Saint Ephraim the Syrian Prose R

St. Ephraim's Prose Refutations of Mani, Marcion and Bardaisan.
Transcribed from the Palimpsest B.M. Add. 14623 by the late C. W. MITCHELL, M.A., C.F.

S. Ephraim's Prose Refutations of Mani, Marcion and Bardaisan. Transcribed from the Palimpsest B.M. Add. 14623 by C. W. MITCHELL, M.A., volume 1 (1912). Introduction

OF MANI, MARCION, AND BARDAISAN

OF WHICH THE GREATER PART HAS BEEN TRANSCRIBED FROM THE PALIMPSEST B.M. ADD. 14623 AND IS NOW FIRST PUBLISHED

C. W. MITCHELL, M.A.

THE DISCOURSES ADDRESSED TO HYPATIUS

PUBLISHED FOR, THE TEXT AND TRANSLATION SOCIETY
BY
WILLIAMS AND NORGATE
14, HENRIETTA STEEET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON,
AND 7, BROAD STREET, OXFORD
1912

LONDON :
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,
DUKE STREET, STAMFORD STREET, S.E., AND GREAT WINDMILL STREET, W.

PREFACE

THE work of which this volume contains the first two parts was begun when I held a Research Studentship at Emmanuel College, Cambridge. It was then my intention to publish a translation of the fragments of S. Ephraim's prose refutation of the False Teachers, published by Overbeck ("S. Ephraemi Syri aliorumque opera selecta," pp. 21-73), and considered to be a valuable document for the history of early Manichaean teaching. In undertaking this I could not foresee that the work would extend over such a long period, or that it would, when complete, pass so far beyond the limits of my original plan. An unexpected enlargement of it has been made possible and has developed in the following way.

Before I had finished the translation of the Overbeck section, Professor Bevan, who had suggested the work, informed me that the remainder of Ephraim's Refutation was extant in the palimpsest B.M. Add. 14623. Wright's description of this manuscript did not encourage the hope that the underwriting could be deciphered. On p. 766 of the catalogue of Syriac Manuscripts he referred to it thus: "As stated above, the volume is palimpsest throughout, and the miserable monk Aaron deserves the execration of every theologian and Syriac scholar for having destroyed a manuscript of the sixth century written in three columns containing works of Ephraim . . ." These words not only state with emphasis Wright's opinion of the importance of the manuscript, but also suggest, I think, his fear that its original contents were lost. While I add, in passing, that they may also be taken to indicate the satisfaction which the recovery of that text would have brought him—a text of which he knew the first part intimately through his active share in the preparation of Overbeck's volume—, I may also venture to express here, by anticipation, the hope that, after the whole of the present work has been published, both Theology and Scholarship may consent to modify the severity of this verdict on ill-fated Aaron.

On examining this palimpsest of eighty-eight leaves, I found that the older writing on a few pages could be read with ease, on a good number of others with much difficulty; while in |2 each of these legible pieces there were more or less irrecoverable passages, and worst of all, only one side of the leaves could be read, except in two or three cases, though there was evidence that the writing was lurking in obscurity below.

I decided to edit as many of the pages as were fairly legible, and to publish them along with the translation which I have mentioned above. After I had worked at the palimpsest for a considerable time, my gleanings amounted to over thirty of its pages. But the illegibility of one side of the vellum, coupled with the confusion arising from the disturbance of the original order of the leaves and quires in the hands of the monk Aaron, made it impossible to arrange the deciphered pages so that they could be read consecutively. As they had been transcribed with tolerable completeness, most of them containing about a hundred manuscript lines, and as each page was a section from a genuine work of Ephraim against Mani, Marcion, and Bardaisan, the Text and Translation Society undertook the expense of publishing them as isolated Fragments.

In 1908 the pages, grouped in the best way possible according to their subject-matter, began to be printed. Nearly one half of them had passed through the press when the work was unexpectedly stopped by a most fortunate turn of events. Dr. Barnett, Keeper of Oriental Manuscripts at the British Museum, began to apply a re-agent to the illegible portions of the palimpsest, and so wonderfully did its virtue revive the energies of the ancient ink, so distinctly did the underwriting show itself, here readily, there reluctantly, that it now became possible to transcribe almost the entire contents. In consequence, too, of his action, I was able to reconstruct the order of the leaves and quires, and to assign the former Fragments to their proper places in the original document.

It will thus not be difficult to see how these successive extensions of my first project prevented the appearance of the volume at the times promised. I feel, however, that the work has, in the meantime, gained so much in character and importance, that the facts which I have stated above will be a sufficient explanation to the members of the Text and Translation Society for what may have seemed vexatious delays. Instead of a text and translation of a collection of fragments, torn from their context, and suffering greatly from illegible gaps, this volume and that which is to follow it are now able to present to "the theologian and Syriac scholar" the text and translation of Ephraim's "Contra Haereses" approximately complete. The lacunae which still remain will not, I think, be found to affect seriously the elucidation of many passages of importance.

Even with the help of the re-agent, the work of transcribing |3 the palimpsest has been necessarily slow. Not to speak of the arduousness of the decipherer's task, which anyone who has had experience of such work will appreciate, there have been in the present case unusual difficulties owing to the fact that no other copy of the underwriting is extant. Such difficulties are inevitable when the decipherer's aim is not collation, but the recovery of a lost document. In a field of this kind pioneer work cannot go on rapidly ; for it constantly happens that advance is only possible by verifying and re-verify ing one's conjectures as to probable words and letters in passages which at first sight seem all but obliterated.

The time, moreover, which I have been able to devote to the work has been limited by my other duties, and has often been rendered still more scanty by the weather. Accurate deciphering is only possible under a good sunlight, and London has never claimed an abundance of this among her varied endowments. When bright days have been absent, in the interests of completeness and accuracy I have been obliged to postpone both transcribing and proof-correcting. For, however much the editor of such a work as the present may hope, for the sake of mistakes which he may have allowed to creep in, that he may not be transcribing e's act, yet he must feel that, as the writing soon fades back to that underworld from which it has recently emerged only after a thousand unbroken years of obscurity, there is laid upon him a special responsibility to attain finality in transcription. At the same time, he is aware that there comes a temptation to linger too frequently and painfully over sparse after-gleanings. Perhaps I have sometimes erred in this respect, but at any rate I feel that this edition presents a maximum of text recoverable from the palimpsest, and I have no hope that the lacunae can be filled by a more prolonged study of it.

I have tried to make a literal translation, and for the sake of clearness have introduced marginal summaries. The difficulty of the Syriac of the published fragment of the second Discourse was formerly noted by Nöldeke (ZDMG for 1889, p. 543), and the remainder of the work is written in the same style.

In the next volume containing Parts III. and IV.—the latter of which is now being printed—there will appear the text and translation of an unedited work of Ephraim, called "Of Domnus." It consists of Discourses against Mani, Marcion, and Bardaisan, and a Hymn on Virginity. The Discourses against Bardaisan are remarkable as showing the influence of the Platonists and the Stoics around Edessa.

In the third volume, Part V., I shall endeavour to collect, arrange, and interpret the evidence derived from the first two volumes for the teaching of Mani, Marcion, and Bardaisan. In that |4 connection notes will be found on special points, e.g., the references to the Hymn of the Soul, Vol. i, pp. lxxxix., cv.-cvii.; BÂN the Builder, p. xxx.; BOLOS, p. lxxii.; HULE, p. xcix. f.; Mani's Painting, p. xcii.; the Gospel quotations, e.g. pp. xc., c. Part V. will also contain indices for the whole work.

Throughout the first volume Ephraim directs his main attack against the teaching of Manichaeism—'perhaps the most formidable rival that the Church has encountered in the whole course of her history.' If that system ultimately failed on the favourable soil of Syria, its defeat must have been in some measure hastened by the weapons forged by Ephraim, and stored up in these Discourses to Hypatius, to be used by others in proving that Manichaeism could not justify itself intellectually to the Syrian mind.

I could wish to make my recognition of Professor Bevan's help as ample as possible. In editing the text, in conjectural emendations, and, above all, in the translation, I have had his constant and generous assistance. Throughout the work I have received from him encouragement and help of the most practical kind. For its final form, of course I alone am responsible.

I desire to express my thanks to Dr. Barnett, who has taken the greatest pains to restore the Manuscript to legibility, and who by his courtesy and kindness has greatly facilitated my progress with this work. I am also deeply grateful to Dr. Burkitt, who has given me advice and many suggestions ; and to my colleagues the Rev. F. Conway and Mr. C. E. Wade for help on certain points.

To the Text and Translation Society, who undertook the publication of the work, and to the Managers of the Hort Fund for two grants in connection with it, I beg here to offer my sincere thanks.

MANUSCRIPTS OF THE FIVE DISCOURSES ADDRESSED TO HYPATIUS.

Two manuscripts—B.M. Add. 14570 and B.M. Add. 14574— have preserved the First Discourse. The first of these is fully described in Wright's Catalogue of Syriac Manuscripts, pp. 406-7. This small volume contains as well a Discourse of Ephraim "On our Lord." It is written in a small elegant Estrangela of the fifth or sixth century, and each page is divided into two columns. On the first page there is a note stating that this was one of the two hundred and fifty volumes brought to the convent of S. Mary Deipara by the Abbot Moses of Nisibis, A.D. 932.

As regards the other manuscript, only the part of it numbered DXXXV by Wright, and described on pp. 407-8, requires mention here. Its nineteen leaves are "written in a fine regular Estrangela of the VIth century," each page being divided into three columns with from 34 to 38 lines to each. They contain not only the First Discourse but a fragment of the Second, (Overbeck, pp. 59-73) and originally belonged to the palimpsest Add. 14623, of which they formed the first nineteen leaves. Along with the eighty-eight leaves of this palimpsest, to which reference has already been made in the Preface, they formed a volume containing "To Hypatius" and "Of Domnus," two works which Ephraim intended to be his great refutation of the False Teachings. It thus becomes evident that the text of Discourses II-V, edited in Part ii., pp. 1-185, is really derived from a single manuscript, although, according to the Catalogue, the nineteen leaves and the palimpsest portion appear under different numbers.

When this sixth-century volume was rendered a palimpsest by |3 the monk Aaron, c. A.D. 823, fortunately the above-mentioned fragments—its first nineteen leaves—'escaped his ruthless hands.' But the surface of the remaining eighty-eight leaves suffered a ruinous transformation through his zealous attempt to remove the writing, and the treated vellum was re-arranged into new quires. The long list of works which the renovated codex was destined to contain can be seen on pages 464-7 of the Catalogue.

The two plates, one facing the title-page, the other opposite this page, show the present appearance of the manuscript. They have been reproduced from photographs of both sides of folio 13, which is a fair specimen of the leaves. It will.be noticed that the underwriting on the first plate is fairly clear, while that on the second plate showing the other side of the same leaf is, except for the title, completely illegible. The text of both has been transcribed with the help of the re-agent. The photographs have lost somewhat in distinctness in the process of reproduction.

On folio 88b there are two notes of interest in connection with the history of this palimpsest (CSM, p. 766). From the first we learn that Aaron was a Mesopotamian monk, a native of Dara, and that he wrote his manuscript in the Thebaid of Egypt. His date given above shows that Add. 14623 is one of the earliest palimpsests in the Nitrian Collection. Another note on the same page states that the volume was presented with nine others to the convent of S. Mary Deipara, by Isaac, Daniel and Solomon, monks of the Syrian convent of Mar Jonah in the district of Maris or Mareia. A.D. 851-859.

The manuscript was brought from the Nitrian desert by Archdeacon Tattam, and has been in the British Museum since March, 1843.

SIZE AND ARRANGEMENT OF THE WORK.

At the head of the First Discourse in B.M. Add. 14574, the following title is found : "Letters of the Blessed Ephraim, arranged according to the letters of the alphabet, against the False Teachings." On this Wright remarked that although the words "arranged according to the letters of the alphabet" appear to imply that there were originally twenty-two of these Discourses, following one another like those of Aphraates in the order of the Syriac alphabet, yet this "seems unlikely as the second Discourse begins with the letter p" (CSM, p. 408).

The exact meaning of the words remained obscure till Professor Burkitt, after examining the palimpsest portion of the work, showed that it consisted of five Discourses arranged acrostically in the order of the five letters of the author's name. He also observed that "a similar method of signature is actually used by Ephraim in the Hymn added at the end of the Hymns on Paradise (Overbeck, p. 351 ff.), the several stanzas of which begin with the letters m Y r p ) " (Texts and Studies, vol. vii-2, pp. 73, 74).

The decipherment of the palimpsest makes it possible to complete Professor Burkitt's evidence (op. cit. p. 74) thus :—

TABLE I

TABLE II

GIVING THE TRANSCRIBED LEAVES OF THE PALIMPSEST ACCORDING TO THE ORDER OF THEIR NUMBERING IN THE CATALOGUE, AND THE PAGES OF THE PRESENT VOLUME ON WHICH THE TEXT OF EACH LEAF BEGINS

THE FIRST DISCOURSE	pp. i-xxviii
THE SECOND DISCOURSE	pp. xxix-l
THE THIRD DISCOURSE	pp. li-lxxiii
THE FOURTH DISCOURSE	pp. lxxiv-xci
THE FIFTH DISCOURSE	pp. xcii-cxix

[Short lacunae are indicated in the translation by dots, and longer gaps by asterisks, but in neither case is the number of the dots or asterisks intended to bear any exact relation to the number of the missing words. In respect to this an approximately correct inference may be drawn by consulting the Syriac text.

Single inverted commas are used in numerous cases where the words seem to be quotations or to belong to a special terminology.

Words in italics inside square brackets are to be regarded as conjectural translations or paraphrases.

In a few passages, where the text has suffered great mutilation, italics indicate an attempt to summarise the argument from suggestions in the fragments.]

SELECTED DISCOURSES

EPHRAIM ¹ to Hypatius my brother in our Lord—greeting : may peace with every man increase for us and may the peace which is between us abound, in the peace of truth may we be established, and let us make especial use of the greeting (conveyed) in a letter.²

Behold, I am writing willingly something that I did not wish to write. For I did not wish that a letter should pass between us, since it cannot ask or be asked questions ; but I had wished that there might pass between us a discourse from mouth to ear, asking and being asked questions. The written document is the image of the composite body, just as also the free tongue is the likeness of the free mind. For the body cannot add or subtract anything from the measure of its stature, nor can a document add to or subtract from the measure of its writing. But a word-of-mouth discourse can be within the measure or without the measure.

For the Deity gave us Speech that is free like Itself, in order that free Speech might serve our independent Freewill. And by Speech, too, we are the likeness of the Giver of it, [Ov. p. 22.] inasmuch as by means of it we have impulse and thought for good things; and not only for good things, but we learn |ii also of God, the fountain of good things, by means of Speech (which is) a gift from Him. For by means of this (faculty) which is like God we are clothed with the likeness of God. For divine teaching is the seal of minds, by means of which men who learn are sealed that they may be an image for Him Who knows all. For if by Freewill Adam was the image of God, it is a most praiseworthy thing when, by true knowledge, and by true conduct, a man becomes the image of God. For that independence exists in these also. For animals cannot form in themselves pure thoughts about God, because they have, not Speech, that which forms in us the image of the Truth. We have received the gift of Speech that we may not be as speechless animals in our conduct, but that we may in our actions resemble God, the giver of Speech. How great is Speech, a gift which came to make those who receive it like its Giver ! And because animals have not Speech they cannot be the likeness of our minds. But because the mind has Speech, it is a great disgrace to it when it is not clothed with the likeness of God ; it is a still more grievous shame when animals resemble men, and men do not resemble God. But threefold is the torture doubled when this intermediate (party between God and animals) forsakes the Good above him and degrades himself from his natural rank to put on the likeness of animals in his conduct.

A letter, therefore, cannot demonstrate every matter about which a man is seeking to ask questions, because the tongue of the [Ov. p. 23, 1. 2.] letter is far away from it,—its tongue is the pen of the writer of it. Moreover, when the letter speaks anything written in it, it takes to itself another tongue that the letter may speak with it, (the letter) which silently speaks with two mute tongues, one being the ink-pen, the other, the sight of the (reader's) eye. But if we thus rejoice over a letter poor in treasures, how much more shall we rejoice over a tongue which is near us, the lord and treasurer of the treasures within !

But I had desired that instead of your seeing me in the characters of a document, you might have seen me in the characters of the countenance ; and instead of the writing of |iii my letter thus seeing you, I had desired that my eyes instead of my writings might see you. But because the sight of our face is not worthy of the pure gaze of your eyes, behold you are gazing on the characters of our letter. But justly pure writings have met your pure eyes ; not that I say that the pure is profaned by the defiled, but it is not right that pure eyes should look at what is riot pure. For even though the People had sanctified their bodies three days, (yet) because they had not sanctified their hearts he did not allow them to approach the holy Mountain, not that holiness would be profaned by those who were defiled, but those who were defiled were not worthy to approach holiness. [Exod, xix. 10 ff.] But by Moses, the holy one, who went up into the holy Mountain, God gave an instance for the consolation of the pure and for the refutation of the defiled, (showing) that all those who are holy like Moses are near holiness like Moses. [Ov. p. 24.] For when one of the limbs of the body is satisfied all the limbs receive a pledge of satisfaction, that they too will be satisfied together with that one in the same manner. For by means of that body, too, in which our Lord was raised, all bodies have received a pledge that they will be raised with it in like manner.

But, my brother, in that thou didst stir up our littleness to approach you, know that if I wished I could come, but know, too, that if I could come I would not wish to be deprived (of the opportunity). For I could come if I had no intelligence ; but I have been unable to come because I had intelligence. In (blissful) innocence I might have come on account of love, but (looking at the matter) intelligently I was unable to come on account of fear.

And whoever is steeped in love like a child is above fear ; and whoever! is timorously subject to fear vain terror always tortures him. It helps athletes too in a competition to be above fear through the encouragement of a good hope, and not to fall under the sickly apprehensions which result from a timorous habit of thought. Athletes perhaps (might) well fear because the victor is crowned and the loser suffers shame, For they do not divide the victory between the two of them.

But we ought not to fear a struggle in which failure is |iv victory ; since when the teacher wins the learner too is much helped. For helper and helped are both partakers in the gain. If, then, we had come to teach there would have been a common victory as Error would have been overwhelmed by our Truth. [Ov. p. 25. l. 3.] But if we had been unable to teach, yet had been able to learn, there would have been a common victory in that by your knowledge there would have been an end of ignorance. The treasure of Him that enricheth every one is open before every one, since Grace administers it, (Grace) that never restrains intelligent inquirers. If, therefore, we had possessed something we could have bestowed it as givers, or if we did not possess anything we could have received as inquirers. But if we had not been able to give nor able even to receive, our coming could not have been deprived of all good. For even if we could not have searched you out with our mind yet we could have seen you with our eyes ; since we have no greater gift than seeing you. [Ex. xxxiii. 18 ff.] But Moses testifies that while it was granted to him to do everything like God, at last he abandoned everything and prayed to see the Lord of all. For if the creatures of the Creator are thus pleasant to look upon, how much more pleasant is their Creator to look upon ; but because we have not an eye which is able to look upon His splendour, a mind was given us which is able to contemplate His beauty. Man, therefore, is more than his possessions, just as God is more excellent and more beautiful than His creatures.

But know, my beloved, that if we had come, it would not have been possible for us to have been real paupers such as receive everything, nor again for you to have been complete givers, to give everything. One who lacks is not lacking in all respects, lest he should be abased ; neither is he who is complete, complete in every respect, lest he should exalt himself. But this lack has arisen that completeness may be produced by it. For in that we need to give to one another and receive from one another, the wants of all of us are filled up by the abundance of all. [Ov. p. 26, 1. 7.] For as the wants of the limbs of the body are filled up |v one by the other, so also the inhabitants of the world fill up the common need from the common abundance. Let us rejoice, therefore, in the need of all of us, for in this way unity is produced for us all. For inasmuch as men are dependent on one another, the high bend themselves down to the humble and are not ashamed, while the lowly reach out towards the great and are not afraid. And also in the case of animals we exercise great care over them on account of our dependence on them, and obviously our need of everything binds us in love towards everything. O hated Need ! yet much-loved unity is produced from it. Because countries are dependent on one another, their dependence combines them as into a body ; and like the limbs they give to one another and receive from one another. But these arrangements of interdependence belong to one rich complete Being, Whose need is this—to give to everything though He has no need to receive from anywhere. For even what He is thought to receive from us, He takes it astutely from us in His love that He may again give it to us manifold more as the rewarder. This is that astuteness which ministers good things, and our craftiness which ministers evil things should resemble it.

But as regards that fear of which we spoke above, not only upon us weak ones does the constraint of fear fall, but even upon the heroes and valiant themselves. Nor have I said this in order to find comfort for our folly, but that we might remind thy wisdom. For when Peter despised fear and was wishing to walk upon the waters, although he was going (thither) on account of his love which was making him run, yet he was nigh to sinking on account of fear which fell upon him ; and the fear which was weaker than he on dry land, when it came among the waves into a place in which it was strengthened became powerful against him and overcame him. [Ov. p. 27, l. 13.] From this it is possible to learn that when any one of all the desires in us is associated with an evil habit which helps it, then that desire acquires power and conquers us. For fear and love were weighed in the midst of the sea as in a balance, and fear turned the scale and won ; and that Simon whose faith was lacking |vi and rose in the balance was himself nigh to sinking in the midst of the sea. And this type is a teacher for us, that is to say, it is a fear-inspiring sign that all those whose good things fail and are light when rightly weighed, are themselves nigh to sinking into evil. But if any one say :—why is it necessary to frame illustrations of this kind, let him know that this may not be harmful if we receive from everything some helpful lesson for our weakness. [Ov. p. 28.] If, therefore, Peter was afraid of the waves, though the Lord of the waves was holding his hand, how much more should weak ones fear the waves of Controversy, which are much stronger than the waves of the sea! For in the waves of the sea (only) bodies are drowned, but in the waves of Investigation minds sink or are rescued.

But, again, that Publican also who was praying in the Temple was very importunate about forgiveness, because he was much afraid of punishment. He was in a state of fear and love ; he both verily loved the Merciful One on account of His forgiveness, and he verily feared the Judge on account of His vengeance. And though, on the one hand, he was praying in love because of his affection, yet, on the other hand, because of his fear he would not dare to lift up his eyes unto Heaven. And though Grace was urging him forward, his fear was unable to cross boldly the limit of justice.

If the fear of the Publican who was justified knew its measure and did not exalt itself to cross the limit, how can weakness dare to neglect the measure and to cross the limit of propriety ? For this also (is said) that a man may know the degree of his weakness and not exalt himself to a degree above his power. I think that such a man cannot slip. For he does not run to a degree too hard for him and so receive thence a fall. For without knowledge men run to degrees too hard for them ; and before they go up pride urges them on, and after they fall penitence of soul tortures them.

But, again, indeed, I see that that importunity about which our Lord spake was praised and enriched because its importunate nature ventured to cross the limit of propriety ; for if it had been abashed and observed propriety, it would have gone empty away, but because it was presumptuous and trampled down |vii harmful modesty as with its heels, [Ov. p. 29, l. 5.] it received more than it had asked. O Necessity, whose importunate words enriched its destitution! For it does not aid necessity to be subject to harmful modesty, but (it is aided) by its importunity being a good instrument for (securing) good things.

But if all these praises were bestowed on importunity, which opened closed doors, and aroused those who were asleep in bed, and received more than was its due, how must that indigence be censured which has not approached open doors nor received help from the treasuries of the Rich One ! Better, therefore, is he who is importunate about his aid than he who is ashamed and loses his aid. For whoever observes proper modesty while he loses his aid, even the propriety which he has observed is in that case subject to censure, and propriety has become impropriety. And he that seeks after exact propriety at all times is neglectful of sound propriety. For from the best wheat, if it shed not much bran, fine flour cannot be made ; for unripe fruit is not palatable, and what is over ripe loses flavour, or else its taste is pungent, or bad.

For if we refine things much beyond what is proper, even the fine and the pure are also rejected. For it is not right for us to cultivate Ignorance, or deep Investigation, but Intelligence between-these-two-extremes, sound and true. For by means of the two former a man surely misses his advantage. [Ov. p. 30, l. 3.] For by means of Ignorance a man cannot understand Knowledge, and by deep Investigation a man cannot build on a sound foundation. For Ignorance is a veil which does not permit one to see, and Investigation, which is continually building and destroying, is a changeful wheel that knows not how to stand and be at rest; and when it passes in its investigation over true things, it cannot abide by them ; for it has unstable motions. When, therefore, it finds anything it seeks, it does not retain its discovery, and is not rejoiced with the fruit of its toil But if we inquire much into everything we are neglectful of the Lord of everything, inasmuch as we desire to know all things like Him. And since our Knowledge cannot know everything. |viii we show our evil Will before Him Who knows all things. And while He is higher than all in His Knowledge, the ignorant venture to assail the height of His Knowledge. For if we are continually striving to comprehend things, by our strife we desire to fence round the way of Truth and to confuse by our Controversy things that are fair—not that those fair things are confused in their own nature, but our weakness is confused by reason of the great things. For we are not able completely to apprehend their greatness. For there is One who is perfect in every respect, whose Knowledge penetrates completely through all.

But it is not right for us to look at all things minutely, but rather simply—not that our Knowledge is to be Ignorance; for even in the case of something which a man does not do cleverly, if he does the thing with clever discrimination then his lack of Cleverness is Cleverness. And if, by his Knowledge he becomes an ignorant man so that he ignores those things which he cannot know, even his Ignorance is great Knowledge. For because he knows that they are not known, his Knowledge cannot be Ignorance. For he knows well whatever he knows. But the mind in which many doubts spring up, destroying one another, cannot do anything readily. For thoughts, vanquishing and vanquished, are produced by it, and the waves which from all sides beat upon it, fix it in doubt and inaction. [Ov. p. 31, l. 12.] But it is an advantage that the scale of simplicity should outweigh in us the scale of wrangling-logic. For how many times, in consequence of the clever and subtle thoughts which we have concerning a matter, that very matter is delayed so as not to be accomplished! And consider that in the case of those matters which keep the world alive, Simplicity accomplishes them without many thoughts. For these matters succeed when a single thought controls them, and they stand still when many thoughts rush in. For there is only a single thought in Husbandry, that is (the thought) that in a simple manner it should scatter the seed in the earth. But if other thoughts occurred to it so that it pondered and reasoned as to whether the seed was sprouting or not, or whether the earth would fail to produce it, or would restore it again, then Husbandry could not sow. For morbid thoughts spring up against a single |ix sound thought, and weaken it. And because a thing is weakened, it cannot work like a sound thing. For the soundness of a [Ov. p. 32.] thought like the soundness of a body performs everything. And the husbandman who cannot plough with one ox cannot plough with two thoughts. Just as it is useful to plough with two oxen, so it is right to employ one healthy thought.

Moreover, if the martyrs and confessors who have been crowned had approached with double thoughts they could not have been crowned. For when our Freewill is in a strait between keeping the commandment and breaking the commandment, it is usually the case that it is seeking two reasonings destructive of one another, so that by means of the. interpretation of one reasoning it may flee from the pain of the other, that is to say, (it argues) in order that by a false excuse it may cast away the burden of the commandment. Now, without wandering after those things which are unnecessary, or omitting anything that is necessary, let us say in brief and not at length, that if anything succeeds by means of a single sound thought, its soundness is weakened by many thoughts. For if we approach with polished wiles any matter which we ought to approach in a simple way, then our intelligence becomes non-intelligence. For in the case of every duty, whenever a man proceeds beyond what is its due, all the ingenuities which he can devise about it, are foolish. So (too) in the case of any investigation in which the investigator slips from its truth, all the discoveries he may make, although his discoveries may be clever, are false. For everything which is clever is not true ; but whatever is true is clever. And whatever is debated is not deep, but whatever is said by God is subtle when it is believed. But there is no subtlety equal to [Ov. p. 33.] this, that everything should be duly done in its own way, and if it happen that what is to be done can be done simply, its simplicity is subtlety. For it is all the more fitting that we should call this simplicity subtlety in that it accomplishes helpful things without many combinations and reasonings. For in that it does things easily it resembles Deity, Who easily creates everything.

It is right, therefore, that we should investigate well the advantage of things by an examination of them ; and if they are |x judged by the investigators to be simple, there are many things which are thought to be obviously unsuccessful, but their unseen qualities achieve a great victory. For there is nothing that appears more simple than this, that the husbandman should take and scatter in the earth the gathered seeds which he holds in his hands. But, after a time, when it is seen that the scattered seed has been gathered and has come with a multitude like a general with his army, and that the seed which had been regarded as lost is found and finds also other (seeds) with it, then a man marvels at the husbandman's simplicity, which has become a fountain of cleverness. Therefore, with regard to this very thing, hear on the other hand the opposite of it, that if a man spare the gathered seed, so as not to scatter it, he is thought indeed to act prudently in refraining from scattering. But when we see the husbandman's scattered investment collected in the principal and interest, and the earth rewarding him, then the intelligence which refrained from scattering is seen to be [Ov. p. 34.] blindness, because it is deprived of (the chance of) gathering. Therefore, it is not an advantage to us that we should always be led astray by names, nor that we should be deceived by outward appearances.

For if, because I wisely discerned that it would not be right for me to venture to come, I did not come for that reason, perhaps it would have been better for me if I had not wisely discerned. For, perhaps, my coming to thee in childlike and simple fashion would have met with success. But know again that if I had come recklessly I would not have wished to come, because our coming would have been indiscreet. For we should have had no fruit of intelligence. For everything which is done indiscreetly belongs either to reckless habit, or blind chance ; and it has no root in the mind of those who do it.

But if these two wise conclusions (namely) that I should come and that I should not come, (both) belong to my Will, this is a single Will of which one half does battle with the other half, and when it conquers and is conquered it is crowned in both cases. This is a wonder, that though the Will is one, two opinions which are not homogeneous are found in its homogeneity. And I know that what I have said is so, but why (it is so) I am not |xi able to demonstrate. For I wonder how that one thing both enslaves it and is enslaved by it. But know that if this was not so mankind would have no free power of Choice. For if Necessity makes us wish, we have no power of Choice. And if, again, our Will is bound and has not the power to will and not to will we have no Freewill. ["The Will is both one and many."] And, therefore, necessity thus demands that there should be a single thing, and though it is a single thing, when that single thing wills to be two it is easy for it, and when again it wills to be one or many it is a simple matter for it. For in a single day there are produced in us a great number of Volitions which destroy each other. [Ov. p. 35, l. 5.] This Will is a root and parent; it is both one and many. This Will brings forth sweet and bitter fruit. O free Root with power over its fruit! For if it wills it makes its fruits bitter, and if it wills it makes its products sweet. For God to Whom nothing is difficult has created in us something which is difficult to explain, and that is, Freewill. And though this (Will) is one, yet there are two opinions in it, that of willing and that of being unwilling ; so that when half of it struggles with and conquers the other half, then the whole of it is crowned by the whole of it. For this is an unspeakable wonder, how, though the Will is one, half of it rebels against the Law and half of it is subject to the Law. For, lo, there are in it two opinions contending together, for part of the Will desires that Evil should be done, and again, part of it uses restraint and guards against Evil being done. And how on the one hand has the Will not been transformed by that part of it which desires evil things that it may become like its part which desires evil things ? and how again (on the other hand) has the Will not been converted by that part of it which loves good things, that the whole of it may become good like the part of it which loves good things ? But if both these parts can be converted to Good or Evil, what shall we call them ? That we should call them Evil (is impossible, for) they can be good,—that we should call them good (is impossible, for) they can be bad. [Ov. p. 36.] And though these two can be a single thing, yet except they are divided and are two there can be no struggle between them. This is a wonder which we are unable to speak of, and yet we cannot be silent about it. For we know |xii that a single Will possessed of many conclusions exists in us. But since the Root is one we do not understand how part of the thought is sweet, and part of it bitter, even if it does not completely escape our notice. And how, on the one hand, is that bitterness swallowed up by that sweet thing so as to become pleasant like it ? And how again when it (i.e., the sweet thing) has been swallowed up is it mixed with that bitter thing so as to become bitter like it ? And again, how when these two frames of mind have been swallowed by one another, and have become one thing affectionately, are they again separated from one another and stand one against the other like enemies ? For where was that Mind before we sinned that brings us to penitence after sins ? And how is that Mind turned to penitence after adultery, which was raging before adultery ? These are frames of mind which are like leaven to one another, so that they change one another and are changed by one another. But here our Truth has conquered the (false) Teachings and bound them so that none of them can bear investigation.

But if any one wishes to investigate some of the Teachings (in question) let him know that we have not been called at present to struggle with enemies, but to speak with friends. But when the statement (intended) for friends is finished, then our belief will show a proof of its power in a contest also. But it is easy for every man to perceive what I have said, because there are in every one two Minds, [Ov. p. 37.] which are engaged in a struggle one against the other, and between them stands the Law of God, holding the crown and the punishment, in order that when there is victory it may offer the crown, and when failure appears it may inflict punishment.

But if the Evil which is in us is evil, and cannot become good, and if also the Good in us is good, and cannot become evil (then) these good and evil promises which the Law makes are superfluous. For whom will the Rewarder crown—one who is victorious by his Nature and cannot fail ? Or whom, again, will the Avenger blame—that Nature which fails and cannot conquer ? But if that good thing which is in us is obedient to |xiii something evil, how can we call that Good, seeing that it has a close relationship to Evil ? For by means of that thing whereby it becomes obedient to Evil its kinship with Evil is perceived. For that Evil would not be able to draw it to itself if it were not that its lump had an affinity to the leaven of Evil. See therefore, also, that what they call a good Nature is, in virtue of what it is, convicted of being an evil Nature; inasmuch as it has an evil Will which is drawn away after Evil. But inasmuch as it has an evil Will, all Evil things had a tendency towards it. [The evil Will is the root of Evil.] For there is nothing more evil than an evil Will. For that is the root of evil things. For when there is no evil free Will, then evil things come to an end. For the deadly sword cannot kill apart from the evil Will of its holder. [Ov. p. 38.]But see, already when we have not advanced to the contest (even) before the contest, the enemies of the Truth have been conquered beforehand.

And if any one ask, what then is this Will ? we must tell him that the real truth about it is that it is the power of Free-choice. And because it is not right to scorn a good learner, let us now like those who hasten and pass on throw him a word, that is to say, one of the words of Truth. For, even from a single word of Truth, great faith dawns in a sound and wise hearer ; just as a great flame is produced by a small coal. For if a single one of a few coals of fire is sufficient to make scars on the body, one of the words of Truth, also, is not too weak to clean away the plague spots of Error from the soul. If, therefore, any one asks, "What is this Will, for though it is one thing, part of it is good, and part of it evil ?" we shall tell him that it is because it is a Will. And if he asks again, we shall tell him that it is a thing endowed with independence. And if he still continues to indulge in folly, we shall tell him that it is Freewill. And if he is not convinced this unteachableness of his teaches that because there is Free-will he does not wish to be taught. But if he is convinced when they say to him that there is no Freewill, it is truly wonderful that in the annulling of his Freewill, his Freewill is proved, that is to say, by his being in a desperate state. [The very denial of Freewill proves that it exists.] And the matter is as if some eloquent person wished to harangue and to prove that men have no power of Speech. And that is great madness; |xiv for he says there is no power of Speech when he uses the power of Speech. For his power of Speech refutes him, for by means [Ov. p. 39.] of Speech he seeks to prove that there is no power of Speech. When Freewill, too, has gone to hide itself in a discussion and to show by argument that it does not exist, then is it with more certainty caught and seen to exist. For if there were no Freewill, there would be no controversy and no persuasion. But if Freewill becomes more evident when it hides itself, and when it denies (its own existence) it is the more refuted, then when it shows itself it is made as clear as the sun.

And why does Freewill wish to deny its power and to profess to be enslaved when the yoke of lordship is not placed upon it ? For it is not of the race of enslaved reptiles, nor of the family of enslaved cattle, but of the race of a King and of the sons of Kings who alone among all creatures, were created in the image of God. For see every one is ashamed of the name of slavery and denies it. And if a slave goes to a country where men know him not, and there becomes rich, it may be that, although he is a slave and of servile origin, he may be compelled to say there that lie is sprung from a free race and from the stock of kings. And this is wonderful that, while slaves deny their slavery, yet the Freewill of fools denies its own self. And see, if men give the name of slave to him who says that there is no Freewill, he is displeased and becomes angry, and begins to declare the Freedom of his family. Now, how does such a person on the one hand deny Freewill, and on the other acknowledge it ? And on the one hand hate literal slavery, and (on the other) acknowledge spiritual slavery ? If he chose with intelligence and weighed the matter soundly it would be right for him to acknowledge that (principle) that he might not be deprived of the mind's free power of Choice. [Ov. p. 40.] And here he is exposed who blasphemes very wickedly against the Good One, the Giver of Freewill, Who made the earth and everything in it subject to its dominion.

But there is no man who has gone down and brought up a crown with great toil from the hard struggle, and (then) says that there is no Freewill, lest the reward of his toil and the glory of his crown should be lost. The man who has failed says there |xv is no Freewill that he may hide the grievous failure of his feeble Will. If thou seest a man who says there is no Freewill, know that his Freewill has not conducted itself aright. The sinner who confesses there is Freewill may perhaps find mercy, because he has confessed that his follies are his own ; but whoever denies that there is Freewill utters a great blasphemy in that he hastens to ascribe his vices to God ; and seeks to free himself from blame and Satan from reproach in, order that all the blame may rest with God—God forbid that this should be ! But if he is intelligent he ought not to think that a being endowed with power over itself is similar to a thing which is bound in its Nature. [The mystery of the Will is a part of a wider mystery.] And, moreover, it would not be right for any one, after he has heard that the Will . . . to ask (and say), 'But what, again is the Will ?' Does he know everything, and has this (alone) escaped his knowledge, or does he know nothing at all since he cannot know even this ? But if he knows what 'a bound Nature' is, he can know what an unconstrained Will is, but that which is unconstrained cannot become constrained, because it is not subject to constraint. But in what is it unconstrained except in that it has (the power) to will and not to will?

And if he is unwilling to be convinced in this way, it is because the power of his Freewill is so great, and our mouth is unable to do it full justice ; our weak mouth has confessed that it is unable to state its unconstrained Will. For it is a Freewill which subjects even God to Investigation and rebuke, on account of its unconstrained nature. It ventured to bring up all this because it desired to speak about that which is unspeakable. [Ov. p. 41, l. 5.] But that (Freewill) which has ventured to make statements concerning God, itself is not able to state its own nature perfectly. But concerning this, also, we say to any one who asks that this is a marvel which it is very easy for us to perceive, but it is very difficult to give a proof of it. [But it is impossible to explain anything completely.] But this is not so only in this matter, but it is the same with everything. For whatever exists may be discussed without being searched out; it can be known that the thing exists, but it is not possible to search out how it exists. For see that we can perceive |xvi everything, but we cannot completely search out anything at all ; and we perceive great things, but we cannot search out perfectly even worthless things. [Let us thank God that our Knowledge of things is limited.] But thanks be to Him Who has allowed us to know the external side of things in order that we may learn how we excel, but He has not allowed us to know their (inward) secret that we might understand how we are lacking. He has allowed us, therefore, to know and not to know that by means of what can be known, our childish nature might be educated, and that our boldness might be restrained by those things which cannot be known. Therefore, He has not permitted us to know, not that we may be ignorant, but that our Ignorance may be a hedge for our Knowledge. [Knowing that our powers of knowing are so limited we can avoid vain and weary searching.] For see how we wish to know even the height of heaven and the breadth of the earth, but we cannot know ; and because we cannot know we are thus restrained from toiling. Therefore, our Ignorance is found to be a boundary for our Knowledge, and our want of Knowledge (lit. simpleness) continually controls the impetuosity of our boldness. For when a man knows that he cannot measure a spring of water, by the very fact that he cannot, he is prevented from drawing out what is inexhaustible. [Ov. p. 42, l. 5.] And by this experience it is seen that our weakness is a wall in the face of our boldness. Thus, too, when we know that we cannot know, we cease to investigate. For if, when we know little, the impetuosity of boldness carries us on and proceeds to those things which may not be known, who is there who will not give thanks to Him. Who has restrained us from this wearisomeness, even if we do not wish to remain within the just boundary within which He has set us ? Our Ignorance, therefore, is a bridle to our Knowledge. [Yet we are not to be ignorant, but to seek after practical Knowledge.] And from these instances it does not follow that the All-knower wished to make us ignorant, but He placed our Knowledge under a helpful guardian ; and better is the small Knowledge which knows the small range of Ignorance than the great Knowledge which has not recognized its limits ; and better is the weak man who carries about something that is necessary for his life than the arrogant strong man who burdens himself with great stones which cause his destruction. [Our chief Knowledge is to know what subjects can never be known.] But our chief Knowledge is (just) this—to know that we do not know |xvii anything. For if we know that we do not know, then we conquer Error by our Knowledge. For when we know that everything that exists is either known or not known, thereby we acquire the true Knowledge. For whoever thinks he can know everything, falls short of the Knowledge of everything. For by means of his Knowledge he has gained for himself Ignorance. But whoever knows that he cannot know, from Ignorance Knowledge accrues to such a one. [Ov. p. 43.] For in virtue of the fact that he knows that he cannot know, he is enabled to know, that is to say, (he knows) something which profits him.

If, therefore, as I said above, though the Will is one, part of it compels and part of it is compelled, by whom was I compelled not to come except by my own Will ? O that some unknownexternal Constraint had opposed me ! For perhaps with the whole of my being I would have contended against the whole of that (Constraint) and been victorious. (O that it had been thus), and that an inward Constraint had not opposed me, (a Constraint) of which I know not how to give an account ! For I am not able to state how part of me contends with another part ; in virtue of being what I am, I conquer, and am conquered continually.

But we are not stating the case as the Heresies state it. For they say that Constituents of Good and Evil are mingled together in us, and "these Constituents conquer one another, and are conquered by one another." But although Error is able to deck out what is false, the furnace of Truth is able to expose it. For we say that free Volitions conquer one another, and are conquered by one another ; for this is the Freewill which the voice of the Law can transform.

And if they say that if Freewill comes from God, then the good and evil impulses which belong to it are from God ; by saying this, what do they wish to say ? Do they wish to affirm that there is no Freewill ? And if they deny Freewill what can they believe ? [Ov. p. 44.]For if they deny Freewill the Law and Teaching are of no use ; and so let books and laws be rolled up and let judges rise from their thrones, and let teachers cease to |xviii teach! let prophets and apostles resign their office! Why have they vainly laboured to preach ? Or what was the reason of the coming of the Lord of them all into the world ?

But if they profess belief in Freewill—which is actually what they profess—that Freewill which they profess to believe in compels them to deny that Evil which they believe in. For both of them cannot stand. For either our Will sins, and (at other times) is proved to be righteous, and for this reason we have Freewill; or if the Constituents of Good and Evil stir in the Will, then it is a Constituent which overcomes, and is overcome, and not the Will.

But if any one says that everything which stirs in our Freewill does not belong to Freewill, by his Freewill he is making preposterous statements about Freewill. For how does he call that Freewill when he goes on to bind it so that it is not Freewill. For the name of Freewill stands for itself; for it is free and not a slave, being independent and not enslaved, loose, not bound, a Will, not a Nature. And just as when any one speaks of Fire, its heat is declared by the word, and by the word 'Snow,' its coolness is called to mind, so by the word 'Freewill' its independence is perceived. But if any one says that the impulses that stir in it do not belong to Freewill he is desiring to call Freewill a 'bound Nature,' when the word does not suit a Nature. And he is found not to perceive what Freewill is, and he uses its name rashly and foolishly without being acquainted with its force. [Ov. p. 45.] For either let him deny it, and then he is refuted by its working, or if he confesses it, his organs contend one against the other ; for he denies with his mouth what he confesses with his tongue.

For the Giver of Freewill is not so confused (in mind) as this man who is divided (against himself) part against part, that He should become involved in a struggle with His nature. For He gave us Freewill which, by His permission, receives good and evil impulses, and He furthermore ordained a Law for it that it should not do overtly those Evils which by His permission stir invisibly in it. And let us inquire a little. Either though He may have had the means to give us Freewill, He did not wish to give it, though He may have been able to give it, or He may |xix not have had the means to give, and on this account He was unable to give it. And how was He Who was unable to give freewill able to give a Law when there was no Freewill ? But if He gave the Law, the righteousness which is in His Law reproves our Freewill, for He rewards it according to its works.

And if there is no Freewill, does not this Controversy in which we are involved concerning Freewill, bear witness that we have Freewill ? For a 'bound Nature' could not utter all these various matters controversially. For if all mankind were alike saying one thing or doing one thing, perhaps there would be an opportunity to make the mistake (of thinking) that there is no Freewill. But if even the Freewill of a single man undergoes many variations in a single day so that he is good or evil, hateful or pleasing, merciful or merciless, bitter or pleasant, blessing or cursing, grateful or ungrateful, [Ov. p. 46.] so that he resembles both God and Satan, is it not established by thousands of witnesses that we have Freewill ? And, behold, at the mouth of two or three witnesses is every word established. [Deut. xix 15. S. Matt. xviii. 16.]

For examine all those variations which I mentioned above, and see that they do not exist in any 'bound Natures,' not in the sea nor on the dry land, not in the luminaries nor in the stars, not in trees nor in roots ; nor even in animals—and yet there is sensation in animals—nor even in birds, though they have sight and hearing. But if hawks are birds of prey, they are all birds ofprey; if wolves are destructive, they are all ravagers; and if lambs are harmless, they are all innocent, and if serpents are cunning, that subtlety belongs to all; but man, owing to his Freewill, can be like them all, while they cannot become like him. On this account they have a (fixed) Nature, while we have Freewill.

Thou usest the word 'Freewill,' learn its independence from the word ; thou usest the word 'Slavery,' learn the bondage (of slavery) from the word; thou usest the word 'Nature,' recognize its immutable fixity by the word ; and thou speakest of 'God,' recognize His actual Existence by the word. For all these are words which are not at variance with their (underlying) realities. If thou namest these things when thou wishest, thou must of necessity acknowledge them to thyself even if |xx thou dost not wish. Speak against Freewill, and in virtue of what it is we can know how powerful Freewill is, since it has struggled with its power against its power. [Ov. p. 47.] For even when a man says that there is no Freewill, he is able to say there is no Freewill because he has Freewill; and, therefore, in proportion as that Freewill artfully changes itself in various ways, so those changes tell us that Freewill exists. For a 'bound Nature' cannot be changed. Why then is it necessary for us to obtain from another direction testimony as to whether Freewill exists or not ? For, behold, in virtue of being what it is, the evidence for it is proclaimed. For when it denies itself, (saying) that it is not independent, it is convicted of not being in bondage. For when any one acknowledges that Freewill exists, it is not right that Necessity should come near it.

But if, as these say, the Constituents of Good and Evil overcome, and are overcome, they are able to believe in a Mixing of Good and Evil, just as if they denied that there is a Mixing, then they are able to believe that Freewill exists. But if they say that, when the evil Constituent is large, Freewill is subject to compulsion ; what, then, is it that the Heretics teach in their Congregations except the Error which they have been taught ? For if they teach it is because there is Freewill; supposing there is no Freewill, let them shut their mouths and not teach.

But let them be asked, are they Teachers of Freewill or Changers of our Nature ? If a man eats by mistake from a deadly root, the Will of the eater cannot change that deadly thing, seeing that it is not an unfettered Will that he should change it; but it is an evil Constituent, the nature of which cannot be changed by words. How then can the just Judge condemn mankind (by asking), why they have not changed by the Will the evil Nature which cannot be changed by the Will ? [Ov. p. 48.] Therefore, let them either admit that unfettered free Wills are changed to Good or Evil or let them admit that if they are 'bound Natures'of Good and Evil, they are Natures which cannot be conquered by words. For they ought to supply an antidote as a medicine to counteract a deadly poison. For it is right that by natural illustrations that Teaching should be refuted which was composed deceitfully from analogous phenomena in Nature. But |xxi Truth is strong enough to destroy with the single reply which it makes the numerous fabrications of Falsehood.

For it is obviously clear from what I say that there are not Weights of Good and Evil conquering one another and being conquered by one another. For, behold, in a single hour one can think even a hundred good thoughts. And if because there was at that time much Good in a man, his good thoughts were numerous within, behold that man can do the reverse of this in the same hour. For directly after these good thoughts a man can think a multitude of evil thoughts. Which one of these, therefore, do they affirm to be more than the other ? And if they say that the Evil was most (in amount), how then since all that Evil would be in the man did it permit him to think all those good thoughts ? And if that Evil made room of its own Will, that Evil is good, which has this good Will. For how did that Evil which, when it wished, finally conquered the Good, consent to give way before it at first ? [Ov. p. 49.] But if they say that the Good exceeded (in amount), in which of a man's limbs, did all the Good hide itself, and make room for the small amount of Evil to go up and show a great victory ? If, therefore, the Evil submitted to give way before the Good, the Evil is better than the Good, in that it took the crown and gave it to its opponent. But if the Good consented to give place to the Evil that it (i.e., the Evil) might be victorious, the Good is more evil than the Evil in that it gave place to the Evil to do corruptly.

It is, therefore, clear to any one who has knowledge that Weights and Constituents of Good and Evil neither outweigh one another, nor are outweighed by one another ; but on the contrary, there are real free Choices which conquer one another and are conquered by one another, since all the Choices can become one Choice. For if good Choices spring up in us from the good Root which is in us, and evil Choices are produced in us from that evil Root which is in us, then these (powers) in us are not independent free Choices, but Natures fixed by Necessity.

For if, as one of the Heretics says, Purity and Foulness were mixed together, it is not Freewill that would be required to separate the good Will from the evil Will, but a strainer to |xxii separate the pure from the foul. For in the case of things that are literally mixed together, a separating hand is required to separate them like the skilful hand which separates with a fire the dross from the silver, and separates with a strainer the pure from the foul.

But if they say that these Natures in which there is mixed an excrement have 110 Freewill whereby they may separate the Foulness from them, let us leave them a little. Even if we wander a little from our subject, let us go with them where they call us. For Truth on account of its strength goes wherever it is led as a victor, and where it is pressed towards a defeat, there it gains the better crown. Let us leave, therefore, the 'bound Natures' and let us come to 'the independent Minds' ; let us see if the Wills of these men in whom there is Freedom can separate and send out of themselves the evil Ingredient, that by (the example of) the visible Mixing of the visible Evil we may believe that also the invisible Mixing of the invisible Evil can be separated. [Ov. p. 50, 1. 12.] If there is a quantity of harmful poison or deadly phlegm in any of these men, let them tell us : will 'the blameless Conduct of Freedom' separate this Evil, or will drugs and medicinal roots ? Does not this fact refute them (and convince them) that the harmfulness which I have mentioned cannot be separated by 'the righteousness of Freedom,' but by medicinal skill ? If, therefore, this small Evil which is mingled with us is not expelled from us by 'blameless Conduct,' but by the virtue of drugs, how can' Commandments and Laws' separate that mighty and powerful Evil which is mixed in Souls ? For, behold, as experience teaches us, (medicinal) virtue can separate from us even the Evil which we have mentioned by means of skilful (medical) methods, and not by the 'Conduct of Freedom.' For if they talk such nonsense let no one hear those who would relate empty tales to foolish minds. [Ov. p. 51.] For empty allegories are believed (only) by one whose mind is empty as regards the Truth.

If, therefore, that deadly Evil is mixed in mankind like a noxious poison let them hear the true reasoning with a healthy ear. Just as when a vessel of poison is filled up, an emptying is necessary by means of drugs that that poison may not overflow |xxiii and produce in us pains and hurts ; so also when Evil is excessive in the Soul a discharge is necessary for it, either from month to month or from year to year. For, behold, just as poison becomes excessive in us from nutriment, so they say that "Evil collects and increases in us from Foods." If, therefore, the measure of the Evil of both kinds becomes excessive in us, it is clear that there must be a discharge and an emptying of the fullness. For, behold, it is also the case that when blood or phlegm increases in us (then) a discharge is necessary for them.

Those, therefore, who ought to expel Evil from mankind by a visible working, lo, they are purging away the sins of mankind by an invisible forgiveness. But though the sins of mankind do not depart from them they are added to those who (say that they) purge them sevenfold. For around their necks is hung the debt of sins for the pardon of which they have falsely gone surety. For also madness, though it does not depart from a dog which has gone mad, enters sevenfold into those who are bitten by the dog. [St. Matt. x. 14.] But the disciples were commanded that they should shake the dust off their feet against whoever did not receive them, [ Ov. p. 52.] let us shake off the dust of our words against these who do not receive the Truth of our words. For if vengeance was ready to come for the dust of feet, how much more ready will vengeance be for the Truth of a word which is treated despite-fully by him who hears !

But I wish to know this : is Freewill the cause of sins, or is Evil the fountain of sins ? But if it is Evil as they say. free Volitions cannot block up the springs of Evil. By what method then is the Evil made subject to our Will ? For, lo, when we wish, we stir it up in us to injure us, and when we will we keep it quiet within so that it cannot harm us. A plain demonstration refutes their obscure Teaching. For, behold, not even a fever within us is subject to our Will, so that when we wish it may rage and abate. If, therefore, this slight fever is not subject to our Freewill, who can make subject to our Freewill that great Evil about which they speak ? If that Evil made itself subject to us, there is nothing kinder than it, for it has made its great power subject to our weak Will. But if the power of Good makes Evil subject to us, it is clear that whenever it hurts us |xxiv that same Good stirs it up to hurt us. And, therefore, even if that Evil is evil because it hurts us, yet that which permits Evil to destroy us is more evil than it.

But we are not venturing to blaspheme against the Good, but (this is said) in order that by means of what is considered blasphemous, though it is not blasphemous, the blasphemy of madmen may perchance be refuted. For one cannot bring into the way a man who is walking outside of the way, [Ov. p. 53, l. 2.] unless one goes a little from the way after him into the wilderness. See, then, that the Nature of things does not follow our Wills, but our Will goes after the Nature of Creation, in that we use them according to their natural adaptations (lit., as they are natural and for what they are natural). But if even fire is not cold or hot according to our Will, how is the fierce power of that Evil which possesses an Existence of its own made subject to the Will of those who are created ? But Evil does not possess an Existence of its own, because Freewill possesses empire over itself. And fire always retains its hot nature, but Evil does not retain the nature of its being even as much as the fire which is a created thing. And, though we do not wish to be burnt, yet fire still acts according to its own nature, and when we go near it, it burns us. How then is that Evil, which is mixed in us, if it also has an injurious nature, able to injure us when our Will wishes to be injured ? If our Will gives it power, then the wickedness of our Will is stronger than the wickedness of Evil ; and according to their preposterous Teaching it is found that Evil is therefore accused by our Freewill because, as Freewill wishes, and in proportion as it wishes, Evil opposes it. And in vain do they blame Satan since their Will is more hateful than Satan. But if Evil can injure our Freewill whenever it (i.e., our Freewill) wills to be injured, it is clear that they are calling Freewill Evil, though they not not aware of it. [Ov. p. 54.] For fire which burns does not wait for Freewill to will or not to will, but it injures alike him who wills and him who does not will—both of them—if they approach it.

But if they think "that our Will is able to conquer Evil," let us then dismiss the strife of Controversy, and let us come to actual experience. Let one of them stretch even the tip of his |xxv little finger into the fire, and if his Will can conquer the power of the fire that it may not injure him, it will be possible to believe that the injurious nature of Evil can be conquered. But if the fire causes irritation and pain over the whole body when it has touched only our finger, how does that injurious Evil, since it is all mingled with the whole of us, not also injure us like the weak fire ? If they say that He (i.e., God) has not allowed us to conquer fire by our Freewill, who then granted them power over Evil to conquer it by means of their Freewill ? But if another Good (Power) granted to Freewill the power of conquering Evil, all their blasphemy applies to Him Whom they praise. For all the censure is attached to that (Good One). For if He thus changed Evil so that it might not injure us like injurious fire, it is clear that He is also able to change any Evil that injures us at present that it may not injure us. But if He was unable, is our victory still certain ? And let them persuade us (and show) how their Freewill conquers Evil when it cannot conquer fire. But whichever proof they may choose, they are fettered by the one they choose. If they say that because fire by its nature possesses heat on that account our Freewill is unable to conquer it, [Ov. p. 55.] it is evident that Evil does not possess Freewill by nature ; and on that account our Will is able to conquer it.

But if the injurious and hot nature of fire, though it has been created and made, cannot be mitigated, how, seeing that Evil is an actual Existence, as they say, can the true nature of Existence be mitigated, seeing that even (mere) things cannot mitigate one another or be mixed with one another unless they have an affinity so as to receive one another ? And, if a thing cannot love its opposite, how did Evil, as they say, conceive a Passion for Good, and make an Assault on it and mingle with it ? And how, too, did Good mingle with Evil and love it ? And though teachers and law-givers summon it, it despises their counsels and makes void their laws, nor do the drawn swords of just judges frighten it to abstain from the hateful love which it has for the body which they call 'deadly,' and it hates and denies the |xxvi good Source of its Nature, and loves to bring forth the evil fruit of the bitter Root [Rom. xi. 17 ff.] into which it has been grafted for a while.

And how does the Word of the True One convict (them), who says : there is no good tree which yields evil fruit! [St. Matt, vii. 18.] For if the Soul is a good thing from a good Nature, how does it bear the evil fruit of the 'deadly Body' ? And how does the Body which they say springs from an evil Element bear good conduct like good fruit ?

But it is possible for thee to hear, O Hearer, what is greater than this. For lo, when we will, the Evil in us may 'become lessened' and not injure us. And in the twinkling of an eye, again, if we will, it may be real and 'fierce' and 'deadly' in us. [Ov. p. 56, l. 3.] O what a great marvel is this, that is to say, O what great blindness (in the false Teaching) ! For see, that when we lessen the Evil in us we do not mix anything in it except the good Will alone, that it may be lessened. And when it (i.e., Evil) revives and rages we do not mingle anything in it that it may rage except the evil Will. But if our Will lessens it or makes it worse, behold, is it not clear even to fools that our Will is good and evil ? Therefore they are alluding to Freewill when they use all these evil terms, and they are uttering blasphemies against this Will, though they are not aware of it. For if a man drinks diluted wine and mixes his good. Will in it, can it acquire strength and become overpowering though he should mix no (more) wine in it ? And if, on the other hand, the wine is unmixed and strong, can he lessen its strength by his Will alone, though he mix no water in it ? Therefore, let them take their stand either on a Mixing or on the Will.

For if our Will lessens Evil, that statement is conquered whereby they say that Evil is mixed with Good, and behold (they say) "the Good is refined little by little." For behold our Will is in us always, and is not 'refined at all, nor does it go out from us.' For if our Will 'were being refined and going out,' our Will would have already come to an end, and it would not be possible for us to will rightly. And if our Will does not come to an end neither do Good and Evil. When, |xxvii therefore, does the Refining and Separation of the two take place ? [Ov. p. 57.] And if there is a Refining of the Good by means of Good so that it goes up from the Depths to the Height, why is there not also a removal of Evil by means of Evil so that it may be sent down to its Depths ?

But if they persist in holding this (theory of a) Mixing, that (explanation) fails inasmuch as by our Will we conquer Evil,and, therefore, instead of 'the Good Words' which they teach they ought to distribute good Parts that mankind may eat or drink them that those good Parts may enter and lessen the fierceness of Evil. For words do not lessen the bitterness of roots ; but the (natural) acridness which is in a Nature is lessened by the (natural) sweetness which is in (another) element. For facts are not overcome by Words, nor by Expressions are Natures changed. For that Evil which exists independently, as they say, can be thrust out by means of some Good which also exists independently. For Power thrusts out Power and Substance is thrust out by Substance and Force is conquered by Force. Yet our (mere) Word cannot stir a stone without the hand, nor can our Will move anything without our arms. And if our Will is not able to move such insensible and helpless things, how can it vanquish the great Evil, seeing that a Power is required and not (mere) Will ? For Light does not drive out Darkness by Will, nor by Free-choice does the sweet overcome the bitter. If, therefore, these Natures, because they are Natures, require a powerful Force and not a mere Will, how is it that the quality of Power, not (mere) Free-choice, is not required in the case of Evil and Good, if they have 'bound Natures' ?

