

PROFESSIONAL MORONS

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MORONS AND PROFESSIONAL MORONS

According to Scripture, all non-Christians are morons.¹ Even some professing Christians resent such a blunt and negative characterization of God's enemies, and so they disown and criticize me for speaking this way. However, as hard as they try to portray this as something that I have taken upon myself to assert, I am merely repeating what Scripture teaches. If they have a problem with it, then rather than disowning or criticizing me, they should face reality and disown Christ and criticize Scripture.

Some Christian writers are very courteous. In fact, they are so courteous that they allow their critics to haunt them to their deaths while patiently explaining again and again their unpopular but biblical views. Of course I believe in cordial discourse, especially in contexts in which Scripture commands such. However, these critics are often not interested in hearing what Scripture really says, but in protecting their own unbiblical opinions and beliefs, all the while insisting that they are genuine believers.

My policy is that, while I respect and even prefer polite theological discussions, when my critics try to use me to attack Scripture by proxy, I will expose them as the spiritual hypocrites that they are, and slam them down by the power of Christ the Logos, that is, by the very Scripture and Reason that they try to undermine.

It is important for us to realize that non-Christians are morons and that I am right in stating this as an integral part of the biblical approach to apologetics. This is because if we are going to face our intellectual enemies with Scripture as our weapon, then we better first accept Scripture's own description of the unbelievers, that they are stupid and depraved. No wonder many Christians are such feeble apologists! They have rejected Scripture's own description about the situation from the start.

I have often said that the person who affirms the biblical worldview and who practices the biblical apologetic can easily and conclusively defeat any non-Christian. It does not matter whether the non-Christian is an atheist, a Muslim, a Buddhist, or a Catholic, and it does not matter even if the non-Christian is highly educated. In fact, I have even stated that even a toddler who has been trained in biblical apologetics can crush any professor of science or philosophy. Here I will go even further. I will assert that even a person who is mentally limited or damaged in some way, but who can nevertheless communicate in fragmented statements (e.g. a person with Down's Syndrome), can still defeat any non-Christian scientist or philosopher.

¹ I have provided biblical justification for this statement in numerous places in my writings, so I will not repeat it here. See Vincent Cheung, *Systematic Theology, Ultimate Questions, Presuppositional Confrontations, Apologetics in Conversation, Commentary on Ephesians*, and "A Moron by Any Other Name"; Douglas Wilson, *The Serrated Edge: A Brief Defense of Biblical Satire and Trinitarian Skylarking* (Canon Press, 2003); Robert A. Morey, "And God Mocked Them" (audio); and James E. Adams, *War Psalms of the Prince of Peace: Lessons From the Imprecatory Psalms* (Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1991).

Of course, some of us are able to argue with more finesse than others. And if you are a child, or a person with severe mental disabilities, or just a person who is unfamiliar with technical expressions, you might have to ask your non-Christian opponent to express his ideas and arguments in simpler language. Nevertheless, when it comes to the substance of the debate, as long as you can grasp the fundamental principles of the biblical worldview and the biblical apologetic, you too can be an invincible apologist for the Christian faith against any non-Christian opponent.

In connection with this, I have also said that although a non-Christian scientist or philosopher might give a better presentation of his views, the substance of his arguments are never really better than any other non-Christian, including the retarded and the insane. That is, a non-Christian scholar might be able to argue his case with greater precision, coherence, and thoroughness, but when it comes to the rational merits of his arguments, his case is just as foolish and fallacious than that of any uneducated and even mentally disabled non-Christian.

This is true not just when they are speaking about God or religion, but it is true about everything that they say. One's view on the ultimate reality, being ultimate, necessarily affects every area of his worldview; therefore, because the non-Christian is wrong about the ultimate reality, he is wrong about everything.

I say all of this not just because I enjoy insulting and belittling the unbelievers (although that also has its place; 1 Kings 18:27); rather, this is a scriptural teaching that few Christians are faithful to emphasize. Those who say anything about it at all usually obscure the teaching by their almost poetic language, making human depravity and wickedness, and the effects of sin on the mind, sound almost beautiful. But the Bible is blunt and unambiguous on this matter. It teaches that God has made "moronic" non-Christian philosophers and scholars, along with all their ideas (1 Corinthians 1:20). On this word, even the basic and popular *Strong's Concordance* yields the definition, "to make as a simpleton," so that there is no excuse in failing to understand the verse this way. Therefore, on the authority of Scripture, I charge any Christian with sin who distorts or hides this teaching, or who tries to undermine the efforts of others to proclaim it.

