the more we are active, and the less we are passive, so much

the more perfect are we. Even as all other things, so also the spirit

strives to retain and to enlarge its reality; its striving is its

willing; the end is not different from the cause--from the

unfree-acting impulse of nature; the passing-over to a higher reality

awakens the feeling of pleasure; the opposite, that of displeasure.

Pleasure in connection with the consciousness of its cause, is love;

the opposite is hate. For a real difference between good and evil there

is, in this world-theory, no place whatever. Neither good nor evil is a

reality in things themselves, but both are simply subjective

conceptions and notions, which we form by a comparison of things, and

are hence only relative relations having their basis not in things but

in ourselves,--are only modes of our thinking; for example, a

particular piece of music is good for a melancholic person, not good

for a different one, and is of no significancy at all for a deaf one;

hence it is per se neither good nor bad, (iv, praef:) Hence we cannot

say in general that any thing at all is good per se; it is only by

comparing one thing with another higher entity, or with a notion formed

by ourselves, that we find any thing to be good; good and evil are only

expressions of our subjective judgment as to that for or against which

we have a desire or an aversion. Per se, however, every thing is good,

because necessary; nothing is or transpires without God or against his

will; every thing is just as, according to eternal, divine destination

and necessity, it ought to be; hence the notion of evil is only a

limited and ungrounded manner of thinking on the part of our own

understanding,--is nothing on the part of God. Evil is in fact, even in

our own conception, only a negative something, a privation; but God

knows no mere negative something, hence God knows absolutely nothing of

evil (comp. the view of Erigena, � 33), and hence there is in reality

no such thing as evil; for what God does not know does not exist, and

outside of God's thinking there is no other thinking. Moreover, were

evil or sin a real something, God would necessarily not only know it,

but also be the cause of it, for God is the substance and the cause of

all that is; and what is of God cannot be evil. Hence it is only a

false manner of looking at things, an imagination, when we find any

thing evil in the real world,--false, in that we bring things into

relation to ourselves, to our fortuitous feelings of pleasure and

displeasure, instead of contemplating them in their own nature; in and

of itself, and hence in truth, every thing real is good and perfect. In

all seemingly free action nothing else can take place than what results

with necessity from the existing circumstances of the acting subject.

Even the stings of conscience are a self-deception, and are nothing

other than a sadness or chagrin which we feel over some kind of a

failure. Let it not be objected to this, that if men do every thing

from necessity, and hence, also, sin from necessity, they cannot

consequently be blamed therefor, but that all men would then be

necessarily happy. On the contrary, man can be without guilt, and,

notwithstanding that, be also devoid of happiness. The horse is not

guilty for its not being man, and nevertheless it still remains a

horse; and he who is bitten by a mad-dog is also not guilty therefor,

and yet he goes mad; he who is blind was in fact destined in the

concatenation of beings to be blind and not seeing (Ep., 32, 34.) This

is surely the most wonderful justification of the moral order of the

universe which one could possibly fall upon; for, in fact, whence can

mad-dogs originate in an absolutely necessary and good world? If every

thing is necessary, and the entirely innocent can be made mad by

mad-dogs, this is evidently a very bad sort of world-order. And we must

ask: if all human thinking is the thinking of God himself, and is

absolutely necessary, how is there in fact possible any manner of false

thinking and imagining? If men really regard evil as real, then this

is, in fact, an error on the part of God himself, which our philosopher

should endeavor to account for; but if there is no evil, then there is

also no error, and the system thus entangles itself in its own meshes.

And when Spinoza makes error to be just as necessary as truth (ii,

prop., 35, 36), he still cannot evade this contradiction by declaring

error to be merely relative, for a merely seeming error would yet in

reality be the truth, and hence would not admit of the turn here taken

by Spinoza.

Hence--so infers Spinoza--all is good which is useful; and all is evil

which hinders from a good (iv, def., 1, 2.) Hence virtue is the power

or capacity of acting in conformity to our own nature; virtus nihil

aliud est, quam ex legibus propriae naturae agere; hence every one must

follow the necessity of his nature, and by it judge of good and evil.

Hence sin is avoided for the simple reason that it is contrary to our

nature; but why sin is yet in fact committed, Spinoza needs not to

answer, because sin in the proper sense of the word cannot be committed

at all; of sin there can be any question only in the State, and, there,

it is disobedience to civil law (iv, 37, schol. 2). As reason can

require nothing which would be against nature, hence it requires that

each should strive for that which is useful to himself; and useful is

that which brings each to a higher reality. Hence morality requires

that each should love himself, should seek to preserve as much as

possible his existence, and to bring it to higher perfection and

reality; and man is all the more virtuous the more he seeks after that

which is useful to him, (iv, prop. 18).--As the essence of reason is

knowledge, hence knowledge is the most useful of things, and the

rational man holds nothing for truly useful save that which contributes

to knowledge. Hence the highest good is the knowledge of God, and the

highest virtue is the striving thereafter; and every man has the

strength necessary thereto; and as the body is directly connected with

the spirit, and as the spirit is all the more vigorous the more

vigorous the body is, hence it is useful and virtuous to make the body

skillful.

The good always awakens delight; hence delight is per se necessarily

good, and sadness necessarily evil, as well as whatever leads to

sadness. Hence compassion is, for the rational man, evil and

irrational; true, it often inclines us to beneficence, but this we

should do at any rate even without compassion, (this is the virtue of

generositas); and the truly wise man knows indeed that nothing is or

takes place in the world over which we could grieve; moreover

compassion easily leads astray to false acting (Eth. iv, 50).--Also

humility as including a feeling of sadness is not a virtue, and springs

not from reason, but from error, inasmuch as in it man recognizes

himself as, in some respect, powerless, whereas, in virtue of the

prevalence of universal necessity, he has all the power necessary to

his destination (iv, 53). Repentance over committed sin is not only not

virtuous, but it is irrational, because it rests on the delusion of

having done a free and, that too, evil action, whereas the action was

in reality necessary, and hence good; he who feels repentance is

consequently doubly miserable. However, our moralist appears to shrink

back from the practical consequences of this doctrine; he declares it

as very dangerous when the great masses are not kept in bounds by

humility, repentance and fear (iii, 59, def. 27; iv, prop. 54),--an

apprehension which is, of course, entirely inexplicable from the

ground-principle of his system, and must be banished, as a mere

"imagination," into the sphere of unreason; for how can there be, in

Spinoza's world, a dangerous populace to be curbed only by false

notions, seeing that indeed every thing that takes place is absolutely

a necessary divine act?--The notion that any thing is bad or evil is,

according to Spinoza, per se already an evil; if man is truly rational

and has only correct ideas, then he can have no notion of evil at all,

for it in fact does not exist; whatever affects us as pain or

suffering, is such only in virtue of an erroneous, confused conception,

an "imagination;" if we have correct knowledge, then are we free from

all pain; the more we recognize all things as necessary, so much the

less are we subject to suffering; every painful state of the emotions

disappears so soon as we form to ourselves a clear notion thereof.

Hence, according to Spinoza, the sole evil is false conceptions, but

how these could arise we are not informed.--He who truly knows himself

and his circumstances, has necessarily joy; and as in all true knowing

he also knows God, and as this knowing is attended with joy, hence he

also loves God; hence in the knowledge and love of God consists the

highest joy. God himself, however, (conceived as the universe) is

without states of emotion, without love or aversion. God can neither

love nor hate, save in the love or hate of man himself; and when any

one who loves God desires to be loved in turn by God, he desires in

fact that God should cease to be God. True, we may indeed speak of

God's love, but not in such a manner as that God as a personal spirit

should love man, but only that God loves in our love; God loves not me

but God loves himself, namely, in that I love Him.

Spinoza's ethics appears at once as very widely different from all

preceding ethics; its essential characteristic is, unhistoricalness.

Greek philosophy, and also scholasticism, are the fruit of a long and

vigorous development of an historical current of human

thought,--presuppose an already historical moral consciousness, for

which they aim to create a scientific form. Spinoza's ethics sprang, in

no sense whatever, from the spirit of an historical people,--has no

historical antecedents, no historical consecration, and hence wears in

its lofty, reality-spurning bearing, also the character of historical

impossibility. Plato's idealistic state is historically possible on a

Greek basis; Spinoza's ethics can absolutely never and nowhere be the

expression of the moral consciousness of a people,--can be appropriated

only as their isolated moral consciousness by single persons, who in

proud selfishness imagine themselves far above the morally-religious

consciousness of the masses, whereas in fact they owe the very

possibility of their moral existence in society simply to this

consciousness of the masses. Spinoza has learned nothing, whether from

the philosophers of Greece, from the Middle Ages, from the religion of

the Old Testament, or from Christianity; his ethical speculations are

devoid of preparatory antecedents,--are an absolutely revolutionary

breaking-off from all historical spirit-development,--base themselves

purely upon individual thinking. His unimportant dependence on

Descartes is not in conflict therewith. If he had had even the

slightest appreciation for the significance and the rights of history,

he would have been required, on the very ground of his own system, to

recognize the Christian world-theory as a highly important revelation

of the alone-ruling God, and to regard history in general as a normal

and necessary life-manifestation of God. Whereas in fact he turns

himself contemptuously away from all history of thought, as if God had

come to true self-consciousness alone and solely in himself. He does

not free himself in any sense from the contradiction of declaring, on

the one hand, all reality as necessary and good, and all evil as mere

appearance, and of regarding on the other hand, all previously-existing

spiritual reality as absolutely wrong, senseless, and irrational.

Plato and Aristotle, for the reason that they stand more within the

current of history, stand also far nearer the Christian consciousness

than Spinoza. In his wide-reaching antithesis to the real essence of

spirit which is in fact necessarily history, he is the father of the

Naturalism of more recent times. Only the unfree, the nature-entity, is

real; the free, the spiritual, and hence also the moral, in general has

no existence whatever. Though indeed he contrasts thought and extension

in space, as being of different nature, yet this thinking is in fact

not free and spiritual, but bears absolutely a nature-character,--has

not ends before it, but simply presents manifestations of a necessary

ground; so in the case of God, so in the case of man. Ethics is

therefore degraded to a mere describing of necessary nature-phenomena;

and where it falls into the tone of moral- exhortation in view of

rational ends, then this is to be understood either in a merely

improper sense, and is indulged in simply in view of the unwise

multitude, or it comes into irreconcilable contradiction with the

ground-thought of the system. The Jew continues a Jew, in this

Christian age, only through hatred against history, which has in fact

pronounced his condemnation; he is either the petrified guest in the

midst of living society, or the insolently mocking despiser of all

historical reality, utterly devoid of reverence and respect for the

historical spirit,--a champion of the wildest radicalism. Spinoza,

breaking loose from the petrified form of Talmudic Judaism, stands

entirely isolated in the world of the historical spirit; he can find

for himself no proper place in this world,--makes only an attempt to

build up an entirely new world out of himself. The same self-delusion

which prevails throughout post-Christian Judaism, namely, in that it

dreams of still having an historical character, whereas it has in fact

sunk utterly into mere lifeless matter, is also potent in Spinoza. He

dreams of creating a system. of ethics, whereas it proves to be really

nothing else than the theoretical describing of a moral instinct devoid

of a rational end. Where the "must" dominates, there all "should" and

"would" cease. In sharp contrast to the pure idealistic Pantheism of

Erigena, who really recognizes only God and not the world, and who,

like the Indians, finds evil only in the distinguishing of the worldly

and finite from God, Spinoza holds in fact fast to the reality and

divinity of the finite,--merges God into the world, and regards the

real, simply as it is, in its isolated separateness, as good and

perfect. The Pantheism of Erigena leads to an ascetic turning-away from

the world; that of Spinoza, to a contented and absolutely satisfied

merging of self into the world; and the "akosmism" which Hegel thinks

he discovers in Spinoza is not to be found in him, but rather in the

nobler and far more spiritual John Scotus Erigena.

Spinoza exerted in his own age but little influence. Notwithstanding

the deep spiritually-moral declension of that dark period, the

religious God-consciousness was as yet too vital to fall in with this

naturalistic Pantheism; and the requirement to recognize all reality as

necessary and good, could find little response at a time of profound

disorganization and far-reaching material, misfortune in Germany. It

was reserved for a later age, when a wide-spread irreligious sentiment

was attempting to create for itself a scientific justification, to

emphasize the doctrine of Spinoza not merely in its undeniable (though

yet not to be overestimated) philosophical significancy, but also to

attempt to exalt it to a religious character, nay, even to a pretended

transfiguration of Christianity, and "to offer a lock to the manes of

the holy Spinoza "--(Schleierm., Reden; 2 ed.., p. 68).

That from this doctrine there could arise for the moral life itself

only a perverting influence, needs for the unprejudiced mind no proof.

The letting of one's self alone in his immediate naturalness and

reality, is here even lauded as wisdom; repentance and sanctification

within, and sanctifying activity without, become folly, because no one

has either the right or the ability initiatively to interfere with the

eternally necessary course of things. That Spinoza himself was an

upright man, proves nothing in favor of his system; the weight of

custom and the natural moral sentiments are often stronger than a

perverse theory; nor is, in fact, mere uprightness in our social

relations the full manifestation of the moral.

Leibnitz,--though also stimulated by Descartes, but opposed to Spinoza

in his fundamental thoughts, and more imbued with an historical spirit,

and standing in closer connection with the results of precedent

spiritual development,--did not produce a system of ethics proper,

though he broke the way for the development of such. Though highly

respecting the Christian consciousness, he yet had no very deep

appreciation for the same, and hence his thoughts in relation to

religion and morality are of a somewhat external character. He is

unable to comprehend evil in the purely spiritual sphere, but seeks for

its roots, beyond this sphere, in the essence of the creature as such.

God as the absolutely perfect rational spirit has indeed realized,

among all possible conceptions of a world, the best one; but as the

world does not contain the fullness of all perfection, which in fact

exists in God alone, nor yet all possible perfections, as in fact all

that is possible has not become real, hence there lies in the

conception even of the best world still at the same time the necessity

of a certain imperfection, without which a world is in fact not

conceivable, and which consequently belongs to the essence of the world

as such, and is a malum metaphysicum; this is, however, not per se a

reality, but only a nonbeing, a limit. The reality of the morally evil

is fortuitous, is the fault of man; only the possibility of it is

necessary. In his popularly-written work "Th�odic�e" (1710), he further

develops this thought, although elucidatorily rather than

scientifically.--Though Leibnitz recognizes the freedom of the will and

the guilt of man in relation to sin, still he does not sufficiently

deeply conceive of this guilt, and above all of the significancy and

workings of sin as an historical world-power, otherwise he would have

constructed his theory quite differently. He constantly seeks the roots

of evil elsewhere than in committed sin. The naturalistic determinism

of Spinoza, however, he utterly rejects; to the free personal God,

corresponds the freedom of the rational creature. The rational man

never acts from mere fortuitous fancies, but only from rational

grounds. But this moral necessity does not interfere with liberty,

because the possibility of irrational determinations still

remains.--Leibnitz conceives of ethics essentially as the doctrine of

right, inasmuch as moral duty is a right of God upon us. Right, in the

wide sense of the word, has three stages: mere right, which requires

that we injure no one; equitableness, which leaves and imparts to every

one his own; and piety, which fulfills the will of God and thereby

preserves the harmony of the world. Hence faith in the personal,

almighty and all-wise God is the foundation of all right; and the

essence of piety is love to God, from which all other forms of love,

constituting the essence of justness, receive their power. To love

signifies to be rejoiced by the happiness of another, or to make that

happiness one's own. The proper object of love is the beautiful, that

is, that, the contemplation of which delights; but God is the highest

beautiful. Piety as the highest stage of right, creates also the

highest moral communion--the church--which is destined to embrace

entire humanity. The three forms of society, corresponding to the three

stages of right, have also a threefold uniting-bond: mere power, and

reverence, and conscience; but also the first two receive their real

character of right, only through the latter. Love to God leads us into

the way of the highest happiness,--is in itself already the beginning

of the same in the "this-side," and works a constant progress in

perfection also in the "yon-side." [222]

In an original spirit, and, in the moral sphere, almost independently

of Leibnitz, wrote Christian Wolf. He created a complete ethical

system. [223] His great reputation, and the authoritative character

which he enjoyed with his contemporaries, were, however, almost

entirely overthrown in the Kantian period; that over-estimation, as

also the subsequent under-estimation, were equally unjust. A many-sided

boldly-exploring spirit, and, though in many respects deceiving himself

as to the scientific value of propositions which he uttered with the

greatest confidence, and attempted to demonstrate in a not unfrequently

stiff mathematical form, he yet attained to an extraordinary influence,

because of the clearness and precision of his ideas, and of their

manner of presentation, and gave rise, also in the sphere of ethics, to

a very vigorous scientific movement; and though his commendable effort

to remain in harmony with Christian revelation was not by any means

always realized, yet it helped to preserve for a long while in Germany,

as in contrast to the frivolous hatred of Revelation prevalent in

France and in England, a more earnest Christian and scientific spirit.

Precisely in the field of morals Wolf was greatly influential toward

the independent shaping of German science; and he broke off the

excessive dependence, also of theological ethics, on Aristotle. While

Wolf, in his decided, scientifically-grounded recognition of the

personal God--whom he conceives of indeed rather merely, in his

relation to the world, as Creator and Governor, and less,--in relation

to himself, in his inner essence-holds fast to the

objectively-religious basis of ethics; he yet at first view seems to

endanger the subjective foundation thereof, namely, the moral freedom

of the will, by his determinism.

Whatever takes place, also the seemingly fortuitous, has a sufficient

ground, either in itself or in its connection with other things, and is

in so far determined; there takes place no change whatever which is not

conditioned in the peculiarity of the concatenation of the universe,

and determined by the antecedent circumstances thereof, just as a

clock, set in motion for a whole year, is determined in each moment of

its movement by this its first starting; the world is just such an

absolutely, determined clock-work,--is a machine. Also in the freedom

of the human will, every real determination has its sufficient ground,

and is not arbitrary. This freedom consists in the possibility of

choosing and doing the opposite of what we really do, but that the

opposite possible should become real pre-supposes motives, and in so

far as the motive. is sufficient, this determination to realization is

also conditioned by the motive. It is impossible that a person who

knows something as better, should prefer to it the worse, and hence in

such a case it is necessary that he should choose the better; but the

will is free in this nevertheless, as in fact man has the ground of his

determination of will in himself.--This sounds at once very

questionable, and, as is well known, Wolf was, because of this

doctrine, driven from the Prussian states, as politically dangerous.

However, it is not to be overlooked that when man is considered as a

rational creature per se irrespective of the already-existing

depravity, his freedom is in fact not a groundless and irrational

caprice, but is determined by rational knowledge, and that, for the

really moral man in possession of correct knowledge, there does in fact

exist a moral necessity of following the rational. Hence Wolf's thought

is not per se incorrect, but only too unguarded, and therefore liable

to misunderstanding. As, however, Wolf expressly declares himself

against determinism as held by Spinoza, and as he distinctly and

repeatedly asserts the real, free will-determination of man, though

indeed not as irrational caprice, [224] we are consequently not at

liberty to attribute to him the full determinism of Spinoza.--The

question as to whether, and in how far, our knowledge is conditioned by

and dependent on our moral nature, and hence as to whether this

knowledge is freely, or absolutely unfreely, determined, Wolf does not

answer, but simply holds, that our willing is conditioned and

determined by our knowledge; and with him, as with Socrates, the

essential point is simply to correct and disseminate knowledge, and

then the corresponding moral action follows of itself with inner

necessity. Hence we can explain the almost unbounded pretensions which

the Wolfian ethics makes, and hence also the per se correct, but (in

view of the actual condition of humanity) erroneous thought that ethics

is not simply a scientific consciousness of the moral life, but also an

essential motive to the moral life itself,--that, properly understood,

ethics is the source of virtue. This thought stands forth more or less

clearly throughout Wolf's writings; practice follows theory of

necessity. The moral life is like a mathematical question proposed for

solution; it is only necessary to have clear notions of virtue and vice

and of duty, and then evil disappears of itself, and man becomes

virtuous. "I have," says Wolf, (in the preface to his second edition),

"not a little lightened the entire practice of the good and the

avoidance of the evil, by the fact that I have shown that when one

wishes to turn the will, it is just the same as when one disputes,

namely, in that one has at all times in the one case, as in the other,

simply to answer to one of the premises of an inference;" and later (in

the preface to the third edition) he says: "When my writings on

world-wisdom and, among them, the present one on what men are to do and

what not to do, appeared, those who are able to understand and judge of

the matter for themselves, and who were not prepossessed by unfavorable

prejudices, judged that thenceforth reason and virtue would become

universal, and that every body would strive, by this means, to attain

to happiness of life." Wolf, however, expressly deprecates the

misconception, that in his ethics he "ascribes too much to nature and

leaves no room for grace; the doctrines taught by me," says he, "serve

much rather to make clearly understood the difference between nature

and grace, and especially the great help which the latter is to the

former, so that consequently they are guides to grace;" the Christian

religion offers more than world-wisdom can do; rather does man learn by

this rational morality, that his natural powers do not suffice, and

hence he perceives all the better the necessity and excellency of the

grace which is offered to us in the Christian religion, and which

supplies that which nature lacks. How it can be that the natural powers

do not suffice, and how, on the presumption of such a lack of strength,

the philosophical ethics of Wolf can yet be, independently, effectual

in itself, we are not informed.

Ethics has to do with the free actions of men as distinguished from the

necessary ones; and freedom consists in the possibility of choice

between several possible things. The condition of a man is perfect when

his earlier and later conditions agree with each other, and all of them

with the essence and nature of man., The free actions of man promote or

diminish this perfection, that is, they are either good or bad. When,

therefore, actions are to be judged according to their moral worth,

then we must inquire what change they bring about in the condition of

our body or soul. Hence free actions become good or evil in virtue of

their effect; and as the effect follows from them necessarily and

cannot fail, hence actions are good or evil in and of themselves, and

are not made so simply by God's will; hence if it were possible that

there were no God, and that the present inter-dependence of things

could exist without him, still the free actions of men would

nevertheless remain good or evil.--Here the per se correct

ground-thought of the moral receives an external and therefore

misleading application, inasmuch as the result of our actions is

dependent on other powers than these actions themselves; only in an

ideal and as yet not sin-perverted condition of humanity, would such a

judging of the moral worth of actions from their result, hold good,

though even then it would be certainly more appropriate to determine

this worth from the essence of the action itself and not simply from

its result. In this respect Wolf clings so fast to the merely-outward

that he says: "Thus, he who is tempted to steal learns that stealing is

wrong, because it is followed by the gallows." Equally one-sided is the

contrasting of the goodness per se of an action and of the will of God.

The general maxim of ethics is therefore this: " Do that which renders

thee and thy condition, or that of others, more perfect; avoid that

which makes it more imperfect;" this is a universal rule of nature.

[This "or that of others" is only thrust in, and is not at all derived

from the ground-thought; the dualism involved therein, and the possible

contradiction, are in no manner reconciled.]--The sufficient motive of

the will is the knowledge of the good; and it is impossible that one

should not will a per se good action, when one only clearly comprehends

it; hence when we do not will it, it is for no other reason than that

we do not comprehend it." Likewise is the knowledge of evil the motive

of non-willing or aversion, and hence it is likewise impossible that

one should will a per se evil action when one clearly understands it.

Hence all moral willing and doing of the good or of the evil rests

absolutely on our knowing or non-knowing. True, man can indeed act

contrary to his conscience, but this takes place only when, because of

special circumstances, he regards the good as evil, or the evil as

good, and hence, after all, from error. The ultimate end of all moral

actions, and hence of our entire life, is the perfection of ourselves

and of our condition, or happiness, which is consequently the highest

good for man.

Ethics proper, Wolf treats as the doctrine of duties. Duty is an action

which conforms to law. Law is a rule to which we are bound to conform

our free actions; it is either a natural, a divine, or a human law.