But if the Will does not lessen the Evil which is mixed with bitter and deadly roots, whereas Free-choice conquers this Evil of mankind, how can it be, if it is the very same Evil which is in mankind and in roots, that part of it is conquered by Force, and part by the Will ? Either Evil is divided against itself, or there are two Evils which are unlike one another in their essence. [Ov. p. 58, l. 7.] And if part of the poison which exists in fruits and roots is 'amassed and collected in us' (and), if Evil is all one, how is part of it in us conquered by 'a Law and Commandment,' and part conquered (only) by mixtures and drugs ? [Cf. p. cxvi. ll. 2, 3.] And Counsel and |xxviii Teaching are of no avail to counteract the poison in our bodies, nor are drugs and mixtures of any use for the Evil which is in our Souls. And here it is seen that the poison which is in us is a 'bound Nature,' and a Law cannot change it, and the Evil which is in our Souls belongs to Free-choice and (medicinal) Roots cannot lessen it. Though, therefore, there are many things which it is possible to say on these subjects, I do not wish to increase (their number), lest it should appear that we have conquered by means of many words, and not by true words. For we do not conquer with the weapons of Orators and Philosophers, whose weapons are their logical Teaching. For thanks be to Him Whose Teaching thus gains a victory by our child-likeness and His Truth by our simplicity without the Teaching of Philosophy.

Single inverted commas are used in numerous cases where the words seem to be quotations or to belong to a special terminology.

Words in italics inside square brackets are to be regarded as conjectural translations or paraphrases.

In a few passages, where the text has suffered great mutilation, italics indicate an attempt to summarise the argument from suggestions in the fragments.]

[P.101] indicates page 101 of the accompanying Syriac. [l.2] means line 2 of the current page of the accompanying Syriac. [RP]

I have moved the footnotes to the end. Those consisting of "Read [syriac] for [syriac]" or similar have been omitted, as it has not been possible to transcribe the fragments of Syriac. The pages are numbered with Roman numerals. Arabic numbers and line numbers relate to the Syriac text printed at the back of the paper volume. Greek text is rendered using the Scholars Press SPIonic font, free from here.

LOOK¹ at this Teaching intelligently how it is destroyed by itself, and refuted by its own nature, and unmasked by its own character; its condemnation is from it and in it. And just as the very words of the servants gave the verdict against them before the Lord of the Vineyard, so also the very words of this Teaching give the verdict of their condemnation before wise Hearers.

For he has set a difficult beginning over against a confused ending, things which strive with one another that it may be known that not one of them is true. For at the beginning he said that the Darkness has a longing Passion for the Light; which is not natural for this Darkness which is visible, inasmuch as even this Darkness which is visible to us is, as they say, [P. 2, l. 3.] of the same nature as that which is invisible to us. Yet this Darkness certainly flees from before the Light as from its opposite, and certainly does not make an Assault upon it as upon what is pleasant to it. Behold one argument in favour of their condemnation, an argument drawn from the nature of things in general.

Hear, again, another argument against them from their scripture. If the Darkness verily longed passionately for the Light because the Light soothed it, how do they say that the Light is its opposite and finally its torturer ? And if Light is an Element which is desirable and attractive to Darkness, how is there produced from that pleasant Nature something which is bitter to Darkness ? For the sweetness of our place bears witness that bitterness is not tasted in its midst. [The Prison for Darkness not built from Darkness.]But if that Prison-house, |xxx the tormentor of Darkness, is built up from the Nature of the Domain of Darkness, a Nature cannot torture itself. For fire does not burn itself. And if the Darkness is tortured by what belongs to itself—a notion difficult to accept—then Good, too, is not at rest in its place, and the matter is found to be preposterous, (namely), that every Entity which is in its own place is in anguish, but [P. 3, l. 9.] in the place of its Opposite it is at rest. For if all Darkness altogether with all that is in it is one Entity all alike, it is not opposed to its own nature ; just as a wolf does not oppose itself nor a lion itself.

But if from the Domain of Good that Prison-house is built up for Darkness, how is its enjoyment changed to its torment ? For lo, it is a Nature which is unchangeably pleasant. "For the Architect and Builder of that Grave," as their account says, "is one—whosoever he may be, whose name is BÂN—who in the days of his adversity became the fashioner of the Grave of the Darkness." And how from that one Entity, since it is single, does there come both builder, and that which is built, and from it the Grave and from it the Earth on which the Grave is built ? For this is found (to be the case) with this earth of ours that everything comes from the earth itself, both he who makes and that which is made; for since it was not created out of Natures and Entities it is changeable into anything as [P. 4, l. 5.] the word of the Maker commands. [If the stones for the Prison come from the Light- Realm they must suffer when cut.] But if all those things are one Nature and from one good Entity, how can it be divided up ? And how when that Nature is cut does it not suffer ? And do not they who are not even willing to break bread lest "they pain the Light which is mixed with it," pain it in cutting and hewing these Stones ; and if the Light suffers in the breaking of bread, how much more does it suffer in the cutting and hewing of its members ! And if it be an Earth in which there is no sensation, and they be Stones in which there is no feeling, how is it that, though it is one Nature and one Entity, from it there come speaking Souls and also deaf-mute Stones? [Cf. p. XXXV. l. 32.]Therefore, there is not one homogeneous Essence, but many unlike one another. And if on account of their mute condition, they do not feel when they are cut, behold also this Light being of the same nature is mingled with these things in a mute condition. |xxxi Why, therefore, do they not break and cut them, seeing that this [P. 5.] (Light) does not feel ? But if they do not cut it lest they should pain it, with their teeth they cause it to suffer much more when they eat it, and with their bellies when they confine it there.

But if he who framed the Body is evil, as they blasphemously say—and this God forbid, it is not so—if the Darkness contrived to frame that Body to be a Prison-house for the Soul that it might not go forth thence, it would not be difficult for him to know from this that the refining Furnace which he framed injured him and refines the Light. But if it escaped his notice at the beginning he could, now that experience has taught him, destroy his framing and make another Body, not one that separates (the Light), but one that imprisons; not one that refines, but one that befouls; not one that purifies, but one that defiles ; and not one that makes room for the Light (to escape), but one that detains the Light. If this making of the Body really belongs to him (i.e., the Evil One), then his work convinces us concerning him that he is a wise and skilful Maker, he who might have made vessels alien to the Cleansing of the Light. [P. 6.] But if he might have made them so and yet did not so make them, his workmanship is sufficient to extol him and to put to shame those who falsely accuse him.

Now wise physicians prove to us—and the limbs with the veins bear them witness—that the power of food pervades the body. But if the Light is refined little by little and goes out, it is clear that it is a Nature which is dissolved and scattered. And so if the Soul is of the same nature, how does it too not go out in the Refining ? For it must be that the Nature of the Soul itself is capable of dissolution just as the Nature of Light as. How. is it that the Light goes out while the Soul remains ? and who gave to the Soul this indissoluble fixity ? If this belongs to its nature, how is this Element partly fixed and partly not,partly dissolvable and capable of being scattered, partly fixed and massed together ? For if the Nature was a fixed one from its beginning, the Sons of Darkness when they ate it—if they ate it—would not be able to dissolve its Nature. For just as they could not annihilate its Being so that it should no longer be in existence—for lo, it is in existence—so they would be unable to dissolve the fixity of its Being. [P. 7.] These statements, then, can |xxxii be made without examination, but on examination they cannot stand.

And if they say that that Evil One fixed the Soul in the midst of the Body, in order that it might be imprisoned, how then did he not fix that Light, which is 'refined and goes out,' so that it could not go out ? And how did he fix a Nature which is incapable of being fixed ? For who is able to fix the Nature of fire to prevent its being divided in the flame of a lamp ? And although fire is amassed, it can be divided because it has not a fixed nature. But a ray of the sun a man cannot divide because it is fixed through and through in an indissoluble nature. But, if by reason of the entrance of the Soul into the Body which can be confined, that (Soul) was confined which was not confined (before), how is it that that Light, which, they say, is 'refined and departs,' was not confined along with its kinsman who was confined there (in the Body) ? And if it has self-knowledge because it is collected together and fixed, it is clear that those Parts which are not fixed are deaf-mutes without knowledge, and silent without speech, [P. 8.] and quiet without motion.

And it is in this connection that Bardaisan, the teacher of Mani, is found to speak with subtlety, when he said that of seven Parts the Soul was composed and fixed ; though he is refuted as well. For the numerous Parts which the Soul gathers and collects, make (possible) many a mixing of the seven Parts without proper regulation. And because it does not receive in equal weight from all the foods the Parts of all the Constitutents, it may happen that the scale of one of the Constituents may preponderate and overwhelm the rest of its companions ; and this abundance of one is the cause of the disturbance of all the Constituents. And from the Body which is without it is possible to learn about the Soul which is within, (namely), that whenever one of its Constitutents preponderates on account of the quantity of one of the foods, the injury reaches the whole system. But the spiritual character of Angels proves that their nature receives nothing more ; and not only are those holy beings exalted above this, [P.9.] but even in the case of unclean devils their nature receives no addition to and suffers no loss from what it actually is ; nor is the nature of the sun ever more or less than |xxxiii what it is. For these things, and those that are like them, are perfect Natures, since at all times the (true) balance of their natural character is maintained. But when anything has either too little or too much, either increases or diminishes, either is lessened or grows weak, its nature is destructible by its creation ; though even over those Natures which are not destructible there rules that Will which made them indestructible. But we have not come to stir up now the mire of Bardaisan ; for the foulness of Mani is quite sufficient. For behold our tongue is very eager to conclude at once and flee from him. But if those Natures which were mentioned above are perfect though made, how much more must the (Eternal) Essence be perfect in its Being !

This doctrine of madmen, then, proclaims an Existence which is deficient in everything, and this its deficiency refutes those who proclaim it. For they have put together two Roots with preposterous reasoning, but they are dissolved with straightforward reasoning. [P. 10, l. 5.] For if a statement is made without knowledge, it is rectified by sound knowledge ; and whoever puts on contentiousness is stripped bare by the persuasive arguments of Truth. For they have professedly set forth two Roots, though on investigation it is found that there are many. [For how can they produce offspring unlike themselves ?] For he introduces births and generations which are the opposite of one another. But, that though this Entity is one, there should be from it births (which are) the opposite of its nature—this is not pleasing to the ear of Truth. For how can that Element bring forth anything foreign to itself ? In the case of creation from nothing, this can be ; but in the case of a 'bound essential Nature ' there is no (such) means ; above all (it is impossible), when it (i.e. the Nature) is one and other Entities are not mixed with it.

He has set forth, therefore, an Entity which is immortal though the children whom it brings forth from itself are mortal. And whence did mortality spring up in the fruit though it was not mixed in the root from which it came ? And how does a [P. 11.] Nature which is not composite bring forth bodies which are composite, which have been confined and killed ?

Thou hast heard this foolishness ; come hear one that is greater still. "When the Primal Man," he says, "hunted the Sons of Darkness he flayed them, and made this sky from their |xxxiv skins, and out of their excrement he compacted the Earth, and some of their bones, too, he melted, and raised and piled up the mountains,"—we thank him that his falsehood is revealed— "since there is in them, a Mixture and a Mingling of the Light which was swallowed by them in the beginning." For his sole purpose in stretching them out and arranging them was, that by means of the rain and dew whatever was swallowed by them might be purged out, and that there might be a Separation and Refining of the Natures from one another.

O how foolish a workman was this ! But perhaps he was a learner, who had not yet reached experience in workmanship. For if there had been wine (to purify) would he not have known how to make a strainer ? And if there had been silver or copper (to refine), would he not have known how to arrange a furnace ? [P. 12, l. 4] For by means of these instruments which the wisdom of mortals has contrived, the dregs can easily be separated from the pure and the dross from the silver. But this workman, even after many years, has not acquired intelligence nor after innumerable experiments has he been able to know what is necessary for his workmanship, that is to say, how to employ such compendious^²methods. But he made the sky a strainer which is useless all summer, and even in winter it does not refine every day ; but in the remote south it is not even, a little moistened. Very stupidly arranged, too, is the hollow of this filter ; for if what is pure descends to the earth, then the dregs are left above in the sky. And this performance is the reverse of the right one, in that the pure descends to the bodily sphere while the dregs remain behind in the spiritual sphere.

But as for the other statements, how and what they say about the Snow, as they are quite futile, let them be gathered within a covering of silence.

"Moreover," (he says) "he (i.e., Primal Man) made trees to be Furnaces." Yet they do not at all times separate fruit from the dust and their produce from the soil; and also cornfields (are said to be furnaces) ; and yet they do not continually draw up life from the earth. And if, as they teach, a Refining goes |xxxv up from the offal of the Archons, [P. 13, l.12] then the greater part of that swallowed Light is going forth by means of the offal of the Archons who swallowed it. Such is the polluted teaching which refines the Parts of its God from the midst of offal!

But if, as some of them say, just as a serpent has a Sheath-skin, so out of the Sheath-skins of the Sons of Darkness the sky and the earth and the rest of created things were made, let them know that the proof which they offer stands against them. For there cannot be lifeless Sheath-skins from, things which in their nature are immortal. For as the lifeless Sheath-skin of the serpent convinces any one that the serpent also is mortal, and in like manner divisible, capable in like manner of being disintegrated and destroyed. And as the Sheath-skin of the serpent proves that its nature is destructible, so also the [P. 14.] Sheath-skin of Darkness proves that Darkness is mortal too. For a thing that is derived from an Existence is like it in every respect. Therefore, whether they were Sheath-skins, or real hides, the case is the same.

But if the Sons of Darkness were skinned and stretched in the air, they give evidence that Darkness, their Father, is also mortal because he is composite. Why, therefore, did they not skin him, too, in the beginning and deliver creation from his injuries ? What necessity could there be that he should be left alive, and what reason ³ was there in his case that he should remain and turn again to struggle with pure souls ? . . . [Cf. p. lxxiii.] And after he has 'intoxicated' and perverted and put them to shame, after he has made some of them fornicators and minstrels and blasphemers, then that wise Builder and Architect [Cf. p. xxx. l. 14.] has sense enough to frame a Grave and Prison for him. And instead of the Prison-house being thus built after a long period, and with [P. 15.] much toil, if the Sons of Light had been gathered together and with these Stones had stoned him, then, lo, [Cf. p.xxi. l. 32.] he would have come to an end. But if he would not have died, because his nature is not mortal, then this impure Teaching is put to shame in everything it says. For how did the sons of the immortal die, and how were the sons of a spiritual one skinned, and how were those |xxxvi who are not composite disintegrated ? [Mani himself was skinned.] And they did well who skinned the lying Mani, who said that Darkness was skinned, though it has neither hide nor Sheath-skin.

If, moreover, as they say, "the Moon receives the Light which is refined, and during fifteen days draws it up and goes on emptying it out for another fifteen days," if she is filled very gradually till the time of full moon, it may well be because there are not sufficient Refiners to give the Light at once, but why, pray, is it that she empties the Light little by little ? [Cf. pp. xxxviii. ll. 27, 127 ; xlii. 1. ll. P. 16.] Either the Receiving-Vessels do not receive and let it go at once, or the place into which she empties it is small and there is room for only a part daily. And while for fifteen days that Ship of Light seeks to empty out (the Light), where, pray, does that other Light, which is 'being refined and is going up,' go and collect and exist while the Moon is being emptied ? It must wander about and be lost for lack of a place to receive it; and so Darkness swallows it once more. [Cf. pp. xliv. 1.16; lxxxv. 1.4; lxxxix. l. 26.] For if it 'sucked in the Light' when it was far from it in the beginning, will it not gulp it down all the more, now that the Light exists at the very door of its mouth?

But understand how foolish that Director is. For, instead of (the arrangement) which would have been right, namely that the Moon should go and empty out (the Light) in one hour and return so that that former Light which was emptied out might be preserved, and that latter Light which is being refined might not be lost, (instead of an arrangement such as this), behold, the Moon is worn out with going and coming, and at full moon it is then emptied in such a way that the former Light is worn out and the latter scattered. Now a woman is with child for a long time, since her babe is developed after nine months. But when her [P. 17.] labour is easy, the birth takes place in a single hour, and thus the child is not in much torment, nor is the mother much exhausted. But in the case of the bright and lightly-moving Moon, at the time of full moon her child is produced in such a way that she is worn out and her child exhausted. And if she brings forth each offspring in a day, can she not also bring forth as the scorpion in one day ? And if she really empties it out she should be there as long as she is emptying. Why is she worn out with coming |xxxvii (and going), though she takes nothing hence till the time of full moon ?

And how is it that from eternity to eternity this Ship of Light is filled uniformly and receives neither more nor less ? But this contrivance was not a wise one. For it would be right that, at the time when the Refining is great, the Moon should receive more, that is to say, instead of being filled till the time of full moon, it would be right that she should be filled in five days. For if their statement were true, it would be right that what I have said should be the case. [Mani's teaching has not aided the Refining.] For to-day there is much of Mani's Teaching, and so it is clear there is also much Refining! But as a hundred years ago, this Teaching did not exist—would that it did not now—it is evident that the Refining of Light a hundred years ago would be less than it is to-day. And if the Refining of Light was not the same in amount then and now, how was the Moon then and now uniformly filled till full moon ? And when the Refiners were few in number, there was not less Light for the Moon, nor to-day when the Manichaeans abound is there any Light added to it. But when there were no Manichaeans, and when they are now in existence, there is no increase in the Moon to-day though they exist, just as there was no lessening in the Moon when they did not exist. [P.18, l.31.] So by the Moon, fixed in the Height which they have made as a mirror for themselves, it is possible for that secret falsehood of theirs to be brought to light. For if the existence and non-existence of the Manichaeans are alike to the Moon, the lying Teaching is refuted by what is peculiarly its own, in that its existence is on a level with its non-existence. And if they do not exist for the Moon, for which they imagine they do now exist in a very special way, they do not in a very special way exist for God the Lord of the [P. 19.] Moon. Thus from the Luminaries they receive a special refutation who imagine that they are recognised by the Luminaries. And, in fact, does not the reasoning of arithmeticians^⁴convince them that when those who persuade are many, much more do those that receive measure out; and when there are many floods the rivers are filled above their limits and rise beyond their wont ? |xxxviii

And why, indeed, is there a Moon for twenty-nine days and a half ? Let the false Teaching which disguises itself offer a proof on this point by means of a natural demonstration. But let us strip it that it may appear bare without any truth. Let them tell us, therefore, concerning this part of a day why it is defective and not completed ; is there no superfluous Light in any of the months, so that the deficiency for this day may be filled up ? But when it (i.e., the day) is defective it is not finished, and if there is superfluous Light (?) it is not completed. And if on account of the small amount of Light that day is imperfect, there would [P. 20.] be a chance that other days too would be imperfect. And in like manner when the Light increased, it would be right that the days should be found increasing as well. The shortage of Light, however, does not make any lessening in the Moon, nor does the increase of Light fill up this defective part. So let this defective part of a day convict the Heretics that they are altogether lacking in truth.

And because Truth quickly refutes them, when it passes from dealing with the Moon to the Sun . . . that it may refute by the pair of Luminaries those who while they worship Luminaries are persons whose intelligence is wholly dark. For just as he is enlightened who worships the Lord of the Luminaries, so is he darkened who exchanges the worship of their Lord for the worship of the Luminaries. Let us, therefore, state the case as they state it, though we shall not maintain it as they maintain it. For they say that the Sun receives the Light from the Moon ; right worthy⁵ are these Receiving-Vessels which receive from one another! [Cf. p. xxxvi. l. 10. xlii. l. 11.] And is there then no room in the Sun to receive all those Parts in one day from the Moon ? But, perhaps, the Sun might receive it, but the Moon is unable to give it; and behold with whatever load she has, she must hurry along and fling off some of the weight she is carrying. How, again, does the Sun not show that there has been some addition to his Light when he receives fifteen Parts of refined Light ? For, behold, the Moon is clearly marked even by one Part which is added every day, just as she shows when she is lessening. Is the sun then a |xxxix vessel not completely filled ? And how is its deficiency invisible ? And if it is not deficient how does it receive ? For if it is complete and its cavity is full of its Light—as it is in reality—(then know that) if thou pourest anything more into a vessel that is already full, it does not receive it; for anything that falls into it overflows. But this full object (i.e., the Sun) which does not receive anything which the Manichaeans assert (to exist), by its appearance calls us not to accept anything from the Manichaeans.

Let us forsake then those doctrines of the Manichaeans, because they are the only witnesses concerning them, and let us hear those of Moses, to which all nations under Heaven bear witness, and in old time the Hebrews who reckoned according to the Moon, and after them all nations who are called Barbarians, and also the Greeks, who use the reckoning of the Sun, though they do not desert the reckoning of the Moon. And, therefore, even if we prolong our discourse, let us declare what is numbered by Sun-reckoning and what by Moon-reckoning. Days are numbered by Sun-reckoning. [P. 22, l.22.] For the dawning and darkness are indicated by the Sun. Behold the division of the day. But by the Moon the months are indicated. For the beginning of the months and end of the months are indicated by the Moon. [The Sun marks the days not the months.] For it is by the rising of the Sun and the setting of the Sun that the days are divided. But in the matter of months it makes no division, because its succession goes on uniformly, and does not declare any division when thirty days are ended, that it may be known by that division that the month has ended, or begun. [The Moon marks the months not the days.] But the Moon, when it is full and wanes, makes a division for the months, but makes no division for the days. For how often does it happen that the Moon rises at the third or fourth hour, and sets [P. 23, l. 2.] at the seventh or ninth hour ; while for two whole days she is not seen at all. God, in His wisdom who, indeed, ordered the months for the purpose of reckoning and the days for the purpose of numbering, made the Sun to number the days, as also the Moon to number the months, and as the day is completed in its course, so the Moon also is completed in its months, and from its beginning to its end the Moon produces thirty days. But if the day consists of twelve hours, and the Sun moves through a course of twelve hours, it is clear that the Sun is the fount of days. And, again, |lx if the month consists of thirty days and the Moon completes thirty days in waning and waxing, it is clear that the Moon is the mother and parent of the months.

But the exact reckoning is twenty-nine days and a part. For this also in the beginning the Wisdom of the Creator (both) put together and ordered the numberings that it might perfect the reckoning. For when the months are reckoned by, numbering [they have] thirty days. But the eleven days which are after the months he did not put in their right place, and why not ? And, wherefore are eleven days lacking in the Moon, and why are there three hours more in the year in the course of the Sun ? They are these three excellent Mysteries (?), as the numbering is interpreted, and the reckoning explained, so that because of the lack which exists in the Moon months are intercalated, [P. 24, l.21.] and because of the excess which exists in the Sun days are intercalated in order that since months and days are intercalated this Luminary may be abased, and the sovereignty of God may be made known. For because many nations go astray in the matter of them (i.e., the Luminaries) on account of their Light, let their numbering convince them (i.e., the nations) that on account of their dependence it is not right that they should be worshipped.

For if the numbering of the Sun is not arranged (with exactness) the course of the Moon (also) by its swiftness and deficiency changes the seasons of the year, so that summer is turned to winter, and winter to summer. And if again a deficiency is not [P. 25.] found in the Moon, which is dependent on the fullness from the Sun, as for these three superfluous hours which are in the Sun there is no place for them (in which) to go and remain in the numbering and reckoning of the year. For in the perfect days of the three hundred and sixty-five days, where may three superfluous hours enter and exist, (those hours) which cannot be reckoned with the perfect number of the months, and do not exist in the perfect number of the days ? But between the months of the Moon and the numbering of the days of the Sun, the Lord of the Luminaries arranged for them a place that they may go and rest in it. But we have spoken this rapidly because we were not sailed to speak of these matters ; but we were compelled to speak |lxi (of them) in order to refute those who wish to turn aside the Luminaries from the service of the months and days, that they may point out in them Refinings which go up from the earth.

And inasmuch as the Moon seems to be made for the numbering of thirty days, and consists altogether of these parts., when the thirty days come to an end, it (itself) ceases to exist. For it is not one thing and its Light another thing. And because "the Moon is a vessel into whose midst the Light is poured," even if that Light were lacking, the vessel itself as [P. 20, l.9.] regards its own nature with (i.e., in proportion to) the aforesaid Light, would not be able to come to an end or increase, since all vessels give evidence that they themselves exist in their natural size, and if there falls into them a greater amount the vessels do not grow larger, and if less falls into them, they do not shrink. And if anything that is in them is emptied out and vanishes, those vessels themselves do not vanish. And since they call the Moon the Ship of Light, let a demonstration come forth from a ship to refute them, (namely), when it is filled or emptied it remains in its proper size, that is to say (in the real proportion) of its length and breadth and height. But in the case of this Ship of Light, which, they say, is in the heavens, the Light which is poured into it or emptied from it is visible to us, but the Ship itself is not visible ; either let them then tell [P. 27.] us the nature of the vessel, that we may know that for this purpose it was arranged that it might be filled and emptied as they say ; or let them tell us if that vessel itself is filled and built up and rises, and is completed and demolished and comes down. It is evident even to blind men who do not see that the Moon is made for the numbering of the months, and is not for a Refining.

And if they say that because the Moon is very 'pure and ethereal,' therefore, it is not visible, then how is the Sun visible, seeing that it is a Light purer and more refined than the Moon ? [Cf. p. lxxxiv.] And it is the Sun that goes and comes every day on account of its purity to the House of Life, as they say. |lxii

And which view shall we hear, that of Bardaisan, who says about the Moon that it is an Earth and a Matrix which is filled from a high and lofty overflow and floods those who are below and beneath, or that of Mani, who says that the Moon is filled with those who come from beneath and sends (them) away to the Upper Places ? But they both are wrong in both respects, so that the word of Moses may be believed who said concerning the Luminaries, 'they shall be for signs and for [P. 28.] seasons, etc.'

But who will not laugh at the words of children, that the Luminaries have finally become the Receiving-Vessels⁶ of the School of Mani, and not of anything which is great, but of Disgorgings ! For by these the Light is refined if it is refined. For there is no evidence that it is refined by Prayer as they say, but that (it is refined) by Disgorgings its taste gives evidence. And if not, let them pray and disgorge, and let incontrovertible experience show in which of them is the taste of food, in Prayer or in Disgorgings! But above all there is evidence that he who disgorges looks upwards in order to send upwards by means of the force and violence of the wind that thing which is refined to the Domain from which it has come down. And, perhaps, this Mystery was secretly in the world, and the world did not perceive it! And, perhaps, even Mani did not perceive it. And here it is not the man who prays much who is refined, but the man who disgorges much. For those physicians by means of things which are very different excite Disgorgings in order to purge (?) the stomach which does not digest. [P. 29.] For when it does not disgorge there comes the evidence of its (i.e., the food's) heaviness and coldness. And it must be that if it does not digest, it does not liquefy, and if it does not liquefy, it (i.e., the stomach) does not disgorge, and if it does not disgorge, it does not go forth ; and if it does not go forth, it is not refined. For the coldness shuts up the food heavily there, that is to say, the cold phlegm, which is over the food—the great enemy of the School of Mani. For it wishes by its coldness to restrain the Refining, lest it (i.e., the food) should be released, and go forth thence. And, therefore, |lxiii that pungent radish⁷ can be the enemy of their enemy ; for it enters and does combat, and as it were, engages in a contest with it, and rends the veil which is spread over the face of the food ; and then a way is opened up for the imprisoned Light which is there that its Refining may go forth in the Disgorging.

And thus when the Manichaeans disgorge, because their food has not yet been digested, it is clear that their Refining has not [P. 30.] yet 'gone up,' and we must say that their Light is still mixed in their vomit, and it would be right for them to turn and swallow it anew in order that that Light which is concealed in it may not abide in corruption. Above all if (?) a dog comes and swallows it behold that Light which has gone forth in vomit from the midst of a Manichaean called a Righteous one (ZADDIQA), has entered and become imprisoned in the unclean stomach of a dog, [and it is clear] that if the Manichasan had turned and swallowed his vomit immediately, there would have been an ascent to the Height for the imprisoned Light to fly away and 'go up' to the House of its Father. And that Manichaean ought to be tormented instead of it (i.e., the Light), because he knew (?), and (yet) that Light went in and was imprisoned in the belly of the dog, and thence it was sent forth by a Transmigration (?) when the dog produced young ; and that Light was transmitted in the race of mad dogs and biters ; and it must be mad like them, and bite like them. It is right, too, that it should bite and tear in pieces that Manichaean who disgorged it and did not swallow it again ; for he is the cause of this madness. [P. 31.] But if they say that in a dog too it is refined, then are dogs more than they are in the Refining-process, and it is right that they should be fed more than they.

And if they say that the air 'is refined and sent up,' they confess, though they do not wish it, that not by Prayer is it refined, but by other causes, such as either dry or boil or heat or cool. For if, as they say, 'that pleasant taste which is in foods belongs to the Light which is mixed in them,' then just as the mouth perceives that Pleasantness of the Light when it |lxiv enters so it ought again to perceive it when it goes out. For if the mouth perceived it when it entered, though it was mixed with Bitterness, how much more ought the mouth to perceive it when it goes out, when its Pleasantness has been separated and isolated! But if it perceives it when it enters, but when it goes out in the Refining-process it does not perceive it, it is clear that the Pleasantness belongs not to the Element which is refined, but to its Opposite. [P. 32.] For a thing that is palpable and capable of being tasted when it enters must be palpable and capable of being tasted when it goes out. But if they tell additional falsehood, they incur additional exposure. If they say that because the Light has been made very subtle and has been 'refined,' on that account the mouth does not perceive it, then by this short utterance their whole system is utterly upset as to the manner [Cf. pp. xxxvi. l. 17; lxxxv l.4; lxxxix. l.26.] in which the Primitive Darkness, not merely 'seized' that Primitive Light, but also 'felt, touched, ate, sucked, tasted, and swallowed it.' For behold this mouth (of ours) is of the same nature as that Darkness, and it certainly does not perceive the Light when it goes out from within it. And here all this falsehood of theirs is felt because a sound ear meets it.

For this Refining which goes out of the mouth is not completely refined ; therefore, it goes from the mouth to the Moon, and from the Moon to the Sun, to be refined, and to be as it was of old. For if it is refined and not dependent on the Refining of the Moon, why is it necessary that it should go to the Moon, and from the Moon to the Sun, and (why does it) not flit away outside and go up, and be taken up to its place? [P. 33, l. 7] For it abides here in idleness for fifteen days while the Moon is being emptied, and then it suffices for thirty days.

Or is it possible that it forgot the way to its Home ? And how did it know to go, because it did not know the way ? . . . [then how does one (i.e., the Moon) know how to go, and does not lose its way, while the other (i.e., the Refined Light), loses itself and requires a helper to conduct it ? Such easily lost Light would not be able even to find its way to the Moon, but it would require a |lxv helper to conduct it, and deposit it in the Moon. But if they are both (i.e., the conducting Moon, and the Refined Light) one Nature, how does one draw while the other is drawn ?]

[L. 35.] And how do the Sons of the Omniscient not know how to go to their House from which they came ? And who can have patience with these (men) ?—unless it be the truth that He delights in their repentance, [S. Luke xv. 7, 10.] He whose sole object in refuting these (men) is that they may not thus go astray. If, therefore, this (Light) which goes out of the mouth—inasmuch as taste [P. 34.] implies an Exhalation and a Mingling—is so 'pure and subtle' in its going forth from the mouth, (that) the mouth does not perceive it since it is refined, and is more refined and pure than before the Mixing and Mingling, how is the turbid Darkness able to handle that pureness which is not palpable, or how can the corporeal seize the spiritual which is intangible, or how can the bodily eat a thing which has no body ? For either the Darkness is 'pure and refined, and subtle,' and that Light is gross in its nature, or they are both subtle, or (both gross) ... (so that) the two of them do not perceive one another, so that as they were perceived in the food, they may be perceived in the Refining. And if they are both light, whence is this heaviness ? And if they are pure turbidness has entered from some other place. And, therefore, it is necessary that we should seek some other Entity who himself disturbed the two of them. . . .

But if that Light (?) had been God, if he was good or just, it would have been incumbent on his Goodness and Justice to surround his place with a strong wall, and preserve his freedom and honour from his unclean Enemy and from his raving Neighbour, especially when the Good (Being) had perceived that his nature was capable of being injured, as they say—though God forbid that this should be said concerning the perfect Good! But if in their shame they turn and say that it is not injured, then whom do they teach—is it not one who is in error? [P. 35, l.30.] And whom do they heal—is it not one who is smitten? And whom do they teach the creed—is it not one who denies and |lxvi blasphemes ? For these evils with innumerable others happened, and are happening to the Souls which (come) from him. And if they are not from him, and are in his Domain it was incumbent upon him as one who is wise and loves his possessions to place a protecting wall around his flocks which were capable of being injured.

But in these matters a convincing argument, may be drawn from this creation which has been arranged by a wise Creator, for, because he knew that mankind (would) presume with their Freewill and attempt by their free Choice to set a limit to creation . . . because they are not able to set a limit to creation—for Constraint does not permit them—they have attempted to set a limit to the Creator by Disputation; just as also they wished to build a Tower by which they might go up whither an ascent should not be made. [Gen. viii.] [P. 36, l.22.] For the ladder to that Height is the grace of the Creator, nor in thousands or myriads of years would they be able to go up to that Height whither Elijah went up in the twinkling of an eye. For a tower does not enable (us) to ascend to Heaven, because it is the Will of the Lord of the Heaven that enables (us) to ascend to Heaven. Therefore, in order that kings at the present time might not be bold like those of old He placed them in the midst of a creation which cannot be overcome. For (should they wish) to go up above, there are the outstretched heights immeasurable,—to go down beneath, there are the terrible impalpable depths,—to cross the ends (of the earth), [P. 37.] there are bitter illimitable seas, and these [things He did, not because He was afraid on His own account—He who is not capable of being injured—but He made the heaven strong against our boldness that it may not wear itself out in vain and fruitless efforts]. [L. 11.] [The Realm of the Good Being ought to have been protected likewise.] And if the creation is so protected against weak mankind it would be much more right that the Domain of the Good (Being) who actually exists should be fortified against terrible enemies. For as the Lord of the Domain is perfect in his Essence, so it is right also that his Domain be fashioned aright, and his building fortified, and it would be right that that building; should be protected with a strong wall. |lxvii

But the Domain lacks a wall, and its lord lacks reasoning. And if he did not fortify it with a . . . wall, he would be lacking in it; how shall we call him God who is even more deficient than mankind ? For there is no one who does not make doors and bars for his house ; or do they perchance argue in answer to this, that there should not be walls for a city, and a fortress for a place of escape, and a castle for . . . a hedge for a vineyard, an enclosure for a flock ? And which of the Manichaean [P. 38.] is there who does not shut his door or the door of his place of Assembly ? But closed doors are here . . . on account of that [ —l. 16.] injury. . . . And if a robber came against Mani in the open country, and against his disciples, would they not take refuge in a fortress, and hide in a castle and enter within walls ? [If the Manichaeans practice non-resistance. they do so that they may be killed and escape from the Body.] But I think that they are wiser than their Father (i.e., the Good Being) who, they say, is a God. For they understand how to make these things though they are clothed with the disturbing Body ; but their Father who is not clothed with the polluting Body, does not know how to make these things in his own Domain. And if the School of Mani do not flee before a robber, and do not take refuge in citadels or walls, let us ask, is it because their Bodies cannot be injured ? And if they are looking forward to this, (namely), to be killed and to escape from the Body, and so do not need a wall, above in the House of their Father there would be a special necessity for walls that they [P. 38.] might not be mixed with the vile Body. [A wall would have prevented their being mixed with the vile Body.] For owing to the lack of walls, of which they had none, the Darkness swallowed them and mixed them in this Body, and while they are expecting (?) to escape from it by means of a sword, which, moreover, is not really the case, they Avould have escaped from it by means of walls.

And suppose a man says there were no stones, where was that great Earth from which BÂN, the Builder, cut whole stones for the Grave of the Darkness ? And where is blindness such as this . . . [that in a place where there existed this Graver and graven materials, and where there was all this Working, and where there was |lxviii this Wise Disciple and Architect of its Grave who stretched the line and [P. 39, l.35.] weighed out axes (?) and set, the rules, and devised a plan, where there was all this], was there not found a single one to give advice that they should receive it and preserve their Domain ? And lo, they (would) have escaped from the ten thousand evils which encompass them to-day.

But if they talk foolishly against these things, against all propriety they are debating so that only those things that are not proper may be proclaimed. And if they are thus puffed up though in Error (it is) as if they had found out something true ; for it has escaped the notice of the Heretics that they have discovered (only) Error; but they by their Freewill have been discovered [P. 40, l.10.] by it according to its will. And because of the proud who have exalted themselves, let us diverge (lit., creep) a little from our Examination, and let us disregard them on the one side that they may be defeated rightly on the other. For it would never be pleasant for the Darkness to depart from its Domain, because every Entity which exists is contented if it is in its own place—because that is the place which belongs to its nature—[See from illustrations that this is true.] as fish are in water, as moles in sepulchral vaults,⁸ as moths in clothing, as worms in wood, as maggots in barns, as swallows in places frequented by man, as an owl in ruins, as a dove in the light, and as bats in the night. To these and many others their natural dwelling-place is pleasant, and if any one changes the dwelling-places which belong to them for those which do not belong to them, that is to say, places which hurt them instead of those [P. 41.] which do not hurt them, it is a great evil and bitter trouble for them as the celebrated Psalm of the Blessed David reckons ; and he declares in due order the places of all of them in Psalm civ, which is 'Bless the Lord, O my Soul, O Lord my God, thou art become very great,' which declares that according to their nature are their places, and according to their places is their contentment. For if you immersed a fish in oil, and hid a mole in honey, and made a moth live in silver, or worms in gold, or a louse in a heap of pearls, although these excel the dwelling-places |lxix which belong to them, yet they are contented with their own (dwelling-place). And if these things that are made, and that are not Entities are contented with the places which were created for them, how much more is the Entity of Darkness contented with its natural den! And if any one stimulates it to go forth thence, it suffers pain, just as a man pains the dark mole when he brings it up from its dark place.

For if the Darkness had its own peculiar Domain,⁹ as they say,--this is a statement which is difficult to believe—[but] what is more difficult than this is that "Darkness exchanged the Domain of its nature, and loved the Opposite of its nature," and exchanged its ordinary manner for something which was alien to it. For a newborn babe changes from its place to another place, for both of them belong to it; and though it comes from its own to its own [P. 42, l. 9.] it verily weeps when it goes forth,—how much more is an Entity [troubled] if a man roots it up from its place (and takes it) to another place which does not belong to it! For just as in its own Domain it is at peace, so in a Domain which is not its own it suffers calamity. Moreover, physicians say that everything which does not keep its nature ruins its natural generation, though they are speaking of custom and not of nature. For if a man goes to accustom himself to something to which he is not accustomed, if he does not wisely acquire the custom by stealth, little by little, he is injured by it. But if a thing to which a man is unaccustomed disables a man if he comes to it suddenly when it is natural even if it is not customary, how did the Darkness come upon the Light, its Opposite, suddenly [and enjoy it] ? And instead of what would have been right, (namely), that [P. 43.] it (i.e., the Darkness) should be positively injured as Nature indicates, it actually made an Assault upon it (i.e., the Light), as the Falsehood says, which against the Light. . . .

But when that imposture is crushed by the questions of the [L. 16.] Truth all his system has been exposed and laid bare. For as the question (?) of Moses shattered the Molten Calf, so the power of the Truth shatters the fabricated Teaching. But I know that |l although the Calf was shattered the Jews did not flee from the worship of it, so also the Teaching of the Manichaeans has been well exposed, but the Manichaeans do not revile the worship of the Sun and Moon. For they are like one another in their blasphemies, even if they are not alike in their Scriptures. For as the Jews blaspheme against the New Testament, they (i.e., the Manichaeans) blaspheme against our Old Testament. [The parable of the Wineskins applied to Jews and Manichaeans.] But that (i.e., Scripture) is (both) new wine and old. For as for the old its-taste is in it, and its odour has not grown faint, but in the new there stirs the ferment of its power and of its violent heat. (?) But [P. 44, l. 10.] such vessels as do not receive the old convict themselves by their impurity, that (?) they are not even worthy to contain it. And such as do not receive the new they are old bottles which it (i.e., the new wine) convicts by its power that they are not able to bear it.

Single inverted commas are used in numerous cases where the words seem to be quotations or to belong to a special terminology.

Words in italics inside square brackets are to be regarded as conjectural translations or paraphrases.

In a few passages, where the text has suffered great mutilation, italics indicate an attempt to summarise the argument from suggestions in the fragments.]

[P.101] indicates page 101 of the accompanying Syriac. [l.2] means line 2 of the current page of the accompanying Syriac. [RP]

7. ¹ The radish is said by the native Arabic authorities to produce disagreeable belchings (see the Lisan-al-'Arab, xiv. 29, 19).

8. ² [Syriac] in the Syriac occurs only here and on p. 73, l. 10, but it is found frequently in the Nabataean Inscriptions.

THE THIRD DISCOURSE AGAINST THE TEACHINGS

I DESIRE to utter one more refutation against the three of them (i.e., Marcion, Mani, and Bardaisan), that is against Marcion in the first place who (says) that a heaven is found also beneath the Stranger. Let us ask who bears up those heavens, and what is in them. For a power is necessary to bear them. Or can it be that the heavens of the Stranger are resting on the heavens of the Maker, so that he is the all-sustaining Maker, as indeed is the case? But if they say that the heavens of the Stranger hang by the power of the Stranger, we also will deal [P. 45.] frowardly with the froward, (and say) that he who is above the [Ps. xviii.26] heavens cannot support the heavens, but (only) if he were beneath them. But if he is the same person who is above the heavens and below them, it is clear that the place of his possessions is the same, and in the midst of it are collected those Souls whom ISU¹ brought up hence. For a Supporter is required for those heavy Souls whom he brought up thence . . . [inasmuch as when his possessions are found enfolded within his bosom there is required for them another power which supports them.] For we cannot accept from them just as they do not accept from us [L. 26.] that there should be anything set up without a foundation.

But know that if the Stranger has heavens which have been created from nothing, we must inquire by whom they werecreated. And if they are his in virtue of (their) 'essential being' there is a fortified boundary of 'essential being' beneath him, which he cannot cross. And just as he is not able to go forth from that Place which surrounds him so as to be something which does not exist in a Place, and has no Creator, so he is not able [P. 46.] |lii to cross that boundary which is beneath him. Nor were the Souls able to go up hence to cross it.

But if that boundary was capable of being crossed so that also the Stranger crossed it and came down to us, as they say, and the Souls also rent it asunder and ascended, as they falsely state, then (it follows that) a boundary which could be crossed would not be able to prevent the Maker from going up to the Domain of the Stranger. If, therefore, when he was able to go up he was unwilling to trample down the boundary of his Companion, he is a God who is worthy of praise, since even those things which he (i.e., Marcion) has invented, redound (lit., cry out) to his praise. But if he had the will to go up, and the Stranger above [L. 39.] allowed him, let them show us why. . . . And if the Good (Being) was guarding himself, he was verily afraid lest he (i.e., the Maker) should injure him. And how did he who was afraid in his own Domain, come to the Domain of the Maker to struggle with him? And if he guarded his freedom that there should be no Strife and [P. 47.] Contention between him and his neighbour, let his Heralds be despised who make him quarrelsome and contentious. And if they say that the Maker did not perceive the Stranger, it is unlikely. For how did he not perceive him when he was his neighbour? And if they say that he was far from him, infinitely far, if it was a mountain immeasurable and an endless path, and a vast extent without any limit, then how was that Stranger able to proceed and come down the immeasurable mountain, and (through) a dead region in which there was no living air, and (across) a bitter waste which nothing had ever crossed? And if they make the improbable statement that "the Stranger like a man of war was able to come," well if he came as a man of war--[though he did not come], (take the case of) those weak Souls whom he brought up hence, how were these sickly ones able to travel through all that region which God their Maker and Creator was not able to traverse, as they say?

And if they say that these were able but their Maker was not, if they say anything they like, they must hear something they dislike, (namely), that if the Soul, which is all the creation of this Creator, was strong enough so that with the strength of the Stranger, it was able to cross and to go, and did not remain |liii anywhere (?) on that immeasurable journey, how much more able [P. 48, l.13.] would the Creator be to go, not only up to the Domain of the Stranger, but even to explore the other regions inside of it, if there were any there! . . . [Thou mayest know that the system of statements which they make is impossible.] For (being) a Person who grows not old nor ever dies or grows weary, who has no need of a conveyance of any kind, and requires no food,--and in that Domain there were no walls to hinder him,--how was the Maker hindered from travelling to see what was above him, (to see) whether that Domain was empty or had something in it or not? But if he reached the heavens of the Stranger, even if he did not actually enter he must have struck them to see what they were or whose they were.

And when the Stranger went forth from his Domain to come hither, it is clear that he vacated his Domain. For anything which is limited, and in the midst of a place, when it goes forth from its place, the whole of it goes forth and no part of it remains in its place. But if half of it goes forth and half [P. 49, l.11.] remains, or some portion of it, these things prove concerning its nature that it is divisible. And if again they wish to change their ground, and say a thing which cannot be, (namely), that when he went forth to come from his Domain, his Domain was not deprived of him at all, because he is a Fullness which [P. 49, l.15.] does not lack, and a Greatness which is not lessened, then how was his Domain full of him, and the Domain which was in the middle full of him--a place infinite and unlimited? And, moreover, the Domain of the Maker would be full of him (i.e., of the Stranger), and this creation would be full of him ; even unto Sheol beneath would his extent reach. If before he went out he was the sole occupant (lit., fullness) of that Domain wherein he dwelt, and after he went out that Domain was likewise full[P. 50.] of him as before, it is clear that he is something which was found to belong to that Domain, and was (nevertheless) outside. It is necessary that we should inquire whence this addition arose ; or perhaps some veil was upon his face as upon the face of the Sun; and when that veil was drawn aside he extended his |liv rays unto us. And when he gathered himself in and confined himself to his Domain he filled the whole of the Domain in which he dwelt from of old. And it is necessary that we should inquire from whence are those causes which arose in front of him, and impeded the Light; and here his nature is found to fill all (space), and our place is not found to be foreign to his rays, just as also the vault of creation is not foreign to the rays of the Sun, even if by means of other veils it is concealed from us.

But the Sun is one thing and its effulgence is another thing. For the Sun has substance and a circumference, too, and the eye sets bounds to the Sun, but its effulgence has no limit and substance. For the eye cannot set bounds to it. And by this proof it is discovered that the child is greater than its parent, since the parent is limited and the child that springs from the parent unlimited. But it (i.e., the effulgence) is not really greater; it really is less than it, in that it has not substance like it (i.e., the Sun). But because also the Sun is fire we learn to know it (i.e., the Sun) from this lower fire; for thus also a flame of fire has a substance, [P. 61, l.28.] but the Light of the fire has no substance. And bodies come and go in the midst of its Light and are not injured, but bodies cannot approach very near to the substance (of the flame). And just as there are flowers or blossoms or one of the roots which have sweet-smelling fruits and one small place is able to accommodate them because they are substances, but their scent is diffused outside of them because it has no localised substance ; and we [P. 52.] do not say that the scent of spices is more than the spices, or the perfumes of ointments more than the ointments, for they themselves are sold for a price, but the scent of fragrant herbs is freely given to all who come near them ; and (just as) the censer cannot fill the house, but its smoke is greater than the house, for it is even diffused outside of it, (so) if they have made, therefore, their God like a perfume, which is dissipated and like a flame which is scattered, though they wish to honour him, they reduce him to inferiority, for they make him (to be) without an independent substantial Existence.

Again, let the party of Bardaisan be asked concerning those Entities which he speaks of, what supports these things of his |lv also,² seeing that they are placed in a deserted and empty Space in which there is no breath of air supporting all, especially inasmuch as he mentions that there are both light and heavy Entities there? For Light is lighter than Wind and Wind than Fire, just as also Fire is lighter than Water. But light and heavy things cannot exist unitedly in one enclosure without the force of another [P. 53.] (supporting them).

For the light (thing) must dwell above just as the heavy (thing) dwells beneath all. Therefore, Fire cannot exist in the same rank in which Light exists, nor can Water, which is heavy, be in the rank of Fire, or of Wind, because there is no force to support them. . . . Water puts an end to Fire, which is opposite it. For [L. 29.] heaviness and weight cannot exist in one rank just as they cannot [L. 39.] . . . by the same weight . . . things which are light and heavy in the midst of Water or in Air. These things convince concerning themselves how (far) the heavy approach the light. And if these which are heavier by measure than their companions, do greatly flee towards the depths, how much more distant from those things [P. 54.] which are beneath, without weight and without measure, will the Darkness be which exists more heavily than all! For lo, all its heaviness, too, is beneath all ... [how did the Darkness] go up from them because its heaviness. . . . But if it is able to exist [L. 16.] and be quiet, let them tell us what thing it was which came upon its heaviness (?) . . . for it is unable to be raised by itself. . . . [Ll. 12, 22.] But if they say that it crossed its boundary and when it crossed [L. 34.] it, it crossed it in an upward direction, then (let me ask), which is easier--for a heavy thing to go upwards, which is not natural, or to be sent downwards according to its nature? For so [L. 46.] . . . [owing to some cause or other] to cross its boundary and make an Assault upwards. Above all [the proper nature of its [P. 55.] (i.e., of the Darkness) heaviness, demands that it] should be continually sent beneath. And because from of old and from eternity everything was actually going down and down the Fire would not be able [to find its way down through the great |lvi distance to the Darkness beneath or to reach] the Depths which are immeasurable.

But let us inquire as to this Fire, what was the cause that stirred it up also to cross the Boundary which it had never crossed before? They say that the Wind beat upon it and stirred it up. Let us come to the succession of causes and let us ask also concerning the Wind,--what stirred it up too? And if the causes are multiplied, what, then, was that which was the Cause of all the causes? If it be not known, there is a great error, but if it be known, there is a right question in reply to which a true argument should be offered. For if it was God, then He is the cause of all confusion, He who disturbed things in their state of order and [Cf. p. lxxiii. 1. 15.] mingled things that were pure and introduced Strife and Contention among Natures that were at peace ; then He Who, they say, [P. 56.] is the real cause of all beauty turns out to be the cause of all ugliness.

But whoever stirred up that Evil which was asleep, and gave power to what was powerless and found out a method and arranged the Cause to make the Evil cross the Boundary, a thing that had never crossed its Boundary, that misdeed of his teaches us what name we should give him, with what eye we should look upon him, and with what amazement we should wonder at him!

But if the same Upper Being stirred the Element of the Wind in a manner contrary to its nature, then that Upper Being must have crept and come down from his natural height; and what Cause, then, stirred him up, too, that he should hurl Contention [Cf. p. lxxiii. l. 15.] and Strife among the Entities and Natures which were in a peaceful state, and, if they know not, whence did this cause spring?

For as regards these other things which they say concerning the Entities, whence did they learn that they are as they say? If the spirit of revelation made (it) known to them, it ought to [P. 57.] have revealed to them (something) concerning the Cause on which all the causes depended.

But one must wonder at this Wind that it was not revealed to Moses, the chief of the Prophets, who divided the sea and went through its midst, nor again to Simon, the chief of the Apostles, |lvii was it revealed, he who went down and walked upon the waters, and moved lightly upon the waves of the sea! But it was revealed to this Bardaisan who was unable to prevent the dew which dropped upon his bed! But let them give us the signs and wonders which he did, that by means of the open signs the secrets which he taught may be believed. But if the Prophets and Apostles [L. 22.] who did many signs and wonders did not say one of the things which Bardaisan by himself denied, and if Bardaisan, who denied many things which are foreign to the teaching of the Prophets and Apostles, did not do any of the signs which they did, is it not clear and evident to any one who wishes to see clearly that there is a great gulf between his Error and their true Knowledge?

Let us ask [what force it is which supported] all those creatures which Bardaisan preached and the Firmament (?) and the Earth and those whom he calls PANPHLGOS ³ (?) and all that earth (?) which is beneath everything and above the Darkness--who supports all these? Or how does the Darkness, which is beneath [P. 58, l.10.] everything, support everything so as to be the foundation of all? But if they say that everything is placed on nothing, let Bardaisan who said how can it be explained that something comes from nothing, (let him) repeat the thing which went forth from his mouth (and ask) how can something be supported by nothing? For how can a thing which does not exist support a thing which does exist? But if he says that it would be easy for God to hang everything on nothing, he confesses, though unwillingly, that it would not be difficult for God to create everything out of nothing. For if he was unable to create something from nothing, neither would he be able to set something on nothing . . . [and [P. 59.] Bardaisan cannot say that the Will of God supported everything]. For (how) was that Will which they say is light [and unable to [L.7] make anything from nothing able even to support it?] And, [L. 13.] therefore, as it was necessary for the Will to have something out of which to create creatures ([so it needed something] on which to place its creatures.

[And if creatures are made from Entities] which are not |lviii dependent on something which supports them, [are not these Entities dependent] upon something which is not dependent? And if they say that there is a myriad of ... each supporting one another . . . [they are not wise in what] they say ; [for let us [L. 33.] ask about that last supporter] of them all, who bears it up? Until of necessity one great and perfect One is found Who is perfect in every respect, Who is identical with His own Domain and exists by His own power, and from nothing makes everything. For if He lacks any one of these things, then He is not perfect, and, therefore, [P. 60]. He is in some sort an imperfect God who requires three things--that is, something from which to create created things, and a Pillar which upholds His creatures and a Domain in which His Divinity may dwell. But if the Will of God is supporting by its power the creatures which come from the Entities, it is clear that also that Will of God was supporting the Entities from the first and the same confused them. And if it was not supporting the Entities, then it does not support anything that comes from them. And if the Entities were dependent on it (i.e. the Divine Will) and existing by His power, they were not even Entities, especially as the Darkness also is found to exist likewise by the power of the Good One.

And, therefore, on these grounds we have opposed Mani also with a true refutation. For he, too, calls God the Earth of Light, which (Earth) is not perfect, but if it is a deficient thing, the very word deficiency is enough to refute its claim to perfection. For its one side proclaims concerning the whole if it, that if on its side which is near the Darkness, it is limited by the Darkness, and if it is (so) by nature, its nature is very deficient and imperfect, inasmuch as that which limits it on one side is not a thing which is fair but the Darkness. Now, in the case of a thing which is limited by the Evil, inquire no further as to its weakness; [P. 61, l.13.] for it is enough that the Evil limited it. And how, O Mani, shall we call that thing the perfect Good which is limited by the Darkness, or perfect Light that which is bounded by the Darkness? For it (i.e., the Darkness) confined and limited its inferiority (i.e., the inferiority of the Light), and did not suffer it to fill all (Space), in addition to the fact that it (i.e., the Darkness) waxed |lix bold like a strong one to trample down its Domain and to enter its Boundaries, and to plunder its Possessions. But they say that it (i.e., the Darkness) came as one in need ; but if it was in need, know that this (i.e., the Light) also is weak, and if the former plunders the latter is plundered. And, in order that they may be refuted in all points, if the two frontiers of Good and Evil were thus contiguous, all that side which bordered on the unclean became unclean and defiled, and infected, and corrupted by the contact of the Darkness. And if they say that that side which bordered on the Darkness was not injured by the contact of the [P. 62.] Darkness, then that side which could not be injured is more excellent than those Souls which were injured by the contact of the Darkness, for it (i.e., the Darkness) is said to have acquired power over the inferior, since this inferior was all injured. But although it (i.e., the side) has contact with the corrupt Darkness from everlasting to everlasting, the injurious contact could not injure it. And if the Enemy was unable to get dominion over it, and the Foe to tread it down and the Marauder to ascend and cross it, then why was it necessary for the Good One to takethe pure Souls who belonged to him, and to 'hurl' them beyond his own victorious Frontier into the jaws of the Darkness? For it has been said that the Darkness could not even cross that mighty Frontier. But if it was a defenceless Frontier, one which could be overcome, and laid low, and trodden down and crossed, then its weakness could also be injured by the contact of the Darkness. And if the Darkness had been able to get dominion over it, if it had wished to destroy it, lo, it would have destroyed [P. 63.] it by degrees, and made an Assault. And if it desired to rob it, behold it would have approached it stealthily by degrees, and moved onwards. And if (it had wished) to feel a Passion for it and to enjoy it, lo, what gave it Pleasure was at its side . . . if [L. 13.] what gave it Pleasure was in close contact on its side from everlasting to everlasting; and if it carried its will into action, the Darkness had no need to make an Assault and enter the midst of the Earth of Light, because the same Pleasantness was diffused throughout the whole of it (i.e., the Earth). For the Light is one in its nature, and wherever a man has pleasure in it, |lx it is the same. Look, therefore, at the fabricated system of deceit, for in all this the Pleasantness of the Light is in contact with the Darkness, as they say. If it is after the fashion of a park, the one side which bordered on the Sons of the Darkness was entirely akin to the Darkness--for it is with them. And if the Fragrance of that pleasant thing is sent forth into their nostrils, and if that Light is diffused upon their eyes, and if the Melodies of that sweet Player are poured into their ears, how since all this was present with him, did he smell and perceive as from a far mountain that "there was something pleasant [P. 64, l.12.] there"? And if from the centre of the Earth (of Light) or from the inner sides he received the smell of the Pleasantness of Light, this, too, is against them. For how did it come about that the sweet smell and effulgence burst forth and entered even there? And how did this beautiful Fragrance ever smite the Darkness?

For if the Darkness had foreknowledge, and by means of that he knew that there would be something pleasant (in the realm of Light) then is that Entity (of the Darkness) greater and more excellent than this Good, in that it has this foreknowledge. But lo, the Souls who are from this (Entity) are to-day existing in Ignorance and Error. [How can the Souls escape from this Darkness?] And if he had great foreknowledge, when do the Souls who have strayed expect to be 'refined,' seeing that 'he who leads them astray' is so great? For by his knowledge he made them to be without knowledge. But, above all, they cannot go forth hence, because, howsoever that Good (Being) may contrive to form ways and means for their departure [P. 65, l. 9.] hence, that Evil One knows beforehand all the movements and secrets which are planned there against him ; and that Good (Being) cannot even conceal his secret thoughts from him. And if he cannot conceal from him the thoughts in his own heart and in his own Domain, how does he expect to release from under the hand of this mighty One the Souls who are subject to his authority, [Cf. p. lxxii. l. 3.] especially, too, if they are stored up in the midst of him and 'swallowed,' as they say? And if, when they were not swallowed, he contrived to swallow them, now that he has swallowed them, who is there that can bring them forth from his midst? '(This |lxi is a thought) which even Mani himself may have muttered from the midst of the Darkness when he was swallowed. And in his muttering whose help would be invoke? (Would he invoke) Him who even in his own Domain is guarding himself from that which he fears? For he is afraid to come because he knows that if he comes he is swallowed; but they are ashamed to say that he [P. 66.] can be swallowed. And how can they conceal it? For behold those Souls which were swallowed up (so as to be removed) from him make them ashamed. And if they were not swallowed, again they are all the more ashamed in this point, (namely): Why did that Nature which cannot be swallowed not contend (?) with the Darkness and swallow all of it?

Behold, two alternatives are set before them; let them choose one, whichever they wish, that they may be put to confusion in it. But if in both directions they are put to confusion, this is not due to us, but to their wise Teacher, who concocted for them a Teaching which is put to confusion in every respect. But if they say that he had no foreknowledge, [then let them hear my former questions about the contact of the Darkness with the Light]. [Cf. p. lviii. f.]

If the Evil One has foreknowledge from the first, how is it that he sometimes (?) perceived as if he sometimes knew? And if when he knew he did not feel desire ; the question is one which resolves itself into two alternatives, (namely), if he verily made an Assault with his eyes (open?), it is a thing [P. 67.] repugnant to his nature ; but if, though he felt desire, he did not make an Assault he remained by reason of his self-restraint for a long time in a state of desire perforce. But these Souls who are from the Good (Being) are put to shame by his self-restraint, since they are found to be fornicators, and they run corruptly into all evils. And who caused that false ascetic to offend? Can it have been that Virgin of the Light about whom they say that she manifested her beauty to the Archons, so that they were ravished to run after her? But it is not possible for pure mouths to speak as they do about the things after this ; so that we will not commit them to writing, but we will take refuge in such discourse as it is possible to use (and argue), that if that Virgin of Light appeared to him and |lxii made him offend by her purity, her folly is seen in this. And in what respect was the beauty or pleasantness or fragrance of the Virgin of Light different from that of that Luminous Earth? So that if there is a question of Passion, behold, [P. 68.] as a harlot, she embraces the fornicator. For the borders of both Domains embrace one another after the manner of bodies. And, because from eternity and from everlasting they were touching one another, perhaps, also, that Evil one became weary of the perpetual contact. But if a comparison such as that which they employ (lit., bring) is applicable to the matter, (namely), that one loves and another is loved, the experience of debauchees refutes them, (namely), that, although they love, there comes a time when they are sated and weary of that thing which they love.

And if our questions do not please them, neither does it please us that they should speak all this blasphemy against the Truth. If, therefore, they wish to hear many things, in a single [L. 33.] word . . . that is to say, when they confess that they are in an evil case. And, therefore, silence is our part, and they will [P. 69.] have profit. But if . . . And if they do not wish to come to that which overthrows them (?), let them show how at one time the Darkness had a Passion for the Light, though they were from everlasting hidden in one another. If this Fragrance was diffused recently, first we must inquire what was the cause which made it spread, and what was the power which stirred it up, and why all this was. (?) And it is clear that that is the cause of the trouble and war. But if the Darkness acquired Thought which . . . , and a Mind which he had not (formerly) and² Knowledge which he had not, lo again [we refute them by asking how Mind could be acquired by a Nature which did not contain it. It could only come from an outside source-- from a region above the Darkness].