TEACHING NONSENSE FOR A LIVING

Since I interact almost exclusively with the works of professionals, in my writings I have already provided a number of examples on how even the most educated of non-Christians never rise above the stupidest of humanity in the substance of their arguments. Here I will offer yet another example from the debate between William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.

Sinnott-Armstrong is Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Legal Studies at Dartmouth College. Even if he is not among the very best of contemporary thinkers, his credentials and achievements are at least equal to many professional philosophers. In addition, one with the fame and stature of William Lane Craig thought it worthwhile to debate him. So let no one say that I have deliberately chosen an inferior specimen to criticize.

One atheist is just as easy for me to refute as another, so I do not have to use Sinnott-Armstrong as an example. But let me tell you why I have chosen him. I had obtained the book containing the debate some time ago, and among other things, took notice of the fallacious statements written by him that I will shortly show you below. I thought that I could use them in some future writing project as illustrations.

Then, one day my wife came home and said that she heard William Lane Craig in an interview on a Christian radio program. The interview was mainly to promote this book, and the host of the program asked Craig about several of the issues that were discussed in the debate. My wife thought that Craig's responses were too uncertain, too tentative, and she wondered whether such weak answers do more damage rather than good for the Christian cause.

I could understand her sentiment, because even when we overlook the flaws of classical apologetics, I had always thought that Craig's arguments and conclusions are typically so "modest" that they are at best sub-biblical, and fail to exude the confidence and certainty that a Christian leader should exhibit in both his attitude and arguments, let alone instilling this same confidence and certainty in other Christians. Anyway, I will not let this article turn into a critique of Craig's presentation; I am only explaining why my wife and I were dissatisfied with it.

In any case, as I flipped through the debate again, I realized that it would be too inefficient to write a complete alternative response to Sinnott-Armstrong's arguments. This is because many of his challenges are directed toward the arguments of classical or evidential apologetics, and do not even touch the biblical or presuppositional arguments, so that even if his arguments were successful, it would not at all affect the biblical approach that I teach and practice. Moreover, his essays are presented in the context of his debate against Craig, so that unless my readers have already read the debate, I would have to explain the context from scratch before presenting my own response.

Therefore, as much as I would like to do it, I will not present a thorough critique of Sinnott-Armstrong's arguments. Instead, I will criticize one particular aspect of his thinking and presentation; it mainly concerns his arguments surrounding the problem of evil. Although the product does not amount to a total destruction of all his arguments, it is sufficient to show that, although he is a professor in philosophy, his reasoning ability does not rise above that of the average atheist, and so a professional moron is a moron still. With all of this in mind, let us now consider the case of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.

In one place, he explains why he cares enough about the topic to participate in a public debate. He writes as follows:

My answer is that I am a teacher, so my job is to educate. I am also a philosopher. Philosophers question common assumptions and inspect the reasons for and against those assumptions. That is why

I want to help readers get clear about the evidence for and against the existence of God, so that they can decide for themselves.²

This assertion about his motive is very helpful to our analysis, because it commits him to a certain intellectual policy against which we can compare his actual arguments. And when he fails to live up to what he states above, it will make his hypocrisy and incompetence all the more obvious.

We then note that although his stated policy is to "question common assumptions," he nevertheless depends on numerous subjective/intuitive premises and common assumptions throughout his presentation.

For example, on page 34, he writes, "Craig still might ask, 'What's immoral about causing serious harms to other people without justification?' But now it *seems natural* to answer, 'It simply is. Objectively. Don't you agree?'" No, I do not agree. His response amounts to saying, "It *seems* objective," but if a belief is based only on "it seems," then it is by definition subjective, not objective. When you say "it seems" in a context like this, you are telling us something about yourself, and not about anything that is outside of your own mind.

I demand more than "it seems natural"; I demand a rational justification. What if what "seems natural" to you seems *unnatural* to me? What if what seems natural to a normal person seems unnatural to an insane person? Now what is normal and what is insane? And who is normal and who is insane? How do we know? Is "it seems natural" an adequate justification in any argument? If not, when is it adequate and when is it inadequate? How do we know? This "it seems natural" *seems* quite irrational, not to mention outright lazy.