Reason is the teacher of the law of nature; this law fully embraces the

whole moral life, and is, for this life, sufficient and absolutely

valid and unchangeable, for it rests on the harmonizing of our actions

with our nature. But as this our nature is established by the divine

creative will, hence the law of nature is at the same time also a

divine law, an expression of the divine will, though this will is not

to be conceived of as an arbitrary one, so that, for example, God's

will might declare the per se good for evil, and the per se evil for

good. The duties are: (1) duties of man toward himself, and more

specifically, toward his understanding, toward his will, toward his

body, and the duty in regard to our outward condition (that is, our

social position); (2) duties toward God, and more specifically, love to

God, fear and reverence, trust, prayer and thankfulness, and outward

worship; (3) duties toward other men, and more specifically, toward

friends and enemies, duties in regard to property, and duties in speech

and in contracts. This general classification of duties became

subsequently very usual.--Upon ethics is based natural right, which

treats of the allowable, as ethics proper treats of the obligatory; all

rights rest on duties. The ground-thought of right is: thou Inayest do

whatever sustains and promotes the perfection of thy own condition and

that of the condition of others, and thou mayest do nothing which is

contrary thereto. In the further application of right to society, and

hence as politics, the welfare of society is the norm of action.

Wolfian ethics has manifestly, both in form and in contents, great

defects. In respect to form, it may be reproached with a manifold

commingling of empirical maxims with speculation; notions derived from

experience are often simply analyzed and then used as bases for further

inferences, and that, too, with the pretension of philosophical

validity; also there is abundant philosophical dogmatism, inasmuch as

the thoughts are very frequently not really developed in regular

process from the ground-thought, but are only associated and joined

with it. In respect to matter, there prevails throughout this ethics,

despite all its monotheistic presuppositions, a naturalistic tendency;

Wolf knows only the immediate natural existence of the moral spirit,

but not the history thereof, that is, the life proper of the same. His

ethics has a history of the spirit neither as its presupposition nor as

its goal; there is created by the moral activity not a moral history of

humanity, but only a state of the individual. Hence the question as to

whether indeed the actual nature of man is not already in some respects

a product of such a moral history of humanity,--whether or not it is a

pure unchanged original nature,--falls outside of this circle of

thought, and in fact remained unheeded by philosophical ethics, and

hence also to a large degree by theological ethics, throughout the

eighteenth and a part of the nineteenth century; and in this respect

Wolf was, in fact, the forerunner of the modern Rationalistic school.

And what he says of sinfulness, of divine grace and of Christianity, by

way of guarding against this naturalistic ground-tendency, is rather

mere personal good-will than a consequential result of his system. All

real interest is directed here to the sufficient reason, and not to the

end; there is lacking to morality and to history the vital heart-blood

of free spiritual productive creation. Christianity can be, to this

world-theory, at best only a higher revelation of the truth, a

furthering of knowledge, but not an historical history-creating fact.

Hence in the further theological development of this stand-point,

Christianity constantly sunk more and more to a mere revealed system of

morals, which, however, contained and could contain nothing other than

the Wolfian doctrine itself. Positive contents proper, Wolf does not

really give to the moral law; he does not rise beyond mere formal

definitions. What the good is, in and of itself, we are not informed;

we learn only that it stands in harmony with reason and makes us happy;

hence it is embraced only in its relations to something else, but not

in its inner contents.

In the spirit of Wolf, though with some independence, Canz labored

further, in T�bingen; his Disciplinae morales omnes, 1739, is an able

survey of the entire ethical field as then known; more theological is

his Instruction in the Duties of Christians, (1745, 4to., presenting

ethics as "duty-imposing God-acquaintance" and prefacing the doctrine

of duties simply by an essay on the four chief springs of all human

action and omission, namely, the flesh, nature, reason, and the

gracious workings of the Holy Spirit). Alexander Baumgarten (a brother

of the noted theologian) perfected, in his Philosophia ethica (1740,

1751), the Wolfian ethics, especially in formal respects; he places our

duties toward God (as those which condition all the others) at the

head.--G. F. Meier of Halle wrote, on the basis of Baumgarten's book, a

fuller and more popular work: Philosophical Ethics (1753).--(The

voluminous and superficial Eberhard appears in his Ethics of Reason

(1781) merely as a feeble, barren imitator of Wolf.)

Nearly contemporaneously with Wolf, had Thomasius (of Leipzig and

Halle) presented ethics from the stand-point of mere common sense in a

very popular form, [225] offering indeed many good observations, but

containing neither precision of thought nor a really scientific

development. "He places Christian ethics higher than philosophical, but

conceives of the former very superficially; Aristotle and the schoolmen

he despises and combats without understanding them. The essence of

virtue is love, or the desire naturally inherent in man to unite

himself to, and to remain in union with, that which the understanding

recognizes as good; in this love lies blessedness, that is, repose of

soul and absence of pain, as the highest good; love is irrational when

it aims at vain, transitory, and hurtful things, or when it is too

violent, or wills the impossible; from such love spring all the vices.

General love to man, as the essence of morality, embraces five chief

virtues: sociableness, truthfulness, modesty, forbearance, patience;

self-love should rest only on love to man. The necessity of revelation,

Thomasius recognizes; philosophy does not supply its place, but leads

to it, in that it leads to self-acquaintance.

Clear-headedly and with deep Christian knowledge, Christian August

Crusius (of Leipzig, ob. 1776) opposed the Wolfian philosophy, but was

abler in criticizing than in creating, and hence. of more limited

influence than Wolf, ("Directions for Living Rationally," [226] etc.,

1744; third edition, 1767). He declares himself very definitely against

the determinism of Wolf; the human will is not absolutely determined by

its knowledge, but remains, in relation thereto, free, and can act

contrarily thereto; he appeals in proof thereof to the perfectly

unambiguous evidence of consciousness, and to the full responsibility

of man for his sins. The determinations of the will are indeed, as

rational, not arbitrary and fortuitous, but have, on the contrary, a

sufficient reason; but this reason is by no means a

necessarily-determining one, but the will has always the possibility of

acting contrarily even to a sufficient reason; and Crusius goes, in

this respect, so far as to find perfect freedom only in holding that

the will can determine itself as easily for the one course as for the

other. All duties he considers as contained in our duty toward God, and

hence he does not co-ordinate, but subordinates, them to this duty.

Moral effort has indeed happiness and perfection for its goal, but it

has its law in the divine will, which likewise aims thereat. Man's

relation of dependence to his Creator directs him to make his entire

life dependent on the holy will of God; our striving toward the

rational God-willed goal, becomes truly moral only when it is the

expression of loving obedience to the revealed divine will. Hence it is

incorrect that the good is good per se even without reference to God's

will; rather is it good simply because God wills it, though this divine

willing is not irrational caprice, but a morally necessary act of his

holy essence. Hence morality rests in its very essence on religion; and

the moral law may not, as in Wolf's system, stand apart from the

religious consciousness, but requires a free God-obeying course of

acting answering to the divine will, and therefore also to the end of

the perfection of the creature. A natural, though not absolutely

sufficing manifestation of the divine will, is given in the conscience,

which, however, does not, as with Wolf, simply form a theoretical

judgment, but contains also at the same time a feeling of joy or

anguish, and hence an impulse. Crusius separates prudence from the

doctrine of morality proper, as the ability of finding, for rational

ends, also the special appropriate means.--A more popular presentation

of this view is contained in the so-long-esteemed, widely-read, and

influential "Moral Lectures" [227] of Gellert (1770), which, however,

are estimable more for their noble sentiments and warmth of feeling

than for depth of thought; and which, in their rhetorically verbose and

often dull and tedious manner could have made so great an impression

only in an age which had lost all taste for strong food; discursive

discussions on "the utility of health," etc., were then regarded as

interesting reading. Gellert addresses himself more to the feelings

than to the cognizing understanding, but the former are not embraced in

Christian depth, but rather as mere feeble sentimentality.

Since the middle of this century the taste for really philosophical

thinking had been declining in Germany, in the precise measure in which

the pretension to the name of "philosophical century" was put forward;

instead of a spiritually-vigorous, constantly-progressing development

of thought, we find, for the most part, only a self-complacent

superficial criticising tendency and arbitrarily-brought-together,

ungrounded assertions and observations, derived more from outward

experience than from reason, and often delighting in rhetorical

bombast.--The voluminous Feder of G�ttingen (Prackt. Philos., 1776;

Unters. �b. d. menschlichen Willen, 1779-85), reminds indeed often of

Wolf by his pedantic minuteness, but not by depth of thought; and he

bases himself in the main on the empiricism of Locke.--Garve, who was

highly esteemed by his contemporaries, derived the most of his matter

from the English moralists, and limited his own moral thoughts to

annotations on other writers (Cicero), and to disconnected but clear

and elegantly written, though neither profound nor ingenious,

dissertations.

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[217] Enchiridion militis christ.; Matrimonii christ. institt.;

Institt. principis christ.; and others.

[218] Opp., Bas. 1567, 3 t.

[219] Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam, 2d ed., 1610.

[220] Ethica Aristotelica, etc., Selenoburgi, s. a., 4to.,--later:

Cosmopoli, 1681, 4to.

[221] De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum, 1527 (?) then in Col.,

1531.

[222] In various essays, especially in the preface to Cod. juris

diplom., 1693; Gubrauer: Leibnitz; 1842, i, p. 226 sqq.

[223] Vern�nft. Gedanken. v. d. Menschen Thun u. Lassen (1720); more

elaborate is: Philosoophia moralis s. Ethica, methodo scientifico

pertractata (1750), both works forming the first part of a whole which

he presented in his Philos. prac. univ. (1738), the second part of

which embraces the doctrine of society or politics; also in his Jus

naturae (1740) there is much ethical matter.

[224] Introduction to the 2d ed. of his Moral.

[225] Von der Kunst vern�nftig. u. tugenhaft zu LIEBEN, etc., 1710; Von

der Artzenei wider die unvern�nftige Liebe, 1704; comp. F�lleborn:

Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil, 1791, iv.

[226] Anweisung vern�nftig zu leben

[227] Moralische Vorlesungen.

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SECTION XLI.

In England and France an anti-Christian tendency gave rise to a

progressively-degenerating moralism, which,--resting on an idealess

empiricism, and, though vigorously resisted, yet maintaining a rising

influence for a long time,--based itself in part on a superficial

deism, but also in part, and more consequentially, advanced to pure

atheism and materialism, and exalted into a moral law the lowest form

of Epicurean self-seeking. But it was especially reserved to the French

mind to draw the ultimate consequences of these premises, and to seek

in the wildest demoralization the highest civilization and

"philosophy," and, through a destruction-loving dissolution of all

moral consciousness in the higher classes (a dissolution which swept

over devastatingly into the un-German circles of the German literary

world) to prepare the way for that general convulsion in Europe which

at length attained, only through horrors and anarchy, to some presence

of mind and to some degree of calm. English moralism lingered in

general in a state of capricious wavering between the principle of

happiness and the principle of spiritual perfection, between the

principle of subjective eudemonism and the principle of objective

spiritualism. The reaction of this freethinking on Germany shows itself

mostly in the superficial utilitarian morality of the period of

self-styled "illuminism."

Quite otherwise than in Germany was philosophical ethics shaped in

England and France. While in Germany, notwithstanding the deep

spiritual and moral disorder consequent upon the Thirty Years' war,

there prevailed, for a long while still, a predominantly Christian

spirit, (which remained proof against the. Spinozistic Pantheism, and

sought to develop philosophy in harmony with Christianity, and only

gradually and at a late hour was enervated by French freethinking

through the un-German culture of the higher classes), in England the

religious contests had resulted in a deep spiritual laxity and in a

growing aversion to Christianity and to the spiritual in general. The

unspiritual empiricism of Bacon and Locke seconded this superficial

empirical turning-away to the immediately visible and prosaic reality

of the world. At first it was regarded as a progress to disregard the

doctrinal contents of Christianity and to insist only on its morals;

then it followed very naturally that this morality, as divorced from

its doctrinal basis, should be divorced also from its historical

presuppositions in general, and be derived only from the consciousness

of the natural man, and that religion in general, as in contrast to the

Christian religion, should be conceived simply as a system of moralism,

over which then, not as a foundation but as a protecting

superstructure, a superficial deism was constructed;--or, indeed, this

tendency was followed out further, and men rejected also this deism,

and contented themselves with the superficial morality of individual

self-love; and it must be regarded as a real progress (as in contrast

to this spiritual superficiality), when clearer thinkers skeptically

undermined also this pretended natural religion and natural morality,

and insisted on the vanity of all human knowledge.

Bacon of Verulcam, though not himself constructing an ethical system,

opened, by his empiricism (which opposed all previous philosophy, and

according to which there is absolutely no knowledge � priori, but only

such as springs from immediate and primarily sensuous experience), a

current of thought which was dangerous to the Christian world-theory,

although he himself did not in the least oppose the Christian

consciousness, but rather placed Christian faith above all

philosophical knowledge. However, he was not clearly conscious of the

tendency of his fundamental thoughts. On this basis, Locke (ob. 1704)

subsequently developed a system of philosophy which attained,

especially in England, to a wide-reaching influence, but which is in

fact, properly speaking, the very opposite of all speculation. True

knowledge arises only from the experience of our sensuous existence;

general notions are not the first but the last; the human mind per se

has and produces neither notions nor ideas, but is rather a tabula rasa

upon which the experience of the objective world first writes its

characters; and it is only through impressions from objective existence

that the spirit attains, through abstraction, comparison, and analysis,

to ideas. Out of this empiricism, however harmless and pretentionless

it might seem at first examination, was destined logically to result a

system of religion and morality essentially different from the

Christian world-theory; and historical facts realized this logical

sequence. It sweeps away, in fact, at a single blow all ideal contents

of the scientific and religious consciousness, in so far as these lie

outside of sensuous experience. But experience furnishes not ideas, but

only impressions; and at furthest one attains only to abstracted

notions, which, however, have no general and unconditional validity;

for the ideas of the divine and eternal, there is no place. But man

must have something ideal; if he has it not in and above himself, so

that he has simply to accept it in his rational self-consciousness and

in religious faith, then he must have it before himself,--must

practically and productively create it, in action; the ideal is indeed

not yet real, but it is to become so. It is consequently, at least, a

presentiment of reason which turned this idealess empiricism toward

ethics. But precisely this one-sided moralism shows most evidently, the

incorrectness of the ground-principles; an idealess morality sinks at

once to a morality of the most ignoble self-seeking and materialism. A

moral consciousness is, according to this system, derived only from

direct experience; what is good I know only from the fact that it makes

upon me a pleasant impression, affects me, as a particular individual,

with the feeling of pleasure; individual happiness becomes the measure

of the moral, and thus Epicureanism has again attained to validity.

Already before the more complete development of the Baconian empiricism

by Locke, Thomas Hobbes had drawn the natural and clear consequences of

the same. [228] Only what we experience is true; but we can experience

only through the senses, and hence only the sensuous; only this is true

and real, even in man himself. Human action has not a purpose, for a

purpose is a mere idea without reality, but only a ground, namely, in

his sensuously-material reality, and, in virtue of this ground, it is

also fully determined; hence the moral law is in no respect different

from the law of nature. Good or evil is the agreeable or disagreeable

state of the individual person, and hence is determined by our

immediate feelings, and has in no sense a general significancy beyond

the individual being; what is good for me is not so for another; hence,

in regard to the good there can be no general decision; every one

determines this according to his feelings and experience; every one

strives, and rightly too, to have the most possible feelings of

pleasure, and in this he is rational and moral. Self-love in this

sense, namely, of referring every thing to one's own enjoyment of the

agreeable, is the highest moral law; each has a right to all. From this

it follows, indeed, that through mere morality no harmonious life of

men in common is possible, but that, on the contrary, all strive

against each other,--a war of all against all; but this leads not to a

proof of the unreality of the moral law, but only to the necessity of

the State; but also the state, because of the lack of a

universally-valid objective norm of morality, can rest only on the

individual will of the strong. The unlimited despotism of a single

person is alone capable of bringing order and harmony into the chaos of

individual strivings; and all individuals must submit themselves

unconditionally to the will of this ruler,--a will which knows no other

law than its own pleasure, and which consequently is always right, let

the ruler decree what he will, and which is for all the citizens of

that state the unassailable law and conscience, and which has

consequently to determine what shall constitute right and morality.

Also all religion in the state depends exclusively on the will of the

ruler; and he alone has to determine what shall be believed and not

believed; no one has a right, in the state, to hold any thing else for

good and true in the moral and religious sphere, than what the king

declares as good and true; sin is only a contradiction to the king's

will. Whatever is not by him prescribed or forbidden, is morally

indifferent.--We cannot deny to this system full consequentiality, and

the unabashed nakedness of the same is at least more honest than those

more recent views, which seek to bemantle the very same ground-thoughts

with more moral forms and disguises.

In express antagonism to this materialism, Cumberland made general

benevolence the principle of morality; [229] but he rendered it

difficult for himself to refute the consequential Hobbes, by the fact

that he placed himself essentially upon the stand-point of sensuous

experience, and undertook therefrom to rise to higher religious and

moral ideas. He attains thus to the principle which he makes the

foundation of all morality, namely, that the striving for the common

good of the entire system of rational creatures leads to the good of

all the single parts of the same, whereof our own happiness constitutes

a portion. Hence the chief end of moral effort is not one's own but the

general good, although the former is contained in the latter. This

moral law, to the observance of which man is obligated by nature

itself, is especially seconded by religion, and sanctified by the will

of God, as Lawgiver, who associates with the law rewards and

punishments. But the idea of God is not already pre-supposed in the

moral consciousness, but this idea pre-supposes this

consciousness.--Hobbes was opposed from a stand-point diametrically

opposed to this, and related to that of Plato, and hence also more

effectually and consequentially, by Cudworth, [230] who entirely

rejected the empirical basis of the moral, and appealed to original

moral ideas given in reason itself. He assails materialism and atheism

in a learned and ingenious manner, and declares the moral ideas which

transcend all experience, and which can never be adequately explained

by experience, as a self-revelation of God himself, impressed upon

finite reason; and in his opposition to empiricism, he goes so far as

to hold that the moral idea stands even above the will of God, so that

this will does not determine the good, but is determined by the per se

valid idea of the good as existing in God. A complete moral system

Cudworth did not carry out; and his influence was less extensive,

because of the prevalent tendency of the English mind toward empirical

reality, than it deserved to be.--Basing himself upon Cudworth's

theory, Henry More presented a brief but comprehensive treatise on

philosophical ethics. [231] (The end of morality is the perfection, and

therefore the happiness, of man, which rests essentially on virtue;

sensuousness has no right in itself, but stands under the dominion of

moral reason; the antecedent condition of morality is the freedom of

the will, as itself not determined by any thing, not even by

knowledge.) In a similar spirit, Samuel Clarke (1708) insisted on the

view, that creatures are for each other. Morality consists in

conducting one's self, by virtue of free rationality, in harmony with

the universe, and in the proper relation to one's self and to the rest

of the world, even as irrational creatures do from inner impulse. This

relation cannot be arbitrarily fixed by man, but is fixed by the nature

itself of things, and man is morally to conform himself to this

relation; thereby he realizes his happiness.

Locke endeavored to avoid the inferences which Hobbes had drawn from

the ground-thought of empiricism, at least in the moral sphere. [232]

Inborn moral ideas, or ideas that lie in the essence of reason itself

and in the conscience, do not exist; all moral laws are derived simply

from the observation of real life,--are inferred from the benefit which

certain modes of action have for the well-being of the actor or of

others, and hence may, under different circumstances, be very

different; and the actual differences, nay, even contradictions, of

moral views that do exist, prove that these views do not lie in reason

itself. It is only through education and dominant custom that moral

opinions rise into pretended fixed moral principles,--into laws of

conscience; there is no innate primitive conscience; the approval or

disapproval of a particular organized society is the sole sufficient

measure of virtue and vice. Here, however, it is natural that such

modes of action as are useful not merely to the subject himself, but

also to others and to the community, should also be regarded in general

as praiseworthy, and hence virtuous, so that for a certain circle of

actions, there may indeed be found an essential agreement of moral

judgment, and hence a certain natural law lying in the nature of the

thing, which is to be regarded as also God's law. However, Locke

derives this law not from the nature of the moral thought itself, but

in fact, simply from public opinion, and hence from experience, and he

rises only through inferences from facts of experience to more general

notions, which, however, have by no means a validity absolutely and per

se. Hence the moral idea does not transcend reality,--does not so much

say what should be, as rather what already is; a moral judgment upon

the actual moral consciousness of a society is, according to Locke's

theory, impossible; for not the idea is the measure for reality, but

reality is the measure for the idelt. The question whether indeed the

condition and the moral consciousness of society themselves might not

be perverted and untrue, is entirely out of place,--is indeed

absurd,--as it would assume to measure moral reality by an idea

independent thereof; the moral consciousness of society is always

right.--The limiting of these far-reaching assertions by the

interposing of a superficially-conceived divine revelation is without

any sufficient foundation in Locke's system.--The Lockian view has

indeed, as compared with that of Hobbes, a somewhat more respectable

tone, but it has on the other hand less inner consequentiality. The

thought of self-love, or, more properly, self-seeking, is at least

intelligible and clear; but the taking, as a basis, the judgment of

society must be regarded as entirely ungrounded, and is in reality

utterly meaningless, inasmuch as, in every society, moral views the

very opposite of each other are represented, so that consequently the

individual is, after all, referred to his own private judgment, which,

as it rests upon no per se valid idea, can in fact be based only on the

feeling of pleasure or displeasure.

The consequences of this unspiritual ethics showed themselves very

soon. The position of Wollaston [233] is as yet moderate, but for that

reason all the more indefinite and unclear. He reduces all religion to

morality; religion is only the obligation to do the good and avoid the

evil. The good is identical with the true; every action is good which

gives expression to a true proposition, that is, which actually

recognizes that a thing is as it really is, and which hence corresponds

to the nature or end of a thing; things should be treated as being what

they are. The destination of man himself is happiness; but happiness is

pleasure,--the consciousness of something agreeable, of that which is

in harmony with the nature of man; hence true pleasure springs only

from that which corresponds to the destination of man, and consequently

to reason. Morality or religion is, therefore, the seeking of happiness

through the realizing of truth and of reason.--The next advancement of

this tendency consisted in this, that the thought of happiness was

fixed more definitely in view. Man wills by his very nature to be

happy, that is, he has inclinations the fulfillment of which renders

him happy. These inclinations man does not give to himself, but he has

them from nature,--finds them in a definite form existing within

himself; they are the norms of man's actions, that is, he is good when

he follows his natural inclinations. This advance to Epicurean ethics

is made by the plausible and fashionable writer, Lord Shaftesbury.

[234] Every action springs from an inner determinateness of the actor,

from a proclivity or propensity; hence the moral worth of an action

lies essentially in this propensity; the propensity aims at that which

gives pleasure, and avoids that which gives displeasure; that which by

its presence gives pleasure, and by its absence displeasure, is good;

the opposite thereof is evil; as objects of effort, the former is the

good, the latter the evil; between these there lies the sphere of the

indifferent. The decision as to good and evil is not arbitrary; but

that is good which corresponds to the. peculiarity of a being, and, for

that very reason, gives pleasure to the being experiencing it.

Happiness is the greatest possible sum of satisfactions or experiences

of pleasure; spiritual pleasure-impressions stand higher, however, than

the merely sensuous; and the generally-useful or benevolent

propensities are, in turn, the better among the spiritual ones, for

they duplicate the enjoyment by the participation of others; and they

do not stand in contradiction to our own personal good, because they

relate to the whole of which we ourselves form a part. Hence true

morality consists in the striving after the proper relation and harmony

of the individual and of the whole; the one is not to be merged into

the other, for man is just as much an individual as he is a member of

the whole, and self-love is peer se just as legitimate as the

propensity of general benevolence. Hence virtue consists in a

rationally-calculated. weighing out of the measure of the reciprocally

limiting propensities, that is, in preserving a proper equilibrium. The

decision in this case is given primarily by our innate feeling for good

and evil, by the moral sense or instinct,--not taken in the sense of a

conscious thought, but of a feeling, a feeling of pleasure in the

presence of the good, and of displeasure in the presence of the evil.