[L. 40.] For Bardaisan had already (?) (i.e., before Mani) said, 'There arose a cause by chance, and the Wind was impelled against the Fire.' Marcion said [concerning the . . . ] "that |lxiii he saw a certain picture." (?) For we will not utter these other things which are after it(?) ; even though their mouths were fit to utter something which was not permissible. For (let us ask) whence sprang the cause, O Marcion, which first [made him aware of] that which was beneath him? And if the Good . . . which was above it did not perceive HULE seeing that it was under him, how did he perceive it anew, [P. 70, l.11.] or how did HULE(?) recently (ascend to regions) which are not natural for it? And Mani said, concerning the Darkness . . . [that its Sons began to rage and ascend to see what was above them outside the Darkness or that it acquired Thought].

And see how like the perverse crabs are to one another, each one of whom takes a devious course and goes forth, not to come to the Scriptures, but to turn aside from the Scriptures! And, perhaps, Satan, their father, took a somewhat devious course, because he is a native in Error--that is because they are foreigners from foreigners, who do not blaspheme at all. For let the circumcised foreigners prove that each of them is a drop of poison 'of the troubled sea.' Whenever, therefore, it suits Mani, he brings their two sides into [P. 71.] contact, like Sun and Shade, which cannot be mingled together. And, again, when he is forced he destroys the first and mixes them together--the Good and the Evil--like water with water. And that he may not be refuted (by the argument) that if they had been near together, how did the Darkness recently desire the Light, as if it had suddenly met it, he constructed the theory 'that sometimes HULE acquired Thought.' And in seeking to avoid refutation, he came to such a point that he rightly suffered confusion. And because he was compelled he named two Roots ; and because again he was plainly exposed he produced many Natures from the midst of two Natures. But a tongue which is in the power of Falsehood is turned by it as it (i.e., Falsehood) finds convenient.

For with regard to Light which is the opponent and the abolisher of Darkness whenever it suits them, they say that |lxiv it (i.e., the Darkness) had a Passion for it (i.e., the Light). And how does opposite love opposite, that is to say, how does the injured one love its injurer? or how does the eater have affection for that which is eaten, as the wolf for the lamb? Or will they, therefore, suppose the Light to be injured [P. 72.] like the lamb? And (then) it had good reason to desire the Darkness (which is) like a wolf! But if they suppose that the Darkness is injured like the lamb, how does that which is injured have a Passion for its injurer? They attribute to Darkness that it desires, like the wolf, and that it is injured like a lamb; and when these two things are laid at the door of the Darkness, has not the true (opinion) perished from them (i.e., the Manichaeans), that is, have they not perished from the Truth? For those proofs and comparisons which they adduce are also confused like them (i.e., the Manichaeans).

But if there are two Domains, and Good and Evil who dwell in them, (now) I portray these from things external and with simple illustrations in order that they may be easy for their hearers. For let us suppose that there is a great and clear and pure river, and fine fish in it, and that there is a bad and filthy and foul sepulchre, and moles in it. Then let us set the moles which dwell in the Darkness as the likeness of the Sons of Darkness, and let us place the fine fish as a fine (?) type of the Sons of the Light and let us suppose that their Domains are bounded this by that, the water by [P. 73, l. 8.] sepulchral vaults, and the dry land by wet ground . . . if those fishes [do not] long to go up to the dry land and to soil themselves in mud and in the burrows⁴ of moles ; is it not, therefore, incontestably clear that just as moles dislike going down to the water, so fishes disdain to go up to the dry land? And they are made to be neighbours to one another ; and in proportion as their boundaries approach one another, so much the further are their (natural) wills removed from one another ; so that there is none of them which desires his neighbour's domain. |lxv

If, therefore, these things which are not Entities, and are not (derived) from Entities, and were not made from good and evil Natures--since if thou kill a mole and cast it to the fishes, the fishes will devour it--and if, therefore, these things which are near to one another in a certain sense are thus far strangers as regards their abodes and . . . in their nature, and do not dare to cross their borders, how much more would it be right that Good and Evil should exist in their Nature and Domains, seeing that they are real Entities and really strangers to one another, and the reality of their Enmity [P. 74.] is never lessened! For if it was lessened, that is due to Freedom and not to Essential-nature, (it is due) to Will and not to Nature; how, therefore, did the Darkness . . . to cross to the Domain of its opposite, and why?--seeing that when a mole goes it goes into its own (proper place), and when it ceases (?) (it goes forth) and smells that it may reach the edge of the water and (then) returns again to go into its own (proper place). And so, also, a fish, to which are assigned its depths comes into its own (proper place), and when it ceases (?) it returns to its depths

Here are correct demonstrations which refute those who have introduced confused Teaching . . . For it is found that [L. 33.] fishes and moles which come from Nature [stay in their own natural places] . . .

[Moles akin to the Darkness are not anxious to cross the [P. 76, l. 5.] boundary] of fishes, the sons of water. And how do they flee from this boundary and rank of the Sons of the Light; and (yet) the Darkness, their Father, made an Assault to enter within the boundaries of the Sons of the Light, and why are (the words) 'refined,'⁵ and 'first' (used to describe him)? But if their Father made an Assault, but they flee, it is found that these blind and dark moles do (in reality) come from the nature and abode of the Good (World of Light). For, behold, they flee from their opposite. Nor (even) like these blind |lxvi moles is the perception of Souls which see and hear and speak and perceive that they may flee from the vile boundary of the Darkness.

Again, let us turn and ask the advocates of Error, that is, its Preachers--how were the Sons of the Light cast into the mouths of the Sons of the Darkness? And how did the Darkness swallow the Light--a thing which is not natural to it? But the nature of both is that the Light swallows and the Darkness is swallowed. And if here (in our world) the [P. 76.] Light swallows the Darkness as experience shows, but there the Light is swallowed, as the Heretics say, it is clear that this Darkness which is swallowed here is not akin to that Darkness which swallows there ; just as also the Light which swallows the Darkness is not akin to that which is swallowed by the Darkness. And if they strive to make a stand, again they fall. For one fall is not sufficient for them. For really it is not a case of falling at all. For this takes place (only) where there has been standing ; they are always prostrate-- they do not wish to stand.

Again, let them understand (?) that as regards this Light which swallows the Darkness here with us, and this Darkness which here amongst us is swallowed by the Light, it it is the nature of that which swallows to swallow, and of that which is swallowed to disappear. Or has the Creator's own will changed their natures? And if it is due to (His) Will, where was their (unchangeable) Nature? If he is one who submitted (?) himself there, and is the Light-God who did not [P. 77.] aid himself, whose Light was swallowed by the Darkness, how has he to-day changed the nature of the Darkness that it should be swallowed by the Light? For they say that he is the Maker. And, if the Darkness changed its nature, it is unlikely that it would bring itself to the weakness, so that he who swallowed them is swallowed to-day. Since that true saying demands that natures essentially fixed cannot be changed; but that Freewill, because He created it to say |lxvii everything, proclaims by name those Entities whose true nature it cannot declare. But, because those names belong to the Entities, the Entities of the substances (?) are changed. For if the substances (?) of the Entities had been like the names of the Entities, and were fixed natures, they could not be changed ; because a thing which exists in the natural condition of its original Essence, so exists as it is, and so remains for ever and ever.

But let us inquire about the nature of this Darkness, whether this is natural to it, (namely), that it should be swallowed by the Light, just as our sight proves . . . that [P. 78.] it (i.e., the Darkness), too, is swallowed here so that both here and there it has an essential Nature. For one Entity cannot be divided into two Entities, even though the Heretics speak absurdities. And if the nature of the Light around us, as it proves about itself, is such that it swallows and is not swallowed, and there is no means whereby Light is swallowed by Darkness, at any time and for all time to come, it is clear . . . that as it swallows the Darkness here, so it swallows there, and was not swallowed (by the Darkness).

Also the perverse ones do perversely proclaim the Teaching --but here [we have correctly refuted what] they say concerning the Light and the Darkness . . . we hear that it was done there in quite a contrary and opposite way. On which (opinion), therefore, is it right that we should stand--on the cunning tale which is proclaimed preposterously, or on true evidence, whereof the correctness is seen by practice? . . . For not a little . . . because it was not right that they should [P. 79, l. 2, Ll. 7, 8, 9.] be a little ashamed. For . . . to speak . . . against . . . that rightly . . . but also those who believe. (?) For according [Ll. 10, 14.] to the great falsehood and untruth . . . difficult . . . he [Ll. 17, 24.] gives them a preposterous account of a thing which we see in practice correctly every day. For it seems that he made them drunk first, and then he told them a tale. For he was afraid of the truth of Nature, lest it should refute him. But, if not, how (?) was the perverse tale not disgraced in their ears, |lxviii that, while they see that the Light swallows the Darkness here, they think that there it (i.e., the Light) is swallowed by the Darkness?

And the Darkness when it is swallowed here by the Light has not even a body ; for nothing is separated from itself (i.e., the Darkness), seeing that it vanishes altogether. But a house full of darkness shows that if a man opens the doors [P. 80, 11.] and windows in the daytime, whither can that darkness, which is in it, go up [to hide]? There is no room for it to go outside, for the Light which is from outside absorbs it. If we say that it stays within, it does not remain there. For the rays of the Sun entering pursue it. And if it does not exist within, and goes out, it is clear that it has all come to an end ; and with it has come to an end all that Teaching which says that it (i.e., Darkness) has a kind of body in reality. For in this manner it (i.e., the Teaching) says that it has a body, in that "it verily ate those brilliant Shining Ones (ZIWANE) who were cast into its mouth." So Darkness and Light have become composite bodies--a thing which nature does not teach. For a man never eats Light nor ever swallows Darkness.

And if this Body with which we are clothed is of the same nature as the Darkness, as they say, and this Soul which is in us is of the same nature as the Light, when we look at these two natures which are in us, and at the two (natures) of Light and Darkness which are outside of us, they are refuted (and shown) that these are not from those, neither these from those. For how can the bright Soul which is within be over[P. 81, l. 13.] come by the Body which is akin to the Darkness? For the outer Light which is akin to it (i.e., the Soul) overcomes the Darkness. Moreover, how does this Body overwhelm the bright Soul, seeing that this outer Darkness which is akin to it is consumed and swallowed by the Light?

And as for these things which are obvious even to simpletons and madmen, how do they who will not distinguish between statements which are correct, and those which |lxix are self contradictory, applaud them when they hear them? For how dost thou receive (this) into thy mind, O wise Hearer, and how is there a (healthy) ear . . . that thou shouldst hear [L. 32. L. 37. Ll. 38, 39.] . . . when . . . and explains with explanations which are worthy of ridicule?. . . [for he says] that the Primal Man(?) cast(?) "the Sons of the Light into the mouths of the Sons of the Darkness as (into the mouths) of hunters, and that the Light was pleasant and agreeable and sweet to those Sons of the Darkness; and thus they were found to eat them [P. 82.] greedily, and they were cast in and entered into their midst and were mixed with them." O how exceedingly ridiculous that a man . . . O what vile blasphemy! . . . wolves eat lambs and lions eat calves, and the eater and the [L. 11.] eaten are quite content with one another! And these are bodies, and these are composite things, and both of them . . . if ... the Sons of the Darkness are bodies because (they [Ll. 21, 22.] have) bodies as they say (but) the nature of the Sons of the Light is spiritual, as they say ; for this Light, too, is akin to them, how is it fitting (that) this thing which is mingled (with the Darkness) should be held fast? And the Soul which dwells in the Body [would not be held fast] since it is akin to it ... so that if the Soul was akin to the Darkness . . . this [Ll. 38, 41.] [perturbed] Body . . . lo, they are akin to its nature as they say [L. 46.] [for] that Darkness . . . and as the wise ones profess. . . .

Darkness by the Primal [Man] who bore it, he would have [P. 83, l. 9.] died ; since it is difficult . . . which (is) in its Essence . . and also the Parts . . . which he slew . . because they [Ll. 16, 18,19.] teach that the Darkness has a nature . . . and goes into anything which he catches.[L. 22.]

And, therefore; if the Sons of the Light were eaten and entered into the belly and were digested in the stomach, it must be that they were dissolved in the excrement and waste |lxx refuse. For these are plausible statements to be made by their own about their own! And, therefore, those Sons of the Light are natures which can be dissolved and destroyed. And it is proper to ask concerning this nature, as to how it existed from all eternity. For if they were compounded they are also dissolved . . . and also destroyed; they are not the thing [P. 84.] which they were before they were destroyed ; and besides this, it is clear that if he collects and compounds them, . . . has compounded them from the beginning. And if from all eternity they have not been compounded, but are natures which are not composite (they spring) from an Existence which is not composite. So that by plain things they have been refuted who speak much falsehood about secret things . . . [L. 18.] akin to the body, as they say, that body is found not only [unable] to eat or to destroy or to torture . . . but, also, it [L. 30.] is unable to understand their plain things . . . as they say, [L. 37.] [that as] the Darkness ate the Light . . . which was in it, [L. 40.] and it was all inside the Darkness . . . how did it eternally and from the beginning both seize it and feel it . . . into [P. 85, l. 7] its midst . . . and how . . .?

But they say these things in addition to those other things, (namely), "that the Souls came to the Judge." For if that nature is one, how can part of it judge and part of it be judged? And also the Souls are part of the Essence (?), how (does [L. 16.] there spring) from it one who torments and one who is tormented? And if, too, the fire which torments is akin to him who torments, and to those who are tormented, what ear is there which can endure this blasphemy that the judge and the judged and the tormentor are from one good Essence, as they say? And how are there in it these three opposites? For He also who judges the judged came hither in his entirety and was mixed with the Body ; thus he sinned and offended just as those Souls who are from him offended. And if these Souls. had stayed in their (native) Domain and had not come hither, |lxxi these would have possessed it, after he had gone thither. And how are they true natures, those natures which did not [P. 86.] preserve their Essence?

For, consider the pure and righteous Body, how it is not such as the apostates state (when they say), "that the Body is a covering which is from the evil Nature." nor is the Soul as they say, from a pure Root. For the eyes of the glorious body clothe themselves with chastity, its ears with purity, its limbs with glory, its senses with holiness, in its mouth is praise and on its tongue is thanksgiving, and in its lips is blessing, in its feet is the habit of visiting the sick, in its hands alms for the needy, in its heart is true faith, and in its . . . love (?). And that wall was built by God and [He made it to be] a pure shrine for Him, and a temple . . . for its architect when . . . in (?) the body . . . he (i.e., Mani) says . . . that it (i.e., the Body) is from a nature so that it sins . . . it is a shame to them since it shows that the Body . . . And if they are not [L. 39.] persuaded to secret sin, they will be persuaded by a devil. How did he(?) force . . .

Consider again the refined Soul about which they say [P. 87.] that its nature is from the Good (Being), it shows concerning its nature . . . the Body is . . . (a nature) which is evil. Also . . . the refined Soul which they say is the Daughter of the Light puts on that Darkness in its deeds and . . . in its conduct. . . . And if (it is) from God [how does it revile [L. 23.] Him?] . . . and if (it is) from [the Holy One, how is it impure] . . . and if (it is) from . . . behold it puts on ... and if it is from the Good (Being), how has it become a den and nest of unmixed Evil?

And if all this was pleasant in the midst of Satan, how do they say that some of these Souls who sin much and do much wickedness, and blaspheme much, and are guilty of great unbelief are found like dregs in the midst of one whom they call BOLOS?⁶ As they say that "when the fire dissolves all his interior, there is collected every portion of the Light which was mixed and mingled among created things, and those Souls [P. 88, l. 3.] who have done much wickedness are assigned to the realm of the Darkness when he is tortured." And if it (i.e., the Light) is a nature which pleases him, as the beginning of their Teaching says, how is it the cause of his torment, as the end of their fabricated system says? But that that Luminous Nature should become at one time his enjoyment, and [that he should like it] and enjoy it, and that, again it should be assigned to his realm, and that he (i.e., the Darkness) should be imprisoned and tortured therein--this may happen in the cases of changeable Natures which are created out of nothing : according to the Will of the Creator they can be changed to anything.

For loose dust of the earth is the dwelling of every creeping thing, and according to its liking it crawls in it and dwells in it. But if any one by regulation associates two Natures with the Nature, that is to say, so that it may be moulded with water by the hand of the workman, and receive strength from fire, then there springs from it a vessel and a prison-house to torture . . . that creeping thing which lay in it when it was dust, and crawled in it, and was delighted when it was [P. 89.] clay. When it becomes a vessel moulded and baked in an oven, it becomes the torturer of those that are imprisoned in it.

If, therefore, the Darkness is finally tormented by that Luminous Nature in which it takes pleasure, what was the cause of the negligence long ago (which brought it about) that the Darkness obtained dominion over all this and took pleasure therein? And what is the cause of its fierceness so that at last the Darkness is imprisoned and tormented in it? If its 'Essential nature' has this strength, then where was |lxxii it "formerly? But if this energy conies from another place, why did it not come formerly? So that instead of the Grave which is now built stupidly for the Darkness, an impregnable wall should have been built, and thus there would have been (a separation) between the two Domains, (such a wall) as it would be fitting for the Good (Being) to make, and right for the Just (Being) to keep in repair, and proper for the Wise (Being) to guard. But after those atrocities which the Darkness wrought [Cf. p. XXXV.] upon the Light, and after those blasphemies which the Souls blasphemed against their Father, and after they committed fornication and folly and polluted and disgraced themselves, [P. 90.] and after great blemishes have appeared in them, so that, although their wounds may be healed, they cannot be effaced, and the places of their spots cannot be covered up, after all this Strife and Contention, and after all this misery and loss [Cf. p. lvi. ll.13, 26 f.] --even if there was a gain, the gain of such things would not be equal to the loss--he has planned to-day to build a Grave for the Darkness so that at last it may be imprisoned there.

And how can a Grave limit him who is infinite? For if the Darkness can be limited, then the Light also can be limited. And if the Good (Being) cannot be limited, but the Evil One can be limited, it is clear that this Evil One who can be limited is not an (eternal) Entity, the Companion of that Good (Being) who is not limited; and it is found that that which limits is an (eternal) Entity, and that which is limited by whoever is able to limit him, is a creature. But if he is not a creature and is an (eternal) Entity, an Entity cannot limit an Entity without itself being also limited by that other one, his equal, which is limited.[P. 91.]

Single inverted commas are used in numerous cases where the words seem to be quotations or to belong to a special terminology.

Words in italics inside square brackets are to be regarded as conjectural translations or paraphrases.

In a few passages, where the text has suffered great mutilation, italics indicate an attempt to summarise the argument from suggestions in the fragments.]

[P.101] indicates page 101 of the accompanying Syriac. [l.2] means line 2 of the current page of the accompanying Syriac. [RP]

THE FOURTH DISCOURSE AGAINST FALSE TEACHINGS.

YE know that it is right that Mani be asked: From which of the Elements was the Grave built for the Darkness? But if it spontaneously turned and imprisoned itself, know that, because it cannot mix or mingle with itself anything else-- [P. 91, l.20.] for there is nothing--and because, moreover, it cannot change itself--for it is an (eternal) Entity which exists as it existed before, and does not come to change--it cannot become opposed to itself. But if he built (the Grave) from the Element of the Good (Being), how did he make it from these Souls in whom he takes delight to-day? But if there is essentially belonging to his nature something which is harder than these Souls, then why did the Darkness not build from that hard and deaf (i.e., inexorable) and victorious element a wall for the outer Domain in order to keep his possessions within? And thus [P. 92.] he would have been spared all these evils. But, perhaps, this wisdom had not come near him at that time, but in the end (?) of his years it happened that he was harassed and learned,, practical (?) workmanship and stone-cutting, and architecture. . . . And if these (qualities?) are there, not only are they there. For many things are required there. For a natural building shows how many things it requires to be employed (in constructing it).

For if they are stones in reality, (?) and if they are cut as they say, there is required one who cuts, and the iron [L. 30.] which cuts, and the stones which are cut, when . . . are [L. 40.] left, and a rope . . . which in the middle, and all these . . . natures . . . which is in it and a destroyer of their |lxxv essence ; and, moreover, fire injures iron, for it (i.e., the fire), transforms the nature thereof. And if any one leaves an iron in the furnace there its destruction (?) follows. And [P. 93.] if any one goes . . . though they are bound (natures), and they go into one another. All this creation is required there so that it may be found in the Domain of the Good (Being). So when this Teaching professes to explain about the Domain of the Good (Being), its explanation is found to refer to this creation. And just as even when it explains about it (i.e., this creation), . . . lacks intelligence, and just as ...

And this Earth from which the Stones are cut is not [L. 26.] essentially such that is uncomposite, and also incapable of being cut up. For a thing which is not composite cannot be cut. For a composite nature can be dissolved. But if it can be cut . . . And if it has these (qualities) in its nature, it has no (immutable) Essence in its nature, and it shows that the natures which (spring) from it are composite creations. For that Grave is built, it is certainly composed and . . . But if [L. 40.] the Architect of the work is skilled in building it is right that it should be put together cunningly. These Stones, [P. 94, l. 8.] therefore, which were compounded there show concerning the Earth from which they were cut, that it also is a composite nature.

And just as if any one asks about natural stones ... as to whence they were cut, it is possible to declare and say that they are cut and hewn from some place or other--a thing whereof also a building in our country is a witness to us--it is right, moreover, to ask whence had this Earth (such resources) that these Stones were cut from it. For it is clear [Cf. p. xxx. l. 29.] that they were made either from something or from nothing. For they cannot say that it exists of itself; for . . . refutes them. And, therefore, let the great deep and abyss which is in that quarry, from which these Stones were cut, refute them. And when BÂN, the Builder, built to make the Grave [Cf. pp. xxx., xlvii.] for the Darkness, he made that great pit in his Domain for the Sons of his Domain. And whence was the deficiency [P. 95.] of that Earth filled up (again) ; for if it was fair before it |lxxvi became lacking, it was exceedingly and endlessly disfigured after it had been cut.

Thus, the idle tales have become and are a laughingstock. For if the stone-cutters operate on that Earth, they are at the same time carrying it forth into the Domain of the Darkness. And if it has not a nature to remain in a Domain which is not its own, then how does it imprison in a Grave built from itself the Darkness which is foreign to its nature?

And, again, if this Earth stretches unto the Earth of the Darkness, is it not the fact that, since it is beaten out and everywhere bordering upon it (i.e., the Darkness), it has all become one earth in the Domain of the Light, and in the Domain of the Darkness? And it is found that one earth supports them both. These are fine Gods and (eternal) Entities which are supported by one another! And if it is one, as also it is one, for it must be one, then either it is all dark [Cf. xcv. 7.] towards the Good and towards the Evil, or, again, it is luminous towards both. For it is impossible that the half of it towards [P. 96.] the Darkness is dark, and the half of it towards the Light is luminous, because its fixed nature will not allow it. For it is one in its Essence. Or a great gulf exists in the middle between these two Earths, and does not allow them to go forth to one another.

And if a mighty gulf which separates above and below does exist there, how did the Darkness cross to the Domain of the Good (Being) without a bridge? Or did he forsooth make a bridge over it and cross? For those to whom it is easy to speak falsely in everything, it is not difficult to lie.

And if they say that he crossed without a bridge, even if they speak falsehood, they are refuted. For if the two sides can cross over one to another without a bridge, a wide gulf being in the middle, they are found to be spiritual, and they are not heavy bodies, and it is evident that for Natures which are thus subtle and light, a supporting Earth is not required as for bodies. Therefore, either let them appeal to the Earth, and it shows that they are corporeal, |lxxvii and are unable to cross the gulf without a bridge. Or let them appeal to the Abyss, and if they flew and crossed it [P. 97.] they are spiritual, and are not dependent upon the Earth.

And if they flee from these two (alternatives) to (the theory of) a bridge . . . [they are refuted] for when the sons of the Darkness bridged (?) the Great Abyss, to cross it. with what (did they make it) and how? And how did they bridge it ; for those who build a bridge fix (?) its foundations (lit., legs) on both sides as rivers show, or a deep which is bridged. Why. therefore, did they bridge it? And how were the Sons of the Darkness able without a bridge to ... their companions . . . or did they, perhaps, . . . cross the bridge . . . since they were on one side, and the Sons of the Light on the other side! And if that bridge was . . . the waste in the middle would make it useless. But if it was . . . it would not allow them to cross ; and thus the twisting of Mani has come to an end.

But if the Earth was all one, since it stretches towards Good and Evil, are they not ashamed when they say concerning the one, that is to say, concerning the one Essence that the half of it which is towards Good is good, and the half of it which is towards Evil is evil? But if it is in its Essence praiseworthy (?) O what ridiculous Teaching--how can the Essence of the Earth be praiseworthy (?) [when it touches the vile Earth which was opposite? ].

And if those illustrations of the Sun and Shadow which [P. 98, l. 8.] they bring forward do belong to things ; if (they are) Earths, because they are dense bodies, they touched one another and were limited by one another . . . how is it (the Light) [L. 20.] limited by the Darkness, seeing that the Light scatters the Darkness and rends it asunder and (enters) into its Domain, and . . . also its nature . . .? [L. 28.]

For (as regards) the Sun and the Shadow which touch one another, the nature of the Sun has no [gross and dense] body . . . to destroy the Shadow, and the Light which is here . . . seeing that no other body is interposed. [L. 38.] Moreover, a Shadow is not a nature (in) itself. For it is the child of that substance, either of stone or wood, standing in the [P. 99.] |lxxviii face of the Light; and apart from the Light a Shadow cannot be produced.

But if they say that, although there was no dense body which hinders the Light, the Light was not able to enter the Domain of that Darkness ; they confess, though unwillingly, that they are 'bound Natures' in Essence, and that they are unable to depart from their (respective) territories. But if they are 'bound Natures,' fixed in their places like mountains, how did they make an Assault on one another and enter into one another? And it is very probable that if they do make an Assault on one another, the Light has extension and radiance and effulgence and rays, so that its effulgence may stretch afar. And if the rays of such a thing (as this Light) the nature of which is to scatter its rays afar, were limited by external compulsion, and it did not cross the border of the Darkness, how do they know how to [announce] that the Darkness made an Assault on the Light--when it (i.e., the Darkness) has no (such) nature? And the Light which ought to have been victorious did not even make a stand for itself.

For these things which they say do not occur in the case of this Darkness and Light which are here. Let them either appeal to the Light and Darkness which are here, or let them admit that this is not the same Light as exists there, but another. And if it is not the same, why do they worship this Sun if it is not the same as that which is in the Domain of the Good (Being)? And if the Light and the Darkness are not the same, then this world was not mixed and brought [P. 100, l.14.] into existence from these Natures. And whence then are these Luminaries which are in our sphere?

O what (is to be said) of a Teaching whose failures are more than its artifices (can remedy)! For as often as they need an argument they bring forward such proofs as these, and as often as an allegory suits them they concoct such tales as these. For Mani did not know that his deceit would enter the furnace of Truth. For where it suits him, he says that the Darkness made an Assault; but he does not remember that this visible Light shows him clearly that this cannot |lxxix be so. Again, where it suits him, he asserts that the Light is the Light of Souls, that is to say, that the Luminous Nature of the Soul is created (in the form of) Light of the Soul. But the worship with which he worships the visible Luminaries refutes him. Or can it be that the visible Sun is perversely (represented as) the God of the invisible Souls? [P. 101.]

"But," he says, "the Primal Man cast his five Bright Ones (ZIWANE) into the mouth of the Sons of the Darkness, in order that, as a hunter, he might catch them with his [net]." And here it is found that the Sons of the Light are their food, and that the Essence of the Sons of the Darkness [is akin] to the Sons of the Bright Ones. To which of them is it like-- to the Light, which is visible, or to the Wind which is invisible ; to the Water which is cold, or to the Fire which is hot? ...

Know that this world was not made from these refined [L. 26.] Natures, and it is necessary that . . . the creation of the world which was from such Natures. But if it was mixed out of these Bright Ones (ZIWANE), let them know that the refined Light was also made turbid by its opposite ; but, concerning its nature, he declared that it is visible, [and it consists of] hot Fire and cold Water. And still our question stands, (namely), to which of them (i.e., of the Bright Ones) was their (i.e., of the Sons of the Darkness) Root (Essence) itself like? But know (?), O Mani, that the fish of the deep and birds of [P. 102.] the height are caught with a bait which is akin to them, as nature shows from which they bring illustrations. For from the quarter from which they bring illustrations, from there (they) can be refuted. . . . And if ... them, how does it [L. 15.] oppose them, if it is true that from their own (Elements), and from the (Elements) of Darkness, the whole of it (i.e., Creation) does exist as they say?

But as regards those who say that everything is created from nothing, and that devils and men have Freewill, and this Freewill produces good and evil actions--and if it be |lxxx not so they have no Freewill at all--it is impossible that we should stand up (and) contend (?) against them either in words or in writings. For a nature is changed into everything according to the will of the Creator ; in order that he may show that (Creation comes) not from 'bound Entities' . . . [L. 44] like the Freewill of mankind [so the devils (?) have Freewill] [P. 103.] . . . when those who persist in the arrogance of their Will do entreat and make supplication. And these (words) "thou has set thy heart on my servant Job, O (?) Satan ..." prove that he (i.e., Satan) has Freewill just as several passages from the Old Testament. But there are many (such passages) belonging to the New (Testament), and these are sufficient to stand on behalf of us and to contend against our enemies.

But, perhaps, this great confusion is a small thing to Mani ; and it is right that we should turn again and ask him of this Consuming Fire, from which of these Natures does its consuming nature come? If it is from the Darkness, how does it injure the body which is akin to its nature? And if it injures its nature, it would be right that it should injure itself also, if that nature which springs from it is injured. But if its harmfumess is from the Light, how could the Sons of the Darkness imprison it in their midst without being injured, seeing that bodies, their kinsmen, are not able to stand before its breath? And if they are two, as if from the two Natures of Good and Evil, then how did they receive [P. 104.] one another into union when they were opposed to one another? And all this (that he says, namely), 'they loved one another' is due to the fact that the difference between them is not known. And how did they become one mind, when they are both suspicious of the two Natures from which they have sprung? For when good and evil (persons) touch them (i.e., the Elements contained in Fire), they are both injured equally by both of them. And the good Fire which springs from the good Nature does not recognize the good, its kinsmen, just as also the evil Fire does not discern the evil, its |lxxxi relatives. And in virtue of the test applied to this one Compound (i.e., Fire), we have a right to say that all that Mixture of the two Natures consists of one mingling of love. But if there are some of the Minglings which struggle with one another because they are opposed to one another, why does Fire not struggle with Fire?

Is it not thus plain to an intelligent person that all the creatures exist in natures which are different from one another according to the Will of the Creator, He who prepared them for the numerous uses of mankind? And there are some that are akin to one another, and there are some which are opposed to one another, according as it pleased the Will which arranges everything. But when they agree and differ deliberately, and exist in agreement and disagreement [it is obvious] that they are not made from Entities which differ. For if, on [P. 105, l.12.] account of the enmity which they have towards one another, it is supposed that they are differentiated from one thing, then (it follows that) on account of the love which they have, they are known not to be made from Entities which are opposed to one another. For if those were created for our benefit (?) it is clear that we must recognize that likewise all of them were regulated for our sakes. For this is the true cause of their creation(?). For if Light and Darkness exist for their own sakes, and not for our sakes, perhaps he is right (?) in thinking that they have enmity towards each other. But if they exist for our sake and are both useful to us--the Light for toil and the Night for rest. . . .

[and they are useful to us] even if they have a war with one [P. 106.] another, but for us they both bring much peace and health. For when hot fire is necessary for us on account of its heat which is necessary to [warm us] it is supposed that because it is a consumer it is an enemy opposed to the things which are injured by it, and [why] do I (?) weary myself (?) with many details? For these many things can be explained even in. . . . Since they are all useful to mankind they are |lxxxii all at peace with one another, (namely, those) which are supposed to be created from different Entities. For on account of the uses of man, which are unlike one another, creatures were created for his service, and are unlike one another. For if his use were (only) one, then it would be a single thing which was necessary for his service. And if his service were one, there would be one thing for his use. Butbecause everything is useful to him, everything was created for his use.

And even those things which are considered unnecessary [P. 107.] are necessary (to promote) either his awe or his chastisement (?) or his fear, or in the course of his swimming through this world that this dwelling may not cause his nature to sink, (this dwelling) which also hated the true lodger (?); and the temporary lodging-place was acceptable to that Good [L. 15.] (Being) in His grace and not . . . but (he set) upon him the constraint of many troubles, that on account of the troubles that are in the world he should hate the dwelling and desire to return to his true profit. These are the true causes on account of which the different creatures which are unlike one another were created.

But seek out completely the creatures as related to one another, and seek them out again as related to man, and see that creatures which are not all useful to one another are all useful to man, and those which are thought to be strange (to one another) are all related to the service of man. For how is the bull like the horse in running? And (yet) the swiftness of the horse and the slowness of the ox are both useful to man. [P.108] And how is the winter like the summer in comparison? And (yet) the coldness of the one and the heat of the other are a source of help to man. And how are fierce things like gentle things? And (yet) they both do one common service. And, therefore, their histories are too long and their numbers are too great, and their kinds are too abundant that we should labour (?) to complete the comparison of them, but some tastes (i.e., specimens) of them are sufficient to convince concerning them all. |lxxxiii

But those Heretics who do not examine creatures according to the reason of their use in relation to us, but compare creatures with one another (saying) "how is the Darkness like the Light, and sweet like bitter, and that which harms like that which is harmed," when they bring comparisons of one thing with another, they cause the simple to err by means of their names, and because childhood has not (sufficient) knowledge to oppose them, it is perplexed. But also they are refuted by their own words. For because they perceived that everything was created as for our service--for there is no single thing among all these which is benefitted but they must needs make an assumption and say "that it is due to the Light which is mingled with all," and to that cause the benefit [P. 109.] of everything is to be ascribed, [and] they have confessed, though unwillingly, that if a man is helped by them all, (then) they all were created on his account.

We turn, again, to examine that thing which they also investigate, (namely), of what use are harmful creeping things which have been created. But being eager to win, they have been quickly defeated. For how does a creeping thing do harm, seeing that even in it, as they have said, there is mixed in it some of the Good Nature which is scattered through everything? And where is the Evil that is not mixed in an innocent lamb, if it is scattered in everything? And so it is possible to distinguish between Good and Evil by means of wolves and lambs, and by means of serpents and doves, and the Mixing of Good and Evil has appeared in man alone! And how are wolves always evil and rapacious, [Cf. p. xix. (in med.)] and lambs always illtreated and innocent, whereas men sometimes ravage like wolves and sometimes are illtreated like lambs? Who is he who arranged these things . . . and who [P.110, l.2.] is he who [gave] to creatures a 'bound Nature' so that creatures [have a fixed disposition], and to man gave an independent Will?

If the Darkness has Freewill--for behold as they say, by its Will it made an Assault, and, again, if the Light has an independent nature--if from two natures which have Freewill and Independence and Thought all creatures have come, |lxxxiv how (?) is it that they all have not Life, and all have not Thought, as also they all have not independent Freewill? And here it is found that man alone is from these two Natures which have these (qualities), because he also has such (qualities) as these. Whence therefore came the rest of creatures and of beasts and plants which do not possess these (qualities), and are not from the two Natures from which man comes? Or let them be convinced that there is one Will which created everything from nothing, as was useful for Freewill and for [P. 111.] our boldness (?) according to the reasoning which we wrote above.

But consider also that according as it suits their cause they learn to construct discourses, but because they are (artificially) constructed they are reduced to nothing, and because they are decked out they are refuted, and because they are powerless they are not able to stand in a contest.

For they say that everything which injures is from the Evil (Nature), just as everything which helps is from the Good (Nature). And they say concerning the Sun that it purifies from Evil, because it goes and comes every day to the Domain of the Good one, which is a purification. And yet [Cf. p. xli.] the eye which fixes its gaze much upon it is injured by its strength, but if it fixes its gaze to look on the shadow or thick darkness it is not injured, and so it is found that the Sun of the Good (Being) is harmful.

And if they say that it harms the body which is akin to the Darkness, why did it not always harm it, but instead (of that) it actually gave Pleasure to it? And how is the Soul which is in the midst of it (and) akin to the nature of the Light harmed by the Body? For it causes it to sin, since the [P. 112.] Bitterness (?) of the Darkness is not all like itself, as also the Pleasantness of Light is not the same in everything. For this visible Darkness by its colour confuses the eye, and does not imprison it; it is rather Satan who by Thought enslaves the Soul, and it is not the Colour (which does it), and this |lxxxv (Darkness) which has Colour has no Thought. And the Primal Darkness from which they both come, on account of its (greedy) hunger, harmed the Light which it 'passionately [Cf. pp.xxxvi. l. 17; xliv. l. 16; lxxxix. l. 26.] desired and ate, and sucked in, and swallowed, and imprisoned in its midst, and mixed in its limbs.'

And what is the nature of all of this harmful (Darkness), seeing that this Darkness, which is from it, confuses us by its Colour, and Satan, who is from it, by his Thought slew the Light, but the Primal Darkness crushed it with its teeth?

And just as this Darkness is not like itself, so neither is the Light (like itself). For this Sun by its Colour delights us, and not by its Voice, and the Soul which in his (Mani's) Teaching is akin to it (i.e., the Sun), delights by means of its Voice, and not by its Colour. And how is this Sun wanting in Thought (?), and how does the Darkness not possess Speech like its original Father? . . . the creation and learned . . . to give to them his Refining that he may bring them to the House of Life. And why does the Moon go on quietly, and why are the stars in silence? If they all come from an [P. 113, l.9] eloquent Nature, why are they not all eloquent like the Nature from which they come?

And though Bodies are from the Darkness, as they say, they have Speech and Mind (and) Beauty, and there is no . . . and as regards the lightly-moving Luminaries which are from an Element endowed with Speech which shuts up their mouths like a scorpion ... let them be refuted concerning the Luminaries (and shown) that because they are lamps created for our service, the Sun and Moon are rightly deprived (?) of Speech. For by Speech [our superiority in the rank of creatures is clearly demonstrated and the Luminaries are] for our service, God . . . [so the Luminaries] are found against them, so that though they do not wish it they establish the word which Moses wrote. For when God created everything for the service of man, and that he might show that creatures were created to serve him, He did not give them Speech and Mind as (He did) to him that their inferiority |lxxxvi might prove about them that they were certainly for service, as, also, the superiority of man proves concerning him that he [P. 114, l.4.] is certainly to be served. And not only harmful creatures did He create for the service of Adam ; for it might be thought that if they were harmful they might be able to cause him harm, on this account God created those creatures which are fierce, and those which are terrible, and those which are cruel, and those which are harmful, in order that the sovereignty of Adam might be seen, set over all like that of God. But he possessed this power over them before he sinned, but they received this power against him after he had sinned. Therefore God said, let us make man in our Image, that is in the Image of His authority, so that just as the authority of God rules over all so also the yoke of Adam's lordship had been set over everything.

Let them tell us, therefore--those who speak against the God of Moses--how they speak against that Scripture to the Truth of which they themselves are witnesses. For the Scripture declares that God gave to man dominion and [P. 115, l. 8.] authority over the earth, and behold now . . . [we see] that it is so, but, according to the scripture of the Heretics, it is not only to man that they give honour and dominion, but to all the Parts of the Light, because they say "they are from one Great and Glorious Essence." And because they desired to give worship to those that serve, those Manichaeans are sun-worshippers, who have compelled mankind who ought to be served to offer worship to the things of creation. Consider, then, how they are refuted by the things of creation. For it is a fact (lit., found) that they have magnified the Sun and the Moon more than mankind. Let them tell us which is greater--a thing that is excellent by its Light and its Effulgence, or a thing which is excellent by its Reason and Knowledge. For if a thing that is excellent by Light is superior, let them blot out their scriptures and annul their doctrines, and put their words to silence, and deny their faith and sit down and weep for themselves.

And why have they not Radiance like fire, if that Radiance is excellent? So that they may also be asked (this question) |lxxxvii --if they are from that Effulgent Nature, why have they not the Radiance of their kinsman? If, therefore, some one produces a fire in a desert by the rubbing of a flint, or of something else, that he may make there a great flame from a great heap--of the two, (namely), that great fire which has a great Radiance, and the small mortal who has an excellent Mind, which is the greater? For if the rays [P. 116, l. 21.] of the fire have suffered(?) themselves to be confined for a long time, the hidden beams of the Mind (are such that) this creation has no power against them that they should be confined by it. For a lamp which can be confined in the midst of a vessel can prove concerning every Light that exists, that it can be confined in some hollow or other. But there is no hollow to confine the Mind ; for it is confined in the body, and more excellent than it; and in the midst of creation, and is more than it; and in the hollow of creation, and it has no power against it; for it is limitless because even unto God who is not limited its extent reaches.

Let them, therefore, either be persuaded honestly, or let them be vehemently plied with questions : either man is more honourable than all, and all created things are assigned for his service, or else there is one head (?), the nature of Light, as they say. Why, then, are the Parts of this Light which are in a deaf man, deaf-mutes, and those which are in a blind man are changed into their opposite (i.e., become Darkness). and those which are in a dumb man are silent, and those which are in a scorpion inject poison. And if the Evil (principle) [P. 117, l. 19.] has prevailed and overcome them, behold in doves and in lambs the Good Parts are many, why, therefore, are those in a dove not cunning, and those in lambs not wise? And so it is discovered that Darkness possesses cunning and wisdom . . . because this Darkness is cunning . . . the Good Nature . . . So also at all times the simplicity of that [L. 43.] Good Nature has been conquered, and is conquered by this cunning of that evil Nature. For it has both power and [P. 118] |lxxxviii wisdom. For a lion shows, and a wolf and a dragon, that they are cunning and crafty, and that they are wise and strong ; just as a lamb, together with a dove, shows that they are weak and simple. So that simpleness and weakness show an inclination towards that Nature whose Parts are numerous in them. But if they bring other illustrations (to prove) that the Darkness bears witness to its own weakness,--for it always fails before the Light,--they have (thereby) refuted and discredited the starting-point of their doctrine, though they do not perceive it. For there they relate how the Darkness conquered the Light and 'swallowed it.'

But perhaps, they are glorying over this, that they enchant the serpent and charm the scorpion, and "the cunning of the serpent is conquered by Enchantment, and the poison of the scorpion is charmed and conquered with it (i.e., the serpent)." Wise are these investigators whose wisdom has conquered even the cunning of the serpent--that is to say, their wisdom is mocked at by the cunning of the Devil! For [P. 119.] the Devil himself is enslaved that he may enslave, and he subjects himself to be their slave so as to become their lord. For he subjects himself in those things which do not harm him in order that they may be subject to him in tliose things which cause their death. For the Devil himself, on account of his subtlety, enters into the serpent as he was concealed in it from the beginning, and as those of the house of Adam thought that a serpent was speaking with them; and because they were not willing to contemplate the invisible (being), who had taken up his abode in it (i.e., the serpent), they were drawn after the external (audible) voice which called them. But when they thought that they were obeying the serpent, they became the disciples of Satan who was in it, and they did not perceive it. But let us pass on with few words, because there is no time to finish the whole account of the Serpent. But even if we turn from the account of it, we come again to the account of his disciples--as it were from the Serpent to the sons of the Serpent. So since the Devil does everything by means of a serpent, at that time of Enchanting the Devil [P. 120.] does not reveal himself that he is there. For he knows that they |lxxxix flee from him because he is hateful. But he causes it to be supposed concerning the serpent that it is made subject to the Enchantment in order that they may believe that that Enchantment is from God, so that while they are persuaded on account of the serpent to learn Enchantment, they may be persuaded to serve Satan by means of Enchantment.

Let us ask, therefore, the Sons of the Serpent (i.e., the Heretics), concerning the serpent as to how it is persuaded, or how it is enslaved by Enchantment, seeing that other natures, although they are Sons of the Evil One, as they say. are not persuaded by Enchantment. And how is that a single Nature, part of which is conquered and part of it not? If that Enchantment is powerful, why did it not enslave all the Parts of the Evil One? And if that Evil One is too powerful for Enchantment, [weak and feeble] is whoever was persuaded. And if the power of the Good (Being) is mixed in the Enchantment and the name of the True (Being) associated with it so that it (the Enchantment) becomes a weapon whereby serpents and scorpions [S. Luke x.19.] and all the power of the Enemy may be overcome, then (we may ask) was there not a single sorcerer or enchanter in the Domain of the Good (Being) who might have gone forth and enchanted that great Dragon which was assaulting them in the beginning? [P. 121.] But, perhaps, the Sons of the Light had not yet learnt this Enchantment. And from whom then does this discovery come after a time? For owing to the lack of this Enchantment perhaps, which had not yet been learnt that All-devouring¹ (Serpent, [Cf. pp. xxxvi. l. 17; xliv.l. 16; lxxxv. l. 4.] or Dragon) was not bound which crawled forth from its Domain and swallowed the innocent ones, the Sons of the Light. And what authority did Jesus give his disciples to conquer serpents and scorpions--the authority of Enchantment or the authority of Faith? And if Faith is from God, He (thereby) asserts that Enchantment is from Satan. He, therefore, by his cunning arranged such fetters as these, allowing himself to be bound in order to bind; so that when they come to bind him by Enchantment he may turn and bind them by impiety. |xc

And how do they say 'the Primal Man'? For even with regard to the name of this one they go far astray. For they are content to understand the Scriptures in a perverse way. For the passage is written in the Gospel that "the Life is the Light [P. 122.] of man"; but the Greek Gospel explains that the Life is the Light of men. They have combined and made from the word 'man,' ² as it is written in the Syriac (the explanation) that this (word) refers to a (single) man, that is the Primal Man, the Father of the Five Shining Ones whom they call ZIWANE (the Bright Ones).

And those things which Bardaisan makes (i.e., considers to be) five Entities, Mani makes (to be) from a single Essence. And this conflict is not ours. For it is right for us to lift ourselves from between two serpents in order that they may fight with one another for the victory which is itself altogether a defeat in other respects. Because Mani was unable to find another way out, he entered, though unwillingly, by the door which Bardaisan opened.

For because they saw that this Body is well put together, and that its seven senses are arranged in order, and that there is in the heart an instrument for the impulses of the Soul, and that there is in the tongue a harp of speech, they were ashamed to speak blasphemy against it (i.e., the Body) in plain terms, and they had recourse to cunning, and divided it into two parts. But they suppose that its nature (?) is from Evil, and its workmanship [P. 123.] from the Archons, and the cause of its arrangement is from Wisdom. And she (i.e., Wisdom) showed an image of her own beauty to the Archons, and to the Governors, and she deceived them thereby so that when they were stirred up to make (something) in imitation of what they saw, each of them should give from his treasure whatever he had; and that owing to this cause their treasures should be emptied of what they had snatched away.

And since Mani saw in this place that he was not able to cross the river at any other place, he was forced to come and cross where Bardaisan crossed. For he, too, spoke thus concerning |xci the Primal Man : "By means of the image which he showed to the Sons of the Darkness he compelled them."

And because here they both say the same thing, the same thing may be said against them both, so that by means of the Truth which is not divided against itself, the two divided ones may be overcome, (the two) who in this passage have clothed themselves with (a semblance of) agreement against the Truth. But a single passage which the true Apostle spoke dissolves their fabrications without trouble. For he said that 'your Bodies are temples of God. and whoever shall destroy [1 Cor. vi. 19.] the temple of God, him will God destroy.' If, therefore, the Body belongs to corruption, as they say, who cut off hope as [1 Cor. iii.16, 17.] regards their Bodies, why is he destroyed who destroys it, seeing [P. 124.] that even when he does not destroy it the Body pertains to corruption? But if he is destroyed who destroys it, it is clear that its Architect and Regulator is God, and not the Sons of the Darkness as Mani said, nor the foolish Governors as Bardaisan said.

Single inverted commas are used in numerous cases where the words seem to be quotations or to belong to a special terminology.

Words in italics inside square brackets are to be regarded as conjectural translations or paraphrases.

In a few passages, where the text has suffered great mutilation, italics indicate an attempt to summarise the argument from suggestions in the fragments.]

[P.101] indicates page 101 of the accompanying Syriac. [l.2] means line 2 of the current page of the accompanying Syriac. [RP]

1. ¹ Lit., "that which sucks in (its prey)"--the word is found in the Hymn of the Soul, see 'Texts and Studies,' Vol. V., part 3, p. 12, 136, and p. 20, 586. Wright translated "loud breathing." The rendering given above is based on the passages to which reference is made in the margin.

2. ¹ Ephraim means that the Syriac word may be taken either as singular or plural.

THE FIFTH DISCOURSE AGAINST THE FALSE TEACHINGS.

BUT true obedience is the likeness of a pure betrothed (maiden), who is not drawn after the voices of strangers; and the ear which turns aside a little from the Truth is like the Adulteress who turns aside from her consort; and the ear which is led to all Teachings is like the harlot who is persuaded by every one [P. 124, l.38.] who calls her. Let us, therefore, refute that erring obedience which is infected by the words of the liar, which, instead of the name of the true Bridegroom, loves the name of its corrupter. For it has consented that the name of Mani should be proclaimed over it, and not the name of the Messiah.

And because this is the Teaching which comes from the party of Marcion and Valentinus and Bardaisan and he is the last of all, that is to say, the dregs, lower than that above him, so this one (i.e., Mani) is more abominable than those before him. But in the evil times of the world this Teaching has sprung up in the world's latter time. And because it has fought much against the Truth, let us speak a little against it, and it is not [P. 125, l.18.] we, but the Truth which speaks against it. But the substance of this Teaching while appearing small and insignificant to those simple ones who are not acquainted with it is like the hole which the Blessed Ezekiel saw in the wall. For though that hole was insignificant and small, great evils and numerous abominations and the secret things of shame were inside it. [Ezek.viii. 8.] But that passage (of Scripture) which commanded Ezekiel to dig in the wall which was a veil over the hateful things, by the power of that holy passage, let us also remove the veil of this foul teaching so that the hated things inside it may be exposed. |xciii But I do not wish to speak of all of them because they are [P. 126.] unclean, just as the holy Prophet was unable to make his mouth a channel for the hateful filth. . . .

But let us be like the illustrious Prophet (observing) how, as often as it was possible for him to say (something), he said (it); also (let us observe) what he said, also that he did not (utter) all these things, but only some of them, those things which are omitted being intelligible to the wise by means of these things which are uttered. Therefore the holy Voice commanded [Ezek. viii. 9, 10.] the Prophet obedient in everything (and said) 'go in and see the great abominations which they are doing here.' And he went in and saw all the idols of the House of Israel portrayed on the wall. So also Mani painted in colours on a scroll — as some of his disciples say—the likenesses of the wickedness which he created out of his mind, placing on hideous (pictures) the name of the Sons of the Darkness that it might declare to his disciples the ugliness of the Darkness that they might abhor it, and placing on beautiful things the name of the Sons of the Light "in order that its beauty may in itself indicate to them that they should [P. 127.] desire it," as he said, "I have written them in books and pictured them in colours; let him who hears them in words also see them in an image, and let him who is unable to learn them from . . . learn them from pictures." And perhaps he actually worships these likenesses which are pictured there.

But the Voice said again to the Prophet: [Ezek. viii. 13, 14.] 'Turn again and see greater abominations than these'; and he went in and saw women sitting and weeping for Tammuz. And wherein was this abomination greater than the first ones except that those images of heathenism were considered to be images of the living God, whereas here Tammuz is being worshipped and bewailed, idle and adulterous as he is? So on this account this abomination was greater than those. And, therefore, corresponding to those vain mourning women who were bewailing the god Tammuz who was slain on account of his adultery by a wild boar,—whom, moreover, they suppose to be a god,—come see here also those idle women of the party of Mani—those whom they call [P. 128.] 'the Righteous Ones' (ZADDIQATHA), because they multiply wickedness. For they also are idle, and sit on account of the Bright |xciv Ones (ZIWANE), the Sons of the Light, "whom the Darkness came forth and swallowed."

[Ezek. viii.15, 16.] Again He who commanded said to him who was commanded : "Turn again and see greater abominations than these"; and he went in and saw between the porch and the altar—for beside the porch was built the altar of their offerings—"about twenty-five men with their backs to the Temple of the Lord." But by the word 'backs' he means their nakedness. And by reason of this ignominy which they displayed over against the Temple of the Holy One, this sin was greater than the first ones, and the middle ones; and these, it is said, were rising early and worshipping the Sun. And in the case of these it is written that they worshipped only the Sun; but Mani went on to teach his disciples to worship the Moon. For they worship the Sun and the Moon, luminaries by which those who worehip them become dark. But when the Sun comes to the West [P. 129.] they worship the West, as do the Marcionites their brethren. For it was right that by this worship the common kinship should be manifested. And because the name of . . .

[L. 20.] who said . . . that a place (?) limits him who can be limited; [L. 27.] they wish (?) to flee from him. . . . For if the heaven is enclosed (?) by a gulf which any one wishes to cross . . . [L. 33.] how much more exceedingly is He in every place whom gulfs and places are not able (to contain)! But these abominations which Ezekiel saw, perhaps they are allegories . . . the Manichaeans believe thus. For he assumed at the beginning two Entities and two Domains, and two Elements, and two Roots. Let him, therefore, be asked about the two if there are only two; [P. 130, l.4.] for each of these two because it is a single thing, must be altogether like itself. But if there is in it anything which is not like it, it is falsely called one. For it is clear that that thing which is not like it in nature is not part of its nature. Let us hear, therefore, when he explains (the change of) one into many which are not like it in nature, nor is it like them, nor are these like those. And first of all he assumes a Space, and how is a Space |xcv like God? For one limits and the other is unlimited; and one confines and the other is not confined; and the one has Personality and Knowledge and Power and Wisdom, and in Him (?) are Grace and Freedom, and the other has none of these things, though concerning the nature of the Space there is an undeniably great discussion. For not only is the Space not like God, but [neither is it like] itself (i.e., homogeneous), (being) [Cf. p.lxxvi.18 ff.] dark and luminous as they say it is there. And let the discussion be choked by means of inquiry, and this is the noose which they have thrown round their own necks. For let them [P. 131.] be asked concerning that Space, whether half of it is dark and half of it luminous, and whether half of it is good and half of it is evil, and whether its sides which are towards the Good are like the Good, and its gulfs which are towards the Bitter are like the Darkness. If they say that the half of it towards the Good is Good, and the half of it towards the Evil is Evil, this is difficult to accept; for since that Space which confines both of them is one, how is half of it good, and half of it evil? For they cannot make two (separate) Spaces, and suppose a third Space between Space and Space. Concerning the property of this third Space there is a third inquiry as to what it is, and whose it is, and whom it resembles. For of necessity, that Space which confines is one, and many differences and boundaries are found in the midst of it. For boundaries do not bound and limit Space as if it came to an end, but they bound things in the midst of Space, that is to say. either houses or cities or lands or mountains or plains or kingdoms or peoples who are bounded one with another by the sea or [P. 132.] dry land.

But if they say that that Space is altogether the same (i.e., homogeneous), though (?) it is stretched over the Good and over the Evil, it is clear that either it belongs to both of them or that both of them belong to it. For by the one yoke which fell upon the two Entities they have become subject to those two, (namely), the great yoke which ruled over them (?) And, therefore, even the distinct are not distinct. For the equal yoke cast upon them does not allow them to escape from being themselves conformed to its equality, except in this respect, (namely), |xcvi that a person who is in the midst of Space cannot occupy the whole of that Space.

And if it be not so, fashion in thy mind that whoever is in the midst of that Space, and has a body must necessarily be limited also. For the place which limits him is greater than he is. But anything which is not in Space cannot be limited; there is no Space to limit it.

And on this account that pre-eminence which the Teachings give to Space, the true Teaching gives to God, because He is His own Space. For greater are the praises which Bardaisan uttered concerning Space than those which he uttered concerning the God in the midst of Space, which (praises) are not suitable [P. 133, l.10.] for Space, but for God. For if they are suitable for Space their Space is found to be more excellent than their God. But the true word (i.e., piety) demands praises as it demands acts of worship, and presents them to the one great and adorable (Being). For as it is not right to worship idols that there may not be many gods with the One, so it is not right to bestow the title of 'Existence' on Space along with God. And as it is not right to postulate another power which is able to command God, so it is not right to postulate a Space which is able to limit God. For if He is made subservient in one respect, this is a great blasphemy. For, as He does not command all if He is commanded, so He does not limit all if He is limited. For if the (title of) Commander is necessary to His lordship, the (title of) Space is also necessary. [P. 134.] For if all commanders are under His command, as they say, all places too are included within His greatness, as we say, that is, as the Truth requires.

But he went on to say that that God has also a Luminous Earth, and that He dwells upon it. And as he made Him depend upon Space, so he made Him depend upon an Earth. For he did not say that that Earth was a thing made and arranged for the sake of His possessions : as the true Prophet [Is. xlv.18.] said concerning the true God : 'not in vain did he create it, but that His Creation might dwell in it.' And as He made the Earth for the lower beings He made Heavens for the higher beings, and those things and these (exist) for the sake of beings |xcvii made and created, spiritual and corporeal. For He before His creation was not dependent upon a Heaven on which to dwell, nor upon a Space (or Domain) within which to be.

But as for Mani and Marcion, the one before, the other after, with Bardaisan in the middle, one inquiry is directed against the three of them. But let Marcion be asked first as (being) the first—if those Heavens actually exist for the Stranger it is clear that he is not one Entity, but two unlike one another. And if a Space surrounds him, then again there are three Entities, and the Space is not like the Heavens, nor do they both resemble God. God is found to be weak and inferior to the two of them. [P. 135, l.14.] For it is found that a Space surrounds him as being an inferior, and that the Heavens bear him up as being weak, not to mention other things which we shall not give at length, which indeed refute Mani also. For he names a Space and an Earth along with God as an actual existence. But Bardaisan (who was) in the middle and (was) clever, chose one and rejected the other; and this (he did) in order that he might thereby refute his neighbour, and he did not know that that of which he was ashamed is the companion of that which he affirmed. For he said concerning God that He is in the midst of Space, but he does not [attribute actual existence to the Heavens as Marcion did [L. 41.] nor to a Luminous Earth as Mani]. . . . [Yet in his Teaching like them he limited God. For he made Space] support God [L. 48.] and he did not know that there is something outside God which [P. 136.] surrounds him; (and that) there is something beneath God which bears him up. . . . a self existent Space like God. For [L. 11.] both of them exist also, so that either the latter was dissolved like the former, or the former was established like the latter.

But, again, Mani goes on to make many things, five Natures which he calls ZIWANE (the Bright Ones). And how, if he assumes two Roots, can there be many (beings) confined in the midst of each of them? For how from [one source can such diverse objects come as Light and Water. Wind and Fire?] . . . These show concerning their nature as also Water and Light show that their Root is not a single one. The fashioner of this Teaching [L. 39.] was foolish even if he was clever. For he says (there are) two |xcviii [P. 137.] Roots that we (?) may not say to him as Bardaisan said, (namely, that there are) five Roots (one) above (the other). . . .

[L. 18.] divide one Nature into many Natures those which are composite. . . . And this is the refutation of those two [that Water and Fire and the other Bright Natures would injure one another [L. 23.] if they existed together as neighbours] . . . without the contact of the Darkness which he represents as the opposite of the Entities, those Entities are found to be injurers of one another if they are really in existence. For thus their Existence demands, and so experience proves. But if they were created [P. 138.] from nothing, the Will of the Maker is able to make them be at peace with one another, and to part ¹ them (in anger) one from another, when they were injuring, and being injured.

And, therefore, let us inquire briefly concerning these two Roots, leaving on one side many questionings in their statements, (let us ask) whether they (i.e., the Entities) were in contact with one another, or far from one another, or whether one was below or above the other. And if he says that one was opposite to the other, then Marcion and Bardaisan are more subtle than he. For Bardaisan supposes that the Darkness was beneath, below everything; and Marcion represents the Stranger as being above everything. Therefore (it may be said), that if that Space in which they all dwell is one, and the length of that Space is immeasurable, and its breadth infinite, what (is meant by saying) that all those Entities were dwelling in the same neighbourhood, and one above the other or one behind the other? Was there not a chance that they would be scattered and be far from one another in that Space which is infinite?

So this proves concerning their Teaching that it is the elaborate arrangement of men. For the cause of this nearness of their Gods who are near to one another is evidently this, (namely), that it is because the false (Teachers) are near to one another; on this account they bring their Gods together. And because they are imprisoned in the midst of one hollow of |xcix Creation, therefore they have imprisoned their Gods within one Space. And because they are not able to go outside of [P. 139, l.19.] this world, lest the argument should be brought against them 'Whence did you perceive their Gods'? they have managed to construct causes which result in their Gods being in the midst of this world so that the effect might be that from these Gods they received the revealed Teaching concerning their secrets. And as children who play on a wide staircase, when one sits on the lowest step his companion, in order to anger him, sits on the middle step, and in order to resist both another sits on the upper step, even such are the heralds of Error. To [P. 140.] resist each other they have named Places some of which are more compressed (i.e., lower) than others, and Gods who are higher than their companions. In the sport of children the (same) story (?) is found. For children who are older than one another have ranks one above another. But they (the Teachers) have named empty Domains and idle Gods who do not exist, and futile stories which have no root.