Then, he writes, "Similarly, if *we look* long and hard at a natural evil, such as an intestinal blockage, and *we find* nothing to suggest any adequate compensation, then *we are justified* in believing that there is no adequate compensation for that evil."³ This pattern of argument occurs throughout his presentation; that is, our subjective intellectual investments into the situation are supposed to suffice in producing a rational justification for making an inference about objective reality. Sinnott-Armstrong appears to think that rational justification consists of our subjective satisfaction, and not necessary inferences.

In another place, he writes, "I am trying to show that *common sense* commits you to the premises of my argument."⁴ Whether or not it is true that "common sense" commits us to his premises, how does he know that what we believe according to our "common sense" is true? He neither challenges nor establishes our "common sense" as a reliable way to truth, but simply assumes it in his arguments.

² William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, *God? A Debate Between a Christian and an Atheist* (Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 81.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

On page 145, he says, "It might sound neat to say that God is not subject to our standards, but this ploy leaves it unclear what it is that makes God good. In the end, we need to use our own standards, because we cannot understand any others." But it is not automatically true that if God is not subject to our standards, then this leaves it unclear what it is that makes God good. The biblical doctrine of God's goodness answers the question, and Sinnott-Armstrong must confront the doctrine before making such a statement; that is, he must establish that the Bible is not God's written revelation.

Then, notice he says that "we need to use our own standards, *because* we cannot understand any others." But this is a purely pragmatic reason, and not a logical one. It amounts to saying, "We need to pretend that this is true because we have nothing else." And who is he to speak for all of us? Just because *he* cannot "understand any others" does not mean that the rest of us cannot; just because he is stupid and ignorant does not mean that he can drag the rest of us down with him. But even if we really cannot "understand any others," it does not mean that we must pretend that what we have is true. Why not resign ourselves to skepticism and ignorance? Moreover, philosophers constantly argue about what "our standards" should be in the first place. I contend that biblical standards should be "our standards."

Sinnott-Armstrong concludes the debate by saying, "In contrast, I tried to base my arguments on commonsense standards of reasonable belief and adequate compensation."⁵ Thus throughout the debate he appears completely oblivious to the fact that he has said, "I am also a philosopher. Philosophers question *common assumptions* and inspect the reasons for and against those assumptions."

The only way to reconcile his stated intellectual policy (to question common assumptions) with his actual debate strategy (to appeal to common sense) is if he makes a sharp distinction between common assumptions and common sense. That is, common *assumptions* refer to certain shared beliefs, while common *sense* refers to a shared intellectual ability or intuition that is in itself without content. But if this is what he does, then for a professional philosopher to leave this point unstated when the two are so easily confused or even identified is still inexcusable.

In any case, numerous problems remain even if he makes a sharp distinction between common assumptions and common sense. For example, if common sense refers to only a shared intellectual ability or intuition without content, then how could this "sense" that is so common produce these common "assumptions" that he now challenges using common "sense"? That is, if the "sense" and the "assumptions" contradict each other, then how can both be "common"?

Perhaps the common assumptions (that Sinnott-Armstrong challenges) were adopted because people failed to use common sense, in which case, common sense refers to a common ability or intuition that is not commonly used. Or, the common assumptions were produced by a common flaw in thinking that caused people to deviate from their common sense. But then what is this "flaw"? Is the "flaw" not part of the "sense"? Why

⁵ Ibid., p. 149.

or why not? And how does he know? Both of these views have problems, but we are already complicating the matter too much.

The truth is that Sinnott-Armstrong does *not* make a sharp distinction between common assumptions and common sense. He writes:

In contrast, I tried to base my arguments on *commonsense standards* of reasonable belief and adequate compensation. *These principles* are not peculiar to atheists. Most Christians also use the same standards in their everyday lives. More importantly, these principles are accepted by almost everyone who is not committed in advance either for or against the existence of God. That makes them neutral starting points.⁶

He identifies the "commonsense standards" with "these principles." In other words, by common sense, he is not referring to a shared intellectual potential or ability apart from any content, but he is referring to actual common *beliefs*. In other words, in his mind, the commonsense standards *are* common assumptions. But if the task of the philosopher is to "question common assumptions," then why in the world does he not question the very common assumptions ("principles," "standards," etc.) that he is using, and on which his arguments depend?