This moral sense is developed by exercise and reflection into a moral

judgment. Virtue is indeed independent of religion, and even atheism

does not directly endanger it; but yet it receives its proper force and

life only in the belief in a good, all-wise and justly-governing

God.--Shaftesbury endeavors to rise above the fortuitousness of the

determination of the moral in Hobbes and Locke, and to attain to a per

se valid determination of the same; but after all, he also finds the

deciding voice only in the fortuitous feeling of pleasure or

displeasure; his empiricism is essentially subjective. That, as

differing from Locke, he regards the moral feeling as innate, does not

yet guarantee its objective truth, and, at all events, the objection of

Locke holds good against it, namely, the actually-existing diversity of

moral views. But this moral feeling is not a moral idea; it has no

contents, but utters itself only in each separate case, when it is

stimulated by an action or an object, even as a piano gives a note only

when it is struck; otherwise this feeling is silent and dead, whereas

an idea is living and conscious even in the absence of any reality

affecting it; this subjective feeling itself is moreover incapable of

being tested by a per se and absolutely valid idea.

While Collins, the eulogist of Epicurus, a disciple and friend of

Locke, and the first who called himself Freethinker, denied the freedom

of the will and regarded human action as absolutely determined by the

influences surrounding us, Hutcheson (of Glasgow) endeavored to rectify

the moral system of Shaftesbury by assuming good-will toward others, in

contradistinction to self-love, as the contents proper of the innate

moral sense. To the purely empirical foundation of ethics, however, he

held fast in his "System of Moral Philosophy" (1755). We find that

certain actions in men, even when these men are not affected by the

consequences of the same, meet with approbation or disapprobation; from

this it follows that the ground of this judgment is not personal

advantage or disadvantage, but a natural moral sense, which perceives

the moral irrespective of personal interest, and has therein pleasure,

and which therefore also, equally disinterestedly, impels to moral

action. This inborn moral sense is not a conscious idea, but an

immediate feeling which differs from the interested self-feeling,--just

as we have an immediate pleasure in a beautiful, regular form, without

being conscious of the mathematical laws thereof, or having any benefit

therefrom. The moral approbation and striving are consequently also all

the purer the less our personal interest is involved in the case. The

selfish and the benevolent propensities mutually exclude each other,

for benevolence begins only where personal interest ceases. Therefore

we have to make our choice between the two propensities, and as the

benevolent one is the purer, hence the moral proper consists

exclusively in it. Virtue is not practiced for the sake of a benefit or

an enjoyment, but purely out of inner pleasure in it; our nature has an

inner innate tendency to promote the welfare of others without having

any regard therein to personal benefit. This benevolence toward others

is the essence of all the virtues; for even our care for our own

welfare is exercised in order to preserve ourselves for the good of

others; the degree of virtue rises in proportion to the happiness

procured for others, and to the number of persons benefited by us. The

preliminarily-ignored moral relation of man to God, Hutcheson afterward

brings--not without violence--into his system, by holding that the

moral sense leads also to the union of the moral creature with the

Author of all perfection.--The fundamental thoughts of this ethical

system are indeed well meant, but they are scientifically weak and

arbitrary; from the Christian view they are far remote, for the

self-complacent mirroring of self in the pretendedly pure virtuousness

of one's own benevolent heart, and the easy contenting of self in a

certain circle of benevolent outward actions, are, in one direction,

quite as dangerous for correct self-knowledge, as is the system of pure

self-seeking in the other.--A related system, but one manifoldly

complicated in unclear originality, was developed by Adam Smith (1759,

and later). He emphasized, more strongly still, the element of feeling

for others in the innate moral sense, and conceived of it as the

feeling of sympathy, in virtue of which we share in natural

participation in the joy and in the pains of others, and strive for the

participation and harmony of others with our own feelings and actions;

in this harmony we find the good, and in the opposite the evil. The

morality of our action we recognize by the fact that it is adapted to

awaken the sympathies of others; a perfectly isolated man could not

possibly have a moral judgment as to himself, because he would lack the

criterion, the mirror. Hence man must always so act that others not

standing in the same fortuitous relations, that is, impartial persons,

can sympathize with him. The obscure conviction that the moral

consciousness must rest on a per se valid idea, brings the empiric to

this strange and certainly very difficult and inadequate procedure,

which, however, though expressly intended to throw off the

accidentality of individual being, yet cannot, after all, get rid of

it.

Also David Hume treats of the subject of ethics, though with less

acumen than that wherewith, in the sphere of religion and of

theoretical philosophy, he skeptically undermines the certainty of all

knowledge. [235] While, in the field of philosophy, he ingeniously

exposed the feeble superficiality of the prevalent empiricism, he yet

hesitated to introduce his skepticism, with like consequentiality into

the practical sphere of morals. A real science of the moral there

cannot be, in the opinion of Hume, seeing that the moral is not an

object of the cognizing understanding, but only of mere feeling or

sensation. The ultimate end of all action is happiness; but that which

renders happy can be determined only by sensation; hence a sense, or

tact, or feeling innate in all men, decides as to good and evil, in

that the good excites a pleasant, and the evil an unpleasant feeling.

Hence we must learn by way of pure observation what actions violate, or

answer to, the moral feeling; and we find, now, that the useful excites

moral approbation, and more particularly, that which is useful to the

community. General and necessary moral ideas there are none; and even

the moral feeling is very different in different nations; hence moral

conceptions have always only a varying worth and rest essentially upon

custom. The obligation to virtue rests on the fact that in virtue there

is furnished the greatest guarantee for actual happiness; and also the

working for the good of others reacts in the end upon our own good.

Thus Hume coincides essentially with Locke. That he regards suicide as

allowable is easily explainable from his ground-thoughts.--By means of

a feeble and unfounded eclecticism, Adam Ferguson (of Edinburgh) [236]

endeavors to avoid the one-sidedness of other moralists, but only

involves himself in worse confusion. To the moral he gives three

fundamental laws: the law of self-preservation, the law of community or

society, and the "law of estimation," (the latter relating to the per

se excellent),--without reducing this threefoldhess to any kind of

clear unity. He attains to an unpredjudiced consideration of the moral

in detail only at the expense of the consequentiality of his system.

The ultimate consequences of empiricism were not drawn by the

systematic moralists, but by other so-called Freethinkers who wrote

more for the general public. Such was the case especially with the most

influential among them, Lord Bolingbroke, the chief representative of

deism (ob. 1751), [237] who declared Plato to be half crazy, and all

philosophy proper to be mere narrow-mindedness. The moral law is, as

the law of nature, clearly revealed to all men through the observation

of existence. All morality rests on self-love; this law incites to

marriage, to the family, and to society, and to the duties that result

therefrom. The end of all effort is the greatest possible happiness,

that is, the greatest possible number of pleasure-sensations. But this

natural law teaches Bolingbroke some very strange things; shamefulness,

e. g., is only an aspiration of man to be something better than the

brute, or it is a mere social prejudice; polygamy is not immoral; on

the contrary, it harmonizes with the law of nature, because it effects

a, greater increase of the race; wedlock-communion is disallowable only

between parents and children; all other degrees of relationship admit

of it, for the highest law and end of marriage is propagation. The

pretentious superficiality of this writer obtained for him in the

"cultured" world the highest repute.

English moralism checked itself, for the most part, at half-ways; it

found as yet too much moral consciousness alive among the masses, not

to feel bound in general to hold fast still to a respectable code of

morality, even though at the cost of the consequentiality of the

system. In France, on the contrary, the demoralization had made

sufficient progress among the cultivated classes to be enabled to throw

off all reserve, also in the sphere of theory. The scanty remnants of

religious and moral contents still retained in the freethinking ethics

of Englishmen, had to be thrown out, in the further fermenting process,

as discoloring dregs, in order that the unmingled wisdom-beverage of

the natural man might attain to its life-giving purity; deistic

moralism had to pass over into atheistic materialism. The French ethics

of frivolity became, also for German ears, a sweet-sounding music; and

French parasites at the little German ducal courts charged themselves

with the task of distilling the decoction of trans-Rhenane moral

notions also into the lower strata of the German population.

Shaftesbury and Hutcheson had endeavored to, secure the innate moral

feeling against the threatening overthrow of all morality, by placing

over against the feeling for self, a feeling for the social whole,

either as of like worth, or as of a still higher validity. This course

was arbitrary, and not grounded in their fundamental principle; for

every man is, as an individual, the nearest to himself. And a feeling

inborn in me relates, after all, first and last, always to myself; as a

merely natural being inspired by no higher idea, I feel for others only

in so far as I am myself interested in them. Feeling clings absolutely

to the subject, and egotism is the inner essence of any natural moral

feeling which is not willing to be dominated by an idea. In order to

this further development of ethics, there was need of a still further

carrying out of empiricism as a theory. This we meet with in Condillac,

a French nobleman, an abbot and prince-educator,--one of the most

superficial and, therefore, most preferred authors of the middle of the

eighteenth century.--All knowledge rests on sensuous impressions; man

is acted upon and filled with spiritual contents, simply as a machine,

through outward impressions; of all the senses the sense of touch is

the highest; it alone gives us certainty as to the objective reality of

things, and raises man above the brute. with whom in other respects he

is essentially identical. The pleasure and displeasure of impressions

work desire and repugnance, and hence awaken and determine the will. It

is incredible what stupid absurdities Condillac offers in the name of

metaphysics; and it is a significant index of the spirit of the age,

that he was one of the most influential and f�ted writers of France.

The ethics of this world-theory was easily inferred, and was pronounced

with open boldness. Long previously Gassendi (of Paris, ob. 1655) had

presented the satisfaction of desire as the end of human life, this

satisfying is rational when it is orderly, natural, and not excessive;

and it effects peace of heart and painlessness of body. He recommended,

consequentially enough, the doctrine of Epicurus as the highest

wisdom.--The full and clear consequence of empiricism, however, was

drawn by Helvetius, who expressly based his doctrine on the, by him,

highly esteemed theory of Locke. As an affluent gentleman of leisure,

and living only for his pleasures, he became greatly renowned by his

work, De l'esprit (1758), throughout the luxurious fashionable circles

of Europe. His book was proscribed in France, but all the more

circulated throughout Europe; and the author, in his travels to

different courts, especially the German ones, was f�ted as a great

philosopher. His second more important work, (a further development of

the first one,) De l'homme, appeared only after his death (1772). The

highly-colored and daring tone of his writings, with their rich setting

of wit, and of indelicate anecdotes, furnishes a clear image of the

then prevalent spirit of the higher classes of cultivated Europe.--All

thoughts, according to Helvetius, spring from sensuous perceptions, and

our knowledge extends only so far as the senses extend; of any thing

super-sensuous, and hence also of God, we know nothing. The motives to

activity are essentially the passions, which spring from our

inclination to pleasure and our aversion to displeasure. The

fundamental stimulus of all moral activity is self-love, the expression

of which is, in fact, the passions; nothing great is accomplished

without great passion; he who is not passionate is stupid. As, now, all

thoughts rest on sensuous impressions, so rest also all self-love and

all passion, and hence all morality, on the impulses of sensuous

pleasure; and even the decision as to truth is entirely dependent on

the interest of the self-loving subject. Should the case arise, says

Helvetius, that it would be more advantageous for me to regard the part

as greater than the whole, then I would in fact assume this to be the

case. The good, or the moral, is neither an absolutely valid idea, nor

is it any thing arbitrarily assumed, but the determination as to it

rests in the experience of the individual; but experience teaches that

each regards as good that which is useful to him; and consequently each

judges of the morality of actions simply according to his own interest;

hence the best actions would be such as corresponded to the interest of

all men; but there are no such actions. Hence we must limit our view;

and, on closer examination, we find to be truly good that which

promotes the interest not merely of the individual but of our nation;

the political virtue is the highest, and the political transgression,

the highest sin; that which does not contribute to the public good of

the nation, as, for example, the so-called religious virtues, is not a

virtue, and what does not conflict therewith is not a sin; virtues

which profit nothing must be regarded as virtues of delusion, and be

discarded. Hence, true ethics has its norm essentially in the civil

law-book and in public utility; that which lies outside of these is,

for the most part, morally indifferent; when it is useful to the public

weal, even inhumanity is just. The motive to moral activity remains,

even in this so narrowly limited sphere, self-love; the thought of

doing the good for the good's sake, is antiquated and exploded. To

sacrifice my own private advantage to that of the public, I am under no

obligation; rather must I seek in the best manner possible to combine

the two. When any one helps an unfortunate, out of compassion, this is

only self-love, for he simply aims to rid himself of the sight of

misery, which is unpleasant to him. Ethics is utterly fruitless and

vain so long as it does not definitely regard personal interest, and

hence sensuous pleasure and the avoidance of sensuous pain, as the

highest principle of morality; nothing is forbidden but what causes us

pain; with religion, ethics has nothing whatever to do. Morality is

therefore also, at different times and under different relations,

essentially different; there is no crime which under some

circumstances--(when it should be useful)--would not also be right.

True, the vicious man seeks also his own advantage, and the only

trouble in the matter is that he deceives himself as to the means

thereto; hence, he is to be pitied because of his error, but not to be

despised. The fact that among all nations, some actions are regarded as

virtuous which offer no profit whatever for this life, is simply a

hurtful delusion. As self-interest is the ground of all virtue, hence

it is also entirely legitimate that the state should stimulate its

citizens to obedience by rewards and punishments; in fact, it thereby

hits upon the solely correct moral motives to the good; rewards and

punishments are the gods which create virtue. All statesmanship

consists in awakening the self-love and self-interest of men, and in

thereby stimulating them to virtue.

The intellectual revolution--represented by great names--made sweeping

advances in France and also in the fashionable world servilely

dependent on France, at the courts of the rest of Europe, and

especially of Germany,. and had already long since reached its ultimate

results, before the political revolution enabled also the lower classes

to speak their word in the same sense. It was fashionable at this

period to designate by the word "esprit" (as the privilege of the

giddy, freethinking world) that which was subsequently called

"revolution" among the great masses, and which was, in fact, simply the

consequence of the former. Every thing which hitherto had passed as

philosophy, (with the exception of the Epicurean), was regarded as

nonsense; the most stupid superficiality, provided only that it

ridiculed sacred things, passed as philosophy; wit and frivolous

fancies took the place of earnest science. The "philosophical" century

sank, in the appreciation of really philosophical thought, deeper than

even the earlier and as yet barbarous Middle Ages had sunk. The higher

the encomiums they heaped upon what they called "spirit," so much the

more utter became the spiritual vacuity; men extolled reason more

pretentiously than ever, and yet they placed in her temple, as goddess,

a public woman. Rousseau and Voltaire passed as the profoundest

thinkers of all ages; their spiritual triumphs and attainments were

unparalleled, and Voltaire's renown transcended in glory all renown

ever heaped upon an author. The history of the human mind has no second

century to refer to in which un-reason dominated with such complete

omnipotence.

Jean Jacques Rousseau produced indeed no system of ethics, but he

exerted in the sphere of moral opinion an influence such as no author

before or after him ever exerted, and felt even up to the present

day,--not indeed because he uttered deep thoughts, but because he gave

expression to what lay in the spirit of the age,--himself an utterly

ungenuine character--under the form of a severe moralist undermining

all morality, under the form of earnest thought bidding defiance to all

philosophy and science, under the form of a censorious sage, in

hermit-like seclusion from the world, preparing soft cushions for the

vices of the "cultured" great. And precisely in this his peculiar

character he chimed in with the tastes and desires of the age; he

simply made, in the dike of the as yet somewhat cramped current of the

age, the little breach through which its pent-up waters dispersed

themselves over the low-lands so as subsequently, as morasses, to

exhale the pestilential miasma of revolution. Of scientific

ground-thoughts there can in Rousseau be no question; bold assertions

and rhetorical phrases take almost every-where the place of scientific

demonstration. The writings of Locke exerted upon him the greatest

influence; sensuous experience is also for him the source of all ideas.

His moral views receive their proper commentary in his utterly immoral

life. His Contrat social (1761) became the theoretical basis of the

French Revolution; his narrow-minded sophistical work, Emile (1762) had

an immeasurable and bewildering influence on education, and is yet

to-day the catechism of all un-Christian schemes of education.

Rousseau's religion of nature, as he called it, is a shallow idealess

deism grouped around the three thoughts: God, virtue, and immortality,

in high sounding rhetorical phrase. He bases morality upon the natural

conscience, which, as a direct feeling for the moral, renders

unnecessary all instruction and all science as to the moral, and guides

man with unerring certainty. All immorality springs simply from

"civilization," and from perverted education; true education consists

in non-educating. Let the child be simply let alone in its naturalness;

let it be guarded against perverting influences, and then it will

spontaneously develop itself as normally as a tree in a good soil. In

the nature of man there lies nothing evil whatever; all natural

impulses are good; every child is by nature still just as good as the

first man was in coming from the hands of the Creator. The sole inborn

passion is self-love, and this is good. The child should learn every

thing through personal experience, and nothing through obedience; the

words "obey" and "command" must be erased from its dictionary, as also

the words "duty" and obligation;" the child must by all means be kept

in the belief that it is its own lord, and that its educator is

subordinate to it. Make the child strong, and it will be good; for all

defects, the educator alone is to blame. The sole moral instruction for

the child is: "Do wrong to no one;" of love and religion there should,

in education, be no question whatever. Instruction should by no means

be imparted before the twelfth year, and even after this period only at

the desire of the pupil; at twelve years it should yet be incapable of

distinguishing its right hand from its left. It should never believe or

do any thing on the mere word of another, but must always do simply

what it has found to be good from personal experience. The end of this

"inactive" method of education, as Rousseau himself designates it, is

the end of human life, namely, freedom; but true freedom consists in

this, that we wish nothing other than what we can do or obtain; and in

this case we will also do nothing other than what pleases us; and this

is always the right. Hence the essence of all morality is the giving

free scope to our natural propensities. The highest moral law is; "seek

thine own highest welfare with the least possible detriment to others."

Christianity is the natural enemy of true morality and of human

society, for it desires the absolute purity of human nature,--directs

man away from the earthly, and preaches only servitude and tyranny.

These were sweet words for the ears of the great multitude, and they

did not die away unheeded, but found enthusiastic welcome.--Although

the almost apotheosized prince of the "philosophical" century,

Voltaire, whose pretended philosophy rests almost exclusively on Locke,

wrote both moral phrases and un-moral poems, yet in neither case has he

produced any thing peculiar or original, much less philosophical,

notwithstanding his frequent allusion to his "metaphysics." Morality,

he repeats time and again in the strongest affirmations, is entirely

independent of religious faith,--rests upon a natural innate impulse,

and is consequently in all men and in all ages, so soon as they use

their reason, uniform and the same. [238] Virtue or vice, the morally

good or evil, is always and every-where that which is either useful or

hurtful to society; incest between father and daughter may, under

circumstances, be allowable, and even a duty, as, for example, when a

single family constitutes an isolated colony; falsehoods uttered out of

a good purpose are legitimate, and the same holds good of almost every

thing that is in ordinary cases unallowable. Divinely-revealed moral

laws there are none; but a certain benevolence toward others is inborn

in man, at the same time with self-love. To the objection, that with so

uncertain a basis, one might seek his own welfare by stealing, robbing,

etc., Voltaire has the ready answer: then he would get hanged. [239]

And all this he calls metaphysics.

What little of a superficial religious consciousness had yet remained

with Rousseau and Voltaire, entirely vanished with the Encyclopedists,

and especially with Diderot (ob. 1784). Diderot endeavored, above all

things, entirely to divorce morality from religion; the latter is for

the former rather a hindrance than a help. In morality itself he

wavers, undecided, between naturalistic determinism and a very

superficial society-morality. The Epicurean view he regards as the most

true. All the vices spring from covetousness, and hence they can all be

got rid of by the abolition of property, by a community of goods; for

the discovery of this universal panacea of human ills, he takes to

himself great credit.--Naturalistic morality appears in its most gross

form and in shameless nakedness in La Mettrie (ob. 1751), [240] whom

even Voltaire despised, but whom Frederick the Great, from some

incomprehensible caprice, made his reader and daily companion (from

1748 on), and even nominated him, ignoramus that he was, to membership

in the Academy of Sciences. Religion and morality stand in

irreconcilable antagonism to philosophy; they rest only in politics,

and serve for the bridling of the masses who are yet unable to rise to

philosophy, just as, for a similar reason, there is as yet need also of

hangman and death-penalties. But humanity as a whole cannot be happy

until all the world embraces atheism. Religion has poisoned nature and

cheated her out of her rights. Where the truth, that is, atheism,

prevails, there man follows no other law than that of his particular

natural propensity. And thus alone can he be happy. Man is not

essentially different from the brute, not even by any peculiar moral

consciousness; he stands in many respects below the brute, and has only

this advantage, that he has a greater number of wants, whereby a

greater culture becomes possible. Man--as sprung from the mingling of

different races of animals, and as formed from matter of the same kind

as that constituting the brute, save only that it has simply gone

through a higher fermentation-process, and as being of a merely

material organism (for the soul is only the brain, which is itself only

a slightly organized piece of dirt),--is simply a mere machine, and is

set into motion by outward impressions, and hence he is necessarily

determined in all his volitions, and is not responsible for any of his

actions. Repentance is folly; for individual man is not at fault for

his being a poorly constructed machine. Hence also we should not

despise the seemingly vicious, nor judge them severely. As, at death,

all is over, hence we should enjoy the present as much as we possibly

can. To defer an enjoyment when it offers itself, is the same as

waiting at a banquet without eating, until all are done; enjoyment, and

indeed primarily and principally, sensuous enjoyment, is our highest

and sole destination.--It was precisely during his stay in Potsdam that

La Mettrie wrote his most audacious glorification of the wildest and

even unnatural wantonness. His writings were very much sought after in

the higher circles of society.

The total result of materialistic ethics is summed up in a work written

very probably by Baron Holbach with the cooperation of Diderot and

other Encyclopedists: System de la nature, par Mirabaud (1770),

constituting the gospel proper of atheism, and presenting nakedly and

undisguisedly, in a dull and spiritless form, the results of the

philosophy of Locke, Hobbes, and Condillac, who are in fact expressly

cited as sources. As man is only a material machine, hence there is

between the physical and the moral life no difference; all thinking and

willing consist simply in modifications of the brain. All propensities

and passions are purely corporeal states--are either hatred or love,

that is "repulsion or attraction;" the absurd doctrine of the freedom

of the will has been invented simply to justify the equally absurd one

of divine providence. Man is only a part of the great world-machine,

determined in all his movements,--a blind instrument in the hands of

necessity; the concession of freedom even to a single creature would

bring the whole universe into confusion; hence whatever takes place

takes place necessarily. Religion and its ethics are the greatest

enemies of man, and occasion him only torment. The system of nature

alone makes man truly happy,--teaches him to enjoy the present as fully

as possible, and gives him, in relation to every thing which is not an

object of enjoyment, the indifference that is essential to his

happiness. Hence there is no need of a special moral system. Its

fundamental principle would necessarily be: "enjoy life as much as thou

canst;" but every man does this already of himself without instruction.

Self-love, one of the manifestations of the law of gravitation, is the

highest moral law. The chief condition of happiness is bodily health;

the true key of the human heart is medicine; the most effectual

moralists are the physicians; he who makes the body sound, makes the

man moral. Every man follows by nature and necessarily his own special

interest, a course of conduct which in fact follows immediately and

necessarily from his bodily organization; vice and crime are but

consequences of morbid corporeality,--are not guilt but necessity.

Hence only the unwise can repent; in any case repentance is only a pain

arising from the fact that an act has had bad consequences for us. Now

as the instincts and passions are the sole motive of human action,

hence we can influence other men only by working upon their passions.