And because Mani saw that before him his two elder brethren, namely Marcion and Bardaisan, that one had said, 'below'² and the other 'above'—because he saw that if he said 'below,' that had been said; and if he said 'above,' he saw that it was not new (lit., ancient), not knowing how he should represent the two Entities which he introduced, when he saw that (the arrangement of them) above and below was taken, he represented them as being one opposite the other on a level.

For he, too, prophesied by the spirit of his brethren, and [the afore-mentioned . . .] HULE ³ (i.e., Matter) is found in all of them, for it is only in the Church that it is not found. And if HULE belongs to the evil Existence as they affirm [and because the Church does not preach HULE in the Church, HULE is not in the Church, because it is not in the Scriptures of the Church], among all of them it (i.e., HULE) is altogether because it is all [P. 141, l.6.] found in their Scriptures. |c

And if Mani and Bardaisan have called the Maker God, perhaps a way might have come to them to call HULE also (God). For it is the cause of the Making as they say. As for Marcion who compelled him to rend again his tunic and dance with the wanton. . . .? For if he says concerning the Stranger that he is not the Maker this would be sufficient to put him in error. For he said that the Good One came—he who did not make (things)—and gave life to the Sons of the Maker; and because he had no property in the realm of the Creator it would not be necessary for him to undertake the cause of HULE. And if in order to show that the Maker tricked HULE the Stranger Himself did not keep faith with him when he came, and transferred by fasting and prayer the bodies which were from HULE, and after he worked all this work in them he sent them by death to the realm of HULE, he removed them without [P. 142.] compensating the Maker in that he raised the bodies of Enoch and Elijah to Heaven, and promised resurrection in his Scriptures [Dan. xii.13.] as He said to Daniel, 'Go, rest till the end, and thou shalt stand in thy time at the end of the days.' And who forced Marcion to introduce the subject of HULE except HULE herself, For she who is preached could not fail to make a revelation concerning her name by the mouth of her Preachers.

And, therefore, this HULE which is found in them all is a sign set upon all of them, so that by one sign set upon all of them they may be known to be all one. But wild asses are weak against a strong lion. When they see him they verily gather against him as one who is strong, and victorious, but he rends one and as for the many who have gathered, he scatters all of them by means of one. The Truth also in its splendour when it conquers one of the false (Teachers), by means of that one who fails, defeats all those who have gathered together. For all who are in Error are limbs one of another. But when a [P. 143.] body is caught by one of its limbs, the limbs also which are not caught are caught by the one which is caught. For it is [S. John x. 8.] written concerning those former deceivers, " All those who have come are thieves and robbers." But blessed is he who is able to bear insult (lit., that which stirs indignation), and blessed is he again whom their insult does not reach at all, so as to perturb him. |ci

But what insult is greater than this of the Heretics who say that the Good is "refined little by little and goes up"? O the unspeakable madness! For it would be right that some other Good should be added to the first in order that the Evil Constituent might be weaker so that it might not prevail over it and drown the world. But they are like fruits whose exterior, when they are dry, deceives those who see them. But when they are squeezed between two hard things, then the dryness within them is convincingly revealed. These (men) also are set between two true words so that all their long fabrication is dissolved briefly.[P. 144.]

For if the Evil which is mixed in us, as they say, injures Us, then one of these two things can be, either that that Evil can be separated from us that it may not hurt us, or the Good Constituent may increase in us so that the Evil which is in us may be weakened so that it may not kill us. But I had wished to repeat this statement, (?) not that when it is repeated this statement gains power, but that when it is repeated the Hearer gains power . . . because those Hearers whose [L. 28.] faithfulness has opened their ears even from one . . . receive it. But such Hearers . . .

If, therefore, . . . is mixed in the Evil Element, the Souls [P. 145, l.12.] are existing in an evil condition, how can they exist in a good condition when the force of Evil increases in them? For in proportion as the Good (Element) 'is refined and goes up,' so the Evil (Element) becomes fierce, and goes down. And just as that Good which has been 'refined,' and has 'gone up' is . . . and victorious (?) and reigns, so that other Good which is left behind is [defeated] and stifled. For the victory which is gained by those Souls who have been 'refined,' and have 'gone up' has (only) increased the defeat of those Souls who are left behind. For in proportion as all (?) the Parts of the Light have been mixed as one . . . in Evil they would lessen the Evil by their quantity so that it might not stifle them. Therefore, just as |cii those Souls which are 'refined and go up,' are victorious and exultant (?) so those Souls which are left behind are defeated [P. 146.] and stifled; but not even now are the Souls able to be refined, and to go up because the Foulness of Evil lies heavily upon them.

Because that other Power (of Good) comes and is not confused, it is clear that it is not of the same nature as these Souls which are stifled. And instead of these Souls coming who struggled with the Evil, why at the first did not that Power come whose nature cannot be overwhelmed by 'the Floods of Evil'? But if that Power is found to be of the same nature as those Souls that are overwhelmed, it is evident without dispute that by means of that Foulness which 'intoxicated' them he who comes is perturbed.

And, therefore, accordingly to this infallible refutation and undeniable evidence and unanswerable demonstration and experience which neither errs nor causes to err, Marcion, too, and Mani and Bardaisan, because they were clothed with the Body which they represent as from the Element of Evil, were unable to be good in it, because, as they say, it is from the Evil One, nor (could they be) upright, because it is vicious; nor (could they be) true, because it lies; nor (could they be) pure, [P. 147, l.9.] because it is turbid. And let them not be angry because these things have been spoken against them by us. For their mouth overthrows them, not our tongue; and their Teaching, not our Will; and their Error, not our free Choice. For they said that the Body comes from the Element of Evil and lies; and it is clear that because their Souls were playing on this hateful harp, the 'intoxicating Foulness of the Body' did not allow the melody of Truth to be played on its strings. And, therefore, they have decided against themselves that they are preachers of Error, owing to the fact that they are mixed in the Body which comes from Error according to their decision. For it (i.e., the Body) speaks against them.

But if, as we say, the Soul is able by means of the senses |ciii of the Body to hear the Truth, and to speak what is right,—for to us, who are Sons of the Church, the function of teaching properly belongs, inasmuch as we confess, according to the Preaching of the Prophets and Apostles, that the Body is akin to all the beauties of the Soul, and is a partner with it in all good things, since it is able to learn by means of it, and teach by means of it,—it (i.e., the Body) is, as it were, a trumpet for it; for by its (i.e., the Body's) mouth, it (i.e., the Soul) preaches Truth in the World, and it is a pure harp for it, by means of which it sounds forth Truth in creation. For along with it (i.e., the Body) the [P. 148, l.15.] Soul is adorned just as along with it the Soul is defiled. For they are alike in the matter of gain and loss, in every respect like friends they suit one another. For (they come) to the struggle like companions and to the (victor's) crown as partners, even if it is thought that it (i.e., the Soul) contends in it (i.e., the Body) against it. But it does not escape the notice of a wise (Hearer) that the triumph is on behalf of both. For when the Body is chaste and the Soul chaste it is a common gain, just as also when the Soul is impure and the Body impure it is a common loss. And nature shows about this that when they are foul they are both called by one Evil name, and when they are fair they are both called by one good name. And if both . . . that they both teach . . . For it is the speech [P. 149, ll.1, 4, 8.] of it all. And when it (i.e., the Soul) is . . . it (i.e., the Body) is. . . . For . . . which are from them and in them and other [Ll. 11, 14.] things which are not from them are not spoken convincingly (?) against them. . . . Obedience . . . by persuasion . . . in him [Ll. 18, 20.] who is not persuaded. For by the visible limbs of the Body the invisible movements of the Mind (are known. . . .)

For just as the Body is beside (?) its real (?) Shadow so also the Soul is beside the Body. For the Shade (?) of the Body has no power apart from its Body, upon its movement (it is dependent), nor has the Body any power apart from the Soul, upon its guidance in everything . . .

[P. 150, l.12.] And, perhaps, because of . . . which is between the Body and the Soul there is this . . . . Shadow so that by the visible Shade the invisible strife may be scattered. For if the Shade |civ [shows itself the servant of the Body] . . . the Body, too, proclaims who can influence it according to its power. For they teach by means of one another that in teaching . . . But the symbols (?) . . . which thou hast heard are not in the case of everything. For behold the real Body. . . .

[L. 37.] Why is the Shadow loved just as also the Body is loved? No, and why not?—because the Shadow is not able to hear and see like the Body. But the Body lives with the Soul. . . . [P. 151.] For . . . spring up and are seen by means of it. For the Shadow cannot see or hear, either with the Body or apart from it. But the Body sees without its Shadow, without it it (i.e., the Body) hears and speaks; it does not exist with it and by means of it; it does not hang in it when it is weary. But the Soul and the Body exist one in the other, and one of them cannot exist apart from its companion.

But let us introduce subjects into the midst of other subjects in order that they all may tend to edification. Let us ask the Heretics who lay hold of the Soul and leave the Body, though the Soul in its love and conduct has not forsaken the Body. But the Body exists between the two of them—between the Soul and the Shadow—one invisible within, the other outside it—they are both bound in this middle vessel. The Shadow is the contemptible object, but the Soul is the glorious object. But if the Body is something dependent, it is not dependent on the Shadow that it should borrow anything from the Shades. For it uses its own limbs as real objects. But the Soul which is great and perfect, how is it altogether dependent [P. 152.] on the Body? For it can do nothing without it. For hearing enters into it by the ears, smell comes to it by the body's inhalation, it (i.e., the Soul) sees forms through the Body's eyes, it tries tastes with the Body's mouth, with the Body's heart it discerns knowledge, and with the whole of it all manner of things. By the touch of its fingers it obtains a great and subtle perception, it touches with the finger the veins,and learns things that are invisible. It describes everything that |cv is in a diseased Body as if it (i.e., the Soul) had entered into it. It describes to the sick man invisible things that are concealed in him. From it he learns (the truth) concerning his ailment which he has, [the sick one does not cease to understand, the finger becomes as it were the speaking mouth;] when it calls, no one [L. 28.] hears, for it calls quite silently; it speaks with him, while those who are near at hand hear it not. It describes to him his suffering and recounts to him his trouble. And there is a passage where he said deceitfully, Likewise when the end comes, the Soul learns all these perceptions by means of the Body; and just as these things which are here are learnt by means of it, so likewise these things which are to come are acquired in conjunction with it. And if these things which are to come are more subtle than the Body in accordance with the places [P. 153.] (in which they are), so it (i.e., the Body) will undergo change. For that Will which made it gross for the gross purpose which is here present, made for it that Spiritual abode which is yonder. When Elijah was on the Earth he lived as an earthly one, and he was taken up to the Spiritual (abode) . . . from the earthly (sphere) . . . above the Heavens. For during forty days he disciplined his body by the rigour of fasting . . . [L. 18.] he did not hunger nor did he thirst when he was running . . . [L. 21.] in the Body after him . . . [L. 25.]

[who . . . true from the Scriptures for he receives the truth by [L. 37.] Experience, and whoever is true, from the . . . Scriptures declares the truth]. For the Mind was sufficient for the Soul apart from the Body; the Mind does not find the Body apart from the Soul; the Soul was not sufficient for it; it acquired [P. 154.] Understanding on account of the Body, nor does the Body bring it to an end since by means of its Soul it (i.e., the Body) acquired Animal-Life, by means of one another they acquire for one another, and they are a mirror of one another. And just as they both perceived each other by the Mixing of both of them together, so also by means of death they both forget each other.

If the Soul has Thought without the Body, has it need also? And if motion and action exist, it is likewise not in need of the Body. And if it is not in need (of it), how was it compelled |cvi to clothe itself with the Body? And if it clothed itself (with the Body) because it was compelled, it (i.e., the Soul) awaits it (i.e., the Body) in the Resurrection so that in both worlds it (i.e., the Body) may be to it (i.e., the Soul) a brother and a servant and a companion.

But if it has a Soul of its Nature (?) why is it dependent upon an alien (Body)? And if it pleased the Animal-Life to put on the Coat of Skin, over whom is its skin (laid), since its skin is related to skin? How pleasing it was to the subtle Nature of the Soul to put on the gross Coat of the vile Body! But it was vile according to their account. But it was [P. 155.] not vile because the Soul praises him who clothed it with the rational covering of intelligent Senses in order that one might regulate the other by Knowledge.

And what can give it that alien Sense which is mixed in it, seeing that, as they say, it is an alien nature? And if it is alien it is opposed to it. But, if he had given it blindness (?) and not sight he would then be depriving it of sight.

For the Body has a Shadow; as a despised thing it . . . it, it does not call it (i.e.. the Shadow) into its good things nor bring it into its evil things. But what has happened to the Soul [that it made the Body its companion, and makes it such an intimate . . .?]

And even the dream which it (i.e., the Soul) sees apart from [L. 33.] it (i.e., the Body) when it (i.e., the Body) is asleep, when it awakens and . . . [the Soul requires the Body to tell of the dream it has seen; the dream really comes from both of them], [L. 43.] The dream, therefore, which it sees apart from the Body the Soul does not (really) see apart from it; by it (i.e., the Body) and with it and in the midst of it and in . . . [the Soul has its dream] [P. 156, l. 6.] . . . [they depend upon each other, in slumber and in sleep they are not separated from one another] since they [L. 12.] are mingled with each other. But in death . . . they are separated, and . . . from one another—as they were mixed together [in hope . . . on their Resurrection—since they have their Resurrection as a dream so that just as after their sleep Recollection (?) comes to both, so after death. . . .] |cvii

(And when) the Body has slumbered the Soul forgets that it is in its . . . when . . . it sees [gold], and yet it is not [L. 28.] gold, it sees silver, and yet it is not silver, it does not know itself where it goes astray . . . with its (i.e., the Body's) senses, [L. 34.] and it becomes like the pure (ideal form) (?) which he left behind . . .

[And above (in the other world) if its companion left it when rational and went to sleep, it lost all its memory,—when it entered the Body and was clothed with the senses, then it gained perception, and it sees even in a dream because it has the Body; but it loses its senses in death. Nor does that thing left behind (SHARKANA) [P. 157 l.2.] come to it. For if sleep deprived the SHARKANA of all its memory, would not death . . . as it is simple too. How did the Soul enter the Body and put on its grossness . . . For it is correctly clear that the Body does not help the Soul's going up, [Ll. 27, 28.] which he ascribes to it, nor does it receive from it its going up, which he proclaims . . . What then can be the cause of the Soul's coming down from the House of Light, so that it is born into the gross body?]

But as for the Soul . . . of its house perturbs it, as they [L. 33.] say, and all its search (?) belongs to blasphemy, and all its fullness belongs to deficiency, for "the pure Soul came into the turbid Body, so that though it was a thing which was not deficient it gained through it (i.e., the Body) very great deficiency." [P. 158.]

For if the Soul came from a Place, as they say, who know not what they say, how and why is it not able to return to its natural Place? For if it was sent forth when a child^⁴it was here that it received Understanding, and that Place which was deprived of Intelligence was abandoned (?) by it. And if when it was possessed of Knowledge it was conducted (on its way) how did it leave Understanding behind? And if the Body perturbed it and (so) it forgot, as long as it is (associated) with the Body it is forgetful.

And if it is forgetful how do the false (Teachers) teach it to |cviii remember anything that it has forgotten? It actually lost its Knowledge and a borrowed Voice teaches it (again), it lost all its Understanding, and a Buzzing (sound) in the ear makes it remember! And how does the Body not perturb that Voice which teaches it, seeing that it stands between two Bodies, (namely), between the speaker and the hearer; for it goes out of the mouth of the Body and enters the ear of the Body. And if the feeble voice of the teaching is not drowned in (passing [P. 159.] through) the innumerable ears of the Hearers, that is to say, is not confused so as to proclaim Error instead of Truth.— for, as they suppose, they proclaim Truth to their Hearers,—how much more, therefore, would the Soul which is stronger than words be able to purify the Body in which it dwells, if it (dwells) in it without uncleanness! For, moreover, one Soul has no need of another Soul to learn or to teach. For as wild beasts are not dependent on one another because that animal-life is part of their nature, so one (Soul) is not dependent upon another in (the matter of) Knowledge, because their essential Knowledge is the same, if, as they say, the Essence of all the Souls is one. But if their Knowledge is not one their Essence is not one.

But in all refutations the same Truth conquers, and is crowned, in that if the Soul is conquered by the Body, much more would teaching fail (given) through the ear. And if teaching does not fail, much more does the Soul not fail. 0 let not, therefore, the heretics teach, for teaching is futile. (?) For if the teacher does not err, how does the teaching err, seeing that they are both clothed with Bodies? And if teacher and teaching are from one Root and both are covered with the [P. 160, l. 5.] flesh, how is one bitter and another pleasant, (how does) one go astray, and another teach, one wander and another guide? And if their Root is pleasant and (yet) their perturbation is bitter, either they are bitter like the Body or pleasant like the good (Root), or they are all [bitter, and one of them is not sweet] [L. 21.] . . . or one of them does not remember. For how does he escape who escapes, and what is the cause that he (finds release) if they are all from one family, and from an Entity. . . .?

[L. 29.] And how is it a single Existence when there is from it one |cix good and another (evil). If there is Recollection in all the Root, then there is [no] Error in all the Essence. And as for the Sons of this Essence how does one fail and another conquer?—their Essence is not the same. For how does he err who errs, and his companion who is with him not err if his nature is akin (to the nature of the other)? If they are from [the same] nature, in the contest they are companions. And if on account of this Body with which he is clothed, he goes [P. 101, l.21.] astray and . . . then how does his teacher who is clothed with the Body [not] go astray like him? And if the teacher . . . [in spite of the body] is able to teach . . . he shows concerning his Soul that he exists from its power. . . . For he knows that if he taught like his companion, he would be abased. And how does he teach us. . . . that Evil is not the same since [L. 20.] from it comes one who is fierce also . . . in its part which is fierce (and) in the part which . . . it conquers.

How do the false (Teachers) teach Abodes and Places? And the Places are fashioned in their (?) minds, and are not seen (?). If the Soul has come from a Place, how did it forget its Place? But if the Body perturbed it, and it forgot its permanent Place in which it dwelt, how . . . And the Body [L. 39.] does not perturb the images (?) of the mind. . . .

But if a quantity of wine intoxicates and leads astray, [P. 102, l.18.] how (much more) will a quantity of Error intoxicate and lead astray! But if, as they say, the number of Souls constantly becomes less from day to day because they are 'refined and go up,' how are those Souls that are left behind able to conquer seeing that they are left [in the midst of a quantity of Evil which they are not able to conquer?] Why [do they not all join forces against the Evil?] Is it not clear to the blind, that when a king goes to fight a fierce battle with a numerous force . . . [he unites his force with] other forces. . . .? [Though] therefore kings wisely add . . . to their forces, in this battle which, as they say, is fiercer than these battles of ours, [P. 163, l.7.] see how the number of the Souls grows foolishly less!

But consider how foolish is the wisdom of the Teaching, nor do they know how to hide their falsehood. But how is |cx Falsehood able to hide from the face of Truth? For instead of that which they assert, (namely), "lo, the Good is refined, and goes up," it would be right that the Evil should consume away and be removed little by little and cast into another place. For in this way there would have been advantage to both sides. For that Evil which was removed hence (?) would not be able to conquer on account of its defeat, and that Evil which was left behind could have been easily conquered on account of its smallness. For in proportion as the Particles of the Evil were plucked up from day to day and removed, so the Particles of the Good would have been strengthened from hour to hour, and would have conquered.

But instead of these two desirable things which I have just mentioned, lo, on the contrary two hateful things are done. For the Good Particles which have been refined are tormented and then they escape, and the Parts which remain, see, they are tormented and are unable to escape. For their smallness is swallowed up in the abundance of the Evil. As for those, therefore, who say that Evil and Good are mixed together, and that these Constituents conquer, and are conquered, it is not right for them to weaken the Evil by Laws and Commandments. [P. 164, l. 21.] For in this way the Evil is not weakened. But they should make for themselves measures and weights, and wherever they see that the evil Constituent is great in a man, let them rather pour into him two measures of Good in order that the Constituent may outweigh the other. For thus experience in mixings teaches. For cold things are mixed in hot things in order that the heat may be mixed (?) and that they may not be . . . [And when the heat has been [L. 37.] lessened it cannot] turn [again to its fierceness]. . . .

[It must be] therefore, that, as they say that the Souls are 'refined and go up' (so also) the Evil . . . [gains power] because the numerous Parts of the Good are 'refined and go [P. 165, l. 20.] up.' . . . to those Parts which are left behind . . . How are they able to conquer? For behold the Foulness of all these their companions which have been refined has been added to them. [P. 32.] And what mouth ventures to say that these Souls [can escape from the Evil]. . . . But what mouth ventures to say that these |cxi Souls. . . . And what mouth ventures to say and to fabricate the Teaching. . . .

So that it was swallowed up in "the bitter Sea." But [P. 166, 19.] easily does the Falsehood lie which the Truth easily exposes. But if the false (Teachers) prepare again for themselves other escapes, again other bonds are prepared for them. For even if that Darkness is great in that it covers all places yet the Light is greater than it, in that it drives it from every place. But that thou mayest know that when a great quantity of the Good is mixed with Evil, then the Evil is able to conquer, let us ask them again, why of all these Particles that are mixed at present with the Evil, one drop only was not mixed with the Evil from the beginning? [P. 167.]

If they say that even one Part of all these Parts which are mixed at present would be able to conquer the Evil,how is the majority of the Parts conquered by the Evil? But if they say that the sole purpose for which the Good was mingled (with the Evil) is that it (i.e., the Good) may overcome the great quantity of the Evil, they confess, though they do not wish to do so, that when that good Constituent preponderates in its quantity then the fierceness of the Evil is conquered. Easily, therefore, does every Teaching fail which says that the Good is refined and goes up from the Evil. For addition would be necessary, and the Good would be added in order that by the quantity of the Good the fierceness of the Evil might be lessened.

But let Error be scourged by the inquiries of Truth in order that its disciples also may be confounded when they are convicted (and made to see) how greatly they err. For if, as they say, all the Souls are from one Nature, and their Nature is pure and beautiful, how can there be found in them two tendencies which are divided against one another? For there are among the Souls some who err and some who do not err; some who sin, and some who are pronounced righteous; [P. 168.] some who love the Good, and some who hate it. Let them tell us, therefore, what is the cause of this division that the Souls are thus divided against one another so that they are |cxii quite unlike, nor do they agree with the source from which they came. If their Essence is not like its Nature it is found that their source is divided against itself. And lo, in virtue of what it is, a great Evil dwells in it, and the perturbation in it cannot be purged away because it is an Essence of which, in virtue of what it is, the Foulness cannot be refined. Why then, O Mani, did not the Souls come from this Good Part to wage war with the Darkness, since before the war they had had a great war in their own Domain, inasmuch as their Essence was divided against itself?

And even of these pure Souls (it must be said that) their nature is not pure continually. But it happens even to these that they sometimes . . . [are pure and] sometimes they sin. And it is found that even in the case of this source the tendency of its nature does not always abide in it, inasmuch as its fruits are bitter and sweet.

And if they say that the Souls have Freewill, then how is their Freewill found to blaspheme against their Essence? And how also is their Will capable of being divided against their Root? [P. 169, l. 11.] And how is one Entity able to be the opposite of itself? . . . [L. 17.] And see that when half of it has a contest with its (other) [L. 26.] half . . . for its divided Will . . . with its Essence, nor is all of [L. 39.] it tasted . . . . How much more does it give evidence that in the divided fruit which comes from it, its self-contradictory character is indicated! For if that Root is homogeneous, and its Parts homogeneous, how does the Freewill which comes from it bring reproach by its fruits upon the [Father] of Souls?

[P. 170, l. 5.] And if they say that the Souls have this Freewill, and this Freewill is from the Pure One, and by the craft of Satan, this Freewill goes astray . . . and how was their wise Will taught . . . their former Freewill perished, and [they obtained] another [L. 37.] Freewill instead of the Freewill, and a Will. . . . (How is it possible) to persuade this Will which is not capable of being persuaded? But if the separation of (these) things occurred through force, and the Evil returned to its Root, and its Will also returned with it, and the Good also went to its Nature and its |cxiii Freewill was drawn away with it, while this cleansing is [P. 171.] thought to be a good thing, it is afterwards brought to nought. For there is no true foundation among the false (Teachers), and on this account the thing which is built up with trouble afterwards collapses without trouble. For, lo, it is the [opinion] of the false. (Teachers) that through their Will they always and for ever forget. (?) And how does the good Will which is mixed in them not remind them? And it was not enough that it did not remind them at all, but the reminder itself forgot along with them. And, again, how are there others who did not forget, and the Will of Error was not able to make them forget? And if these who forgot forgot because of the Body with which they were clothed, lo, these also who did not forget were clothed with the flesh.

And that thou mayest know that the Will of the Soul is always hateful, seeing that Freewill exists by virtue of its own nature, though it be not good; for Satan did not at all 'intoxicate' the Souls by means of the Foulness of his force in order that the Soul might not know when it does Evil that these things are evil. Even if it had been so it is (worthy [P. 172.] of) great blame, that, just as a thing which comes from the Pure One has a nature which may err and cause to err, and Satan mocks it as one mocks a drunkard,—and surely it was he who intoxicated the Soul and mocked it,—the Soul did not intoxicate him by its breath so that it might mock him. And as for those who as enemies were mocking at Samson (saying), Was he a Nazarite of God, seeing that all uncleanness mocked him, (was he) a strong man, seeing that a woman brought him low, and mocked at the hair of his head? the mockers of Samson were mocked; for a just inquiry mocks them, when it demands, and seeks to know how this Soul which proceeds from the Good, and this holy being which proceeds from the Pure, and this wise being which proceeds from the Knowing, and this chaste being which proceeds from the Venerable, how did the Evil One intoxicate it (i.e., the Soul), by means of his Foulness, and all this (Evil) mock it, and put |cxiv to shame its chastity and render contemptible its venerability and cause its wisdom to err, and defile its purity? And what is more than all else (is the fact) that he made a disciple of it and taught it to insult God, whom they call the Father of Souls; and Samson was so far from [P. 173.] blasphemy that he actually prayed to God. But the pure Soul though it comes from God (reviles) as they say . . . [L. 8.] and it is found . . . when it blesses God and curses its Root and reviles God its Father. . . .

[Ll. 17, 19] And what force (constrained them) . . . (they) rebel against him and become his enemies. Neither have all those Souls come thence to whom this has happened here, for they proceeded from their Father in order that they might not come (hither) and go astray from him and blaspheme against him. And if from the time when they came hither they went astray here, perhaps there would be an excuse before they came, because anything which is from the place of God. . . .

[P. 174, l. 29.] So that he restrained from blasphemy those who remained beside him, and gives victory to those who are sent from him. And he (i.e., the Good Being) would have shown his foreknowledge as one who knows all.

But if those Souls who came and rebelled, came also thence, they would know before they came that when they " came they would rebel against him. And they did not only rebel from the time when they came here, but also when they were there beside him they are found to have been rebellious against him, inasmuch as they possessed a rebellious knowledge. For one of two things is necessary, either that they [P. 175, l. 8.] knew or that they did not know. If they knew, then they would be disloyal to him, and if they did not know then on the other hand, they would have been in Error there before they came (hither), and there was always room for disloyalty and error in him; and he could not be at rest from strife even when the Enemy outside of him did not molest him. For if his enemies injure him because they are disloyal to him, then it is a division inside of him which is able to |cxv contend with him. And if he was not disloyal to himself, how are the Souls which come from him disloyal to him?

And who will [stop up] this (gushing) spring of questionings, seeing that the things which have been said are many, and those which stand are not a few? And in proportion as one contradicts this false Teaching it is found that failures are crowded in the whole of it, and, therefore, that according to their saying, their Teacher was drunk in very truth. For he fights as a drunkard who falls wherever he turns himself. [P. 176.] But for a space let us submit and accept from them the thing which the Truth cannot accept. For we will make them think that they have come to conquer in order that they may allow themselves to be justly defeated.

For suppose that the Evil One really intoxicated the Souls who went astray, is it not clear then that the thing which intoxicates our nature is akin to our nature, neither can our nature be greedily captivated and become intoxicated by means of anything except because it pleases it exceedingly? For excess in drinking proves to us the pleasantness of wine, for because it is very pleasant it has been drunk in great quantities, and because he mixed much drink the drinker became much perturbed in mind. For if we are given wine to drink, or strong liquor, or anything which is pleasant to us, it intoxicates us. Likewise, too, the Evil One, and Satan intoxicates the Soul by means of those things which are pleasant to the Soul, that is to say, by falsehood and by pride, and by arrogance, together with all hateful things. And how were things which are foreign to its nature acceptable to the Soul? For if drunkards are captivated by means of wine [P. 177.] which is akin to our nature, the Souls would not be captivated by something which is the opposite of their nature. And if we receive drugs which are fiercely opposed to our nature in (a time of) great necessity, since there is a benefit for our pains in them, how is the Soul pleased with the wicked pleasurable (things) by means of which it is assuredly made sick?

And those things which intoxicate us also take away our memory, so that the drunken ones who go astray are. not blamed; for they do not know that they are assuredly going |cxvi astray. But the Evil One who makes the Soul drunk with the pleasurable (things), cannot take from it the Recollection of the Commandments and Laws. For consider those who do the Commandment when they know the Commandment, and those who rebel against the Law (and) who are acquainted with the Law; not from lack of knowledge do Souls sin, but on account [L. 30.] of the arrogance, either of their Nature, as the false Teachers say, or of their Freewill as the true ones teach. For, though they know what righteousness is, they do evil; and though [P. 178.] they know uprightness, they commit follies; and though they know the truth, they become denied; and though they are aware of purity, they are made impure; and though an evil name is hateful to them, they take pleasure in the work of the Evil One; and though they confess the Good One, they are far from Good works. How, therefore, did the Evil One make them drunk as they say, seeing that they exist in all this perception? And if they did not know then they would not be blameworthy; but it is a very bad thing that, though they know they do not do, and though they are aware they do not practise.

And how do the Evil (Souls), who are not wont to learn, learn to do wisely, and how are the Good (Souls), who are wise by their knowledge, found to be unskilful in practice? For the Soul is untrained in that which concerns it, and its Adversary (?) is very cunning, for even . . . he compels men, for this Soul which they call 'Light,' when it practises the deeds of shame, goes into the Darkness in order to sin. And how did it turn its face from the Light its kinsman, and in Darkness perform the deeds of Darkness?

And see the Sun in their blindness they actually worship it, and the Moon—such is their madness—they greatly magnify and call it "the Ship of Light which—as they say—bears away the burden of their Refinings to the House of Life," and these Shining Ones who bear burdens, did they not bear (and) bring victorious weapons to the Souls which failed in the war . . . [who failed because they were weak, and not because] [P. 179, l. 12.] their Will did not wish to conquer? |cxvii

But if they are so weak in their Nature their Nature is put to shame. And if they go astray by their knowledge they [discredit] their Root. And if . . . by their Will they are able to conquer . . . who say concerning the Soul that it became drunk, and was compelled since . . . (Satan) made it drunk by force. . . . But if the Soul is stronger than Satan seeing that when it practises Evil it verily denies Evil and [reviles] Satan. . . . Satan did not lead and carry it captive by force . . . [for [P. 179, l.26.] captives are not accustomed] to revile the king who takes them captive, and servants are afraid of their lords and disciples of their teachers. But how is the Soul not afraid to [rebuke [P. 180.] its master?], and lo, it is a bitter lodger (?) when it [stays] with him in his (?) beloved house. For the Body, as they say, is his (?) House, and . . . house of the Evil One. If the Evil One . . . [is master of his own house, how does he allow the Soul] to revile him? In the controversy of the true furnace this cannot stand. For he would not give it room (?) to [revile] him with words. . . . But if the Soul is stronger than he by its Freewill, as it is also stronger than he by its words and. . . . For it is found that it is the cause of Evil. . . .

But if Freewill has the character of a 'bound Nature,' . . . . [how are there in] it sentiments which are unlike one another? And it is found that there are not two Entities which contend with one another, as Mani says, because they are Wills of one Existence . . . [For how do Entities contend with one another?] . . . but that which was created from nothing. And when it is changed from one thing to another thing? For an independent Will it (i.e., Freedom) has not, because it is bound in something from which it has come. For if it was (created) from an Entity . . . the Freedom of the Soul . . . [P. 181, l.13.] [depends] upon [the Entities].

And if they are good it is good just as if they are evil it is evil. And if the Entities are good or evil it is like them. And of necessity Freewill such as this is not at all Freewill, but a shadow either of the Entities or of 'bound Natures,' so that wherever they turn it (i.e., Freewill) turns with them in like manner. But that Freewill which was created from nothing |cxviii is not bound up with that nothing, because it does not even exist. And on this account it is not turned as a 'bound Shadow,' but it is changed as an independent Freewill.

But let us refute them a little, for whose correction even [P. 182.] much refutation is too little. Because the Souls come from something, as they say, it is found that their Freewill also is bound up with something, and it is not found that they are either pleasing or hateful, but if this true Root is pleasing they are mingled with it. But if they say that while the fountain is pure its Will is perturbed on account of its free Nature, then without Evil and Satan, in virtue of what it is, Freewill is able by its own power to produce many evils. And they acknowledge the truth unwillingly that Freewill has power to change its Wishes, since its Wishes are not bound up with a good or evil Essence. For if it is bound up with a good Nature or an evil Root, its wishes have no (free) power, but they are pipes in which Bitterness and Sweetness move along from the Roots with which it is bound up.

But if they say that there are Bodies which are more evil than other Bodies, and Corporeal Frames which are fouler than others,—because (some) Bodies are fiercer than others, such Souls as chance upon perturbed Bodies are more perturbed than others who happen to come into gentle Bodies. But where they think that they have conquered there are they all the more taken captive. For if because of the Evil which [P. 183,l. 6.] was great in those Bodies, on that account the Souls that are in them make themselves exceedingly hateful, that is the [Cf. p. cvii.ff] argument which we mentioned above, (namely), that the Souls cannot remember, "because the Pollution of Error is (too) great for them, unless sweet Floods have come from their Home a second time, and lessened the Bitterness in which they were dwelling," or else (it must be) that the Souls who have been 'refined, and have gone up,' descend again that they may come to rescue their companions who have been overwhelmed so that they all may rescue all and go peacefully to their Domain; so that as all came to the struggle (together) . . . (so) they might go up from the struggle (together), and not be separated from one another. |cxix

And lo, again [another word], how is it that since that Evil is a single Essence it does not agree with itself? For the part which is not evil like its companions is better than its companions.

For the Teaching which is fabricated by means of Error is [P. 184,l.3.] wont to be destroyed by itself. For they blaspheme against God, although He is their Maker; they blaspheme against the Body, although it is their Body; they blaspheme against marriage, although it is their Root; they blaspheme against . . . though . . . therefore . . . and who fast according to [P. 184, l. 19.] Error since (their words are) against the True One (?) who says that 'ye shall know them by their fruits' . . . [meaning thereby] [S. Matt, vii. 20.] that from their words ye shall recognize them. For their works are like our works as their fast is like our fast, but their faith is not like our Faith. And, therefore, rather than being known by the fruit of their works they are distinguished by the fruit of their words. For their work is able to lead astray and (yet) appear as fine, for its bitterness is invisible; but their words cannot lead astray, for their blasphemies are evident. And just as he who worships idols does not worship wood or [P. 185.] stone, but devils, so he who prays with the Manichaeans prays with Satan, and he who prays with the Marcionites (?) prays with Legion, and he who (prays) with the followers of Bardaisan (?) (prays) with Beelzebub, and he who (prays) with the Jews (prays) with Barabbas, the robber.

THE SIXTH BOOK OF THE SELECT LETTERS OF SEVERUS, PATRIARCH OF ANTIOCH, in the Syriac Version of Athanasius of Nisibis. Edited and Translated by E. W. BROOKS, M.A. Vol. I. Text, Parts I. and II. Vol.II. Translation, Parts I. and II.

THE CANONS OF ATHANASIUS OF ALEXANDRIA, in Arabic and Coptic. Edited and Translated by Prof. W. RIEDEL (Griefswald) and W. E. CRUM.

A RABBINIC COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF JOB, contained in a Unique MS. at Cambridge. Edited by W. ALDIS WRIGHT, with English. Translation by Dr. S. A. HIRSCH.

AN ANCIENT ARMENIAN VERSION OF THE APOCALYPSE OF S. JOHN; also THE ARMENIAN TEXTS OF CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA SCHOLIA DE INCARNATIONE, and EPISTLE TO THEODOSIUS UPON EASTER, the former incompletely preserved in Greek, the latter unknown in Greek or Latin. All Edited with English Versions, etc., by F. C. CONYBEARE, formerly Fellow of University College, Oxford.

THE SYRO-HEXAPLAR FRAGMENTS OF CHRONICLES, EZRA AND NEHEMIAH, AND OF THE NON-PESHITTO EPISTLES. Edited with full critical apparatus, etc., by Prof. GWYNN.

THE COPTIC (BOHAIRIC) TEXT OF THE MARTYRDOM OF ST. THEODORE "STRATELATES," from the Vatican MS., together with certain other Coptic texts. Edited by Mr. E. O. WINSTEDT, B.Litt.

S. EPHRAIM'S PROSE REFUTATIONS OF MANI, MARCION, and BARDAISAN. Vol. I., The Discourses to Hypatius, ready. Vol. II., The Book of Domnus, in the Press. Vol. III., in Preparation. Edited and translated by the Rev. C. W. MITCHELL, M.A.

A TRANSLATION (the first in English) OF THE HOMILIES of APHRAATES. By H. L. PASS, M.A.

AN EDITION OF THE "BOOK OF HIEROTHEUS" OF BAR SUDAILI. By the Rev. A. S. DUNCAN JONES, M.A., and others.

AN ARABIC WORK BY ABU'L-HASSAN OF TYRE, ON SAMARITAN BELIEF AND PRACTICE. Edited by Dr. COWLEY and Prof. HOGG.

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Single inverted commas are used in numerous cases where the words seem to be quotations or to belong to a special terminology.

Words in italics inside square brackets are to be regarded as conjectural translations or paraphrases.

In a few passages, where the text has suffered great mutilation, italics indicate an attempt to summarise the argument from suggestions in the fragments.]

[P.101] indicates page 101 of the accompanying Syriac. [l.2] means line 2 of the current page of the accompanying Syriac. [RP]

4. ³ There seems to be an allusion here to the opening lines of the Hymn of the Soul; see 'Texts and Studies,' Vol. V, part 3.

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AND 7, BROAD STREET, OXFORD

PREFACE.

THE present Volume is the continuation and completion of that published in 1912 for the Text and Translation Society by the late C. W. Mitchell. After Mr. Mitchell's death at the Front (3rd May, 1917), the various papers and proof-sheets belonging to this work were placed in the hands of Prof. A. A. Bevan and of the present writer, then away in France. On a survey of the material it appeared that about half the Syriac text (pp. 1-128) had been passed for press and printed off; a good deal of the remainder was in type, but only partly corrected, and some was still only in MS. About half the translation was made, but still needing revision. Professor Bevan and I have therefore completed the text and the translation, and I have verified the Syriac, as far as my eyes would go, with the Palimpsest in the British Museum. We have further compiled a list of passages where corrections were necessary, both in the former Volume and in the earlier part of this.

I should have wished that at least part of the Introductory Essay might have been Mr. Mitchell's work, but the only thing of the sort among his papers was a rough draft of an Introduction, written before Volume I. was published, when what he had deciphered from the Palimpsest was a mere collection of detached fragments, not a continuous text. This being the case, no other course was open to me but to write a wholly new chapter, explanatory of the documents here edited.

CHARLES WAND MITCHELL, son of Mr. Robert Mitchell, Maple Braes, Lennoxville, Quebec, was born April 9, 1878. He was educated first at the little country school near his home, then at the Lennoxville Academy; he then had a distinguished career at Bishop's College University, Lennoxville, ending as a Lecturer in 1901. He came up to Cambridge in 1902 as an Advanced Student, passing the required standard in the Theological Tripos in 1903 and the Oriental Languages Tripos (Hebrew and Aramaic) in 1904. He must have worked hard and been well trained in |iv Canada, for in 1903 his knowledge and power of expression was much above that of the average student, and it was no surprise to those who had seen his work to hear that he gained the Tyrwhitt University Scholarship (Hebrew) in 1903, and the Jeremie Prize (Septuagint, etc.) in 1904.¹

In the following year (1905) Mitchell was appointed Hebrew Master at Merchant Taylors' School, London, a post which he held till he went out to the Front as a Chaplain. He was ordained in 1907, and took his M.A. in 1912.

The very sympathetic notices that appeared in various papers and periodicals at the time of Mitchell's death speak of his varied interests in Merchant Taylors' School, in the parish work of S. Thomas, Telford Park, Streatham Hill, with which he was connected, and of his admirable devotion as an Army Chaplain in the most acute form of Active Service. It is right here, however, to give the chief place to his services to Oriental scholarship, by which indeed he will be permanently remembered.

A full though characteristically modest account of his work of decipherment will be found in the Preface to Volume I. Mitchell had begun before he left Cambridge to work at the portion of S. Ephraim's Prose Refutations, which had been published by Overbeck in 1865, but never translated into English; ² his new post at Merchant Taylors' School allowed him leisure and also easy access to the British Museum, where the MS. of the Refutations has its home. This MS., which in its original state must have been a very handsome book, now survives in two parts, very differently preserved. The first 19 leaves (i.e. two quires) are very much in their original condition; they are as legible to-day as when they were written some 1400 years ago, and any one who knows the Syriac alphabet and the ordinary rules of Syriac grammar can transcribe them. This is the portion published long ago by Overbeck (B.M. Add. 14574). The remaining 88 leaves (i.e. nine quires), or very nearly five-sixths of the whole, were turned into a Palimpsest in 823 A.D.; that is to say, the quires were unbound, the sheets of vellum washed, so that the writing was effaced, and then when covered with fresh writing the leaves were bound up into a new volume (B.M. Add. 14623), the new order of the leaves being of course |v quite different from the old. These operations were very thoroughly carried out. It is difficult entirely to eradicate older writing in this way, but the excellent facsimiles given in Vol. I. will shew the reader that the MS. has a most discouraging appearance to any one who sets out to read the older text. I myself had spent some time over it twenty years ago, and did not feel inclined to go on.³ It was Mitchell's great merit that he had the courage to go on. He began to copy out what he found legible, and gradually the new fragments amounted to a considerable body of text, which he began to print.

In 1908 the work of printing was stopped by what he describes as 'a fortunate turn of events,' i.e. by the decision of Dr. Barnett, keeper of Oriental manuscripts in the British Museum, to apply a reagent to the illegible portions of the palimpsest. The happy result is described in Mitchell's preface. What however is not to be found there is a statement of the fact that it was Mitchell's patience and perseverance in transcribing so much of the faded writing that moved the authorities of the British Museum to relax their usual rules.

It is not to be supposed that even after the reagent has been applied it is an easy matter to make out the older writing of B.M. Add. 14623. It is hard enough to verify what has been correctly deciphered, and doubly difficult to make out the text for the first time. To do it needs patience, determination, a good knowledge of Syriac idiom and of Ephraim's style, and specially good and trained eyesight. All these Mitchell had, with the result that he was able to transcribe whole columns of text that at first sight seem absolutely invisible. He made mistakes now and then, of course, but the general correctness of his decipherments has been attested by the discovery in other MSS. of short extracts from the Refutations.⁴

The text of these Refutations, which shed such a flood of light upon religious and philosophical thought in the Euphrates Valley sixteen centuries ago, will always be connected with the name of C. W. Mitchell, but his interests and activities were in no way confined to the past. He was a man of fine physique, and an enthusiastic teacher and leader of boys and young men. And he never forgot that he was a Canadian. When the first Canadian contingent came over and landed at Plymouth he felt it impossible that they should be in the post of danger and he stay behind in England, and in 1915 he became a Chaplain to the Forces, first |vi at Shorncliffe, then with Bishop Gwynne during the winter of 1915-16 at General Head Quarters, and finally, as he wished, he went to the Front as Chaplain to the 8th Battalion East Yorks.

I have written, at length about Mitchell's services to Oriental and Patristic literature, because this is the place to do so and because his permanent fame will be connected with that side of his activity. But I have no doubt, if testimony be worth anything in human affairs, that it was as a Padre in the very Front Line that he found the life that was most congenial to his whole being. "One sees here," he wrote to me from France (28 Feb., 1916), "another palimpsest: and ancient features in town and countryside are disappearing beyond all the subtleties of chemistry to restore." Yet he was still more concerned about his men. "He was always up near the men," wrote Col. de la Perelle, his Commanding Officer, himself a Canadian, "nothing on earth could keep him away;" and it was while he was helping the doctor to bandage the wounded near the firing, line that he was fatally wounded near Monchy, on May 3, 1917.

It is impossible not to regret that one who had so many and such varied gifts of service and encouragement for his fellow-countrymen should have had his career cut short so early. But this at any rate may be said of C. W. Mitchell, that it was given to him to exhibit the example of a life of singular consistency, devoted to the highest ideals that he saw before him. His decipherment of S. Ephraim's Refutations is a permanent contribution to Syriac literature and to the understanding of ancient religious ideas, and when in the future scholars ask what manner of man it was that made this contribution to our knowledge of the distant Past, they will learn that it was one who felt he could not give real help and real encouragement to men in danger and discomfort without himself sharing in the danger and discomfort to which they were exposed, and who met an early death because he did share in the dangers of these others.

1. * As an "Advanced Student" under the then regulations Mitchell's name does not appear in the regular Class List, but merely as having attained the required standard.

2. + A not very satisfactory German translation is given in K. Kessler's Mani (Berlin, 1889).

3. * My results were published in S. Ephraim's Quotations from the Gospel (Texts and Studies vii 2), Cambridge, 1901, pp. 73, 74.

A DISCOURSE MADE BY THE BLESSED SAINT [P. 1] EPHRAIM AGAINST THE DISCOURSE WHICH IS CALLED "OF DOMNUS," WHICH WAS COMPOSED BY BARDAISAN AGAINST THE PLATONISTS.

KNOW, O my beloved, that in (?) everything it is right for us to know the (just) Measure of everything. For by this knowledge all [advantages] are found, just as ... all injuries are produced by all arrogance. For whenever we know how to approach anything by measure there is nothing that is able to hurt us. For even those hurtful things are not able to hurt us as long as we approach them by measure.

But that thou mayest know how great is the victory of correct measure, see that nowhere does it put us in the wrong ; for even in the case of fire, though it is a harmful thing, when our bodies [P. 2.] approach it by measure an advantage is produced for us out of its harmfulness. And if without measure starving men make use of food death is produced for them out of its (i.e. the food's) vital force. O correct measure, which produces out of hurtful things advantages for those who may be hurt!

For as heavy burdens teach weakness to excuse itself from (lifting) any weight which it is unable to bear, so it would be right also for an uninstructed imagination to refrain from an investigation in which it is unable to speak convincingly. For some have been found who are wise in something or other, but |ii have come near to be detected ¹ in directions where they themselves are not wise. For their boldness has made them think that because they are wise in one direction, so also they are wise in all directions.

But any craftsman who makes a promise about any craft which has. not been learnt by him is reproved when he approaches the work which belongs to that craft. But if a craft is able to [P.3] reprove him who does not know how to deal with it, investigation is not too feeble to reprove also by its silence the ignorant man who desires to approach it (i.e. investigation) as one who knows. For wise men, perfect and righteous, have humbled themselves that they might be as though they were ignorant men even in that which they knew—not that they wished to destroy their knowledge, but that by making themselves needy the Fulness which is enough to fill up all our needs might incline towards them. If therefore such just men as knew were not arrogant, how shall we sinful ones be arrogant in such matters as we do not know ? For whoever comes forward humbly as a learner, that humility of his places him under the weakness of confessing that he does not know ; but whoever comes forward with arrogance as one who knows, he is one who has exalted himself above (the limit of) moderation, because arrogance knows not how to be subject to moderation. For if arrogance allowed itself to be subject to moderation, it would not be arrogance at all. For arrogance [P.4] cannot be arrogance unless it exalts itself [above its proper measure . . . for a man is not to be blamed (by being asked) why he does not know something which he could not know] [l.10]. But if he says 'I know,' whereas it is known that he cannot know it, [then his arrogance is really arrogance, because though he does not know] he is unwilling to be humble [l.22]. . . . And if he teaches another. . . . For he who is humble and learns from a teacher, he is able . . .

[P.5 l.27] Thus the Greeks spoke words of knowledge and . . . they said also various things that were in [metaphor] and as if in parables, and these without the tradition (of their meaning) no one [can] know . . .

|iii we (?) blame the speaker, because he is not able to know what he [p. 6. l.9] says.

But this which I have mentioned is found in the case of great sages, namely that one confesses 'I do not know.' For this is their great knowledge that when they do not know a thing they confess that they do not know it. For that same knowledge is able to accuse ignorance, because that ignorance cannot accuse itself. For if a man confesses about something that he knows it and again about something else that he does not know it, he gains a victory as about that which he knows. For in both these cases he has spoken the truth, and because he does not lie in either of them his truth is victorious, since it triumphs and defeats fasehood and is crowned.

But thou knowest that it is said in the book (called) 'Of Domnus' that "the Platonists say that there are sw&mata and also a0sw&mata," that is to say, corporeal and incorporeal things. But these inquiries do not belong to the Platonists, even if they [P. 7.] are written in the writings of the Platonists ; but they are the inquiries of the Stoics which Albinus ² introduced into his book which is called 'Concerning the Incorporeal,' according to the custom followed by sages and philosophers who in their writings set forth first the inquiries of their own party and then exert themselves to refute by their arguments the inquiries of men who are opposed to their school of thought.

But in the writings of the Stoics and the Platonists this took place, for the Platonists say that there are sw&mata and a0sw&mata, and the Stoics too (say) the same thing. But they do not agree in opinion as they agree in terms. For the Platonists say that corporeal and incorporeal things exist in nature and substance, whereas the Stoics say that all that exists in nature and substance is corporeal (lit. is a body), but that which does not exist in nature, though it is perceived by the mind, they call incorporeal. But the Philosopher of the Syrians (i.e. Bardaisan) made himself a laughing-stock among Syrians and Greeks, not only in that he [P. 8.] was unable to state but also in that he did not really know the |iv teaching of Plato ; and in (his) simplicity he hastened to calumniate Plato by (ascribing to him) the inquiries of others, though Plato had a great struggle against these (very) inquiries, which Bardaisan thinks belong to Plato.

But these inquiries (were conducted) according as the Stoics invented names for things, and because they (were expressed) as in parables . . .

[l.24] [as I have said above, Bardaisan accepts (as literal fact) the parables of the Stoics.]

[l.38] When [a man sees] a fire [burning] in a Temple or a [Palace] the sight [compels] him to be confused, and he will run in every direction, because he cannot extinguish that great fire . . . that [P.9] weakness hastens to contend for great things, and though it knows that its insignificance cannot produce conviction it is no longer able to remain quiet: lo, our insignificance also [is stirred up by the hearing of these errors, and though our insignificance knows] that it can[not] produce conviction about these things, yet it cannot refrain from argument about them.

[l.21] But see . . . "for they have not the three dimensions (to_ trixh~ diastaton)," namely length and breadth and height, nor do they [have] colour (?) ¹ " . . . " and time and place . . . and outline and length and breadth and the [marks] that things are known [by]."

But . . . that a man should say concerning the sun that it is mortal, . . . it is on account of the appearance which he sees in the sun that he says this concerning it ; for it is produced (lit. born) in the East and ... in the South . . . and extends (its rays) as far as the West . . . and called the sun mortal, he [P.10] hastens to blame (it) ; for he who blames is himself blameworthy. The fact therefore that the Stoics have called these things incorporeal I [admit] that I may say how and why and wherefore.

[l.19] . . . but they are names applied to (?) corporeal things and substances. For they have begun by saying concerning Space, namely (that) this Space exists in name and in meaning, as.I have said ; for because it has a name (lit. by reason of its name) |v it is expressed by a sound and because it has a meaning it is perceived by the mind. And, because it is perceived by the mind, if thou, O hearer, dost not hear (at all) with the mind thou canst not hear it. For consider that it is a necessary result that Space should both exist and not exist. And if these two (possibilities) cannot (both) be, Space cannot exist and receive a name, that is to say, exist in name, though it has no body or substance. [P. 11] For all things, whether they be substances or bodies, can exist in this thing (i.e. Space) which is incorporeal.

But if Space likewise has a body and substance, it is found that it is not Space but something which is in the midst of Space ; so that the truth is found (to be) that the Space in which all bodies exist has no body or substance. For if it is a body it is limited somewhere ; but if it is limited it touches upon some body and is (thereby) limited. And again, what is that thing in the midst of which it is placed, so that it is a companion and a limiter for it (i.e. for Space) ? But if that body is an impediment to it, then also again something surrounds that body ; that is to say, that Space which belongs to it (i.e. the aforesaid "something ") cannot be surrounded by anything. And on this account note carefully with thy mind, 0 hearer, and see that necessity compels (us) to say that that Space will not have a body.³ For as long as we say that Space is some kind of body by that (statement) the [P.12] former reasoning continues to be overthrown and built up (afresh). And again let us turn back to the truth concerning it, namely to say that it (i.e. Space) is incorporeal and also that on account of this it is not in a place, as the Stoics have said. For that which can dwell in the midst of a place ⁴ is not (itself) a place, for one place cannot dwell in the midst of (another) place ; and if it be not so, all those things which were said above have been confuted. For if one corporeal Space be discovered which has substance and another Space be discovered which is incorporeal, then the corporeal may dwell in the midst of the incorporeal—this is a thing which can be stated indeed, but cannot be (in reality). But I venture to say ... as many have thought, even though |vi they were unable to demonstrate (it) in practice. But that two places exist (?) in one another one cannot even . . . assert . . . [P.13] For because a single entity is found . . .

[l.17] which is also a substance, from that substance there is produced in us a likeness to this (substance) . . .

we cannot produce out of a shadow another shadow. No other Space can exist besides this, though, because of the heaven and earth that came into being, in the midst of the created things that came into being inside the world distinctions have arisen that are called 'Places,' either [North] or [West].⁵ Now these are names of lands or habitations ; but the Place in the midst of which these places are, that is what we say is incorporeal.

[P.14] Can it be therefore that because this place has no substance it is not (really) a place ? . . . we are not able to demonstrate. Both things therefore have been found to be true, (namely) that it exists and that it does not exist, that is to say, that it exists in name and meaning, but that it does not exist in body and substance. And a thing which does not exist in substance is a thing to which these three dimensions do not belong. For everything which is a substance or a body has three dimensions (?). And on this account also they have not wished [to reckon] God Who [is above all] with the things they call incorporeal, nor can they (do so), because of that which they were saying, that ... is a body. Now this Space also has neither length nor breadth ; for these are names of measurements (which belong) to bodies [P.15] that exist in the midst of it. ... it is necessary that these three dimensions (?) should be found (to belong) to them. But just as that Space includes (lit. has received) all bodies, though it has no body, so it includes all measurements though it cannot be subject to measurement.

For see that Height and Depth also are (so) named on account of the heavens. But store up (?) these things in thy mind, |vii and see that there is not any other body in the middle but only Space, which is incorporeal. And when thou hast considered (the matter) thus, create in thy mind height and depth—art thou able (to do so) ? For which of the directions wilt thou call Height, and which again wilt thou name Depth, seeing that height is called Height on account of the heavens above thee ? When therefore the cause on account of which it has been called Height is removed it is clear that the Space which remains has neither height nor depth. And so also (it may be said of) Length and Breadth—they have arisen and exist through corporeal causes. And when those causes are removed it is clear that these [P. 16.] names likewise do not exist. For (in the case of) that Space of which we are speaking, through what (i.e. in relation to what) does its height become high, and through what does its length become long, seeing that these measurements belong to substances, so that when the extent and dimension of a substance is long it is called the Length ? And because one side is shorter in its measurement it is called the Breadth, while also (in the case of) a Round it is likewise clear for what reasons it is (called) a round.

But that thou mayest know that the Bardesanists have not even heard that Philosophers have . . . seeing that this length and breadth is placed by Bardaisan in that measurement of Space, when he says that "Space also has been measured that it holds so much (i.e. a definite quantity)." For if he supposes that Space is measurable it is necessary that length and breadth also should belong (?) to Space, a statement which I have contradicted above.

[This] same length and breadth therefore the Philosophers have there also [perhaps] called incorporeal, and just as Space is measured in virtue of what it is (?), so they reckon them (i.e. [p. 17.] length and breadth) in virtue of what they are, so that thou mayest know that they also are things distinct from Space, that is to say, they are names and notions, but not bodies and |viii substances. For thou measurest a body which has length, but length itself, which is produced by a name and is called Length, thou canst not measure (and) ascribe to it three dimensions, for this Length is produced by the conjunction of body and speech.^⁶For the body produced the measure, and speech produced this name which is called Length. Thou art able therefore to measure the extent and width of that body, and when thou hast measured (it) thou givest the name of Length to that which thou hast measured. But thou canst not turn round (and) measure the name which is called Length, because it is not a substance at all; for it is a bare name whereby the notion of that which thou hast measured is perceived (by the mind).

[P. 18.] Since then this name has no substance, let us say therefore that it does not exist. And how does it not exist, seeing that apart from this name no creature can be measured ? Therefore also this name which is called Length both exists and does not exist. And so also all words both exist and do not exist, but they exist (as) signs by means of which we understand everything {that} has body and substance, whereas they (i.e. words) have no body, and though by means of them we speak about all substances they themselves have no substance.

For I say that I buy and I sell; but the thing which I buy or sell is some substance, whereas these verbs⁷ and the nouns called 'buying' and 'selling' have no substance. Therefore substances which are bought or sold have these three dimensions, but these nouns have them not, for they are incorporeal. And that I may not write to thee at great length (it is enough to say that) thou hast often heard this with respect to Time and Number [P. 19.] and with respect to everything which is incorporeal. For with regard to everything which is like these or similar to these, (we may say that) its branches divide there, for these (i.e. Time and Number) are the roots from which all the branches shoot forth. And though it would suffice that thou shouldst know all of them by means of a single one nevertheless they (i.e. philosophers) |ix have abundantly demonstrated these things to him who seeks them, in order to assist the weakness of the seeker.

Hear therefore with respect to a sign (shmei~on) and a line that they too are incorporeal things (dependent) on bodily substances which exist, that is to say, a horse or an eagle or one of the various bodies and substances. When some one begins to portray them . . ., at the (very) commencement, when thou seest, thou knowest whether he wishes to portray a horse or a lion, and before the artist portrays (anything) on the tablet, the likeness of the horse is portrayed in his mind, and if the artist wishes to add (extra) limbs thou blamest him by reason of the substance of the horse which the truth fashions.

But if I say to thee, "I intend to draw a line," thou knowest not what (line) I shall draw for thee ; for a line has not any [P. 20.] substance, as a horse has a substance, so that if he (i.e. the artist) adds or subtracts thou canst convict him. But if thou thinkest, "He is drawing a straight line," he draws for himself a crooked one ; and if thou thinkest that he is making it (to consist) of four angles he can make it (to consist) of eight¹ angles. For when artists portray the likenesses of bodies which they perceive they cannot add or subtract anything ; and when they portray the likenesses of substances which they do not perceive they portray them in their proper colours and shapes. And if he adds in one of the substances anything which is not in the (true) image of that substance, he is blamed. But in the case of a line he adds and subtracts anything that he wishes, and he is not blamed, because there is no real substance (which is) the likeness of that line so that thou couldst blame him. And because it has not substance it does not exist, and because it does not exist we have on that account also called it incorporeal.

But Bardaisan has said that even a line is measured by that body, whatever it be, in which it is. Hear this (word) as (thou [P. 21.] hast heard) that which I have said concerning Space, in the case of which the terms Length and Breadth are used, not, however, (as applying) to it but to that which exists in Space. For consider that before a horse is portrayed it is pictured in thy mind, and thou knowest what is its length and breadth. But (in the case |x of) a line, before it is formed thou knowest not its length and breadth, because it has not length and breadth. For if they belonged to it it would be known before it is formed, as the length and breadth of all animals is known in our mind before they are portrayed, except such animals as are invisible to us, or the likenesses of angels, whose length and breadth, when we see them once, are pictured in our mind as (in the case of) those things which are visible to us. But (in the case of) a line, though thou seest it always, thou hast never yet limited it, and this (is) because, as I said, it has no 'bound' likeness or fixed body (such) that if the draftsman of the line departs from the likeness he can be [P.22] blamed. That line therefore has no length or breadth before it is formed on the tablet, in the way that even before a man is born we know the fashion of his length and breadth ; but this line, which has no substance, when it is drawn (lit. falls) upon a tablet or upon (some other) body these three dimensions arise for it. But they (i.e. the dimensions) belong, not to it, but to that thing with which it is associated ; for if they were its own they would belong to it even apart from this tablet.