He has stated that he is arguing against the existence of God because it is his job as a philosopher to question common assumptions, but then he turns around and argues as if truth is a matter of agreement and popular opinion. In another context, he might challenge the same fallacy in his opponent, but when he has no case, he employs the "everybody knows" strategy. Note that his error is not hidden, but both sides of his self-contradiction are explicitly asserted. On the one hand, for him the very purpose of the debate is to question common assumptions, but on the other hand, he bases essential parts of his arguments on common principles ("assumptions," "standards," etc.) without first questioning or justifying them.

Although glaring errors pervade his entire presentation, this illegitimate appeal to popular opinion is the only philosophical blunder that I intend to document. However, since the above quoted paragraph contains additional claims by him, I will briefly deal with them before moving on.

He says that the common principles on which he bases his arguments are affirmed not only by atheists, but also by Christians. Even if this is true, it does not show that his arguments are true, since he has yet to establish these principles, so that they can at best serve as the basis for an ad hominem argument. That is, perhaps these common principles are false, so that both atheists and Christians are wrong in believing them. But I say that they can "at best" support an ad hominem argument because they cannot even do that, since these are only principles that we supposedly agree on in our "everyday lives." He

⁶ Ibid.

has yet to establish that those principles that apply in our "everyday lives" necessarily apply to the current debate.

But his case is even weaker than this. Since he appeals to these supposedly common principles as essential premises of his arguments (and not as mere personal opinion that does not affect the soundness of his arguments), this means that it is also essential to his arguments that these principles indeed be common. This he fails to show or even attempt to establish; rather, he just asserts again and again the commonality of his premises. In other words, he says "everybody knows" when in fact nobody knows if everybody knows. How does he know what "most Christians" believe? Does he even know what most atheists believe?

At least equally problematic is the next statement, "More importantly, these principles are accepted by almost everyone who is not committed in advance either for or against the existence of God. That makes them neutral starting points."

He says that his premises are accepted by almost every neutral person. How does he know this? And who are these neutral people? Where are they? How does he know that it is possible to be neutral about God's existence? And how does he know that these people are neutral? Also, if there are so many atheists and neutral people out there, then why are the beliefs of Christians considered "common assumptions" that he claims to be his task to challenge as a philosopher?

He speaks as if almost one hundred percent of the human population already affirms his essential premises, but if so, this makes his premises much more common. But then, should he not start by challenging *those* common assumptions, instead of the Christians' assumptions, which now do not seem so common after all? And even if there are such things as "neutral starting points," why are they exempt from critical examination? Are they not much more dangerous, since they are so common and seemingly neutral, and so easily overlooked?

To assert that one should argue from neutral starting points entails another problem, namely, we can ask whether one's view toward neutrality is itself neutral. For Sinnott-Armstrong, to be "neutral" is to be not "committed in advance" (at least concerning the current topic of debate), but is he neutral about neutrality, or is he "committed in advance" to neutrality? If he is "committed in advance" to neutrality, then why should we trust him when he talks about neutrality?

If I make this the very point of debate – that is, if I propose to argue about whether we should be neutral about neutrality, and if I propose to first settle this issue as a necessary logical precondition to the debate about the existence of God – then will Sinnott-Armstrong appeal to neutral starting points again to establish his preference for neutral starting points? That is, will he appeal to the common assumptions of people who are neutral (not "committed in advance") about neutrality (if there are such people) in order to argue for his preference for neutrality?

According to his standard, he must find people who are neutral about neutrality, then discover what these people believe about things that are relevant to neutrality, and then use *these* beliefs as so-called neutral starting points to argue for his preference for neutral starting points. But do you know what happens after that? I will propose that as a necessary logical precondition to the debate about being neutral toward neutrality, we must first argue about whether those who are neutral toward neutrality were neutral about being neutral toward neutrality, and so on. This makes an infinite regress, and it also means that Sinnott-Armstrong has no rational right to his so-called neutral starting points when debating the existence of God in the first place.

Look how far the human race has fallen, that someone can be this stupid! Like all other non-Christian scholars, Sinnott-Armstrong is an intellectual fraud. He passes himself off as a professional philosopher, and claims to be one who examines the assumptions behind people's beliefs. Yet, at essential points in his arguments, he resorts to subjective intuition, common sense, and popular opinion. Professor of philosophy? I would not trust him to teach even elementary school debate. He is better off roaming the streets and picking up soda cans – at least then he would be making an honest living. Where are the scholars? Where are the philosophers? Where are the professors of this world? Has not God made intellectual mincemeat out of them?