Each is obligated only to that which procures him an advantage. Hence a

good man is he who satisfies his passions in such a manner that other

persons must contribute to this satisfaction so as that they also

thereby satisfy their own passions and interests. Hence the atheist is

necessarily a good man, whereas religion makes men bad in that it

embitters to them the passions. That suicide is held as legitimate for

those who are weary of life, is a matter of course.--This godless

world-theory disseminated itself in rapid development deeper and deeper

among the masses; and the ten years of the French Revolution are the

practical realization of this ethics as a social power.

It is characteristic of the difference of national spirit that the

naturalistic tendency could not, in its stark crudity, take hold upon

the German people, but came to expression only in association with

other higher principles, with Christianly-moral elements, namely, in

the Rationalistic "illuminism" of the eighteenth century. Open unbelief

proper and materialistic morals spoke, in Germany, almost exclusively

French; and the sycophant court-atheists were too much despised to find

hearty favor with the masses. The demoralizing revolution which

proceeded front the upper classes, met with a powerful opposition in

the German national spirit. Even while a popular school of poetry

divorced itself from the Christian consciousness, still this school

held fast to the antithesis of the spiritual and the naturalistic

world-theories, recognizing the former as the higher; "let him who

cannot believe, enjoy; let him who can believe, deny himself."--The

superficial deistic ethics attains to greater influence in Germany than

the materialistic, though without giving rise to any important

scientific works. On the basis of the uncorrupted purity of human

nature there was developed a superficial utilitarian morality without

deeper contents; and this morality was looked upon as the essence

proper of Christianity. Basedow's demagogic attempt at world-renovation

by a new system of education based on Rousseau, became very soon too

ridiculous to exert any enduring influence, Steinbart [241] (professor

of theology at Frankfort on the Oder) in his utterly superficial but

greatly lauded System of Pure Philosophy or Christian Doctrine of

Happiness (1778, '80, '86, '94), regarded the chief contents of the

Christian religion and of Christian ethics as simply the answering of

the question: "What have I to learn, and to do, in order to have the

greatest possible sum of pleasure?" "Happiness is the end of the entire

human life, and consists in the heart-state of a continuous contentment

and of frequently recurring enjoyment." Every man is by nature

perfectly good and pure, though indeed not as a spirit but as an

animal, and he rises only gradually from the animal to the man.

Self-love is the ground of all morality, and morality is the infallible

way to a state of enjoyment; of a checking of self-love there can be no

occasion; hence Christian virtue is "nothing else than a preparedness

to enjoy one's existence to the highest degree, under all

circumstances"; the highest state of enjoyment is of course only in the

life after death, where alone we can really survey the consequences of

our beneficent, meritorious actions; "but our glimpses into that life

encourage us to a better using of the present one, and the fullest

enjoyment of this life enlarges our receptivity for higher degrees of

happiness in the future world." This is the pure doctrine of Jesus,

which unfortunately has, for eighteen centuries, been lost sight

of.--Steinbart was favored in the highest degree by the Prussian

government, and aided in his plan of founding a "general normal school

in which teachers might be educated for the true enlightenment of the

nations."

It was only the revival of the Pantheism of Spinoza in the nineteenth

century that gave rise, in Germany, to a scientific form of ethics; but

also this system, though of a far higher character than the

freethinking of France, yet, in its later unscientific offshoots,

ultimated in like results; and the fact that in our own day a

resuscitated materialism, resting, however, more on natural science

than on philosophy, presents us again with the ethics of the "System of

Nature," is certainly no indication of progress in spiritual

development, though indeed an evidence of a progress of the

intellectual blight consequent on the too great stagnation of the

religious and philosophical spirit in the present age.

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[228] Especially in his Leviathan, 1651, and in his De cive. 1647;

comp. Lechler: Gesch. des engl. Deismus, 1841, p. 67 sqq.

[229] De legibus naturae, 1672, 83, 94.

[230] Systema intellectuale, etc., in English in 1678.

[231] Enchiridion ethicum, in his Opp. omn., 1679, 2 fol.

[232] Essay on the Human Understanding, 1690.

[233] The Religion of Nature Delineated, 1724.

[234] Characteristicks, (1711), 1714; comp. Lechler, p. 240 sqq.

[235] Treatise of Human Nature, 1730; Essays, etc., 1742.

[236] Institutes of Moral Philosophy, 1769.

[237] Works, 1754.

[238] Oeuvres, Paris, 1830, t. 31, p. 262; t. 12, p. 160; t. 42, p.

583.

[239] Ibid., t. 37, p. 336; t. 38, p. 40.

[240] L'homme machine; L'art de jouir., 1751.

[241] System der reinen Phil. oder Gl�ckseligkeitslehre des

Christenthums.

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SECTION XLII.

The theological ethics of the evangelical church of the eighteenth

century made but a quite temperate use of German philosophy before the

time of Kant, and insisted but little (not without some influence from

Pietism) on the antithesis of the two evangelical churches in the

sphere of ethics. Buddaeus furnished the first scientific system of

ethics, though in its philosophical elements it is rather eclectic.

Stapfer, Baumgarten and others, applied the Wolfian philosophy in

pedantic minuteness to Christian ethics; while Mosheim constructed it

more upon a purely Biblical basis, and upon that of practical

life-experience. Toward the close of the century the superficiality of

Rationalism began already to make itself felt.

Francis Buddaeus of Jena, one of the most learned and sound theologians

of the eighteenth century, a man of comprehensive philosophical culture

and who wrote also a thoughtful, evangelically-inspired system of

practical philosophy (Elementa philosophiae practicae, 1697, and

often), prepared the way, with his Institut. theologiae moralis (1712,

'23, 4to.; in German as "Introduction to Moral Theology," 1719), for a

more thorough, systematic treatment of ethics. The rich, carefully and

some times rather lengthily treated subject-matter rests upon sound

Scripture exegesis and careful observation of human life. Influenced

somewhat by Spener, this writer combines practical sense with a

scientific spirit. He begins at once with the thought of the corruption

of human nature and with that of divine grace, and hence gives not a

general philosophical, but only a specifically-Christian system of

ethics, in view of man as regenerated. The ground-thought of morality

is: man must do every thing which is essential to a constant union with

God and to the restoration of God's image, and must avoid the contrary

thereof. The whole subject-matter is distributed, (1), into moral

theology (in the narrower sense of the word), which treats of the

nature of regeneration and sanctification in their collective

development,--(2) into jurisprudentia divina, which treats of the

divine laws and of the duties resting thereupon,--and (3) into the

doctrine of Christian prudence, which presents the practical carrying

out of the moral in detail, and especially by clergymen. For the future

development of evangelical ethics, the thorough treatment of the first

part is especially valuable; Buddaeus finds in Christian ethics not

merely the manifestation, but also the progressive development of the

spiritual life of the regenerated. He presents as chief virtues: piety,

temperateness and justness. (Buddaeus has been much used by other

writers, also by J. J. Rambach, 1739, and by J. G. Walch, 1747).

The Reformed divine, John F. Stapfer of Bern made, in his rather

comprehensive than scientifically-important system of ethics (1757), a

very moderate use of the Wolfian philosophy. The earlier

Calvinistically-rigorous spirit is here already very much modified.

Sigismund Jacob Baumgarten (of Halle, a brother of the philosopher)

follows, in his discursive "Theological Ethics" (1767, 4to.), the

painfully-minute manner of Wolf, which is applied also in his numerous

other writings, and which leaves absolutely nothing unsaid, not even

that which every reader could supply for himself; and this pedantic

discursiveness detracts considerably from the otherwise real

thoroughness of the treatment.--(The Wolfian philosophy was applied to

theological ethics by Canz (� 40), by Bertling [1753], and by Reusch

[1760]; J. C. Schubert [1759, '60, '62] is more independent.)--The not

sufficiently prized P. Hanssen: (of Schleswig-Holstein) gave in his

"Christian Ethics" (1739, '49) a very clear and sound presentation of

the evangelical doctrine,--a work which gives evidence of a truly

philosophical spirit, and protests against the one-sidedness of Wolf;

in the first general part, he develops the threefold form of the moral

life--in the state of innocence or perfection, in the state of sin, and

in that of regeneration. T. Cr�ger (of Chemnitz) develops, in his

Apparatus theol. moral. Christi et renatorum (1747, 4to.), the thought

of the moral pattern as found in Christ, and hence of an ethical

Christology and of its application to the life of Christians, with

great profoundness and uncommon erudition, though in a somewhat stiff,

over-carefully-classified, scholastic form.

Mosheim's comprehensive "Ethics of the Holy Scriptures," [242] though

in its sometimes almost hortatory discursiveness, often unnecessarily

detailed, yet differs from works of the Wolfian and the earlier schools

by a beautiful, animated and popular form, free of all stiff

scholastic-elements, and gives evidence of a close observation of life,

of impartial and profound study of the Scriptures, of a simple, mild,

evangelical spirit, and of a thorough and careful attention to details;

but the scientific demonstration and development are frequently feeble,

and, despite all his insisting on the rationality of Christian

morality, the philosophical element is almost entirely overlooked; the

antitheses of view, as developed in the two churches, are not made

prominent. The whole subject is distributed into the consideration of

the inner holiness of the soul, and into that of the outer holiness of

the walk. Miller's continuation of the work, though furnished with more

learned apparatus, is less mature and also less inviting in

form.--Crusius, whom we have already mentioned as a philosophical

moralist, wrote also a "Moral Theology" (1772) which is inspired with a

philosophical spirit, and gives evidence. of deeply Christian

knowledge.--T�llner, 1762, wrote rather on the treatment of ethics than

on ethics itself,--already quite Rationalistic; Reuss, 1767,

uncompleted; the work of G. Less, (1777, and subsequently), is not

important; H. C. Tittmann, 1783, '94, endeavors to be strictly Biblical

but is without depth; Morus' work, 1794, is imperfectly edited from his

lectures,--partially based on Crusius, frequently rationalistic. The

Englishman, Thomas Stackhouse, wrote on Christian ethics in a plain and

Biblical spirit, treating mainly only of general questions. The

Reformed divine, Endemann of Marburg, closes the series of Reformed

moralists (1780), but he bears the distinctively Reformed character

only in very feeble traits.

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[242] 1735-70; continued by Miller, 1762; Miller wrote also a special

Einleit. in die theol. Moral, 1772, and a short Lehrbuch, 1773.

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SECTION XLIII.

In the system of Kant philosophical ethics put off the naturalistic or

subjectivistic character; the moral idea attained, on the basis of the

freedom of the will, to an objective significancy, and became an end

per se, and not simply a means to the end of individual happiness.

Independently of the theoretical reason and of the God-consciousness,

the moral idea became the presupposition and basis of all speculation

on the supersensuous, and hence also of rational religion. The

universal validity of the moral law became the formal, and, pretendedly

also, the material principal of morality. But the one-sided rational

character of this morality left essential phases of the moral

unaccounted for; and the merely formal character of the moral law

admitted of no consequential carrying-out in detail.--The application

of Kantian ground-thoughts to theological ethics was of two-fold

effect,--raising it indeed above the utilitarian ethics of the

"illuministic" current, but robbing it, in its divorce from religion,

of a part of its Christian character.

Previous philosophical ethics had gone astray in two respects. The two

equally true and necessary thoughts, that, on the one hand, the moral

idea has a universally valid significancy, that it cannot be dependent

in its obligating character on the chance caprice of the individual

subject, and that yet, on the other, it has in fact for its end the

perfection of the person, and hence also his happiness, had been

one-sidedly held fast to, each for itself. Naturalistic Pantheism gave

validity simply to the objective significancy of the moral,--absolutely

annihilated the freedom of the will, and conceived by the moral law as

a mere fatalism unalterably determining every individual; and when,

with the champions of materialistic atheism, this notion of the unfree

determination of the individual, ultimated practically in an entire

letting-loose of the passions, it was not without the countenance of

strict consistency with the ground principle. The opposite tendency

proceeded from the subject, emphasizing his free will, and hence

looking less to the ground than to the end of the moral activity; man

was to be determined by nothing which does not leave him absolutely

free, which does not contribute to his own individual advantage, in

other words, by the thought of individual happiness. While the first

tendency undermined morality by the fact that it annihilated the moral

subject, sinking him into a mere unfree member of the great

world-machine, the other tendency imperiled morality in its innermost

essence, in a no less degree, by the fact that it required no

self-subordination of the subject under a per se valid idea, but

emphasized the absolute claims of the individual personality, so that

in fact in their ultimate consequences the two opposite tendencies

resulted, equally, in the letting-loose of the individual in his;

unbridled naturalness.--Christian ethics could not, save by letting

itself be led astray by philosophy, fall into either of these errors.

That the moral idea is valid per se, that it has an unconditional,

universally-obligating significancy, is here a point settled from the

very start, inasmuch as it conceives this idea as the holy will of God.

He who inquires first as to himself, and only afterward as to the will

of God, has absolutely reversed the moral relation. On the other hand,

it is, in Christian ethics, not in the least doubtful, that this will

of God has in view the perfection of man, and hence also his perfect

happiness,--that man, in fulfilling God's will becomes also truly

happy, and does not lose his freedom but brings it to perfection.--It

was high time, toward the end of the eighteenth century, to set bounds

to the decline of philosophical ethics; the two opposed currents had

attained to their last corrupt consequences, subversive of all

morality. The "eudemonistic" tendency could oppose nothing else to the

frivolous enjoyment-seeking and conscienceless self-seeking of the

materialistic tendency, than an insipid utilitarian morality

essentially identical at bottom with the other, and which differed from

it only by an air of external decency, but not by profundity of thought

or moral worthiness. It was a great forward-step of philosophical

thought-development when Kant, with mighty hand, dashed to atoms both

these moral structures, and built up a new firmer-based system;

although his own age, in its enthusiasm for him, no less than he

himself, sadly deceived themselves as to the perfection and durability

of the same.

His first and by no means unimportant service consists in the fact that

basing himself primarily on the skepticism of Hume, he annihilated, at

a single stroke, all confidence in previous methods of philosophizing,

whether speculative or empirical, and deprived both empiricism and the

pure theoretical reason, in so far as it had thus far been developed,

of all right to pretend to establish, in respect to the supersensuous,

or the ideal, any thing whatever as philosophical knowledge. Though in

his "Critique of the Pure Reason" (1781) Kant had ascribed to the

speculative reason, in the sphere of theoretical knowledge, really only

the function of formal thought or logic, he yet attained in fact to a

positive knowledge of reality in the sphere of the practical reason,

that is, in that of morality. [243] Reason is not merely a cognizing,

but also a volitionating power; hence there is not merely a rational

knowledge of that which is, namely, theoretical or pure reason, but

also of that which, through rational volition, ought to be, namely,

practical reason; the former seeks in every given reality for the

rational beginning, the ground; the practical reason seeks for the

rational goal, the end. This end can, as a rational one, not be

fortuitous, arbitrary, or doubtful, but must have an unconditional

absolutely-valid character. The office of reason is here entirely other

than in the sphere of pure theoretical cognition; the practical reason

directs itself toward something which is not yet real, but which should

through reason become real, and which, consequently depends upon

reason; hence reason is here, as in contrast to the other sphere, in

its own sphere proper, where it itself actively creates its own

object,--is free and responsible. Man, as a spirit, can choose whatever

object of action he pleases, but as a rational spirit he should set

before himself only a rational, and hence absolutely valid object. As

he acts here in a sphere determined by himself, hence he is dependent

only upon himself; in willing and acting, man is free. A rational end

is such a one as must be recognized by every rational man, as his own

end; for reason is not a merely individual quality, but is in all men

the same; hence the rationality of the end consists in its universal

validity. Hence the highest principle of all rational moral action is

the law: "act in such a manner that the maxim of thy conduct is adapted

to become a universal law for all men." (Maxim is here taken as the

subjective principle of moral action in contradistinction to the

objectively-valid law.) The obligatoriness of such action lies

exclusively in my rationality, and is hence entirely unconditional;

should I act otherwise I would not be rational; hence this law of the

reason is the "categorical imperative." I am here to inquire not after

my own happiness, but only after that which is rational; I ought to be

rational; to this end I need no other motive than my own rational

nature itself. To make my own happiness the end of my moral

activity-eudemonism-is irrational and immoral; for, because of the

fortuity of the outward conditions of happiness, and of the

heterogeneousness of claims upon happiness, the moral would be rendered

dependent upon accident and. caprice. The moral reason is absolutely

free only when it has absolutely within itself the law and the motive

of action, and where it makes itself dependent on no other conditions

not given within itself. "Autonomy" constitutes the essence of reason

and the dignity of human nature. Reason, in a practical law, determines

the will directly, and not by means of an intervening feeling of

pleasure or displeasure. To be happy is indeed the legitimate and

naturally-necessary striving of every rational being, but such a ground

for action can be known and recognized only empirically, whereas the

moral law must necessarily have objective unconditional validity. What

is good or evil cannot be known through any thing outside of reason,

but only through reason itself; but feelings of pleasure and

displeasure belong not to reason, but to the lower sphere of the

spirit-life.

Though morality as resting exclusively upon the categorical imperative

of the reason has not happiness for its motive, yet it earns a right to

happiness; virtue is the subjective fitness for and worthiness of

happiness, that is, for that condition of a rational being to whom, in

its entire existence, every thing goes according to wish and will, and

where consequently also the outward relations, including those of

nature, harmonize with the spiritual and moral reality of the person.

Neither virtue per se, nor happiness per se, but happiness as attendant

upon virtue, constitutes the true, perfect life-condition of man--his

highest good. The moral law per se is the sole true motive of the will,

while the idea of the highest good is an object of reason. Happiness

depends not merely upon our rational will, but also upon outer

conditions which lie not within our power. Hence happiness and virtue

are not identical (as the Greek moralists taught), but have primarily

nothing whatever to do with each other; the virtuous man may possibly

be very unhappy, namely, in so far as his condition is not dependent

upon himself,--which is in fact another proof that the striving after

virtue and the striving after happiness are not one and the same thing,

and that the striving after happiness per se is neither moral nor leads

to morality. In this distinction lies the dialectics of the practical

reason; happiness is not already included in virtue itself,--stands

therewith not in analytical but in synthetic connection; and hence we

are brought to the important question: how is the highest good

practically possible? that is, how can the two essentially different

elements of this good be brought into perfect harmony?--The highest

good is a demand of the practical reason; the demand of happiness for

the virtuous is just as rational as that of virtue itself; but its

realization rests not (as that of virtue) within our free power, but is

rather a morally necessary demand upon the moral government of the

world,--a "postulate of the practical reason." The demand, the

postulate, of a perfect morality which is not fully to be attained to

in this temporal, sensuously-limited life, and of a correspondent

happiness, that is, the demand of the highest good, finds its

fulfillment only in the assumption of an immortality of the rational

personality, and of a universal government of an all-wise, just and

almighty God. These postulates have, in virtue of the moral nature of

man, entire moral certainty, because it is only on the assumption of

their truth that the morally-rational life can attain to its goal. Thus

the moral law leads, through the idea of the highest good as the object

and end of the practical reason, to religion, that is, to the

conceiving of all duties as divine commands,--not indeed as arbitrary

prescriptions of an external will, but as essential and

morally-necessary laws of every free rational will per se, which,

however, must be looked upon as divine commands, because it is only on

the supposition of a moral Infinite Will that we can attain to the

highest good. Thus the moral striving is preserved from becoming

selfish, and the thought of happiness is not made the motive of

morality, but this motive is and remains absolutely nothing else but

the moral law; but, through the religious consciousness, our reason

attains to certainty and confidence in its moral aspirations. Ethics

will never become a doctrine of happiness, an art of becoming happy; it

becomes simply the doctrine as to how we may make ourselves worthy of

happiness. Hence the moral idea rests not upon religion, but,

conversely, religion rests upon the per se certain and necessary moral

idea,--follows by moral necessity from this idea. Man is not moral

because he is pious, but le is pious because he is moral. Morality in

so far as it rests upon the idea of a free and rational creature, has

no need, per se, of religion, because it has no end nor motive outside

of itself, but it leads necessarily to religion, and thus gives rise to

the idea of an almighty moral Lawgiver and world-Governor.--A special

carrying-out of philosophical ethics, Kant has not really given; we

find only a scanty approach thereto in his "Doctrine of Virtue," a work

of no great importance, and which already betrays marks of intellectual

senility. He contents himself mostly with the mere general

foundation-laying, whereas in fact, the chief question is: in how far

the general thoughts admit also of being carried out in detail? Duties

toward God belong, according to Kant, not to ethics proper, but to the

doctrine of religion. [244]

Unquestionably there lies in the ethics of Kant a decided advance

beyond antecedent philosophical ethics, and especially beyond the

empirical and naturalistic. He raised it from the low region of a

self-seeking or external utilitarian morality into the dignity of the

science of a purely rational idea transcending all mere

reality,--rejected all inferior self-seeking motives to morality, and

insisted on the unconditional validity and obligatoriness of the moral

law. While there lies in this a decided approximation to the Christian

conception of the moral, still the great difference of this from the

Christian view, and the inner weakness of the Kantian system as a

whole, are unmistakable. The independence of morality on religion which

follows from Kant's theory of rational knowledge, makes it impossible

for the moral principle to obtain positive contents; his much admired

moral law, and for which he puts forth such high claims, says in fact

absolutely nothing, and does not lead, save by arbitrarily calling in

aid from without, a single step further; and it is manifestly not

without good reason, that Kant developed no system of ethics proper.

The above-mentioned formula expresses not, properly speaking, the moral

law itself, but only the universal validity of the law which is yet to

be discovered,--says, in fact, nothing else than: "act according to

rational, and hence universally-valid law;" but if we now ask, what

then is this law, we are left entirely without answer. The application

of this formal principle becomes in each particular case an experiment;

an examination of the question: can I will that all men should act

according to the same maxim by which I act? But we have absolutely no

clue or criterion as to whence and on what basis the answer is to be

given, inasmuch as the moral law is utterly destitute of positive

contents; we could at best only start the inquiry as to what the result

would be in case all men acted as we; but this, as a judging of

morality by the result, would be in contradiction to the other moral

views of Kant, and would be the worst of all empiricism,--as in fact

not the real, but only the possible or probable result could be taken

into consideration. But in case, now, some one should, in view of some

per se immoral action, come to the manifestly possible, though

erroneous conviction, that such action is adapted to be practiced

universally, then such a person would be entirely unassailable and

unreformable from the stand-point of Kant, and thus an error in the

calculating understanding would jeopardize the entire moral conduct of

the person. And in fact Helvetius and La Mettrie affirmed without

hesitation, that their own maxim was adapted to be a universally valid

law; what could Kant then object to them, seeing that they recognized

his formal principle? The Kantian moral law, which he himself declared

to be purely' formal, is moreover incorrect even in formal respects.

Inasmuch as, according to Kant, a maxim is the subjective rule which

lies at the basis of my conduct, hence it is for that very reason per

se utterly unadapted to be made into a universal law for all men; a

maxim is the law as subjectively conditioned and shaped, and has in

fact, in its subjective form, validity only for this particular

subject. The moral maxim of an educator and guide is not adapted to be

also the maxim of him who is to be guided and led,--that of a warrior

cannot be that of a clergyman. Although it is true that the law which

forms the basis of my maxim must be universally valid, yet I cannot

derive the law from the maxim, but only the maxim from the law. Kant

gives not the contents of the law, but only the way in which the

contents may be found; this way, however, is in contradiction to his

entire system, and is not merely a purely empirical or rather

experimental one, but also an entirely false one. In the very attempt

at rejecting every merely individual element as determinative, Kant

exalts it in fact to the solely determining one.