But I say to thee briefly — there are these three classes which are incorporeal, one class (consisting) of fixed nouns which are given to bodies and substances ; and another class of nouns which are given to notions, like these of Space and Time and Number ; and another class (consisting of) verbs which are used with reference to anything. And whereas these three classes are incorporeal, they have nevertheless called these seven names only "incorporeal." And why (none) but these names, seeing that 'Gold' and 'Silver,' even if these also are names (or 'nouns'), [P.23] are a0sw&mata, i.e. incorporeal ? Nevertheless, because they have been given to bodies and substances, they also are corporeal names. When therefore thou hearest a name which some one uses and he calls out 'gold,' or 'silver,' or 'eagle,' or 'earth,' at the mere mention of the name thy imagination fixes itself on the corporeal substance, and thou knowest whether it be soft or hard, or bitter or sweet. And so also when some one speaks to thee of colours. But if, on the contrary, he mentions to thee 'Time' or 'Number' thy imagination does not fix itself on |xi bodies or substances. For what substance belongs to Time, or what body belongs to Number or Space ? Nor dost thou know whether they be black or white, whether they be soft or hard.

And if thou sayest that likewise Height and Length are names and are used of bodies and substances, [I reply] that at first they exist by themselves and stand without the support of any body whatsoever, but afterwards [they are applied] also to [P. 24.] bodies according to common usage ; for a man says 'length' even though bodies and their extent have not previously been mentioned, for "the name of Length and Breadth—these names exist by themselves without the support of any body" ; but afterwards a man says "the length of a stone" and "the breadth of it"—these, lo, stay upon the bodies by favour. But if thou sayest 'Iron' or 'Brass,' with the name there stays the substance also, and the name of Iron or Brass cannot be said (i.e. without implying the qualities of these substances). . . .

. . . And on this account they are 'bound' names, and these also [l. 33.] [are attached] to 'bound' substances ; for these names of Iron or Brass or Stone . . . but it is right (?) that incorporeal names [l. 42.] should be detached, and, because they are not as 'bound' substances, perhaps on account of this they have called them a0sw&mata.

(Here follows) yet another fashion (of argument). There is [p. 26] nothing which is not named as being in Space or in a place. [l. 2.] There is nothing which is not in Time and subject to Time and performed within (the limits of) Time. There is nothing which has not or does not become subject to Number and Measure. There is nothing which does not possess Length and Breadth. There is no body or person who does not bear a Mark by means of which he (or it) is distinguished from others, like the point which distinguishes one word from another. There is nothing |xii which is formed or written without a Line being in its form or in its writing. There is no clang or buzzing or humming or sound without one of these seven sounds, or of those seven vowels (?), or seven Syllables, being in it. And therefore here (i.e. in this connection) also the Stoics made the seven syllables a0sw&mata, so as to include everything within them just as (they include) these writings which have no sound.

But just as there are names of horses which are derived from the Sun, that is to say 9Hliodro&moj, and from Fire, (that is) [P. 27.] Purola&mpoj, and again from Water, Ph&gasoj, so there are among our names other names which are derived from each of those seven names, besides these words, which are verbs and not names, as I said above.

But leave all of them (?), and hear the sound of the tongue, which has in it and within it (musical) tones, which convey a meaning to the hearer when they are varied in the mouth, and these tones and variations of the voice are called verbs, such as, 'eat,' 'drink,' 'rise,' 'sit.' Now these are variations of the tongue within the mouth and changes of sound, but the sound, because it exists (?), has been apprehended (lit. overtaken) by the hearing ; whereas the meaning of these variations of the tongue and of sound is perceived by the mind. For nothing which reaches the hearing is (actually) severed from the tongue or from the sound, as if thou givest a piece of thy flesh or of thine eyelids thou givest some substance which can be felt and seen. But in this case (i.e. when the above-mentioned words were uttered) the ear heard thine own voice as it came. And [P. 28.] if they (i.e. the speakers) are Persians, the mind fails to perceive the meaning of the words, though the ear did not fail to hear the sound. But if the meaning were any sort of substance, the ear would perceive it also, just as it perceives the sound. And lo ! also by a gesture a man conveys a meaning, and in this case hearing is in abeyance and thou hearest with the eye (?). And (yet) nothing is severed from the gesture or from the things written and reaches the eye, but [the eye] sees something [of |xiii which] the meaning is seen by the mind — it (i.e. the mind) perceives it. And even an unlearned eye sees a book because it is really a thing seen. But these senses ... do not perceive . . . the meaning (of the book), because that meaning is not seen by the eye, nor tasted by the mouth, nor smelt, nor handled. But that meaning which is heard by the ear in the sound can attach itself (lit. can come) to a gesture, and the ear does not hear it in the gesture, but the eye [sees] that whereby really the meaning was spoken. ... but it has not departed to (any other) place, [P. 29.] because it exists (?). But the meaning can be expressed (?) by anything, because it is incorporeal.

So all these words and names of everything that exist are not bodies but meanings (or notions), so that they may not wander about among all words and names. . . . For during the day and [l. 19.] the night all objects (?) which are in space are visible to us. And so even (in the case of) these six notions which are associated with this (space), it is not the notions themselves that are visible or audible, but that thing has an appearance of its own and a special mark ¹ of its own. For without a voice I hear its voice, even when no one has spoken to me about it. But the notions, if thou dost not speak to me ² about them, have no voice, but within (the compass of) thine own voice thou utterest those notions which have no voice. But it is here that Bardaisan erred and went astray, for he said concerning notions that they are audible. But the Stoics did not err, for they said that they (i.e. notions) are perceived by the mind. [P. 30.]

[l. 5.] . . . sight perceives with the eye, voice with the tongue, smell with the nostrils, taste with the palate, but touch [with all] the body, and these things are 'bound ' and not separable ; but notions are not 'bound' [to one sense, for if] thou think 'surely it is bound up with the voice, consider . . .

[l. 27.] For see that unless thou hast sung or called I know not whether thy voice is beautiful or not, and unless thou hast seen (something) it is also the same (as regards) thy sight, and unless |xiv them hast smelt it is also the same (as regards) thy sense of smell, and unless thou hast heard I know not whether thy hearing be quick, and so also (with) thy foot and thy hand. For as regards each of these a man is able to learn it (i.e. its qualities) by means of it. But as regards thy notions, even without thy tongue and thy voice I can know by means of writings whether they (i.e. thy notions) are good or wise, though writings are (only) signs of [P. 31.] notions. For writings are divided up into syllables, but a notion is not divided ; and a book, moreover, is visible, whereas a notion is not visible. And it is not right that the Greeks should be blamed for the appellations which they bestowed. For these appellations were not invented with a view to judgement and discussion, but for the notion of why it was so. It would therefore not be right that we should pass judgement on a thing which was not designed for judgement but for (expressing) a notion. For authors would not even have been able to compose anything, if they did not employ these appellations. For those things are known which introduce judgement and discussion.

For even these very words which are spoken are included within these seven a0sw&mata, for from these same seven Names [every]thing begins to be spoken, while the limner asserts concerning Geometry that with its lines all works and all designs are made, and (also) what the Greeks called e0pifa&neia, Manifestation, i.e. the appearance of anything whatsoever, for there is nothing, either of things visible or of things invisible,which has not an appearance of its own.⁹

But the causes of appearance are these : that is, according [P. 32.] as the intervening distance is far or near, and according to the |xv greatness or smallness of the object seen, and according to the healthiness or unhealthiness of the eye itself, and moreover according to the faintness or intensity of the light which reveals (the object) ; for by much light the eye is dazzled and that object which is (usually) visible is swallowed up or hidden, as the stars by the sun. On the one hand therefore the darkness is a revealer, like the light, since in the darkness the stars are bright and visible, which are hidden by the light, as the sons of darkness (are hidden) by the day.

But the cause of the eye failing (lit. slipping) is that the sight of the eye wanders by reason of the distance of the (intervening) distance, and on that account it (i.e. the eye) does not see. But if there were something in which the sight might be shut up, as in a tube, [the sight] would be able to go forth to see that object which it cannot (now) see on account of the distance . . .

But again [in the case] of the stars, that same (intervening) l. 19. distance which belongs to them by day belongs to them also by night, and the eye which could not see them by day was able to see them by night. And why (is this so), unless it be that the darkness is for the eye as it were a tube and its sight is concentrated and goes up to the stars, while the light of the stars, on the other hand, descends to the eye as it were into a pit ? And so too a fire by night is seen from a great distance, but by day it is not seen even a quarter of this distance.

[ll. 5-20.] [Even by day the stars might be seen, if the light of the sun was obscured.] ... he (?) cannot see by that light which is [l. 38.] outside (of the eye) that which he saw by the light which is within (the eye). Consider again and fix the eyes also on the sun, and see that, if the light is not concentrated (into the eye) little by little and (so) conies to its place, the eye cannot see. And again, if a lamp be extinguished at night on the [P. 35.] way, observe that because the eye is distracted by the rays of the lamp (it is only) when it has concentrated the light into itself little by little that it can see. |xvi

But that thou mayest learn well how tubes concentrate scattered things and propel (lit. send) them, consider also the fire-hoses (si/fwnej), and see to what a height they propel and scatter the unstable water. Consider moreover aqueducts and see how water is collected in cisterns and pipes and (then) it ascends and does service on heights that are hard of access. And so would the eye be able to see from afar, if there were instruments to (assist) the eyesight. Look also at the mouth of a kiln, how it concentrates and sends forth the smoke, and it circles and is carried up on high. But when the smoke goes out into the open air it wanders (i.e. is dissipated) and is scattered and swallowed up after the manner of the aforesaid eyesight. Consider moreover the breath which we send forth from our mouth gently, and see that when it is concentrated in the furnace [P. 36.] of a blacksmith or in the fireplace of a goldsmith its blast goes forth strongly because of its concentration. Furthermore, if this wind that blows is compressed between the clefts of a mountain, or in the opening through a wall its breath beomes stronger because of its accumulation. Consider moreover a trumpet, and see that the voice which in us was weak and, when it went forth from us, wandered (i.e. was dissipated), as soon as its wandering motions are concentrated in the trumpet, observe how far the concentration of that voice carries. Again, make (lit. take) an experiment for thyself, (namely) if thou openest thy mouth wide and criest, thy voice wanders and is weak ; but if thou compressest thy lips a little on the outer side and makest with them as it were a spacious hollow on the inner side thy voice is concentrated and increases, especially if thou art looking downward and not upward. Again, observe a carpenter (and see) that when he considers the straightness of the wood— because the sight of his eye is scattered as long as it (i.e. his eye) is altogether open—the workman closes half of his eye, that he may concentrate it (i.e. the sight) against the straightness of [P. 37.] the wood.

Again, inhale breath from thy mouth and inhale also from thy nostrils, and see that the inhaling power of thy nostrils is strong enough to concentrate (and) bring in the air, because the nostrils are compressed and hollow (?) like cavities and tubes. And if |xvii a workman is comparing (?) depth with height he makes a small hole for himself, in order that he may concentrate and cause to pass through it the sight of the eye, and that he may estimate (lit. weigh) the extent (lit. surface) of the depth and reckon it in comparison with the height. But I say that if smell and heat were concentrated they likewise would be found travelling to a distance. But it must be so ; for rest cannot be stable, because that air which sets things in motion (lit. the dragger of things) is (constantly) travelling and knows not how to rest. For it is by the air that everything is drawn along.

Consider again that he who blows a flute or he who utters cries with a mouth that inhales and exhales the air (does so) in order that the air may be a vehicle for the voice or the flute-blowing. For the air is a vehicle for everything. Moreover when a man looks in the direction of the sun, if he does not place [P. 38.] his hand above his eyes and shelter them, their sight is not concentrated (enough) to look (steadily). And likewise when a man carries a lamp, if he does not spread his hand above the lamp and ward off the rays from his eyes, his eyesight is scattered and cannot travel to a distance. And when a man looks into a basin of pure water he sees in the collected water below the colour of the sky and likewise a bird, if it happens to fly above the aforesaid basin.

But because everything is given to us by measure, we also see by measure, along with everything else. For beings above and below, along with everything which is created, act by measure. But if there be some who exceed (others), as (it may be said) that cattle eat more than birds, and a wild beast drinks more than creeping things, and the sun is brighter than the stars, though (even so) all these are subject to measure. For increase the blaze and see that the heat increases ; and likewise the sight becomes less through much fasting, and when the sight [P. 39.] is weak errs (lit. slips). But the contrivances which I have mentioned assist our weakness.

Know moreover that Dark and Light are the opposites of one another ; the opposite indeed is not assisted by its opposite, nor is Light injured by that which is akin to it, but the sight (is |xviii injured) by the Light, because the sight wanders right and left, like water that wanders in a plain. But in the dark, because it (i.e. the sight) does not wander right and left, and as ... in a tube . . . and the sight [comes] up to the torch or the . . ., on that account they are seen by the eye ; and the sun does not hide the stars when it rises—for light does not become the opposite of the star which is akin to it—but the rays scatter the sight of the eye and it (the eye) cannot see the stars. For lo ! a lamp, although (?) it is seen at noon on account of its nearness . . . that which is swallowed up is seen neither by reason of distance nor yet on [P. 40.] account of nearness (?). But light cannot swallow up anything because its concentrated nature . . . nor does it swallow up the darkness ; the darkness is wholly destroyed and ceases (to exist), because there was nothing in the sky, for it (i.e. the darkness) is incorporeal.

There are these two natures only coming to meet one another, namely sight and the illuminated object; the latter comes with its light visibly towards the eye, and sight goes to meet the illuminated object invisibly, like the invisible scent which comes from visible blossoms. For if it were not the fact that some sight (or other) is sent out and goes forth from the eyes, how would those animals which see by night see in the darkness ? For there is no light of which we can say that it is. ... For the rays do not belong to the eyes nor . . . nor to the water, but to the light which comes and strikes its rays upon it (i.e. the water) ; [P. 41.] and if the beams were striking upon a mirror and turning back to it (i.e. are reflected towards the eye), they are thought to belong to the mirror. But if they belonged to the mirror, they would be seen in it also at night, in the absence of the light; for also when the sun diffuses (its light) upon the water, lo ! thou seest the sun and its rays (therein), but we do not say that that which is seen in the water belongs to the water. And when it (i.e. the sun) declines and the shadow in its turn falls upon the water, how can we see the rays in the water, seeing that they are not in the water ? For everything that is polished, |xix when the light of the sun strikes upon it ... so that when the sun shines upon them the sight (of the eye) which gazes at them wanders. But as for dark-coloured stones and (other) black substances, know that also upon them when the rays strike the light is spread, but (only) on those white substances, which are akin to the light, does the light show its power. Nor again do rays go forth from unpolished bodies or from substances that [P. 42.] do not glitter,¹⁰ as they go forth from polished objects or from substances that glitter. But as everything which falls into a mirror is seen when it sinks into the midst of the mirror and is thought to belong to the mirror, although it does not belong to it, so also those rays were thought to belong to the mirror, although they did not belong to it, as I have said. But as when hard substances strike against one another a sound is engendered ^¹¹from between them—and it was not the case that that sound was (previously) within them and was inaudible, for it is their nature to engender ^¹¹ a sound by striking together—in like manner also (in the case of) the eye and the illuminated object, by the striking of both of them, in combination with one another, sight is engendered ^¹¹ in the eye.

As therefore heat that goes forth from a fire, and rays from a lamp, and perfume from spices are weakened when they go far from their sources, so also the sight diminishes as it goes to a distance. For (only) in a small measure is perfume deposited [P. 43.] in a blossom and light in a lamp and heat in a fire ; on this account also they penetrate to a distance (only) in a measure and begin to grow weak as they go to a distance. For (in the case of) fountains of abundant water their flow is even, because there is an abundant and material (lit. solid) outflow. But effulgence perfume, and heat are not corporeal, nor do they really flow like a literal (lit. bound) fountain. For lo ! the voice which is in us is a thing bound within us, and as it goes away it likewise grows faint, and by the mechanism of a trumpet it becomes something |xx different, by reason of the strength and clearness which are added to it. But as when the radiance of a lamp is abundant and copious this amount of light would be able to contend with the long measure of a great distance, so the amount of the sun's light suffices for the measure of all space ; and so also the amount of water (suffices) for the measure of the earth. So, because the [P. 44] extent of the distance is greater in its measure than the amount of the light of the eye, on this account from afar even large objects appear small. For as these things again mix one with another unequally, but are ...

[P. 45, l.15] on account of which not even those things which are before the eyes of the man are tested by him, since even the summits and depths of the earth, together with the summit and lower parts of the sky, both help and harm. For the sky is like a circular belt, that is to say, like an arch, and that which is placed at its summit does not appear like that which is placed in its lower parts. Let the moon when it rises from the East show how great is its circle and full and ... its disc. But there are those who say that because the moon [is affected by the power] of the sun, which is in the West, it (i.e. the moon) appears thus, and ... at dawn, when the moon reaches, the lowest part [of the West], the light of the sun rises from the East; and it is not thought . . . [P. 46.] its disc. . . . And again there are those who say that, because it rises from the Ocean, on that account its appearance is great and its disc is glorious and beautiful. But I say that, because it rises suddenly and its light shines into the darkness, on that account it appears to the eye to be great, though its size has not received any augmentation (?) and no further radiance has been added to its light. Thus although these four examples are equal, as I have said, these contrivances which I have enumerated for thee above have not yet failed ; for they are helpful to a certain |xxi measure. For a man calls, and there is a certain measure to which his voice reaches, but (lit. and) when the contrivance of the trumpet steps in it causes the voice to pass over that former (?) limit. Oh ! what a thing is Contrivance ! since it makes Nature to become something different. And on that account there is no excuse for the sinner, seeing that Nature itself is compelled to follow the will, when that will desires to compel Nature. For P. 47. God created the world and adorned it with natural objects ; and, (yet) if contrivance had not afterwards adorned the world, the world would be a waste. And that I may bring to thee a testimony from near at hand, consider thy limbs, that is to say, thy senses, and see that God created them as (He created) natural objects which are bound (by necessity). But by the gift which comes from Him thou teachest thine eye another (kind of) sight, (that) of many books, of seals, of pearls and the like. Again thou teachest thy hand to write and to work at a forge and to engrave, and so also (thou teachest) thine ear the hearing of many sounds.

And again, as for what Bardaisan says, that "if a perfume or a voice reach to us we should all equally perceive them"—lo ! in the case of the light, which reaches all eyes equally, why does one man see more than another ? If he says that (it is) because of weakness or disease or other things of the same kind, it all tends to show that what he has now failed (to apply, namely) that if a p. 48. perfume approached us equally we should all perceive it equally. For it (sometimes) happens that he who is near a thing does not see it, while another, though he is far off, sees that object which is placed on the (very) eye of the former. And so likewise (he errs) in that he says concerning the voice also that "it reaches the ear of (every) man equally, if his ear is not dull."

But from this very thing learn that if, moreover, thou diffusest a perfume by measure in all directions thou wilt see that all (men) are not able to smell equally ; nor do they hear equally, nor . . . foods touch all mouths equally, and yet all mouths [l. 33.] do not taste equally

But so Bardaisan juggled ¹² even by names and supposed that [P. 49.] |xxii the nature (of things) is like their names. For because 'light' in the Aramaic language is called as masculine, and 'eye' feminine in the same, he hastily coupled them together in a foolish phrase, saying that "Light, like a male, sows perception in the Eye." And lo, he, Bardaisan, calls the moon feminine ^¹³in the Aramaic language : when therefore (?) the eye looks at the moon, does that female sow perception in a female ? Well, then, because in the Greek language 'sun' and 'eye' are both called masculine, when the eye looks at the sun a male sows perception in a male, according to the teaching of Bardaisan !

Single inverted commas are used in numerous cases where the words seem to be quotations or to belong to a special terminology.

Words in italics inside square brackets are to be regarded as conjectural translations or paraphrases.

In a few passages, where the text has suffered great mutilation, italics indicate an attempt to summarise the argument from suggestions in the fragments.]

[P.101] indicates page 101 of the accompanying Syriac. [l.2] means line 2 of the current page of the accompanying Syriac. [RP]

2. ¹ Albinus (c. 152 A.D.) wrote an Introduction (Ei0sagwgh&) to the Platonic Dialogues, but the work here referred to is different and does not seem to be extant.

3. ¹ Lit. 'will belong to that which is incorporeal.' On p. 11, 1. 44, add [Syriac] at the end of the line.

4. ² Here and in what follows it has been found necessary to render athra sometimes by ' Place ' and sometimes by ' Space.'

5. ² The words in square brackets are uncertain ; perhaps they are place-names.

7. ³ In Syriac a Verb is called a 'word' ([Syriac]) and a Noun is called a 'name'.

9. ⁶ Compare Aristotle, Metaphysica vi 2, 2 : "It is held by some that the boundaries of a body, such as the visible surface (e0pifa&neia) and outline (grammh&) and extreme points (stigmh&) and its isolation (mona&s), are real (unsai/ai), more real than the solid itself."

10. ² A word used of gaudy attire in the Life of Rabbula 189₁₉. The Note to p. 42, 1. 2, should be deleted.

11. ⁴ Note, in view of Ephraim's argument against Bardaisan (p. xxii), that the word for 'engender ' is, literally, 'give birth to.'

12. ¹ Lit. 'sailed about' : see p. 221, 1. 35, and delete the Note, p. 48, 1. 48

AGAINST MARCION I.

To the true Scriptures of the Church all the Teachings bear witness that they are true ; but as for the Scriptures belonging to the Teachings, only the Teachings bear witness concerning them, because the Scriptures of the Church do not appeal to the testimony of the Scriptures of the Teachings. Moreover to our Scriptures the Jews bear witness, for in every place. . . . For inasmuch as God knew that the Teachings were about to go forth into the world He worked great Signs beforehand . . . and the dividing of the sea and the cloud, and the Pillar and the Quails and the Manna and all the Signs and all the Wonders. . . .

in order that they might bear witness concerning that people [p. 51, l.4.] that it was the people of God. . . . Moreover (to ?) other countries some of them were scattered formerly, and (they bear witness) to-day concerning the aforesaid Jews and concerning their laws, as that (passage) in which it says,¹ 'The LORD hath brought evil upon this place, as He said.'

But the Edicts which had been written by Nebuchadnezzarand by Darius were deposited among the archives of the aforesaid kingdom first of all, and then they were sent to the (various) countries. And lo ! also the kings of the countries bear witness concerning the books of the Hebrews in the chronicles which |xxiv belong to them, according to that which is said in Ezra, 'Learn and see that this city is a warlike city from of old,' together with that other (passage in) which he says. 'Learn again and see that [P. 52.] Darius commanded concerning this city that it should be built.' ^²Thus the miracles which were wrought in the midst of Egypt were inscribed in the archives of Aegyptus ; and, again, the miracles which were wrought in the midst of Babylon were in the annals belonging to the kings of Babylon, and also (in those) belonging to the Greeks, and the Romans likewise, as well as (in) those of the aforesaid country of Jerusalem. For lo ! even to this day Tablets ³ which are even now inscribed and set up bear witness to the people of the aforesaid city that they must not venture to enter within their limits.⁴ All these witnesses which I have enumerated to thee, together with the aforesaid teachings (and) together with the Hebrews, are witnesses to our Scriptures that they are true. But to the Scriptures of the aforesaid teachings, as I have stated before, those teachings alone bear witness. And would that they all bore witness to the Scriptures of one another ! ⁵ For even if this were thought to be in their favour, inasmuch as their witnesses were many, yet it would be all against them that the testimony of each one of them about [P. 53.] his fellow was a denial of his own teaching. For how could he be veracious who proclaims Seven Gods, when another asserts after him in confirmation who proclaims only Two Gods ? Or how could he who proclaims Three Gods assert (anything) in confirmation of both of them ? Thus all the teachings are refuted by the Jews, because the Scriptures belonging to the Jews are truer than all the teachings. But the Jews themselves, who by means of their true Scriptures have been able to overcome many teachings, are refuted by the Church. . . .

[l. 29.]Therefore to the one God whom we proclaim, the Jews bear |xxv witness together with the Marcionites (?) . . . Bardaisan together with Mani. For though Bardaisan said [seven Entities constitute] the world he nevertheless said concerning the Law that it was given by God. And Mani again, though he said that [He] who spoke, by the Prophets exists as the result of a 'mixture,' nevertheless said concerning Him that He is in heaven. And Marcion, though he introduced a 'Stranger,' nevertheless, (while) he was crying out all the [time (?)] about the [. . .] of [P. 54.] the 'Maker' and about His preaching and about the people that is His, yet our Scriptures that are in the hands of the Marcionites were bearing witness on [our] behalf. But the blasphemies [of] the Marcion[ites]—it is [the books of] the Marcionites only that bear witness to them.⁶

The followers [of Marcion] therefore name our God 'the Just One' : yet we see that His worshippers are afflicted in this world, and His prophets were ... in the region of the Maker . . . but on the other hand (lit. side) we see that the unjust and the doers of evil enjoy themselves, and He is found to be good towards evil men and something different towards those who are His own. For He promises enjoyments to those who keep His commandments, and lo ! afflictions surround them. And He said concerning the unjust 'Cursed art thou.' . . . And he who isblessed according to the Law runs on foot in front of him who is cursed in the Scriptures ; for Elijah the prophet ran in front of Ahab the unjust, while Ahab the . . . was sitting in his chariot. [P. 55.] Again, the prophets of Baal were battening at Jezebel's table, and the true prophets [were] housing themselves in caves.

The followers (?) of Marcion say concerning each of these things, that is, concerning the justice of the Just One and concerning the grace of their own (God), that it did not come and bring relief to the just in this world (?). But [see that] the grace of the Maker [lo,] is extended even over the followers of Marcion. |xxvi And if they say that an Alien Force is opposed to them, who is it, on the other hand, who is opposed to Mercy ? And, again, who constrained Him that His mercy should afford a covering to Philosophers and Magians and all manner of doctrines ? And (as for) the babes and the seed-corn and the plants and the possessions of the followers of Marcion, who causes them to grow ? And who sends down the rain for them, or who causes the sun to shine for them ? Who commands the earth to bear them, and governs the sky for them ? Thou seest that all the grace of our Maker is (shown) towards the followers of Marcion [P. 56.] and moreover towards those who are ungrateful like them ; but in the case of the righteous and the prophets the contrary of these things (takes place), namely humiliation and ignominy. For Jeremiah the prophet is cast into a miry pit, while Zedekiah, an unjust man, is living in luxury. Or can it then have been the case that an Alien severe One [came and was favouring] the wicked and oppressing the good ?

But it was not the Stranger—who did not exist—that had . . . already announced earthly things to the simple-minded, while, on the other hand, among all of us he taught the likeness of true things by means of his faithful ones and by means of his righteous ones ; by means of these two (methods he taught) two classes of persons, namely the class of the mature (?), and another (consisting) of the simple-minded. For he gladdened the simple-minded with promises of the earth, and oppressed (?) the mature by severe afflictions. But let us see to what our own affliction is like ; is it like that of [the simple-minded] or that of his prophets ? If we are like the prophets in our afflictions, how do the followers of Marcion say that (only) in recent times have afflictions been [P. 57.] announced ? And, again, let us ask the Jews also, that is to say, the Jews and the righteous ones who were among them, Whom ought we to resemble ? [The others] rather than them we ought to resemble.

Let them then look at us and at the righteous, and let them see if we are like them in our afflictions. And if we are like the righteous in our afflictions, it is also the fact that the Law is |xxvii with us. For unto whom was it right that the Law of the afflicted and destitute ones should be given, to us the afflicted and destitute, or to those who even until to-day are expecting to go up to Jerusalem, and are eagerly looking till now for the milk and honey ? Thou seest, therefore, O Marcion, that if in the midst of all this maturity the simple-mindedness of the Jews has not been outgrown (lit. weaned), since these (qualities) still exist in them, how could numerous countries attain to maturity, seeing that one country (i.e. the country of the Jews) with all this exertion was not able to attain to maturity ?

But if the associates of Marcion, whom we have left behind (in our discussion), come and agree with him and say to us, If the Creator was one and knew that Adam would sin against Him, [P. 58.] why then did the Creator create ?—let all the sects (lit. teachings) know that they too are included in this (objection). For why did not their Gods come or prevent (it), so that he (i.e. Adam) should not be created, or so that they might set right and assist that which had been created ? For why did not their Gods prevent the Maker from creating that which is not good ? And if they did not prevent Him at that time, who will send (?) after them to-day ? And perhaps it was for that reason that God caused Adam to dwell for nine hundred and thirty years outside the enclosure of the Tree of Life, in order that it might be seen that there was no other God who could be found to break into the enclosure, which the Just One had enclosed by means of the Cherub and the point of the sword,⁷ and to bring him (i.e. Adam) in. For if there had been another God more compassionate than this one and stronger than our Maker, he would have broken into the enclosure—which was not then broken into— and would have brought the mortal Adam into the presence of the Tree of Life, that he might eat thereof, so that, just as in consequence of his eating of the Tree of Knowledge we all die, [P. 59.] likewise in consequence of his eating of the Tree of Life we might all live by means of him. But if he remained for nine hundred |xxviii and thirty years outside the enclosure of Paradise and did not find any other God to bring him inside the enclosure of Paradise, and afterwards (God) dissolved him and caused him to return to his dust, and no other God was found to raise him from the dust—acknowledge, O Marcion, the justice of Him who said, I am God and there is none beside Me !

But if Marcion says that the sole reason that the Stranger did not come previously was that at the last his grace might be seen, [let him know] that God had already shown a small measure of grace in connection with His justice, so that His great grace was not deemed strange when it was manifested in its time. And therefore He who showed a small measure of grace towards Adam at that time—when no strange God had shown his grace towards him—is known to be the same (God) who showed great [P. 60.] grace at this time, (a grace) of which they say that it is the grace of the Stranger. For God had decreed this in His justice concerning Adam, (saying) that 'In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.' For our God decreed justly and in order that He might in His love warn Adam who was existing in a good state, lest he should exist in an evil state. But when Adam did not take warning and fell from grace, Justice overtook him, according as it (had) decreed that 'In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.' But God turned in [the way] of grace and tempered the harshness of justice, that Adam might not die that very day but that he might live nine hundred and thirty years [and] then die.

[As He gave to Adam] nine hundred and thirty years at that time on account of His compassion, (so) He has kept him alive even now in the life everlasting on account of His grace. For He gave to him in the beginning a temporal life, in order to show that. . . . For He gave to Adam in mercy—which (signifies [P. 61.] that) He gave to him by means of our Lord—life everlasting. But if they apply the term 'strangeness' to every (?) grace,then (?) also in relation to Adam 'strangeness' was displayed. For the same (God) decreed that, 'In the day that thou eatest |xxix thou shalt die'—and how is He found keeping him alive for nine hundred and thirty years ?

About John, again, from whence ... let the Jews therefore be asked whether John did come, or no. . . . [If he says] that John did come, from whence hast thou this, O Marcion ? [1.38.] Perhaps he says from the testimony to Isu. . . .⁸

[P.62] The Jews say that in the days of the Messenger the King's Son [l. 6.] also comes, seeing that John also when he [heard] the report of [Isu] that he had come [asked] him, 'Hast thou then come, or look we for another ?' ⁹ And he (i.e. John the Baptist) does not say, 'they look,' but 'we look,' in order to show that he and his contemporaries, in his own days and in those of his contemporaries, were looking for Him.

If therefore the Jews say that if Elijah comes the Messiah also has come, and (as) John thought concerning Isu, when He came, that He was he, was not this because he firmly believed that he was to come in his own days, even John's ? On that account he thought concerning Him, when He came, that it was he, or did not even John know when the Messiah was to come ? And why then did he (i.e. John) come ? If he came to smooth the way before Him, then he came to clear away stones. But if he came to call sinners to repentance and to baptize the [P. 63.] repentant, he was sent to purge away sins by means of water. It is evident that these were prepared as it were for the guest-chamber of Him that was to come, and it is manifest that He has come. If He dwells in pure hearts, He is therefore spiritual; but if He who was coming was not spiritual, because He was David's Son, let him (i.e. Marcion) explain to us which was the way that John (was) smoothing for Him. For in honour of kings, or kings' sons, ways are levelled and stones cleared away before them. But before (the coming of) this One he said that minds should be purified. What is probable ? That David's Son . . .¹⁰ |xxx not to David himself ? Or can it be that David also, in the days of his sovereignty, was dwelling in minds and not in palaces ? And if David was dwelling in palaces, and also David's son is to dwell in palaces, what (was) John preparing for him ? minds instead of palaces ? Or can it be that John smoothed ways and prepared palaces, though he was not even dwelling in the cultivated land ?

[P. 64.] But nevertheless, although John was the Messenger of the kingdom, he did not go straight to the capital of the kingdom. Why did he leave the cultivated land and go out to the desert ? Or can it be that he who sent him came into the desert and that on that account he who was sent also was preaching in the desert ? But if they drove him out, did they not treat him rightly ? For what did they see in him that was likely to make them believe that he was the Messenger of Him who was coming ? Perhaps (they were convinced by) the fact that he was imprisoned, or that he was removed, or that the girl played with his skull! But perhaps thou wilt say that they did these things to John by the power of Herod. And if he is the Messenger of that Messiah to all nations, was he really not greater than Herod even there ? Or can it be that even the general of Herod was greater than the King of the. nations ? . . . But if thou sayest that these men, on account of their subjection, were more submissive [P. 65.] than . . ., whereas Herod was not subjected and submissive but he subjected. . . .

[l. 20.] For if in truth he was His herald ... a Messenger for the [l. 28.] King. Can it be that he who is coming is really persecuted [1. 34.] like his Messenger ? . . . Or is he really killed like him ? But if at his coming [they did] not [recognise him, how does he] resemble him (i.e. John) ?

[P. 66, 1. 29.]. . . For even if he were not 'in his days,' but yet were really like him in every respect, this would suffice, even by itself, to refute them (by showing) that he cannot be 'strange' to one whom he resembled in every respect. And if this one point would suffice to refute them, how much more credible will it be [p. 67.] that he is not 'strange' to this man (?) also who happened to |xxxi be in his days, seeing that at the mouth of two witnesses every word is established !

But if thou sayest that therefore not (only) John is like Isu, but also Elijah and Jeremiah, who preceded him, thou sayest well. But are these whom thou citest like him or not ? If they are like him, lo ! it is against thee that thou canst not turn round (?) and say that by chance, as it were, John only happened to be like him. But lo ! thou saidst that there are many men of former times who are like John, and these are all like Isu, so that now we have found that humility existed before Isu. And if humility existed before him, what is that one new thing which he brought with him (and) which was not in those three (i.e. John, Elijah, and Jeremiah) and in their other associates who were like them ?

Why forsooth do they say that there was no fasting (in the world), seeing that when all the scattered groups (lit. fragments) of the followers of Marcion are gathered together they cannot keep the fast of Ezekiel, nor have they (ever) prayed, nor do they (now) pray, a prayer like that of the friends of Daniel ? ¹¹ [P.68] If they say, 'We are praying the whole day,' let us see whether their prayer is accepted. But perhaps they will say, '(It is.) for how do you know that it is not accepted ?' I say, 'From the fact that He does not do for them here (?) anything at all.' And if they say that He does (something) for them, let them show (it) us, and we will accept (it) ! For Daniel used to pray three times a day and by means of his prayer he interpreted dreams and brought back the People from Babylon, and angels used to come to him at the time of his prayer. But the Marcionites, because they pray more than Daniel, as they say, will not accomplish more than he, nor even as much as he, but less than he. But since they pray more than the righteous, as they say, and yet are not answered even as much as sinners (are answered), it is clear that, because they pray to one who does not exist, on that account they are not heard or answered when they |xxxii pray. But if we pray concerning great and heavenly things, [P. 69, 1.6.] these are additions. . . . What is the new (kind of) prayer which he brought with him ?

[1. 21.] Perhaps thou wilt say that these things were not announced in the Old (Testament), for in the New (Testament). . . .

[1. 17.] by means of the prophet, and speaks thus that he should give again his cheek to him who smites. . . .

[1. 36.] to the prophets he sent it and also to Isu. And if Isu did not send the prophets and the Maker did not send Isu, then from these same sufferings of the prophets Isu [took an example] that [P. 71.] he might adorn himself with them in the midst of the world when he came ; because he saw that these very (qualities) were pleasing (lit. chosen) and agreeable to one who loves, he invested himself with them and made use of them, so that he might attract the inhabitants of our world by the humility which was pleasing to them. And if he attracts us by something that is pleasing to us, how can that which is pleasing to us be strange to our nature ? For even if they had not been in the prophets, but are greatly pleasing to our nature (it would equally follow").Or do they say that he changed our nature and (the nature) of the former prophets ? Who changed their nature ? Was it Isu ? Wilt thou not then tell us that he was in the world ? And if he was in the world, then the world was in him ¹² ; and if the world was in him, he is the Creator's Son, as the Scriptures say, and he is not the Stranger's Son, as the followers of Marcion erroneously assert. But if he was not in the world,¹³ who previously sowed in our world the pleasing qualities of Isu ?

Did then the Maker really know that by means of these he (i.e. Isu) was destined to lead created beings astray, and did He give them to us beforehand, in order that we might not go astray [P. 72.] after Isu when he came ? And where is that (passage which |xxxiii says) that 'there is none that knoweth the Father save the Son' ?¹⁴ [P. 72.] And again, that which says that 'none of the princes of the world knew him' ? ¹⁵ And if it be that because the Maker did know He announced them to us beforehand, did He not thereby really lead us astray so that we should think concerning Isu that he was from Him, when he announced these very things which He also had announced to us ? But let us suppose that these things belong to Isu ; can it be that he actually changed the prophets, and that they were then able to fulfil these commandments ? And if he actually changed the prophets, how can he announce to us that we should accomplish them, when he has not yet changed our nature ? In virtue of the fact that he incites us by 'Blessed are the humble in their spirit,' ¹⁶ will he really change our nature ? And if five hundred Beatitudes do not change our nature, if he utters (lit. gives) them we are not able to fulfil in this nature that which we are not able to fulfil in this nature without a change. Or is it because he cannot that he does not change it ? Or because he does not wish ? If he cannot, how was he able to change the nature of the former ones ? And if, though he was able, he really did not wish, how did he consent to change (that) of the former ones ? And if he [P. 73.] did not wish to change (them), why will he change us by means of laws which are strange to our nature ? But if the laws are akin to our nature, and our nature to the laws, where is that' Strangeness ' of the Stranger ? . . .

That thou mayest know that these others also [agree] with [l. 26.] these former ones which I have enumerated to thee [I will cite] the words of David, when he says,¹⁷ 'My knees are weak through fasting, and my flesh is wasted for want of ointment,' and Job says,¹⁸ 'Sackcloth have I girded on my skin, and I have sprinkled my head with dust.' And again David says,¹⁹ 'I have made sackcloth my raiment.' Who therefore remains to the Stranger ? |xxxiv [P. 74.] . . . of those things which Isu commanded there is found in our Scriptures ; so that if he preached mercy, it is found in David . . . mercy is more (?) pleasing to Him than fasting from bread (?), for he says,²⁰ ' This is not the fast which I have chosen, saith the LORD, that thou shouldst bend thy neck like a rush and spread out sackcloth and ashes for thyself, but this is the fast which I have chosen, saith the LORD, that thou shouldst loose the bonds of iniquity, and give thy bread to the hungry, and bring the alien into thine house.' And, again, if fasting is pleasing to the Stranger, lo, Elijah and Elishah and the sons of the prophets (are examples thereof), and lo, John, who fasted in his own days (i.e. in the days of the Stranger) ! If then these (persons) are pleasing [to the Just God], as also they are indeed pleasing to Him, why does He torment His friends here ? Either there is something compassionate [in Him and gracious] to these who are here tormented ; or if there is nothing [He is] very wicked, and they are wronged [by Him] on whose account they are here tormented ! And how [is manifested] the Justice of the Just One ?

[P.75] [See] also, O Marcion, that [these] two Gods, namely the Maker and the Stranger, are both of them angry at the same thing, and take pleasure in the same thing, and are gratified by the same thing. For the Maker is angry at hateful things, and the Good (God) also is angry at hateful things — if it be right to admit that the Good (God) is angry with those who have committed no offence whatever against Him. And so also both of them are gratified by good things, for ... it is evident that they are both angry at adultery and theft and other hateful things, and that they are both gratified by sackcloth and fasting and prayer. For what has happened to these two Gods that they should have one will ? Is it not clear that either there is (only) One God, or that they are both One, for as one they both will with one will ?

And that thou mightest know that this is so, the Maker sanctified Moses and sent him to Egypt, and since Moses wished to take his wife with him by force, He (i.e. the Maker) constrained |xxxv him by means of an angel²¹ to send her back, that He might show how pleasing holiness is to Him. And the Stranger also acted likewise towards Simon (Peter), although he did not [P. 76.] compel him ; and (the fact) that he did not compel him, was it because it did not [become] Him to compel, not only because He is good but also because He is not our Creator ? And again, when the People had been sanctified, He did not allow them to approach the holy mountain because they were turning again to married life ; but the People were standing at a distance, and Moses the holy was speaking, and God was answering with a voice. And again, the disciples also were standing in silence, and Simon only was speaking. And perhaps thou wilt say, Was there not among them John, a virgin, and were not all his companions holy ? (But I reply, Nay—) for here (i.e. at Sinai) also were not the People holy in relation to the Maker ? And Joshua was a virgin, and ²² he (i.e. Moses) was brought in with Joshua only. Lo ! here also it is found that Isu resembles the Maker ; for the Maker sanctified the chief of His prophets, and Isu sanctified the chief of His apostles.

But if on account of the holiness which He preached you [P. 77.] think concerning Him that He is a Stranger, then (are we to suppose that) Elijah was caught up to the heavens of the Stranger? For He ²³ would not have taken up and made to ascend to His heavens one who by his holiness wished to be the opponent of the Creator, who wished that by means of marriage the creation should be fruitful and multiply. For by the case of Elijah, so to speak, all the creation of the Creator has been made void. But how could Elijah have been received (into the heavens) on account of that one thing? . . . For the [P. 78, l.14.] priest was not allowed to enter the Tabernacle unless he was sanctified in his body. . . But if that single [virgin] of the [l.38.] Maker had preceded those many [virgins] of the Stranger, |xxxvi it would be right that that Maker who had preceded (the [P. 79. l.16.] Stranger) should be called . . . since there is no other who was before him, so as to enable us to say that he (i.e. the former) was the cause of him (i.e. of the latter), and that this one imitated him, since he was the latter and imitated the Maker. How is he the Stranger ? Since therefore we have found that the prophets are like to one another in humility, and John to all of them, and all of them to Isu, how then can the Stranger, who resembles them all, be strange to them all ? Or can it be that they give the name of 'Strangeness' to that which is similar ? Well, then, the prophets also, who resemble one another, are 'strange' to one another ! And if thou sayest that thou wilt not compare creatures to God — for 'how (?) can creatures who have been humbled resemble a God who has been humbled ?' — (I ask) then, Is it because Isu was humbled whereas the Maker was not humbled that [P. 80.] strangeness arises ? Well, then, according to thy reasoning, because the Father of Isu is not humbled together with Isu who was humbled, the Stranger also, who was not humbled, is strange to His son who was humbled. And if the Stranger who was not humbled is not strange to His son who was humbled, then it is not because one was humbled and the other was not humbled that the Strangeness arises but because Strangeness consists in Strangeness to the nature (of some one). But if Isu who was humbled resembles the Stranger who was not humbled, how much more will Isu who was humbled resemble the Maker who was humbled ! For in what consists the fact that Isu was humbled ? Is it not in this that he was manifested to men and taught them to do what is good ? If this is not also (found) in the case of the Maker, they (i.e. the Marcionites) speak truly. And if not even this was lacking to Him, why do they utter blasphemy by means of the Strangeness which they introduce ? Did He not enter into the abode of Abraham and eat ? And if it was right that we should say that He ate and that He was manifested to Moses and to Elijah and to Isaiah and to Daniel and the rest of the prophets — and that thou mightest not say |xxxvii that He was manifested only to righteous men, whereas the Stranger (was manifested) to sinners—lo, He was manifested [P. 81.] to the whole People without exception! And if thou sayest that they were righteous, (I answer) Lo, on account of their iniquity they all fell in the wilderness and, except in the case of two, they did not enter into the land of promise. We have thus compared Isu with the Maker, and it has been seen that the Maker was antecedent to Isu in humiliation. And if thou sayest that Isu was actually crucified, thou sayest that it seemed so (?), and not the truth. And if thou addest that He also went down to Sheol and ascended, thou sayest (it) without believing (it). For thou dost not confess the [coming to life of] the body. But inasmuch as (?) it is true that He was actually manifested, the Maker anticipated Him in manifestation. How therefore canst thou liken Isu to that Stranger, who is strange to Him in every respect ? And (why) dost thou wish, on the other hand, to account Him strange to the Maker when He resembles Him in every respect ?

But if Marcion still persists in cavilling, let him be asked again as to whether he believes the word of the Stranger or not. If he believes it, what did He (i.e. the Stranger) testify concerning John ? That John forsooth was a liar, or a true man ? Did [P. 82.] He say concerning him that he was in error, or that he was an enlightener of such as are in error ? If then John is a true man, and not a reed shaken by every wind,²⁴ why [therefore] is he shaken and does he think about Jesus ²⁵ that he [was] the Messiah of the Law. And if [John knew] the word of Isu to be 'No,' [lo,] then Isu really lied in that he said concerning John that he (i.e. John) did send to him. But if in truth John was shaken and sent to Isu, the word of Isu was also a lie, when he testified concerning John that he was not a reed shaken by every wind.

Thus both of these assertions cannot stand. For either he was shaken, or he was not shaken. If he was shaken he was a |xxxviii reed, and why did he (i.e. Isu) say that he was not a reed ? And if he was not a reed, then he was not shaken. And can it be that he wrote (a letter) and dispatched it to him, and sent to him (saying), 'Art thou He that cometh ?' But it is wonderful to hear that John believes in David's Son, and yet Isu bears witness [P. 83.] in saying concerning him that he was not a reed and he has been found to be going astray after the Stranger, though the Messiah who is (mentioned) in the Law is strange to him (i.e. to the Stranger) in every respect. And were it not for the testimony of Isu, who said that he was not a reed, it would have beenpossible to say that because John was humble and happened (to live) in the days of Isu who preached humility, by reason ofhis humility which resembled his (i.e. the humility of Isu) he abandoned the exalted Son of David and loved the humble Isu; but that (passage) which says that he was not a reed does not permit us to hold this opinion concerning John.

But as for this John, who erred [in thinking that it was necessary] that he should send to Him, did he really know the time, or did he send to Him though he knew that it was not He ? And what then compelled him to send to Him ? If (it was) that his disciples might learn from Isu . . .

[l. 40.] And if thou sayest that because He is kind He did not wish [P. 85.] to [injure] John, then because He is kind will He not [condemn] the heathen and the [wicked] and [will] He bear witness to all the [1. 41.] [false] teachings that they are true ? . . . and, what is greater than all things which (consist) of dust and ashes (?), He caused them to attain to all this discernment; if He secretly [P. 86.] punishes them for their grievous sins, He becomes an evil Being (?).

And if they say that the sole reason that Isu said concerning |xxxix John 'Blessed is he, if he is not offended in me,' ²⁶ was in order that he might show that he did not communicate (lit. deliver over) to him that other (utterance) which he said concerning him, that he was not a reed—why did he say it ? But if the sole reason of his saying it was in order to show that John was true in his teaching, then he did not send to Isu, and Isu himself made him (i.e. the Evangelist) a liar who recorded that John sent to him, when (in reality) John did not send to him. And if what he said is true, namely that he sent to him, then is not John true ? And if Isu had wished to send to him (saying) 'I am He,' would he not have been going astray after him ? But he said 'Blessed is he if he is not offended in me.' Whom then do they call a stumbling-block ? Is it not he who turned back from (being) with him ? John therefore was one who believed in Isu, and on that account Isu sent (saying) 'Blessed is he if he remains steadfast and is not offended in me.' Or can it be that by means of the beatitude he actually wished to deceive John ? And was [P. 87.] John deceived or not ? If he was not deceived, then the bribe of the Stranger was lost. And did not the Stranger know that his bribe would not be accepted by John ? And if he knew, why did he allow his bribe to be lost, that is to say, the bribe of that praise of his ?

But concerning Moses and Elijah who were found on the mountain in company with Isu, what do they (i.e. the Marcionites) say that they were doing in his presence ? But they say that they were guardians there. And what. pray, were they guarding, since there was nothing on the mountain ? And if there had been anything on it, the Maker would have had the Cherub and the point of the sword with which to surround the mountain.²⁷ And if because Isu was a stranger to Him (i.e. to the Maker) they were guarding the mountain for Him, then, as between the mountain and the sanctuary, which of them was greater ²⁸ to the Maker, that He should cease to guard His city and |lx His sanctuary and send them (i.e. Moses and Elijah) to guard a mountain in which there was nothing ? If He did not set forth [P.88.] some symbol there for us, let them tell us what such persons as Moses and Elijah were doing there. And if they say, 'You are asking us concerning your own (affairs) also,' then leave that (question) of ours as to what they were doing, and tell us (?) your own (opinion), namely on what account Isu went up thither. Was it in order to fight that he went up thither ? . . . did he make war against the Maker or . . . ? . . .

[l. 38.] These [two, why] were they sent ? For the Maker had myriads [l. 46.] of angels, if to make war [He desired] ... Or were they with [P. 89.] him to say to him (i.e. to Isu) : "If thou art really buying, in order to buy mankind,²⁹ what is the price of mankind ? And if thou art taking mankind, why didst thou beforehand take the Twelve and the Seventy -two from the [flock] ³⁰ of another ? . . . ³¹ Or can it be that thou art taking mankind [l. 12.] hence ? And art thou not, lo, he that said that before the foundation of the world thou knewest them ? ³² Why then didst thou not take them before, when as yet [thou didst not intend to [1. 27.] buy ?]"... If again they returned and said to him "[As for] mankind, because thou art about to buy them, if thou didst take them beforehand, nothing hinders (?) : this mountain that thou hast gone up—and why ?—was this mountain also really required for thee ? And if it is required for thee, give |lxi the price of it, seeing thou hast gone up ; and if it is not intended by thee to buy the mountain, get down off it; why wilt thou stir up enmity for thyself with the Maker about nothing ? But the price of mankind will not be found by thee to give to the Maker, for He has given no pledge." If such words were [P. 90.] put forward (lit. were in the midst), and things similar to them, [then] it was for war that they had come to him. But if Isu came to (wage) war, he was not a good Being, for he did not purchase ... it would not be right for a good Being to injure, [l. 14.] much less those whom he had not yet even purchased ! And were it not that our Maker is good and there is no end to his kindness, He would surely, not have trusted the Stranger so as to give him men to accompany him, when as yet he had not paid their price to Him. Or was there, forsooth, a bargain ? And did Isu say to the Maker, 'Give me men, and I will not depart from Thy house, that is, Thy creation, until I pay Thee their price ' ? And did not the Maker learn from the descent of Isu that he was also to ascend, so that as there was no one who perceived him when he came down, in like manner he would remove those whom he wished to purchase and carry (them) off without any one perceiving him ? But perhaps the Maker [p. 91.] said to him these very things, and Isu returned answer to Him and said to Him, 'If I carry (them) off, as Thou thinkest, in virtue of that which I did when coming down, those souls which I am purchasing from Thee, how can I take them up without Thy consent ?'

And that we may not explore too far into the perverse tale of Marcion, this pact that Moses, etc., agreed on with the Stranger in the mountain,—the glory moreover, which He shewed them in the mountain, for what purpose (was it shewn) ? Can it be |lxii (that it was done) in order that He might shew them that what He gave was greater than what He received ? Then also Moses, etc., sold themselves to Him there, on account of that surpassing glory which they saw. And perhaps Isu too shewed them that glory on the mountain in order to incite Moses, etc., so that because Moses and Elijah were accustomed to that surpassing vision of the Maker Isu shewed them that (his glory) surpassed that of the Maker, in order that they might desire it eagerly on [P. 92.] account of its surpassing character. Well, then, in short, they made a bargain with him, because they had loved him.

And if thou sayest that neither for a sale nor for a bargain had Moses, etc., come to Him, then why had they come to Him ? Can it be that they had come to fight ? And very likely It is that men would come to fight against God ! And which of them is it who strikes (the blow), or which is it who is struck ? Or did he on this account take his Apostles with him and cause them to ascend (the mountain), in order that they might wage war with the Prophets ? And which of the sides conquered there or lost ? But that battle, what was it for ? Can it have been on account of the love of their Gods ? And why would not those Gods themselves contend for the love of mankind ? For if the Gods are at peace, why do they contend about mankind ? . . . [l. 39.] For if created things are from One, unadvisedly did Isu [1.42.] interpose, ... If they say that in truth the Stranger went up to heaven, see how much the Maker despised him and . . . [P.93.] against his disciples and against him [who said], 'This is my Son and my Beloved,' ³³ [for] He had sent only two against them.

[1.10.] But [if] they say, ' If . . . is it not clear that because he was very strong on that account he did not overcome [him ? How] could two men [overcome] three ? [Were they just] two men — and not [both] alive, but one alive and one dead — to fight [a God] !Was the Maker then really afraid to come, and on that account indeed did not come ? So that if He had come, He would have been killed ! Or can then a Divine Nature suffer pain, either |lxiii the Maker's or the Stranger's ? And if they did not suffer, why did the Maker not come against him ? Or can it be that He really knew that Moses, etc., would be sufficient to meet the attack of the Stranger, and therefore He did not come ? For lo, even the Stranger did not contend with them, and it is clear that he really perceived that they were stronger than he, and on that account he remained quiet (and refrained) from engaging in battle. And as to his preparing battle with the Maker, if [his desires hankered] ³⁴ after men, why was he [lo,] unable to [P. 94.] create this ? And if to create men he was too weak, how much more was he too weak to wage war against God ! Again, the Stranger who proclaimed there, 'This is my Son and my Beloved,'whom did He wish to cause to hear (it) ? Can it be that He was calling to Moses, etc., that He might make them His disciples ? Or that He might warn them not to say anything to him (i.e. to Isu) ? And from which heavens did He call ? Was it from the heaven of the Maker ? And why did He descend to it ? If, as it were, on account of the aforesaid Maker the Stranger descended to it, then He did not snatch away men only but also the heaven. Or can it be that the Stranger purchased the angels who were in the heaven together with the heaven ? But if those who were above were not purchased by Him, why did He pass through their abodes ? But if (the voice) came that it might be a witness to the Son, who had no witness on earth, lo ! seeing that the voice came from the heaven of the Maker, who is to tell us that he is [P. 95.] not the Son of the Maker, in a case where the voice which came was coming from the heaven of the Maker, especially when the mountain was the mountain of the Maker, and the cloud of Moses, etc., belonged to the Maker, and the prophets likewise who were on the mountain (were the prophets) of the Maker ?

For if the voice had come from the heaven of the Stranger perhaps it would have been reasonable for us to think that in order that mankind might not be mistaken, owing to the mountain and the cloud and Moses, etc., on that account the voice was coming to them from the heaven of the Stranger, so as to overthrow the opinion which they had concerning Isu. But if even the voice |lxiv which came was from the heaven of the Maker, it did not by any means disown him (by asserting) that he was not the Son of the Maker, but it actually confirmed it that he is the Son of the Maker, and the servants of his Father's house, who had come to do him honour, were witnesses (thereto).

For if there had been a battle, the Maker would not have remained silent, He who even when there was another God did not [P. 96.] refrain from (saying) 'I am God and there is none beside.' And if when there were idols, whose nature showed (lit. answered) that they were not gods, He was proclaiming 'I am He and there is none beside,' (can we suppose that) in a case when a God was warring against a God the Creator went into a hiding-place, that the creation might go astray after the Stranger ? For if in connection with idols He had been silent, (yet) here it would be right for Him to cry out. How much more when He was not silent even towards dead idols ! But seeing that the questions relating to a war have, as in a (real) war, overcome and silenced the question of purchase, now that the tale about a war has come to an end, let us turn to the question of purchase. Explain to us then, What is the purchase which the Stranger made, and from whom did He purchase it ? And, moreover, by means of what did He purchase it ? And that thing by means of which he purchased that which He purchased, of what nature was it ? Was that which He gave of the nature of the aforesaid Good Being, or did He really create (something) and give (it) ? And was not that which the Stranger created fairer than that which the Maker created for Himself ? And if that which He (i.e. the Stranger) created for Himself was fairer, why did He [P. 97] sell unadvisedly and become a laughing-stock ? And if that which He gave was something smaller, the weakness of the Stranger was seen in His creative action. And how was the wise Just Being persuaded to give to the Stranger something great in return [P.98. 17] for something small ? . . . Was it . . . bodies that are from HULE that he bought, or souls ? And if it was souls, |lxv then why [did he not buy] the bodies ? . . . they say that [l. 32.] because the souls had been polluted (lit. had become turbid) He came to purify them. But if those souls were not polluted, then did not the Stranger who purchased them make a. mistake about them ? And even if the souls were polluted, on which account he came to buy them, [was he not alien to their nature ?]

And if they should say that 'He purifies the nature of [l. 8.] the Souls' . . . because 'a fire is kindled in mine anger and [l. 19.] it will burn unto the lowest Sheol.' ³⁵ If He is a nature from whom fire is kindled and it then consumes Him in His turn, (in the case of) everything else which is found to belong to that nature fire will therefore be kindled from it and will then consume it in its turn. For if thou bringest some of the water of the sea into a royal city bitterness is (still) in it. And so too. the souls which (come) from the Maker are polluted as the source (lit. root) from which those souls came is polluted. For it is unlikely that they will say that the fruits are changed when the root of the fruits is not changed. And if they say that that root [P. 100.] also is changed, then how did He (i.e. the Stranger) not exert Himself in the case of the root as in the case of the fruits, that the perfect goodness of the Stranger might be proclaimed ? But the Apostle says,³⁶ 'Eve shall live on account of her children' : then the Maker will have lived on account of the souls which (came) from Him. Or did the Maker not wish to live thus ? And how did the souls which (came) from Him consent to live ? But if the nature of the souls is the same, their will also is the |lxvi same. And if their will is different, their nature also is strange, and they are not from the Maker. And let them tell us whence are those souls ; for it is probable that they are not from the Maker. For He would not sell them (if they were really His), because He would not hate His own nature and love a nature which was not His own. " And if He was selling His nature for something which was not akin to His nature, there is a great kinship between Him and the Stranger, for lo ! one affection is found in both of them ; and moreover one will belongs to both [P. 101.] of them, namely that the Just One should love the nature of the Stranger and sell some of His possessions to Him, and that the Stranger should love the nature of the Just One and purchase from Him. And it will also be (considered) that that nature of the Just One, which is bought as being something precious, surpasses (the other) ; for if the nature of the Just One were not more excellent than that of the Stranger, the Stranger would not have actually purchased it. But what did the Stranger give to those whom He purchased ? And if He gave them a kingdom, can it be that He gave them one greater than that of Elijah and Enoch ? And why then did He not bring with Him some of His good things hither also ? Or (was it) because our domain is not worthy of them, (and) did He on that account not even introduce them into our domain ? In that case they are greater than the aforesaid Isu, inasmuch as our domain is worthy of Isu and unworthy of His (i.e. the Stranger's) good things. And if (it was) in order that they might not be denied, then he (i.e. Isu) was denied when he entered our domain. . . .

Single inverted commas are used in numerous cases where the words seem to be quotations or to belong to a special terminology.

Words in italics inside square brackets are to be regarded as conjectural translations or paraphrases.

In a few passages, where the text has suffered great mutilation, italics indicate an attempt to summarise the argument from suggestions in the fragments.]

[P.101] indicates page 101 of the accompanying Syriac. [l.2] means line 2 of the current page of the accompanying Syriac. [RP]

3. ³ This refers to the sth~lai set up round the Temple ; one of these was discovered by Clermont-Ganneau in 1871. Ephraim probably knew of them through Josephus (B J v 5, 2).

4. ⁴ I.e. Foreigners are not to enter the Jews' sacred limits. The MS. clearly reads [Syriac], p. 52, 1. 42.

6. ¹ For the details of the reconstruction of this passage, see the list of Corrigenda. The Palimpsest is to me (F. C. B.) illegible.