You might exclaim, "What?! He calls himself a philosopher, and *this* is how he argues? What's wrong with him?!" I already told you – he is a moron. And remember, he is a trained and experienced professional philosopher, not just some drunken bum. But as long as he remains an unbeliever and rejects divine wisdom, all he can do is to dress up his stupidity a little. Although some philosophers might manage a more careful presentation, none of them are rationally superior in the substance of their arguments. If I can demolish them, so can you. What you need is to learn how to think biblically and logically, and to gain confidence in the superiority of divine wisdom.

YOU CANNOT GET THERE FROM HERE

Why do non-Christians reason like Sinnott-Armstrong and think that they are still practicing valid reasoning? It is because they cannot reach their desired conclusions by necessary inferences, and so they simply agree among themselves to redefine the standard of rational argumentation to something much lower, that is, something that is outright *invalid*. "Valid" reasoning is thus defined by agreement, and not by logical necessity.

Early on in his debate against Craig, Sinnott-Armstrong writes:

If we were not allowed to reach any conclusion without being completely sure, then we would never be allowed to reach any conclusion on any important matter, since we can never be completely sure about anything important (at least if it is

controversial). The demand for certainty leads to ignorance and inaction.⁷

This is a significant admission. He concedes that *he* "can never be completely sure about anything important."⁸ That is, the conclusions of his arguments are never reached by necessary inferences from the premises, but by logical leaps, and this is what makes his conclusions "uncertain," or as I would say, invalid and irrational, to be dismissed in rational debate.

Although he adds, "at least if it is controversial," this does not help him at all; rather, it confirms that he regards validity and certainty as directly related to agreement, and not logical necessity. The implication is that a conclusion is more "certain" the more it is agreed and non-controversial; its certainty is not measured by the logical rigor by which it is reached. On the other hand, he later says that a philosopher is supposed to "question *common* assumptions"!

Of course, some non-Christians still insist on defining valid reasoning by logical necessity, but then they face the problem of not being able to formulate valid arguments. Some of those who are aware of this dilemma give up on the possibility of attaining positive knowledge of anything, and they become skeptics and agnostics. However, as I have shown elsewhere, they cannot logically remain in these positions, since skepticism and agnosticism are self-contradictory. Rather, they must either adopt the biblical worldview or become insane. Most choose the latter.

Sinnott-Armstrong realizes that he cannot logically establish "anything important,"⁹ and thus he makes logic and certainty a purely pragmatic matter. That is, he says that if we must be completely sure, then we would never reach any conclusion on any important matter. Then, instead of saying, "Therefore, we can never reach any conclusion on any important matter," he in effect says, "But we want to reach some conclusions no matter what, so let's just change the rules." That is, "If we follow the rules, then we will never get there; but we want to get there, so let's just change the rules." Although he cannot logically escape skepticism, he stays away from skepticism just because he dislikes it, and because he wants to retain the right to make assertions about various things, even when he has no such right.

Non-Christians are not just practicing this pragmatic redefinition of rationality, but they are actively teaching it. Again, we are aware that some non-Christians still think that they can establish their conclusions by logical necessity, but in reality they really cannot. In fact, none of their arguments are rationally superior to Sinnott-Armstrong's arguments in substance. The difference is that they refuse to admit it; it is a different kind of self-deception than what people like Sinnott-Armstrong is practicing. Therefore, one of the things that we should do when debating against them is to show that their arguments are

⁷ Ibid., p. 95.

⁸ He applies the "we" to all of us, but I would reply, "Speak for yourself!" He does not represent us when our worldview and arguments are different from his and immune to the problem.

⁹ I would remind the reader that he can speak only for himself.

just as fallacious. However, right now we are discussing those non-Christians (much more numerous than you might think) who admit that they cannot establish "anything important" (I would say "anything at all") by logical necessity, but who still wish to consider themselves rational, so that they simply redefine rationality and valid reasoning.

In what follows, I will use David Zarefsky as an example. Among his numerous credentials and achievements, Zarefsky is Professor of Argumentation and Debate and Professor of Communication Studies at Northwestern University. Therefore, as with Sinnott-Armstrong, let no one say that I have deliberately chosen an inferior specimen as an example of non-Christian foolishness.