Kant undertakes, now, actually to advance further by the aid of this

formal principle, and infers from it, as a second formula, the

principle: "act in such a manner as to consider and use rational

nature, that is, humanity in general, both in thy own person and also

in the person of every other one, always, at the same time, as an end,

and never merely as a means,"--namely, because rational nature is

personality, and personality is an end in itself. Kant himself admits

that this formula is merely formal; but precisely in this fact lies its

defectiveness, for it is just as impossible to attain to positive

contents from merely formal principles as to obtain a real value from a

purely algebraic equation. When the principle is only a mere empty

space which is first to be filled from without, and not the fountain

which unfolds itself into a stream, there is no possibility of

advancing a step-further. And hence, the above formula may be applied

equally well morally and immorally; the whole question depends on, what

the end is, for which I consider the person; it might in fact be an end

of Satanic malice. This second principle is, in its

arbitrarily-determined form (and which in fact embraces only a limited

part of morality) still less adapted to its purpose than the first,

with which in fact it stands in no logical connection.

Another wide-reaching defect of Kantian ethics is this, that morality

appears as a mere one-sided affair of the understanding, while the

heart entirely disappears, and is left utterly unexplained. This

one-sidedness results of course from the divorce of morality from

religion. It sounds plausibly, and is likewise very easily said, that

the good inust be done for its own sake, that the law of the reason

must be per se the direct motive to moral action; but as Kant

positively admits elsewhere the possibility that man can act also

against his better knowledge, and consequently against his conscience,

hence this undeniable fact proves that rational knowledge is not per se

a sufficient motive to moral action. The thought of love is wanting;

man can indeed act against his knowledge, but not against his love. It

is only in a love of the good that a sufficient motive for moral action

is found; but in this God-ignoring morality of the understanding, love

has no ground and no place. The love of the living God can enkindle

love, but an abstract thought cannot. Kant demands simply unconditional

obedience, but not love; he expressly declares that the law must often

be fulfilled even against our inclinations, yea, in the face of decided

repugnance; but this would amount only to an outward fulfilling of

duty. Kant's morality is possible only for beings who have in

themselves no manner of sin and no germ of sin; but so soon as even the

mere possibility of an already-existing sinfulness is admitted, this

ethical system loses all foundation; for both the certainty and also

the potency of the rational law as a motive, are thereby undermined.

And now Kant in fact admits,--in his remarkable work: "Religion within

the Limits of Pure Reason" (1792, '94)--(which, with the exception of

the one point here in question, became the catechism of

Rationalism)--the indwelling of an evil principle in man along-side of

the good one, a "radical evil in human nature," existing there already

anterior to any exercise of freedom,--a tendency to evil inhering in

all men without exception, as a subjective motive-power antecedent to

all action,--a peccatum originarium, which he describes with such dark

colors that even the strongest presentations of the orthodox doctrine

of hereditary sin would fail to depict the natural man so unfavorably;

but by this admission, Kant undermines his entire moral system, for he

thereby renders it entirely incomprehensible, how the mere knowledge of

the moral law (if indeed, under such circumstances, such a knowledge

could in fact be certain and unclouded) could be the motive to a

willing fulfillment of the same, seeing that, in fact, the love of man

is turned in the direction of evil. And though it is true that often

precisely in the contradictions of a system, the deeper presentiment of

the truth is in fact contained, still the system itself is thereby

overturned and proven untrue. And in general the antithesis of reason

and sensuousness, which extends through Kant's entire world-theory, is

in no respect rendered comprehensible, nor conciliated; it appears

simply as a fact, broadly prominent and defying all

comprehension.--Another peculiarity of Kantian ethics is its utter lack

of appreciation for history, although this was in fact characteristic

of the entire epoch; his ethics has history neither as its

presupposition, nor as its end, nor as its contents. Each man stands

unconnected with the historical development of the spirit,--is

considered only as a rational unity, and acts only as such; and there

is also a lack of all appreciation for an historical goal of the moral,

for a morality of humanity, for the rational moral significancy of

universal history.

The Kantian ground-principles of ethics were further carried out and

applied, with partial modifications, by Kiesewetter (1789), by K. C. E.

Schmid (1790), by the Roman Catholic Mutschelle (1788, '94), by Snell

(1805) in smooth, popular style, by L. H. Jacob (1794), by Heydenreich

(1794), by Tieftrunk (1789 and later), and by others.

Kant's moral system was, in its general character, very poorly adapted

to be applied to Christian ethics. Its absolutely unhistorical

character, its merely formal principle the application of which rests

simply on reflective calculation, its lack of any other moral motive

than the authority of an abstract law, and above all the reversing of

the Christian relation between morality and religion,--all this could

not, on its application to theological ethics, fail to endanger the

Christian character thereof, notwithstanding the fact that it opposed

with moral earnestness the insipid utilitarian morality of deistical

"illuminism." Precisely this divorcing of morality from religion--a

direct contradiction to the Christian view--was very much in harmony

with the dominant spirit of the age; and this in fact accounts in part

for the warm welcome which Kant's moral system met with also within the

sphere of the already deeply sunken theological world; and upon this

adoption of Kantian views rests the general development of the system

of Rationalism. The dogmatic element of the Christian

religion,--reduced now to the ideas of God, of immortality and of

Christ as the ideal of virtue,--sank into secondary importance--into

dependence on the morality given with full certainty in reason itself;

the historical phase of Christianity was without worth; Christ himself

was admired only in so far as he had realized in himself the moral law

given already in reason,--only as a teacher of "illuministic" morality,

and as a living exemplification of the same. It was not evangelical

faith that could lean with confidence upon Kant, but rather only the

anti-Christian tendency, which had thus far been represented in

"illuminism," and which now, in fact, received from Kant a more

earnestly-ethical and scientific character. We have no wish to deny

this scientific impulse given to theology; but when (as is done by

Daniel Schenkel in his Dogmatics) Kant is exalted into an essential and

necessary reformer of the whole field of evangelical theology, through

whom there has been wrought "a deep-reaching reaction on the part of

the ethical factor against the fanatical-grown doctrinism of the

dogmatics of the seventeenth century" which had annihilated all

interest in ethics,--such a manner of viewing the matter simply

indicates a forgetfulness of the fact that this orthodoxy in question

had been already for almost a century devoid of vitality, and that in

the meantime the philosophy of Wolf and the movement of Pietism had

given theology an entirely other direction, and that Pietism especially

had in fact almost one-sidedly emphasized the moral phase of

Christianity,--so that there could hardly have been need of the Kantian

moralism as the sole salvation against said doctrinal "fanaticism."

The most important theological presentations of ethics from the Kantian

stand-point are: J. W. Schmid ("Spirit of the Ethics of Jesus," 1790;

"Theological Ethics," 1793; "Christian Ethics," 1797), who presents the

founding of ethics on Kantian principles as the sole mission of Jesus;

J. E. C. Schmidt (1799), in a similar spirit; S. G. Lange; S. Vogel.

St�udlin treated theological ethics (from and after 1798) with constant

changing of title and stand-point, until in his "New Treatise on

Ethics" (1813, third edition, 1825) he despaired of any superior

principle at all, and brought together, in a wavering eclecticism of

heterogeneous thoughts, a feeble whole. The self-metamorphosing C. F.

von Ammon repeated at first (1795-'98) simply the ethics of Kant, but

soon after (1800) broke entirely away from him, without yet getting rid

of his own superficiality.

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[243] Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785; Kritik der

praktischen Vernunft, 1788, the chief work of the Kantian form of

ethics; Metaph. Anfangsgr�nde der Rechtslehre, 1797; Metaph. Anf. der

Tugendlehre, 1797.

[244] Met. d. Sitten, ed. 1838, p. 355 sqq.

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SECTION XLIV.

The philosophy of Fichte, resting upon Kant, but, with rigid

consequentiality, proceeding beyond him, manifested itself'

predominantly upon the ethical field. Fichte endeavored indeed to

complement the formal principle by a material one, but both of them are

so absolutely devoid of ethical contents, and the material principle

stands even so positively in antagonism to the contents of a really

moral consciousness, that an actual ethical development of these

principles became impossible; and the occasionally sound and

morally-earnest contents of the development in detail could only be

loosely associated with these principles, but not scientifically

developed from them. The immaturity of the entire stand-point rendered

it also impossible that any important ethical tendency in philosophy or

theology should arise therefrom. Fichte labored indeed fruitfully in a

time which had lost all solid philosophical foot hold, but he formed no

school.

Fichte's "System of Ethics according to the Principles of the Doctrine

of Science" (1798) is the most important attempt to apply the

ground-thoughts of the "Doctrine of Science" to one particular science.

We would do injustice to the Fichtean philosophy were we to consider

its unfruitful eccentricities apart from their connection with the

immediately-preceding philosophy; his philosophy is a

scientifically-justified and necessary advance beyond Kant. As Kant had

denied to the pure reason all objective knowledge, and also placed all

contents of the practical reason exclusively in the subject, and

derived the objective validity of the law of reason simply from the

subject; so Fichte simply made the validity of the individual subject,

the ego, all-predominant,--conceived all objective existence merely

negatively as the non-ego, and based cognition and volitionating

absolutely on the individual ego. The ego and the non-ego reciprocally

determine each other, and hence stand in reciprocal relation. The ego

posits itself as determined by the non-ego, that is, it cognizes; and

it posits itself, on the other hand, as determining in relation to the

non-ego, that is, it volitionates. The two are only two phases of the

same thing, inasmuch as the non-ego in its entire being exists only in

so far as it is posited by the ego, so that, strictly speaking, the ego

is its own object. The ego should in all its determinations be posited

only by itself,--should he absolutely independent of all non-ego. Only

as volitionating, as absolutely determining the non-ego, is the ego

free and independent. The ego as rational, should not permit itself to

be determined by any non-ego independent of it,--should be absolutely

independent, should make all non-ego absolutely dependent on

itself,--should exercise absolute causality upon the same. In freedom,

in volitionating, I am rational; and in that I determine my freedom as

an absolutely self-poised power, that is affirm my freedom, I am moral;

hence morality is self-determination to freedom. I should act freely in

order that I may become free, that is, I should act with the

consciousness that I determine myself in absolute independence. Hence

the formal principle of morality is: "act according to thy conscience,"

or "act always according to the best conviction of thy duty;" and as

material principle of ethics, there results this: "make thyself into an

independent or free being." "I should be a self-dependent being; this

is my destination; and the destination of things is, that I use them in

furthering my independence."

So absolutely void a principle of morality was probably never before

proposed. The formal principle expresses nothing other than: act

according to a yet unknown material principle. As to what the

"conscience" is and contains, we are as yet utterly uninformed; and the

material principle gives only the formal presupposition of morality,

but not its contents proper; I must in fact already be free, in order

to be able to act morally; freedom is not the contents, but the form,

of moral action. If this material principle is to be taken in its

entire significancy (and according to the philosophical presupposition

this is strictly consequential), then the very opposite of all morality

would be thereby expressed, namely, the acting absolutely without law,

the virtualizing of freedom in its simple form without contents, and

hence as mere individual caprice--amounting to a radical absolutism of

the individual subject. whereas all morality consists in fact most

essentially in a determining of individual freedom by an

unconditionally and objectively valid law,--is a subordinating of the

subject to a universally-obligating idea standing above the subject.

From Fichte's principle there results, not a system of ethics, but,

consequentially, only a theory of license. While it is true that in his

examinations of particular moral questions only loosely connected with

his system, Fichte shows himself, for the most part, high-minded and

earnest though indeed often strangely unpractical, still there lies, at

least in his ground-principle and in his general system, no

justification thereof. The cold, heartless, non-loving, intellectual

character of his discussions, is moreover not very well adapted to

awaken a moral interest.

What Fichte says on moral questions in his later, more rhetorical than

scientific, writings, bears in general the same unfruitful stamp,--

often widely misunderstanding the reality of life; we need only call to

mind the new system of education proposed in his much admired

"Addresses to the German Nation," which was presented with the

assumption of world-regenerating significancy, but at which, in fact,

no experienced educator can avoid smiling, and also his "Doctrine of

the State" which is even more than fantastical. The public often

allowed itself to be deceived by the ring of his periods, and by the

loftily enigmatic character of the expression. And it is doubtful

whether the fanaticism of the philosopher himself, or that entertained

for him by others, was the greater; certain it is, however, that very

soon there was a vast sobering-down of both. We will here only refer to

the fact that Fichte was personally very far from drawing the very

natural consequences of his dangerous moral principle, but that on the

contrary in his rhetorical "Direction for a Holy Life" (1807), in which

he already largely departs from his earlier views, and takes a rather

mystico-Pantheistic turn, he expressly presents, as the goal of

morality, complete "self-annihilation"--not, however, in the Christian

sense of moral self-denial, but rather in the sense of the religion of

India. The belief in our self-existence must be absolutely destroyed;

by this course the ego that was, sinks away into the pure divine

essence; we should not say: let the love and the will of God become

mine, because in fact there are no longer two; but only One, and no

longer two wills but simply one. So long as man yet desires to be any

thing himself, God comes not to him; but so soon as he annihilates

himself fully, utterly and radically, then God alone remains and is all

in all. In annihilating himself man continues in God, and in this

self-annihilation consists blessedness. The scientific justification of

this (in some respects) not unambiguous requirement, is not

given.--Notwithstanding the enthusiasm which Fichte's pretentious

philosophy excited, especially among the youth, it was unable to create

any long-enduring movements of thought. Feeble attempts to develop it

further, or, in fact, to apply it to Christian ethics (Mehmel:

"Elements," 1811), fell very soon into deserved oblivion.

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SECTION XLV.

Schelling, after passing from Idealism to Pantheism, and from Pantheism

to a dualistic Theosophy, endeavored, in this his third

development-period, to reconcile the freedom of the individual with the

sway of necessity, and indeed of necessary evil, by regarding

individual man as determining himself for evil in an ante-mundane

self-determination as influenced by a principle of darkness lying in

God himself,--but as necessary for the self-revelation of divine love.

The presentations of philosophical ethics which based themselves on

Schelling, have been unable to attain to any permanent

significancy.--The imperfectly developed anti-Schellingian philosophy

of Jacobi answered, in its ethical phases, more to the Christian view,

but it also has given rise to no real ethical system.

Schelling, appearing at first as a disciple of Fichte (at a period

which was very receptive and thankful for philosophy, even for a

youthfully unripe one), and then, in a more highly speculative spirit

passing beyond him, and also in constant metamorphoses progressively

rising above even himself,--never settled, never bringing any thing to

perfection,--did not develop in his earlier period any ethical system,

and, at furthest, only gave, on purely Pantheistic foundations, more or

less clear suggestions toward an ethical system; however, in his last

productive period (when, under the stimulation of Jacob B�hme and

Francis Baader, he plunged into a current of phantasy-speculation not

un-akin to Gnostic dualism), he furnished, in his "Philosophical

Inquiries as to the Essence of Human Liberty" (1809), a less

dialectically developed, indeed, than theosophically-portrayed, though

certainly deeply suggestive, presentation of the presuppositions and

bases of a system of philosophical ethics.--In God there exists, before

all reality, his eternal ground, his per se unintelligent nature, out

of which in all eternity the divine understanding generates itself as

the eternal antithesis to this ground-nature, which understanding

stands dominatingly over against this nature,--rules creatingly in it,

and by its acting upon it creates the finite world. Every creature has

consequently a twofold nature in itself: an essentially dark principle

corresponding to the nature-element in God, and also the principle of

light or understanding. In the highest creature, man, there exists the

entire power of the dark principle, namely, the unintelligent

self-will, and also the entire power of light--the deepest abyss and

the highest heaven. From the fact of his springing from the ground or

nature-element in God, man has in himself a principle relatively

independent of God, which, answering to this ground, is darkness, but

which becomes transfigured by the light, the spirit. But while in God

the two principles are indissolubly united, in man they are separable,

that is, man has the possibility of good and evil. The dark principle

can, as selfishness, separate itself from the light; self-will can

endeavor to be, as a separate will, that which it truly is only in

unity with the universal will,--can endeavor to be, also in the

periphery or as a creature, that which it is only in so far as it

remains in the divine center; this self-severing of self-hood from the

light is evil. Evil, as the dissevering of the two principles, is

necessary in order to a revelation of God; for if these principles

remained in man as unseparated as they are in God, then there would be

no difference between God and man, and God could not manifest his

omnipotence and love; but God must of necessity so reveal himself. For

this reason, the self-will of man is influenced by that dark

unintelligent principle in God,--man is tempted to evil, in order that

the will of divine love may find an opposing element, an antithesis,

wherein it can realize itself. Hence evil exists in man as a natural

tendency, for the reason that the disorder of his powers, as occasioned

by the awakening of self-will in the creature, communicates itself to

him in his very birth; and this ground-element in God works also

constantly in man, and excites his self-hood and individual will, in

order that in antithesis to it, the will of divine love may find scope

for action. Hence results a general necessity of sin, which, however,

by no means does away with the personal guilt of man, for the dark

ground in God realizes not evil as such, but only prompts thereto. The

actions of actual man result, indeed, with necessity from his essence,

but this essence man himself has determined by an act of

self-determination beyond all time and co-incidently with creation

itself. Man is indeed born in time, but he has, himself, determined his

life and character before his temporal life, yon side of time, in

eternity. Hence our actual actions are, on the one hand, necessary,

and, on the other, within our own responsibility. That Judas betrayed

Christ, was absolutely necessary; neither himself nor another could

have changed the matter; and nevertheless it was his own guilt, for he

had so determined himself from eternity. As every man now acts, so

acted he, as the identical person, already at the beginning of

creation; he is not simply now forming his character, but his character

is already formed. All men have determined themselves from eternity to

egotism and self-seeking, and are born with this dark principle

essential in their being. Evil, however, ought not to remain, but to be

overcome by the good principle.

Schelling promised a fuller development of these ground-thoughts, but

did not carry it out. The enthusiasm with which this philosophy of his

(which promised the solution of all the enigmas of existence), was

received,--an enthusiasm which was not dampened, but rather heightened

by its oracular tone and by the boldness of assertion which often

assumed in it the place of scientific proof,--gave occasion also in the

ethical field, to various, though mostly feeble, fruitless and soon

abandoned, attempts at a further carrying-out of his

ground-principles,--some of them in greater approximation to the

Christian consciousness; (Buchner, 1807; Thanner, 1811; Klein, 1811;

M�ller, 1819; Krause, 1810, though deviating considerably from the

master, and rather independent).--The facility with which other kindred

currents of thought admitted of being joined into Schelling's

theosophical outbursts, was indeed very tempting to the book-prolific

spirit of the age, but it also soon awakened in the sobering-down

spirit of the time a degree of distrust; and the fame obtained by the

master in his meteoric flight, showed itself less partial for his

zealously-imitating scholars; and when Daub, after welcoming, in their

regular order of succession, all the philosophies from Kant to Hegel,

advanced in his "Judas Iscariot" (1816), on the principles of

Schelling, to a sort of personality of evil, to a philosophical

Satanology, which indeed is yet far different from the Christian

view,--then, at last, the predominantly Rationalistic spirit of the age

began to lose confidence in the worth of the more recent philosophy as

a whole.

F. H. Jacobi of Munich, who, in antithesis to all Pantheism, took his

departure from the stand-point of the free personal spirit, has given

in his miscellaneous and unsystematic writings [245] only hints and

suggestions toward an ethical system. He opposed to the Pantheistic

philosophy, however, rather, merely the consciousness of its untruth

than a scientifically-constructed theory. He emphasized very strongly

the personal, moral will-freedom of man as opposed to all necessary

determination, without, however, creating for it a really scientific

basis, appealing here, as also in the case of the idea of the

personality of God, to inner spiritual experience--to feeling.

Morality, he based on a primitive feeling for the good, which is

independent of the striving after happiness; the good must be

accomplished for its own sake, and not as a means to happiness. In

general, Jacobi did not rise beyond the views of Rationalism.--The few

moralists who followed in his wake, defend indeed the Christian

stand-point as against the Pantheistic tendency, but they have no very

great scientific significancy. Among them belongs essentially also the

Roman Catholic theologian, Salat (1810 and later).

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[245] Werke, 1812, 4 vols.

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SECTION XLVI.

The philosophy of Hegel knows nothing of ethics under this name; upon

its Pantheistic ground no really personal freedom can find foothold,

although it makes all possible endeavors to find scope therefor. The

reality of freedom appears essentially only under the form of

necessity, as that right which, on the part of the subject, is duty;

ethics appears only as the Doctrine of Right; its scientific

significancy lies in its decided advance beyond the previous subjective

stand-point (which appears even yet in Kant) to the objective validity

and reality of morality in the family, in society and in the state, as

real moral forms of humanity. In the fact, however, that only the State

is conceived as the highest realization of objective morality, lies

also the one-sidedness of the view, inasmuch as the full reality of

moral freedom remains unrecognized.--The Hegelian school has not

developed philosophical ethics beyond the positions of the master; its

application to theological ethics by Daub and Marheineke presents the

unrefreshing picture of a vain attempt at harmoniously reconciling

irreconcilable contradictions.--The school of Pantheistic radicalism,

which is nominally connected with Hegel but is in reality based rather

on Spinoza, has produced no real system of ethics, but only

narrow-minded and absurd essays on particular ethical topics.

The ethics of Hegel, as presented in his "Philosophy of Right," (1821;

better by Gans, 1833),--the field occupied by which constitutes a part

of the Philosophy of the Spirit,--rests on the Pantheistic current set

in motion by Spinoza, and appears in higher scientific maturity than in

Schelling.--The rational spirit, as the unity of the objective

consciousness and of the self-consciousness, is the true free-become

spirit; it cognizes every thing in itself and itself in every

thing,--is, as reason, the identity of the objective All and the ego.

In that the rational spirit recognizes rationality in nature, and hence

nature as objective reason, it is theoretical spirit. But reason knows

its own contents also as its object, objectivizes the same, posits them

outwardly, that is, the spirit is practical spirit--volitionates. But

in so far as it is determined to this volitionating by no other object

foreign to itself, but determines itself simply by virtue of its

rational being, it is free spirit. Hence the spirit posits itself

outwardly from within, objectivizes itself in freedom, realizes itself

in an objective manner. This its realization is not nature, but is

essentially of a spiritual character, is a spiritual world, a kingdom

of the spirit which exists not merely in the ego, but has an objective

reality the creator of which is the free rational spirit; the

objective-become spirit is the historical world in the widest sense of

the word. The freedom of the rational spirit is, however, with Hegel,

by no means a real freedom of choice; such a freedom finds in the

Pantheistic world-theory no legitimate place; it is only the spirit's

active relating to itself, its being independent upon any other

external entity, but it is nevertheless essentially at the same time

necessity. Thus the free spirit creates a world as the objective

reality of freedom,-- a reality, however, which has a general

significancy transcending the individual being,--becomes a power over

the individual spirit, assumes the form of necessity, whereby the

individual subject is determined in his freedom, and which consequently

must be recognized by the individual as the higher factor,--is a

general will over against the individual will,--is right, which becomes

for the individual, duty.

The Philosophy of Right falls into three parts. (1) The free will is

primarily immediate, as individual will. The subject of right is the

person, which stands to other persons primarily in an excluding

relation. The person confers upon itself the reality of its freedom

posits a special sphere of its subjective freedom in property. I

declare an objective entity as my own, and hence as that upon which

another has no right. This is primarily as yet an outward and not

necessary action; it lies not in the essence of the thing itself that I

declare it as my property; hence right in this sphere is the merely

formal, abstract right. The freedom of the subject is assured and

recognized by the fact that other subjects must concede the validity of

my freedom, my property, my right; freedom receives thus a general

significancy, becomes right. The freedom of individual subjects is

regulated by law, is reduced to general harmony. But that the reality

of this right rests primarily on the subjective will, and that the

general will is the product of the individual will, is as yet an

irrational state of things, and abstract right advances now, (2), to

morality, wherein the individual will becomes the product and

expression of the general will, but on the basis of freedom, through

free recognition. In the first sphere the subjective freedom of the

individual is bound by the right of the other, and hence trammeled. But

in the free recognition of this right, the bondage, the trammeling

element, is thrown off; right and law are no longer a merely outward

limiting element, but become the personal law of the subject, the

contents of his free self-determination. In the mere fulfillment of

right the disposition does not come into question; I may concede to

another his right unwillingly, and hence immorally; so soon, however,

as right becomes morality, the disposition, the intention, becomes the

chief thing, and the outward act a merely secondary matter. A man may

be forced to right, but not to morality; only free, cheerful action is

moral. That which in the sphere of right is wrong, becomes in the moral

sphere moral guilt. The intention of the moral action directs itself

primarily upon the rational subject himself, wills his welfare; but, as

rationality has a general significancy, this intention looks also to

the general welfare, to the realizing of the rational will and hence of

rationality in general, that is, to the good. To realize the good, is

for the individual subject, duty,--is no longer a merely outward law,

but an inner, freely appropriated one. The good as the unity of the

notion of the rational will and of the particular will of the

individual subject, is the end, the goal of the universe.