7. ² The 'Cherub' and the 'point of the sword' are taken verbatim from Gen. iii 24 syr.vg, but the enclosure (or 'hedge') of the Tree of Life is not a Biblical phrase.

8. ¹ Isu. It is clear from these treatises that this transliteration of the Greek 0Ihsou~s must have been used by the Syriac-speaking Marcionites, but it is not preserved elsewhere in extant Syriac literature, the genuine Semitic form Yeshu' or 'Isho' (i.e. Joshua) being found without exception.

11. ² Ephraim seems to have regarded the Song of the Three Children as an integral part of the Book of Daniel.

21. ¹ See Exod. iv 24-26 : the same view of the passage is taken by Aphraates (Wright, p. 110, 1. 11 — Pat. Syr. i 257) and by Ephraim elsewhere (ES i 205C).

25. ³ [Syriac] does appear to be the reading of the palimpsest. It is the only occurrence of the ordinary Syriac form of the name 'Jesus' in the anti-Marcionite treatises.

26. ¹ Luke vii 23, but the wording is that of Matt, xi 6 C. Epiphanius (Haer. 324) says Marcion read this 'corruptly' (parhllagme/non), referring the application of the saying to John: we may infer that the corruption consisted in reading e0a_n mh_ for o4j e0a_n mh_ .

30. ⁶ This word (p. 89, 1. 9) is illegible, but for the idea of ' flocks' and ' shepherds ' in Marcionite sources, see p. 106, 1. 40 ff.

31. ⁷ The three illegible lines must express something like " before the price was agreed upon."

35. ³ Deut. xxxii 22. The use of this verse by Marcionites as a proof-text is attested also by Eznik (J. M. Schmid's tr., p. 200).

36. ⁷ 1 Tim. ii 15 : [Syriac] (p. 100, 1. 11) is right, and the note should be deleted. The reading and interpretation of the passage agrees with Ephraim's own Commentary (Ephr. arm in Epp. Pauli, p. 248).

AGAINST MARCION II.

[P.103, l.5] about which Zechariah says, 'Lo ! thy King cometh unto thee,' in order to show us (?) that he is a king. And that other (passage) which Daniel uttered,¹ 'One like a son of men came, and to him He gave the kingdom.' And one (coming) was in humility, as all the Prophets bear witness about [it], and the other in [exaltjation, as the Scriptures bear witness

[P.104, l. 19] But. just as, O Marcion, when David [mentioned] the Messiah who is (foretold) in the Law, our Lord proved from David that he (i.e. the Messiah) is not David's son—and the matter remained in doubt among the Scribes—in like manner, when John recognised our Lord. . . .

[l.43]And when [he] explained that he is David's son that cometh, how being David's son is he the Lord of David, seeing that David [P. 105.] testifies and our Lord confirms ? As Malachi testifies concerning John, 'Behold I send my messenger before thee,' and our Lord confirms it that John was Elijah, give me evidence from the other Scriptures that John is [the messenger] of whom Malachi spake.

Therefore according to the testimony of David and the confirmation of [our Lord], David's son, concerning this son of David [and] about this Lord of [David], are there then two Messiahs or two natures ? For [if in some respects he is the son of David] and in some respects the lord of David, is it not [clear that the |lxviii two natures come together and] are mingled as one, and in relation to the manhood (he is) the Messiah and in relation to the Godhead [he is lord]. For why was a body required for God ?

[P.106 l.30.] . . . so that if ye believe and do not doubt and "if there is in you belief," is it false belief, like (the belief) of that blind man ² or the belief of strangeness ?

"Because John was near to die, he sent his flock by the hand of two under-shepherds to the Lord of the flock : our Lord began to teach concerning him—' Did ye go out to see a great man on account of his raiment ?' " This man, the meek and humble, [P. 107.] and, if not, a trembling reed shaken by every wind, does he not thus go astray [a little], and is bent and beaten about by all manner of reports ? Because he knew whose coming he announced (lit. before whom he announced), for the witness of the truth and the herald of the kingdom of the Lord of the kingdom is taught by the truth. If our Lord Isu, therefore, bore witness to John that he was meek, let us learn from this humility which of the Messiahs the humble herald resembles (lit. approaches), that Messiah (who is) the source of humility, or that one at whose side thousands fall. For it is necessary that the herald of the dispensation (lit. time) should be himself similar to the dispensation. But Malachi says, The messenger of the covenant, lo ! he cometh, and who endureth the day in which he cometh ?' But if the herald is humble and meek, and he who is heralded is set on high and exalted, lo, in this also there is strangeness !

But (as for) our Lord who says, 'John is greater than all who are born of women,' not because he saw the greatness of the herald, as ye say, that it was great and splendid like that of him who was heralded, (it was not) on account of this that He [P. 108.] said (it). Either give us the splendour of John which was eminently great as (befitted) that of the herald who (went) before the Pre-eminent One, or explain to us why our Lord called him great. For even as all the prophets were 'just,' like Him |lxix who sent them, so also this man, His herald, is like Him who is heralded. For if the greatness of him who is heralded is not shown in the announcement concerning him, who will believe that he is a great one? And if He performed signs, read (of them), and if He worked miracles, declare (them). For (with regard to) those messengers whom our Lord sends at the last and that token which appears before that terrible coming, is the sign (shmei~on) thereof terrible and glorious like the thing itself, or can it be that it is alien to Him in His lowliness ?

But it was not Moses or one of the prophets who said concerning John "He is greater than all who are born of women." What is there about him ³ that magnifies John ? But can it be that the bonds of Herod magnify him, or that the head-asking of the daughter of Herodias exalts him, or that the executioner confirms for him (the application of) that (passage), 'Who can endure the day in which he cometh ?' A herald who was humbled [P. 109.] and slain came before Him who comes on the clouds to destroy the slayers, and a lowly messenger who did not stand up for himself was sent before the King before whom no created beings can stand ! And he with whose head the girl played, who will believe that he was the apostle of that ⁴ Stone which will cause all falsehood to pass away ? . . . and let us bring forward the aspects of the two Messiahs, and let us look at the aspect of John and see which Messiah he resembles — that Stranger [in whose] days he came beforehand, or this (Messiah) who is in the Law, of whom as yet not even a rumour had been heard ; for even from . . . and proximity (?) it was possible to learn their true nature. Set therefore the two Messiahs over against one another, and set John between (them) ; with whom then does the slain herald agree, with the slayer or with the slain one ? Whom does the meek and [despised] one resemble ? Him who was |l humbled or the shatterer of all ... ? And if it was because [P. 110.] John announced the coming of that Messiah (lit. announced before that Messiah) that he became great, it is still the same thing ; for he caused us to ascribe the majesty of that King to the herald and the messenger who preceded Him, as is also the custom of kings and their messengers.⁵ Or can it be that the majesty of him who was to come consisted in humility ? For lo ! [the majesty] of humility was also upon His herald, together with the rest (of His qualities). But because John was the messenger of the kingdom he was also wholly forgotten by them (?). When he comes, that Just One and the greater of the [two] Messiahs, does a herald or a messenger go before him ? Or [will it be sudden ?],⁶ that terrible coming of His, and does no messenger and herald come before it ? But if another herald does come before it, . . . he is greater than John. For that majesty which was ascribed to John bears witness concerning this (Being) that He is greater than John. And is that messenger who comes before that subjugator of the nations thus subjected [P. 111.] and humbled and persecuted as John was? If thus is his coming (?), the contest is ours, for if the messenger is thus humbled and scorned, how does the lowly announce the coming of the Mighty One, and the scorned (announce) the coming of the Exalted One ? Who will believe that he is the Messenger of the Saviour in a case where he cannot stand up for himself, or does not show terrible signs and does not cast fear and trembling upon mankind ? But if the messenger who comes is great and mighty, how necessary is it that He too should be great ! For (He is) like the Sun, and the herald also is a ray that precedes Him. If therefore it is so — as indeed it is — John, the humbled and lowly, announced the coming of Isu, who differs, by reason of his lowliness, from that high exalted King who is coming ; and he is alien, by reason of his abasement, to that mighty messenger who is sent before the face of that Mighty One. But does the Messiah come to save Israel or to torment it ? If he comes to |li save it, his messenger therefore convicts of sins or preaches salvation. But if he is one who convicts, when they repent [P. 112.] then they are saved. And if they do not wish to repent, does he preach to them ease or salvation ? But if he preaches destruction to them, all those things which Israel expects are annulled. And if he preaches salvation to them, by his character of Saviour he offers them a foretaste of the great salvations which come after him, as Moses did in Egypt.

Let us see therefore what foretaste of salvation John offered to them ; and, in the second place, lo, the Jews acknowledge all (manner of) prophets and righteous men, and this man, who is greater than all of them, they not only slew but do not even acknowledge ! When therefore the Just and Upright One comes, whom this persecuted and slain one announced beforehand, will He avenge his ill-treatment and murder and the refusal to acknowledge him upon all the tribes of the Jews, who unto the last continually refuse to acknowledge him, or will He not ? If He does not avenge (him), where is the Just One who delivered even the observer of the Law (and) avenged him on the Gentiles ? ⁷ This man, who is greater than all the Prophets, [P. 113.] He does not avenge ! And if He executes vengeance on all these Tribes, who disbelieve in John and continue to do so, then He who comes is the destroyer of the Jews and not their Saviour. For those who slew His messenger slew Him Himself, and those who deny His herald are not able to acknowledge Him.

But if when all these sins are openly committed (lit. are in the midst) they are not punished, why was it necessary that John should come to baptize and absolve from transgressions, seeing that not one of the transgressions is punished ?

But there is no one who is kinder than He who forgives all these transgressions ; and how is it that this justice shows neglect, (this justice) which in no case neglected to punish ? Has that grace which comes to Israel at the last compelled us to say that it is alien to that justice which wrote for Israel ⁸ 'blow for blow' ? But if sins are punished, that baptism which remits sins is necessary at the last; for lo, the baptism of John ceased |lii (to exist) among the Jews thenceforward. Who therefore can [P 114.] bring it (back), and who can baptize, now that John is dead ? And if it (i.e. baptism) is not necessary at the last, why was it formerly necessary ? Is it withheld by Grace or by Justice ?

But (thou wilt say), ' Lo, these very things by means of which thou judgest me, (by asking) why they are not found in connection with John, are the things by means of which thou too art judged as to why they are not found in connection with John. For lo, the prophet testifies and our Lord confirms that those things which are said concerning Elijah are fulfilled in him (i.e. in John).' But I say that the herald is like Him who is heralded, that as about Him terrible things are written and as if in this world He is doing them, but it is at the last He is ready to do them. But the roots (i.e. causes) of retribution, since they come from this quarter, prophecy takes up, in order to pluck the fruits from their roots, according to that (passage), 'Lo, the kingdom of God among you !' ⁹—And they did not (then) see those good things and the pleasures of the Kingdom, but because He is the root of the aforesaid pleasures [P. 115.] He says 'Lo, the Kingdom !' Because those words which John proclaimed [give an earnest of what is to come]¹⁰ he called things of Yonder things of Here, just as in the case of a murderer who is slain after twenty years, the hour in which he committed the murder has slain him, as (it befell) Adam.¹¹

And if thou sayest. that they likewise teach that there is a proof (?) respecting these associates (?), then also the Messiah who is (mentioned) in the Law has two comings, one in which he deposited pledges, and another in which he redeems pledges. For from the actions of John I demonstrate (that he has) two comings, one to which the actions (?) of John bear witness that it was not a Lowly One who came to announce the advent of the Exalted One, and another (coming) promised by (lit. the promises of) Malachi in the passage "He cometh as a fiery furnace," that is to say, on account of the retribution which was hidden in the preaching of John, (the retribution) which |liii is revealed at the last, as he said also concerning his Lord, "Thousands shall fall at thy side," ¹² and "Peace at the last," ¹³ and as that (passage says), 'The LORD God shall give him the throne of David his father.' ¹⁴

Now the Baptism at the hands of John was so alien that not [P. 116.] even the angels, and righteous men and prophets were aware of it; let that Strangeness, therefore, of which no one was aware, appear in the days of this Strangeness of Isu, of whom no one had been informed ; but it was right that the Strangeness of our Lord should be bound together with the Strangeness of John by the conduct of our Lord, as John also was with the Law : Old Testament and New Testament (meet) in the new Baptism of John.

But nevertheless if our Lord was David's Son, as all the prophets bear witness, and if He was not David's Son, as David too testifies and our Lord also confirms, on your account then it was said that He is not David's Son, so that this very Strangeness to which ye have recourse might be found within the Scriptures, in order that your error might be hampered from running (abroad) throughout the world.

Single inverted commas are used in numerous cases where the words seem to be quotations or to belong to a special terminology.

Words in italics inside square brackets are to be regarded as conjectural translations or paraphrases.

In a few passages, where the text has suffered great mutilation, italics indicate an attempt to summarise the argument from suggestions in the fragments.]

[P.101] indicates page 101 of the accompanying Syriac. [l.2] means line 2 of the current page of the accompanying Syriac. [RP]

1. ¹ Or, ' He came like a son of men ' : this peculiar phrase is that of syr.vg, Dan. vii 13.

2. ¹ I.e. the blind man who called Jesus 'son of David' (Luke xviii 38). P. 100, 1. 17, appears to read 'Thy faith hath saved thee ' (Luke xviii 42).

AGAINST MARCION III.

[P. 117.] IF the organs ¹ of the body suffice for the gifts of the Good (God), O Marcion, that is to say, the eye for His light, and the ear for His voice, why then does the body not live at the last ? But if the body does not suffice for these good things at the last, no[thing] else in this world suffices for them. Therefore neither is the heart sufficient for knowledge of the Stranger, nor hearing for the study (lit. reading) of Him. Moreover, as to the fact that the souls do not sin in the Kingdom, is it because of their nature, which is good, that they do not sin ? And how then did the evil body change the good nature ? But if the Stranger changes them there, though they are evil, what sin did the body commit [P. 118.] so as to be deprived of this desirable change ? But if the souls are good there, is it because they enter that region that they are good, or are they good from the point where they stripped off their bodies ? If this desirable state be due to the place, let the body also enter into it, and likewise all men [in whom] are sins. . . .

[P. 119, l.5] ... [And as] Fire is not [separated from Heat, so Evil is not constituted apart from its power. But how and wherefore does that which is hot retain its natural heat, when that which is cold did not remain in its natural state ? If therefore it is an Existence and an Entity, they are [not] changed in nature. But if that creative power has made out of nothing something good, it [can] be changed in character. For this ye have learnt, (namely) that they are created from nothing, because a thing which is created from nothing can be changed into |lv anything. And if it is not created, it is always 'bound' by its essential nature ; for, (in the case of) a thing which can be changed into anything, its change bears witness concerning it that it [does not come] from an unchangeable Existence. But if it is possible for the souls to strip off their bodies, they (i.e. the souls) are purged of all evils. Why did he who came come ? Was it to bring life to the body which [P. 120.] [was] without life, or to come and change the soul which was (already) alive ? . . . And henceforth they are dragged again [l. 17.] from struggle to struggle, and therefore also weapons and crucifixion are necessary to them (?) in the Kingdom. And if not, for what reason are the souls which are very evil here not evil there ? For if this is due to the place then also their Creator is able to bring them up to a place which is raised above and higher than HULE. And if they say that they (i.e. the souls) cannot conquer even there, (I reply that) if it be the fact that the Stranger constrains us to conquer in the region of Evil and (in) the body of Sin, how much more will the Maker give us the victory in a place which is raised above Evil and also above the body of Sin ! But if even thus it (the soul) cannot conquer, it is then unjust in the Stranger to demand of us victory in a [P. 121] region where there is no possibility of our being victorious. But if, when the souls have stripped off the body of Sin and are lifted up again to a region which is raised above Sin, the souls are still polluted even there, how do they say that in that region of the Good they are purged ? And why then do they blame the body by asserting that 'it causes the soul to sin,' when in reality, in all this interval of time, the nature of the soul is found to be evil ? And how at the present time do the souls become good in the Kingdom ? For if the Stranger creates a new mode of existence (lit. another creation) for them there, if He is able to change the mode of existence of the soul, it may be that He can change the soul's nature. But if the nature is changed by creative power, then the evil was not in the essence (of the soul) but in the creative power, and hence the Maker can change |lvi the nature according to His will, as also other created beings testify who serve according to the will of their Creator. And therefore when Isu came to us, He ought to have made use of [P. 122.] creative power and not of preaching, for creative power changes natures, whereas preaching does not; and this is proved to thee by craftsmen, that is to say, even by potters and smiths.

But if when our Lord came He did not wish to change the natures, was it as a kind and wise Being that He did not wish to change the natures ? Was it as a kind and wise Being that He did not wish to destroy that which was well adjusted ? Or was it as an evil and envious Being that He did not wish to adjust that which was badly constructed ? But if it was because our Lord saw it to be rightly fashioned that He did not even adjust any part of it, how do they say that the Maker repented of the work to which our Lord Himself testified that it was rightly fashioned ? Or how again, when our Lord praises it, do they find fault with it ? But know that by the fact that He praised the latter one it is seen that He agrees with the former one, and by the fact that they find fault they themselves are seen to disagree with the latter (and) also with the former. But in which (respect) is our Lord seen to have praised the work of the Maker ? Is it not by the fact that [they find fault, but He was] [P. 123.] one who repaired the normal arrangement ? ² For it was not abnormal eyes, alien to nature, that our Lord gave to the blind man, but eyes in accordance with nature. [If He were] a Stranger, it would be reasonable that just as He gave us laws which were alien to the Maker in like manner He should give us also physical organs which are alien to the Maker. But if He changed laws but did not wish to change physical organs, it is seen that the organs are (works) of God, and our Lord, who changed the laws from generation to generation, did not change the organs in any generation.

But they say, 'The sole reason of His not changing (them) was that they might not think concerning Him that He was a Stranger, and (so) persecute Him.' The laws therefore which He changed, did He change them in order that they might |lvii think concerning Him that He was not a Stranger ? In which of the two circumstances, then, was strangeness most powerfully to be seen, in the change of laws or in the change of organs ? For even a feeble human being can change laws, but (only) a powerful Maker can change organs. Would that He had changed [the] mind and had not changed the law, so that [a man] might see its excellence and not its difficulty ! For when new creations came to pass [in] men more strangeness [P. 124.] [would arise] . . . .

For just as by the fact that He [changed] the laws He shewed [l. 22.] strangeness, [so] by the fact that He did not change the bodily organs He annulled the strangeness. But if our Lord [made] the two of them one — for He gave to the hearers additional interpretations which were not in the Law, but He did not give to those who were to be healed additional organs which were not in nature, (it was) in order that when contumacious persons treat Him as a stranger because He abrogated laws they may be convicted of error by the fact that He maintained the normal arrangement of nature. Again, He gave new laws and maintained primeval nature, in order that when He is treated as a stranger on account of the new laws primeval nature may come forward and prove concerning Him that He is not the son of a [P. 125] stranger.

But if He is a stranger, as they assert concerning Him, then this thing which He did was exceeding foolish ; for He abrogated the former commandments and maintained the former nature. For, as I have already said, He ought, as a strange law-giver, to have created on that account a strange nature also, so that, just as His law was seen to be something more than the former law, in like manner His creation also might be seen to be something more than the creation of the Creator. But if "in His law our Lord was a stranger, but in His action one of the household," ^³this is (a description of) the foolish Marcion, who is partly inside and partly outside. And they ought therefore, if they are lovers of true things, to remain in doubt ; for if they called Him a stranger on account of the new sayings which He uttered, then |lviii because He did not create a strange creation the bold preaching ought to have been buried in silence (lit. confined within silence). For the Marcionites preach two things concerning our Lord which are at variance with each other, for "He abrogated the former laws and healed injured organs." But here this man, [P. 126.] whoever he may be, is seen to be alien to the creation in virtue of his teaching and akin to it in virtue of his activity.⁴ But let us see which is the true 'strangeness,' that which consists in sayings or that which consists in deeds. If that which consist in sayings is true, their contentious doctrine is true, but if that which consists in deeds is true our faith has received the crown.

Let us know therefore who was a stranger to the world— Ho who instituted in it new laws, or He who created in it strange creatures ? For He who institutes in the world new laws is not a stranger to the world, since in that world new laws have been issued from generation to generation ; but He who created strange creatures was perhaps considered to be a stranger, since no strange creature has (ever) appeared in the world. If therefore the Marcionites proclaim that our Lord gave eyes to the blind, it is a good thing that from their own mouth their condemnation is proclaimed. For instead of bestowing strange eyes, that it might be known that He was a stranger, He restored to health these former ones, that it might be known that He is that (Being) who existed in former times. But this thing, which they proclaim to others, is to themselves a thing unheard of ; for their hearing [P. 127.] is at variance with their tongue, just as their intention is at variance with their Maker. For the Creator and Lawgiver abolished the former laws and gave other laws, but He did not abolish the former sun and create another sun ; again He replaced the Old Covenant (diaqh&kh) by a New Covenant, but He did not abolish the old heaven and create another heaven. With regard therefore to Him who creates natures and gives laws, just as it was easy for Him to change laws so it would have been easy for Him to change natures. But wherefore He who changed laws did not wish to change the creation thou mayest hear from us abundantly, if there is not with thee that contentiousness which is wont to resist abundant (proofs), which, though it is |lix supposed that with its labour it really acquires them, does not [know] that it is driving away from beside itself an acquisition without labour. For the contention of the hearer is [an impediment to] the gifts that come forth from the mouth of the speaker.

Hear therefore why it was that He who abolished the former laws did not abolish the former creatures ! He created the creatures in accordance with His own perfection, but He gave [P. 128.] many laws in account of our imperfection. For if we had abided perfectly by the law which He has written on the heart—(the law) which was followed by Abel and by Enoch who did not taste death—laws varying from nation to nation would not even be required. Thus where the creatures (are concerned, permanence of species is due to) the perfection of the Creator, who in all respects is perfect; and where laws (are concerned, the diversity is due to) the imperfection of man, who in all respects is audacious. God, therefore, did not abolish the former creatures, lest we should think that He had actually received advice or had been taught to create creatures superior to the former creatures ; but He gave many laws, that in many (ways) He might restrain the audacity which did not abide by the former law which was written on the heart.

But man, on account of his imperfection, when he does something, is taught by his experience of former things to do something more than (those) former things ; whereas the Creator, since He is perfect in His Wisdom, even before He creates, each separate thing that He wishes to do is completely visible to Him: But perhaps thou wilt say, 'Lo, creatures were transformed in Egypt!' They were transformed in Egypt on [P. 129.] account of the tyranny of Pharaoh, but they did not undergo transformation on account of ⁵ . . .

[P.130. l.29][For the Will that bound the course of Nature ⁶ (is able to alter it) and we learn that He who relaxed the Laws was Himself the |lx [l. 38.] establisher of the Laws.] For a composite nature cannot remain in its composite state without the . . . power of its Creator, and a law cannot be annulled without the good will of its Maker ; [P. 131.] for where there is power to make there is also wisdom which directs the things that are made, and where there is Justice which punishes sins there is also Grace. . . . For consider that One who is good cannot shew mercy save to those who have transgressed His just law, for if He has compassion with regard to the law of another He has deflected from goodness and also ignored justice, so as to incline altogether towards iniquity. For that Stranger who becomes the pardoner of debtors necessarily wrongs the creditor. "But," it is said, "He paid our debt by His death." But know that we owed a real debt: if therefore He died in reality, He also paid our debt in reality ; but if it was in appearance that He died, that debt of ours also was paid in by a fraud. Yet know that the Good One also was pleased by this deception, that He should come and pay our debt by a fraud. Yet He who is just and mighty is not mocked, for in virtue of His justice He does not act wrongly and in virtue of His might He is not mocked. For the Just One would not act [P. 132.] wrongly so as to come, when our debt has been paid, and demand the paid debt afresh, nor again would the Mighty One be mocked, so to allow His real possessions to be snatched from Him, without receiving anything real in exchange for His real possessions. "But," it is said, "though the Just One is mighty, the Good One is nevertheless mightier than He." If therefore He overcame Him by might, how ⁷ do they bring in the term 'purchase'? [Call] Him therefore a doer of violence and not a purchaser. But if He made a real purchase, as one who acted humbly, how was 'might' involved in the affair ? For either let them choose for themselves that He purchased as a humble and true (Being), or else let them choose for themselves that He did violence, as one who is mighty and tyrannical.

But since the followers of Marcion were ashamed to be sponsors for the term 'violent robbery' (as applicable) in the case of the Stranger, they have used with reference to Him the term 'purchase in humble fashion,' and because they are refuted in |lxi the matter of the purchase, they have used with reference to Him the term 'might,' so that when it is asserted against them that He did violence they say that He merely purchased, and when again it is asserted against them that the Maker did not wish to sell his possessions they say that He (i.e. the Stranger) is mightier than He (i.e. the Maker). Each of the (two) assertions [P. 133.] therefore annuls the other. For if it is a 'purchase in humble fashion,' consent (lit. will) and not compulsion is involved, but if the purchaser overcomes by force he does not really purchase but seizes by violence. If therefore they introduce (the mention of) His might, which is a plausible term, (the notion of) violent robbery comes in with it . . .

[P.134, l.26] let them learn that it is a doctrine (artificially) constructed and . . ., which has no foundation (lit. root); for the poets likewise construct fables out of bare names, their fables being devoid of foundation, for the poets make use of names . . .

[P.135, l. 21.] On that account He gave that which is His own in order that He may take that which is not His own. And again, if there is no affinity between the purchaser and the seller, in their mutual action, they cannot give to one another or receive from one another. For that which they give is profitable to both, and again that which they receive is pleasing and profitable to both. But if they have heard only the word 'purchase' and hence have introduced the mention of 'strangeness' (lit. and from it have named strangeness), they ought to have made mention of 'strangeness' from the days of Isaiah onwards, who said ⁸ "For nought have ye been sold," and thenceforward it would have been a purchase in reality, that the People was sold, that it should serve its masters. But if there is no strangeness in [P. 136.] a real purchase, how can there be strangeness in a fraudulent |lxii purchase ? But if they say that the Just One did not perceive the Good One, (I reply) 'And how was it that that Good and Humble One came to purchase something which its owner did not wish to sell—something which it did not even enter His mind to sell ?' But if they say something that pleases them they must hear something that does not please them. For it pleases them to say this, that this Just One did not perceive that Good One ; but it does not please them that some man should say concerning that Good One that He robs with violence. But this (statement) which does not please them is derived from that (statement) which pleases them. For if the Just One did not perceive the Good One, He therefore did not even contemplate the selling of His possessions to Him, for lo, He did not even perceive that He (i.e. the Good One) existed ! But if He did not perceive Him and moreover did not contemplate the selling (of anything) to Him, it necessarily follows that if He sold (anything) He was compelled by force to sell that which He did not [P. 137.] wish to sell. But perhaps they may say that even if the Good One compelled the Just One by force it was only for our salvation that He compelled Him by force. Know that in this respect He was on a level with all robbers. For he also who goes forth to take by robbery a possession that is not his own puts pressure on the possessor by reason of his love for the possession ; and, in a word, all those who take away things from their owners; it is because of the love which they have for the things themselves that they grieve the heart of their possessors. But they say, "Even if the Good One put pressure on the Just One by snatching us from Him, He only took us to Himself in a loving manner." (But this is no argument), for what thief is there who will steal a precious pearl from his neighbour and will not keep it lovingly and carefully after taking it away ? And on this supposition all evil-doers are found to be acting, not in an evil manner, but mercifully and kindly. For what robber is there who goes forth to take away or to filch something hateful and [undesirable] in his own eyes ? Why therefore have the [P. 138.] Marcionites adorned with fair titles One who in His conduct is not different from evil-doers ? But far be it from us to speak thus concerning our Lord ! But it is only on account of them (i.e. |lxiii the Marcionites) that we are obliged to say these things for their refutation, so that if they are convinced these things will not be reckoned to us to our detriment, on account of the advantage (which accrues) to them, and if they are not convinced they will pay the penalty for it, that their confusion (of mind) led us to use words that are not seemly. But even if we utter the blasphemy (only) with our lips, and not in our heart, nevertheless who is there who wishes to taste, even with his lips (only), the deadly poison ? For as to that which is not seemly, would that it had never in our life (?) entered our mind !

But nevertheless let us return to our former subject, which we abandoned for a while on account of the pretext of 'purchase.' If therefore before the coming of Isu this [convention] ⁹ existed, O Marcion, that is to say, that though laws were changed from generation to generation the order of nature ¹⁰ was fixed and . continued (lit. came) through all generations, we see that if our [P. 139.] Lord came and diverged from this [convention] ⁹ of the Maker it is evident that He was 'strange' to the Maker. But if He proceeded in accordance with this order it is manifest that this beseemed the Son that His steps should hasten in the footprints of Him that begat Him, for He also . . . But the Son [1. 17.] also preserved by His healing the normal arrangement of the former body, that He might testify, as their Father did, that the creatures were created aright from the Beginning. Our Lord therefore is not found to resemble a destroyer, nor a stranger, for He did not injure healthy organs . . . nor, again, when He healed did He bestow abnormal organs, nor, again, did He [make it [1. 33.] appear] to them by His creative power that He was alien to the Maker, but He preserved organs that were healthy, and cured organs that were hurt. But (?) He who preserves healthy organs, in order that they may not be hurt, plainly testifies concerning Him who created them that He is perfect and (that) it is not right that His arrangement should be hurt. But He who [P. 140.] sets in order organs that have been hurt testifies concerning |lxiv a creative power (shared) in common, (namely) that He is a fellow-workman to Him who set them in order from the Beginning ; and it is evident that it was a love (shared) in common which constrains Him to set in order by a common mode of workmanship the common work. For when the work of a craftsman is injured it cannot be set right save by him who made it, or by a fellow-workman to him who made it. These are two things from which the Marcionites have deflected, for they are not willing to call our Lord 'the Maker,' nor (do they admit) that He was (sent) by the Maker. But His active power itself deprives those who deprive Him of active power, especially because that active power of His was repairing the work of the Creator. But it is clearly seen that this is a thing learnt from Him, (I mean) that primeval Teacher who is the Architect of the creation. But this active power was sent as to the first of creatures,¹¹ in order that it might be known that by this same active power the creatures had been created. For the repair of a work can only be wrought by means of that workmanship which set it in order.

[p. 141.] But when this perfect Disciple of that perfect Architect came, not that He was a learner, nor was His Teacher instructed, in virtue of that workmanship which (proceeded) from Himself (and) in which the normal arrangements were included from the Beginning—when He came, therefore, He ordered aright the hands which He had made, that they might give alms to those who lacked health, whereas He found them (such) that, instead of giving alms from that which was their own, they committed thefts from that which was not their own. But because the hands did not perform that service on account of which He created them He was empowered, as a just Maker, to command that the hands should wither up. But instead of this He commanded that hand which was withered to be stretched forth ; ^¹²for He knew the effrontery of the Marcionites, that if when He was restoring and repairing the corruption of the natures they call Him 'strange' to Nature, if His deed had been contrary to Nature how much more would they have considered Him 'strange' ? But because they are perverse, perhaps if our Lord [P. 142.] had done contrary to Nature they would not have considered |lxv Him 'strange!' But even if they had been as it were able to learn perversely, yet for the upright Teacher it was not seemly that because of the perverse ones He also should teach perversity,

[P.113 1. 16.] a rent worse than the former one ¹³ . . . ' unless' they were willing to learn. For if in the [straight] way the followers of Marcion are not [able to walk, in slippery places how] can they [direct] their goings ? ¹⁴

Single inverted commas are used in numerous cases where the words seem to be quotations or to belong to a special terminology.

Words in italics inside square brackets are to be regarded as conjectural translations or paraphrases.

In a few passages, where the text has suffered great mutilation, italics indicate an attempt to summarise the argument from suggestions in the fragments.]

[P.101] indicates page 101 of the accompanying Syriac. [l.2] means line 2 of the current page of the accompanying Syriac. [RP]

1. ¹ For this translation of haddame, generally rendered 'limbs,' see p. xxi, 1. ] 1, where Ephraim says "by thy haddame, that is, by thy senses."

4. ¹ The same word as is translated 'creative power,' pp. lv (last line), lxiii f.

5. ¹ Here follows a very illegible page, containing an allusion to Hezekiah and the Sundial (Isaiah xxxviii 8), p. 129, 11. 15-22.

9. ² The word [Syriac], which occurs twice in this context, is legible in the Palimpsest. It is probably a distortion of some foreign word, e.g. to_ eu0a&reston or the Latin orbita.

14. ³ The concluding sentence is mostly illegible, but the reference to the ' rent' is clear. [...]

AGAINST BARDAISAN.

I. BARDAISAN, lo, declares--that even without the sin of Adam--the Body would turn to its dust,--that Flesh does not cleave to Spirit,--that the dregs run downward--and the fine material upward,--and . . .--the one its height and the other its depth.

II. His opinion is diseased, similar--to the infirmity of Bardaisan,--his whole mythology is sickly.--"For if," says he, "[it is] by Adam--we die the Death of here below,--it would have been right that He who came--should have given Life here below--that he might render recompense for the usury paid."

III. But our judges are judged--before that Truth which is from judgement;--they are being judged, the judges--of all [P. 144.] judgements that [are] judged in error.--The truth of it judges the judges,--for Verity [cometh] in judgement;--by its truth it is the victor--of the wickedness hidden in the judges.

IV. When by artifice Error judges--that it may conquer the truth,--it is judged secretly--by the knowledge of the truth. --Wherefore not again has Verity [come]--if open audacities have changed it,--for its victory in truth--holds the crown over it.

V. To the word of truth . . . the healthy ear [is a test :] . . . --the healthy mouth also is a test²--to fruit sweet [and bitter]--the mouth teaches the taste--to the eye that has erred by the sight.

VI. For that inexperience--of the eye which sees [all forms]--is obedient to the mouth which tries [all] tastes--[that thou] |lxvii mayest learn [thereby the wholesomeness] of fruits ; [so] also the inexperience -- of the ear that hears all words -- (is obedient) to the heart that tries all words -- that thou mayest learn thereby the force of the words.

VII. Let us be like to the ordinary (physical) body -- whose [P. 145.] organs are equal in love, -- for the sound organ that has stumbled -- its fellow that is skilful admonishes it. -- Let the lover[s] of truth also become -- one Body against Error -- that [our] lack may be filled -- . . .

VIII. A true decision bears witness -- that the transgression of Adam -- turned the Body to a principle ³ -- that looses the fixing of its life, -- for if we have seen that our Lord also -- fixed the mortal Body -- with life that cannot be loosed -- His truth has borne away the crown.

IX. Our disputation has entered a contest -- that from two sides, lo, is approached, -- that on two sides it may be crowned, -- for in that one involves the other -- in the common contest they are alike. -- For if our Lord put on the Body -- with the life of Paradise He rewarded it, -- because it lost its life there.

X. Compare, then, and let us take the [trial]s -- of our Lord that thou mayest know, if they are like -- to bodily and mortal ones, -- whether He put on the Body, or not. -- Begin then with the Birth -- and go on to finish with the Death -- and include in the middle -- His human mode of life.⁴

XI. For they are bound one to the other -- His truths that bound Error ; -- in that His Death persuades us about His [P. 146.] Birth -- that He put on a mortal Body ; -- His Resurrection bears witness to His Death -- that the Body which died was raised. -- For His Birth is bound up with His Death, -- and His Death is bound up with His Resurrection.

XII. For our Lord has fixed the traditions -- of His truth like the bodily organs, -- [which] He has fixed in one another, -- that when contention and Error -- wish to cut off an organ -- the Body all of it wails -- and the organs [from all] sides -- are crying out about that one which is cut off.

XIII. The Truth is living and life-giving to all, -- lo, the |lxviii tastes of it bear witness to it.--For lo, by a myriad trials-- the affair of our Lord is learnt,--that in the Body He died and was raised,--and His Birth and His Death have become a test ⁵--for the very Body which He put on,--that not in appearance and fraud did He put it on.

XIV. [When] He confessed His [mys]tery to Thomas,--who by touch wished to examine Him,--He gave His Body to the touch of the hand,--that the sense of touch also should be a [P. 147.] test to Him ;--there came to him the word of Truth,--that will cast out all contention,--"For a spirit hath not bones" ; ⁶-- in truth He put on His bodily organs.

XV. For even if ... --proclaims that our Lord was clothed with a Body,--Contention stops up its ears--and in perversity proclaims something else,--that our Saviour did not put on the Flesh.--And if its perversity in truth justifies us--how much more will His correctness justify us ?

XVI. But I think that Truth--thus conquers Error--not when . . . --the eloquent ... to run,--but . . . with Him--his running surpasses their running,--as . . -- . . and is crowned.

XVII. * * * * * * *
for what reason and wherefore--the Body cannot for ever--be accompanied for ever by the soul.

XXI. These things that [are] supposed --to be strange to one another,--[and also] are not acceptable to one another--are one, and are from one, and in one,--for they exist in one creation --and from one Air are nourished--and by one Death are cut off --and to one Working are obedient. |lxix

XXII. But see the seed, that as ...
. . . -- that in the bosom of its mother it may take refuge, -- and [P. 149.] leaven out of all bosom[s] -- in the mass of dough takes refuge alone. -- The bosom of the earth is the opposite of the [seed], -- and when aforetime it was growing up in it -- in the mode of [its species] it grew up.

XXIV. * * * * * * *
-- whether the Will [of] the Creator -- begat the wealth of diversities -- that are regarded as opposites, -- or that there are Entities, strangers -- and not related to one another -- and . . .

XXV. That Error much distresses me -- . . .
... in the Beginning, -- that what they say about the end -- [P. 150.] we may say to them about the beginning.

XXXI.⁷ Now let us turn for a little -- to a question . which [P. 151.] is before this, -- that she may not be bereaved by having been left -- let Truth then run to meet her -- holding fast the victory of her sister -- and announcing to her about Error, -- that it had become a mark for the arrows -- that she also may begin to mock at it.

XXXII. Body and Soul have been invited -- to Paradise, and in Paradise -- they were honoured and returned in disgrace, -- they were disgraced and have returned in honour ; -- Body and Soul entered together, -- Body and Soul went out together, -- by death they were separated one from the other, -- and in resurrection again they are joined. |lxx

XXXIII.⁸ The death that God decreed--for Adam after he sinned,--it is not the wicked killing--whereby men kill their fellow-men ;--the killing of Abel the righteous--was from the Free-will that wronged him,--and the death of Adam the sinner--was from the justice that requited him.

XXXIV. It was not the case then because--the killing of Abel the righteous was previous--to the death of Adam the sinner ⁹--that Abel died first--by that death that is from God : [P. 152.] --Free-will in its audacity--made an assault on Abel in its envy,--and brought in lulling before death.

XXXV. By that sentence from the Judge--Adam died first,--by that killing from Man--Abel was killed first; ¹⁰--they stand in the domain--of Justice and of Free-will,--Justice is not wronged--and Free-will is not constrained.

XXXVI.¹¹ And lo, there go down from the beginning--the two ways of death,--one of sentence and one of killing.--For as Free-will brought in--killing before death in the Beginning,--so Justice brought in--death after sin.

XXXVII. He¹² Who knew beforehand that the killed-- would be killed by the killers--by the lulling set a bound to their life--though He be far from the blame--of the killers who have dared to kill,--and is far also from (the blame for) the accident-- of the killed man who is killed by sudden death.

XXXVIII. If therefore one who is killed--goes not in sentenced time it is an accident,--and if he goes in his time it [P. 153.] is a scandal--for it justifies the one who killed him,--yet God is high--above accident and also above scandal;--it is not an accident, in that the sentenced time drew nigh--and it is not a scandal, in that there is about to be a judgement. |lxxi

XXXIX. But however much, lo, they are explained--these things have need of explanation,--for it is hard (to explain) how--there should chance in the one hour--the hidden sentenced time of him who is killed--and also the will of the killer,--that the man killed should go in his sentenced time--and the killer with his weapon be held guilty.

XL. Let us turn aside now from these things--for it was not these things we are concerned with ;--an investigation against those in error--we have been concerned with to conquer therein.--For not a little loss is it--that has entered through Bardaisan,--that inexperienced folk who have heard have suffered loss--of the merchandise of their lives.

XLI. And that ignorant folk may not go astray,--saying that "Abel, he died first,"--and disturb the comparison--that is struck between our Lord and Adam :--let them know that killing is of man--but the sentenced time is from God;--for as regards Abel wickedness killed him,--but as regards Adam the [P. 154.] Just One made him die.

XLII. But not even for this will there be--an opportunity for thee to hinder the inexperienced--in that as regards our Lord it was men who killed Him--and as regards Adam the Just One made him die :--Adam that sinned against Justice-- God in the sentenced time made him die,--but our Lord that killed wickedness--by wicked men was the killing of Him.

XLIII. If the Body depends upon the Soul,¹³--lo, the Soul also like the Body--upon another Power depends wholly-- namely, on that Power which gives life to everything.--And as (in the case of) the Soul if it lets go--of the Body, it (the Body) is undone and falls to pieces,--the Power also that gives life to the Soul--if it lets it go, it (the Soul) is undone.

XLIV. If the Body, that is mixed with--the Soul and is its companion,--they say cannot cleave to it,--the light one, because of the weight of it (the Body),--how can they cleave,-- Entities corporeal and heavy,--to that Power which is above everything subtle--to live in it for ever and ever ?

XLV. Well, then, let us also say--that if the Body because of its weight--breaks away from the limpid Soul,--that limpid [P. 155.] |lxxii substance is also separated--from the Power that is more limpid than it,--[and as] in the case of the Body--the same retribution comes to it (the Soul)--from that Power which took hold of it.

XLVI. For to both of them it (the Soul) is strange--to that limpid one and to the turbid one ;--to the turbid one because of the impurities,--[to] the limpid one because of its refinement.-- If the one is for ever in it--the Body would be ever beside it ;--it does cleave to that which is more limpid than [it],--and that which is more [turbid] than it cleaves to it.

XLVIII. As for the Entities that Bardaisan brought in-- he is to be accused because he taught--that one is heavier¹ than its fellow--and one is lighter than its fellow ;--he put the evil ones as the lower,--he put the good ones as the upper,--he put Light and Wind as fine,--Fire and Water as heavy.

XLIX. If the lower one . . . --does not adhere to the one higher than it,--neither does Water that is corporeal-- [P. 156][cleave] to Fire that is lighter,--nor Fire to limpid Wind--nor does Wind cleave to Light,--nor any of them to God--Who is higher than all of them and more refined.

L. But if they are acceptable as friends,--all these Entities to one another,--those that are heavy and those that are light,-- and possess and are possessed by one another,--that Highest One who gave them their level--does not treat the lowest one as alien ;--and if He treat the lowest one as alien--He cannot treat the middle one as akin.

LI. For on one side of the two is with him--weakness or wickedness ;--but if He be Evil, how is He the Good One ?-- and if He be weak, how is He the Creator ?--and if as the Good One He humiliated Himself--unto the middle (Entities) which were at strife,¹⁴--all of them with all He would have reconciled--that His kindness might not suffer loss.

LII.¹⁵ But look upon Man--and see that all of them are reconciled :--his heat is from Fire,--his cold from Wind,--his |lxxiii dampness from Water,--his dryness from the Dust;--in the midst of him dwells Life,--creative power holds him firm.

LIII. And even if these (theories) were so,--that things [P. 157.] should be so would be difficult,--as, if there were Entities,--it would be difficult that they should be made (into anything).--an Entity cannot be destroyed,--an Entity cannot be arranged ;--in that it is an Entity it is indestructible,--in that it is an Entity it is unarrangeable.

LIV. That Creator Who is unable--to destroy the Entities that exist--by the same analogy again is unable--to arrange the Entities that exist;--for He did not create the existence-- therefore He cannot destroy it,--He did not moreover arrange its fixing--therefore He cannot undo it.

LV and LVI.¹⁶ And if He cannot undo--the existence of other Entities,--(an existence) which is bound by its Nature,-- the Maker also is unable--to make anything and arrange (it).-- But let Him make the trial,--the very Maker from Himself,-- that as He cannot be arranged--the Entities cannot be made ;--by this moreover we shall understand as--the Body consists by the Soul,--the heavy by the power of the light,--the Soul also is similar to the Body--in regard to the Power that is more subtle than all.

LVII and LVIII.¹⁷ Against them let us say their words,-- [P. 158.] who say that the Stranger--blew His Life into the Entities and girded them ;--how to strange Life--are the Entities akin so that they lived ?--If indeed the Stranger blew His Life--into the Entities so that they became alive,--the Soul makes itself akin to the Body,--as He made His Life akin to the Entities--that had been strangers to His Life.--But if by the Master the servants lived,--how much more does the Body live--by the life of the Soul its colleague ?

LIX. "Reason," as they say,--"is the strange Leaven that is hidden--in the Soul," which is without knowledge ;--to the Body and Reason it is strange !--If so be then the Body cannot--cleave to the Soul, being earthy,--neither can it (the Soul) cleave--to the Reason which is Divine. |lxxiv

LX. We have therefore no contest--to expla[in] and persuade them--that are thrown into the contest;--and when struggling on their behalf--their struggle will be on our behalf,--for them the labour and for us the crown,--that when arguing on behalf of the Soul--their argument becomes (one) on behalf of the Body.

[P. 169.] LXI.¹⁸ Let us demonstrate therefore all the more--from the created things that are before us :--for lo, Fire is subtle--in comparison with Water that is corporeal,--[and] Wind [also in comparison with] Light--it also is denser than Light;--the Soul also in comparison with the Body--as their saying goes is "subtle"--and in comparison with Reason it is "corporeal."

LXII. Let us demonstrate therefore that all--Natures are devoured by one another,--substances' both corporeal and spiritual.--For oil is devoured by Flame,--and Flame is devoured by Wind ;--and the oil is not perceptible in Flame--and Flame is not [perceptible] in Wind,--for everything is easy to the Possessor of all things.

LXIII.¹⁹ Water again is placed in the middle--between Winter and Summer,--so that if the cold be fierce--it makes it a bodily substance--that embodies it in a hard form,--and if the heat be fierce--it makes it a spiritual substance--that absorbs it in a subtle way.

[P.160] LXV. [And if so be] that Bardaisan says--that because of its weight it (the Body) remains therein,--from the fine [substance] of the Soul;--lo, when the heavy one de[parts]--[there departs] also the light part,--like a vapour [and a puff of air (?) it becomes] --and like a breath it is for a while--and flies away lightly. LXVI. Lo, . . . --of the Entities that Bardaisan brought |lxxv in,--corporeal ones as he says,--in all Folds and Limbos-- If there be any corporeal it is refined--, . . . created all according to His Will.

LXVIII. When the resurrection comes to pass--this comes to pass as the result of it;--and if every one had been raised . . . -- [p. 161.]
* * * * * * *

LXIX. . . . in Adam . . . all . . . were dying--though as yet they were not born,--from the womb . . .
* * * * * * *

LXXI. The Second Adam also-- . . . and was raised up in Sheol,--He brings all that are [there],--in Him they were living secretly,--and when their resurrection drew nigh--there sprang upon them the voice of .... --in that as a dead man made the living die--the voice of resurrection makes them alive. LXXII. For that first Thousand --is the type of that last [P. 162.] Thousand,--in that as the death of Adam put to death--all those that that Thousand [had brought to life] . . . delivered--one that flew away and one that was rescued.

LXXIII. Our Lord also in the last Thousand--raises the Dead by His resurrection--in that all the Dead are found in His Thousand,--and there comes the Deluge of Fire--in the midst of which the Wicked sink--and the Righteous in it are delivered ;--like Enoch the living [are] snatched away,--in the manner of Noah the Dead are rescued.

LXXIV. But Bardaisan in this has erred--and wishes to make us also err therein,--in this [he has greatly gone astray ;]--he has died, and caused all [his comrades] to die.--" Our Lord also, (says he) Who was raised,--(why) did He not raise all Bodies,--that as their undoing was in Adam--their reconstruction should be by our Lord ? " |lxxvi

[P. 163.] LXXV. Lo, Adam not at the moment -- when he died and fell did he cast down everything. -- but he died in his sin -- and the world died in the sentence on him ; -- our Lord also not at the moment -- when He was raised did He raise everything. -- but He lived by His glorious acts -- and the world lived in the pledge He gave.

LXXVI. In the hour that Adam died and fell -- the earth was full of living beings, -- and on his account only did Death reign ; -- our Lord also gave life now -- when Sheol was full of the dead -- on His account only does Resurrection reign. -- Death spread from one on all, -- from [one also] spread Resurrection.

LXXVII. It did not suffice Bardaisan to look -- upon [the matter from both (?)] sides ; -- on the one side he looked only -- and not even on that as it is, -- for his eye did not [see] clearly, -- that when he was declaring about Adam, -- he that has slipped in one thing -- has slipped in everything.

LXXVIIL But he does not know that that Body -- which died in Adam the Messiah has made alive. -- The Nails bear witness to His dying. -- the Watchers bear witness to His Resurrection, -- and the Nails that came out of the furnace -- have become furnaces (i.e. tests) for our Truth ; -- the fixing of them admonished [P. 164.] Thomas that He was not -- raised with [?] His Soul by Himself.

LXXIX.²⁰ Bardaisan insists that if so be -- that these Bodies died in Adam -- it was right for our Lord Who came -- that He should raise up the Bodies from the grave ; -- but if the Bodies He did not raise, -- it is clear that the death of the Soul -- Adam brought in by his sins, -- for the Souls which he brought down to Sheol -- our Lord brought up with Him.

LXXX. He [finis]hes his word with another, -- "for lo," says he, " our Lord says -- 'Every one that keepeth My word -- death for ever he shall not taste,' ²¹ -- and lo, all those who kept it have died -- [ . . . ²²]" -- For he has confused and dissolved words -- to the confusion of the inexperienced ear. |lxxvii

LXXXI. And [the] word the argument of which is something else--he makes into stuff for his argument,--for he considered about this same death--that the Souls which are hindered in every place--in all depths and Limbos ²³--and that "have kept the word of our Lord,"-- . . . from within the Body,-- are exalted to the Bridal chamber of Light!

LXXXII. According to the doctrine of Bardaisan--the Death that Adam brought in--was a hindrance to Souls--in [P. 165] that they were hindered at the Crossing-place--because the sin of Adam hindered them,--"and the Life," he [says], "that our Lord brought in--is that He taught verity and ascended,--and [brought] them across into the Kingdom."

LXXXIII. "Therefore," he says, "our Lord taught us-- that 'every one that keepeth My Word--death for ever he shall not taste,'--that his Soul is not hindered--when it crosses at the Crossing-place--like the hindrance of old--wherewith the Souls were hindered--before our Saviour had come. LXXXIV. He is caught in one of two things :--in that every one that kept the Word of our Lord--(and) died before our Lord ; . . . --but if he is hindered at the Crossing-place--his soul has tasted Death,--and if he had crossed the Crossing-place--what is that which he said about our Lord.--that He had crossed it first of all ?

LXXXV.²⁴ For if Lazarus when he died--had gone up to the Bridal-chamber of Light--an injury ²⁵ our Lord did him--in that He turned him back to his body the Prison-house ; --and that which our Lord was saying--to Martha, that "Thy Brother shall rise," ²⁶--from whence then did He say he [P.166] should rise--from the height, or from the deep ?

LXXXVI. As a Physician He did justly--in that sin the |lxxviii bringer of pains--He was rooting out from mankind ;--for that Primal Serpent--had bitten the Primal Adam--not with teeth but with advice,--He ²⁷ too healed the wound--with commands and not with drugs.

LXXXVIL If the Soul it was He came to teach--according to their word it would be right--that the Souls in Sheol He should teach--that they should not steal nor commit adultery ;--and if in Sheol it is not for Souls--to lend or be in debt, then--to Body-and-Soul in its contest--He comes to conquer and to crown.

LXXXVIII.²⁸ An example He depicted--and a likeness He impressed--and a mirror He fixed by His Body,--that was victorious and tasted suffering--and was raised and put on glory ;-- and He taught that every one who thus--conducts himself is [P. 167.] thus glorified--and he that fights thus conquers--and he that conquers thus is crowned.

LXXXIX.²⁹ Adam, too, by him He depicted--an example for every one to look at,--that he sinned and was sorry and brought to confusion--and was cursed and went forth and was brought low--and departed and was undone and destroyed,-- and He taught that every one whose support is wickedness --even his profit is loss.

XC.³⁰ In both worlds he is mocked at,--in both worlds he carries disgrace :--by the steps that Adam went down,--by them it was our Lord brought him up.--In the beginning He gave him verity--instead of the falsehood that the Serpent gave him,-- in the end He gave him Life--instead of Death that the Tree gave;--He conjoined with him his life,--the equilibrium of which Death had divided.

XCI. Seeing that of all Bodies that die--the Body of our Lord rose only--Bardaisan erred and supposed--that it was the Souls that our Lord raised up,--and he did not consider that the death also of Adam--had reigned in Adam first,-- |lxxix and thus after nine hundred years--the leaven of it had spread in all generations.

XCII. Our Lord also when He was raised up--in Him Life [P. 168.] reigned first,--like the Death that reigned in Adam ;--and as with Adam after a period--his Death reigned over all,--our Lord also after a time--His Resurrection was reigning over all,-- that the usuries paid might be like to one another.

XCIII.³¹ His Leaven that makes all alive spread--in all the lump of the Dead--that, lo, is kneaded in the bosom of Sheol,-- so that if after nine hundred years--the Leaven of Death reigned in us,--lo, after a little--His living Leaven will conquer mortality.

XCIV.³² And now if so be this suffices,--as also it does suffice,--this argument of ours has been spoken--about the Body and about its Resurrection ;--the rest of the discourse of it which remains,--the matter of it shall be ours for another day,--that we may gain by our disputation--discoveries about our Faith.

XCV. Where he has fallen we have risen,--and where he has slipped we have been strengthened,--and where he failed we seem--to have acquired the fortunes of Adam,--in that wickedness ruled over Him in the beginning,--Death ruled over [P. 169] him in the end,--in that his Body and his Soul sinned together--Death divided his equilibrium.

XCVI. I give thanks to Thee, my Lord,--that Thou hast not stinted me, nor hast Thou filled me :--Thou hast not stinted me that I may grow,--and Thou hast not filled me, so that I may ask.--Satiety knows not how to ask,--and hunger ceases not to beg ;--Thou hast satisfied me to abate my hunger,--Thou hast made me hungry to awake my supplication.

Single inverted commas are used in numerous cases where the words seem to be quotations or to belong to a special terminology.

Words in italics inside square brackets are to be regarded as conjectural translations or paraphrases.

In a few passages, where the text has suffered great mutilation, italics indicate an attempt to summarise the argument from suggestions in the fragments.]

[P.101] indicates page 101 of the accompanying Syriac. [l.2] means line 2 of the current page of the accompanying Syriac. [RP]

1. ¹ The general metrical scheme of this piece is a stanza of eight lines of seven syllables each, but several stanzas have a line too few or too many and three lines are a syllable too short (x 8, lii 1, xciv 1).

7. ² Stanzas xxxi-xlii are preserved also in the upper writing of B.M. Add. 14623 : see Introduction.

8. ¹ B.M. 17193 contains St. xxxiii-xlii, and B.M. Add. 14731 contains St. xxxiii-xxxvi, xli-xlii.

10. ³ xxxv 3, and by that killing of Man, 17193. 4, Abel was the first killed one, 17193.

11. ⁴ Stanza xxxvi is legible in the Palimpsest, except the first line; it is preserved in the upper writing, also in B.M. Add. 17193 and 14731, which come from another exemplar. Yet in all these the stanza has only seven lines. Therefore some of the other stanzas, preserved only in the Palimpsest, which have less than the eight lines, are probably irregular owing to the author, not to a defect in the transmission.

15. ³ Omit [Syriac] (sic), p. .156, 1. 34, so that Stanza lii, line 1, has only six syllables : see the Note at the beginning of this Discourse.

24. ⁵ Stanzas lxxxvi-xciv are preserved also in the upper writing : see Introduction.

28. ² Stanza lxxxviii is also preserved in B.M. Add. 12155 and 14532, without variation, except that 12155 reads 'He was' for 'that was' in l. 4. Stanza lxxxviii has nine lines in all four copies.

32. ² The first line of Stanza xciv (otherwise a regular one of eight lines) has a syllable short: see the Note at the beginning of this Discourse.

ON VIRGINITY.

I.¹ PUT off, O Body, that Old Man ² which is altogether hateful, that it may not wear out the newness that thou inhabitest and hast put on ; for the recompense of its interest is contrary with its clothes, in that if thou hast been renewed it will return and wear thee out : O Body, hear my counsels ! Put it off ³by (good) conduct, that it may not clothe thee in (bad) habits.

II. For, lo, our Lord has made thee, O Body, new in water, and the Architect of Life has built thy oldness, in that He formed with His Blood and built for it a shrine for His habitation ; do [P. 171.] not let dwell instead of Him that Old Man in the shrine He has renewed : O Body, if thou dost make God to stay in thy shrine, thou also wilt be a temple of His kingdom and a priest of His sacrifice.

III. For this Old Man is reproved by Nature that teaches and the Book that proclaims, for its wickedness is between two just things, that if it sins in respect of what is without law, its Nature will reprove it, and if it sins in respect of law, the Book will reprove it. Lo, it wounds and they heal; on the track of wickedness they bring in regret, whereby he that sins is healed. |lxxxi

IV. Him that rebels they treat with contempt, and him that returns they bind up his wounds; they justify the Judge, they reprove the rebels, they care for and heal those who return : for they know that they will be measured with one Evil one, who hurts everything, who is fresh in every generation, and is a companion to every one, and hurts every hour ; they also are companions to every one, and are fresh in every generation, and are found at every hour.

V. Hearken to Nature and Law declaring his evil corruptions ! For the People (of Israel) who committed adultery under the Law, [P. 172.] and the Peoples who fornicated without Law, changed their Nature and behaved contrary to their Nature ; Nature and Law have appealed against him, whose dispositions the Disturber has corrupted.

VI. The humble ones have stolen away from marriage under pretext of discipleship, and when they are halfway he (the 'Old Man') has set behind them the shame of stumbling and in front of them hateful desire ; being ashamed to revert to marriage, they fall and are taken in the snares.

VII. How light are thy wings, O Virginity, that soar ⁴ and go up to where thy Bridegroom sits at the right hand of the Lord of the Heights ! Flee from the counsel of the deceiver, for he who apportions debt to the inexperienced is wont to cast his whole property for nothing to the loss of the merchants (?).

VIII. He impoverished the treasures of great Adam, who with his money acquired a weight of debt. O Body, do not borrow from him that does not ask back what he has lent, that if thou pay him his silver the debt impoverishes.

IX. For accompanying its desires are apprehension and [P. 173.] doubt and contempt with disgrace, and they reject and give pain to the doers of them, and the faces only are open and pure of the chaste ones who have put it (? the 'old man') off ; do not be joined, O Body, with hateful love, of which however much the deed is dead, the anxiety of it lives secretly.

X. Subtle and cunning is his (the 'Old Man's') discipleship, in that by all sorts (of means) he will be bestowing his gifts upon the good. The mouth of the poor he stops with his bread ; with |lxxxii his free meals he sells free-men into slavery. The belly he has bribed and it has been corrupted ; (he has bribed) the eye to overlook, and the mouth to keep silence, and the ear to make ^⁵his hateful reports. His silent wine is talkative in those that drink it; it babbles in their voices instead of its master.

XI. For he is cunning, in that first he puts on the mouth of his. snare food as a bait; his love goes in front of his corruption, like Judas, who kissed and killed. The Pure One kissed the unclean, to teach that his kisses are a poison and death is moulded by them secretly ; this is one who if thou raise him up will recompense thee with a fall, who when he rises lulls to sleep, the desire of whom is deadly. And thy own flesh makes it live and resurrects it (this desire), and when it is alive therein it turns and kills it. O Body, if thou give life to deadness, there will be death also for thy life.

XII. Let Fire be a demonstration for thee, that is buried and dead in secret, and the rubbing of wood with wood brings it to life for the destruction of both of them ; but when it (i.e. Fire) has come to life it turns to burn the substance that brought it to life by its companionship. Oh, the evident illustration !— that Wood is made a grave for Fire, and when the one has been resurrected from it, it is destroyed by that one !

XIII. For Freedom is as life and as soul to the desires, and by it they live ; and if from it thou cut and cast them off they become dead. It is given authority that by its will faults stand and by its will sins fall; it is the likeness of the Most High whose Power upholdeth everything, and if He should withdraw it everything would fall.

XIV. The Judge is just, in that He does not immediately [P. 175.] a man has sinned requite him. Wherefore regret comes because of two things : that if he repents it will have wiped out his wickedness, and if he rebels it will have taken away from him all excuse ; wherefore in all faults regret is on the watch to carry witness to the court of Justice.