In his syllabus for a course on argumentation,¹⁰ he refers to deduction and induction, and he expresses his view on logical validity in these terms, so it would be helpful to briefly define them, and review their differences.

Deduction is the process of reasoning by which the conclusion is inferred from the premises by logical necessity; on the other hand, induction is the process of reasoning by which the conclusion is *not* inferred from the premises by logical necessity. In deduction, the conclusion includes only information that is already contained in and necessarily implied by the premises; but in induction, the conclusion includes new information that is *not* already contained in and necessarily implied by the premises.¹¹

In other words, an inductive argument yields a conclusion that is *supposedly* but *not necessarily* implied by the premises. For this reason, induction is always a formal fallacy; that is, the conclusion is never certain, never rationally established. In fact, since the conclusion is not necessarily implied by the premises, there is no way to logically show that there is any necessary relationship at all between the conclusion and the premises.

With the above in mind, he writes, "Formal reasoning is not seen as the prototype of argumentation in recent scholarship."¹² By "formal reasoning," he is referring to deduction, when "one actually reason[s] in syllogistic form."¹³ In his view, "Most argumentation is not represented by a form in which the conclusion contains no new information."¹⁴ But he does not conclude, as I would, "Therefore, most argumentation is fallacious." Instead, he says that argumentation "involves enabling an audience to move from what is already known and believed to some new position," and "This movement involves a *leap of faith* that the arguer seeks to justify."¹⁵

He goes on to say, "*Judgment* is needed because absolute proof is not possible, *yet decisions must be made*."¹⁶ In other words, subjectivity is introduced into the process

¹⁰ David Zarefsky, *Argumentation: The Study of Effective Reasoning, Part 1 and Part 2* (The Teaching Company, 2001).

¹¹ Zarefsky agrees with these definitions (*Argumentation, Part 1*, p. 13-15).

¹² *Part 1*, p. 15.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

because of pragmatic concerns, that is, because "decisions must be made." He continues, "Judgment is sought by giving sufficient reason that a critical *listener* would *feel* justified in *accepting* the claim."¹⁷ Instead of being objectively and logically demonstrated, the claim is "accepted" if the listener "feel" that it is justified. Thus for Zarefsky, "Adherence of the critical listener becomes the *substitute* for absolute proof."

In other words, realizing that for them deduction is unrealistic and often impossible, non-Christian philosophers have chosen to abandon deduction, and instead they have decided to rely on subjective judgments toward inductive arguments.

But then, this means that all of their arguments are logically invalid. Zarefsky admits, "Applying the concept of validity beyond formal logic is tricky."¹⁸ Why? "Because the claim does not follow from the evidence with certainty, we cannot say that if the evidence is true, the claim *must* be true."¹⁹ We may ask, "If it does not follow *with certainty*, then does it follow *at all*?" In any case, what does he do? Does he then write, "Therefore, we must concede that our arguments are invalid, and we must be honest and admit that our conclusions are mere subjective non-rational or even irrational opinions and speculations"?

No way! Instead of saying that all their everyday arguments are invalid he says, in effect, "Let's *redefine* validity! Let's *agree* that even our leaps of faith are logically valid!"²⁰ You might say, "But we still must have a 'check on the process of reasoning,'²¹ don't we?" "Of course," Zarefsky replies, "This function is achieved by focusing on *experience* rather than form."²² That is, rather than thinking of validity as a matter of necessary inference, he proposes that "A general tendency develops over time for certain reasoning patterns to produce good or bad *results*."²³ Like Sinnott-Armstrong, he makes reasoning a purely pragmatic endeavor rather than a rational one. It is also suggestive that his course is entitled, "Argumentation: The Study of *Effective* Reasoning," whereas if I were to teach a course on argumentation, I would instead entitle it, "Argumentation: The Study of *Necessary Inference*."

You see, non-Christians have given up on rationality, because they cannot live up to its demands. Still, they want to go through the motions of reasoning, and they want to consider themselves rational. So they have redefined rationality as a matter of agreement rather than logical necessity. They cannot get from "here" to "there," but they still want to get "there," so they decide to just take a leap of faith. If this sounds irrational and invalid, then they will just agree to *define* it as rational and valid.

Therefore, to put it plainly, their strategy is that, "If you can't get from here to there, just cheat. And if everybody cheats, then we will all look fine to one another. Although our

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ *Part 2*, p. 8.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 8-10.