But in the accomplishing of this duty of realizing the good, the

subject finds himself involved in a multitude of contradictions and

conflicts; the outer objective world is, as related to the subject, a

something different from and independent of him; hence it is doubtful

and fortuitous whether or not it is in harmony with the subjectively

moral ends,--whether or not the subject finds his well-being in it. The

abstract right was a merely outward and formal one; morality is a

merely inward subjective something,--has harmony only as a postulate,

as an "ought;" the good is, as yet, only the abstract idea of the good;

hence there is need of a third, higher stage wherein the subjective and

the objective phases are united, where the postulate of the harmonizing

of the two spheres is realized, where the ought is also reality, where

the good is no longer an abstract general something over against which

the subject stands as yet as an isolated individual, but where the good

has attained to reality, where freedom has become nature, and law has

become custom. This brings us, (3), to the sphere of customariness--the

completion of the objective spirit. In customariness the spirit enters

into its true reality; the person finds the good outside of himself, as

a reality to which he subordinates himself, as a moral world. Thus

Hegel, deviating from the ordinary usage of language, distinguishes

morality [moralit�t] from customariness [sittlichkeit], conceiving the

former as the merely subjective and individual morality, and the latter

as civic or social morality. In the sphere of morality man is

considered as an individual who determines himself according to

abstract moral laws; in that of customariness he is considered as an

essential member of a moral community, of a moral whole, so that he now

fulfills not abstract laws, but the requirements of the concrete-become

spirit of a moral, social reality. Hence the end of customariness is

primarily and immediately, not the individual, but the moral whole. The

moral organisms constituted by reason as become objective, present

themselves in the three development-stages of the family, of civil

society (in which the individual subjects are bound together only by

legal relations), and of the state, in which appears the full reality

of morality.--The state is the moral substance as conscious of

itself,--the objectively-realized moral and rational spirit, the union

of the principle of the family and of civil society, the outer full

realization of freedom,--inasmuch as here the moral reality rests no

longer (as in the case of the family) upon a nature-ground, and no

longer (as in the case of civil society) upon merely outward legal

relations, but upon the common consciousness wherein the individuals

are conscious of themselves as organic members of the whole. Hence the

state is the per se rational existence, the highest manifestation of

moral reason in general.--Hegel conceives the state in higher

significancy than antecedent philosophers, namely, not as a mere means

for the end of the individual citizens, but as end per se, to which the

individual must sacrifice his particular and finite ends. This is a

decided advance, especially in contrast to the utterly perverse and

entirely anti-Christian state-doctrine of the eighteenth century, when

it was regarded as perfectly self-evident that the state has no other

task than to serve the interests of individuals, whether the interests

of the individual citizens of a state, or the interests of a class in

society, or those of a prince, but not to fulfill a moral idea. But the

state is also here the ultimate and highest form. of all morality, as,

indeed, Hegel recognizes no higher existence yon-side the finite

reality of the natural All, but not an absolutely self-existent,

infinite, personal spirit. The purely moral reality of the

church,--which in its purely spiritual interests is far above the

necessary outward limitations of the state, far above classes of

society and national boundaries, and has a super-mundane eternal goal,

and which, as resting absolutely upon freedom, does not exert coercive

power,--finds no room for itself in Hegel's system. All morality,

without exception, appertains to the state, and all reality of the

church must be merged into it,--a doctrine which of course was

especially favorable to the absolutism of politics then in vogue. All

that was usually ascribed to the church in its significancy for the

moral, falls here to the state, while religion is regarded only as the

basis, but not as the essential reality, of the moral spirit. "The

state should be reverenced as an earthly-divine element; the state is

divine will as present and developing itself into the real form and

organism of a world." Hence with Hegel, as also with the Greeks,

morality is merged in the state, and has no significancy beyond it.

"What man has to do, what the duties are which he has to fulfill, is,

in a moral community, easy to determine: nothing else is to be done by

him than that which is prescribed, expressed, and made known, in his

relations." That this moral community may also be morally a very

perverted one, and that consequently man may be morally obligated to

resist it, and that even the most perfect actual state, does not

embrace the whole field of the moral community-life,--of all this the

Hegelian system takes no account. In the carrying-out of the

classification of the moral subject-matter, the "Philosophy of Right"

varies largely in many places from the presentation given in the

"Encyclopedia" and in the "Phenomenology of the Spirit." The transition

from morality to customariness seems artificial and very arbitrary. The

freedom of choice here largely brought into requisition is entirely

without justification in the system, and even contradictory thereto.

The classification itself is also not rigorously kept apart, nor indeed

can it be; the sphere of right falls largely into that of civil

society, in so far as there is any real attempt at carrying it out; and

the protection of right, which according to Hegel falls into the sphere

of civil society, is utterly impossible without the state. Furthermore,

it is worthy of note that Hegel, in perfect consistency with the

principle naturally following from his system, namely, that "all that

is real is also rational," regards war, not as an evil, but as a

phenomenon necessarily connected with the highest moral community-life

or the state, and, hence, as entirely rational, and which simply

expresses in act the frailty and finiteness inherent in all finite

being, and which has in the moral sphere the same inner necessity and

normalcy, as death in the nature-sphere; war is death exalted into the

moral sphere. [246]

The Hegelian school, dividing itself soon after the master's death into

a right wing, which progressively drew nearer to the Christian

consciousness, and into a left wing, which sank lower and lower in the

direction of radicalism and destructiveness, has not produced any very

important results in the ethical field. (Michelet gave a "System of

Philosophical Ethics," 1828; Von Henning presented the "Principles of

Ethics," historically, 1824); Vatke ("Human Freedom in its Relation to

Sin and to Grace," 1841) develops, in opposition to Julius M�ller's

"Presentation of the Christian Doctrine of Sin," the Hegelian view in a

very ingenious manner, without, however, succeeding in reconciling the

unfreedom essentially inherent in the Pantheistic System with the

general consciousness of moral freedom of choice; evil, though regarded

as ultimately to be overcome, is yet held to be an absolutely necessary

incident of the good. Daub and Marheineke undertook, in their ethical

works, [247] the vain and thankless task of giving to the Pantheistic

ground-thoughts of Hegel such a turn, and of clothing them in such

forms of expression, as to make them appear as a higher scientific

expression of the Christian doctrines. But the rapidly disenchanted age

soon saw clearly enough the impossibility of this undertaking. Daub's

Ethics, as edited from his lectures in an easy and often conversational

style, though proposing to present Biblical ethics, is yet unwilling to

derive the moral law from the Scriptures, but seeks for it only in

reason, regarding it as inherent therein, and forces the Biblical

teachings, frequently with violence, into conformity to the already

adopted system; the lofty self-complacency of the philosophizing

theologian looks often contemptuously down upon the churchly

consciousness, and oftener still, artfully explains away its

significancy. Marheineke divides ethics into the doctrine of the law as

the objective phase, into the doctrine of virtue as the subjective

phase (virtue being taken as the harmonizing of the will with the law)

and into the doctrine of duty. Despite a very pretentious style, the

positive contents, consisting in many places merely in a loose series

of single, and not always ingenious, and sometimes even insipid,

observations, are really quite barren, and often involved in violent

self-contradiction.

The left wing of the Hegelian school,--which strayed still further from

the master in the direction of a vulgar Pantheism based on Spinoza, and

which does not rise in the ethical field even to the honest

consequentiality and earnestness of Spinoza, but, for the most part,

sinks back into the most vulgar freethinking of French

materialism,--has shown itself utterly unfruitful in ethical works; it

has made itself felt, on the field of ethics, less by scientific

productions than by impudent assertion. David Strauss is unwilling to

admit the fatalistic necessity of all the individual phenomena of life,

so consequentially affirmed by Spinoza; but he gives scope, without

hesitation, to chance and to arbitrary discretion, and affirms (of

course without any justification in his system) even the freedom of the

human will. What the world had not as yet known, Strauss presumes to

assert, and takes the liberty of blankly contradicting the principle of

Spinoza, that the human will is a causa non libera, sed coacta. In his

view, Pantheism alone guarantees the free self-dependence of man. If

God is immanent in the world, and hence also in man; if, as in the

Christian world-theory, the finite stands over against the absolute

Agent as a distinctly different object, then is this finite (the world)

only in a condition of absolute passivity; but in Pantheism the

absolute actuosity lies in the collectivity of finite agencies, as

their own activity. While in monotheism it holds good, that as truly as

God is almighty so truly are men unfree, in Pantheism it holds good

that as certainly as God is- self-active so truly are men also so, in

whom He is so. [248] What the drift of this special-pleading inference

is, appears at once from the following observations: "This holds good,

of course, only of our conception of the divine essence; whether it

holds good also in the reciprocal relation of finite things, where

Spinoza denies it, is another question, and one which does not concern

us in this place." He makes, however, in this connection, in order to

maintain against Spinoza the freedom of the will, also the following

very curious observation: "Spinoza declares individual man as unfree,

for the reason that only that determinedness of his essence and

activity remains to him which all other things leave to him; but in

this connection he overlooked the fact that also, conversely, only that

much remains to all other things which the individual leaves to them;

this is of course not freedom of choice, but it is also not coercion."

The honest Spinoza would doubtless have shaken his head in astonishment

at this na�ve objection.--Strauss, naturally enough, recognizes also,

as the highest moral reality, the state as separated from the church

and as entirely swallowing it up within itself; in the place of the

worshiping of God must be substituted art, and especially the theater;

for genuine morality, that, is, for the life in the state, religion is

not only superfluous but hurtful; for whoever thinks he has, outside of

his duties as a citizen of the state, still other duties as a citizen

of heaven, will, as a servant of two masters, necessarily neglect the

first class of duties. [249] In this expression of opinion he gives to

governments a very significant hint, as to how dangerous for the state

is an ecclesiastically pious disposition in the people, and how great

is the duty of an enlightened government to guard against it.--Lewis

Feuerbach, who finds in religion only a morbid delusion, namely, in

that man regards his own being as a divine object, declares religion,

and especially the Christian religion, as the destruction of morality,

inasmuch as it makes the validity of the moral law dependent on

religious faith. Nature is every thing, and exclusively so; to follow

the voice of nature is the highest principle of morality. This voice,

however, teaches us love to our fellow-men, whereas religion teaches

only hatred against those who believe differently from us, and directs

the love and activity of man, not toward other men, but toward a

non-existing being--God; only the religionless man can have universal

love to man, which is per se always practical atheism, namely, a denial

of God in heart, in sentiment, and in act. For a scientific

justification of these wonderful assertions we seek in vain; morbid

bombast supplies its place. That this theory of morality must lead to

the vulgarest enjoyment-seeking, is perfectly natural; and Feuerbach

himself explains himself as to the nature of this morality of human

love, very clearly, thus: "When I am hungry then nothing is more

important to me than the enjoyment of food,--after the meal, nothing

more than rest, and after rest, nothing more than exercise; after

exercise, nothing more than conversation with friends; after the

completion of the work of the day, I court the Brother of Death as the

most beneficent of beings; thus every moment of the life of man has

something,--but nota bene!--something human in it." [250]

Thus the philosophy of "modern science" has returned, in rapid circuit,

back to the morality of French materialism, to the practical morality

of Philip of Orleans under Louis XV. The more advanced and almost

insane productions of the still more "radical" circle, especially of

the circle of "emancipated" ones,--which formed itself around Bruno and

Edgar Bauer, and by whom even Feuerbach was soon stigmatized (Max

Stirner) as belonging among "theologians, "believing hypocrites" and

"slavish- natures,"--belong not in the sphere of a history of science,

but, at best, only in that of the history of the morals of the

nineteenth century.

We will mention additionally, in passing, only the materialistic

world-theory, which, though not directly springing from the Pantheistic

philosophy, yet coincides with it in its ultimate results, and which

has its origin more in the empirical study of nature than in

philosophy, and which in its moral views has sunk back to the French

materialism of the Syst�me de la Nature (Moleschott, Vogt, B�chner,

etc.). If spirit is simply a phenomenon. of brain-force, and if man is

nothing more than a highly organized animal, then the moral catechism

is very easy and short. Vogt declares it as presumption in man to

pretend to be any thing essentially different from the brute; man

belonged originally to the ape race, and has only gradually developed

himself somewhat more highly. Man is guided and impelled, just as the

brute, by his own nature, that is, bly the laws of his material

existence, and with inner irresistible necessity; every so-called act

of the will is strictly a necessary product of the material conditions

of the brain and of the outer sensuous impressions, as determined by

nutrition and by the peculiarity of the brain-substance. Hence also

there can be no manner of moral responsibility; all so-called sins and

crimes are only "consequences of a defective nutrition and of an

imperfect organization of the brain." The distinguishing between

morally good and evil actions is merely a self-deception; "to

comprehend every thing involves also the justifying of every thing,"

says Moleschott. Hence, the moral amelioration of man takes place

solely through suitable and strengthening nutrition. "The more fully we

are conscious that by the proper proportioning of carbonic acid,

ammonia, and the salts, etc., we are contributing to the highest

development of mankind, so much the more are also our efforts and work

ennobled." Upon eating and drinking, these writers naturally enough lay

very great emphasis; it appears to them as a sacred rite, and

Moleschott is not ashamed even to compare it with the holy eucharist.

It was also reserved for this writer to stigmatize the Christian

world-theory and Christian custom as detrimental to the public good,

and for this, among other reasons, that thereby the national wealth

suffers a considerable loss from the practice of burying corpses in

special graveyards, whereas the bodies of the dead should rather be

used for manuring the fields. Those who look always for the truth

simply in a "progress" beyond that which has hitherto been known and

practiced, can perhaps inform us what the next further progress beyond

this world-theory will lead to.

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[246] Phanomenol., p. 358; Phil. des Rechts, pp. 417, 427, sqq.

[247] Daub: Prolegomena zur Moral, 1839; System d. theol. Moral., 1840;

Marheineke: System d. theol. Moral., 1847.

[248] Glaubenslehre, ii, 364.

[249] Glaubenslehre, ii, 615 sqq.

[250] Werke, i, 355.

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SECTION XLVII.

The philosophical ethics of the two last decades, based in general on

Hegel or on Herbart, shows a manifestly growing approximation to the

Christian world-theory; but because of the rather

unphilosophically-inclined spirit of the age, it has exerted less

influence upon society at large than the immediately preceding

philosophy.

The most recent times have suddenly shown, after an excessive and

almost morbid intensity of enthusiasm for philosophy, an all the

greater lack of earnest interest therein. The excessive expectations

were soon followed by, discouraging disappointments; and while at the

beginning of the century the most crude products of philosophy, if they

were only presented with assurance, were sure of an enthusiastic

welcome, the, in general, far more mature and more scientific and

profound works of recent times have met with but cold indifference; and

though the philosophers of the present day have some reasons to

complain of the thanklessness of the educated world, and that only

ambitious rhetoric is now able to win applause, nevertheless this state

of things is clearly explainable as a reaction from the wild

intoxication of the past.

Nearly contemporaneously with Hegel wrote Herbart of K�nigsberg. Taking

up his position outside of the historical development-course of

philosophy, and, in keen skepticism, discarding the unity of the

principle of reality, he had in his elegantly written "Practical

Philosophy" (1808) thrown open a new path. In his view the previous

treatment of ethics, as the doctrine of goods, of virtues and of

duties, makes the will of a twofold character--a norming or commanding

one, and a derived or obeying one,-- and hence makes of the will its

own regulator; but this is impossible and absurd. On the contrary, a

will-less judgment as to willing precedes all actual willing; this

judgment cannot command, but only approve or disapprove; but it never

acts upon the will as strictly isolated, but always as a member of a

relation. Hence all willing presupposes moral taste, which has pleasure

in the morally-beautiful; thus the moral is conceived essentially

esthetically. The esthetical judgment as to the will leads it to action

but not necessarily; the will should be obedient, but it can be

disobedient; taste is immutable, the will. is flexible; thus manifests

itself the idea of inner freedom. Together with this idea Herbart

assumes still others,--ideas which are connected, but reduced to no

real unity, with this idea, and which precede all exertion of will,

namely, the ideas of perfection, of benevolence, of right, and of

fitness; by virtue of these five ideas the moral taste passes upon an

act of the will, directly and involuntarily, a judgment of approval or

disapproval. The full realization of the moral is society, as

expressing itself in different stages.--This work of Herbart, though

little regarded in its day, contains in its details many profound and

ingenious thoughts; the violently original character of the whole is

very stimulating, but not satisfying; the unity of the theory as a

whole is defective.--Hartenstein wrote in the spirit of Herbart, his

"Fundamental Notions of the Ethical Sciences," 1844, a work full of

thought, and presenting a much more candid view of the realities of

life than the writers of the Hegelian school, and not unfrequently

assailing Schleiermacher and Hegel with keenness and success. As

primitive ethical ideas, he assumes those of inner freedom, of

benevolence, of right and of fitness. Similarly also Allihn:

"Fundamental Doctrines of General Ethics," 1861.--(Beneke: "Elements of

Ethics," 1837, entirely empirical, and only partially based on

Herbart.--Elvenich: "Moral Philosophy," 1830, based on

evangelically-modified Kantian views.)

The "Speculative Ethics" (1841) of Wirth sprang from the Hegelian

school, but deviates therefrom in many respects; the Pantheistic

fundamental view is not entirely overcome; (ethics is "the science of

the absolute spirit as will realizing its absolute self-consciousness

into its likewise infinite reality;" in details it offers many good

thoughts, though also many mere empty phrases, especially where it

treats of religious morality; to close the development of ethics with

an amateur-theater as one of the most important moral agencies, is

surely a very odd fancy).-- Chalyb�us of Kiel: "'System of Speculative

Ethics," 1850,--doubtless the most important treatise on philosophical

ethics in modern times. Chalyb�us, in his work, breaks entirely away

from the Pantheistic view of Hegel, and treats ethics on the basis of

the idea of personal freedom, and does not, as Hegel, regard the ideal

and the real as in perfect harmony, but on the contrary recognizes evil

as merely possible in virtue of freedom, and hence its reality as only

fortuitous and guiltily-incurred, but not as necessary. A candid, sound

view of reality is combined with an ingenious development of thought in

clear vigorous language; and notwithstanding a few cases of the

lowering of Christian doctrines, this philosophical ethics expresses

the Christian consciousness, in many cases, more faithfully than does

Rothe's "Theological Ethics."--Also J. H. Fichte (son of the

philosopher) places himself in his "System of Ethics," 1850, upon a

decidedly theistical stand-point, and strongly emphasizes the idea of

personality, which in Hegel falls into so dubious a back-ground. (The

essence of the moral appears as love, which, as an "unselfing of the

personal ego," is carried out somewhat one-sidedly so far as to throw

the validity of self and of right quite too much into the

back-ground.)--K. P. Fischer (of Erlangen): "Elements of a System of

Speculative Ethics," 1851,--briefer than the preceding works, freighted

with thought,--likewise an essential advance of recent philosophy

toward a deeper comprehension of the Christian consciousness.

(Martensen: "Outlines of a System of Moral Philosophy," 1845.

Schliephake: "The Bases of the Moral Life," 1855,--inspired by Krause,

empirical toward the close, but keen and judicious).--In this place

belongs also, in part, the ingenious and deeply Christian work of

Stahl: "The Philosophy of Right--" [251] based in the beginning rather

on Schelling, but afterward more independent; the idea of the human

personality as a copy of the personality of God is, in contrast to all

naturalistic philosophy, raised to the full significancy and to the

foundation of all morality and of all right.

(The preposterously original Schopenhauer goes back to Indian

conceptions, and finds morality only in an annihilating of the

individuality. The will to live is the root of all evil; the denying of

this will is virtue. The will must turn away from existence, must turn

to will-lessness; for existence is absolutely null, and the will a

delusion, from which we must become free, Vulgar suicide is indeed not

right, for it is a phenomenon of a strongly-affirming will; on the

contrary, a voluntary starving of one's self to death is a real moral

sacrificing of the will to live. "The two Fundamental Problems of

Ethics," 1841; "The World as Will and Conception," 1819, '44, '60.)

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[251] 1830, 3 ed., 1851.

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SECTION XLVIII.

The Theological ethics of the nineteenth century, in so far as it came

not into a relation of complete dependence upon some particular

philosopher of the day, remained either upon a purely Biblical ground,

mlaking no use or only a very moderate use of philosophical thoughts,

or assumed a rather eclectico-philosophical character. Rationalism

proved surprisingly unfruitful.

Ethics was treated in a predominantly original manner by

Schleiermacher, in a widely differing and irreconcilable double-form of

philosophical and of theological ethics,--in the former case entirely

irrespective of the God-consciousness, and in the latter, from the

inner nature of the pious Christian consciousness,--with great richness

and ingenuity of thought, but also without a rigidly scientific form,

and, in a violently-revolutionary originality, in many cases beclouding

the Biblical view with foreign thoughts.--Rothe shaped his "Theological

Ethics" into a system of theosophic speculation, resting upon the

philosophy of Hegel and Schleiermacher, but carried out in an unclear

originality, covering almost the entire field of Christian

doctrine,--constituting a work in which a pious mind, and exotic

thoughts deeply endangering the Christian consciousness, go hand in

hand.

Although the scientific treatment of the subject-matter of ethics in

the earlier and (in the main) Biblical moralists of the nineteenth

century, may be regarded as relatively feeble, yet they have this not

to be despised significancy, that in an age almost entirely estranged

from Biblical Christianity they kept alive the consciousness of this

estrangement, and faithfully held fast to the indestructible bases of

Christian Ethics. Reinhard's "System of Christian Ethics" (1780-1815)

has indeed neither any special depth of thought nor a rigidly

scientific form, and contains many insipid and useless discussions, and

furnishes no just comprehension of the inner essence of the moral idea;

but yet it gives indication of a thorough examination of the

Scriptures, and of an unprejudiced observation of real life, furnishing

often in detail good and morally earnest discussions, and avoiding all

eccentricity. His classification of the whole is poorly adapted to give

a clear steadily-progressive development of the subject-matter. In his

third edition Reinhard declares himself very decidedly against

Kant.--Flatt of T�bingen in his "Lectures on Christian Ethics"

(published by Steudel in 1823) gives only carefully-compiled, purely

Biblical material, without impressing upon it-a scientific form.--F. H.

C. Schwarz of Heidelberg in his "Evangelically-Christian Ethics," 1821,

presents ethics in two different forms, in the first volume in a

scientific, in the second in an edificatory form, but which is designed

to serve at the same time in elucidation of the first,--presenting for

the most part a simple evangelical view, brief, clear,--but without

deeper foundation.

De Wette has furnished a threefold treatment of ethics, which more than

the above-mentioned works is imbued with philosophical thoughts (from

the stand-point of the Kantian Fries). His "Christian Ethics" (1819)

one half of which is occupied by the history of ethics (which is

introduced between the general and the special part), is more ingenious

than profound, and does not appreciate the full significancy of the

evangelical consciousness. His "Lectures on Christian Ethics," 1824,

are intended for a wider circle of readers. (His Compendium of

Christian Ethics, 1833, is only a brief outline.) With the exception of

this rather Rationalistic than evangelical treatment of ethics,

Rationalism has, contrary to what might have been expected, produced

but very little in the ethical field. The next most noticeable work is

Ammon's (comp. � 43) later "Hand-book of Christian Ethics," (1823,

'38), scientifically very unimportant, and containing, besides many

examples and anecdotes, mostly only commonplace thoughts and mere

objective observations, without in any degree going into the depth of

the subject.--Baumgarten-Crusius in his "Compendium," [252] breaks

already, in many respects, with Rationalism; his work is ill-digested,

but in many respects instructive. K�hler, in his "Christian Ethics"

(1833; a "Scientific Abridgment," 1835) hesitatingly endeavors to rise

beyond the Rationalistic stand-point, and gives much that is peculiar,

and also much that is superfluous.