XV. Learn, O Body, Repentance and not every-day regret; for Repentance is as ⁶ a Healer to our wounds, but this regret is a stalk of straw, and it brings a relapse of pains every day. |lxxxiii

XVI. The signature is on every tax-collector's bond for him who owes money ; so by the same illustration regret is a tax-collector in its silence for him that is in debt for sins. O Body, if thou hast accustomed thyself to repent and again thou sin, thy regret is the signature of thy bond.

XVII. It is written ⁷ that if a man have wronged his wife, her parents shall go forth and declare her virginity, because the judges could not see the secret things ; the tokens of virginity on the veil were declaring the truth before the judges. But because thy own Bridegroom is one that seeth secret things, [P. 176.] to thy secret Lord in virginity ⁸ show the secret things in the flesh ; not in thy veil⁹ but in thy body shew injuries, and do not¹⁰in veils thy own virginity shew to thy Bridegroom.

XVIII. In the guise of a lamb the cunning Amnon ¹¹ approached the ewe, and when he had deceived her about what was hers he did what was his ; in that he saw that virginity was rebellious in her nest, the healthy wolf that made himself ill deceitfully made her enter his den and so trapped her ; the invalid that was torpid got up to the contest and snatched away the crown that was for her shame.

XIX. That Athlete who saw that as long as he was standing he did not throw, and he hasted and fell, and so threw off and broke the yoke with cohabitation, and dared even to adultery, and the wicked one who sowed in the chamber his harvest, in his field the sword ruined him, who had ruined virginity, and he who had spotted it with its blood washed in his own blood. They made him drunk and rose up and dragged him away ; and for that he had ill-treated the sheep, vengeance was demanded in the time of sheep-shearing. [P. 177.]

XX. If a virgin be ill-treated in the field Moses the Stammerer,^¹²the advocate of truth, he is persuaded about her that "the girl cried out and there is no help." For thine own self, O virginity, |lxxxiv who is there to persuade, that in the midst of peace art taken captive and art silent ? Do not give thyself to captivity in the midst of peace, that peace may not bind thee in the court of Justice.

XXI. As for the married women and virgins that were in Midian, he killed those which had played the harlot and kept alive those on whom was set the seal of virginity. But if virginity kept alive heathen women, how much more will it keep alive pure ones ?

XXII. And lo, in the chamber and lo, in the field they are lying in wait for thee, O Virginity ! Thou didst enter the chamber; the cunning Amnon stole thy wealth ; thou didst go forth into the field, the brigand Shechem robbed thy treasure. Whither wilt thou go, O lonely Dove ? For lo, many in every place are they that hunt for thee !

XXIII. The hunters of thee, O Virginity, that have hunted thee are hunted; by the contrary are they requited. For [P. 178.] Shechem,¹³ who met with thee in the field and took thee captive, in his house they slaughtered him ; and Amnon again, who in the chamber lay in wait for thee and took thee captive, in the field they dragged him off. They ruined thee and they were ruined ; and there was drawn in their case an illustration that he who ruins thee is ruined.

XXIV. O Virginity, inexperienced Dove, cunning is thy hunter and thou art innocent, ingenious is thy deceiver and thou art simple ! in that Amnon who under pretence of food was seeking what he was not seeking, and with food for which he was not hungry served the desire of the flesh for which he was hungry. O the Deceiver, who was seeking that which he did not require, that under pretext of it he might be finding thee !

XXV. For he asked her for tarts ¹⁴—alas for the expert in tarts !—she went in and placed (them) for the uplifted at heart: the serpent was clothed in the appearance of sickness that the hand might contemptuously spare him and so he might strike her. He whose desire deceived virginity and polluted it, wrath deceived the desire and ruined him, |lxxxv

XXVI. Tamar rent her tunic, for she saw she had lost her [P. 179.] virginity. She got a tunic instead of that tunic ; her virginity that she had lost was not got again. The rents of her garment workmen sufficed to heal ; but the loss of her virginity for One alone is easy to heal. O Virginity, whose loss is easy for all, and whose reparation for the Creator of all alone is easy !

XXVII. Tamar feared to keep silence and was ashamed to speak ; hut because she could not keep silence nor speak she rent her clothes, that the open rents might be heralds for the secret virginity that was ruined. Ah, the confusion and dismay of the king's daughter, whose pearls that were hanging on her could not console her for the one that was lost !

XXVIII. She was a King's daughter on whose limbs were carried stones and beryls, but the virginity alone surpassed them all ; wherefore the unclean one despised the beryls and chose the pearl, he rejected the coin-ornaments and snatched the tokens of [P. 180.] virginity. The thief knows thy value, O Virginity, but thou didst not perceive how much thou art worth.

XXIX. From the royal jewel-house he chose out and stole the pearl, which when he got it left him, that pearl which is lost away from its owner and does not remain in the treasure of the thief !

XXX. Eve ¹⁵ the inexperienced found the Serpent, the poisonous one whose words are sweet ; she cherished him with love, and he smote her to destruction. Do not find for thyself also the treasure-trove of Eve. that thou mayest not find for thyself in it regret. For if she had shut the door of her hearing before his speaking, the door of Paradise would not have been shut in her own face ; in that she gave a place within her mind to the word of the Evil One, the pure Garden vomited and cast her out.

XXXI. Keep thy bosom in sanctity that the pure bosom of Paradise may receive thee. Do not become dust, the food of the accursed Serpent, for dust is his bread, and thou art chosen salt, which if it go bad cannot afresh become new salt. [P.181] |lxxxvi

XXXII. Jephthah's ¹⁶ Daughter who washed in her blood was baptized and she sent up from herself the pearl that rooted out ¹⁷ fear, and to the treasure on high it ascended ; the girl that stretched out her neck to the slaughter of the sword, the pure pearl consoled her that went with her. And she that here destroys virginity, apprehension becomes her companion in the day of remembrance, and in the Resurrection fear becomes her leader before the Judge, though she have greatly repented.

XXXIII. Jephthah's Daughter wished to die, so that the vow of her father might not be made void : do not thou make void with thine eyes the vow of virginity that thy mouth has vowed. Jephthah poured out the blood of his daughter ; but thy own Bridegroom, his holy Blood was shed for thy fault.

XXXIV. Lo, therefore the unique Blood bought the virgin blood with which thy door is sealed, in the likeness of doors that [P. 182.] were sealed with the blood sprinkled in the midst of Egypt ¹⁸ ; for as often as that same blood was sealed upon the doors outside, life was dwelling within after the type of virginity in peace.

XXXV. Oh, the blood that was a wall to the treasure of life, that was within it and by it conquered death ! That is, that as they were a little wearied in sprinkling it and (as) it comforted them much by its protection, thy perfection and thy virginity are walls that keep and are kept; that inasmuch as they are kept safe for a little they have kept safe much.

XXXVI. The married woman wished to die that adultery might be made void ; the virgin died that the vow might not be made void. If so be therefore that cohabitation, the mother of seed, wished to die that it might not receive stolen seed whose sower is accursed, let not the virgin steal the unclean seed, for a pure embryo is the embryo in the midst of her.

XXXVII. Do not leave off, O Body, from the virginity that [P. 183.] by grace has revived our country, and as a sojourner dwells in our land. And if any one persecute her and uproot her nest, because she cannot turn and build it her wing quickly takes up on high the bird of the height, that grows old in one nest and if disturbed ¹⁹ she has left it for ever. |lxxxvii

XXXVIII. And when the friendship of Angels has flown away there enters in its place the Devil's friend Desire, that is the adversary of Virginity. Joseph persecuted her from within his body, that the friendship of Angels might not dwell in it; with the Angels she doth flee to go forth. And who is there who will not weep that instead of that peaceful one there entered in and dwelt in him one full of sores ? ²⁰

XXXIX. Let youthfulness be afraid of Wine that despoiled the old age of Lot. But if Wine did that which is difficult, that women by him should have stolen pregnancy, how much more forsooth will it do that which is easy, that men by it should steal virginity ? The girls despoiled the treasure of the old man ; keep thou ²¹ thy treasure-house from those that are young.

XL. Be afraid again of Wine in that it disgraced Noah the [P. 184.] precious; and he that had conquered the Deluge of water from a handful of wine was conquered, and him that the Flood which was outside him did not overcome, the wine which was within him in silence did steal. If wine disgraced and cast down Noah, the head of families and tongues, thee forsooth, O lonely one, how it will conquer !

XLI. Do not trust in wine, for it is an impostor and an agitator that surrenders thy fortress, that the captive-taker may come and take captive thy freedom into handmaidenship, that thy love may follow his will.

XLII. And when moreover thou hast lost thy true Bridegroom and got in his stead a false one, when thou hast the consolation that even if thou hast lost but yet thou hast found (what will it profit thee, ?) : because his love is lying and deceitful and alights on everything, it does not cleave to thee, and then the regret will be great.

XLIII. When on this side and on that thou art deserted and art orphaned on two sides, the True One will have left thee [P. 185.] because thou hast left him, and the lying companion that thou |lxxxviii hast loved will have let go of thee and left thee at the cross-roads ; and whither then will thy gaze wander, a simple Dove ²² that has uprooted her nest and gone forth in her love after a Serpent ?

XLIV. Thy Pearl is a pearl that from two thieves flies away to be lost, for it is Merchants who are single that can get it, and if they have become unclean both of them lose it. O Pearl, that is greater than all! And he is the fool, with his hands he presents the Pearl to the Thief !

XLV. It is easier for him that is drunk with wine than for him that is drunk with hateful love, for the counsel and teaching of wide-awake hours are dreams to him, and a beating is like no beating. Strong fetters are weak to him ; despised is the rod, and weak is a stick, and disregarded is the cane. Admonition [P. 186.] is to him a story, and reproof like a tale passes through his ears ; contemptuous usage is like a treat and spitting in the face like dew.

XLVI. For there is not in his heart a path-finder for the words that have beaten upon his ears. The gates of his ears are open, one opposite the other ; the word that goes in into his one ear goes out on the opposite side through the other. The speech that they pour into him is driven outside, it goes forth altogether ; his teacher supposes that the teaching goes in, but he does not perceive that he pours it all out, and it is spilt, because there is no place in his mind to receive.

XLVII. For filled and heaped and choked up are the bosoms of his imaginations from the drop of evil love, that has dropped there and become a great sea ; and lo, arguments plunge and emerge,²³ like sailors whose ships have been wrecked, and lo, the thought there is unclean, like a ship that has no skipper, and when Law like a sailor wishes to bring it into a good harbour [P. 187.] it struggles with its sailor and loves its own loss.

XLVIII. O Youthfulness, mistress of (various) courses (of life), do not complete [thy] courses in the maze of desires ; when that which works in thee and takes away thy strength has |lxxxix dismissed and left thee (it will be) that thy Old Age may come to mockery, because a hateful course thou hast kept for shame.

XLIX. Lighten, O Youthfulness, thy course in the contest, that a crown may adorn thy Old Age ; for when Old Age has faded and its intelligence diminished, they remember the humility of its Youthfulness, which concentrated its intelligence ; men abhor it seeing the blemishes of its Body, but they cherish it seeing its secret plants of the Spirit.

L. Paint, O Youthfulness, thy victories on thy members, by which thou wilt become precious when thou growest old : paint on thy hands all charitable acts, with the visiting of the sick seal thy footsteps ; paint on thy heart the image of thy Lord.

LI. And if the nailed-up Tablets that the carpenter has constructed and the painter painted have become precious, yea, are [P. 188.] revered by reason of the Figure of Royalty, how much more therefore will thy limbs become precious, on which are painted the images of thy King ?

LII. Youthfulness is like a branch of fine fruits that is fair in the summer, and when its fruits and its leaves have been stripped off it becomes hateful, and every one turns his face from it, and what was desired of all becomes the despised of all. O inexperience! do not shew thy beauty to those outside, which when it has become hateful and aged those that see despise it.

LIII. O Eye ! let not the beauty of Youthfulness take thee captive, in which are hidden the blemishes of Old Age. For the limbs of youthful vigour, a fair spectacle, carry them, but Old Age convicts them, that a borrowed beauty was dwelling upon them, one that while yet it stays and alights goes off and flies away.

LIV. But if there should chance to be a royal captivity, and thy humility should be exposed in the field, the unclean compulsion of the captor argues for thee that thou art holy, as Sarah also [P. 189.] was holy in the unclean bosom of foul Pharaoh, she whose heart with her free-will did not commit adultery; her will was a priest to her bodily frame, and with its hyssop it purged the body that was defiled by force. For as a priest can cleanse the |xc temple in which he serves, so a pure Will can cleanse the Body, the Temple in the midst of which it acts as a priest.

LV. For it is a marvel in Man, that though he is one, he is to himself a Temple, he is to himself a Priest, he is to himself a Pontiff, he is to himself a Sacrifice ; he is the Offering, and he is the Offerer of the Offering : for he is like that Lamb of God, who was to Himself everything.

Single inverted commas are used in numerous cases where the words seem to be quotations or to belong to a special terminology.

Words in italics inside square brackets are to be regarded as conjectural translations or paraphrases.

In a few passages, where the text has suffered great mutilation, italics indicate an attempt to summarise the argument from suggestions in the fragments.]

[P.101] indicates page 101 of the accompanying Syriac. [l.2] means line 2 of the current page of the accompanying Syriac. [RP]

1. ¹ The whole of this Discourse was copied out by the monk Aaron (B.M. Add. 14623, foll. 23a¹-25a¹) from the old MS. before the writing was effaced. Where the transcript can be checked by the still legible portions of the original it is found to bo quite faithful, the few variations being almost all due to the adoption of a more modern style of spelling.

The text, both in the Palimpsest and in Aaron's transcript, is divided up into paragraphs or stanzas, which I have numbered, as in the case of the previous piece, but the Discourse on Virginity is not in regular metre. On this question, and the relation of the piece to the Hymns de Virginitate, printed at the end of Lamy's Ephraim, vol. ii, see the Introduction.

10. ⁴ 'and do not' (conj.)] 'virginity,' Palimpsest (sic), 'virginity and do not,' Aa. Apparently a mere scribes' blunder, the scribe of the Palimpsest having written [Syriac] before [Syriac].

12. ⁶ See Exod. iv 11, and Overbeck, p. 150, 1. 20 : cf. also Deut. xxii 27.

14. ² 2 Sam. xiii 5 ff. The Peshitta has the same word for 'cakes' and 'hearts.'

15. ¹ A new paragraph should clearly begin here, but it does not even begin a new line in the Palimpsest. Aaron's transcript has an ordinary stop before 'Eve,' not the ornamental stop which marks a paragraph.

20. ¹ The reference must be to the Story of Joseph and Asenath (E. W. Brooks, The Book of Joseph and Asenath, S.P.C.K., Hellenistic-Jewish Texts, No. 7). In this tale, though both hero and heroine are represented as the perfection of beauty and virtue, yet the affair ends in a real marriage, which to Ephraim was a sad falling-off !

22. ¹ Dove] 'Fish,' Aa. This absurd blunder is of interest, because it also occurs in the transliteration into Syriac of "Aenon near Salim" (John iii 23), where syr. C-vg. have 'En Yon, while syr. S and the Arabic Diatessaron have 'En Non.

23. ² The same phrase occurs in Ephraim's Comm. on Genesis (ES 1 15A), where it is used of the Light not yet concentrated in Sun and Moon.

AGAINST MANI.

LET Mani be asked about that Archon, that if he be from the Evil Part, that is, from an essence loving adultery, as they say, why did he say 'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' etc. ? (Let him be asked this) that thou mayest know that he (the Archon) commanded that which was approved by him. And because of sins he extirpated the Hebrews altogether . . . and [if] he [1. 15.] is a Mixed Being, half and half, he ought to command that . . . how did he say 'There is none beside Me' ? And how [1. 22.] again did he kill Jesus ? And if 'men were intoxicated, they would not pay attention to these things, not even if he had commanded,' then a command to sin was really pleasant to [P. 191.] the sinners. For if when he said 'Do not commit adultery' they did go on committing adultery, how much more if he had commanded them to commit adultery ! But if he is a lover of Good things and on account of them makes commands, let them say who was annulling his commandments that they should not be performed ? If Satan was annulling them, lo, they are both from the one evil Essence, as they say ! How is it fighting half with the Good and half with the Evil ? But if because in this one the mixture of Good was greater this very thing is pleasing to him, then evil beings are good beings in whom he has not made another power greater. And lo, evil beings like good ones become related to him ! And why then did that Archon not receive Jesus, the Good ? For lo, as they say, there is a means whereby the Good may be mixed with him and be accepted by him, (so) that if it is mixed with him it is acceptable to him. Till Jesus had come, then, he was mixing (for men) his good words, why did he not mix in them (i.e. in |xcii men) Good Parts ? When even those good words that are mixed in him he does not accept, neither therefore can he accept [P. 192.] the Parts. For as his evil hearing is strange to the good Word, so also his hateful essence is strange to the better Part. For if with their will the evil ones accept the mixture of Parts, how did they not accept the mixture of Words ? And if by force the Parts are mixed in them, why does the Good expect the Words to be mixed in them of their own (free-)will ?

But see that in fruits and in seeds and in fountains there exists evil that kills, but good that gives life [is also] in them for men, how does the evil overcome the good ? For lo, the good is in the majority. In fruits . . .

[P. 193.] [how was the ' mixture ' arranged in wolves and lambs ? If (the Maker) had wished, could not he have arranged for HULE the bodily organs of lambs ?]

[1. 40.] ... for it would have been right that He (the Maker) should do to Himself that very thing which He does to others. But [they] say 'Even the Maker does first to [Himself] what He does to [P. 194.] others.' But let them know that the Maker [did] what He did

[1. 13.] that is, that it will preserve itself and will destroy the other. That Entity, if it is an Entity, how does it bring forth anything the taste of which is not in its own essence and nature ?

[1. 31.] [If] the Maker [rejoices] in it and also that which is made rejoices in it, that is, God and man, then the Destroyer will be grieved at that destruction and (so will) the destroyed, except things given in legislation on the condition that the chastiser is satisfied by them and the transgressor is grieved by them ? But as when a transgressor becomes of the same will as the chastiser there is no suffering, so when one who is to be destroyed submits to the [P. 195.] will of the destroyer there will be no destruction. And as the will of the chastiser is not that he should suffer, so also will be the will of the destroyer, that is, that he should not be pained. For the just Entity, as it is just in itself, so it is just also towards another : the contrary then of this should be found in the case of |xciii the wicked Entity. For the just Entity does not destroy itself nor others ; the wicked Entity, what is it ?—one that preserves itself as a just one and treats one that has not transgressed against it as a wicked one: which very thing with many (others), and more than many, bears witness against it that it is not an Entity but a compound.

And if they should say that the Sons of Darkness are divided one against another, then also about each one of them is said the same that is spoken about all of them, that is, that each one of them is divided also against his own members, as he is divided also against his mates. For if there is concord in each one of them it should be found in all of them, and so division also ; and if they with themselves are at war and do not cease from war one with another, how did they come to make war with the [P. 196.] Light ? For lo, that adversary that they have among themselves, it is either because he is akin to the Light their adversary, or he is a third party made to be an adversary to both of them, to [which] we ought to give a place and essence by itself. And then, in the nature of Light also is there an adversary ? But if there is none, because it is one nature, what I have said above has been verified, that it is because of two natures mingled in one another that division arises, as also Body and Soul bear witness. But which of the natures is greater, O Mani ? The Dark or the Light ? If the Dark was greater, it could not be overcome by Light. But if Sons of the Dark be killed, as they say, why not all of them, if so be that their nature is mortal ? And if so be that at the End it is actually bound, because it does not die, then he is refuted, in that he lied about their death.¹

And for what reason do the Natures hate one another ? For lo, Body and Soul that are from him (the Archon) are friendly to one another ! And if (it is) because one is mingled with the other, for the mixture can change our nature, then because, lo, in Body and in Soul there has been a change [have they [p. 197. l.4] become one nature ?] . . .

[l. 45.] ... for all I require . . . about these mixed things . . . how [P. 198.] [can] Heat receive Cold and be warm like it seeing that this Essence is in Heat ? But if by mixture with its fellow it becomes not-itself, then also [Evil] by mixture with Good becomes not-itself. And what then . . .

[1. 16.] But know that if the strife becomes a discussion about one of the created things, it is from created things their fellows that we will bring an analogy for witness and not from a divine Nature. For God Who is not made—it is not possible for us to take an analogy from Him for things made ; so also about Entities—we do not take from created things an analogy for them, except from their own selves. Now let us take an analogy from this great Entity, about Whom we all bear witness, that if it can be subject to ² these sufferings it is necessary that we [P. 199.] believe about these other Entities also that they also can be subject to these sufferings ; but if the witness of this Entity (is) that it is not subject to these sufferings, it clears all the Entities that exist, that they also are [not] subject to these sufferings. Therefore by the witness of the True Entity the word of Error has been vanquished which brought Entities into the world. But if without witness thou compellest me to believe thee that there are Entities, be thou also compelled without evidence to believe me that there is no other Entity but the One. I have no witness greater than thy defeat, for what is the victory of the athlete but the vanquishing of his opponent ? Nor again can Entities remove themselves from those places that they are in, for who set them there that he should remove them thence ?

Now as to that thou blamest me, (saying) 'why is Evil found in the midst of the works of the Good, for that Good one that thou speakest about, is not Evil really found in the midst of His works ?' But if Evil in His works is mingled, how hast thou been profited by the new and strange opinion that thou hast [P. 200.] brought in ? For is it by the Evil that thou art offended or by the opinion ? If by the Evil thou art offended, how hast thou been profited by the purification whereby thou dost purge out the dregs |xcv from the [clear substance], for lo, the poison that is in the midst of His works is killing thee ! But if the opinion offends Freewill, Him that generated the opinion we ought to call the Evil. For see, that if that Evil is still established in our midst, Him therefore we are required to judge and blame for the Evil who was able to take away the Evil from our midst. For if no Evil ought to be found in the midst of His good works, how, lo, is it found ? For it is from that very thing which thou blamest that thou shouldest be blamed. For if it (the Evil) is left as a defect— worse and worse ! And if again it is left as a surplus, it is possible that by some means or other Good will be the cause of Evil. But if it is so, then the matter would be worse if Evil had not existed, for this would be a great evil, that those Good things should be annulled which are accomplished by means [P. 201.] of Evils. Just as therefore when a physician does not do evil things then he does evil, especially that (thereby) the alleviations are annulled that are accomplished by means of pains and drugs, so when he does the evil, that evil is good, where all the cures are generated by it.

Therefore it is about Diseases that we are having a discussion. The diseases of the Body, are they from mixtures?—let the Mixer be blamed ! But the diseases of the Soul, are they from Freewill ?—let the Giver of it be blamed. But God forbid that He should be blamed, by blaming Whom the blamers of Him are to be blamed, because they have dared to blame Him that is not to be blamed ! But from that which thou sayest to me, that 'Nothing can come to be, except from an Entity,' from this very saying learn that those Entities also cannot come to be. For this opinion of thine is harder than mine. For how will the Entities be found to be not made and not created ? With thy mind taste this that I say. But thou sayest 'Dost thou not believe that the one Entity exists?' Then to Faith thou dost conduct [P. 202.] me, and not to Discussion. Thou therefore that compellest me to concern myself with Faith, what compels thee to compel me to run to Discussion and not to Faith ? But if thou dost turn to Discussion I will leave Faith alone! What do I [acknowledge] ? There exists an Entity, called God. But thou sayest ' Lo, the world exists ; if thou wilt, call it an Entity, and |xcvi if thou wilt, [set down] that from Entities it is made. Is it not necessary for thee to acknowledge that that essence exists ?' Then that necessity which has bound me to acknowledge this paradox that 'it cannot really be investigated, but it is believed without investigation'—that necessity has bound me to believe that 'from Nothing everything comes to be,' another paradox which without investigation is to be believed !

But instead of all these things which thou hast said above, this which is unexceptionable I say 'How dost thou compel me to believe that there exists a God invisible and intangible?' Wilt thou compel ...

[P. 203.] and how Four Entities that are visible . . . Now the Fire devoured the Water and the Dust and the Stones and the Ox,^³and they became nothing. But a thing that exists in essence cannot become nothing. Now (this came to pass) that God might make known that from nothing created things [will become] nothing. If therefore thou dost not believe this, learn by experiment as a fool, because . . .

[l. 33.] Look at this, that God in the Beginning made the Earth from nothing, [and] He turned and generated everything from the Earth. For just as the Earth is from nothing and from it is everything, so in Fire everything (becomes) nothing, and at the last it also turns to nothing. But if thou say that this work is [P. 204.] subtly divided in the midst of the Air, pound and break up anything thou wilt and examine (?) it in the Sun that comes in through the window, and see that it appears to thee that thou dost see [it] ; therefore also the flame of a fire [that] has gone out or Water that is dried up is (more) subtle.⁴

Let us say further against Mani that a thing which by sins was cast down from its place as a thing—by righteousness and by keeping the commandments could it be restored ? If the ZIWANE also through sins were mixed with the Darkness, it is necessary that by means of fasting and prayer they should be 'refined.' But if it was in order that the Darkness might be |xcvii caught through them that they were mixed (with it); now that it has been caught, by all means it is required to know how the Sons of the Light may return to their place. And if so they do not go up, never can they return to their place. For if cleansing is required, as they say, 'fountains of refining' as others say, how [blind] is Bardaisan ... to cleanse and to refine that which is mixed in the Sea and in the dry Land and in the Heaven and in the Earth and in all that is in them, and in the Seven Limbos ⁵ and in the Ten Firmaments, as they both have said ? Therefore these their disciples make their words void. For if the refinings are many and great but their disciples are few [P. 205.] and dispersed, how by Five Initiates can that be separated and refined which thousands and myriads do not suffice for ? For if they had been wise they ought to have contrived to find a Teaching suitable for a few, so that it might be believed that a few could suffice for it. For if any one set out that he with a few workmen would suffice to cut through a great mountain or to dam a mighty river, then by those feeble ones who are with him is it not clear that he is making a mock of himself ? For with many and strong men that on which he set out is to be done, or not at all: how much more (is it absurd) that he set out with Five to do that for which Five Hundred was too few ?

They also actually proclaim a refining and cleansing of all Rivers and Sources and Fountains, when between them all they cannot refine the water of a single Spring ! And so look at everything, at Fruits and Produce and Crops and Vegetables and Fishes and Birds,—how many can eat of all these that are [P. 206.] in all quarters, both by sea and land ? For if it were so as they say, Kings and their countries and Lords and their retinues and Captains of armies and their forces ought to be placed over these matters, so that by many coming from all quarters the Light which is in all quarters might be refined. But the Romans are omitted, who had not heard the news of the Refinings, and the Greeks and the Hebrews and the Barbarians and the Arabs, for they refine more than all, seeing that not even . . . escapes |xcviii them ! All these therefore are unemployed in Refining, and 'a pair of Initiates refine,' they say, 'and cleanse the mixture' which is too great for all!

For if by the knowledge and the Faith of the school of Bardaisan and Mani the creation is being cleansed and refined, and otherwise there is no way, when do these feeble ones look forward by themselves to finish the creation ? But if they should say that all peoples are refining and cleansing the Light from the Darkness, and the Good Parts from the Evil, know further that for their shame they are compelled to say so, though they on [P. 207.] all sides cannot avoid shame. For how is Light refined in the mouth of the unbelievers, and how are the Parts of the Soul [l. 10.] cleansed . . . how are they ... to proclaim the truth about Refining, for lo, those also who do not believe cleanse and refine ?

[l. 32.] that which is in their teaching, for lo, from Adam even unto Bardaisan and to Mani. Vainly then they were going and . . . [P. 208.]

[l. 17.] And if they should say for their shame that there were some of old time Teachers of the Truth,—for they say about Hermes in Egypt, and about Plato among the Greeks, and about Jesus who appeared in Judaea, that 'they are Heralds of that Good One to the world,'—(what does it prove)? For if so be that they did proclaim these (doctrines) of the Manicheans as they say, if Hermes knew the Primal Man, the Father of the ZIWANE, and if he knew the Pillar of Glory and the . . .⁶ of Splendour and the Atlas and the rest of the others that Mani proclaimed and even worships and prays to ; and if Plato knew the Virgin of Light . . .⁷and the Mother of the [Living], or the war or . . . ,—but [P. 209.] he did know . . . and Hera and Athena and Aphrodite the adulterous Goddess !—and if Jesus proclaimed to them the Refining in Judaea, and if He taught the worship of the Luminaries that Mani worships, he who they say is the Paraclete, that comes |xcix after three hundred years : and when we have found that the teachings of these or their followers agree the one to the other, or those of one of them to those of Mani, there is justification ! But if they do not agree, refutation is at hand. But why is it that Astrology, even though it is a lie, agrees with itself in its teaching, and Magianism with its tradition, and Geometry with its calculation, and Medicine with its book ? And the disciples of Plato learned his teaching and teach it to this day, and the disciples of Jesus both learned and taught what they heard from Him ; and so do the disciples of Marcion and Bardaisan and Mani. If they also with Hermes and Plato and Jesus and others from the Beginning were proclaiming a Refining in succession, as Mani says, how is it their disciples are not proclaiming their teaching in Egypt and in Greece and in Judaea like that which Mani teaches to-day ? For how is what Jesus teaches like what [P. 210.] Mani teaches ? So that by this teaching of our Lord, which is open and manifest let that one be convicted who has much wronged God and the Dead.

For Hermes taught that there was a Bowl,⁸ filled with whatever it was filled with, and that there are Souls excited by desire, and they come down beside it, and, when they have come close to it, in it and by reason of it they forget their own place. Now Mani teaches that the Darkness made an assault on the Light and desired it, while Hermes teaches that the Souls desired the Bowl; and this is a little (more) probable, even though both are lying, but it is (more) probable, because it, the Soul, desires to remain in the Body and delay in its Habitation and dwell in its House and be fondled in its Bosom. But Mani compels a man to hear him seriously though he is talking nonsense, for 'the Darkness (he says) loved the Light its opposite'—and how does Water love Fire that absorbs it, or Fire Water that quenches it? And how did Fire love Light? How, pray, will it be benefited by it ? For 'Fire loved Fire, and Wind Wind, and Water Water.' Or, perhaps, are these Natures of Darkness [P. 211.] male and those from the Good One. female ? And if not, what is the sense of this, that they loved one another? |c

These things therefore Hermes did not teach, nor did Jesus, because Jesus taught the opposite of all of them. For He quickened bodies and raised the dead, whereas neither Hermes nor Plato believe in the resurrection of the body.

But indeed how did Water love Water and both went astray ? For, lo, if an evil man sink in water the evil Water drowns him and does not remember that it is of his race, and if a good man be drowned in water the good water does not recognise that it is of his family. And so the Wind loved the Wind and they became one thing—and against the just and the unjust they come up in the contrary direction and batter their faces ! And so the Light makes no distinction between the unclean and the clean. And how do they worship that which has no discrimination? And if because of His grace,—neither the Water His fellow-kinsman is good which drowns the righteous, nor the Fire which burns the humble! And (see) that even the Sun burns the fruits and torments the reapers, and sees those that are oppressed with [P. 212.] its heat and does not produce the fruits as one that is good ; and in the country of the far East ⁹ they say three things are at ease in the shade, Men and Cattle and Wild Beasts, for the Sun not to burn them with the fierceness of its rays. And how, pray, did the Sons of the Darkness endure its burning, seeing that bodies are of the same family as they are and they cannot endure its heat? For if this heat is of the same nature as these bodies, how is that which is of one Entity tormenting and being tormented from itself ? And if it is from that other nature, then how could this which is injured endure that which injures ? But it is wonderful and difficult and incredible that it even 'eagerly desired it and was pleased with it.'

And if Fire was mixed with Fire, and Water with Water and Wind with Wind, it necessarily follows that Light also (was mixed) with Light! Now that these Natures are akin one to the other all reasonable beings know, apart from madmen—but perhaps even madmen apart from the Manicheans. For we [P. 213.] know the causes whereby Water is transformed, and witness is |ci borne uniformly to this that, lo, by trees it is transformed into Wine and into Oil and into the many tastes thereof. What therefore shall we say? That Wine is not akin to Water, or that Oil also is not of its family ? And if Wine and Oil that, lo, are very distinct from Water, even though they seem to be strangers are not strangers, how much more is Water akin to Water, though it be bitter ? For as it is diverse in plants so it is diverse in countries, though the true Word of Providence places it and the countries and the plants under the one Will that creates all things.

Furthermore we will confute them from another quarter, in that if Fire has been mixed with Fire, when pray are they being refined and separated one from the other? For if they were being refined they would also be recognised, in that Fire had become dimmer than it was because of the refining away of that other that was separated from it. For there are old men that have lived more than a hundred years and they have not perceived that this Fire after a hundred years is colder or dimmer than [P. 214.] that was, nor was that of a hundred years ago hotter or stronger or brighter or clearer than this ; nor has Water become weaker than Water was, nor Wind than Wind ; and (so) these Natures stir up an unfalsifiable refutation against those who wished to tell all these lies about plain things. For these Natures that have not become weaker and are not becoming weaker prove about Bardaisan and Mani that there is no sense in their teaching.

But if something from behind moved the Element of Wind and impelled it, as Bardaisan says, it would impel it towards its diameter,¹⁰ that is, against the Element of Light it would cast it. For opposite the Western one it is set in the East. For if from the North-West the Wind was hurled by whatever it was that hurled it and cast it on the Fire it did not make it go down below upon the Darkness in the middle ; for it turned the Fire to the South, and took it away, and it went forth into empty Space. And because they are Atoms, as Bardaisan says, [P. 215.] inasmuch as it is in intention that the distinction between each of them is apprehended,¹¹ it is clear that the Entities were not also |cii hurled one into the other like bodies into bodies. And it is to be supposed about them in their own selves that Wind cannot set in motion the Light of the Sun.

But if the Elements were impelled from above downwards, what prevented it from impelling the Fire to go down alongside of the Darkness, if the pretext of Darkness was required for the Maker to make ? And if the Wind blew, lo, it would have separated the Atoms, because they had not yet been mixed by the force of creative power. And even that Wind would not have been able to blow, because it had not yet even acquired the faculty of blowing by the regulation (of the Maker) ; for if by reason of creative power the Fire acquired brightness and the Light extension and Water flow, it is clear that before their regulation they did not have these (properties), nor did the Darkness, because it also still consisted of scattered Atoms.

For if when [the regulation] was not . . . the Water . . . [P. 216. l. 3[ ... and the Wind would not have sufficed of itself to blow and the Fire to [glow] and the Darkness to smoke, and the Light and the Fire and the Wind . . .

[l. 12.] and it would have been made more hateful than it was (before) by the regulation of this Maker, who they say really did make things more beautiful than they had been in their original essence. Or should we say the true (constitution) of this Fire is not of that which Bardaisan says ?—for truly indeed it is not of it. It is not as if what I am saying does exist, but on the contrary I assert that it does not exist, not as one that likes it to be so, but as one that is convinced, not without consideration, but by prudent investigation. For if from the very same thing come Light, Wind, Darkness, experiment, vision—let us see therefore if this is established by its own power, without conjunction with anything [P. 217.] else, and let us see if it (the Fire) kindles Wind like chips of wood, or has power with Darkness as with reeds ! And if this defect that it has to-day it did not have of old and that immemorial non-defect it does not have to-day, it is necessary that either the |ciii Maker really disturbed things ignorantly—which God forbid !—or that with a mouth that is not ashamed to repeat the truth the true conclusion may be said without shame, which is that that man spoke falsely who constructed Entities that do not exist. So that from these Entities, about which Bardaisan spoke, there is no way for created things like those (around us) to come into being, for they do not allow their natures, being 'bound' in essence, to come to regulation as the artificer asks. For creatures which are from nothing, as and also as much as it pleases the Maker, so He creates and fixes them : He changes, transfers, and dissolves, even illuminates.

But if they are Atoms of essence, as they say, that cannot be dissolved but can be concentrated, let them prove to one who [P. 218.] wishes to ask without contention how Natures that are not constructed can be constructed, unless the fixing of their essence has been dissolved, that is, their Atoms ? But if they (the Atoms) had been actually dispersed, they are collected by wisdom and contracted by diligence, and therefore let us say to him what Bardaisan said to another.¹² And if the texture of the essence of these Atoms was really loosely woven and porous, that is, the dispersal of their nature, they can be concentrated by wisdom and condensed by artifice. And if this is all the 'creative power' it is very weak, in that its operation only went as far as putting things together. But if created things also were created out of these atoms, I want to learn how, when atoms cleave to atoms, a Soul comes into being, and when other things cleave to others a Body comes into being ? What is the glue and paste that holds them from being dissolved ? If this bandage also is made of atoms, yet another bandage is required also for the bandage itself to bind it, [seeing that] what is made of sand cannot bind atoms of sand to be one body, because it is not established even [P. 219.] for itself to bind its own self and substance.

For brass that is smelted from sand, as long as thou addest its atoms one to the other it increases and becomes a great heap of sand (only), that is, one does not cleave to the other |civ unless they go into the furnace and are dissolved one by one by Fire from the bond of their nature ; and when the fixing of them one to the other is dissolved, then there comes to all of them one mixing [in] the melting-pot, and one power that moulds, like that of stones, which, if they are not dissolved and turned to lime, cannot be moulded and become one lump of brass. If therefore also these Atoms of Entities can each one of them be smelted, and their essence be destroyed though it be not regulated, and their nature be dissolved though it be not a composition, they have confessed though unwillingly that they were not even Entities but made things, and are not even Natures 'bound' in essence but Natures regulated by creative power, are not Creatures that have come into being from something but from nothing. [P. 220.] And if we adapt ourselves to them, whereas truth does not adapt itself to falsehood at all, if creatures were or are derived from Atoms, how was or is Knowledge and Intention derived from Atoms?

Now, there are some of their wise men, the hidden ones who perversely say something subtly, that 'there are other Atoms, of Reason and of Power and of Intention,' that is, three other Entities, that 'they have been sent from the LORD of All upon the Primal Darkness and upon [this] regulation' and 'some of these Atoms were mingled and are mingled with those others'; as Bardaisan says, that 'the Power of the Primal Utterance which remained in created things, it makes everything.'

[l. 35.] of ourselves, when we have no knowledge of ourselves. And therefore human nature is freed from all guiltinesses, and the blame has been attached to One Whom blame does not touch. But if this blasphemy cannot be believed, there is [P. 221.] found as it were a condition belonging to it that knowledge is not . . . from God, not even as heat from Fire. For if it were so, it would be necessary that as the heat of Fire is like itself and is not divided against itself, so also our knowledge would not be divided against God, if it were of God ; and therefore that neither from God nor from the Entities is really his true self, seeing that from nothing the whole man was |cv created. And this one thing bears witness about everything, that it also was created from nothing.

But that thou mayest know that as far as these things assist Bardaisan, so far he draws them after his will, and where they fail him and are obscure, he too sails off in a vague way. For he declared that the names of the Months were not given without reason, but as allegories, and he began from First Teshri, for (he says) 'About the name of ¹³ first beginning this Month proclaims with its name,' and not to be lengthy, let us say rapidly that he went on and interpreted the names of the Months as far [P. 222.] as Nisan. And when he arrived at the name of Nisan and saw that its name did not suit his interpretation, nor those of the five other Months after it, he interpreted as far as that point and stayed, and explained as far as Adar and stopped.

But if from God allegories had been placed in the names of the Months, in all the Months of the year he would have designed allegories and types in their names. For lo, Nisan, that is greater than all,—and its name does not agree with its activity, that is, its name (does not agree) with the Redemption that took place in it. Because therefore there chanced to be names for the Months which chanced by accident he gathered from them an explanation and persevered and made from them interpretations, and brought things from the dialect of Beth Garmai and from the dialect of Edessa ; and compassed sea and land to make one proselyte!

And see the fruit at variance with its root, in that his son is at variance with his explanation ! For Bardaisan said and declared, that as if by Prophecy the First Month was called TESHRI, and the one after it MARHESHWAN, 'in which all things creep,' and [P. 223.] he did not say 'Teshri and Teshri.' ¹⁴ But his son, in order that he also might establish another allegory which he had himself put together, and also that pure lips might speak it and chaste ears hear it, did not say 'Teshri and Marheshwan' but 'Teshri and Teshri.' For he says thus in his Hymn : 'O TESHRI, Mother of the year, Produce for us another TESHRI,' and this he |cvi says about the Mother of Life, asking her to produce and leave behind a daughter after her own likeness.

So again Bardaisan said thus about the Entities and their colours ; for he said 'the Light is white, the Fire is red, the Wind is blue, the Water is green,' though these (notions) are stolen by him from the Greeks. As therefore he declared that each of the Entities has a colour of its own, so each of them has its own smell, and its own taste, and its own texture,¹⁵ and its own voice. For five aspects each must be found for each of the Entities, corresponding to the five senses which we have ; as [P. 224.] he said 'Everything that exists has its own Power and its own Colour and its own Aspect, and the rest of whatever belongs to it. Let him declare to us therefore what is the texture of Light, and what is the taste of Wind, and what is the smell of Fire, that thou mayest know that here also with the Natures he goes into them as far as he does go, as in the names of the Months, and he shewed from them as far as he did, so as to shew his Philosophy. And when other sides sank away from him and were hidden, he began sailing off, and when . . . and he did not establish himself upon them he paid no attention to them and passed over and began with something else, and beguiled his hearers to suppose that those other things also that had not been spoken of he knew all about, like those kindred matters which had been spoken of.

So again he put the Darkness because of its weight the lowest of all of them (i.e. of the Entities). And if the Darkness be the heaviest, know that the Water being lighter is above it in its boundary ; and because Fire also is lighter than Water, it [P. 225.] must be that it is above the Water ; and again because Wind also is lighter than Fire it is clear that it too is above the Fire ; and because Light is lighter than Wind it is manifest that it is above the Wind. For each of them is lighter than the heavier one underneath it, but heavier than the lighter one above it. And in this correct proportion and just balance there is found the element of Water between the Darkness and the Fire, the one cold underneath it, and the other hot above it; and there ended the construction of the Aramaean Philosopher. |cvii

For if the Wind smote the Fire which was underneath it and bent it downwards, the Fire did not reach to the Darkness, for the great element of Water stands between it and the Darkness, and therefore that extinguishing Intermediary did not allow the arouser of the Darkness to rub against it and its smoke to diffuse so as to reach to its companion (in Darkness). For it is necessary that if the natures of the Entities are true to their names, if the Fire is a Fire in truth, and not an idle name, then the Water also is Water indeed. And if the opposite to the Fire [P. 226.] was the Water, then it did not let the Fire approach the Darkness. And because the Water was the neighbour of the Darkness, again cold on cold was added to the Darkness, the opposite of what those people designed (when they say) 'the heat melted its cold and its smoke was diffused' ; whereas if it had diffused itself and gone up, because they stand one above the other as their Natures teach us, light and heavy, would not 'the beginning of the lowest part' of all of them alone have been destroyed, as Bardaisan says ? For how can heavy and light things in one rank or in one boundary stand in equilibrium? The scales of a balance, or water and oil put in a vessel, prove that the lighter stands above and the heavier below. And therefore when 'the Darkness sought to go up and reach to the heels and the skirts of the upper Light,' when it 'made an assault to go up,' did it overwhelm completely the Water and the Fire and the Wind, and was 'the beginning [P. 227.] of the lowest part of the Light' only destroyed? And therefore they are refuted, and the School of Bardaisan cannot go on inventing from his principles.

Again the Manicheans say a thing that is refuted from itself ; for their words are wont to quarrel one with the other, because they have not acquired unity from love nor equilibrium from truth. For they say that the Darkness has been mixed with Light, a word that may seem probable to the inexperienced, but to thinkers self-contradictory ; and because that speaker was afraid of what he had said, in that he knew that many . . .

[P.228.] For as the Laws reprove the transgressors of the Laws, so [l. 7.] |cviii the Holy Scriptures reprove those who transgress beyond the limit of the Scriptures. But as robbers and thieves without law . . .

Therefore let them establish that if there are bound [Natures], that is, Light and Wind and Water and Fire . . . that knowledge is not in them. But if they are corporeal Bodies, things corporeal cannot eat spiritual Natures. But if from their skins are the Heavens, and from their excrement the Earth, and from their bo[nes] the Mountains, lo, they have ...

... If from the sheath-skins again of their bodies came Heaven and Earth, what sheath-skins belong to Light and to Wind and to Fire and to Water and to Darkness ? And therefore if all these sons of the Darkness . . .

Single inverted commas are used in numerous cases where the words seem to be quotations or to belong to a special terminology.

Words in italics inside square brackets are to be regarded as conjectural translations or paraphrases.

In a few passages, where the text has suffered great mutilation, italics indicate an attempt to summarise the argument from suggestions in the fragments.]

[P.101] indicates page 101 of the accompanying Syriac. [l.2] means line 2 of the current page of the accompanying Syriac. [RP]

1. ¹ I.e. about the death of Entities. The subject of discussion is the nature of the Archon who rules this world.

4. ² The meaning appears to be that mechanically pounded grit is after all visible, however small it be pounded, but dried-up water is quite invisible.

6. ¹ The MS. has [Syriac bits], quite legible in a good light. Evidently the feggoka&toxos (Splenditenens) was named. We should have expected [Syriac] in the gap (Cumont, Eecherches, i, p. 22), but the traces are more like [Syriac].

8. ¹ For the doctrine of the Bowl or Vortex (krath&r), see Mead's Thrice-greatest Hermes, vol. i, pp. 414 f., 454 : also Macrobius, Somn. Scip. i 12.

11. ² I understand the word here translated 'intention' to refer to the Elements themselves, To use S. Paul's terminology, the fro&nhma of Fire, viz. 'to kindle,' is essentially distinct from that of Water, viz. 'to make wet.'

12. ¹ It is a pity that we do not know what Bardaisan said ! The meaning seems to be that substances that can be divided and separated can be reconcentrated and regrouped.

13. ¹ The MS. has ' the name of the name of '—probably by a mere accident of transcription.

14. ² Teshri is October and Marheshwan November. These are the old Aramaic names : the Edessenes generally called October 'Teshri I', and November 'Teshri II.'

S. Ephraim's Prose Refutations of Mani, Marcion and Bardaisan. Transcribed from the Palimpsest B.M. Add. 14623 by the late C. W. MITCHELL, M.A., C.F., volume 2 (1921). Introduction by F. C. Burkitt

	A. GR.	A.D.
MARCION left the Catholic Church	449	138
BARDAISAN born	11 July, 465	154
MANI born	527	216
" first proclaimed his Religion,	20 March, 553	242
" killed by Bahram (Varanes I)	586	273
S. EPHRAIM died	9 June, 684	373

For Marcion, Bardaisan, and Ephraim, these statements are taken from the Chronicon Edessenum (ed. Guidi, 1903). The date of Mani's birth is given by Mani himself in the Shapurakan (quoted by Al-Biruni, pp. 121, 190); his Religion is dated according to An-Nadim (Flügel, p. 149, corrected in Nöldcke, Geschichte der Perser und Araber, p. 412). The Chronicon Edessenum puts Mani's birth in 240 A.D., by a confusion with the date of the proclamation of Manicheism.

INTRODUCTORY ESSAY

THE texts edited in these volumes of S. Ephraim's Prose Refutations are the contents of a sixth-century MS. in the British Museum, the two parts of which are numbered Add. 14574 and Add. 14623. The technical description of these MSS. is given in a separate Note : it will suffice here to say that 14574 contains the first 19 leaves (i.e. the first two quires) in their original condition, while 14623 consists of the 88 leaves which a monk named Aaron used in 823 A.D. for transcribing a fresh volume of miscellaneous contents. The original writing was washed out, and as Aaron's own hand is both small and thick it is often very difficult to decipher the ancient script underneath ; the new order of the leaves, moreover, bears no relation to the old, so that it was one of Mr. Mitchell's first difficulties to discover the original sequence of the fragments he transcribed. But this was happily and completely done, and one result was to establish the fact that, irregular as the order was, the 88 leaves of Add. 14623 contain nothing but leaves from the same ancient codex, and that no intermediate gaps occur. The 88 leaves of 14623 are actually the 88 leaves that once came after fol. 19 of Add. 14574. We may therefore reasonably infer that very little is missing at the end, and treat what survives as a connected whole.

From the scribe's point of view the volume consisted of two parts, of nearly equal size. Part I contained the Five Books addressed to Hypatius, edited in vol. i of this edition ; this part has the headline 'Of Hypatius' at the middle and ends of the quires. Part II is more miscellaneous : it consists of seven pieces, none of which have any organic connexion with the others, though |cxii they are all by S. Ephraim. The first of these is directed against certain opinions of Bardaisan about Space and Perception which were contained in a work of his called 'Of Domnus (swYMdd).' Accordingly the scribe uses 'Of Domnus' for the headlines of his Part II, but the title is merely a scribe's fancy, and the remaining six pieces have nothing to do with Domnus. It is not even certain what the title 'Of Domnus' for the lost work of Bardaisan really signified. It may have been a work addressed to a certain Domnus, just as Ephraim's 'Of Hypatius' is the scribe's short title for Ephraim's Five Books addressed to Hypatius. But nothing is known of such a personage. There was a Domnus Bishop of Antioch, the rival of Paul of Samosata, in 269 A.D., but the name was not common in early times.

Following Ephraim's polemic against Bardaisan's Domnus come three tracts against Marcion, succeeded by a metrical discourse against Bardaisan, and a quasi-metrical discourse on Virginity. It is not easy to see why this latter piece was included in the collection, as it has nothing to do with the heresies attacked in the other pieces. Finally there is a prose tract against Mani, which appears to have concluded the volume ; this work is quite distinct from the Discourses to Hypatius, and contains some important references to Manichean doctrines and nomenclature, as well as some direct quotations from lost works by Bardaisan and his school.

I have been able to supply from other sources a certain number of confirmations and additions to the text of Add. 14623, so ingeniously deciphered by Mr. Mitchell. These are : (1) a long quotation from Book IV and a short quotation from Book V of the Hypatius,¹ both taken from one of the ancient collections of doctrinal Extracts in which the Nitrian Library was so rich. The two quotations together make up 103 lines, which is just as long as one of the three-column pages of the MS, or as one of the pages of the English translation.² Short as the extracts are they afford a most valuable indication of the degree of accuracy which Mr. Mitchell was able to attain in the difficult work of decipherment, and encourage readers who cannot examine the Palimpsest |cxiii for themselves to accept the Syriac text as printed in these volumes with a very considerable measure of confidence.

(2) Similar extracts from the metrical Discourse against Bardaisan will be found noted in the text of this volume. The longest of these are taken from Add. 14623 itself, as the monk Aaron, before obliterating the ancient writing, copied out the equivalent of six pages of the printed Syriac, i.e. between two and three pages of the ancient MS. A good deal of the part thus copied out by Aaron and now preserved in the upper writing of 14623 is practically illegible in the ancient writing, so that the extracts make a considerable addition to our knowledge.

(3) Aaron copied out the whole of the Discourse on Virginity, which therefore survives entire. Unfortunately, from the point of view of the modern scholar, this is much the least interesting piece in the volume, but as in the case of the other extracts it enables us to check Mr. Mitchell's work in parts where the Palimpsest is too illegible to make a continuous text. It is curious that Mr. Mitchell should not have noticed these extracts from the lower text in the upper writing, all the more as the extracts from the Discourse against Bardaisan had been published long ago by Overbeck. But it was a fortunate oversight, for (as I said above) it enables us to check the accuracy of his work of transcription.

(4) The Discourse on Virginity, which is written in a poetical style, but not in any regular metre, was afterwards turned into metrical Hymns by a process of curtailment and transposition. This form survives in Vat. Syr. cxi. (A.D. 522) and some later MSS. in the British Museum. The text is printed by Lamy at the end of his vol. ii., but as we possess Aaron's transcript of the original there was no need to record the variations.

From the point of view of a modern scholar, whose chief interest is to recover the lost works and theories of ancient thinkers, whether orthodox or heterodox, S. Ephraim's literary methods are very unsatisfactory. He makes few direct quotations from the writers whom he is controverting, nor does he explain the |cxiv outlines of their system, or distinguish the books of his opponents. It is all piecemeal work. No effort is made to understand the opponent's system as a whole, but single debating points are taken, sometimes with a good deal of ingenuity, in order to shew the weak places of the adversary. As we do not possess the corresponding Marcionite or Bardesanian polemic against the Catholic system, the result is to give an impression of Catholic common sense as opposed to heretical fancy or perverseness.

This is unfortunate in two ways. At the time, no doubt, it was quite an effective method of convincing Ephraim's supporters that reason was on their side and folly on the side of the vaunted heretical philosophy. In our day it has sometimes an opposite effect. We see that justice is not being done to the heretics, that the Catholic writer, who alone now survives, is both judge and advocate. We dimly feel that the controversy is about great subjects, that these heretics were thinkers conscious of the difficulties of the greater problems of human life, some of which still perplex us. and we sometimes, by a kind of reaction, tend to assume that the heretical systems were really philosophical, nearer to our ways of thinking than the world in which the Catholic controversialist lived. At least we tend to assume that the systems of the greater heretics were consistent wholes.

Yet this is by no means certain. I venture to hope that a really consistent philosophy, unhampered by definitely wrong beliefs, whether about the physical or moral world, would have had more power of successful resistance. The religion both of Marcion and of Mani must have had in them much that corresponded to human needs, or they would not have had their long and honourable records of persistence under persecution ; but they were both hampered by irrational elements.

One point may be urged in S. Ephraim's favour. So far as we know, though he is unsympathetic he is not unfair. He does not seem actually to misrepresent the theories of his opponents or to misquote them. The worst that can be said is that he seems totally unconscious of the difficulties involved in these controversies, and this all the more as his work is wholly critical and destructive, except to a certain extent in the treatise against Bardaisan's Domnus. He is content with picking holes in his antagonists |cxv and does not give us his own philosophy, except by scattered hints.

On this perhaps a few words may be said, mainly with regard to the meaning of certain Syriac terms. Ephraim may be described as a Monist and a Materialist. That is to say, he recognises only one self-existing original entity or being ()YtY) , Ithya), viz. God. The opposite to an Ithya is )dYBB (p. 219, l. 41), i.e. a thing made. What we see around us in this world are made things, things which came into being by God's will. Properties and characters were given to made things by God's will, and so, if He wills it, their properties are liable to change. An Ithya, on the other hand, does not and cannot change ; it has a 'bound nature ' ([Syriac]).

At the same time, created things do actually exist; they have 'substance,' which varies according to the 'nature' of the thing. For 'substance' the Syriac is [Syriac] (knoma), and for 'nature' [Syriac] (kyana). The word knoma is of considerable interest, inasmuch it has been chosen to render u9po&stasis, i.e. 'Person' in speaking of the Trinity, while bar kydna ('of the same Nature') is used for o9moou&sion. The special value of the use of these words in these treatises is that S. Ephraim is employing them philosophically, yet quite apart from their special theological use to render certain Greek technical terms.

I have translated knoma by 'substance,' but this meaning shades off into 'individuality,' and no doubt this was the aspect of the word that made it appropriate to render Hypostasis or Person in the Trinitarian sense. On p. 63, 1. 30, we find "David his knoma," i.e. "David in his own person," as distinguished from some son or descendant of David. Yet I think there is in knoma always the notion of reality, i.e. of materiality. Ephraim talks about 'black knome' (p. 41, 1. 36), and in p. 174, 1. 20, it is used of wood. The whole passage indeed is worth quotation, as it exhibits very well Ephraim's philosophy of substance. "Fire," he says, "is buried and dead imperceptibly (in wood), and the rubbing of one bit of wood with another brings it to life, to the destruction of both. For when it has come to life it turns and burns the substance which gave it life by being conjoined with it." That is to say, Fire is a separate substance really existing within |cxvi the substance of wood. On the other hand, verbal nouns like 'buying' and 'selling' have no substance (p. 18, 1. 34 f.); they are only notions in the mind.

Ephraim's argument to prove that Space has no substance should be read at length (pp. iv—viii). It seems to me a very creditable piece of reasoning, especially in view of the fact that he did not possess two pieces of mental apparatus which facilitate our discussions of such subjects. He had no word for 'Space' as such, which we can so easily represent to our eyes by the use of a capital letter and (where necessary) of inverted commas ; and neither he nor his opponent Bardaisan had the idea of Cartesian axes, whereby all space is rendered manageable by dividing it into eight cubes all meeting at a definite point, from which measures can be taken.

What is perhaps more remarkable is that Ephraim does not regard Darkness as substantial (p. 40, 11. 7-12). No doubt he was helped to this view by the contrary views of Bardaisan and Mani, who held Darkness to be something positive.³ After all, it is partly a question of terminology. Whatever the corresponding Greek and Latin words may mean, 'Darkness' in English is wholly unsubstantial, the mere absence of Light. But [Syriac] (heshshoxa) in Syriac means the Dark substance, to_ skoteino&n quite as much as the state of Darkness, to_ sko&tos. In translating the notions of Bardaisan and Mani into English it is therefore often more appropriate to speak of the Dark or the Dark substance than of the Darkness.

Kydna, 'nature,' is exactly fu&sis. It implies generally a set of qualities or characteristics. No transliteration of ou0si/a is used in these treatises, and parsopa occurs only once (ii. p. 26, 1. 16), where it seems to mean 'person' in the ordinary English sense, i.e. 'individual.' |cxvii

These treatises tell us more about Syriac-speaking Marcionites than is told in any other extant source. The main result is to shew that they were very similar in their beliefs and practices to the Marcionites elsewhere, especially as described in Eznik's well-known chapters against them.⁴ In fact, it is very likely that Eznik's account is not so much an original description of the Armenian Marcionites known to him as a translation from some early Syriac writer.

It is important to notice at the outset that S. Ephraim's polemic against Marcion differs in one respect from that of Tertullian and Epiphanius: there is no controversy about Marcion's Gospel. Marcion, who rejected the authority of the Old Testament as the work of the Adversary of Jesus, considered that most of the writings current among Christians had been interpolated in the interests of Judaism, and the only Gospel he received was a shortened recension of Luke. According to Tertullian and Epiphanius, with whom almost all modern scholars are in agreement, Marcion's Gospel was an arbitrary mutilation of the text, while Marcion no doubt regarded it as the genuine Evangel purged of alien elements. In any case it was obviously a variant form of the canonical Luke, and opponents of Marcion who were accustomed to use the Canonical Luke were concerned to vindicate the superiority of the text familiar to them. But Ephraim and the branch of the Catholic Church to which he belonged habitually used the Diatessaron, not the four separate Gospels. He seems to have been quite unfamiliar with the Gospels as separate literary works (though he knew something about the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel),⁵ and probably did not recognise Marcion's Gospel as being one of the Canonical Four used by Greek and Latin orthodox Christians. However that may be, he says nothing about it. Possibly he did not even know the Marcionite Gospel itself, and only bases his polemic on Marcionite theological and controversial works which quote it. |cxviii

The most striking new fact about Marcionite usage brought out by these treatises is that the Syriac-speaking Marcionites used a different transliteration of the name 'Jesus' from the orthodox. The ordinary Syriac for 'Jesus' is Ow4Y (pronounced 'Isho' by Nestorians but Yeshu' by Jacobites), which is simply the Syriac form of the Old Testament name Joshua.⁶ This form Ow4Y was used not only by the orthodox, but also by the Manichees. It was therefore a surprise to find that Ephraim in arguing against Marcionites, and certainly in part quoting from their books or sayings, uses the form wsY, a direct transcription of the Greek )Ihsou~ (or 0Ihsou~j). As it is always written wsY, never wsY), I suppose the pronunciation intended is IESU rather than ISU, but I have retained Mitchell's ISU (vol. i. p. li), not only for uniformity but also because it was desirable to emphasise the strangeness of the form wsY.

When Ephraim uses this Marcionite transliteration he is evidently basing his argument on Marcionite texts. The question therefore does arise, how far his references to Gospel incidents are quotations from the Marcionite Gospel. My first impression on reading the First Discourse against Marcion (pp. 50-102) was that he was working on a copy of that Gospel, or at least was conscious of its main peculiarities. After an argument about Adam and the nature of his punishment he goes on to discuss the message of John the Baptist to ISU (pp. 61-87), and this is followed by a discussion of the Transfiguration. Both these incidents are contained in Marcion's Gospel, and most of the textual allusions might be regarded as taken from Luke, though the wording often differs from the ordinary Syriac. But a closer examination made this view more than doubtful: I think Ephraim was, as usual, quoting the Diatessaron loosely from memory, and I do not think there is any tangible evidence that he knew that certain of his Gospel references were taken from passages and incidents which had no place in Marcion's Gospel-book, so that their citation had no weight in an argument against Marcionites. Thus on p. 64, 1. 24, and p. 109,1. 13, he has sarcastic references to 'the girl,' i.e. the daughter of Herodias, playing with John the Baptist's head, |cxix while on p. 108, 1. 45, the 'soldier of the guard ' is mentioned. But the whole incident of Herod's banquet is absent from Luke, and therefore from Marcion's Gospel, while the 'soldier' (espuklatra) is mentioned only in Mk. vi 27. Again, on p. 72, 1. 26 f., Ephraim quotes 'Blessed are the meek in their spirit' : this is an inaccurate combination of Matt, v 5 and Matt, v 3, but neither element of the quotation is represented in the Lucan Beatitudes, accepted by Marcion. Further, 'Blessed is he, except he be offended in me,' on p. 86, 1. 6f., agrees neither with the Syriac vulgate nor with the Sinai Palimpsest text of Lk. vii 23, but it does agree with the Curetonian text of Matt, xi 6. Finally, on p. 82, 1. 5, John is called a Light-bringer, which recalls Joh. v 35, but has no parallel in Luke.