²¹ Ibid., p. 8.

²² Ibid., p. 9.

²³ Ibid.

conclusions are reached by leaps of faith, we would still like to think of ourselves as rational, so let's just *agree* that we are rational no matter what." In other words, it is rationality by agreement or by pure fantasy, and not by logical necessity or necessary inference.

You might exclaim, "What?! Are they stupid or something?" Yes, they are stupid, and these are the same morons who attack your faith and call you irrational. They are desperate and dishonest. They are finding it impossible to remain rational apart from reliance on God's revelation, but they refuse to admit it. The pragmatic approach stems from the realization that they cannot arrive at the conclusions that they wish to prove by deduction, because given their non-Christian epistemologies, it would be impossible to begin from self-authenticating premises from which they can deduce true conclusions by logical necessity. And even though there are still some non-Christians who try to live up to the standard of deduction, they cannot do it on the basis of their non-Christian epistemologies and first principles. Therefore, either way, we win.

CHRIST OUR REASON, REASON OUR WEAPON

The Bible tells us that Christ is the Logos of God – that is, he is the Word, the Wisdom, the Logic, or the Reason of God (John 1:1). Therefore, whoever rejects Christ rejects Reason itself. Those who attack Christianity war against Reason, so let it never be said again that the unbelievers employ reason or logic to challenge Christianity – that *never* happens. Rather, their strategy is to attack our faith with irrational and unwarranted assertions and speculations. On the other hand, Christ is our champion, and Scripture/Reason is our weapon.

The non-Christians will claim that Reason belongs to them, and this confuses many misinformed Christians. But as I have illustrated above, although they may try to place the Rock of Reason on their own shoulders, and proclaim it as their God and them its servants, they cannot bear its demands, and ultimately Reason suffocates and crushes them. They slither from under it and try to excuse themselves from it and to redefine it. Then, they hit upon the idea that they could patch together a huge ball of dung and call *that* Reason and Logic – it is much lighter, and surely no one would notice! But the biblical apologist will crush both them and their ball of dung with the Rock of Reason, from which they have tried so hard to escape.

I have used Sinnott-Armstrong and Zarefsky only as examples, but all other non-Christian thinkers are just as mentally feeble. Whether it is Michael Martin, Kai Nielsen, or some other non-Christian in the past or present, it makes no difference. Their irrationalism is necessarily connected with their rejection of the biblical worldview; anyone who plays in dung would stink. And since their way of arguing is not just unknowingly practiced, but deliberately and systematically taught to their students, future generations of non-Christians can only become worse and worse.

This brings us to an important point mentioned earlier. Can even children defeat these non-Christian professors in debate? They certainly can, if they are properly trained by their parents and their pastors. God has already made the unbelievers foolish (1

Corinthians 1:20), and he delights in using the lowly things to humiliate the proud (v. 28). Although we should all participate, who better to embarrass non-Christian scholars than the children, the mentally disabled, and the uneducated? But to succeed, they must embrace Christ as their Reason and they must affirm the whole Scripture as God's revelation. Thus they must be properly taught.

Parents, teach your children systematic theology and biblical apologetics. You should start as soon as they begin to understand language. Train them to think biblically and logically. From the beginning of their lives, teach them to esteem that which God esteems, and to despise that which God despises.

Pastors, preach about the foolishness of the unbelievers – expose them! Use them as public examples and show your people how to rationally demolish them and reduce them to nothing. You will find the worst arguments even in their best works. Impart to your people the skill, the knowledge, and the confidence that they need to engage the unbelievers and win. Our goal is the total humiliation and annihilation of non-Christian scholarship; our purpose is to beat its back and crush its head with Reason until it bows before the throne of Christ. To do that we must labor to raise up an army of biblical apologetics, capable of demolishing any non-Christian in debate at the drop of a hat.

Of course, some of you are still hesitant; you are still shackled by the standard of social discourse and propriety that the non-Christians have imposed upon you.²⁴ This is a defense mechanism that they have installed in your mind to protect themselves against Reason. Stop being stupid! Stop being weak! Stop flattering and romancing that which God has condemned. Instead, get in line with the biblical method and tone of gospel proclamation and defense. Rise up and take your place in the army of God, and fight for his cause.

²⁴ See Vincent Cheung, "A Moron by Any Other Name."