Philosophical and theological ethics were treated very profoundly and

very peculiarly, but in a manner violently revolutionary and different

from all precedent treatment of the subject, by Schleiermacher; indeed

in no other science does the inner and unmediated scientific dualism of

this writer appear so prominently as here. His critical acumen, his

restlessly changing and almost fitfully metamorphosing productiveness,

showed itself here under the most brilliant forms; but there is for

that reason all the greater need of a cautious guarding against being

deceived by the arts of his dialectic genius. Introduced into the field

of philosophy by the study of the Greeks, and especially of Plato,

enthusiastic for Spinoza, and building mostly upon him, but also

powerfully incited by Fichte and Schelling, and uniting in himself the

collective, anti-historical and anti-Christian culture of his day,

Schleiermacher was not able to harmonize his Pantheistic and

unhistorical metaphysics with his heart-Christianity, which latter,

though sometimes drooping and wounded, yet grew constantly more and

more vital with the advance of his years; he left these two forces

standing side-by-side in his soul, and honestly entertained and

expressed religious convictions with which his philosophical opinions

stood in irreconcilable antagonism; and it would be a great mistake to

undertake to interpret the ones by the others. Schleiermacher did not

rise above this inner dualism,--a state which not every mind would be

able to endure. In his first period, he manifested in the field of

ethics a keen critical power, but also as yet great unclearness as to

the positive essence of Christian morality; and he did not keep free

from some of the serious errors of the uncurbed spirit of the age. The

moral laxity of the "geniuses" then reigning supreme in the world of

letters, threw its dusky shadows also over this mighty spirit. His

justificatory "Letters" on Schlegel's immoral "Lucinde," 1800, were of

a nature to be used, and unfortunately not without ground, by Gutzkow

in countenancing the "rehabilitation of the flesh" which was then

taught by this writer, and in casting reproach upon the sacredness of

wedlock. [253] --In his "Discourses on Religion," 1799, which breathe a

Spinozistic spirit under the drapery of poetic rhetoric, Schleiermacher

declares also evil as belonging to, and co-ordinate in, the beauty of

the universe. Morality rests upon religion. In his "Monologues," 1800;

which emphasize the ethical phase, there is manifested a bold,

high-aiming self-feeling,--the full, overflowing self-consciousness of

the youthful genius. Self-examination appears here as the basis and

fountain of all wisdom,--not indeed in the sense, that man is to

compare himself in his reality with an idea or a divinely-revealed law,

in order to arrive at humility and at a consciousness of his need of

redemption, but on the contrary it is an immersing of self in one's own

immediate genial reality as the fountain of all truth and strength,--a

full, self-satisfying enjoyment of self, a pride-inspired

self-mirroring of a nobly-aspiring spirit. [254] Though this unhumble

spirit of self-enjoying was not peculiar to him, but was rather the

spirit then dominant among the excessively self-conscious "geniuses" of

the day, still there lhy therein the germ of an ethico-scientific

peculiarity of Schleiermacher, as against the Kantian school. In the

latter, individual man is a mere moral exemplar shaped after a general

pattern, merely a single fulfiller of an impersonal moral law, the

essence of which consists precisely in not recognizing the peculiarity

of the person, but in throwing it off, and in giving validity only to

the general. Schleiermacher maintains, on the contrary, that every man

is to represent humanity in a peculiar manner, and that, accordingly,

it is the very opposite of correct to propose to one's self simply the

question, "whether this my maxim is adapted to be exalted into a law

for all men." Even as the artist does not produce an object of beauty

by representing simply abstract, mathematically-correct forms, but by

expressing that which is individually-peculiar, so is also the moral

man to be an artist, an artist whose task it is to develop himself into

a personally peculiar art-work, and not merely into a monotonous

expression of the species. He is not to strip off, but, on the

contrary, artistically to develop, his personal peculiarity,--he is not

to cast himself down before duty as a thought different from his

individual personality, but rather on the contrary "constantly to

become more fully what he is; this is his sole desire." Thus

Schleiermacher, in opposing the Kantian one-sidedness, involves himself

in the opposite one; both positions are equally true and equally

untrue, and the Christian view stands in the middle-ground between

them. If the Kantian view answers rather to the Old Testament

law-system, then that of Schleiermacher would answer rather to the

Christian idea of the freedom of the children of God (at least,--in

case it were applied to spiritually-regenerated children of God, which,

however, is not the case), so that consequently the presentiment of the

higher truth turns into untruth,--into a perilous holding-fast to self,

and this all the more so for the reason that it is absolutely and

independently based upon mere self, for "from within came the high

revelation, produced by no teachings of virtue and by no system of the

sages."

The "Elements of a Criticism of Preceding Ethics," 1803,--able but in a

heavy and often unclear style, and hence more celebrated than

known,--relate only to philosophical ethics, and discard, in keen but

sometimes unjust criticism, all previous methods of treating this

science, and present (as opposed to the more usual method of treating

of ethics as the doctrine of virtues or duties) the doctrine of goods

as the basis of the science, and, hence, ethics as an analysis of the

highest good; the good is the objective realization of the moral. The

criticism of the work is applied not so much to the contents as to the

scientific form, and seeks to show that the contents can be true only

when the form is perfect; there is no other criterion of truth in

ethics than the scientific form. Plato and Spinoza are esteemed most

highly. In explaining away the almost unbounded self-feeling of the

author, large account must be made for the spirit of the times; less

care is given to the demonstration of his own view than to the

many-sided assailing of the views of others.

The "Sketch of a System of Ethics" (published in 1835 by

Schweizer,--from Schleiermacher's posthumous papers, in an imperfect

digest of different sketches; in a briefer and more general form in

1841 as "Outlines of Philosophical Ethics" with an introductory preface

by Twesten) [255] rests upon the philosophy of Spinoza and the earlier

views of Schelling, but contains speculations in many respects

peculiar, and not always sufficiently developed. In this philosophical

ethics Schleiermacher leaves entirely out of consideration the

Christian consciousness, and indeed the religious consciousness. in

general,--knows nothing of a personal God as moral Lawgiver, nor of an

immortal personal Spirit independent of nature; this religious basis is

left so entirely in the background that Schleiermacher (as late as in

1825) answered the question: whence, then, arose in the moral law the

idea of a "should," which seems to refer to a commanding will? by

saying, that in the Jewish legislation the divine will had been

conceived as of a magisterial character demanding obedience; and that

this form had also been adopted in Christian instruction, and "thus

arose the custom of associating with moral knowledge also the should,'

and this custom was retained even after men had begun to reduce moral

knowledge to a general form, wherein there was no longer any reference

to an outwardly-revealed divine will, but human reason itself was

regarded as the legislating factor." [256] The two manifestation-forms

of God in Spinoza, namely, thought and extension, and the primitive

antithesis of Schelling, reappear here as the antithesis of the

universe in reason and nature, in the ideal and the real. The highest

antithesis in the world is the antithesis of material (known) and of

spiritual (knowing) existence. The existence in which the former

element predominates is nature; the existence in which the knowing

element predominates is reason, the two appearing in man as body and

soul. Hence reason is essentially knowing, and, in so far as it is

self-active, willing. Speculative reason is ethics, which has, then,

physics over against itself, the two embracing the whole field of

science, so that ethics appears essentially as the collective

philosophy of the spirit,--an entirely unjustifiable deviation from all

previous nomenclature. [257] Ethics presents the collective operation

of active human reason upon nature. Hence the aim of moral-effort is,

the perfect interpenetration of reason and nature, a permeation of

nature by reason, and indeed of all nature in so far as standing in

connection with human nature. This interpenetration is the highest

good, [258] the sum total of all single goods; it is embodied in the

thought of the Golden Age, where man dominated absolutely over nature,

and in the thought of everlasting peace, of the perfection of

knowledge, and in the thought of a kingdom of heaven, and in a free

communion of the highest self-consciousness by means of spiritual

self-representation. In the individual the attainment of the moral goal

appears as personal perfection, as a perfect unity of nature with

intelligence, and hence as a perfect blessedness.--But the unity of

reason and nature is to be conceived in a threefold manner: (1) In

reference to the end-point of the moral striving, namely, the real

unity of reason and nature, as the highest good; herein is embraced the

multiplicity of particular manifestations of said unity, and hence of

good; this is ethics as the doctrine of goods or as the doctrine of the

highest good; (2) in reference to the beginning-point of the moral

striving, namely, the efficiency of reason in human nature, and hence

said unity conceived as power, that is, as virtue,--the doctrine of

virtue; [259] (3) in reference to the relation between the

beginning-point and the end-point, and hence in the movement of the

power toward the goal, and consequently a modus operandi of reason in

realizing the highest good; this is the doctrine of duties. [260] Hence

a threefold manner of presenting ethics is possible and necessary; each

embraces really the whole field of the moral, but as considered from a

different point of view; each, however, refers to the others. In giving

all the goods, one must give at the same time all the virtues and

duties, and the converse. However, the doctrine of goods is the most

self-based and independent, because it embraces the ultimate goal.

"Every definite existence is good in so far as it is a world for

itself, a copy of absolute being, and hence in the disappearing of the

antitheses"; [261] a good is "every harmony of particular phases of

reason and nature,"--that wherein "the interpenetration of reason and

of nature is independently brought about, in so far as this unity of

reason and nature bears itself like the whole in an organic manner.

[262] --The doctrine of goods alone is fully developed, while the

doctrine of virtue and of duties is treated but very briefly and

meagerly.

In the doctrines of goods Schleiermacher distinguishes a twofold moral

activity: (1) In so far as reason exerts itself upon nature as external

to it, it is organizing, in that it makes nature an organ of reason;

(2) in so far as the interpretation of reason and nature is already

posited, the activity of reason is of a symbolizing character, in that

it makes itself recognizable in its work. These two activities manifest

themselves in turn in two different manners. In as far, namely, as

reason is the same in all men, in so far also these two activities are

alike in all; but in as far as individual men are originally and in

their very idea different from each other, in so far also is the

activity of an individual character, shaping itself in a peculiar

manner in each individual. This notion of a legitimate personal

peculiarity, Schleiermacher emphasizes very strongly, without, however,

really grounding it philosophically.--Virtue expresses itself either as

enlivening or as militant: as enlivening, it expresses the harmonious

union of reason and nature; as militant, it overcomes the resistance of

nature; under another phase it is either cognoscitive or

representative; thus we arrive at four cardinal virtues:--the

enlivening virtue as cognoscitive or representative is wisdom or

soundness of judgment; as representative it is love; the militant

virtue as cognoscitive is prudence; as representative it is

persistence. (In his academical Dissertation on the notion of virtue,

Schleiermacher varies in form somewhat from his System of Ethics.)--The

very unequal carrying out of the subject in detail presents, together

with great acumen, also much unsound and fruitless sophistry; the

brilliant thoughts shoot forth in every direction in sharp-cut

crystal-gleams before the dazzled eye of the beholder, but often only

to dissolve themselves suddenly again into a state of formless

fluidity. The interrupted, incomplete, un-uniform presentation, as

given in the hastily-edited edition, render the reading of this work

very difficult, and the ethical results appear by no means so rich as,

from the pretensions of the system, one might be led to expect; and it

is often impossible to resist the impression that the work abounds in

unprofitable sophistry. The academical Essays that belong here, though

ably developed, present after all but mere fragments of the whole.

A wholly different picture is furnished by the Theological Ethics,

which was edited by Jonas in 1843, from Schleiermacher's posthumous

papers, and from notes written by his hearers, under the title:

"Christian Ethics according to the Principles of the Evangelical

Church." [263] The idea of the moral is developed from the

Christianly-determined self-consciousness; hence ethics is the analysis

and presentation of the Christian self-consciousness, in so far as the

same tends to pass over into act. The moral subject is not considered

as a mere isolated individual, but predominantly as being a member of

the Church, and as influenced by the spirit of the Church. The state of

the human self-consciousness as in communion with God through Christ,

is salvation and blessedness. This salvation, however, is primarily

merely an incomplete but progressive one, seeing that we are always

still in need of redemption; hence our life is a constant alternation

of pleasure and unpleasure, and therein lies an "impulse" to activities

in view of arriving at true blessedness. In unpleasure lies the impulse

to a manner of action whereby the momentarily-disturbed normal state is

to be restored, that is, a restorative or purifying manner of action;

in pleasure lies the impulse to a manner of action which subordinates a

lower life-power (as willingly yielding itself to a higher one)

directly and without any resistance to the higher one, thus educating

the lower power, and, hence, deepening and extending the harmony of the

two,--the deepening and extending manner of acting. Both manners of

acting aim at effecting something, at bringing about a change, and,

hence, constitute unitedly the operative form of action, whereby man is

to pass from one condition into another. The purifying form of action

relates primarily to Christian communion, and appears as

Church-discipline and as Church-reform (reformatory action); and then

again, in relation to civil society, as domestic discipline, as the

administration of civil justice, as State-reformation, and as purifying

action in the relation of one state to another.--The extending form of

action, which is essentially the educating of the, as yet lower, but

willing life through the higher, takes place primarily in the sphere of

the Church,--aims to widen and intensify the efficaciousness of the

Holy Spirit as dwelling in the Church, and of Christian sentiment. This

presupposes the propagation of the human race, the production of human

personalities. Hence the extending form of activity in the Church is

primarily the communion of the sexes, and then the inner extending and

heightening of the life of the Church. Then also the extending form of

action relates to the state, and looks to the training of all human

talents, and to the transforming of nature for the spirit,--in both

cases as one common act of all the individuals belonging to the human

race, and hence a maturing of all the citizens through spiritual and

material commerce; (in this connection it is treated of property, of

trade, of money, etc.). This is the first part of ethics, that which

embraces the operative form of action.

Now, between the moments of pleasure and unpleasure there occur moments

of satisfaction (and which are consequently distinguished from those of

pleasure), that is, of relative blessedness, the fundamental feeling

proper of the Christian, and which is at the same time also an impulse

to acting. This acting, however, aims not at effecting a change, but

only at revealing itself outwardly, at making known its condition of

happiness to others, and hence is not an operative but a representative

acting. The operative form of acting is only the way for attaining to

the perfect dominion of the spirit over the flesh, that is, to the

feeling of blessedness; and the active expression of this feeling and

of this dominion is the representative form of action, which manifests

this inner self-consciousness by means of communion with others, and

hence from motives of love. The essence of love is the inner necessity

of the constant intercommunion of self-consciousness as separated by

personality,--rests upon communion, and develops it to a higher degree.

Although the representative form of action takes its rise from the

communion of the subject with God, yet this communion is mediated by

the Holy Spirit that dwells in the Christian society. Hence the

representative form of action relates primarily to the

evangelically-religious communion,--is divine worship, or the sum total

of all actions whereby we present ourselves as organs of God by means

of the Holy Spirit; it embraces, in the wider sense, also the virtues

of chastity, patience, endurance, humility, in so far as in them is

manifested the dominion of the flesh over the spirit. Then again, this

form of action relates to general human communion, which is the outer

sphere of this action, as divine worship is the inner, in other words,

the sphere of social life, the representative form of action in the

intercourse of men, as not immediately connected with Christian

communion, not, however, as an operative form of action, but

predominantly merely as beholding and enjoying. In this connection,

Schleiermacher considers, first, the social life proper, and

particularly social intercourse in eating and drinking under

circumstances of luxury and decoration, and, then, art, and lastly

play.

However much we may admire the creative genius whereby Schleiermacher

endeavored to establish and carry out his highly peculiar

classification of ethics, still in reality we cannot but declare it as

unadapted and unsuccessful; and, in spite of the great and almost

idolizing admiration shown by the public for the skillful

thought-artist, this piece of art has not succeeded in calling forth

any imitation. At the very first glance one recognizes the utter

unnaturalness of making Christian ethics begin with Church-discipline

and Church-reformation, and close with the subject of play; while, in

the second part, is presented the widening form of action in

Church-communion, and, in the third, the ecclesiastical worship of

God,--as also the unnaturalness of placing sexual communion alongside

of Church-communion as simply its presupposition, and of treating it

only subsequently to the discussion of Church-discipline and domestic

discipline,--and of treating of four Christian virtues, in isolation

from all the others, under the head of divine worship, and among them

that of chastity, which of course falls under the head of sexual

communion, whereas in fact all and every other of the Christian virtues

might with just as good right be treated under the rubric of divine

worship. The chief subdivisions of Christian acting as purifying,

extending and representative acting, cannot by any means be sharply

separated from each other; on the contrary, in each one of them also

the other is necessarily involved; the extending or distributive acting

is not possible otherwise than by a representing. At all events the

purifying activity could not be the first, for the obtaining and

confirming of life-communion with God must, as moral activities,

precede the purifying of the already-obtained communion. The feelings

of pleasure and displeasure are, as pure states of experience, not by

any means per se the bases of the Christianly-moral activity; both

feelings may per se be just as readily-immoral as moral; and the first

moral striving must be directed to the end that the pleasure and

displeasure themselves be moral, whereas they are here presupposed

unconditionally as "impulses" to the moral; but this system of ethics

is not written for saints (who might indeed be regarded as determining

themselves by the simple feeling of pleasure or unpleasure per se),

since it sets out with a purifying form of action, relating to the

subject himself. It is true, Schleiermacher brings this pleasure and

displeasure into relation to communion with God; but the apostle

distinguishes, also in the saints, a pleasure and a displeasure in this

God-communion (Rom. vii, 22 sqq.); hence if there exists also in the

Christian, before his final perfection, as yet an unpious pleasure and

an unpious displeasure, it follows that the moral striving must in fact

direct itself primarily upon this pleasure and unpleasure. Furthermore,

the entirely unusual separating of the pious pleasure-feeling and of

the blessedness-feeling (so fully that two chief-divisions of ethics

are based thereupon), is neither justifiable nor practical. The

objective goal of the moral activity, that is, the doctrine of moral

good, is rather presupposed than developed. Knowledge or Christian

wisdom is thrown quite disproportionately in the background, behind the

subjects of feeling, of disposition, and of acting. In general we find,

notwithstanding the great dialectic art employed, especially in the

analysis of ideas, still quite frequently an indefiniteness and

unfruitfulness of the moral ideas in their practical significancy,--an

excessive prominence of the subjective peculiarity and a corresponding

unprominence of a simple Biblical spirit. The ecclesiastical element

with which, from unecclesiastical quarters, Schleiermacher has been

reproached, is in fact reduced in him to its merest minimum. "With the

exception of the free activity of the Holy Ghost nothing is to be

regarded as absolutely fixed by the Holy Scriptures, but every thing as

accepted only provisionally, and to be regarded as remaining subject to

a constant revision." All symbolical settlings of doctrine are

Romanizing, and must be made revocable. [264] We cannot see, however,

why precisely the activity of the Holy Ghost is to be regarded as an

absolutely-established point, and not also subject to a constant

revision,--why it is not "revocable"; and just as little can we see why

this activity, if it is valid at all, should not lead to a real

knowledge of the truth, and hence to a definitively-established

knowledge.

Richard Rothe, standing in part upon Schleiermacher's stand-point, but

also making use of Hegelian and Schellingian philosophy in combination

with his own somewhat peculiar and daring form of speculation,

furnishes, in his "Theological Ethics " (1845-'49, thoroughly revised,

1867) a system of theosophy embracing also a large portion of dogmatics

and even some extra-theological topics, which, however much we may

admire its erudition and earnest thought-labor, yet, in view of its

wonderful commingling of Christian faith, extra-Christian philosophy

and extra-philosophical fantasy, we cannot avoid regarding as a

failure. Rothe manifests, in contrast to a large number of more recent

Speculative theologians, an estimable sense for scientific honesty; and

where he deviates from the ecclesiastical and Biblical view (and this

occurs in very essential and fundamental things) there he does not

disguise the antithesis in fine-sounding words; not every one, however,

could succeed so na�vely as Rothe in harmonizing with a pious faith in

other respects, such questionable contradictions to the general

Christian consciousness as are found, e. g., in his doctrines of the

omniscience of God (which he limits to the past, the present, and the

necessary), and in his doctrine of the church (which he treats in the

spirit of entire anti-ecclesiasticism). His merely-apparently profound

and frequently very unbridled speculations do not constitute a steadily

progressive and regularly-developed line of thought, but are in many

respects mere plays of thought and fantasy; and it is only after

passing through these portions of the work (which, though treated with

a certain amateur-fondness, are yet really very unfruitful of ethical

results, and are presented in a not unfrequently sadly misused

language), that we enter, in the third part, upon a frequently

excellent, beautifully-presented, and really ethical current of

thought, though not without also occasionally meeting with surprising

eccentricities. Rothe's view of ethics as a science we have already

mentioned (� 3, � 4).--The moral task of man is, by virtue of his free

self-determination, to appropriate material nature to his own

personality; hence the idea of the moral is: "the real unity of the

personality and of material nature, a unity as impressed upon nature by

the personality itself in virtue of its nature-determining functions,

or, the unity of the personality and of material nature as the

appropriatedness of the latter to the former." Morality is an

independent something alongside of piety, and rests by no means upon

piety,--is entirely co-ordinate to and independent of it. Ethics falls

into three divisions: it considers (1) the moral as being a product,

that is, the pure and full manifestation of the moral in the unfolded

totality of its special moments and of their organization into unity,

that is, the moral world in its completeness--the doctrine of goods.

The good is the normal real unity of the personality and of material

nature, the appropriatedness of the latter to the former. Here Rothe

considers, first, the highest good as an abstract ideal, irrespective

of sin; (in this connection are treated also of six forms of moral

communion, of which the highest and most comprehensive is the State;

which is ultimately destined to embrace all moral life, and to absorb

the communion of piety, namely, the church, into itself; the church has

only a transitional significancy, but the state a higher, permanent

one). Hereupon follows a complete treatment of eschatology. The other,

next-following, phase is the highest good in its concrete reality; here

it is treated, first, of sin, as something inhering in human nature,

and hence necessary and originally co-posited in the divine world-plan;

and, then, of redemption; where a complete doctrine of redemption is

presented. (2) The causality or power bringing forth this product, that

is, virtue, and hence the doctrine of virtue, is treated of in the

second part, and, in connection therewith, also the corresponding

un-virtues. (3) As this power is a self-determining one, hence there is

need of a determined formula of the moral product, namely, a moral law,

by the observing of which, on the part of the producing moral power,

the real production of the moral world is conditioned, namely, the

doctrine of duties, which in turn falls into the doctrine of

self-duties and the doctrine of social duties.--In the two first and

rather speculative parts of the work, Rothe treats of many things which

one would not look for in a work on ethics, e. g., of pure matter, of

space and time, of extension and motion, of atomic attraction and

repulsion, of-gravity, of fluidity, of crystallization, of vegetation,

of comets, and the like; these digressions into the sphere of natural

philosophy belong among the oddities of the work. The excessively

artificial schemata are repeated in constant and very strange

application, the quadropartite division being throughout observed, even

though the observing of it requires the invention of entirely new

definitions and new words; and not unfrequently are found entirely

useless and profitless splittings of ideas. The chief fault of this

work, however, seems to us to lie in the fact, that it unhesitatingly

lays at the foundation of Christian Ethics, theories which are utterly

foreign to the Christian world-theory, such as that of the

philosophical ethics of Schleiermacher, which, however, Schleiermacher

himself declared to be inapplicable to Christian ethics. Rothe's notion

of the moral is endurable only in a philosophical system such as

Schleiermacher's; and, even there appearing only as an oddity, is not

only per se entirely unsound, but also utterly in contradiction to the

entire evangelico-ethical consciousness. This consciousness has as its

moral goal something utterly other than the appropriating of material

nature to the personal nature; the kingdom of God has with this nature

primarily and essentially nothing to do.