These passages are decisive enough to shew that Ephraim, unlike Tertullian and Epiphanius, is not attempting to confute Marcion out of his own recension of the Gospel. Still less is there reason to regard the few references to S. Paul as taken from the Marcionite 'Apostle.' The most interesting of these, from a textual point of view, is the quotation of 1 Tim. ii 15 on p. 100, 1.10 f.,⁷ but the argument could have meant little to a Marcionite, because Marcion never accepted the Pastoral Epistles.

The most we can learn from Ephraim about the Biblical exegesis of the Marcionites comes from the few passages which he directly quotes from them. The two most striking of these are to be found on p. 106 in the Second Discourse and on p. 125 in the Third. On p. 106, 11. 38-42, Ephraim suggests that the only reason Marcionites can allege for John the Baptist believing at all in Jesus is a fantastic faith in the unknown : " 'Because,' they say (ml), 'John was near to die he sent his flock by the hand of the two under-shepherds to the Lord of the flock.' " And again, on p. 125, 11. 40-47, Ephraim says : "Two things the Marcionites proclaim about our Lord, which are contrary to each other, for they say (ml), 'He annulled former Laws and healed diseased organs.' " The interest of these simple sentences, which are |cxx shewn by the use of the particle ml to be quotations,⁸ is that they seem to be polemical, isolated bits of Marcionite answer to orthodox criticism. It is not to be expected that they will be very profound or convincing, because they deal with points on which the Marcionite theory was weakest, viz. the events of the Gospel history. John the Baptist was a specially inconvenient figure, for he is altogether linked up with the Old Testament and Jewish religion, and yet he appears as a forerunner of Jesus. If John recognised Jesus at all he must, as Epiphanius says (Haer. xlii, p. 325), have known of Him before, while to the Marcionites Jesus is the Son of the Stranger, and His coming was altogether unexpected and unprepared. And with regard to the second quotation, it is easy for Ephraim to shew the inconsistency of regarding the cure of human bodies or organs as good, seeing that the whole domain of matter, or Hyle, is accounted by Marcionites as altogether outside the plan of salvation.

One feature of Ephraim's polemic with the Marcionites that cannot help striking the reader who comes to it after reading the tracts against Bardaisan or Mani is its more Biblical character. The religion of Marcion was essentially Christian and Biblical. He is a Dissenter from the orthodox interpretation of the Bible, but his philosophy starts from it. Bardaisan, on the other hand, appears in these controversies as a Cosmologist or Natural Philosopher with a system of his own, who found in the Gospel, as he found in Greek philosophy, certain things which he adopted because they seemed to be in harmony with his own views. Mani also is a thinker, more or less independent of Biblical data. Both to Bardaisan and to Mani their cosmological notions are an essential part of their religion. But I have the impression, that Marcion was only a cosmologist by accident, that he was essentially concerned with morals and the working of the mind and what may be called the psychology of forgiveness.

Ephraim makes some telling points against him over the Voice at the Transfiguration. Marcion, we know, had a clumsy presentation of the Universe as consisting of three Regions, one 'above' the other. In the highest dwelt the Kind Stranger ; |cxxi in the lowest, on the earth, was the domain of Matter ; between them, above the earth, was the domain of the Creator or Maker, the God of Justice and Law, who had made Man out of Matter in his own image. When the Voice came at the Transfiguration, saying, 'This is My Son,' how, says Ephraim, did they know it was the Stranger's Voice, and not that of the God of the Law ? If it was the Stranger, speaking from the heavens above us, how had He got there? This is a good debating point; but just as we see how very much easier the controversy between Ephraim and Bardaisan would have been, if they had considered Space as measured with Cartesian axes, so I venture to think Marcion would have made his meaning clearer if he had placed his Kind Stranger in a 'fourth dimension.'

The essential thing about the Kind Stranger who can and will forgive freely is that He is not in or of this tangible and measurable world. At least this is so, except in so far as the very notions in Marcion's mind are part of the whole of Nature. With this proviso, the whole of Marcion's system is essentially built upon the same lines as the religion outlined in Huxley's famous Romanes Lecture. Nature is red in tooth and claw, in this world an eye is exacted for an eye and a tooth for a tooth (or its equivalent). Action and reaction are equal and opposite, and the Law of the Conservation of Energy seems to be unbroken. But Man can imagine, more or less, another world where this is not the case, and his mind can take refuge in this fairyland, which is outside the visible universe.

Marcion did not, as a matter of fact, put his thoughts in this way. He was, as Ephraim says (p. lvii), 'half in and half out' of orthodox thought, and so was liable to charges of inconsistency. His great merit is that he felt the charm of the Gospel message apart from the sanction of the Old Testament. Ephraim starts off his polemic against Marcion by appealing to the miracles of the Exodus, and to alleged confirmations of Old Testament wonders in the archives of Egypt and Babylon, an argument which now only raises a smile. But Marcion's position is not similarly affected by modern discovery : the God to Whom he gave his allegiance was always outside of this visible world, and if the visible world has been found not to be geocentric that matters |cxxii less to him than to those whose God had His throne 'above the bright blue sky.'

Apart from their views about the Bible the Marcionites appear in these treatises as an ultra-pietistic school, who fast more than Ezekiel and pray more than Daniel. Indeed, they claim to pray all day (p. xxxi med.). The early orthodox Syriac-speaking Church esteemed virginity so highly, that we need not be surprised that Ephraim does not touch upon Marcion's rejection of Christian marriage. According to vol. i. p. 129, l. 1 (p. xciv), the Marcionites worshipped towards the West.

The treatises of Ephraim add little fresh to what we knew already about Marcion and the Marcionites, but they do add greatly to our knowledge of Bardaisan's system. So scattered and piecemeal, however, are the bits of information which Ephraim gives us that I will begin by quoting what Moses bar Kepha says about him.⁹

"Bardaisan held about this world that it is composed of Five Entities (Ithye), viz. Fire and Wind and Water and Light and Darkness. Each of these was standing in its own region, Light in the East, Wind in the West, Fire in the South, Water in the North, the Lord of them all in the Height, and their Enemy, the Dark, in the Depth below. Once upon a time, whether from some external body or by chance, they were hurled one against another, and the Dark ventured to come up from the Depth to mingle together with them. Then the pure Entities began to run away and flee from the Dark and appealed to the mercy of the Most High to deliver them from the dirty colour that was mingled with them, i.e. from the Dark. Then, says he, at the sound of the commotion the Word (Memra) of the Intention of the Most High, which is the Christ, came down and cut off the Dark from being in the midst of the pure Entities, and it was hurled down and fell to the lower part of its nature, and He set |cxxiii up each of the Entities into its order in the mystery of the cross. And as for that mixture which came into being from the Entities and the Dark their enemy, He constituted from it this World and set it in the midst, that no further mixture might be made from them and that which has been mixed already, while it is being cleansed and refined by ¹⁰ conception and birth until it is perfect."

Moses bar Kepha died 903 A.D., more than five centuries after S. Ephraim, but this account exactly agrees with what we read about Bardaisan's system of the universe on pp. 214-5, so that it may be taken as substantially accurate and used as the starting-point of our description. The most essential feature of Bardaisan's system is that 'God' with him is not the Creator and Source of the stuff of which the Universe is made, but the Arranger of it into an ordered Cosmos. God is not the sole Ithya, the sole self-existent Being or Entity ; besides God there are the four pure substances of Light, Wind, Fire, and Water, and the foul Dark substance. These only make up six Entities, while Ephraim everywhere treats Bardaisan as teaching that there are Seven ¹¹ : it appears to me that the Seventh Entity is Space itself, concerning which Bardaisan said that 'God is in the midst of Space' (vol. i, p. xcvii). 'Greater,' says Ephraim, 'are the praises which Bardaisan uttered concerning Space than those which he uttered concerning the God in the midst of Space' (p. xcvi).

If Space be the Seventh Entity of Bardaisan, we see the point of Ephraim's elaborate discussion of the substantial existence of mathematical Space in the first of the treatises edited in this volume. Ephraim comes to the conclusion that Space is not a thing but a notion ; to Bardaisan, on the other hand, it was a thing of limited extent,¹² outside of which nothing existed, while within it God and the Entities, good and bad, lived and moved and had their being.

The configuration of things before ever the world was, which is implied by Moses bar Kepha and by Ephraim on pp. ci, cii, |cxxiv may be represented by Fig. 1. Another configuration of the system of Bardaisan is set forth on p. cvi and in the metrical Discourse, Stanza XLVIII, p. 155, and is represented by Fig. 2. Ephraim tries to shew that each configuration is inconsistent with itself when used to explain the origin of our World, but he does not complain that the two configurations are inconsistent with each other. He is so quick to press debating points of this kind, that I think we may infer from his silence that the two configurations were put forward by Bardaisan less as absolute physical realities, than as presentations or diagrams explanatory of his ideas. No doubt Bardaisan taught that God and the uncreated Entities existed in Space before our World came into being, but the actual disposition of these Entities must, even to a Gnostic teacher of the 2nd century, have been conjectural. What Bardaisan was concerned to assert was that things were originally in a happy state of equilibrium, that something occurred to disturb this equilibrium whereby general disaster was threatened, but that God came to the rescue and confined within certain limits the damage already done and provided for its eventual reparation.^¹³ This corresponds in a sense to the ordinary Christian doctrine of the 'Fall,' but it differs from it inasmuch as it puts the Fall before the construction of our World—nay more, it makes the Fall to be the cause of this World, not a regrettable incident occurring after this World had been made. In this, as we shall see, the Bardesanian doctrine agrees with Manichaeism : in fact, the religion of Mani becomes more comprehensible if the ideas of Bardaisan are recognised as one of its formative elements.

An accusation brought three times by Ephraim against |cxxv Bardaisan is that he picked out analogies here and there where they suited his theories, without attempting to consider the similar instances where his theories would not work. He 'sailed about,' ¹⁴ rather like a butterfly. No doubt the philosophy of S. Ephraim is more or less open to the same reproach, but it is likely enough that there was in Bardaisan something of the Dilettante. I shall therefore not attempt to exhibit his Philosophy as a system, when perhaps it never had essential coherence, but rather pick out features of interest which can be gathered from Ephraim's very unsympathetic refutations.

This world and its inhabitants having been the result of a pre-mundane accident, it is not surprising that Bardaisan did not believe in the resurrection of the body. Man, according to Bardaisan, is naturally mortal ¹⁵ (I) ; it was Abel, not Adam, who died first (XLI). Our Lord only raises Souls (XCI) : if Death came from Adam's sin, our Lord ought to have rewarded His redeemed with life in this world (II, LXXIV, LXXIX). 'He that keepeth My Word shall not taste Death,' said our Lord, yet all have died; therefore He did not redeem the Body (LXXX). The Body is heavier than the Soul, and not really akin to it (I, LXI, LXV); it cannot cleave to it for ever (XLIV). The effect of Adam's sin was to prevent Souls after death from what Bardaisan calls 'crossing over,' while on the other hand the Life or Salvation brought by our Lord was that He enabled the Souls to cross over into the Kingdom (LXXXII) or, as it is elsewhere called, 'the Bridal-chamber of Light' (LXXXI, LXXXV).

The Body, according to Bardaisan, is incapable of thought, while the Soul is merely ignorant; following the imagery of the Gospel Parable (Matt, xiii 33), he says that the Leaven is the Divine faculty of Reason (mad'a) which God places in the Soul, where it works by its own inherent energy till the whole Soul becomes rational and therefore Divine (LIX, LXI). This Reason he regards as a 'stranger' in the Soul, i.e. it is a gift from God, not a mere natural development.¹⁶^|cxxvi

Bardaisan was evidently known as 'the Aramaean Philosopher,' ¹⁷ and no one has ever questioned his command over the language and literature of his native land. But on pp. iii—v Ephraim raises the question of his competence in Greek philosophical literature. He says that Bardaisan has mixed up the doctrines of Plato with those of the Stoics, which are contrary to Plato's own teaching, naming (but not quoting) a lost work of Albinus as proving his point. Further on (p. xxii), he accuses Bardaisan of basing his theories of vision upon the accidents of Aramaic gender, regardless of the fact that his analogies would not hold good in Greek. The question therefore arises : Did Bardaisan know Greek ? Or rather, seeing that Bardaisan lived part of his life at the court of Edessa and therefore probably could speak Greek, had he a really first-hand knowledge of any department of Greek literature ?

It is difficult to say for certain ; the impression I get is that he had little or no first-hand knowledge of Greek writings, and I venture to hazard the conjecture that a good deal of the vaguely Hellenic air of the theories opposed by Ephraim is due to Harmonius, the son of Bardaisan, who is said by Theodoret (Haer. 22) to have studied at Athens and become familiar with the language and philosophy of Greece. Harmonius adhered to his father's doctrines ; it seems only likely that some of the confusion between Platonic and Stoic teaching, pointed out by Ephraim in his treatise against Bardaisan's Domnus,¹⁸ may be due to the not too accurate learning of an Oriental student picked up in a Western University.¹⁹

But did S, Ephraim himself know Greek? According to the traditional Life, it was an acquirement of his latest years and ascribed to miracle, and this would fit in with the internal evidence of his genuine works, apart from the Domnus treatise. After all, Ephraim gives us no quotations from Plato or the Stoics, or even from Albinus (p. 7, 1. 9), and it is the same with the account of |cxxvii Hermetic doctrine in the final treatise (p. xcix). There is nothing in these treatises to prevent us from regarding the information about Greek literature and philosophy which they contain as based on hearsay. No doubt Ephraim was pretty well informed, and he may very likely have taken some pains to find out how far Bardaisan's statements were to be trusted. Possibly also other Syriac writers, some of whom may have known Greek, had done their best to controvert Bardaisan in the century and a half which elapsed between the publication of Domnus and S. Ephraim's refutations. In any case, the controversial tracts here edited do not compel us to ascribe to Ephraim linguistic and literary acquirements which the rest of the available evidence about him make improbable.

That Bardaisan really did regard things in general from a rather narrowly Mesopotamian point of view is clear from his curious etymologies of the names of the Months, about which Ephraim writes on p. cv. The Mesopotamian year began in October ; the name of the first month was Teshri, and that of the second in early times was Marheshwan.²⁰ Teshri seems to be connected with sharri, 'to begin,' as teshmeshta, 'service,' is connected with shammesh, 'to serve' ; Marheshwan might easily suggest the Syriac word rhash, 'to crawl' or 'creep,' though this derivation would not account for the final syllable. At any rate, Bardaisan brings forward these derivations, which Ephraim controverts on the common-sense ground that if the names of the months were significant they would all be significant, whereas Bardaisan failed to find a plausible Syriac derivation for Nisan, i.e. April, or for the months which follow.

We know, of course, more about ancient Kalendars than either Bardaisan or Ephraim. The names of the Mesopotamian months, used also by the Jews after the Exile, are Babylonian, and Marheshwan is known to be an Aramaic corruption of Arah samna, 'the eighth Month.' The Babylonian year began at the Vernal Equinox with the month Nisan; while the October beginning, which put Teshri in the first place, seems to have 'been the immemorial native Aramaean starting-point. In any case it goes back to 312 B.C., the beginning of the Seleucid Era. |cxxviii

The name Marheshwan for November was dropped by the Edessenes at least as early as the Diocletian persecution, and the first four months of the Syriac year were called Teshri I, Teshri II, Kanon I, Kanon II, instead of Teshri, Marheshwan, Kislew, Tebeth. It may be gathered from what Ephraim says on p. 222, l. 34, that the old name Marheshwan was in his days only used in Beth Garmai, i.e. in the district where Nineveh was and Mosul is.²¹

We learn, further, that the son of Bardaisan, i.e. almost certainly the Harmonius referred to above, speaks of Teshri II for November, whereas his father uses the old name Marheshwan. The extract quoted on p. 223, ll. 14-17, is interesting on several accounts. In the first place, it is in 7-foot metre : —

This is the metre in after years especially associated with S. Ephraim's own name, and so it bears out the tradition that Ephraim took the metres, which Harmonius is credited with having introduced into Syriac literature, and turned them into vehicles for orthodox doctrine.²³

Further, Ephraim tells us that this couplet refers to the 'Mother of Life,' asking her to produce and leave behind a daughter after her own likeness. This is quite in the same range of thought as the short extracts from Bardaisan Hymns quoted by Ephraim in the 55th of the Hymns against Heresies (ES. ii 557, 558). Those Hymns are said there to be written by the 'sons' of Bardaisan, while this couplet about Teshri is said to be written by his 'son.' Doubtless in either case Harmonius is meant. There is a distinct difference of atmosphere between this poetry and the words or opinions definitely given as those of Bardaisan himself. |cxxix

But, it may be asked, is not Bardaisan known to have been a poet ? Did he not write the Syriac poem known (in modern times) as 'The Hymn of the Soul' ? In reply I venture to urge that one result of the texts published in these volumes is to render any connexion of Bardaisan with any part of the 'Acts of Thomas' improbable. As I have published two separate translations of the great Hymn from the 'Acts of Thomas,' one of them under the name of The Hymn of Bardaisan,²⁴ a few remarks on this statement may not be out of place.

Even in the little¹ book called The Hymn of Bardaisan I had stated that it was doubtful whether it was the work of Bardaisan himself (p. 4), but I then thought it had been really made out that the Acts of Thomas were full of 'Bardesanian' teaching. By 1904, in the book called Early Eastern Christianity, I had become much less certain of this, and now after a very careful study of these 'Refutations' of S. Ephraim it appears to me that the doctrines of Bardaisan are altogether different from those of the Acts of Thomas. What, then, were, the reasons which made modern scholars assume any connexion between these schools of thought ? My friend Prof. A. A. Bevan sums up Ephraim's accusations against Bardaisan, as known before the publication of these treatises, under three heads:—(1) denial of the resurrection of the body, (2) belief in a divine 'Mother,' (3) belief in eternal beings subordinate to the supreme God. These three heresies are all present in the 'Hymn of the Soul,' so that a presumption is created that its doctrine is Bardesanian.²⁵

It may be urged on the other side with regard to (1) that it is a common characteristic of almost all schools of early Christian thought except orthodox Catholicism. As to (2) there is very little to connect the 'Mother' referred to in Ephraim, Ed. Rom. ii. 557, with the Queen of the East in the Hymn. For the latter a much nearer parallel is found in that passage of Aphraates (Patr. Syr. i. 840¹²) which speaks of the Holy Spirit as a Christian's Mother. And as to (3) the subordinate divine Powers in the Hymn, the 'Nobles' who set their seal to the Letter of the |cxxx supreme 'King of Kings,' they are mere personages of the Heavenly Kingdom, the Celestial Hierarchy, while the 'eternal beings' set by Bardaisan alongside of God are material elements, the Light, the Wind, the Water, the Fire, and the crude Dark Stuff that exists in the depth below. Of these, the characteristic Ithye of Bardaisan, there is no trace in the Hymn of the Soul or in the rest of the Acts of Thomas.

But the reason against ascribing the Hymn to Bardaisan, which seems to me most clearly to emerge from a study of the Refutations published in this work, is the entire absence of the mythic and poetical element in all that Ephraim quotes from him. In these Refutations 'the Philosopher of the Aramaeans' appears as a matter-of-fact man of science, a teacher of positive doctrine about the physical constitution of the world in which we live. To us, no doubt, it is science falsely so called, speculations as groundless as his derivations of the names of the Months. But such as it is, it is positive doctrine about matter and sense-perception ; there is no parabolic setting-forth of the meaning of human life or the ways of Divine redemption.

Moreover, the attitude of Bardaisan towards life is essentially different from that characteristic of the tale of Judas Thomas, including the great Hymn. The Acts of Thomas sets forth a philosophy of life essentially ascetic, and there is nothing ascetic in the attitude of Bardaisan. It is true that he regarded man as naturally mortal, and held that only the immortal soul is redeemed by Christ. But he did not reject marriage, as the Acts of Thomas does. In the Hymn itself there is nothing about marriage or generation, but the food and dress of 'Egypt' are regarded as unclean, and not merely as things temporary and perishable.

I venture to think that the reason which made it even plausible to suggest that the Hymn of the Soul came from the school of Bardaisan was the very little positive knowledge that we possessed of the actual teachings of Bardaisan. In the first volume of this work Mr. Mitchell, under the influence of the theory here controverted, was at pains to point out all the references and parallels to the Hymn of the Soul that he could find in the 'Refutations.' They are to be found on p. lxxxix and p. cvii of vol. i. Of these, the first merely deals with the meaning of the |cxxxi word sayka as a standing epithet for a Serpent or Dragon : I willingly admit that it must mean 'the Swallower,' not 'the Loud-breathing,' all the more because the ancient Greek translation of the Hymn itself is now found to translate the word by to_n katapo&thn. The other passage ²⁶ has really very little in common with the Hymn except the word shabra, i.e. 'childish' or 'inexperienced.' Certainly Ephraim cannot be referring directly to the Hymn in this passage, for he asks how the Soul leaves Understanding behind, or how the Soul forgets, whereas in the Hymn this is directly explained as the result of eating the unclean food of the Egyptians. It is much more probable that in vol. i. p. cvii, there is no reference at all to the Hymn, but only to that question, at all times interesting, as to how the Soul of man can have forgotten, if it really had had a conscious pre-existence.

The Refutations of Ephraim in the case of the doctrines of the Manichaeans, as in the case of the Marcionites, are chiefly useful as a confirmation and a check to our previous knowledge. The system of Mani, as it appears in these works, is essentially the same religion that is described and controverted in the Acta Archelai and by Titus of Bostra. The special value here of what S. Ephraim has to tell us comes from his early date and the fact that he writes in Syriac. He is only a little later than the other two authorities, and what he reports is undistorted by the veil of Greek language and thought. Ephraim died in 373, so that his Refutations appeared less than a century after Mani's own death.

Just as we started with the account of Bardaisan by Moses bar Kepha it will be convenient in dealing with Mani to follow the account of Theodore bar Khoni as set forth by Cumont in La Cosmogonie Manichéenne,²⁷ because this work gives us more of the actual Syriac terms used by Syriac-speaking Manichees than any other authority except our Refutations.

The Manichees taught their disciples that the first thing they had to do was to distinguish the Two Principles, that is |cxxxii to say, the Light, which is essentially Good, and the Dark, which is essentially Evil. Or rather it would perhaps be more accurate to say that Evil arises by a mixture of the Dark with the Light, and that when such a mixture has taken place, progress towards a better state of things, redemption, salvation, deliverance, is only to be obtained by straining out the Dark from the Light. Besides the Two Principles it was further necessary to understand the Three Moments, that is to say the Past, the Present, and the Future.²⁸ In the Past, the Dark and the Light were separate, but the Dark somehow conceived a passion for the Light its opposite and made an assault upon it, whereby a portion of the Light became mixed with the Dark, was in fact swallowed by it : in the process of this struggle the present world and the race of men came into being, not being wholly of the Light or of the Dark, but being essentially mixed and therefore evil, i.e. incongruous. In the Present the Intelligence which belongs essentially to the Light has contrived a mechanism, whereby the Light is being gradually refined from the Dark and the Dark confined by a wall or prison, so that never again can it overpass its boundary. In the Future, when this refining process is completed, all the Parts of the Light now imprisoned in Men and Animals and Plants will have been refined away : what is left will be burnt out, so far as it is destructible, and the remainder, being wholly of the Dark, will join the original powers of darkness in their eternal prison.

The Two Principles of Light and Dark are thus alone primitive: the ultimate cause not only of that which we see around us, but even of the hierarchy of Light, has been the Attack made by the Dark upon the region of Light. Evil began by Darkness desiring the Light (i. p. xxix) ; it conceived a passion for Good and made an assault on it (i. pp. xxv, xlix, lxxviii; ii. p. xcix med.), it felt, touched, ate, sucked, tasted, and swallowed it (i. pp. xliv, lxxxv). Mani naturally could not explain, any more than Bardaisan could, how this first disturbance of the eternal order took place, but he seems somewhere to have expressed it, that it was as if the Dark from a far distance smelt and perceived that there was 'something pleasant' beyond his region (i. p. lx). Ephraim misses |cxxxiii the point when he merely seizes on it to ask how the Light was far distant from the dark when the two regions lay side by side: Mani's point is, that the beginning of Evil is unregulated desire.

It will be convenient to notice here the asceticism of the Manichaean religion, because it influences even the terms of Mani's cosmology. All generation was to Mani doubly hateful, for it was a fresh mixture. To take life was to cut the Parts of Light imprisoned in a living body ; to produce fresh life was to perpetuate a state of things that ought never to have been. It was equally wrong to sow and to reap, and the Initiates—the Righteous (zaddike), as they called themselves—were not willing even to break bread lest they pain the Light which is mixed with it (i. p. xxx), their food, as we learn from other sources, being wholly prepared for them by mere disciples. In accordance with this the Manichaeans appear to have avoided all words which describe the production of the Hierarchy of Light by words like 'beget,' or even 'create.' We hear of the Father of Greatness, and the Mother of the Living, but the Primal Man is not styled their Son : Mani seems to have carried through the idea of the Logos, or mere Word, as the producing organ. The Father of Greatness neither espouses the Mother of Life nor begets the Primal Man, but calls ()rq)—and they exist.²⁹ There is no syzygy of the Aeons in Manicheism, as in the system of Valentinus ; Ephraim suggests a marriage of the various elements of Light and Dark (ii. p. xcix end), but only by way of sarcasm. When therefore the ZIWANE are called 'Sons' of the Light and the Primal Man is called their 'Father,' these words of relation are used only in a general way to denote origin.

According to Theodore bar Khoni the Manichees called the |cxxxiv ultimate Supreme Good Being [Syriac], i.e. 'the Father of Greatness' but neither He nor His five Attributes or Manifestations, viz. Intelligence, Reason, Thought, Imagination, Intention,are mentioned as such in Ephraim's Refutations. The 'Mother of the Living' is just named in ii. p. xcviii. On the other hand 'the Primal Man' and his five ZIWANE come in for frequent notice. The Primal Man ([Syriac]) is not Adam, but a Heavenly Being evoked for the purpose of repulsing the attack of the Dark upon the realm of Light. According to Ephraim (i. p. xc) the Manichees interpreted John i 4 as referring to this personage, but as he truly remarks the 'Greek' has a plural (to_ fw~s tw~n a0nqrw&pwn).

The first combat between Light and Dark ended in the victory of the latter. The Dark struck the Primal Man senseless and 'swallowed' his Five ZIWANE. That these were five in number is stated in i. pp. lxxix, xc, xcvii. The odd thing is that they are never directly enumerated. From p. lxxix we learn that four of them were Light, Wind, Water, and Fire, but what was the fifth ? Our chief Arabic source (Flügel, Fikrist, p. 87) says 'the gentle breeze,' ³⁰ the Acta Archelai vii says u3lh. There is evidently some confusion here. Cumont, following Beausobre, thinks of a palaeographical confusion between YLH and AHP, but if this were all it remains curious that Ephraim never names the Air as one of the Sons of the Light.

The word Ziwana (? Brilliant) seems to have applied to others of the heavenly Hierarchy, for Theodore speaks of Jesus the Ziwana, who aroused Adam to consciousness (Cumont, p. 46).

The Manichees appear to have been unwilling to represent this all-important combat as entirely a victory for the Dark. |cxxxv On the one hand the Primal Man was left lying unconscious on the field and his Ziwane were swallowed by the Dark, on the other both Ephraim (i. p. lxxix) and Titus of Bostra (A 17) tell us that the Ziwane were used by the Primal Man as a bait (de/lear) to catch the Sons of the Dark and so to return them to their own place.

However that may be, the result was that Light was mixed with the Dark, and the problem then was, first, how to restrain the Sons of the Dark, and secondly, how to separate the Light that had been mixed in them. These Sons of the Dark were called by Manichees [Syriac] (Archons), a word which always has in Syriac the sinister significance of a Demoniac Ruler. In vol. ii. p. xci it is twice used in the singular of the Evil Power.

The Primal Man recovered from his swoon, and aided by fresh Light-powers ³¹ he 'hunted the Sons of the Dark and flayed them, and made this Sky from their skins, and out of their excrement he compacted the Earth, and of their bones he forged and raised and piled up the Mountains' (i. p. xxxiii), and he did all this in order to strain out from them by rain and dew the 'Parts of the Light' that had been mixed in them. According to Theodore bar Khoni this mixed material world, composed of the parts of the Archons, who yet have particles of Light mingled in their substance, is held in place by five heavenly powers, who are also named in Greek and Latin sources. They are

[Syriac]	Feggoka&oxoj	Splenditenens
[Syriac]		Rex Honoris
[Syriac]		Adamas Heros
[Syriac]		Gloriosus Rex
[Syriac]	0Wmofo&roj	Atlas Maximus

Of these the [Syriac] (Sabbala), the Supporter, is mentioned in ii. 208₃₉ (=p. xcviii), and the Splenditenens in the preceding line. Unfortunately only the latter half of the title is legible. The former part (end of l. 37) cannot be read, but it was certainly not [Syriac] or [Syriac]. To me it looks more like [Syriac] or [Syriac], but the fact is that the script has perished. This is all the more |cxxxvi provoking as the meaning of the Syriac word used by Theodore is doubtful.³²

The Archons being thus chained up, Theodore tells us that a certain amount of the absorbed Light was refined out of them at once, and from it was made the Sun and Moon and the Stars. But much yet remained in the Archons, and so a new personage was contrived, the Messenger ([Syriac]), called also the Virgin of Light by Ephraim, who 'manifests her beauty to the Archons, so that they long to run after her' (i. p. lxi f.).³³ As a result, the details of which may be studied in Cumont's Note (pp. 54-68), plants and animals were produced on the Earth by the Archons, who, fearing to lose all the Light they had absorbed, at last produce a new being, Adam, which they form in the image of God, i.e. in the image of the Primal Man, the divine Once again their design fails, for Jesus the Zawana comes, it is not explained how, to Adam as he lies inert upon the ground. Adam looks at himself and recognises who he is, i.e. that he is a being at least partly made of the Light.³⁴ 'Jesus made him stand up and gave him to eat of the Tree of Life.³⁵ Then Adam looked and wept, he lifted up his voice like a roaring lion, he tore his hair, he beat his breast, and said, "Woe, woe to the creator of my body, to him who has bound my soul to it, and to the rebels who have enslaved me!" '³⁶ Ephraim does not refer to this striking passage, which Cumont regards as the actual peroration of the Epistula Fundamenti, one of the most widely read writings of Mani.

So much for the Past. In the Present, according to Mani, a great mechanism has been contrived for refining out of the world what is left of the Parts of the Light that had been absorbed: the arrangement of this mechanism was in fact the salvation |cxxxvii brought by Jesus, when He came on earth and those that saw Him supposed erroneously that He was really a man.³⁷ By it the Light that is separated out is conveyed to the Moon, whereby it waxes for fifteen days, and then when full discharges its load of Light for another fifteen days into the Sun.

The Pillar of Glory ([Syriac]) is named in ii. 208, 1. 37 (=p. xcviii), the only place where the original Syriac term is known to occur. This 'Pillar' is either the way up to the Moon, as the Fihrist seems to imply, or that in which redeemed souls wait till all is fulfilled, as is stated in the Acta Archelai. In either case the Manichees appear to have meant by it the Milky Way. It is also called in the Acta Archelai the Perfect Man, Vir perfectus. Epiphanius changes a0nh&r into a0h&r, but thereby the imagery is spoilt, for it is evidently taken from Eph. iv 13 (ei0s a1ndra te/leion) : the redeemed souls are collected in the Pillar of Glory till all the particles of the absorbed Light have been refined out of the substance of the Archons and the Primal Man is perfect again.³⁸

The most potent agents in refining out the Light are, of course, the fully initiated disciples of Mani, but exactly how they did it cannot be ascertained from S. Ephraim, for obvious reasons. It is not very difficult to be sarcastic with this part of the Manichaean system, and Ephraim takes advantage of most of the obvious openings. What is more interesting is the very small number of the highest class of Initiates, the KPHALPALE ([Syriac], ii. 205⁷, 206²⁷). In the first of these passages Ephraim speaks of Five, in the second of a Pair, which perhaps means much the same thing. Certainly these personages were able to give all their time to their mysterious work, for there was very little else that it was permitted to a fully initiated Manichee to do. They might neither take life nor produce it, whether animal or vegetable, so that agriculture and cooking were as much taboo as murder and aiultery. In i. p. xciii Ephraim depicts the initiate Manichee women, the ZADDIKATIIA, as sitting idle from religious motives. It is curious to hear a fellow-countryman of S. Alexius and S. Simeon Stylites rebuking the unworldly inactivities of the Manichees! |cxxxviii

In general, as may be seen from the peroration of the Hypatius Discourses, the lives of the Manichaean devotees must have been spent in a manner not unlike that of the 'Sons of the Covenant' and other Christian ascetics of the East: 'their works are like our works, as their fast is like our fast' (i. p. cxix). No doubt they spent a good deal of their time in transcribing and ornamenting their sacred writings, as may be gathered from S. Augustine and from the remains of very handsome MSS. dug up in Turfan in Central Asia. In this they were followers of Mani himself, who 'painted in colours on a scroll the likenesses of the wickednesses which he created out of his mind' (i. p. xciii).

As to the Future, the Manichees, like the Christians, looked forward to a victorious end of the present state of things. When all the Parts of the Light have been refined out of the base material, Evil, which is the result of the mixture of Light and Dark, will have disappeared. The Earth of Light ([Syriac]), in which God dwells and which is itself Divine (i. pp. lviii, lix, xcvi), will be complete and inviolate, and the powers of the Dark will be confined inside their own domain, round which BAN, the Heavenly Builder, has now built a wall and fence, to be the Grave of the Darkness for ever (i. pp. xxx, xlvi, lxxv).

Such are the main outlines of the system of Mani, on almost every part of which the Refutations of S. Ephraim throw a certain amount of fresh light. This is not the place to attempt a critical study of the sources and connexions of this fantastic Religion, that had in spite of almost continual persecution so long and sometimes so victorious a career. I shall only bring forward one point, on which the Refutations curiously confirm the evidence of the Acta Archelai, of Titus of Bostra, and of Evodius, as its elucidation seems to have an important bearing upon the origin of Mani's stock of ideas.

Evodius, the friend and correspondent of S. Augustine, tells us (De Fid. c. Manich. 5) that the Manichees taught that the Souls which deliberately preferred Darkness to Light and the sensual life to redemption will remain for ever conjoined with matter in the region of the Dark. Such souls, together with the rest of the Dark substance from which all the Light has been extracted, will |cxxxix be compacted together in a great round Clod (globus). Titus of Bostra tells us the same,³⁹ and the same doctrine is set forth in the Acta Archelai x, the original Greek of which, as quoted by Epiphanius, speaks of the evil man as being for ever dedeme/nos ei0s th_n bw~lon. In agreement with all this we read at the end of the Third Discourse to Hypatius (i. p. 87, 1. 35 ff.) : ⁴⁰ 'How do they say that some of these Souls who have sinned much and done much wickedness and blasphemed much and have been guilty of great unbelief, those which are found like dregs in the midst of that which they call BOLOS, as they say, that when the Fire dissolves all, within it is collected every thing that is mixed and mingled in created things from the Lights, and "those souls who have done much wickedness are assigned to the realm of the Darkness when it is tortured." '

It is clear from all these testimonies that the Manichees not only held this doctrine, but that they called this mass of burning filth the BOLOS, a word which is not Syriac at all, but the Greek for 'a clod.' ⁴¹

Alexander of Lycopolis, himself a heathen, treats Manichaeanism as a New Christianity. This view of it has been unpopular in recent years, for modern scholars have preferred to see in it a more or less independent Oriental Religion, and have tended to consider the form of it which spread to the West and to which Augustine was for so many years a convert as an adaptation fitted to a land where Catholic Christianity had become the established religion. But the name of the Bolus, now attested in the Syriac of Ephraim, cannot have come from anything but a Greek source. It suggests to us that Mani drew his inspiration from the West as much as, if not more than, from the East around him.

And the Bolus does not stand alone. That Mani did call himself the 'Paraclete' is confirmed by Ephraim (ii. p. 209¹¹),⁴² but |clx this term, though Greek, would have been taken by him from the Syriac Bible. More to our purpose is the fact that the Receivers of the Light, i.e. the Sun and Moon, called [Syriac] in i. 20⁴²=p. xxviii, are elsewhere called [Syriac] (i. 15⁴³=p. xxxvi, i. 28⁶=p. xlii), i.e. u9pode/ktai, a word not very common in literature, the only meaning given for it in Sophocles' Lexicon being 'receivers of taxes.' ⁴³ Here again, therefore, a Manichee technical term is taken from the Greek.

HYLE, i.e. u3lh, is another Greek term which according to Ephraim is used by all three of the systems which he is controverting, but it is only really prominent in Marcion's terminology (i. pp. lxiii, xcix, c') and, if it was really used by the Manichees in the East, it was no doubt borrowed by them from the Marcionites or the Bardesanians.⁴⁴

Perhaps the truest idea of the direction of Mani's thought may be gathered from the titles of his seven chief works, catalogued for us by An-Nadim.⁴⁵ Five of these, the Mysteries, the Giants, the Precepts, the Treasure (and we may add the Living Gospel, omitted by An-Nadim), tell us nothing. One, the Shapurakan, was composed in Persian for the benefit of Sapor the Sasanian Monarch, but the seventh, which Alfaric identifies with the Epistula Fundamenti, bore the Greek title of Pragmatei/a.

Whether Mani himself knew Greek is another matter. If we have been right in calling in question Bardaisan's first-hand knowledge of Greek literature it will not be likely that Mani the Babylonian had much real acquaintance with genuine Greek books or thought. What I have in view is the question whether the system of Mani is to be thought of as a form of Oriental Religion which took on a Christian veneer in the Catholic West, or as a peculiar and eclectic Christian Gnosticism. The Greek terms to which I have here called attention appear to me to shew that the non-Oriental, Western, element in Mani's system is much larger than the scholars of the last sixty years have tended to admit.

In particular I cannot agree with the Swedish scholar |clxi Dr. Gillis Wetter in his attempt to represent Manicheism, apart from the personal influence of Mani, as a sort of offshoot of the Mandaean religion.⁴⁶ Brandt is on the contrary of opinion that 'in the verifiable parallels the Mandaean versions seem to be secondary,' and says further : "The religious teachings of the two faiths, however, were essentially distinct in character ; the fundamental dualism of the Manichaean system—a doctrine that finds a soteriological design even in the creation of the world, and involves an ascetic mode of life—is far removed from the Mandaean view' (E.R.E., MANDAEANS, § 18). On the other hand Dr. Wetter is doubtless right in laying emphasis on the personal influence of Mani himself, the Prophet of his own new Religion.⁴⁷ The missionary impulse, maintained over two hundred years, the notable steadfastness in danger and persecution, which characterise the Manichees, prove that their bizarre and unscientific theology was to them in some respects a satisfaction of their needs, a way of salvation from the perplexities of this painful world. And if history has any general lesson to teach us about new Religions, it is that they arise when a system or view of the world, which is not too far away from popular aspiration, is combined with a forceful and attractive personality.

Much, therefore, in the initial success of the new Religion depended on Mani himself. And much in the new Religion appealed at once to human religious instincts. It is natural to wish to be a son of the Light. Children cry in the Dark, and 'a pleasant thing it is to behold the sun,' even in sultry Mesopotamia. Moreover Mani seemed to his followers to have explained what the old religions which had gone before him had only hinted at. But beyond these generalities the philosophy which underlies the whole structure has even now a certain appeal, still perceptible through its fantastic barbarian trappings. The Religion of Mani does explain the presence of Evil in the world we live in, and it does combine practical pessimism with ultimate optimism—perhaps the most favourable atmosphere for the religious sentiment. It is true that the Manichees regarded the world we live in as the result of a regrettable accident, so that no |clxii true improvement is possible till it is altogether abolished. As regards this world they are frankly pessimistic : it was bad to begin with, and it will go from bad to worse. But they believed that Light was really greater and stronger than the Dark, that in the end all that was good in their essence would be collected in the domain of Light, a realm altogether swayed by Intelligence, Reason, Mind, good Imagination, and good Intention; and though at the same time there would always exist another region, dark, and dominated by unregulated Desire, it would only be peopled by beings for whom such a region was appropriate, and they would be separated off for ever from invading the region of Light and so producing another Smudge, such as our present world essentially is, according the Manichean view.

To sum up, the Religion of Mani can hardly be comprehended as a heresy from orthodox Catholicism in the sense that Monophysitism, or Arianism, or Montanism, or even Marcion's religion, are 'heresies.' If Arianism be the brother of Catholicism, the Manichean religion is at most a cousin. And Ephraim's Refutations go far to shew that the connecting links are the philosophy of Bardaisan and the organisation of the Marcionites. In common with the Marcionites the followers of Mani were organised as a community of unmarried ascetics with a recognised penumbra of adherents, who supported and maintained them. The orthodox in the Euphrates Valley seem to have organised themselves in Ante-Nicene times on much the same way, but as soon as the Government of the Roman Empire became Christian the Syriac-speaking Church followed the customs of the West, and the Bnai Kyama became an order within the Church instead of its rank and file. But to the Marcionites and to the Manichees the monastic constitution was essential, as it is to the Buddhists further East.⁴⁸ From the Marcionites also Mani may very well have derived his rejection of the authority of the Old Testament.

The relation of the thought of Mani to Bardaisan is even closer, as will have appeared even in this slight sketch of their |clxiii respective doctrines. In fact we learn from the Fihrist (Flügel, p. 102) that the very first chapter of Mani's Book of the Mysteries was concerned with the Daisanites, i.e. the followers of Bardaisan. With Bardaisan Mani shares the concepts of the attack by the primordial Dark upon the Pure elements of Light, Wind, Fire, and Water, the control of the damage done by the Good God, and a plan for the eventual redemption of souls from the power of the Dark element.

It has been said of a prominent English statesman that his mind fastens on images and banns concepts : I fancy that this is the difference between Mani and Bardaisan. Bardaisan's cosmology is a conflict of forces, Mani's is a drama enacted by a crowd of supernatural persons. Mani, and (so far as we know) Mani alone, excogitated the Splenditenens, the monstrous story of the androgynous Virgin of Light, and the fantastic explanation of the waxing and waning of the Moon. The odd thing is that it should have found so much credence, not only in the immediate time and place of Mani the Founder, but even in the far West for a time and for so many centuries in Central Asia.

No doubt the religion of Mani shews many signs of its strictly Babylonian origin. The mere fact that the special region of Evil was placed in it towards the south shews that its home was an over-hot country. No doubt also many features in it are akin to Persian or even to old-Babylonian religion and never had their counterparts in Greek thought, whether Christian or Pagan. Nevertheless the 'Christian' element remains fundamental. This is clear above all from the important role played in Manicheanism by the creation or formation of Adam and Eve. The Manichee myth is quite different from the story in Genesis, but it is founded upon that story. Mani, like Marcion, rejected the Book of Genesis—which is only another way of saying that his system of thought had been profoundly influenced by it. But Genesis and all the lore connected with Genesis came to Mani from the West, from the Greek-speaking lands, or, as in the case of that which he took from Bardaisan, from sources profoundly influenced by Greek thought, Christian and Heathen.

To conclude this Essay, let me quote the very weighty judgement of Professor Alfaric upon the religion of Mani and its |clxiv literature (Les Écritures Manichéennes, i. 128) : 'The Persian, Arab, and Chinese authors who have written upon the Manichees supply what is lacking in their Latin, Greek, and Syriac predecessors. They generally speak in more direct terms about the Manichean works quoted, because they are less afraid of their diffusion, and being less earnest in their polemics they give us a more objective view. Moreover some of them, such as An-Nadim and Al-Biruni, have in any case more historic sense than Hegemonius (the reputed author of the Acta Archelai), Epiphanius or even Augustine. But they know very little about Christianity, and they do not take much interest in doctrines which are derived from it. Thus they are apt to pass over specifically Christian details in Manicheism which belong to the Bible, and to throw into high relief the reminiscences of pagan mythology which interested them more, thereby giving a false idea of the Manichean literature.'

NOTE ON THE MS. OF THE REFUTATIONS.

On pp. (6) and (7) of Vol. I Mr. Mitchell gave Tables showing the ancient and the present arrangement of the Quires of the MS, so far as the parts edited in Vol. I were concerned. These are repeated here, together with the parts edited in Vol. II.

TABLE I

At the time of the making of the Palimpsest foll. 42 and 45, 80 and 87, must have been refolded, so that what had been the inner pages became outer pages.

Headlines on the 5th and 10th versos of each ancient Quire, e.g. [Syriac] fol. 37a (= VI. 5), and [Syriac] fol. 57a (= IX. 5). "When therefore we find [Syriac] on fol. 4a. we must infer that it is the 5th leaf of Quire XI, which therefore has lost two leaves. Similarly Quire I of Add. 14574 has lost one leaf, the text beginning on the verso |clxvii of what would have been I. 2. No doubt there was a blank guard-leaf at the beginning, now torn off; probably there was as much at the end. What is lost therefore is most likely not more than one or two pages of text, possibly only a few lines.

TABLE II

GIVING THE TRANSCRIBED LEAVES OF THE PALIMPSEST ACCORDING TO THE ORDER OF THEIR NUMBERING IN THE CATALOGUE, AND THE PAGES OF VOL. I AND VOL. II ON WHICH THE TEXT OF EACH LEAF BEGINS

Established for the purpose of editing and translating Oriental Texts chiefly preserved in the British Museum.

THE CANONS OF ATHANASIUS OF ALEXANDRIA, in Arabic and Coptic. Edited and Translated by W. RIEDEL and W. E. CRUM. 1904.

A RABBINIC COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF JOB, contained in a Unique MS. at Cambridge. Edited by W. ALDIS WRIGHT, with English. Translation by Dr. S. A. HIRSCH. 1905.

AN ANCIENT ARMENIAN VERSION OF THE APOCALYPSE OF S. JOHN; also THE ARMENIAN TEXTS OF CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA SCHOLIA DE INCARNATIONE, and EPISTLE TO THEODOSIUS UPON EASTER. All Edited with English Versions, etc., by F. C. CONYBEARE, M.A. 1907.

THE SYRO-HEXAPLAR FRAGMENTS OF CHRONICLES, EZRA AND NEHEMIAH, also THE NON-PESHITTO CATHOLIC EPISTLES. Edited with full critical apparatus, etc., by the Rev. Dr. J. GWYNN. 1909.

COPTIC TEXTS ON S. THEODORE. Edited and Translated by E. O. WINSTEDT, B.Litt. 1910

S. EPHRAIM'S PROSE REFUTATIONS OF MANI, MARCION AND BARDAISAN. Edited and Translated from the Palimpsest in the British Museum, by the Rev. C. W. MITCHELL, M.A. Vol. I. The Discourse to Hypatius. 1912.

EUPHEMIA AND THE GOTH, with the Acts of the Confessors of Edessa. Edited and examined by F. C. BURKITT. 1913.

TWO COMMENTARIES ON THE JACOBITE LITURGY, BY GEORGE BISHOP OF THE ARAB TRIBES AND MOSES BAR KEPHA; TOGETHER WITH THE SYRIAC ANAPHORA OF S. JAMES, AND A DOCUMENT ENTITLED The Book of Life, by Dom R. H. CONNOLLY, M.A. and H. W. CODRINGTON, B.A. 1913.

AN EDITION OF THE 'BOOK OF HIEROTHEUS' OF STEPHEN BAR SUDAILI. By the Rev. F. S. MARSH, M.A.

Single inverted commas are used in numerous cases where the words seem to be quotations or to belong to a special terminology.

Words in italics inside square brackets are to be regarded as conjectural translations or paraphrases.

In a few passages, where the text has suffered great mutilation, italics indicate an attempt to summarise the argument from suggestions in the fragments.]

[P.101] indicates page 101 of the accompanying Syriac. [l.2] means line 2 of the current page of the accompanying Syriac. [RP]

I have moved the footnotes to the end. Those consisting of "Read [syriac] for [syriac]" or similar have been omitted, as it has not been possible to transcribe the fragments of Syriac - only 1, in this case, has been omitted. The pages are numbered with Roman numerals. Arabic numbers and line numbers relate to the Syriac text printed at the back of the paper volume. Greek text is rendered using the Scholars Press SPIonic font, Syriac using SPEdessa font, free from here.

3. ¹ On this subject see the remarkable catena of passages, brought forward in illustration of Milton's Paradise Regained iv 397—400, by J. E. B. Mayor in the Journal of Philology LVI, pp. 289—292 (1903). To S. Basil the Darkness was an evil Power, but to S. Augustine, as to S. Ephraim, it was only the absence of Light.

4. ¹ Eznik of Kolb, Against the Sects, trans. by J. M. Schmid (Vienna, 1900), pp. 172-178, 204-5 [German tr. RP]; the original Armenian of the most important sections is to be found in Petermann's Grammar and Chrestomathy, pp. 14-17.

6. ¹ No distinction is made in the Syriac Old Testament between the various spellings of the name Joshua in Hebrew (Yehoshua', Yeshua').

7. ¹ Ephraim's argument is : "'Eve,' says the Apostle, 'shall be saved because of her progeny' : well, then, the 'Creator' will be saved because of the Souls which owed their origin to Him !"

8. ¹ ml corresponds exactly to 'inverted commas,' but unfortunately there is no corresponding word or sign to mark the ends of quotations.

9. ¹ Text and Translation given in F. Nau's Bardesanes (Patrologia Syriaca I, vol. ii, p. 513-515).

10. ¹ Read dOB for dxB. For the meaning see Early Eastern Christianity, p. 160, note 2.

13. ¹ See the Bardesanian Dialogue De Fato, ad fin. (Patr. Syriaca, ii 611), where stress is laid on the regulation (tukkana) of the Elements or Natures, and their mixture (muzzaga) in this present Cosmos, whereby their primordial vehemence is mitigated.

16. ³ In the De Fato (col. 572, 11. 6-9) Man is regarded as being composed of Reason (or mental Faculty), of Soul, and of Body. Here mad'e is used in the plural.

17. ¹ So p. 225, l. 25 : on p. 8, l. 1, the title is 'Philosopher of the Aramaeans.'

19. ³ Epiphanius, Haer. 477, represents Bardaisan as skilled both in Syriac and Greek, but that seems to come from his mistaken idea that the De Fato is a Greek original, not a translation from the Syriac.

21. ¹ Teshri, in Babylonian Tashritum, ia really derived from a root akin to sharri, 'to begin,' but it seems to mean 'Dedication,' not 'beginning.' In any case it was only the seventh month of the Babylonian Year.

23. ³ Sozomen, H.E. iii 16. Ephraim says of Bardaisan himself that 'he brought in measures' ([Syriac] ES. ii 554A), but Harmonius may very well have been the first to introduce strict scansion.

24. ¹ Essex House Press, 1899. The other translation is in Early Eastern Christianity, 1904, a revised form of which will be found, in THE QUEST, vol. v. (July, 1914).

27. ² Recherches sur le Manichéisme par Franz Cumont, I. La Cosmogonie Manichéenne d'après Théodore bar Khôni, Brussels, 1908 (cited as Cumont).

28. ¹ On the Two Principles and the Three Moments, see P. Alfaric, Les Écritures Manichéennes, ii. 66 f.

29. ¹ Cumont, p. 14, has practically this explanation. H. Pognon, Coupes de Khouabir, p. 185, note 1, points out that )rq for ' create ' occurs also in Mandaean writings, and is inclined to see in it a dialectical peculiarity, but it seems to me that this use of the word 'to call,' instead of )rB or dlw), is due to theological and philosophical tendencies, not to dialect. W. Brandt is evidently of the same opinion, for he says (E.R.E., art. MANDAEANS, § 9) : "The word [Hebrew], 'call,' as used for 'call into being,' can be traced to the Biblical Genesis." This )rq is translated evoquer by Cumont : the Acta Archelai used proba&llein. This Manichee term is also attested by An-Nadim (Flügel's Mani, p. 65, l. 5).

30. ² [???] Augustine (c. Faust, ii 3) seems to have had aer : see Flügel's Mani, p. 213.

31. ¹ These (Cumont, p. 20) are the Friend of the Lights, the Great Ban, and the Living Spirit. Of these only Ban is mentioned by S. Ephraim (i. pp. xxx, xlvii, lxxv).

32. ¹ The Greek and the Latin terms must surely represent the general meaning, all the more as one of the chief functions of Splenditenens is to hold the world suspended, like a chandelier. It seems to me probable that tpc must be an adaptation of the Assyrian sabit (Assurnazirpal, for instance, calls himself sabit liti, 'holder of hostages'). Compare also the Jewish Aramaic [Hebrew], 'tongs.'

35. ⁴ According to the Acta Archelai x Jesus was Himself the Tree of Life. But the text may not be sound.

38. ² It should be noted that the belief that the Spirits of the Just live on in the Milky Way is Stoic : see Somnium Scipionis (circa med.).

39. ¹ Tit. Bost. A 41 : the sinful souls . . . e0n th~| bw&lw| e0mpagh&sasqai a3ma th~| kaki/a le/gwn.

40. ² Mr. Mitchell's translation, p. lxxii, should be corrected and note ¹ deleted.

41. ³ So little is swlwB a Syriac word that the ancient Syriac version of Titus of Bostra (made before 411 A.D.) transliterates it in the form bolara (T.B. 31¹⁶).

42. ⁴ Naturally this only means 'I am the one that Jesus in the Gospel said would come,' not 'I am the Holy Spirit' : see Flügel's Mani, note ⁵⁶.

44. ² It seems to me possible that u3lh was used by Greek-speaking Manichees as an equivalent for the Syriac heshshoxa, the elemental Dark.

48. ¹ There is no tangible evidence that Mani derived any part of his system from Buddhist sources. No doubt his missionaries represented their message as the true Buddhism, just as in Christian lands they represented their message as the true Christianity.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTORY NOTES	(3)-(10)
TRANSLATION OF THE FIVE DISCOURSES	i-cxix
SYRIAC TEXT OF DISCOURSES II-V	1-185

PLATE I	To face Title-page
PLATE II	To face p. (4)

The First Discourse begins	mYrp) )
The Second Discourse begins	tY)$wrp
The Third Discourse begins	Yl)gr r
The Fourth Discourse begins	xrY Y
The Fifth Discourse begins	)tOM$M M

Ancient					Modern
Quire and Leaf					Quire and Leaf
I		Original order preserved in B.M. Add. 14574

II		Original order preserved in B.M. Add. 14574

			B.M. Add. 14623
III	1	=	Folio 14	=	II	6	—	—	—	—	—	┐
	2	=	10	=		2	—	—	—	—	┐	\|
	3	=	9	=		1	—	—	—	┐	\|	\|
	4	=	12	=		4	—	—	┐	\|	\|	\|
	5	=	16	=		8	—	┐	\|	\|	\|	\|
	6	=	11	=		3	—	┘	\|	\|	\|	\|
	7	=	15	=		7	—	—	┘	\|	\|	\|
	8	=	18	=		10	—	—	—	┘	\|	\|
	9	=	17	=		9	—	—	—	—	┘	\|
	10	=	13	=		5	—	—	—	—	—	┘

IV	1	=	Folio 19	=	III	1	—	—	—	—	—	┐
	2	=	22	=		4	—	—	—	—	┐	\|
	3	=	21	=		3	—	—	—	┐	\|	\|
	4	=	23	=		5	—	—	┐	\|	\|	\|
	5	=	20	=		2	—	┐	\|	\|	\|	\|
	6	=	27	=		9	—	┘	\|	\|	\|	\|
	7	=	24	=		6	—	—	┘	\|	\|	\|
	8	=	26	=		8	—	—	—	┘	\|	\|
	9	=	25	=		7	—	—	—	—	┘	\|
	10	=	28	=		10	—	—	—	—	—	┘

V	1	=	Folio 29	=	IV	1	—	—	—	—	—	┐
	2	=	36	=	IV	8	—	—	—	—	┐	\|
	3	=	44	=	V	6	—	—	—	┐	\|	\|
	4	=	34	=	IV	6	—	—	┐	\|	\|	\|
	5	=	46	=	V	8	—	┐	\|	\|	\|	\|
	6	=	41	=	V	3	—	┘	\|	\|	\|	\|
	7	=	33	=	IV	5	—	—	┘	\|	\|	\|
	8	=	43	=	V	5	—	—	—	┘	\|	\|
	9	=	31	=	IV	3	—	—	—	—	┘	\|
	10	=	38	=	IV	10	—	—	—	—	—	┘

VI	1	=	Folio 42	=	V	4	—	—	—	—	—	┐
	2	=	39	=	V	1	—	—	—	—	┐	\|
	3	=	35	=	IV	7	—	—	—	┐	\|	\|
	4	=	47	=	V	9	—	—	┐	\|	\|	\|
	5	=	37	=	IV	9	—	┐	\|	\|	\|	\|
	6	=	30	=	IV	2	—	┘	\|	\|	\|	\|
	7	=	40	=	V	2	—	—	┘	\|	\|	\|
										\|	\|	\|
			The rest of the Quire belongs							\|	\|	\|
			to Vol. II

Folio 9	begins on page	33	Folio 17	begins on page	59
10	"	28	18	"	55
11	"	46	19	"	68
12	"	37	20	"	85
13	"	63	21	"	77
14	"	23	22	"	72
15	"	50	23	"	81
16	"	42	24	"	94

Folio 25	begins on page	103	Folio 37	begins on page	173
26	"	98	38	"	151
27	"	89	39	"	160
28	"	107	40	"	181
29	"	111	41	"	133
30	"	176	42	"	155
31	"	146	43	"	142
32	belongs to Vol. II		44	"	120
33	begins on page	137	45	belongs to Vol. II
34	"	124	46	begins on page	129
35	"	164	47	"	168
36	"	115

Folio 1	begins in Vol. II,	p.225	Folio 30	begins in Vol. I,	p. 176
2	"	220	31	"	146
3	"	218	32	begins in Vol. II	p. 1
4	"	215	33	begins in Vol. I	p. 137
5	"	211	34	"	124
6	"	207	35	"	164
7	"	202	36	"	115
8	"	198	37	"	173
9	begins in Vol. I	p. 33	38	"	151
10	"	28	39	"	160
11	"	46	40	"	181
12	"	37	41	"	133
13	"	63	42	"	155
14	"	23	43	"	142
15	"	50	44	"	120
16	"	42	45	belongs in Vol. II,	p. 10
17	"	59	46	begins in Vol. I,	p. 129
18	"	55	47	"	168
19	"	68	48	belongs in Vol. II,	6
20	"	85	49	"	190
21	"	77	50	"	126
22	"	72	51	"	135
23	"	81	52	"	108
24	"	94	53	"	175
25	"	103	54	"	170
26	"	98	55	"	139
27	"	89	56	"	113
28	"	107	57	"	122
29	"	111	58	"	155

Folio 59	begins in Vol. II,	p. 60	Folio 74	begins in Vol. II,	p. 28
60	"	90	75	"	19
61	"	94	76	"	46
62	"	85	77	"	32
63	"	55	78	"	77
64	"	14	79	"	145
65	"	72	80	"	159
66	"	64	81	"	180
67	"	68	82	"	194
68	"	99	83	"	131
69	"	81	84	"	118
70	"	37	85	"	150
71	"	23	86	"	164
72	"	51	87	"	185
73	"	41	88	"	104

OF MANI, MARCION, AND BARDAISAN

C. W. MITCHELL, M.A.

THE DISCOURSES ADDRESSED TO HYPATIUS

PREFACE

CONTENTS

MANUSCRIPTS OF THE FIVE DISCOURSES ADDRESSED TO HYPATIUS.

SIZE AND ARRANGEMENT OF THE WORK.

TABLE I

TABLE II

SELECTED DISCOURSES

THE THIRD DISCOURSE AGAINST THE TEACHINGS

THE FOURTH DISCOURSE AGAINST FALSE TEACHINGS.

THE FIFTH DISCOURSE AGAINST THE FALSE TEACHINGS.

S. EPHRAIM'S PROSE REFUTATIONS

PREFACE.

AGAINST MARCION I.

AGAINST MARCION II.

AGAINST MARCION III.

AGAINST BARDAISAN.

ON VIRGINITY.

AGAINST MANI.

INTRODUCTORY ESSAY

NOTE ON THE MS. OF THE REFUTATIONS.

TABLE I

TABLE II