The other more recent writers on ethics keep themselves more

independent of recent philosophy. The work of Harless: "Christian

Ethics" (since 1842 in five almost similar editions; the sixth edition,

1864, greatly enlarged), is a brief, able and purely-Biblical

treatise,--practical, purely-evangelical and well written; but the

scientific form is faulty; the ideas are not sharply distinguished nor

always held fast to; the clearness is more frequently appearance than

reality; the development of thought is neither vigorous nor

uninterrupted; the classification (salvation-good,

salvation-possession, salvation-preservation) is not capable of being

kept distinct; the second and third parts overlap each other, for there

is no possession without preservation; and what appears here as

preservation is in fact possession; the general introduction is

insufficient, and Harless himself says of his book, that it contains

"no trace of a system." [265] --The work of Sartorius: "The Doctrine of

holy Love, or Elements of Evangelico-Ecclesiastical Moral Theology,"

(third edition, 1851-'56), is intended for the general public, and is

not a scientific treatise, nor yet a book of edification; but it goes

beyond the limits of mere ethics, and embraces love in the widest

sense; hence it treats also of the love of God to himself, and of its

realization in the Trinity, and to man,--also of creation and

redemption, thus combining much dogmatical matter with ethics. The

spirit of the work is purely evangelical, of ardent faith-enlivened and

enlivening. The discussion, however, remains mostly in the sphere of

the general; the individual moral phenomena are neither completely nor

closely examined.--(W. B�hmer: "Theological Ethics," 1846-'53).--C. F.

Schmid's "Christian Ethics," edited by Heller, 1861, is of a truly

Biblical spirit,--earnest, judicious, and giving evidence of Christian

life-experience; the scientific classification and form are not

happy--are not derived fromf the subject-matter, but outwardly thrown

upon it; many weighty points are omitted, and the manner of treatment

is unequal.--Palmer's "Ethics of Christianity," 1864, is an outline

destined for wider, cultivated circles; the view taken is sound and

evangelical, morally earnest and judicious, and the style pleasing,

light, and untechnical.--T. Culmann's "Christian Ethics," first part,

1864, is based upon Baader's theosophy, and is in sharp antithesis to

all rationalistic superficiality, although, notwithstanding its many

ingenious and even profound thoughts, it strays away into many, and

even anti-Scriptural, assumptions and dreamy brain-fancies.

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[252] Lehrbuch, 1826.

[253] Comp. Vorl�nder's: Schleierm.'s Sittenlehre, p. 69; C. H. Weisse

in Tholuck's Litter. Anz., 1835, 408 sqq.; Twesten, in his preface to

Schleiermacher's Grundriss, p. 76 sqq.

[254] Compare the dissenting judgment of Twesten, idem, p. 83 sqq.

[255] Comp. Vorl�nder: Schleierm.'s Sittenlehre, 1851,--keen and clear

but not evangelical.

[256] Werke, iii, 2, 403.

[257] See his discussion of the difference between natural and moral

law: Werke, iii, 2, 397.

[258] Ueber das h�chste Gut, 1827, '30; Werke, iii, 2, 446.

[259] Comp. Abh. �b. d. Behundlung des Tugendbegriffs, 1819; idem 350.

[260] Comp. Abh. �b. d. Behandlung des Pflichtbegriffes, 1824; idem

379.

[261] System, p. 54.

[262] Ibid., p. 72.

[263] Die christliche Sitte, etc.

[264] Christl. Sitte., etc., Beil., p. 184.

[265] Vorr. z. 6 Au. XV.

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SECTION XLIX.

The ethics of the Roman Catholic Church since the dissolution of the

Order of the Jesuits has been becoming, even in the circles which stood

in connection with this Order, considerably more cautious; in other

respects it has been treated (when not casuistical) principally on the

basis of Thomas Aquinas. The influence of recent philosophy has made

itself in many respects apparent; in part, there has been also a

noticeable approximation to the evangelical consciousness, without,

however, rising beyond a hesitating half-way position. The

ground-character of the Romish church as distinguished from the

evangelical, namely, its tendency to conceive the moral predominantly

under the form of law, whereas the latter conceives it more as virtue,

remains the same even up to the present.

During the last two centuries the ethics of the Roman Catholic church

has made decided advances toward the better. The growing indignation

against the perversion of the same by the Jesuits rendered even the

Jesuits themselves more cautious, although also the works of the

earlier Jesuits have- been very largely in use up to most recent times.

Alphonzo de Ligorio's Theologia moralis, since 1757, (an enlargement of

the work of Busenbaum), is yet to-day one of the most highly prized

hand-books of ethics; (on it are based the works of Waibel: "Moral

Theology," 1841-'47, and of Scavini: "Theologia Moralis," ninth

edition, 1863.) The Jesuit Stattler of Ingolstadt (Ethica christiana

communis, 1791) taught, however; pretty boldly the old principles of

the Order; whereas, on the other hand, the opposition thereto was

growing more emphatic, and has resulted in bringing about a purer moral

view. The moralists who based themselves on the Scholastics, especially

on Thomas Aquinas, have been very numerous; (Besombes, from and after

1709; Amort, 1739, '58, who wrote also a system of "Casuistry," 1733,

'62; Tournely, 1726 and subsequently; Concina, 1745; Patuzzi, 1770; and

others); of the large number of ethical works, however, only a few have

any thing original; the majority simply compile from their

predecessors.--Under the influence of Kant, wrote Isenbiehl (1795),

Muttschelle (1801, Schenkl (1803), and others; Riegler's "Christian

Ethics," 1825, rests in part on Schenkl, and is much used, though

scientifically unimportant. Braun, in his "System of Christian Catholic

Ethics," (1834), and Vogelsang in his "Compendium" (1834), applied the

philosophy of Hermes to ethics. Sailer's "Hand-Book of Christian

Ethics," (1818, '34) is of a very mild and generally evangelical

spirit; and the approximation to a purer evangelical view, though often

somewhat infected with Rationalism, shows itself also in other more

recent moralists. Hirscher's "Christian Ethics" (1835, fifth edition,

1851) is doubtless scientifically the most important, and its general

view is largely based on essentially evangelical principles;

distinctively Romish views are in many cases very much modified and,

advocate-like, idealized and brought nearer to evangelical views; this,

however, is not accomplished without some sophistry. Also Stapf

("Christian Ethics," 1841; Theologia Moralis, fourth edition 1836)

endeavors to shape the older ethics more Biblically; Jocham's "Moral

Theology," 1852, is simple and clear; Martin, 1850-'51; Werner, 1850.

These improvements of Romish ethics do not succeed, however, in

changing its ground-character as in contrast to evangelical ethics; the

notion of the meritoriousness of human works as co-working toward

salvation is not yet overcome,--virtue is not mere thanks, but it

establishes claims; the moral life is not the

spontaneously-out-streaming radiance of the faith-inspired loving soul,

but it is a something yet distinct from faith and relatively

independent,--a laborious working upon salvation as only associatedly

conditioned by faith, but not yet really obtained. The divine will has

not as yet become an inner property of the believing soul in spiritual

regeneration, but simply still hovers before it as a something other

from and objective to it; hence the largely predominant character of

legality in Romish ethics, even where, on the basis of Thomas Aquinas,

the form of the doctrine of virtue is chosen. And here is manifestly

the reason why the Romish form of theology has produced a far richer

ethical literature than the Evangelical, seeing that in the Romish

Church not merely the scientific but also the practical need for moral

instructions and rules, is much greater than in the sphere of the

Evangelican consciousness, which latter is no longer "under the law,"

and has consequently in ethics less a practical than a purely

scientific interest. To the Catholic the Gospel is essentially also a

new law,--simply a further-development of the Old Testament law; and it

is the task of ethics to digest this new legislation and shape it more

or less into a statutory form; only to a Romish moralist is it possible

to take up into a treatise on ethics a civil criminal code, as Stapf

has done, in detailed thoroughness, with the Austrian. The Christian

never succeeds, here, in bearing in himself the Divine will otherwise

than in a law learned by study; the law and the moral subject still

continue exterior to each other, and the former is objective to the

latter; to act according to the authority of an outward law appears as

a special-merit; the law interpenetrates not the human soul, and the

soul not the law; there remains between the two an impassable gulf;

hence the law and the person content themselves, at last, with the

outward; obeying outweighs loving; and loving is never a merit, as

obeying, however, may be. Because of the placing of faith simply

along-side of works, there lacks to the moral the unitary center-point

in the heart, and hence the good appears predominantly as a plurality

of virtues, and the moral life predominantly as a countless sum of

single cases; hence in Romish ethics the predominance of the

casuistical treatment, which is not yet thrown aside even in the most

recent treatises; the thought of ethics awakes at once in the

Catholic's mind the notion of a Summa casuum; also, in this respect, we

see a manifestation of the predominant character of externality. The

notion of a God-sonship manifesting itself in a new free life never

comes to full appreciation in Romish ethics; the notion of a son of the

Church is, in it, much more familiar; and here at once the

ecclesiastical State, with its legal character, steps into the

fore-ground of the moral life.

END OF HISTORY OF ETHICS.

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113. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=13&scrV=18#iii.iii.iii.i-p11.19

114. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=15&scrV=4#iii.iii.iii.i-p11.12

115. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=15&scrV=10#iii.iii.iii.i-p11.12

116. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=15&scrV=15#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.23

117. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=16&scrV=12#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.23

118. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=18&scrV=0#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.15

119. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=26&scrV=16#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.15

120. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=28&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.i-p11.12

121. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=28&scrV=47#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.21

122. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=30&scrV=2#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.15

123. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=30&scrV=2#iii.iii.iii.i-p11.15

124. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=31&scrV=16#iii.iii.iii.i-p12.2

125. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=32&scrV=43#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.3

126. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=32&scrV=47#iii.iii.iii.i-p11.15

127. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=32&scrV=49#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.13

128. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Deut&scrCh=32&scrV=50#iii.iii.iii.i-p12.2

129. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrCh=7&scrV=14#iii.iii.iii.i-p4.2

130. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrCh=13&scrV=6#iii.iii.iii.i-p4.2

131. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrCh=14&scrV=2#iii.iii.iii.i-p4.2

132. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrCh=18&scrV=6#iii.iii.iii.i-p4.2

133. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrCh=19&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.i-p4.2

134. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrCh=21&scrV=4#iii.iii.iii.i-p4.2

135. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Josh&scrCh=22&scrV=5#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.16

136. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=10&scrV=20#iii.iii.iii.i-p4.3

137. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=14&scrV=8#iii.iii.iii.i-p4.9

138. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=23&scrV=6#iii.iii.iii.i-p4.7

139. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=28&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.i-p12.3

140. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=28&scrV=6#iii.iii.iii.i-p4.7

141. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=30&scrV=7#iii.iii.iii.i-p4.7

142. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=1Sam&scrCh=30&scrV=8#iii.iii.iii.i-p4.7

143. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=2Sam&scrCh=2&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.i-p4.8

144. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=2Sam&scrCh=5&scrV=19#iii.iii.iii.i-p4.8

145. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=2Sam&scrCh=5&scrV=23#iii.iii.iii.i-p4.8

146. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=2Kgs&scrCh=2&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.i-p12.5

147. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=1Chr&scrCh=16&scrV=23#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.4

148. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=1Chr&scrCh=16&scrV=28#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.4

149. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=1Chr&scrCh=22&scrV=19#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.17

150. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=1Chr&scrCh=28&scrV=9#iii.iii.iii.i-p11.23

151. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=1Chr&scrCh=29&scrV=9#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.24

152. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=2Chr&scrCh=7&scrV=17#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.2

153. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=22&scrV=22#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.20

154. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=22&scrV=26#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.20

155. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Job&scrCh=26&scrV=5#iii.iii.iii.i-p12.4

156. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=1&scrV=2#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.19

157. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=2&scrV=8#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.12

158. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=6&scrV=5#iii.iii.iii.i-p12.9

159. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=16&scrV=10#iii.iii.iii.i-p12.6

160. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=18&scrV=49#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.12

161. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=29&scrV=11#iii.iii.iii.i-p11.18

162. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=49&scrV=15#iii.iii.iii.i-p12.6

163. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=49&scrV=15#iii.iii.iii.i-p12.9

164. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=67&scrV=2#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.12

165. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=72&scrV=8#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.12

166. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=81&scrV=13#iii.iii.iii.i-p11.13

167. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=81&scrV=14#iii.iii.iii.i-p11.13

168. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=86&scrV=9#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.12

169. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=86&scrV=10#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.12

170. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=88&scrV=10#iii.iii.iii.i-p12.9

171. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=96&scrV=7#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.12

172. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=96&scrV=10#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.12

173. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=102&scrV=15#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.12

174. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=112&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.19

175. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=115&scrV=17#iii.iii.iii.i-p12.9

176. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=117&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.12

177. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=119&scrV=24#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.19

178. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=119&scrV=35#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.19

179. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=119&scrV=70#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.19

180. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Ps&scrCh=119&scrV=121#iii.vi.ii-p6.5

181. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=1&scrV=7#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.1

182. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=3&scrV=5#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.2

183. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=3&scrV=12#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.3

184. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=3&scrV=13#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.4

185. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=3&scrV=18#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.3

186. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=3&scrV=22#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.3

187. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=3&scrV=34#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.6

188. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=4&scrV=23#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.5

189. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=6&scrV=25#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.26

190. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=8&scrV=17#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.3

191. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=8&scrV=35#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.3

192. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=11&scrV=2#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.6

193. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=15&scrV=24#iii.iii.iii.i-p12.7

194. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=15&scrV=24#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.3

195. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=16&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.2

196. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=16&scrV=18#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.6

197. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=16&scrV=33#iii.iii.iii.i-p4.4

198. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=18&scrV=12#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.6

199. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=18&scrV=18#iii.iii.iii.i-p4.4

200. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=23&scrV=26#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.18

201. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=27&scrV=2#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.6

202. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=28&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.3

203. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Prov&scrCh=29&scrV=23#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.6

204. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Eccl&scrCh=12&scrV=7#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.7

205. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Eccl&scrCh=12&scrV=13#iii.iii.iii.i-p16.7

206. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=2&scrV=2#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.5

207. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=11&scrV=2#iii.v.iii-p6.18

208. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=11&scrV=3#iii.v.iii-p6.18

209. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=11&scrV=10#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.5

210. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=25&scrV=6#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.5

211. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=38&scrV=18#iii.iii.iii.i-p12.10

212. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=42&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.5

213. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=42&scrV=6#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.5

214. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=45&scrV=20#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.5

215. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=45&scrV=22#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.5

216. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=45&scrV=23#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.5

217. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=49&scrV=6#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.5

218. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=52&scrV=15#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.5

219. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=54&scrV=3#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.5

220. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=55&scrV=5#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.5

221. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=60&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.5

222. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=61&scrV=11#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.5

223. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=62&scrV=2#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.5

224. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=65&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.5

225. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Isa&scrCh=66&scrV=18#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.5

226. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh=4&scrV=2#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.6

227. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh=7&scrV=23#iii.iii.iii.i-p5.2

228. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Jer&scrCh=16&scrV=19#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.6

229. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Joel&scrCh=3&scrV=1#iii.iii.ii.ix-p59.1

230. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Amos&scrCh=9&scrV=11#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.7

231. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Amos&scrCh=9&scrV=12#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.7

232. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Mic&scrCh=4&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.10

233. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Hag&scrCh=2&scrV=7#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.8

234. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Zech&scrCh=2&scrV=11#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.9

235. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Zech&scrCh=6&scrV=15#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.9

236. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Zech&scrCh=8&scrV=20#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.9

237. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Zech&scrCh=14&scrV=16#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.9

238. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Mal&scrCh=1&scrV=11#iii.iii.iii.i-p9.11

239. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Mal&scrCh=2&scrV=15#iii.iii.iii.i-p13.3

240. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=5#iii.iii.iii.i-p11.3

241. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=5&scrV=31#iii.iii.iii.i-p15.1

242. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=7&scrV=21#iii.i.iii-p6.2

243. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=7&scrV=24#iii.i.iii-p6.2

244. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=19&scrV=8#iii.iii.iii.i-p15.1

245. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Matt&scrCh=19&scrV=21#iii.v.iii-p14.3

246. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=5&scrV=0#iii.v.iii-p29.1

247. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=8&scrV=56#iii.iii.iii.i-p12.11

248. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=10&scrV=27#iii.v.iii-p14.4

249. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=13&scrV=17#iii.i.iii-p6.3

250. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=John&scrCh=15&scrV=1#iii.i.iii-p6.3

251. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=1&scrV=18#iii.iii.ii.vi-p8.3

252. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=1&scrV=21#iii.iii.ii.vi-p6.1

253. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=1&scrV=27#iii.iii.ii.ix-p25.1

254. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=2&scrV=13#iii.vi.ii-p6.4

255. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Rom&scrCh=7&scrV=22#iii.vi.xiii-p23.4

256. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=13&scrV=2#iii.i.iii-p6.4

257. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=1Cor&scrCh=15&scrV=33#iii.i.i-p6.6

258. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Phil&scrCh=4&scrV=8#iii.i.i-p3.3

259. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Col&scrCh=1&scrV=4#iii.i.iii-p6.5

260. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Col&scrCh=1&scrV=9#iii.i.i-p3.1

261. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Col&scrCh=2&scrV=0#iii.vi.iii-p6.1

262. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Col&scrCh=2&scrV=0#iii.vi.iii-p7.1

263. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Col&scrCh=1614&scrV=0#iii.vi.iii-p6.1

264. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Col&scrCh=1729&scrV=0#iii.vi.iii-p7.1

265. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=1Tim&scrCh=2&scrV=4#iii.ii.i-p8.2

266. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=2Tim&scrCh=3&scrV=14#iii.i.iii-p6.6

267. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Titus&scrCh=1&scrV=1#iii.i.iii-p6.7

268. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Titus&scrCh=2&scrV=12#iii.vi.ii-p11.1

269. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=1&scrV=22#iii.i.iii-p6.8

270. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Jas&scrCh=2&scrV=14#iii.i.iii-p6.8

271. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=2Pet&scrCh=1&scrV=19#ii.v-p2.3

272. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=1John&scrCh=2&scrV=4#iii.i.iii-p6.9

273. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Rev&scrCh=3&scrV=11#ii.v-p2.4

274. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Jdt&scrCh=9&scrV=2#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.14

275. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=2&scrV=24#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.7

276. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=3&scrV=16#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.1

277. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=3&scrV=17#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.1

278. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=3&scrV=33#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.1

279. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=7&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.5

280. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=8&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.13

281. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=8&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.6

282. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=8&scrV=6#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.9

283. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=8&scrV=7#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.4

284. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=8&scrV=19#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.8

285. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=8&scrV=20#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.8

286. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=9&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.7

287. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=9&scrV=15#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.8

288. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=9&scrV=30#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.2

289. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=12&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.2

290. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=12&scrV=10#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.7

291. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=13&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.7

292. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=13&scrV=1#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.2

293. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=14&scrV=14#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.3

294. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=15&scrV=15#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.10

295. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=17&scrV=18#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.1

296. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=25&scrV=10#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.2

297. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=25&scrV=32#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.9

298. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=29&scrV=15#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.1

299. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=30&scrV=6#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.2

300. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=32&scrV=27#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.10

301. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=33&scrV=25#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.2

302. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=35&scrV=23#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.11

303. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=37&scrV=17#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.12

304. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=41&scrV=8#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.9

305. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=42&scrV=6#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.13

306. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=42&scrV=7#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.13

307. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=49&scrV=15#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.9

308. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=49&scrV=16#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.9

309. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3?scrBook=Sir&scrCh=51&scrV=18#iii.iii.iii.ii-p3.12

310. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xiii-p2.1

311. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xii-p6.2

312. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xi-p8.1

313. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xii-p3.1

314. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xii-p4.4

315. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.i.i-p6.4

316. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.i.i-p6.3

317. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xiii-p8.1

318. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.i.i-p6.5

319. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.i.i-p6.2

320. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.i.i-p6.7

321. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xiii-p6.4

322. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xix-p7.1

323. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.i.iii-p3.2

324. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.ix-p28.1

325. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xix-p22.1

326. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xi-p3.1

327. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iv.ii-p30.1

328. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xix-p5.1

329. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.ix-p27.2

330. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xii-p4.1

331. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.vii-p4.2

332. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.vii-p8.1

333. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xix-p12.1

334. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xiii-p3.1

335. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xiii-p8.2

336. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xii-p2.4

337. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xii-p4.2

338. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.ix-p35.1

339. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xvi-p5.1

340. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.ix-p14.1

341. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xi-p3.2

342. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xiii-p2.3

343. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xiii-p2.4

344. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xii-p5.1

345. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.x-p2.1

346. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.vii-p8.2

347. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.x-p2.2

348. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xv-p6.1

349. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xv-p8.1

350. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xiii-p2.5

351. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.ix-p27.1

352. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xiii-p6.2

353. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.ix-p27.3

354. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xiii-p2.2

355. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xix-p8.4

356. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xix-p7.3

357. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xii-p2.2

358. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xii-p2.1

359. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xvi-p4.1

360. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xv-p4.1

361. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xii-p2.3

362. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xi-p8.2

363. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xiii-p6.1

364. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p6.2

365. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.ii.i-p7.2

366. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.vii-p4.1

367. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.vi-p3.1

368. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p6.12

369. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.iii-p27.1

370. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.iii-p30.2

371. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.v-p11.3

372. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.iii-p14.1

373. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iv.ii-p6.1

374. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.iii-p35.1

375. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p6.10

376. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.xiv-p3.1

377. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iv.ii-p20.1

378. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iv-p13.1

379. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.iii-p45.1

380. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iv.ii-p3.1

381. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.ii-p26.1

382. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.xi-p8.1

383. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.iii-p44.1

384. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iv-p3.2

385. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iv.ii-p23.1

386. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p15.4

387. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iv-p3.1

388. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xix-p7.4

389. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xix-p7.2

390. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p6.4

391. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p6.6

392. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p6.8

393. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p23.1

394. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.iii-p12.1

395. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p5.2

396. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p5.4

397. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.ii.i-p7.1

398. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.i.iii-p3.1

399. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.iii-p50.1

400. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p11.2

401. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p6.1

402. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.v-p13.2

403. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p5.1

404. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p10.1

405. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xix-p8.3

406. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xxi-p8.1

407. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p3.1

408. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p11.3

409. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p11.1

410. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iv.ii-p18.1

411. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.iii-p30.1

412. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p11.4

413. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.vii-p2.1

414. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p6.15

415. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.i-p2.1

416. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p5.3

417. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.ii-p6.1

418. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.ii-p6.3

419. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.v-p18.1

420. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.ii-p6.2

421. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iv-p3.3

422. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.iv-p3.1

423. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p16.1

424. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p14.5

425. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.xiii-p15.1

426. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.i.i-p7.1

427. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xix-p7.5

428. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p5.8

429. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p5.9

430. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.xi-p10.2

431. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p14.2

432. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.v-p10.1

433. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.i-p5.1

434. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iv.ii-p18.3

435. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p15.2

436. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p15.3

437. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p15.1

438. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iv.ii-p23.2

439. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.viii-p9.3

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441. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.i.iii-p3.4

442. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.i.iii-p4.1

443. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.i.iii-p4.2

444. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.ii.i-p4.1

445. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.ii.i-p8.1

446. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.i-p6.1

447. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.i-p7.1

448. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.i-p8.1

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452. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.vi-p1.1

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462. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xii-p4.3

463. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xii-p6.1

464. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xiii-p6.3

465. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xiii-p8.3

466. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xiv-p2.1

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471. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.iii.ii.xviii-p4.1

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496. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.v.iii-p13.1

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498. file://localhost/ccel/w/wuttke/ethics1/cache/ethics1.html3#iii.vi.ii-p22.1

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